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ΕΙΒΛΙΟΘΗΚΗ
Michael H. Jameson



Edward Clark Crossett Professor of Humanistic Studies

ARISTOTLE

TEXT

AND COMMENTARY

SEMIHL

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

BY

FRANZ SUSEMIHL

PROFESSOR IN GREIFSWALD

AND

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*

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PREFACE.

IN the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the *Politics* in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a *nova impressio correctior* was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the *impressio* of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.

Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the *Politics* as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society* and *Journal of Philology* by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-

ant of the references to the recently discovered *Constitution of Athens*. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman's, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Susemihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of *Quaestiones Aristoteleae* I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven *Quaestiones* are combined, as *Quaestiones criticae collectae*, although the last word *collectae* forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of *Home Life of the Greeks*, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors' initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel's recent work on that subject reached me.

The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

Oct. 15, 1894.

ON REFERENCES TO THE *POLITICS* BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS, SECTIONS, PAGES.

THE text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight **books** in the old order, viz. A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ H Θ Δ Z E). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the mss. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victorius (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of **chapters** here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the **left** hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the *Index Aristotelicus* to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolinus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanus (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner's "vulgo." In this now obsolete arrangement Book I. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The **sections** into which Bekker's chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker's pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the *Politics* by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the **right** side of the page are those introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g. 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Göttling

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879) : Grote in his history always cites the *Politics* by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the **chapter**, **page**, **column**, and **line** of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the *Politics* occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the *Index Aristotelicus* 1252^a 18, 1276^b 4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the **left hand side** of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded : (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, *not* of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the **right hand margin**, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus : (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δύροις θτι χρή προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the *Index Aristotelicus* would be Πβ5, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections : or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879 : but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. ii § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, 1 f.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 8, line 2 : *for Μ. read Isaac*

P. 18, note 7, line 5 : *for πολιτικῶν read πολιτικῶν.*

P. 56, line 14 : *for Stageira read Stagira (cp. Meisterhans² p. 43, n. 373)*

P. 69, note 2, line 3 : *for νόμον read νόμων*

Ib. line 4 : *for πολιτείων read πολιτειῶν*

P. 82, line 2 : *for ἀποπλαν read εὐτοπλαν (cp. below p. 312)*

P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17 : *for μάλιστα δ' έουκε κατὰ φύσιν*

read μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν έουκε

Ib. commentary, right column, last line : *for coediche read coedichc*

P. 146, critical notes, line 3 : *after 28 insert ἥδη]*

P. 147, text, 1253 a 3 : *omit ἐστι*

Ib. critical notes, line 6 : *transpose*

δ omitted by II² Bk

to precede || 3 ἐστι M²

*That is, the δ omitted by II² Bk is in 1253 a 2 before ἀνθρώπος. Stöhr reads
ἀνθρώπος : cp. Addenda p. 663*

P. 150, crit. notes, line 5 : *for Quaest. Cr. III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read Quaest. crit. coll.
(Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff*

Ib. line 8 : *dele Ar.*

P. 151, crit. notes, line 8 : *after Quaest. Cr. II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. insert Quaest. crit.
coll. p. 336 ff*

P. 153, crit. notes, line 4 : *after Quaest. Cr. II. 7 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 339 f*

P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin : *for (p. read (p. 6)*

P. 157, text, 1254 a 27 : *for ἀνδ read νηδ*

Ib. crit. notes, line 3 : *for Dittographia read Dittography*

crit. notes, line 9 : *after ἀνδ read ΓΙΙ Bk.¹ Susem.^{1,2}*

P. 160, text, 1254 b 14 : *omit καὶ*

P. 161, crit. notes, line 1 : *after 18 insert ἐστιν]*

P. 176, crit. notes, line 9 : *after Quaest. Cr. III. 5 ff. insert Quaest. crit. coll. p. 352 f*

P. 178, comm. left column, line 9 : *for κέκτησθαι read κεκτήσθαι*

P. 180, crit. notes, line 3 : *for ην read ἦν*

P. 182, text, 1257 a 38 : *for καὶ εἰ read καὶ εἰ*

P. 183, comm. left col. line 8 : *for 5, read see*

Ib. line 9 : *for μεταπέμψεων read μεταθεμένων*

P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below : *after selling insert and*

- P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: *after citizens insert a comma*
- P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: *for [kal] read kal*
- P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: *remove 9 from line 30 to line 31*
 Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: *for μέρος read μέρος*
- P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: *remove 10 from line 35 to line 36*
- P. 209, *To Excursus II. also belong remarks on B. I. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672*
- P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: *for kal el read κάρ ελ*
- P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: *for III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 § 2,*
- IV (vii). 8 § 4,
 P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: *for Bk. read Bk.¹*
- P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: *for έχει, τάσι read έχει τάσι,*
- P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: *for I. 126 read I. 141 § 3*
- P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: *for I. 9. 9 read I. 7. 2, 1255 b 24 f*
- P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: *for προσέδρεύοντες read προσέδρεύοντος*
- P. 265, text, 1267 a 11: *for δίναυτο read βούλοντο*
- P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: *for II. § 9 read C. 11 § 9*
- P. 279, crit. notes, last line: *after Ephesus insert op. o. fol. 186^a p. 610, 16 ft.*
- ed. Hayduck
- P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: *for evidences read evidence*
- P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: *for δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι read εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν*
- P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: *read διαώξεις*
- P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: *for 8 § 6 read 7 § 6*
- P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: *for p. 9 read p. 20*
- P. 300, comm. left col. last line: *for Otfried read Otfried*
- P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: *for πολεμῶν read πόλεων*
- P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: *for δυναστῶν read δυνατῶν*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 7: *after Schneider || add δυναστῶν II¹ Susem. 1.2 ||*
- P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: *for τι read τί*
 Ib. text, 1272 b 23: *for τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω read εἰρήσθω τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν*
- P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (*bis*, line 4 and line 18): *for ἀποπλαν read εἰποπλαν*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *for 6 εἰποπλαν P¹II¹Ar. read*
 6 ἀποπλαν ΓΜ¹Ald. Bk. Susem. 1.2
- P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: *dele (12)*
- P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: *dele Aristeides*
- P. 326, line 9: *for IV. 130 read IV. 180*
- P. 331, heading, line 13: *for II. 7. 1 read II. 8. 1*
- P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: *for βολαῖαι read βόλαιαι*
- P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: *dele (2)*
- P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: *for φαμέν read έφαμεν*
 Ib. text, 1276 a 10: *read δημοκρατία (τότε γάρ*
- P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: *dele * **
and read συμφέροντας εἰπερ οὖν
The parenthesis extends from 1276 a 10 (τότε γάρ to 1276 a 13 συμφέροντας)
- Ib. text, 1276 a 14: *for καλ read [kal]*
- Ib. text, 1276 a 15: *omit <ού>*
- Ib. text, 1276 a 16: *for τυραννίδος. read τυραννίδος;*
- Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *after 14 read [kal] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)*
- Ib. crit. notes, line 4: *dele incorrect*
- Ib. crit. notes, line 5: *after Hayduck add Susem. 1.2*

- P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: *for τὴν read [τὴν]*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *before 27 add [τὴν] Schneider Niemeyer Jahrb. f. Phil. CXLIII. 1891, p. 414 ||*
- P. 367, text, 1276 b 30: *for διέπερ read διό*
 P. 370, comm. left col. last line: *for δινανται read δίνανται*
 P. 380, text, 1278 b 8: *for καὶ εἰ read κἄ εἰ*
 P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: *after (corrector) add a semicolon*
 P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: *for VII(v) read VIII(v)*
 P. 396, text, 1281 a 16: *with change of punctuation read ἔστω (ἔδοξε γάρ...δικαῖος)*
 P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: *transpose φαῦλον to precede ἔχοντα and read φαῦλον ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ τόμον.*
 P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: *for αρχεῖν read ἀρχεῖν*
 Ib. line 23: *for ἐπιθυμίᾳ read ἐπιθυμία*
 Ib. line 26: *for δ read δ*
 P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πειθέντας*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 10: *after right insert a comma and read πιστευθέντας II fr.*
- Bk.¹ Susem.¹⁻²
- P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: *for εὐ read εὖ*
 P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: *after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "*
 P. 441, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πειθέντας*
 P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: *for dittographia read dittography*
 P. 464, line 44: *for 24 read 23*
 P. 467, line 5 ff.: *dele the sentence Again, one might have imagined...πολιτεῖα.*
- Not so.
- P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: *for καὶ read [καὶ]*
 P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: *for πρὸς read [πρὸς]*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 2: *for υπάρχοντα read ὑπάρχοντα*
 P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: *for οἱ δὲ read οἵδε*
 P. 521, text, 1330 b 30: *for τόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν τόλιν*
 P. 529, text, 1332 a 13: *omit καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι*
 P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: *for 1284 read 1254*
 P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: *for τούτων πάντων read πάντων τούτων*
 P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: *transpose διηρήσθαι to precede καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος*
 Ib. comm. right col. line 17: *for correlation read correlative*
 P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f.: *for VIII(v). § 10, 7 § 2 read VIII(v). 1 § 10, 7 § 4*
 P. 541, text, 1334 a 8: *for ἀνιᾶσσον read ἀφίᾶσσον*
 P. 545, head line: *for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40*
 P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: *for τέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι read ἐγγίνεσθαι τέφυκεν*
 P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: *for χρόνος ὥρισμένος read ὥρισμένος χρόνος*
 P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: *for δσα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν δσα*

INTRODUCTION.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF *THE POLITICS*.

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P^a and P^b (Bekker's I^b), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Aretinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century¹. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274², by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex³ which we will call Π; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date⁴. This translation⁵ primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P¹⁻³, one at Milan M⁶, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Aretinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Aretinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

¹ Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1429 at the request of Palla Strozzi; see the evidence for this in Oncken *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1870, 8vo) vol. I, p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, *Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Gulielmi de Moerbeke* (Leipzig 1872, 8vo) p. xv.

² See Susemihl *op. cit.* p. vi. with note 4. [Von Hertling places it about 1260, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX, 1884, p. 457.]

Thomas Aquinas twice quotes it in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, writing probably A.D. 1261—1265. Tr.]

³ The best manuscript of this 'Old Translation' expressly states it. See Susemihl *op. cit.* XXXIV. See also below p. 49 n. 2, p. 71 ff.

⁴ On the date see Susemihl *op. c.* XII.

⁵ With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century¹, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides T the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M⁹ = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105⁹ (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Schöll and Studemund:

P¹ = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p¹, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (corr.¹), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P¹ was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P¹ the two families are blended², so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P², the principal manuscript of this second family³; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P³; so also of Aretinus' translation and especially of P³; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

¹ On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato's *Republic* is quoted in a gloss on VIII (v). 12, 8, which in all probability (see note⁴) proceeds from this archetype: on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly III. 14 §§ 12, 13 οἰστῶν and οἰσταί for θεοῖς and θεοῖς). Now cursive writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susemihl *op. c.* XIV f., XLVI f.

² Ordinis superioris.

³ Or in its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension—in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text—already made.

⁴ For the same glosses which in P¹ can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in P², and a similar origin may be proved for others in P² in another way. On the other hand P² has few glosses in common with P³, and the number in P³ is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susemihl *op. c.* VIII f., XVIII f.

Aristotle's *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups : an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C⁴. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class : II².

P² = Coislin. 161 (brought originally from Athos : now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's I^b; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red ink : these are indicated hereafter by (corr.¹), (corr.²), (corr.³) and p⁴ respectively : where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.⁴). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P³ = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand ; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P², especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P² than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P³, like P², was last collated by Susemihl.

II. Worse class : II³.

1. First group.

P⁴ = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin ; last collated by Susemihl.

P⁶ = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos, a priest from Crete ; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthélemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.

Q = *Marcianus Venetus* 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by *Johannes Rhosos*, but as early as 1457: collated by *Bekker* for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by *R. Schöll* and *E. Rohde*.

M^b = *Marcianus Venetus* 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by *Bekker* for I. c. 1—c. 6 § 8 and again by *Rohde* for I. cc. 1—4.

U^b = *Marcianus Venetus*, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by *Bekker* for II. cc. 1—7; III. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; VI (IV). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; VIII (V). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by *Rohde* for I. cc. 1—4.

L^s = *Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae)* 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to *U^b*, collated by *Pattig* for I. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books I. II. and V (VIII). from *Stahr* and *Schneider*.

C^c denotes the codex used by *Camerarius*.

Ar. = *Aretinus*, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

2. Second group.

C^a = *Florentinus Castiglionensis* (in the Laurentian library at Florence) IV. (*Acquisti nuovo*), of the fifteenth century, collated by *R. Schöll* for I. 1—4; II. 1—2 § 3; VI (IV). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q^b = *Laurentianus* 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by *R. Schöll* for I. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by *Bekker* for Books II. III. VI (IV).

R^b = *Laurentianus* 81, 6, written by *Johannes Thettalos* in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by *Schöll* for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by *Bekker* for Books VII (VI). VIII (V). It bears a great resemblance to *Q^b*, particularly to the corrections of *Q^b* in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S^b = *Laurentianus* 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after *Q^b*, to which it bears an extraordinary resem-

blance; collated by Bekker for Books i. iv (vii). v (viii), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. i, and for single passages elsewhere.

T^b = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. v (viii), then again by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to V^b than to Q^b, R^b, S^b.

V^b = Vaticano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thettalos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. iv (vii). vi (iv). viii (v), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. i. 1—4) are in striking agreement with C⁴.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to U^b L^b, than to the second.

W^b = Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. viii (vi), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. i. 1—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by P^s = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall¹. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

¹ Nor is P^s now quoted under II¹ II² or II³ in the critical notes of this edition.

manuscript now contains only Bk. viii (v), from c. 6 § 9 onwards, Bk. vii (vi), Bk. iv (vii), and Bk. v (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl¹.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides $\Gamma M^s P^{1,2,3,4}$ Ar., are:

for I. 1—4:	$P^s C^4 Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^s Ald.$
I. 4—6 § 8:	$Q M^b S^b T^b$. for vi (iv). 1: $C^4 Q^b V^b$.
I. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end):	$Q S^b T^b$. vi (iv). 2—3 § 7: $Q^b V^b$.
II. 1, 2:	$C^4 Q^b T^b U^b$. vi (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 4: $Q^b U^b V^b$.
II. 3—7 § 21:	$Q^b T^b U^b$. vi (iv). 4 § 4—7 § 1: $Q^b V^b$.
II. 8—III. 2 § 3:	$Q^b T^b$. vi (iv). 7 § 2—8 § 6: $Q^b U^b V^b$.
III. 2 § 3:	$Q^b T^b U^b$. vi (iv). 8 § 6—16 § 8 (end): $Q^b V^b$.
III. 2 § 3—14 § 1:	$Q^b T^b$. VII (vi): $P^s R^b W^b$.
III. 14 §§ 2—10:	$Q^b T^b U^b$. VIII (v). 1—3 § 5: $R^b V^b$.
III. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end):	$Q^b T^b$. VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10: $R^b U^b V^b$.
IV (vii):	$P^s S^b V^b$. VIII (v). 4 § 11—6 § 8: $R^b V^b$.
V (viii):	$P^s S^b T^b$. VIII (v). 6 § 9—12 § 18 (end): $P^s R^b V^b$.

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Barthélemy St Hilaire.

Π denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,
 Π^1 that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including Γ ,

Π^2 that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding P^s ,

Π^3 that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (*i.e.* all the MSS. known *except* $\Gamma M^s P^1 P^2 P^3 P^4$), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

$\text{Bas}^{1,2,3}$ denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

¹ For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl *l.c.* pp. v—XXVIII.

though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Göttling's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P¹⁻²⁻³⁻⁴⁻⁵ and of a few leaves of M^s, which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P¹⁻² M^s and almost completely P⁴⁻⁵, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P^s (Bekker's I^b) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the *textus receptus*. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon II', the consensus of the MSS. of the first family, viz. Γ, M^s, P¹: failing that, upon P²⁻³. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (*Ed. eth.* II. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch περὶ εὐγένειας, etc.¹

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

Sepulveda. Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.

Camot. The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.

Vettori (Victorius). First edition of the *Politics*; Florence, 1552. 4: a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori¹, Vettori².

Morel. Edition, Paris, 1556. 4; closely following the first edition of Vettori.

Lambin. Latin translation; first edition, Paris, 1567. 4.

Camerarius. *Politicorum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis interpretationes et explicationes*; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.

Zwinger. Edition of the *Politics*; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

¹ Further particulars in Susemihl's larger edition as quoted above, p. xlvi ff.

References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.

- Sylburg.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Frankfurt, 1587. 4.
- M. Casaubon.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Lyon, 1590. fol.
- Montecatino.** Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the *Politics*; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. I), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, II. p. v.
- Ramus** (Pierre de la Ramée). Edition and Latin translation of the *Politics*; Frankfurt, 1601. 8.
- Giphanius** (Van Giffen). *Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis*; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work: wanting the whole of Bk. V (VIII), and Bk. IV (VII), from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
- Scaliger.** See *Scaligerana* published by Oncken in *Eos* I. 1864. 410 ff.
- Piccart.** *In Politicos Aristotelis libros commentarius*; Leipzig, 1615. 8.
- D. Heinsius.** Edition of the *Politics*; Leyden, 1621. 8.
- Conring.** Edition, Helmstädt, 1656. 4.
- Reiske and Gurlitt.** In the *addenda* to Schneider's edition, II. 471 ff.
- Reiz.** Edition of IV (VII). 17 and the whole of V (VIII), περὶ τῆς πόλεως μακαρίας κτλ., Leipzig, 1776. 8.
- J. G. Schlosser.** German translation of the *Politics* and *Oeconomics*; Lübeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
- Garve.** A German translation of the *Politics* edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
- J. G. Schneider.** Edition of the *Politics*; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
- Koraes.** Edition, Paris, 1821. 8.
- F. Thurot.** French translation of the *Ethics* and *Politics*; Paris, 1823. 8.
- Göttling.** Edition of the *Politics*; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: *Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco* (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. *De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist.* (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. *De loco quodam Arist.* (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings *Opusc. acad.* ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
- Barthélemy St Hilaire.** Edition of the *Politics* with French translation; Paris, 1837. 8. A second edition of the translation appeared, Paris, 1848. 8.
- A. Stahr.** Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
- Lindau.** German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
- Spengel.** *Über die Politik des Aristoteles*, in the *phil. Abhandl. der Münchner Akad.* v. 1 ff. *Aristotelische Studien* III. (*ib.* XI. 55 ff.); Munich, 1868. 4. Compare *Arist. Stud.* II. (*ib.* X. 626 ff.); Munich, 1865. 4. 44 ff.

- Bojesen.** *Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles's Bøger om Staten;* Copenhagen, 1844. 1845. 8 (Two Sorøer Programmes).
- Nickes.** *De Aristotelis Politicorum libris;* Bonn, 1851. 8 (Degree dissertation).
- Eaton.** Edition of the *Politics*; Oxford, 1855. 8.
- Congreve.** Ed. of *Politics*; London, 1855. 8. A second edition (unaltered), London, 1874. 8.
- Engelhardt.** *Loci Platonici, quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse;* Danzig, 1858. 4. 24 p. (In a collection of essays celebrating the jubilee of the Danzig Gymnasium).
- Rassow.** Short Gymnasium-Programmes: *Observationes criticae in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik*; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristoteleae*, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik*, Weimar, 1862. 4.
- C. Thurot.** *Observationes criticae in Arist. politicos libros*, an article in *Jahrbücher für Philologie*, LXXXI. 1860. 749—759; and especially *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860. 8.
- Schütz.** Gymn.-Programmes: *De fundamentis reipublicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt*, I. II.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p., III. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.
- Oncken.** Degree dissertation: *Emendationum in Arist. Eth. Nic. et Polit. specimen*; Heidelberg, 1861. 8: and the large work in two volumes *Staatslehre des Aristoteles*; Leipzig, 1870, 1875. 8.
- Bonitz.** *Aristotelische Studien II. III.*; Vienna, 1863. 8. *Zur Aristot. Pol.* II. 3. 1262 a 7, an article in *Hermes*, VII. 1872. 102—108.
- Bernays.** *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*; Berlin, 1863. 8. A German translation of the first three books, Berlin, 1872. 8. *Zu Aristoteles und Simonides*, an article in *Hermes*, V. 1870. 301, 302; *Aristoteles über den Mittelstand* in *Hermes*, VI. 1871. 118—124.
- Hampke.** Gymn.-Programme: *Bemerkungen über das erste Buch der Polit.*, Lyck, 1863. 4; and four articles in *Philologus*, on *Arist. Pol.* IV (VII). cc. 2, 3 in vol. XIX. 1863. 614—622, on II. 5, XXI. 1864. 541—543, on Book I. XXIV. 1866. 170—175, *Zur Politik* XXV. 1867. 162—166.
- Schnitzer.** *Zu Arist. Pol.*, an article in *Eos*; I. 1864. 499—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osiander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1856. 16.
- Böcker.** Degree dissertation, *De quibusdam Pol. Arist. locis*; Greifswald, 1867. 8. 45 p.
- Susemihl.** Three editions, see *Preface*: articles in *Rheinisches Museum*, XX. 1865. 504—517, XXI. 1866. 551—571; in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIII. 1866. 327—333, CIII. 1871. 790—792; in *Philologus*, XXV. 1867. 385—415, XXIX. 1870. 97—119; in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—595; and Indices Scholarum, *De Polit. Arist. quaestionum criticarum part. I—VII.*; Greifswald 1867—9. 1871-2-3-5. 4.
- Büchsenschütz.** An article on I. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCV. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.

- Chandler.** *Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions*; London, 1866.
- Madvig.** *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos*; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.
- H. Sauppe. Hayduck. M. Vermehren.** In communications made to me for my first critical edition of 1872, together with one or two conjectures of Godfrey Hermann sent me by Sauppe. Cp. also Sauppe's *Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum*.
- Bücheler.** In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my *Quaestiones criticae*; Greifswald, 1867. 4.
- Mor. Schmidt.** In communications for my first critical edition; also an edition of Book I. *Arist. Pol. Liber I.*; Jena, 1882. 4 (2 parts); and an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. 1882. 801—824.
- Vahlen.** *Aristotelische Aufsätze II.*; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in *Philol. Anzeiger* V. 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. östr. Gymn.* XXI., 1870. 828—830.
- Polenaar.** Degree dissertation; *Tirocinia critica in Arist. Politica*; Leyden, 1873. 8.
- Triebner.** In communications with me by letter.
- Henkel.** *Studien zur Geschichte der Griechischen Lehre vom Staat*; Leipzig, 1872. 8.
- Riese.** An article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIX. 1874. 171—173.
- Diebitsch.** Degree diss., *De rerum conexu in Arist. libro de re pub.*; Breslau, 1875. 8.
- Heitland.** *Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.*; Cambridge, 1876. 8.
- Broughton.** Edition of Books I. III. IV (VII) with short notes, Oxford and London, 1876. 16.
- Bender.** *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen*; Hersfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.
- Freudenthal.** In communications with me by letter.
- H. Jackson.** Articles in the *Journal of Philology* on I. 3. VII. 1877. 236—243; on IV (VII). 13. 5—7, X. 1882. 311, 312; also in communications by letter published in the Addenda of my third edition, Leipzig, 1882.
- Postgate.** *Notes on the text and matter of the Politics*; Cambridge, 1877. 8.
- Von Kirchmann.** German translation with notes; Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).
- Tegge.** In oral communications to me.
- J. Cook Wilson.** Article in the *Journal of Phil.* X. 1881. 80—86.
- Busse.** Degree diss., *De praesidiis Arist. Pol. emendandi*; Berlin, 1881. 8. 52 p.
- Ridgeway.** *Notes on Arist. Pol. in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, II. 1882. 124—153.
- Welldon.** English translation with notes; London, 1883. 8.
- H. Flach.** An article on Book V (VIII) in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXVII. 1884. 832—839.

II. THE COMPILATION AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE TREATISE.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself¹. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the *Poetics* he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, εἰργται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδομένοις λόγοις ικανῶς, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely *On Poets*². Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, ‘histories’ of plants and animals. But not the *Poetics*, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up “our Aristotle,” to use Grote’s phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle’s own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecture-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle’s master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*³. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master’s

¹ [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper *On the composition of Aristotle’s Poetics* in *Verhandlungen der XXX. Philologen-Versammlung*, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the *Poetics* (Greek and German), edited by Susemihl (Leipzig, 1874, ed. 2) 1—6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* II ii chap. 3. 126—138, which should be compared.] See also *Jahrbücher f. Phil.* CIII. 1871. 122—124;

Bursian’s Jahreshericht XVII. 1879. 251—254; and Zeller *On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching* in *Hermes* XI. 1876. 84—96.

² 15 § 12, 1454 b 17: see note (308) to Susemihl’s edition of the *Poetics*.

³ 276 D: εἰντῷ τε ὑπουρῆμα θησαυρὸμενος, εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας ἔλν Ικηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταῦτῷ ἔχος μετάντι, 278 A: ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅπῃ αὐτῶν τοῖς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὑπεμνησιν γεγονέναι.

death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physics* in his possession¹. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics*², and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles³: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physics* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were designed to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*⁴; the latter part of *Politics* iv (vii). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις⁵, while φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις is still the title borne by the *Physics* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove⁶.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

¹ See Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften* 12. Eudemos wrote to Theophrastos to enquire concerning the reading of a passage in the *Physics*, Θεοφράστου γράψατο Εὐδήμῳ περὶ τίνος αὐτοῦ τῶν δημαρτυρίων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον "ὑπέρ ὧν" φησίν "ἐπέτειδας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἵνα ἔγω σὲ ξυντηρη, ἢ μικρὸν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀναμέσον τοῦ δικερ ἡρεμεῖν καλῶ τῶν ἀκυητῶν μόνον." Simplicius *Comm. in Arist. Physica*, 231 a 21, *Schol. in Arist. (Brandis)*, 404 b 11 ff.

² Alexander of Aphrodisias in his com-

mentary on the *Metaphysics* 483. 19 ed. Bonitz: καὶ οἷμα καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑκένοις ἔδει συντέττεσθαι, καὶ τοις ὅτῳ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους συντέτακται... ὅπο δὲ τοῖς Εἰδῆμον κεχωρίσται.

³ Alexander, *Schol. in Arist.* 158 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and Simplicius *ib.* 509 a 6: see Zeller II ii 71.

⁴ *Staatslehre des Arist.* I. 60 (1).

⁵ Diog. Laert. V. 24.

⁶ See the arguments advanced against Oncken by Susemihl *Jahrb. für Phil.* CIII. 1871. 122—124.

first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be either that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side¹, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the *Posterior* with the *Prior Analytics*, or the third book of the *Psychology* with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle². If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire Encyclopaedia to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation³, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero⁴. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

¹ As in the *Metaphysics*, K cc. 1—7 = B. G. E.; A cc. 1—5; M cc. 4, 5 = A cc. 9.

² In the *Physics*, Blk. VII, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, are other instances only less striking than those named.

³ So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (xiii. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastos' library contains a gross exaggeration: see now Bursian's *Jahresber.* ix. 338; xvi. 253 f.

n. 5, Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 187 f., 215 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 138—154.

⁴ Strabo *l. c.*, Plutarch *Sulla* 26, Porphyry *Vita Plotini* 26, Gellius xx. 5. 10; Ptolemaeus as cited by Ibn el-Kifti and Ibn Abi Oseibia, Rose (in vol. v of the Berlin ed.) p. 1473, Casiri *Bibliotheca Arab.-Hispana* p. 308 b, Wenrich *De auctoribus Graec. versionibus* p. 157; also by David and Simplicius *Scholia in Arist.*

arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. vii of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in some measure in the *Poetics*¹; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the *Physics* in the latter part of Bk. xi (K) of the *Metaphysics* and in part of what is now Bk. v (Δ) of the same work².

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the *Politics*, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details³, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand⁴. There is only one

(vol. iv of the Berlin ed.) 25 b 42 f., 81 a 27 f., 404 b 38 f.; Zeller *op. c.* 11 ii 50 ff. 139 nn. (1), (2), 111 i 620 ff.; Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften* 1—53.

¹ See Susemihl's ed. of the *Poetics*, pp. 3—6.

² The hypotheses above noticed may thus be recapitulated. Aristotle did not himself publish his scientific works. They may have been edited *primarily*

(i) from Aristotle's own drafts as revised after his lectures for the use of his pupils: supplemented by the use, as

(ii) subsidiary sources, of

(a) Aristotle's own sketches, prepared for use at his lectures:

(b) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or without supplements of their own):

(c) passages from works by his pupils:

(d) additions by editors: very rarely

(e) excerpts from his own works.

³ Sober criticism will not be deterred from attributing the plan to Aristotle simply because at the beginning of Bk. iii there is no δε in the received text to correspond to a preceding μέρη οὐν, or because a connecting δε is sought in vain in II¹ at the opening of Bk. II, and should at least be altered to γάρ, if this opening and the close of Bk. I are to be kept side by side. Such twofold transitions from one book to another are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between IV and V, VII and VIII, IX and X; while between VIII and IX Grant has good ground for suspecting the words περὶ μέρη οὖν τούτων ἐν τοσούτοις εἰπόθεω 1163 b 27. [On the

transition from *Metaph.* VI (E) to VII (Z) see Bonitz II 294.]

⁴ That the work in its present shape is as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of Krohn *Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriften* 1 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polenaar *Tirocinia critica in Aristotelis Politica* (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the *Poetics*, 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, or, as Polenaar thinks, by additions of their own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Krohn's, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Krohn does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the *Politics*, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. II, in which only "isolated pillars" of Aristotle's structure have been left

passage of any length, iv (vii). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil¹. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work². Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated: and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 n. (4). The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, *Hapl. βασιλεῖας*: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on III. 14. 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (vii) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Niebuhr (*Röm. Alterth.* 578 Isler) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (viii) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (iv), of which c. 15 together with VII (vi). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (v) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, *Hapl. καιρῶν*: comp. *nn.* on III. 14. 9 (624) and VIII. 11. 9 (1720^o). There are some resemblances to the *Arcopagitikos* of Isocrates: see on III. 3 § 2, § 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 20, IV (vii). 4 § 5, VI (iv). 9 § 7, VII (vi). 5 § 10, VIII (v). 1 § 2. Yet Spengel's assertion "totum Isocratis Arcopagiticum in usum suum Aristoteles verit, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt" (*Aristotelische Studien* III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (viii) is that *ἐνθουσιάστειν*, *ἐνθουσιάστειν* are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings,—*ἐνθουσιαστικός* only

in the *Problems*, *ἐνθουσιαστικός* only in the dialogue *On Philosophy*,—whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

¹ But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see *notes on IV (vii).* 1 § 2 f., § 13. Another well-written chapter is VI (iv). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of "the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Susemihl *loc. cit.* p. 679.

² To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polenaar lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard mere unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Susemihl *loc. cit.* 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows:

same topic¹; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous *lacunae* of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether². The right order has often been disturbed³. The two grossest instances are that Books viii and ix should come before Bk. iv, and Bk. vi before Bk. v (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us)⁴. No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient⁵. For to all appearance

II. 8 § 1 (*ὅτι...βούλόμενος*), 10 §§ 3, 4,
12 §§ 6—14;
III. 17 §§ 3, 4;
IV (VII). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9;
V (VIII). 7 §§ 13, 14;
VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19.
VII (VI). 2 § 7 (*ὅτι...βαρανόλα*), 2 § 9—
3 § 6;

VIII (V). 6 § 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5—10,
12 §§ 1—6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7—18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 § 18; III. 14 § 15, 15 § 11; VI (IV). 7 § 5, 14 § 5. On VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65 n. (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon IV (VII). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (VII). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and n. on IV (VII). 13 § 8 (§§1).

¹ Besides the end of Bk. III and the beginning of IV (VII) see II. 7 §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—21, III. 15 §§ 7—10 = 16 §§ 10—13; IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; VIII (V). 1 § 1; 7 §§ 1; 10 § 24 = 10 § 25.

² See particularly I. 8 § 3, 10 § 1, 12 § 1; II. 2 § 6, 5 § 2, 11 § 5;

III. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, § 6, 16 § 2;

IV (VII). 11 § 2, 13 § 11, 14 § 7;

V (VIII). 7 § 15;

VI (IV). 8 § 7, § 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;

VII (VI). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;

VIII (V). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 25, 12 § 11, § 18. Conring saw this, but carried it too far: "noctem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare sategit" Göttling sneeringly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. LII.

³ [On these transpositions see pp. 78

—95.]

⁴ The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489); and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scaino da Salo *Quinque Questiones ad octo libros de republica* (Rome 1577), Conring, Barthélemy St Hilaire, Spengel *Über die Politik* Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. *Arist. Studien* II. 44 ff. (Munich 1865), Nickes *De Arist. Politicorum libris* (Bonn 1851), Brandis in his history *Griech.-Röm. Philos.* II ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Woltmann in the *Rheinisches Museum* (New Series) I. 1842, 321—354, Forchhammer in *Philologus* XVI. 1861, 50—68, Bendixen in *Philologus* XIII. 1858, 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in *Der alte Staat des Aristoteles* (Hamburg 1868, 410), by Krohn op. c. 30, and Diebitsch *De rerum conexu in Arist. libris de re publica* (Breslau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Conring; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. He was followed by Spengel and even by Woltmann, but was opposed not merely by Bendixen, Forchhammer, Krohn, and Diebitsch, but even by Hildenbrand *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* I (Leipzig 1860) 371 f., and by Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 672 f. n. (2), although they have accepted the first transposition, Hildenbrand under certain conditions and Zeller unreservedly. See below p. 58 n. 2.

⁵ See *Jahrbücher für Philologie* XCIX. 1869. 593—610, CI. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraphs in the text.

even the epitome in Stobaeus¹ presents the traditional arrangement²: and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Areios Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas³. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond all doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said⁴, the text of the *Politics* has come down to us. Yet, as we shall see⁵, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the older edition Bk. IV (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. III.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a *Politics* in the Alexandrian library attributed by some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos⁶; consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laerte⁷ and in the Anonymus of Ménage⁸. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippus of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and no doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library⁹. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian *Politics*¹⁰; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise¹¹. And it is

¹ *Ecl. eth.* 326 ff.

² See Henkel's careful investigation *Zur Politik des Aristoteles* (a Gymnasium Programme of Seehausen) Stendal 1875. 4. pp. 10—17. Büchsenschütz in his *Studien zu Aristoteles Politik* 1—26 (*Festschrift zu der 25ten Säcularfeier des Friedrichs-Werderschen Gymnasiums*, Berlin 1881) judges differently; but see the review by Cook Wilson in the *Philol. Rundschau* 1882, pp. 1219—1224.

³ See Meineke *Zu Stobaeos* in the *Zeitschrift f. Gymnasialw.* XIII. 1859. 563 ff., Zeller *op. c.* III i 614 f., Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 69 ff.

⁴ See p. 13 n. 4.

⁵ See p. 47 f.

⁶ Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: *op. c.* II ii 678 (1).

⁷ V. 24: πολιτικῆς ἀρρόσεως [ώς] η̄ [for the MS. η̄] Θεοφράστου η̄—η̄. Cp. Usener *Analecta Theophrastea* 16 (Leipzig 1858); Zeller *op. c.* II ii 679 (1); Susemihl's critical edition of the *Politics* XLIII n. (73).

⁸ πολιτικῆς ἀρρόσεως η̄ (so the Ambrosian MS. discovered by Rose: see

Berlin Aristotle v. 1467. No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave K, which Zeller *op. c.* II ii 75 ed. 2 had conjectured to be a mistake for H. Rose suggests that the Anonymus was Hesychios of Miletus, fl. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy's catalogue the work occurs as No. 32, *liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikon tractatus VIII* (Berlin Aris. vol. V. p. 1471).

⁹ See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* (ed. 2) 19 f.

¹⁰ He is quoted in Diog. Laert. I 26, cp. *Pol.* I. 11. 9 with the critical notes.

¹¹ See my third edn. of the *Politics* xix note †: *Eud. Eth.* VII. 2 1238 b 5 ff. should be compared with *Pol.* IV (VII).

13 §§ 5—7: *Eud. Eth.* VIII. 3 1248 b 26 ff., 1249 a 12, with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 7. Compare further *Eud. Eth.* III. 2 1231 b 38—1232 a 5 with *Pol.* I. 9 § 2 1257 a 6—10; *Eud. Eth.* II. 11 1227 b 19—23 with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 2 1331 b 26—38; *Eud. Eth.* VII. 10 1242 a 8 f. with *Pol.* III. 6 §§ 3—5 1278 b 21—30, esp. 21 f., 25 f. See also Zeller in *Hermes* xv. 1880. 553—556, who compares *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1218 b 32 ff. with *Pol.* IV

highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—101 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippus and Apellikon of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos¹, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal², while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero³. It is true he did not use it directly⁴ and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition⁵: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources⁶. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty⁷, and it is in

(viii). I. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 27; and *Eud. Eth.* II. I. 1219 a 33 with *Pol.* IV (viii). 8. 5, 1328 a 35.

¹ See Strabo *I. c.*, Plutarch *I. c.*

² Polenaar *op. cit.* p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

³ *De fin.* V. 4. 11, *ad Quint. fratr.* III. 5. 1, *De leg.* III. 6. 14, *De rep.* I. c. 25 (comp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 f., I. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. *Pol.* III. 1 § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. *Pol.* VI (iv). cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (*op. c.* 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation *ad Quint. fr.*

⁴ See Zeller *op. c.* II ii 151 n. (6).

⁵ So Zeller *I. c.* Whether the author of the *Magna Moralia* in I. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with *Politices* IV (viii). 13. 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

⁶ Cp. *ad Att.* IV. 4 b § 1, 8 a § 2, *ad Qu. fr.* II. 4 § 2, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.

⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias *On the Metaphysics* 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz); Eubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, ‘Ἐποκτήψει τῶν ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν βεντέρῳ τῶν πολετικῶν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἀντερημένων ed. Mai *Script. vet. nov. coll. Vit.* II. 671 ff.: Julian Letter to The-

mistios 260 n. 263 D: *Scholia Aldina* upon Aristoph. *Acharn.* 92, 98o: *Scholia* on Lucian *Dream* 3 (*lv πέμπτῳ*): Michael of Ephesus *On the Nicom. Ethics* fol. 70 a, 186 a, 187 b, 188 b, 189 a; Pseudo-Plutarch *De nobilit.* c. 6 932 B ff., c. 8 937 A ff.: Suidas and Photios s.v. ἀσχατλῶν: Eustathios *On the Iliad* p. 625, 36, p. 126, 12 ff.: *De Thessal. urbe* p. 281, 6o (ed. Tafel): Theodoros Metochites *Miscell.* 644, 667 (ed. Kiessling).—Thus Dionysios of Halikarnassos in his description of the Greek *ἀσυγκρέτια Roman Antiquities* v. 73 has not used Aristotle III. 14 §§ 8, 9 as his authority, but the similar account in Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλεῖας*. In his critical edition, p. XLIV and note (81), Susemihl wrongly followed Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57 n. (4) in maintaining that everything which Dionysios relates *I. c.* V. 73 f. exactly agrees with Aristotle III. 14 f., and consequently that Theophrastos *περὶ βασιλεῖας* is borrowed altogether from Aristotle. Meanwhile Krohn, *op. c.* 47, pointed out certain essential differences, and Henkel, *op. c.* 3 note 1, has more accurately explained where Theophrastos' line of thought diverges and becomes original. Hence what Dionysios has here borrowed from Theophrastos could not have been derived from Aristotle. But this only

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the *Politics* of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke¹: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work².

III. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

At the time when the *Politics* was first made known to mediæval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood³, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it 'the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science'⁴. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature⁵. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increases the improbability of Krohn's assertion mentioned p. 15 n. above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that *Pol.* III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastos. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

¹ See above p. 1.

² That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain *Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote* 393 f., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition vi nn. (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in *Rh. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus

died 1280.]

³ On this subject generally see Oncken *I. c.* I. 64—80. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oresme: cp. Roscher in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Staatswissenschaften*. xix. 1863. 305 ff.

⁴ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 753 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in *Hellenica* (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland's translation of Bks. I. III. IV (VII) p. 15 (London 1877. 8), 'Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally *sublimi forit sidera vertice*, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Grant *Aristotle* 117 ff.

⁵ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 707, 708.

of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own¹ and Plato's² cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers³. The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

¹ I. 3. 4 with *n.* (31), I. 6 §§ 1—5 *nn.* (49 b) (50 b), I. 9. 11 *n.* (88 b), II. 6 §§ 17—19 *nn.* (219) (221), II. 8. 16 *n.* (269), II. 9. 23 *n.* (342), II. 12 §§ 2—4 *nn.* (400) (404), III. 3. 1 *n.* (454), III. 13. 11 *n.* (596), IV. (VII). 2. 5 ff., IV. (VII). 6. 1 *n.* (770), IV. (VII). 14. 16 *n.* (911), VI. (IV). 1 § 5, § 6 *nn.* (1118) (1123). Comp. also III. 4. 8 *n.* (476), VI. (IV). 3. 7 *n.* (1158). To this list may be added Phaleas II. 7. 12 § 12, Hippodamas II. 8, Thimbron or Tinbron, IV. (VII). 14. 17 and perhaps Telekles VI. (IV). 14. 4. *n.* (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see *n.* on IV. (VII). 14. 16

(911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper *Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato* in the *Zeitschrift f. d. gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, IX. 1853. 115—182.

² *Laws* I. 630 E, XII. 972 E. Cf. on the latter passage *n.* on II. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildebrand *op. cit.* 395 *n.* (2).

³ See Henkel's exhaustive collection of facts *Studien zur Geschichte der griech. Lehre vom Staat* (Leipzig 1872, 8) p. 2 ff.

evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them¹. Further, the *Laws* proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the *Republic* of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions²'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation³. But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

¹ I may refer to the notes on

I. 13. 16 (127) IV (VII). 6. 5 (774),
II. 5. 2 (153) IV (VII). 10. 13 (838),
II. 5. 7 (158) IV (VII). 12. 2 (859),
II. 5. 15 (166) IV (VII). 15. 10 (936),
II. 6. 5 (192) IV (VII). 16. 1 (937),
II. 6. 10 (208) IV (VII). 16. 12 (944),
II. 6. 15 (215) IV (VII). 16. 14 (945),
II. 7. 6 (236 b) IV (VII). 16. 15 (946),
II. 9. 5 (285) V (VIII). 5. 4 (1024),
II. 9. 23 (325) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025):
also to Thurot *Etudes sur Aristote* 109 ff.
(Paris 1866. 8), Van der Rest *Platon et Aristote* 452 ff. (Bruxelles 1876. 8).

² Zeller *op. c.* II i 783 (Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 492). More precise details are given in Steinhart *Introductions to Plato's Works* v. 238 ff., Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 226 ff.

³ Reference may be permitted to the notes on the following passages:

Bk. I. 2 § 2 n. (5); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8 (54); 9 § 18 (93); 10 §§ 4, 5 (98); 11 § 6 (103); 13 § 12 (121), 13 § 16 (127):

Bk. II. 5 §§ 1, 2 (153), 5 § 16 (167), 5 § 17 (168), 5 §§ 19—24 (172); 6 § 5

(192), 6 § 6 (201), 6 § 9 (206 b) (207),

6 § 15 (215); 8 § 21 (273) (274), 8 § 25 (277); 9 § 2 (279), 9 § 5 (283) (285), 9 § 11 (295 b), 9 § 13 (297), 9 § 20 (318), 9 § 25 (320), 9 § 27 (325), 9 § 31 (341), 9 § 34 (344):

Bk. III. 3 § 9 (466); 4 § 18 (499);

7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (673), 16 § 11 (652):

Bk. IV (VII). 6 § 5 (774); 7 § 2 (781);

10 § 13 (838); 12 § 2 (859), 12 § 3 (860), 12 § 8 (866) (867); 14 § 13 (907), 14 § 14 (908); 15 § 10 (936); 16 § 1 (937), 16 § 12 (944), 16 § 14 (945), 16 § 15 (946), 16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950), 17 § 5 (959):

Bk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1006), 4 § 7

(1014), 4 § 9 (1015) (1016); 5 § 3 (1021);

6 § 2 (1064), 6 § 9 (1071); 7 § 9 (1105):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 3

(1139) (1140):

Bk. VII (VI). 2 § 3 (1391):

Bk. VIII (VI). 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10

(1724) (1725), 11 § 11 (1727), 11 § 12

(1729); 12 § 8 (1763), 12 § 9 (1764).

the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man¹. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting². Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them³.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

¹ I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff *Aus Kydathen 47—54* (Berlin 1880, 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

² Comp. on 1. 2. 4 note (11), 1. 2. 6

n. (19 b), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, *op. c.* 110—113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

³ See the notes on 1. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato¹, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular². By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premisses, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

IV. ECONOMIC (ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH³.

The opening chapters, Bk. I. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village⁴. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important⁵ that man, and

See the notes on I. 1 § 2, 3 § 4,
7 §§ 1, 2.

² See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14
—26 and note on II. 2. 2 (131).

³ On this and the following sections comp. Susemihl *op. cit. On the composition of the Politics* 17—29.

⁴ Mommsen's account in the *History of Rome*, 1 c. 3, p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877. 8), may be compared.

⁵ Van der Rest *op. c.* 372. That from this proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (*op. c.* II. 29 f.) maintains, is undeniable: yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 23) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, *άροτες*, is either exalted above humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion;

properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own spontaneous act¹, quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them².

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (*οἰκονομική* 1. cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4. ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes³, Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age⁴; and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time⁵. Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as when Aristotle wrote it.

¹ Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 393 f., Oncken *op. cit.* II. 18 f. Comp. *n.* on I. 2. 15 (28 b).

² *Poet.* c. 4 §§ 1—6.

³ See on I. 5 § 9 *n.* (46), 6 § 8 (54).

⁴ Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Seneca's remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Lecky *History of Rationalism* II. 258 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei* 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847. 4) and Oncken *op. cit.* II. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared

amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that serfdom was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, e.g. that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the coolie traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. H. W. J.]

⁵ So Hildenbrand rightly thinks *op. c.* 405.

difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect: that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite¹. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved². 'The thought that slavery is incompatible with 'the dignity of man' has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet 'the thought of the universality of man's dignity'³: In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave's soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature's freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery⁴. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs⁵. Yet in all fairness it ought to

¹ See on I. 4 § 2, 5 § 8, § 9 *n.* (45), 6 § 3, § 8 *n.* (55), § 9 *n.* (56), § 10 *n.* (57). Compare also the notes on I. 4 § 5, 13

§ 12.

² Comp. the notes on I. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (54).

³ Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 404 f.
⁴ Comp. the notes on I. 6 § 9 (56), and 6 § 3 (50).

⁵ See the notes on I. 5 § 8 (43) and 5 § 9 (45).

be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better¹, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar fallacies². Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him³.

The more general discussions on production and property⁴ which follow the investigation into slavery, i. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner'⁵, but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly⁶. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (i. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole⁷.

¹ Oncken *op. cit.* II. 73 f.

² Oncken *op. cit.* II. 38.

³ On this subject see some remarks of Lang, *op. c.* 60, and Bradley *op. c.* 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on I. 5, 10 (47) and III. 5. 7 (511).

⁴ [Both are included under *χρηματιστική*. The Greek *κτηνιστής* and the German 'Erwerb' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, *Soph.* 219 C, D, opposes *κτηνιστής* to *ποιητική*, classing all the 'arts'

under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth. Tr.]

⁵ As Teichmüller asserts *Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudämonie* 148 (St Petersburg 1859. 8).

⁶ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 693.

⁷ See on I. 12. 1 n. (107).

However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out¹, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. ‘The axiom ‘that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures ‘of the earth, we also hold to be true’; and the proposition, which Aristotle is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man’s relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing: in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsman who wanders without a home; nor does he bring it into inseparable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture². Agriculture moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades³, and ‘the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the ‘fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsman, the ‘hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and ‘with even less trouble than they do: thus the notion of individual ‘labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background ‘in Aristotle’s view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his ‘notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a ‘further natural species of production standing on the same footing with ‘the former species.’ Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

¹ *op. cit.* II. 75—114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.

² Cp. also on VII (VI). 4. 11 n. (1422).

³ See IV (VII). 9 §§ 3. 4 οὐτε βάναυσος βίοις οὐτ' ἀγοραῖοις δεῖ τὴν τὸν πολίτην...

οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργοῦς εἶναι, §§ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν γεωργοῦς δούλους ή βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους: 10 §§ 9—13: further Exc. III, on Bk. I and n. (282) on II. 9. 4.

plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men¹. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated², but the whole discussion is evidence 'how acutely Aristotle 'has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him 'seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in 'the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited 'with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here 'accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of 'the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so 'exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to 'add.' Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

¹ See on I. 8. 7 n. (71) and I. 9. 8 n. (82).

² Van der Rest *op. c.* p. 382.

him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature¹ in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself², but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal³.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, 'he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas⁴'. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than 'what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it.' The insatiate nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that 'he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual'. Of industry as

¹ See on I. 9. 8 n. (82).

⁴ Cp. on I. 9. 11 n. (88).

² See on I. 9. 8 n. (84).

⁵ Comp. the notes on I. 9 § 13 (90),

³ But see on the other hand the note on I. 9. 11 (87). § 18 (93).

'understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than 'of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, 'that 'second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the 'forces of nature'. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible 'to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aristotle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, 'is not a producer at all, but 'consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the 'true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to 'overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her 'smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aristotle took of money¹ it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age², he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that 'the free community of antiquity 'was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on 'the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is here (I. 11 §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a knowledge of the market. Consequently 'the separation which Aristotle has 'made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly 'maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, 'for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a 'field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound 'remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while 'speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

¹ Cp. n. on I. 9. 18 (93).

² Cp. nn. on I. 10 §§ 4, 5.

³ Comp. Lecky *op. c. II.* 277—289,

Lang *op. c. 59.* [See however Cunningham]

Christian Opinion on Usury pp.

26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]

essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the *πολιτικός* who controls the finances of a state as well as the *οἰκονόμος* who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedure in both cases are completely similar': I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3, II § 11. With this agrees the decided irony¹ with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a circle of several families (I. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenability of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (*ἀρετή*) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. I. 3 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue², as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species³—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays⁴.

¹ Strangely misunderstood by Oncken *L.c.* II. 113, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states need such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.

² On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on I. 13. 6 n. (112).

³ Van der Rest *op. c.* 378. Comp. also *nn.* on I. 13 § 7 (114 b) and on §§ 11—13 (120—122).

⁴ See the *nn.* on I. 13. 12.

V. THE REVIEW OF PRECEDING THEORIES AND APPROVED CONSTITUTIONS.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, III. 15 § 2, VI (IV). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable¹ that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamas, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses² of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's *Republic* ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions and laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human nature and of political and domestic life'. Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well-meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism³ have disclosed very little that will

¹ If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1130); also Hildenbrand *op. c.* 351 f., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 677.

² See II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), § 17 n. (168), § 25 n. (182); 6 § 7 ff. n. (207), §§ 10—14 nn. (208—211), §§ 16—19 nn. (216—219), § 22 n. (230); 7 § 5 nn. (234, 236), § 6 f. nn. (236 b, 237 b); 9 § 2 n. (279), § 5 n. (285) § 14 n. (300), § 18 n. (313), § 30 n. (339), § 31 n. (341); 10 § 8 n. (365), § 9 n. (368); 11 § 3 n. (381), § 4 n. (383), § 6 n. (388), § 7 n. (391), § 10 n. (393), § 15; 12 § 5 n. (413).

³ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 697 f.

⁴ The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulos, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich *De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto* (Halle 1868. 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schlosser, who displayed a singular and singularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pinzger *De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politia reprehendit* (Leipzig 1822. 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out¹. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious²; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought³.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's *Laws*. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible⁴. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children⁵. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phaleas, 7 § 6 f, Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property⁶. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the *Laws* disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other⁷. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character⁸. The refutation of

¹ See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (151) (152); 5 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), § 16 (167), §§ 20—23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).

² See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), § 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187) (189); also on 5 § 22 (177), 6 § 5 (195).

³ See Zeller *Plat. Studien* 203 ff. (Tübingen 1839, 8).

⁴ Even Zeller and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest *op. c.* 108 ff., 121 f., 221 ff., 348 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5. 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

⁵ See on II. 5. 5.

⁶ See on II. 5 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), 7 § 6 n. (236 b). How Van der Rest *op. c.* 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating

such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

⁷ It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Bröcker *Politicorum, quae docuerunt Plato et Aristoteles, disquisitio et comparatio* (Leipzig 1824. 8), Orzes *Comparatio Platonis et Aristoteles librorum de republica* (Berlin 1843. 8), Pieron *Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Staat* in the *Rhein. Mus.* XIII. 1858. 1—48, 209—247, Rassow *Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat des Aristoteles* (Weimar 1866. 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the *Republic*, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the *Laws* and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: 11. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212); 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b); 9 § 5 (285): IV (VII). 16 § 15.

⁸ See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7

Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life¹. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance².

We may admit then with Oncken³ that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and riper humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view: and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamas shows us how little, after all, he was disengaged, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function⁴. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it⁵. However much to the purpose the

(138).
 1 op. c. 1. 191 f.
 2 See the *Excursus II* on Hippodamas
at the end of Bk. II.
 3 See above p. 20; and further the
Excursus on Hippodamas just cited.

objections which he brings against Hippodamas with regard to his division of the civic body¹, they are defective from the jurist's point of view²; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as *ipso facto* disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions³: indeed apart from it we should know next to

¹ Compare the notes on II. 8 § 2 (253), § 9 (264), § 24 (276): but on the other hand II. 8 § 12 n. (265).

² See the notes on II. 8 § 5 (258), § 15 (268).

³ Triebner *Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte* 99 f. (Berlin 1871. 8) endeavours to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephorus. Here I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. LXII f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert *Studien zur altspartanischen Geschichte* pp. 86—109 (Göttingen 1872. 8) endeavoured to show that on the contrary Ephorus made use of the *Polities* of Aristotle. Frick in the *Jahrb. für Philol.* cv. 1872 p. 657 made reply to him that Ephorus' work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said to 355: for all that follows was added by Demophilus, the son of Ephorus, probably after his father's death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his *Polities* as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Müller *Fragsm. hist. Gr.* II p. 121. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Müller on the authority of Meier, Rose *Aristoteles pseudepigraphus* p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the *Πολιτεῖα* did not appear until the period between the years 318 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1865. 8.) p. 247 sq., *Aristot. fragm.* (p. 242 in the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true au-

thor, but only that the work was first published after his death with additions by the editor. For the genuineness of the groundwork at least has been sufficiently made out by Heitz and by Bergk *Zur Aristotelischen Politie der Athener* (On a fragment of the *Polities* found lately, treating of Athens), in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXV. 1881. 87—115: cp. Susemihl in *Bursian's Jahressber.* XXX. 1881. 20—22. If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be completely refuted. But leaving the correctness of these dates an open question, it is not very probable, to say the least, that Aristotle should have published thus early a work like the *Πολιτεῖα* based upon such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken *op. c.* II p. 330 f., by the help of fragments of this work which we still possess on the *Polity of Lacedaemon*, has tried to prove that Aristotle, quite independently of Ephorus, was the first to investigate Spartan constitutional history in true scientific spirit; that he probably visited Sparta himself for this purpose and drew information there from living oral tradition. The difficulties in connexion with this hypothesis are patent, and with reference to Crete at any rate the coincidence between Aristotle and Ephorus is of such a kind that in accordance with the line of argument above Aristotle must have used either Ephorus or his authority: see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible: see the notes on II. 9 § 17 (310); 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359): VIII (v). 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2 (1592), 11 § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771), and compare Rose *op. cit.* 398, 490. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephorus was Aristotle's only authority

nothing of the Carthaginian constitution : moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them¹. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master². On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and

here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephesus in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on II. 6, 17, II. 9, 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephorus, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized : see on II. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (369) ; VI (IV), II § 15 (301).

¹ In spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Tieber *et al.* p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time ; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement ? Why should not a part of the mistakes discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian war that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and

badness ? And the procedure which Tieber commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on II. 9, 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Tieber and others—that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Filleborn in a note to Garve's translation II p. 141 says most sensibly : 'Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history....and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind.' But should not this consideration be extended to other cases ? Where Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right ? See the notes on II. 9 § 14 (299, 300), § 18 (303).

² Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself II. 9 § 33 (ep. note). See further the notes on II. 9 § 5 (303), § 11 (305 b), § 20 (318), § 23 (324), II. 9 § 33 (330), § 27 (333), § 31 (341).

Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough; like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle's model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato's.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon's as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book¹.

VI. THE LEADING PROPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle's own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked², our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former³ and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others⁴. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation⁵ upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them: the true citizens cc. 1,

¹ See further the notes on II. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427).

² P. 21.

³ On what follows compare Susemihl *On the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics* in *Philologus* XXIX. 1870. 97—119.

⁴ Hildenbrand, *op. c.* 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II; 'the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive

'solution of the problem'—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I—'whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.'

⁵ III. I § 9 n. (439 b), 3 §§ 1, 2 n. (456), 5 §§ 5—7 n. (508).

2 : the essential identity of a state c. 3 : the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, *firstly*, a definition of constitution (*πολιτεία*) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (*πολιτεῖαι*). As we are told in Bk. I., the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (*όρθαι πολιτεῖαι*) : those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (*παρεκβάσεις*) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (*Πολιτεία* proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (*τυραννίς*), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider *secondly* a series of difficult problems (*ἀποίαι*). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries : (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13¹. From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

¹ The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated :

- (A) First main division : cc. 1—5
 - (α) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
 - (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
 - (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.
- (B) Second main division : cc. 6—13
 - (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions : cc. 6, 7.
 - (II) Discussion of difficult problems (*ἀποίαι*) : cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8

The comparative merit of constitutions : cc. 9—13

- (α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
- (β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11
- (γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.

(c. 9). This is followed by the inference (β) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (*ἀρχαιμέτατοι*) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (*εὐθύναι*). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author's essential independence of Plato¹, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles², he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life³, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

¹ Spengel *Ueber Arist. Pol.* 15 n. 18, Henkel, *op. cit.* 80, n. 12, Oncken *op. c.* II 165 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the conceit of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato 'nothing was so certain as that the Demos 'meant the sovereignty of folly, and the "rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.' But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle's own ideal state if he thinks (p. 137) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange exegesis.

² For this reason Oncken's assertion *I. c.* 172, that the exposition given II §§ 15, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles' time, is not correct.

³ Whether Trendelenburg in *Natur-*

recht p. 463 ff (Leipzig 1860. 8) has really shown "the fallacy of his analogies" as Henkel thinks *I. c.*, may be seen from the note on III. II. 2 (565 b). Zeller (*op. cit.* II ii 717) on the other hand finds them to the point, and Henkel himself continues; "However, as Spengel remarks 'Arist. Stud. II. 56 n. 1, 'even Aristotle is not disposed to allow the public a correct judgment on that which is strictly scientific. But of that which concerns mankind at large—what the Greeks denote by *κοινὴ ἐρωτική*—every one can judge, and the multitude often judges more correctly than a specialist; who is often prejudiced without knowing it.' Or as Goethe in one passage expresses it, 'There is no doubt this public, so much honoured and despised, is almost always wrong in particulars, hardly ever in its broad views.' That Aristotle's confidence goes somewhat too far is shown in the note on III. 15. 8.

external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion¹, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses: but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist,' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force². He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders³; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit 'of the true statesman 'who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who 'has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

¹ Demosth. *Fals. leg.* 135: ὡς οἱ μὲν δῆμοι ἔστιν ἀστεμπρότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάτερων καὶ ἀσωθετώτατον, ὃσπερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεῦμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἀν τῷχῃ κινούμενος.

² Oncken *op. c.* II. 168.
³ Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. VI. 39. 1: also Pericles *ib.* II. 40, Otanes in Herod. III. 80 s. fin.

'the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the 'body corporate to which he belongs ; that his powers and intelligence 'can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected 'through being merged in a higher unity ; and this is the only ethical 'point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can 'be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3) 'which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the 'public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a 'truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of 'the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more dis- 'putable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each 'individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees 'further than all the intelligence of the experts'. Plato is of quite another opinion (*Laws* III. 700 E ff.)¹, and 'nothing is easier than by 'resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of 'mere cyphers²: but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the 'poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in 'order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with 'which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be 'matched'. Spengel³ is undoubtedly right : these chapters (III. cc. 9— 13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere in the work, doctrines 'which deserve to be written in letters of gold.'

This section ends with the remark (III. 11. 20) that all this does not as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its complete form that of the degenerate varieties⁴, is not yet decided. We

¹ See however the notes on III. 11 § 2 (565 b), 15 § 8 (647).

² Yet on the other hand see *Symp.* 194.

³ Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. *Memor.* III. 7 in the case of the popular assembly (Vettori).

⁴ Oncken II. 165 f. 'What,' he rightly adds, 'would have become of the German drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolai down to the romantic school?' It is however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this 'passive' popular sovereignty to the 'active sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-government of the Demos by the Demos' was also taken by Aristotle, 'when he recognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aristocracy' (Oncken II. 169, 239 f.). For

(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as standing on an equality with the other two forms of government, VI (IV). 8, 1 ; and (2) no greater rights are granted to the people in a Polity than in an aristocracy or a moderate democracy, VI (IV). 14. §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made the assertion (II. 174) that Aristotle invariably subordinated to the law and the popular decree the wisdom and virtue of even the best individual citizen, he must surely have forgotten the substance of III. c. 13, c. 17 §§ 5—8.

⁵ *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 54 (646).

⁶ In general the result of the preceding statements is that Democracy is preferable to Oligarchy, and the latter preferable to a Tyranny ; but whether and how far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank before an unrestrained democracy has not yet been decided.

naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser¹ was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays² declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion $\pi\epsilon\rho\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13³, there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in 13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context⁴. On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands⁵, might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the 'citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law 'as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed above⁶ would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

¹ In his translation vol. I. p. 296 n. 79.
Cp. my note on III. 13, 12 (599).

² In the note to his translation, p. 172.

³ Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, $\varphi\alpha\mu\tau\eta\gamma\tau\alpha\theta\omega\pi\kappa\lambda\tau\epsilon\tau\omega\mu\pi\alpha\tau\delta\tau\eta\tau\eta$ i. e. $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there men-

tioned. But surely it is enough that in 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the *best* constitution and the corrupt forms.

⁴ Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.

⁵ As Conring saw.

⁶ P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 2.

follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only¹. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—‘Are the best ‘laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the ‘majority?’—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at 11 § 20²; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete³. There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally⁴.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (11 § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, 11 § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification⁵. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable⁶, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted

¹ See the note on III. II. 8 (569).

² πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετέον, βουλούμενῷ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὄρθροτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτίστων συμφέρον η̄ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ὅποιος μέντοι τινὰς δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ὄρθρους κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν παν δῆλον...πλὴν τούτῳ γε φανερὸν διτὶ δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κείθαι τοὺς νόμους, 11 § 20.

³ See Thurot's excellent and convincing analysis *Etudes* 47 ff., from which Susemihl should not have expressed par-

tial dissent in *Philologus* XXIX. 113—15 and in the critical edition. It requires correction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (599). Compare also Susemihl *Compos. der Arist. Pol.* 23 ff (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be rescinded) and in part Spengel *Arist. Stud.* III. 24.

⁴ See again the note on III. 13. 12.

⁵ Cp. the note on III. II. 1.

⁶ See on III. 13. 12 n. (599).

in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (*Πολιτεία*)¹; as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy².

VII. MONARCHY AND THE BEST STATE.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. III cc. 14—17, the second Bkk. IV and V. (in the old order VIII), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective: but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

¹ See the note last quoted.

² See VI (IV). 2. 2 with *nn.* (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in

ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.

produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phoenician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development¹. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind². It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility³. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in Polity (*Πολιτεία*) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king⁴, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

¹ Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57: “*Bastiā* is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation;—and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various *ἀροπλας* the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government.” Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel puts the question *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 16—“Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the dis-

cussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of.” This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminently best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 2).

² And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

³ See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (615).

⁴ See Henkel *op. c.* 95. n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1665).

than to base it exclusively upon personal merits¹, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions². This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind³. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (*πόλις*) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (*θρόνος*), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (vii). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world⁴. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

¹ See the *n.* on III. 13. 9; also VI (iv). 2. 2, VIII (v). 1 § 11 with *n.* (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 *n.* (1708).

² Henkel *op. c.* 86.

³ So Hegel *Gesck. d. Phil.* II. 401, Hildenbrand *op. c.* 426. Recently Oncken (*op. c.* I. 16 f., 1881, II. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the *Politics*. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Tostrik *Litt. Centralbl.* 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel *op. c.* 89 *n.* (19), 97 *n.* (26); Bradley *op. c.* 179, 238 f.; Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursian's *philol. Jahresber.* III. (1874—5). 376 ff.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); IV § 15 (633); IV § 5 (678); VI (iv). 11 § 19 (1303). The

last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partizan, made by Bernays *Phokion*, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Wilamowitz *Antigonos von Karytos* 182 f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see Bursian's *Jahresber.* XXX. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug *Demosthenes as a political thinker* (*Studien aus dem klassischen Alterthum* I. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Wilamowitz in a review of Hug (*Deutsche Litteraturzeitung* 1882, col. 1081 f.) has already somewhat modified his position; see *Jahresber.* I.c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (vii). 2. 11 (cp. the *note*) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

⁴ Cp. the note there (782).

of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Politics*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that 'which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development.' He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever in this process.' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions'. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on¹. 'Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period: that the same development of mental culture, of social and military organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of development through which the political world of Hellas passed'². The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy³.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

¹ Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.

² Cp. the notes on III. 14 § 12 (627), 15 § 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).

³ Henkel *op. c.* 94. But certainly this

description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken's remarks. Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.

⁴ Henkel *op. c.* 96 f.

form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order¹, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists *must first determine what is the best life*',—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other². And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work³. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle⁴. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, IV (vii). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows⁵, as in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*⁶, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim⁷. This

¹ In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book IV (vii).

² Cp. in particular Spengel *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. 60 (652) ff., and Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIX. 1869. 604 ff.

³ See the notes on IV (vii). 1 § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.

⁴ See the notes on IV (vii). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (725), § 16 (729); 3 § 3, § 6 (741),

§ 8 (743), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.

⁵ IV (vii). 15 §§ 8—10, V (viii). c. 3, c. 5 § 4 with *nn.* (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14. Cp. the notes on IV (vii). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921): v (viii). 2 § 1 (977): also on c. 3 § 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1032), and *Excursus* I upon Bk. v (viii).

⁶ See the passages quoted by Zeller II ii 614 n. 1.

⁷ Cp. *Exc.* I at the end of Bk. v (viii).

is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's¹, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (viii), it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided². We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. ii, but also in Bk. iii. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy³. And Aristotle's many previous intimations⁴,

¹ See the notes on iv (vii). 1 § 10 (705); 2 § 6 (717); 3 § 3 (736), §§ 8—10.

² Cp. the note on v (viii). 7. 1 (1081). Even William of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation: *residuum huius operis in grecis nondum inventi*. Of older scholars Conring in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing; of the moderns more especially Hildenbrand (*op. c.* 449 foll.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency

does not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller *op. c.* II ii 676 f., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel *Ueb. die Pol. des Arist.* 8 foll.

³ See III. I §§ 9, 10 *nn.* (440, 441); 4 §§ 4, 5 *n.* (471); *n.* (491) on 4 § 16; 5 §§ 2, 3 *n.* (504), § 5 *n.* (509); 7 § 3 *nn.* (536, 537); II §§ 8, 9 *n.* (569); 13 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (595), §§ 11, 12 *n.* (599), §§ 24, 25; 15 §§ 4—6, 9, 10; 16 §§ 2—12; 17 §§ 1, 2; c. 18 with the notes.

⁴ I. 13, 15 with *n.* (126)—cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 *n.* (285)—II. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 *n.* (368),

taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character¹, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction². Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it³. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing⁴. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned iv (vii). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, v (viii). 7. 3 ff.⁵. On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy⁶ as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the rhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, iv (vii). 15. 9, v (viii). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from "which we indirectly learn that a chapter on

IV (vii). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14; 16 § 12;
17 § 12—cp. 17 §§ 5 § 7: v (viii). 3 § 10—
cp. 7 § 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note
on v (viii). 2 § 2 (979). On 11. 6 § 14,
111. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

¹ See IV (vii). 14 § 8 foll. n. (903),
15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted
on p. 48 n. 5.

² See v (viii). 4 §§ 7—9 with Exc. 1
at the end of Bk. v (viii).

³ See v (viii). 5 §§ 4—7 with nn.
(1024-5-7); § 15 foll. nn. (1044, 1045);

6 § 1 ff. nn. (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 § 3 ff.
nn. (1086-7, 1098, 1104-5-9); also the
Excursuses I, II, III, IV at the end of Bk.
v (viii).

⁴ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 should be cor-
rected by this.

⁵ Cp. v (viii). 6 § 9 with n. (1073);
also nn. on 7 § 4 and Excursus V at the
end of Bk. v (viii).

⁶ See the Introduction to my edition
of the *Poetics* pp. 8 f., 15, 64 f.

'scientific education was intended to follow'¹. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (viii). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (viii). 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction: but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (viii). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato², intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course³; and this would furnish the solution of the riddle⁴. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (vii). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory; in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties⁵. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman⁶; if moreover scientific activity

¹ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 n. 4.

² See *nn.* on II. 5. 25 (181), IV (vii). 17. 15 (970).

³ No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.

⁴ This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections *op. c.* II 204 ff.,

218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much: see Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. V (viii).

⁵ See the note on IV (vii). 3. 8 (743).

⁶ See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468), § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5; 18 § 1:

is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue; then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, II. 5. 25¹.

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised I. 13. 15 (cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6)², is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education³, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (VII). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. 17 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (*παιδορόμοι*), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent⁴. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasium for the young, IV (VII). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5; and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pauson with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (VIII). 5. 21⁵. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring⁶; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (*e.g.* *ταμβοτ*) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, 9 § 3 n. (808): 13 §§ 9, 10; 14 §§ 7, 8; V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2 n. (974): VI (IV) 7 § 2.

¹ See the note on II. 5. 25 (182): *Nic.* Eth. vi. 7. 7 (VI. 8 1144 b 14 ff.) *Metaph.* I. 1. 11 ff. (981 a 12 ff.).

² See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285).

³ *Nic.* Eth. x. 9. 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the *Polities*; but the same thought forms the basis of

the remarks in IV (VII). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 8, 9, as Zeller *op. c.* II ii 739 n. 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. nn. on IV (VII). 12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (962).

⁴ See Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 248, Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy (London, 1880. 8).

⁵ See the notes on IV (VII). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 10, § 12; V (VIII). 5 § 21.

⁶ See on IV (VII). 16. 12.

parties of adults are to be countenanced, iv (vii). 17. 12¹. Inspectors for the women (*γυναικονόμοι*) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, vi (iv). 15. 13, vii (vi). 8. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy². We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended³; and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary; ii. 6. 10 ff., iv (vii). 16. § 15, § 17⁴.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, iv (vii). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato's *Laws*⁵, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, iv (vii). 5. 2; and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination⁶. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised iv (vii). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt *σωρείτια*; why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct; together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage⁷; also the consideration of the question postponed in ii. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed⁸.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, ii. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration⁹. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent¹⁰.

¹ Zeller, *op. c.* II ii 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this: see the note there.

² See the notes there.

³ The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta: see n. on iv (vii). 16. 15.

⁴ See the notes there; also ii. 7. 5 with n. (236).

⁵ Cp. the notes on ii. 6. 15, iv (vii). 10. 11.

⁶ Cp. the note on IV (vii). 5. 2.

⁷ Cp. the notes there.

⁸ Cp. n. on II. 10. 9 (368).

⁹ Cp. the note there, (278).

¹⁰ Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.

Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five¹ nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates². Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability³. Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour⁴, and in respect of a public education from their seventh year⁵, all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves⁶. But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, IV (VII). 9. 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age⁷. The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order⁸. Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour: a pro-

¹ See *nn.* on IV (VII). 9 § 9, 16 § 9.

² This follows from II. 11. 6, III. 11. 8, taken in connexion with the other passages quoted in Exc. IV at the end of Bk. II.

³ This may be inferred from II. 12. 5, III. 11. 8: see notes there: also Exc. V at the end of Bk. II. But Aristotle might have required that the jurors in these courts should be elected instead of being chosen by lot: see II. 11. 7 *n.* (391).

⁴ II. 9 § 2 ff., 11 § 10: III. 5 § 2 *n.* (504), § 3, § 5 *n.* (509): IV (VII). 9 § 1, § 3 ff., § 9; 10 § 13; 12 § 4: V (VIII). 2 §§ 3—6 *n.* (982); 4 § 1 *n.* (1004); 5 § 8 *n.* (1028); 6 § 4 ff.; § 16; 7 § 1 with notes. Cp. also Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII); *n.* on I. 11. 6 (103) with the passages there quoted.

⁵ IV (VII). 17 § 7, and the note on § 4; § 15 *n.* (970): V (VIII). 3 § 13 *n.* (1003); 4 § 7 ff. and Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

⁶ See I. 7 § 1 *n.* (58 b): III. 1 §§ 9, 10 *n.* (440, 441), 11 §§ 2 ff., 13 § 9 *n.* (595), 16 § 2 *n.* (672), § 13; 17 §§ 1, 2: IV (VII). 8 § 4; 9 §§ 7, 8; 13 § 9 *n.* (885), 14 § 5: VI (IV). 11 § 8: also II. 2 §§ 6, 7, and cp. the notes on II. 2, 4 (133) and III. 13, 12. Other passages seem to contradict this, as II. 2 § 2 ff., § 4 *n.* (133): III. 4 § 5 *n.* (471); 5 § 10; 6 §§ 1, 2; 7 §§ 1, 2; 15 §§ 8—10; 18 § 1: but see the notes: also *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9.

⁷ Because old men are no longer of service for government II. 9. 25. See the note there and on IV (VII). 9. 9 (816).

⁸ Cp. *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9 (817).

hibition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts¹. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free².

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture³ makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, iv (vii). 6. 1 ff.⁴, as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword⁵. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, iv (vii). 9. 7. 'The messes (*συσσίτια*) are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta⁶, at once common meals and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall⁷. All boards of officials have their messes, each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the rangers and field-patrols in the country⁸. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate⁹.' In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans¹⁰, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen¹¹. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed¹² with their twenty-first year¹³, they are also per-

¹ Even vocal and instrumental virtuosi in music are classed with manual labourers (*βαρύποι*), v (viii), §§ 8, n. (1028) 6, § 4 ff., §§ 15, 16; 7 § 6: comp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (viii).

² IV (vii). 9 § 8, 10 § 13.

³ ['Culture-state'; one which exists to promote the higher civilization: see p. 48. Tr.]

⁴ Cp. notes on IV (vii). c. 6.

⁵ See IV (vii). 14. 21 with n. (917).

⁶ Cp. Schömann *op. c.* pp. 272, 279

Eng. tran., Triebel *op. c.* 1—26.

⁷ IV (vii). 12. 1.

⁸ IV (vii), 12 §§ 2, 7, 8.

⁹ Oncken *op. c.* II. 198.

¹⁰ II. 5. 5 ff., IV (vii). 10. 9, cp. II. 5 §§ 15, 16, with notes, also the notes on II. 5 § 6 (156 b), § 7 n. (158): also VII (vi). 5. 10 with note.

¹¹ V (viii). 4. 9, cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. V (viii).

¹² See on IV (vii). 17. 11 n. (966).

¹³ IV (vii). 17. 15.

mitted to attend drinking-parties¹ and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults²; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds³.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in II. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant⁴, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, III. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in IV (vii). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark VIII (v). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution⁵.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, IV (vii). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion⁶, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage⁷, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the *Laws*, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

VIII. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTIONS.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. IV. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

¹ IV (vii). 17. 11.

see n. (1113).

² V (viii). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. n. on IV (vii). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to V (viii). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious;

³ IV (vii). 17. 11.

⁴ Cp. n. on II. 6. 14.

⁵ Cp. n. on III. 3. 6.

⁶ Cp. Exc. 1 at the end of Bk. II.

description of the ideal state. The task of *Politics*, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (*ταῦς πλείσταις πόλεσι*); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπάρχοντων*), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies¹, Polity (*Πολιτεία*), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny². The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are; (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy; and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it: and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word; just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (*ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly³ be by

¹ *αἱ δυομαζόμεναι ἀριστοκρατίαι* VI (IV). § 4 (1154), § 8; 4 § 1, § 4 (1164), §§ 5, 6,

9. 10: see note on VI (IV). 2. 4. § 8 (1176), § 12 (1182, 1183), § 13 (1185)

² See the note on VI (IV). 1. 4 (1116). § 15 (1187), § 17 (1189), §§ 19, 20.

³ See the notes on VI (IV). 3 § 1, § 2,

Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (*Πολιτεία*) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents *Πολιτεία* in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 12¹: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony: in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v; while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text². If it is right

¹ See the note there, (1315).

² Hildenbrand *op. c. p. 372 ff.* defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in VI (IV), cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book V of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book VI. Zeller on the other hand *op. c. 11 ii 675 ff.*, evidently with the right view that thus to

interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books IV and V of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles; in the (old) Book VI he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the *Jahrb. f. Phil.* cl. 1870, 343—346, 349 f. why

it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, vii (vi). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion¹. Two of the others, vii (vi). 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds². But the fourth, vii (vi). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past³; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation⁴. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. VI (iv) and the first seven chapters of Bk. VII (vi)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion⁵. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. VII (vi), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of *different* constitutions, vii (vi). 1. 3 f.⁶ Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. VII (vi) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in VI (iv). c. 16⁷: but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there VI (iv). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved; namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, VI (iv). 15. § 22⁸. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution: the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on VI (iv). 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

¹ See the note there (1424).

² Only in the latter passage the δέ which follows must be changed into δὴ, or else the whole of the following clause προτὶ δὲ τὰ δικαίωματα... Αἴγαιοις expunged.

³ See the note there, and Spengel *Über die Politik* 36 ff.

⁴ In that case the change of δέ into δὴ, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

⁵ See the note on VI (iv). 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, *op. c. II.* 253, thinks these seven

chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

⁶ E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on oligarchical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1488) at the end of Bk. VII (vi).

⁷ Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on VI (iv.) 15. 1 (1343).

⁸ Oncken *I. c.* complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Attic

proposed this book, viii (vi), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book viii (v) it will be sufficient to refer to the *Analysis*; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the *Commentary*¹. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman². In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, viii (v). 11. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (*rūparvis*) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown³, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks⁴, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in iii. 5. 9 ff., iv (vii). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which

government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook *ἀνα τε περὶ ἐκτίνων εἰ τι λοιπόν, οὐ χέρων ἐπισκέψασθαι* in the announcement of the contents viii (vi). i. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words *καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδύναμι πρὸς ἐκδοτην*, but in reverse order. That the whole book is 'a regular medley of 'motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never 'stood in the same original connexion'

is therefore (see p. 59 n. 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on viii (vi). i. 2 (1379 b).

¹ [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]

² Cp. Hildenbrand *op. c.* 469—486; Zeller *op. c.* ii ii 750; Oncken *op. c.* II. 241—252; Henkel *op. c.* 91; Van der Rest *op. c.* 519 ff.

³ In *Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen* 12 ff. (St Petersburg 1859. 8). Compare the review by Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.

⁴ *op. c.* ii ii 699, 705 foll., 749.

in various ways depend upon them: vi (iv). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; vii (vi). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; cp. iii. 12 § 7 f.; iv (vii). cc. 8, 9; vi (iv). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller¹ himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (*πόλις*) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (iii. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (iii c. 8, see above p. 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself; and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see vi (iv). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, vi (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements² without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (iii. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated vi (iv). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

¹ I. c. 14 ff.

² See the note on vi (iv). 7. 4 (1238).

in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy; and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored VIII (v). 7. 1.¹ In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence², while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III. 7. 4, comp. VI (IV). 13. 7 foll.³ This is just what Aristotle censures in Sparta, II. 9. 34 f., IV (VII) 14 § 15 ff. (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Polities. But on the other hand how should Polities be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, V (VIII). 1. 4⁴, to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Polities⁵. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, VI (IV). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in VIII (V). 7 §§ 5—9, VI (IV). 7 § 4, 8 § 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Polities, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies⁶. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation⁷. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, VI (IV). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in VII (VI). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

¹ See note there, and on VIII (V). 7. 6 (1599).

² See the note on III. 7. 3 (536).

³ See the note on III. 7. 4 (538).

⁴ So *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 3, 1102a 10 f., X. 9. 13, 1180a 29 ff.

⁵ VI (IV). 7 § 4, 11, VIII (V). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In II. 11 § 5 the expression is ——more hesitating.

⁶ It is a strange misconception of Oncken's *op. c.* II. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in VI (IV). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.

⁷ See the notes on VI (IV). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238); VII (VI). 27 (1402); VIII (V). 7. 6 (1599).

amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments¹. It is surprising how Teichmüller² could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller³ himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts)⁴, and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development⁵, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, III. c. 7, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing; so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

¹ Comp. Oncken *op. c.* II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a demo-

cracy from a polity.

² *op. c.* 18 f.

³ *op. c.* 20 f.

⁴ See *n.* on II. 10. 13.

⁵ See *n.* on VI (IV). II. 21 (1305).

their strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class¹; 'but Aristotle is the first 'thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in 'politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his 'explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is 'nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here².' He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, *Πολιτεία*. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with never-ending revolutions, 'and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: 'while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance³'.

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship vi (iv). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, vi (i4). 15 § 19 f, is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears⁴; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, vi (iv). 14 § 10⁵, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Polities the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably⁶. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy:

¹ See n. on vi (iv). 11. 9.

(1371).

² Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 225.

⁵ See n. on vi (iv). 9. 5 (1255).

³ Oncken *op. c.* II. 227, 228.

⁶ See n. on vi (iv). 14. 15 (1340).

⁴ See the note on vi (iv). 15. 21

thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary Polities. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work¹? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, vi (iv) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to Polity? It may be that he is thinking only of those Polities in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way². But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle³, and there is all the more reason to hold⁴, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his *Πολιτεία* is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in VII (vi). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like *Πολιτεία*. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction VII (vi), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; VIII (v). 8. 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken⁵ has well said: "Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential "nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community "to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body "legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, "compensate the poor for the service of watching over them. It was

¹ The practical proposals in VI (iv). 14 §§ 11—15, which Krohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

² As Oncken thinks *op. c.* II. 239.

³ Nor can it be inferred from the following words in VI (iv). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in

the Polity, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

⁴ With Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in n. 4 on p. 41.

⁵ *op. c.* II. 259, 260.

"the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even "an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian "spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings "it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at- "tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the "heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the "national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle "watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling "like an all-powerful monarch; few there are whose observation traces "the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the "idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed, "described¹ Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever "did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only "homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment "escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom- "age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take "as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand- "ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no "healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state."

IX. DATE OF THE WORK AND ITS ASSUMED CONNEXION WITH THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

"There are notices in the *Politics* of the Sacred War, VIII. (v). 4. 7, "as of something in the past; of Phalaecus' expedition to Crete, which "took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)², as a recent event, "νεωστὶ πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, II. 10. 16: lastly, of "the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), VIII. (v). 10. 16³, without any "intimation that it had but very lately happened⁴." On the other hand the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333⁵. The *Politics* as a whole must have been written later than the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4; III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1; IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7; VI (IV). 11. 3⁶, and earlier than the *Poetics* which is announced as to follow in V (VIII.) 7. 3⁷.

¹ In his *Constitution of Athens* in the Πολιτεῖαι: see above, p. 35 n. 3.

² Diod. XVI. 62.

³ Cp. the note there (1673).

⁴ Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 154 n. (4).

⁵ See the note there (375).

⁶ See *nn.* on these passages.

⁷ Cp. the Introduction to my edition of

the *Poetics*, p. 11 f. Heitz' objection (in *Die verlorenen Schriften* 99 ff.) there mentioned in *n. 2* on p. 12 has in the meantime been answered in detail by Vahlen *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXVII, 1874, 293—298: he has made it tolerably certain that the chapter on κάθαρος in question, which is now lost,

It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain¹ to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the *Ethics*², and yet that work itself³ calls the theory developed in it not Ethics but Politics, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*⁴. For the intermediate expression of the *Rhetic* (I. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 f.), $\eta \pi\epsilon\rho\pi \tau\alpha \eta\theta\eta \pi\omega\lambda\tau\kappa\eta$, is here our guide, by making Ethics and Politics in the narrower sense appear as parts of Politics in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the *Magna Moralia* at the commencement of his work⁵, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the *Ethics* that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks *i.e.* p. 8 still retain their force.

¹ Comp. the notes on Bk. II. 4§4 (149); 5 §§ 1, 2 (153), § 14 (164); 6 § 15 (215), § 18 (220); 10 § 8 (366):

Bk. III. 4 § 5 (471), § 9 (478):

Bk. IV (VIII). 13 § 4 (872), § 8 (881); 14 § 6 (899):

Bk. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (993), § 11 (1000); 5 § 4 (1024), § 15 (1041); 6 § 14 (1079):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124—5); 2 § 3 (1140), § 5 (1143); 4 § 21 (1194, 1198), § 22 (1199—1201), § 24 (1203), § 25 (1204); 6 § 4 1223; 7 § 1 (1230 b); 9 § 9 (1265); 14 § 3 (1319), § 9 (1331), § 10 (1334), § 13 (1337), § 14 (1338); 15 § 16 (1366), § 19 (1369), § 21 (1371);

Bk. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1

(1450):

Bk. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504); 3 § 4 (1511); 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1650), § 6 (1657); 11 § 16 (1731); 12 § 11 (1767), § 14 (1777).

² See however the notes on IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7 (876, 879, 881); and *n.* (1287) on VI (IV). 11. 3 in regard to the citations there.

³ 1. 2. 3 1094 a 24 f.

I. 3. 5 1095 a 2,

L. 4. 1 1095 a 14 f.;

cp. I. 13. 2. 1102 a 7 ff.,

VII. 11. 1. 1152 b 1 f.

⁴ *Poet.* 6. 16. 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. note 71 to my edition of this work). *Rhet.* I. 2. 7. 1356 a 26 sqq.

⁵ Brandis *op. c.* II ii 1335 *n.* certainly expounds his words differently; but see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 608 *n.*

To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct¹. Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows²: "Since then previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its kind). Let us begin then with our discussion."

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark³: "there is no coherence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the *Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out." The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end: nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unmolested virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

¹ So recently by Nickes for example.

² Nic. Eth. X. 9 §§ 22, 23 1181 b. 12 f. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνεργητῶν τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτὸν ἐποκλίσασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον τοις, καὶ διὰ δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δίναμον ἡ περὶ τὰ διθύρωτα φιλοσοφίᾳ τελειώθη. πρώτος μὲν οὖν εἰ τι κατὰ μέρος εἰρηται καλῶς ὅπό τῶν προγενεστέρων πειράσματον ἐπειθεῖν, εἰτα τοὺς συνηγμένους πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποιά σώζει καὶ φύεται τὰς

πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἔκδοται τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αλτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούς ναυτὸν πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γάρ τοις τόχ' ἀν μᾶλλον συνέδουμεν καὶ ποιά πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἔκδοτη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τοις νόμοις καὶ θεσις χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὐδὲ ἀρξάμενον.

³ In his translation of the *Politics* I. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.

to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book¹, making what is contained in Bk. VIII (v). come next, and then developing the contents of IV (vii), V (viii), and lastly of VI (iv). and VII (vi). What must be understood by a ‘comparison of constitutions’ we see clearly from x 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7²; at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this ‘comparison’³. That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue; and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down “the theory of the constitution generally”? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words *καὶ δλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας* contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from *καὶ ποίᾳ πολιτείᾳ ἀρίστῃ* onwards we will say nothing: it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover “method in his madness.”

That in spite of their close connexion⁴ the *Ethics* and the *Politics* are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

¹ For the interpretation which Nickes, *I. c.* pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,—“Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing ‘a commencement dealing with other matters,’—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

² οὐδὲ ἀν φύστο (sc. οἱ σοφισταὶ) μέδιον εἴται τὸ νομοθετήσας συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων, and τῶν νόμων καὶ

τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.

³ This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Nickes *I. c.* 25 f. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the earlier attempts he is on the whole successful.

⁴ As Zeller observes *op. c.* II ii 104 f. n. (1).

is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. iv (vii), from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else¹, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' ἔτερας...σχολῆς², has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the *Prior* or Pure and *Posterior* or Applied *Analytics*, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state³.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller⁴ and Walter⁵ have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality⁶; but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant⁷. Yet practical insight (*φρόνησις*), without which there is no moral virtue⁸, can be materially promoted by Ethics⁹, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter¹⁰. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

¹ See above, p. 15 n. 1.

² Cp. the note there (709).

³ Cp. Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 104 f. n. 1,

182, 607 n. 3; Oncken *op. c.* I. 164 f.

⁴ *op. c.* II ii 176—185.

⁵ *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft* 537—554 (Jena 1874, 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.

⁶ *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff., II. 2. 1 1103 b 26 ff. Cp. Walter *op. c.* 151 ff. Zeller *op. c.* II ii 631.

⁷ *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. I. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; II. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff.; II. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9=x. 10 (Bekk.): cp. *Pol.* IV (vii). 13. 11 f., *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a

26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; II. c. 9. Comp. also Walter *op. c.* 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter II. 7.

⁸ Cp. *nn.* in I. 5. 9 (45), I. 13. 6 (112).

⁹ *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., I. 3. 7 1095 a 10 f., I. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, VI. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter *op. c.* 157, 400 ff.

¹⁰ As Zeller thinks, *op. c.* II. ii 608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the *Nic. Eth.* adduced by Zeller, VI. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Rassow.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of *πολιτική* consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle III. 1. 1; VI (IV). c. 1; VII (VI). 5. 1; IV (VII). 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory III. 8. 1 (cp. VI [IV]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur¹.

[X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above², has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation *De praesidiis emendandi Aristotelis Politica*³. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susemihl, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed⁴.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was something deplorable⁵. He renders *περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ κτλ,* *de pronunciatis de optima civitate;* *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις apud alios;* *ἐπιτίθεσθαι praeferri;* *ἐπιδημεῖν praefectum populi esse;* evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as *τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα bona quae circa res bellicas*⁶. But mere ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in II. 12. 8, he made *'Ολυμπίασιν* an accusative after *τοῦ νικήσαντος qui vicit Olimpiasem*⁷; at any rate he gives *super tecta* for

¹ Comp. *nn.* on III. 8. 1 (542); III. 13. 13 (601); VI (IV). 15. 4 (1350); see also III. 2 §§ 1—3.

[Here Prof. Susemihl's own *Introduction* ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible. TR.]

² pp. 1, 2.

³ Berlin, 1881. 8.

⁴ Susemihl however in the large critical edition (1872) p. xxxiii f. had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsisten-

cies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1879, e.g. I p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.

⁵ Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger Bacon writes "ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca de quo praesumit, et ideo omnia transfert falsa et corrumpt scientiam Latinorum." Cp. Jourdain *Recherches* p. 67.

⁶ Busse *op. cit.* p. 36 f. Space permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

⁷ p. 9. The best ms. gives *Olimpiasem*.

ἀνὰ δώματα in v (viii). 3. 9¹—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: *γάρ autem* in *ἴστι γάρ* II. 9. 18, *ἴσως γάρ* IV (vii). 17. 13, *δεῖ γάρ* V (viii). 1. 2²; *γάρ igitur*, III. 7. 5; *δη̄ enim* I. 2. 1; *οὐν enim* I. 8. 6³, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings *καὶ...δὲ et...etiam, καὶ τοι et quidem*. Sometimes he omits particles (*μὲν, γάρ, δέ, οὔτε*); sometimes, e.g. II. 5. 9 *δικαίως et iuste*, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 *φράτορα φυλέτην fratruelēm aut contribulem*, etc.⁴ He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 *καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀρφοτέρους ἔνα et ambos fieri unum ex duobus existentibus*; IV (vii). 3. 8 *κυρίως καὶ et dominos* (i.e. *καὶ κυρίους*)⁵. His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives *ἀριστοκρατικὴ, ὀλιγαρχικὴ* by the nouns *aristocracia, oligarchia*⁶.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v). 6. 3 *ἐν θῷ* (for *ἐνθῷa*) *in tho*, which he took for a proper name; III. 11. 3 *κρίης* (for *κρίνουσι*, so M^s) *Kries*; II. 9. 30 *φιλέτρια* (so M^s) *amicabilia*; V (viii). 1 § 4 M^s *av̄ ipsorum* (he has read the compendium *αὐτῶν*); 6 § 9 M^s *ό αὐτός* (for *αὐλός*) *id ipsum*⁷. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the *Politics*. Take for instance VIII (v). 1. 3: P^t gives *ἀνίστος ἡ. τι ὄντας*, with space for one letter; M^s has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading *ἐπι*; not so William; from the immediately preceding *ἐκ τοῦ ίσοντος ὅτιοντος ὄντας* he derives *inae-
quales* in quounque *existentes*. Similarly with *natura* for *δύναμις* in IV (vii). 11. 4 (from the adjoining *φύσιν*), *alia quidem esse eadem* for *τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι* VI (iv). 4. 25 (from the following *ταῦλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά*): see also III. 16 § 5 *universale* borrowed from c. 15 § 4 *τὸ καθόλον*, IV (vii). 1 § 4 *quaes circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant*, IV (vii). 11 § 1 *si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem* borrowed from 5 § 3 *τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρή ποιεῖν κατ’ εὐχήν*; etc.⁸ Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M^s though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (vii). 14. 22 Γ had the same hiatus as M^s has now, through the homoeoteleuton *σπουδ-άζειν, σχολ-άζειν*: William does what he can

¹ p. 12.² p. 11.³ p. 30.⁴ pp. 29, 30.⁵ pp. 14, 27.⁶ p. 9.⁷ pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna⁸ at V (viii). 5. 17, where *ἀκ...* is all that⁹ stands in M^s of *ἀκροδύμενοι*.¹⁰ Busse pp. 15—20.

to conceal this by translating ἔνεκεν τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης *gratia ordinis et pacis*, as if he had read τάξεως. In vi (iv). 4. 11 M^s gives τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἦ instead of τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὐ; so too Γ, for William renders <*minus*> quam to make sense. Similarly v (viii). 6. 11 M^s has ἤποντο for ἤπτοντο; William *sequebantur*; which must be his attempt to make sense out of ἤποντο¹.

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in II. 9. 20 δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἡναγκάλοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς *regere populum se ipsos* (he read αὐτούς) cogebant reges, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see VII (vi). 7 § 5 προσκείσθαι apponere, 8 § 1 διῃρῆσθαι dividere etc.; and for the converse II. 7 § 6 δεῖξη ostendatur, 8 § 5 γράφειν scribatur, VIII (v). 8. 9 παρεληφέναι comprehendantur, etc.² Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. I. 5. 8 εἴπερ τοῖς εἰρημένοις si quidem et dictis <creditur>, II. 9. 3 κεκτημέναις περὶ οἴκους (so M^s for περιοίκους) possidentibus <praedia> circa domus, etc.³ Yet additions may be due to glosses, like *videro fugientem proelio*, (?) ἀπάνευθε μάχης νοίσω in the margin of P¹, etc.⁴ Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: I. 9. 1 οὐτε πόρρω ἐκείνης neque longe <posita>; II. 8. 13 οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν κτλ non bene autem neque de iudicio habet lex iudicare dignificans, though here one might suppose he had ὁ κρίνειν ἀξιῶν before him⁵: II. 11 § 14 ἔκαστον ἀποτελέσται τῶν αὐτῶν πινum quodque perficitur ab eisdem⁶: c. 11 § 15 τῷ πλούτειν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις inditando semper aliquam populi partem emittentes super urbes, suggested perhaps by ποιοῦσιν εὐτόπους in VII (vi). 5. 9⁷: III. 3 § 2 εἴπερ οὖν δημοκρατοῦνται si quidem igitur in democratiam versae fuerant quaedam: 13 § 2 οἴκοι habetur: IV (vii). 16. 14 πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπεύαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν ad deorum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt cum qui de generatione honorem (as if τὰς εἰληχίας were read)⁸.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π¹ i.e. Γ P¹ M) than P¹, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

¹ pp. 21—23: Γ may have had εἰ-ποντο, but this is less probable.

² pp. 24—26.

⁴ p. 34.

⁶ p. 20.

⁸ pp. 43, 20, 41.

⁵ pp. 24, 43.

⁷ p. 41.

M^s, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text¹. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P^s derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family².

These conclusions however are by no means warranted³. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke render it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of Pⁱ or of M^s. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P^s only: once in conjunction with P^s only: 3 times with Pⁱ (or its corrections) only; once with Aretinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts⁴. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing⁵. Whereas the correct reading is due to Pⁱ alone 11 times, to Pⁱ in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P^s margin, P^s) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Aretinus could

¹ pp. 45—47.

² In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48)

from v (viii). 8. 2—a passage where the second family II² exhibits an hiatus—

P ⁱ M	William	P ^s (margin)
παραδοσιμένη	subintrans	ὑπεσθίουσα
παρανομά	praevaricatio	παράβασις
τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα	parvae expensae	αλ μικραὶ δαπάναι
ἀναιρεῖ	consumunt	δαπανῶσιν.

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Susemihl's large critical edition (1872) p. XIII: "mirum autem est in eis 'verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis co-dicibus omissa hic liber (P^s) cum paucis 'aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, 'eum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum 'hac assentire ant alias eiusdem sensus 'voces quam illos hic illuc offerre, ut 'propensus facile fias ad credendum hos 'in eo locos non ex codice Graeco anti-quiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina 'esse haustos."

³ With what follows compare Susemihl *Politica tertium edita* (1882) Preface pp. VIII—XVIII.


⁴ Γ alone gives 1258 b 40 Χαρητίδη 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δὲ ηδη, 1271 a 20 κάν, 1276 a 33 θύρας έν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1332 a 42 ένα δὲ, 1336 a 34

σπουδασιμένων, 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις, b 38 πλήθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταπεινών ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 πλητικήν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὁν (ορ ξηγοῦ?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων: ΓΡ^s 1328 a 5 παρά, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον οὐτὶ δὲ, 1321 b 29 τὰ omitted, 1322 b 36 προσενθύνας (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ omitted: ΓΡⁱ 1259 b 28 δὲ; Γρⁱ 1265 a 16 παρά, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτό: ΓΡⁱ (corrector) 1273 b 22 παρ': ΓΑρ. 1289 b 38 πολέμους; ΓΡ^s Αρ. 1336 a 5 δὲ: ΓΡ^b 1303 b 31 τὰ: Γ Αρ. Γⁱ (corrector) 1332 a 33 τὰ: Γ Αρ. Γ^s (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 σώματος: Γρ^s 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς δλῶς Μⁱ Πⁱ, δλῶς ccl).

⁵ Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 οἰκονόμαι, 1262 b 32 τοῖς φίλακας, 1274 b 20 (ἀποτίνειν or ἀποτίνειν?), 1280 a 29 ταλάρων may be mentioned.

easily make for themselves¹. In 4, or perhaps 5, places P^s has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M^s or to P^s alone². From P^s and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P^s, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts³.

Further it must be noticed that while M^s Γ are often found alone supporting a variant against P¹, M^s P¹ are less frequently (the number of such cases being about $\frac{3}{5}$) alone in agreement against Γ, and it is very seldom indeed that P¹ Γ alone support any reading against M^s. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that Γ and M^s go back to one common archetype, and P¹ to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P⁴ P^s): only the immediate ancestor of M^s had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with Γ or the authorities from which it is derived⁴. The genuine readings of the family II¹ will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M^s Γ), sometimes in the other (of P¹ and of the corrections in P^s P⁴): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.



¹ P¹ alone 1259 a 13 ἀλαιοργεῖων, the right order of 1278 a 36 f. (corr.¹), b 4 κάκεινος corr.¹ (? κάκεῖνος), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (perhaps Γ also), 1287 b 38 βασιλικόν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχεια, 1335 b 20 γερομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον (corr.¹), 1340 b 30 παύδων, 1299 b 24 ἐτέρων, 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?): P¹ Ar. 1263 b 4 τὸ, 1280 b 19 εἶναι; P¹ (corr.) Ar. 1255 a 37 ἔκγονος, 1299 a 14 πολιτεῖας; P¹P⁴ (margin) P³ (later hand) 1284 a 37 κολοκεῖν. Of these ἀλαιοργεῖων, πρότερον, παύδων, τὸ ποιεῖν,

εἶησαν, ἔκγονον are of slight weight.

² P² 1253 a 25 καὶ omitted after φύσει, 1270 b 38 εἴτοι, 1325 a 29 αὐτὸν τὸ (corr.¹), 1339 a 14 εἰπειεν: perhaps 1338 b 33 ἀπαύδαγνυγήτους.

³ 1267 b 33 τὰ L^a, U^b (corr.); 1274 b 20 τὸ πταλοῦσαι L^a; 1275 b 39 τοῦτο L^a Aldine and M^a (1st hand); 1331 a 24 θεοῖς P⁴ Ar., 1295 a 28 ἡ L^aC^c Ar., 1317 a 12 τὸ R^b Ar. 1302 b 39 τὸ ποσδὺ R^b.

⁴ For proof of this see (beside the criti-

Few of the readings common to M^s Pⁱ or of those common to Γ M^s have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving Pⁱ to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or M^s, it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13. 15 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διάκειν for αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διάκειν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of IIⁱ): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ, solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas Pⁱ, alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where Pⁱ διακόπονται is a trifle nearer right than M^s διακονοῦσι Will. *ministrant*¹.

All existing manuscripts of the *Politics*, when compared even with those of the *Ethics*, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ M^s, other things being equal, in preference to Pⁱ sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of IIⁱ, he would yet oftener go astray if he followed Pⁱ against Γ M^s. The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects II^s is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in IIⁱ: in such cases it is seldom II^s that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is IIⁱ that is mutilated². Yet as a general rule IIⁱ should be followed in preference to II^s.

Coming now to Busse's view about P^s, we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (viii), 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.):

P ⁱ M ^s	William	P ^s
πρὸς ἀκριβείαν	ad perfectionem	πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
εἰρημέναις	dictis	ρηθείσαις
§ 6 ἔνεκεν	gratia	χάριν (Bekk.)
τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ	ipsius quidem enim	αὐτὸν μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
φίλων	amicorum	τῶν φίλων
c. 3 § 1 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἡδονή	de musica autem	περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 3 τέλος	finaliter	τελευταῖον
ὅτι δεῖ ποιοῦντας	quod facientes oportet τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ (Bekk.) ³	

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

cal notes) Susemihl's Third edition (1882) Preface pp. x, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.

¹ Quoted by Busse p. 45.

² The manuscripts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* show an equally perplexing discrepancy between K^bM^b and L^bO^b in

some parts of the treatise, K^bO^b and L^bM^b in others.

³ Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327 a 34, 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 1336 a 34, b 18, 1320 a 10, 1307 b 32 f. Susemihl *op. c. viii.*

the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P^a: 1330 a 32 χρῆ for δεῖ c. c.¹; 1333 b 2 δὲ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα for καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ (Π¹ omit δὲ); 1335 b 23 παιδοποίας for τεκνοποίας; 1336 b 5 γὰρ τοῦ for τοῦ γάρ, 1339 a 16 χάριν for ἔνεκα, 1340 a 8 δῆλον for φανερὸν; 9 ἄλλων for ἐτέρων; 1342 a 6 ἀπάγαις for πάσαις; 1309 a 18 οὐ for μή. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P¹ and M^s against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 λειπομένοις M^s P^b *deficientes* William, 1318 b 31 τιμημάτων τὰς μεῖζους ἀπὸ omitted by M^s P^b translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 μὲν τοῖς M^s P^{1,5} Ald., τοῖς μὲν Π¹; 1332 b 1 μεταβάλλειν M^s P^{1,5} μεταβαλεῖν Π²; 1334 b 2 τε untranslated by Will., τὰ Π^{1,5}; 1335 a 16 τὸ c. c. τοὺς M^s P^b; 1337 a 18 βέλτιον M^s P^b Ar., βέλτιστον c. c. *optimus* Will.; 1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ Π^{1,5} and in the margin of P⁴, κατὰ c. c. in Will.; 27 αἱ πρότεραι Π¹ P^b and the corrector of P⁴, αἱ πρότερον Π²; 1322 a 22 τοῖς εἰρημένοις M^s and P^{1,5} (1st hand), τῆς εἰρημένης c. c. *dicho* Will.; 1306 a 22 ἐγχειρίσωμεν ceteri, ἐγχειρήσωσιν M^s, ἐγχειρήσουσιν P^b *manus iniecerint* Will.; 1313 b 2 φρόνημά τε Π^{1,5} R^b, φρονήματά τε c. c. *sapientiae* Will.; 1316 a 32 τῶν c. c. τοῦ Π^{1,5} Ar., in Γ M^s a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 δεῖ δικαιούντης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας c. c., *indigent iustitia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui* Will. Any one correcting the text from the Latin version would surely have written ἀπολαύειν; but P^b has δεόνται.....οἱ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες.....ἀπολαύοντες. Or again, 1311 b 7 διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύναι (αἰσχύναι M^s P¹ αἰσχύνεσθαι Π²); *propterea quod aliqui monarcharum in corpus verecundiam fecerunt* would have suggested αἰσχύναι, not αἰσχύνειν which is what we find in P^a. So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt ὄπλιτην of 1321 a 12, William's *armatissimam* would have suggested ὄπλιτικὴν or ὄπλιτιν, not ὄπλιτικὸν which is the reading of P^b. Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading ἀφιεμένονς seems to have come down in P^a as well as in P¹: it is at least unlikely that William's *responentes* suggested it. Even in VIII (v) 8. 2, the passage which Busse thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that παραδονομένη should supersede ὑπεισδύοντα².

¹ Consensus codicum.

² Bekker, who took P² of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P^b; in

some cases even, e.g. 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16 f., 34 f., where M^s P¹ have a better reading. See p. 76.

Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the *Politics*, when put into the more coherent shape which to the German editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention¹, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books², but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. I. 11 §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. I., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, *εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δὲ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα, δονλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγενέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς*, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow *τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων* (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of *χρηματιστικὴ* could not be excluded from the *ἐργασίαι* of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before *εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται κτλ.*, are, *περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρῆσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.* This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of *χρηματιστικὴ*, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (*τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, § 1*): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded *περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ κτλ.*: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence *περὶ ἑκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν* be transposed to follow *ἀρετῆς*. The argument too runs on better to the next sentence *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστιν ἐρίσις γεγραμμένα κτλ.*, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a "general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into "details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, "but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is "referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written "upon them"."

¹ As may be done by passing over the parts printed in Clarendon type and reading the duplicates of the same passages in their transposed place; where they stand in ordinary type between thick brackets

thus < >.

² See above p. 16 n. 4.

³ Susemihl *Quaestiones Criticae* 1 p. 9 (Greifswald 1867. 4).

(2) Bk. I. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot¹, "that after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does not say one word of the ἀρεταὶ διανοητικαὶ which properly belong to it, while speaking three times, II. 15, 17, 20, of ηθικὴ ἀρετὴ in the same sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who commands ought to have ηθικὴ ἀρετὴ in perfection, he says that the work belongs to him who directs it and that reason (*λόγος*) is a directing faculty: this reflexion evidently applies to the ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, elsewhere called φρόνησις, III. 4. 17, and not to the ηθικὴ ἀρετὴ of the ἀλογον." He proposes therefore to transpose II. 14—17, ὅμοιως τοίνυν...ἔργον to follow ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς: to omit ηθικὴ in line 20, and change ηθικὴν to διανοητικὴν in I. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if ηθικὴν be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, φρόνησις inseparably involves ηθικὴ ἀρετή, *Nic. Eth.* vi. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. *ib.* 12 § 6, ἐπι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελέσται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ηθικὴν ἀρετήν); so I. 20 ηθικὴ may stand. The dianoetic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, ὁ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, and *Pol.* III. 4. §§ 17, 18, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη, τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινάς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής with the notes.

(3) II. 4. 4, ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον...μὴ νεωτερίζειν. "It is singular that Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1264 b 1, he supposes without saying so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers more obedient" (Thurot)². He therefore suggests that II. 4. 4 should follow κοινωνίαν in II. 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that οὐδαρῆς φιλία must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούναντίον ὥν προσήκει τοὺς ὄρθως κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι; the application to the agricultural class would come in appropriately to point this reversal of the effect intended³.

(4) II. 6 § 3 *sub fin.* καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινα δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion περὶ παιδείας to be extraneous to the main political subject of the *Republic*. Moreover

¹ *Etudes sur Aristote* 18, 19. Comp. also Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VI. 9—11.

² *Op. cit.* 26, 27.

³ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* I p. 13.

in line 37 he exchanges the construction with *περὶ* for a new one *οἵσται δέν...πεπλήρωκε*. The clause *καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φυλάκων* should come amongst the subjects (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν*) on which Socrates in the *Republic* has touched, and therefore in § 1 after *κτήσεως* 1364 b 30¹.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν*). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, *αἱ μὲν ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν*. Giphanius (Van Giffen)² comparing c. 12 § 1, *ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκουνώησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ ὠντυωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον...ἔνιοι δὲ νομοθέται γεγόνασιν...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοῖ, proposed to omit φιλοσόφων καὶ Spengel³ simply transposed these words before *ιδιωτῶν*.*

(6) II. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a reiteration of the former in different language.

ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν δινοσότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τοῦτοντίον δὲ περὶ ἔκατερ (οἱ μὲν γάρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον,

ἴστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἵσας εἶναι τοὺς πολέτας πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γάρ ἄν οἱ χαρίεντες

¹ Compare Victorius *Comm.* p. 106 (ed. of 1576): adiungit autem in extremo disputasse etiam illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc enim coniungi debet cum iis quae nunc repetit facienti-

bus ad materiam eorum librorum indicandum, non cum inferioribus ut quidam falso putarunt.

² In his commentary p. 210.

³ *Arist. Studien* III. p. 14 (66).

οι δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἵσαι^τ ὅθεν καὶ

ἐν δὲ ἦτι τιμῇ ημέν κακὸς ἥδε καὶ ἑσθλός), οὐ μόνον θ' οἱ ἀνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὃν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὡστε μὴ λωποδύτειν διὰ τὸ ῥυγοῦν ἢ πενήνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν^τ ἐὰν γάρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν ταύτης ιατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν, οὐ τούννην διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνεν ἐπιθυμίων ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνεν λυπῶν ἥδοναις. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσίᾳ βραχεῖα καὶ ἐργασίᾳ, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνῃ· τρίτοι δ, εἴ τινες δύναντο δ' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἀν ἐπιξητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἀλλαὶ ἀνθρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσι γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραγνοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥυγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἀν ἀποκτείνην τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον)^τ ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. 7 §§ 10—13.

It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14¹, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14¹.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices, must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον

¹ Susemihl in *Jahrb. für Philol.* xcvi. 1866. p. 330.

ἀγανακτοῦεν [ἄν] ὡς οὐκ ἵσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες^τ ἔτι δ' ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρώτον μὲν ἴκαρὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἥδη τοῦτ^τ ὥ πάτριον, αἱ δέονται τοῦ πλεονός, ἕως εἰς ἀπειρον ἐλθωσιν. ἀπειρος γάρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἡς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν, τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὄμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν ὡστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι^τ τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ἀν ἥπτους τε ὥστι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶνται. 7 §§ 18—20.

ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ιδιωτεύοντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖπο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν δὲ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. "If he was "forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made "provision for poor men in office." Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: "at all events he should not have allowed these "high offices to be virtually put up for sale!"

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβάνει δὲ εὐλόγως. ἔτα μὲν γάρ διαφέρειν καὶ ἀρετὴν ἡ πλείους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δὲ ἥδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβώσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν· αὗτη γάρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται¹ διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχοντιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. Spengel² first called attention to the difficulty of συμβάνει δὲ εὐλόγως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἥδη χαλεπόν) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot³ supposed a lacuna to precede συμβάνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τοὺς πολιτικὸν ἀρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἀπλῶς ἀρίστους>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικὸν πλήθος ἐν φέψικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλήθος πολεμικόν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικὸν before πλήθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβάνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία⁴. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβάνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχοντιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμους⁵. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III. 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...ξε αὐτῶν. Thurot⁶ sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

¹ Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Ph.* xcvi. 1866.

p. 333.

² *Ueber die Politik* p. 23 n. 24.

³ *Etudes sur Aristote* p. 42, 43.

⁴ Susemihl *Philol.* xxix. 1870. 106

n. 16, *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 15, IV. p. 12.

⁵ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 16.

⁶ *Etudes sur Aristote* 47—51.

or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), *i.e.* somewhere between *ἀρετήν* (§ 12, end) and *εἰ δέ τις ἀστριν*, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question started in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13¹.

(11) III. 13. 22. The sentence *ῶστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν*, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to *διορθοῦν* in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited *ῶστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν*, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot² saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after *διορθοῦν*, at the end of the general reflexions. Bernays³ however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after *ἔχει τρόπον*.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, *πότερόν ποτε ἔνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων ή οὐ συμφέρει*, a succession of *ἀπορίαι* and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows⁴: (α) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this *ἀπορία*, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14,

¹ Susemihl in *Philol.* xxix. 1870 pp.

^{113—4}

² *Etudes sur Aristote* 51—53.

³ In his *Translation* p. 211.

⁴ For a fuller account see the *Analysis* p. 112 f.

and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words *κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς*). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 δοκεῖ δέ τισιν...§ 4 πάντων, relates to a different *ἀπορία* altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (*ἐξ ὁμοίων η̄ πόλις?*)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (*ἄντα μέρος?*)?

Here the limit of *ἀπορίαι* distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, ἀλλὰ μὴν...ὅμοιως, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν as far as *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in § 9 must belong to the first *ἀπορία* (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) ἀλλὰ μὴν...§ 5 τῶν κειμένων could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow *καλλίον* and precede *ὅτι μὲν τούνν*; the remainder (β) 16 § 5 ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον...§ 9 κατὰ τὸ ἔθος might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between *πᾶσαν* and *ἀλλ’ ισως*. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (ε) §§ 9, 10 from ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φράδιον as far as *συμφράδμονες*, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β); and this might go in 15 § 10 after *ὅτις* and before *εἰ δή*. To this same *ἀπορία* further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 εἰσὶ δέ καὶ νῦν to the end δεῖν ὁμοίως; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γάρ...ὅτις, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.

καὶ γάρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι
καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὗται
δέ εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν
καθ’ ἔκαστον. καθ’ ἓν μὲν οὖν συμ-
βαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ισως χείρων
ἀλλ’ ἔστιν η̄ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ
ἔστισι συμφορητὸς καλλίων μάς
καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἀ-
μενον ὅχλος πολλὰ η̄ εἰς ὁστισοῦν.

εἰσὶ δέ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἑνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ
κέριαι κράνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ
ῶν ὁ νόμος ἀδύνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ
περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-
τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἀν διστά ὁ
νόμος ἀρχεῖ καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ
τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς
νόμοις τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀ-
ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολύ, καθάπερ ὅδωρ τὸ πλείον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἔὸς ὑπ' ὄργης κρατηθέντος ἡ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἔργον ὁμα πάντας ὄργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἰν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖς καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάσαντις ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἵσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κάκενος ὁ εἰς. 15

§§ 7—10.

τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοτεθῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τούνν τοῦτό γέ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἔνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἔκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀπόπον τὸν εἶναι δόξειν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὅμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοάσι κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶν ποσὶ καὶ χερσὶν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὄφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὥστα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τὸν γὰρ τὴν ἄρχῳ καὶ αὐτὸν φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μηδὲ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὅντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαιρεσίν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κάκείγον καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἵσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἵσους καὶ ὅμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὅμοίως. 16 §§ 10—13.

Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson¹. “It may be that the two chapters belong “almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being “combined they should be still further resolved.” Thus

- (i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν οὖν...ἐνούσας = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ἔλαττον.
- (ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἄρχῃ...πάτας corresponds in subject to
16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἄρα νόμον...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος + §§ 10, 11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
- (iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς corresponds in subject to
16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλ' ὅτι...δεῖν ὅμοίως and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μην

¹ *Journal of Philology* x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.

οὐδὲ ῥάδιον... συμφράδμονες. "Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second."

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected¹ (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ξεῖ δὲ ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 ὁ βασιλέυς. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα...τῶν κειμένων "interrupts the argument of the context: "it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 "and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν 1287 b 23" (in § 11).

Spengel² proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος to follow κάλλιον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὴν, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. A^c, where the recurrence of a word (*συλλογισμός* in *Rhet.* 1. 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ζητεῖν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws³.

(13) IV (VII). I §§ 11, 12 = C. 2 §§ 1, 2

ἐχόμενον δέ ἐστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὑδαιμονίαν τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γάρ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν· οὐδὲν δέ καλὸν ἔργον οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς

πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως η̄ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· πάντες γάρ ἀν ὄμολογῆς εἰναι εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. οἵσοι γάρ ἐν

¹ Cp. Susemihl *Aristotelis Politica tertium ed.* p. XXI.

² *Arist. Stud.* III. 26 (78), f.

³ ἀλλ' ίσως ἀν φαῖη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βαυλεύσεται τερὶ τῶν καθ' έκαστα κάλλιον. The reply is: ἀλλὰ μὴν θα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπος

ἀν δύναστο γρωθῆναι. Objection: ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διουκεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Εἴτι δέ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι θέλωσι, δ τι ἀν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἀμεινοῖς εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.

οὐτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρίᾳ δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὡν μετασχὼν ἔκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. c. 1
§§ 11, 12.

πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὐ τίθενται ἐφ' ἑνός,
οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν γὰρ
πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν. οὗτοι τε τὸν
τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν,
οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρ-
χουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην εἴραι φάμεν
ἀν. εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἔνα δι' ἀρετὴν
ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέ-
ραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιωτέραν. c. 2
§§ 1, 2.

Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed¹. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of c. 1. Susemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12².

(14) IV (VII). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanus (Van Giffen)³ calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πληθεῖ καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσύνοπτος: in this way § 9 ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θείας γάρ...τὸ πᾶν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koraes omitted διό: it is a smaller change, with Böcker⁴, to transpose ἐπεὶ...γίνεσθαι to follow ἀναγκαῖον in § 9.

(15) IV (VII). 8. 2 οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτε
ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἔστιν. Bojesen⁵ saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν καὶ ταῦτα
τοῖς κοινωνοῖς ἄλλης κοινωνίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) IV (VII). 8 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ γὰρ κτήσεώς ἔστιν. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινωνοῖς of § 2⁶.

¹ *Ueber die Politik*, pp. 45, 48.

² *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIX, 1866 p. 602.
See also Böcker *De quibusdam Pol. Ar-
locis* (Greifswald, 1867) p. 6 f., Spengel
Arist. Stud. III. 30 (82).

³ *Comm.* pp. 921, 2.

⁴ *op. c.* 13, 14.

⁵ *Bidrag* (Copenhagen 1845) pp. 24—

26.

⁶ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 15.

(17) IV (vii) cc. 13—15. Wilson¹ regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. “In each the same question is proposed, what is “happiness or the chief good? (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); “and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost “the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with “15 §§ 6, 7 ὅτι μὲν οὖν... ἡχθαί).” These transitional passages stand as follows:

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. (§ 11) τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτ’ ἔστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γάρ φέναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἀνθρώπον ἄλλα μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζώων, εἴτα καὶ ποιὸν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνia δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος φύναι τὰ γάρ ἔθη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνia γάρ ἔστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἔθων ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. (§ 12) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζώων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῆ, μικρά δὲ ἔνia καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἀνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ μόνον γάρ ἔχει λόγον.

ῶστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἄλληλοις. πολλὰ γάρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττοντι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

(§ 13) τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷον εἴναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειρώτους ἵστεθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἥδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἔθιζόμενοι μανθάνοντι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 13 §§ 10—13.

... <τὴν ἀρετήν,> καὶ ὅτι δι’ αὐτήν, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον, τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μέν τινας εἴναι χρὴ τὴν φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παιδευτέοις τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.

ταῦτα γάρ δεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γάρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ἴποθέσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως ἡχθαί. 15 §§ 6, 7.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποίους...ἔθεσιν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

¹ *Journal of Phil.* x, pp. 84, 85.

to the *Ethics*. That there is an advance in the treatment of cc. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13: see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in III. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in III. c. 6; in I. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in I. c. 4 are but amplified and supported¹.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason². Hence Böcker³ proposed to transpose ὅτε ... ἀλλήλοις to follow βέλτιον at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to λόγος and ὥη; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for "the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and "habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would "never do by nature or by habit."

(18) IV (VII). 16 §§ 4, 5 σχέδον δὲ πάντα...τούτους. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 πληθύον ἔτι <ἢ μικρόν>. If this be done, (1) § 6 οἵτι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων κτλ. will directly explain § 4 ἔτι δ' ὥθεν ἀρχόμενοι...βούλησων; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37 (?) respectively⁴.

(19) IV (VII). 17 § 6 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...διατεινομένοις. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 ἀσκησιν; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred⁵.

(20) IV (VII). 17 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ...ἀναγκαῖον. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, i.e. after δυσμένειαν (?) δυσγένειαν in § 14⁶.

(21) V (VIII). 4 § 7. The clause δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι,

¹ Comp. Susemihl *Aris. Politica tertium ad*, pp. XXI, XXII.

² Cp. Susemihl in *Philol.* xxv. 1867, p. 403.

³ op. c. 15.

⁴ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VII. p. 15.

⁵ Susemihl in *Philologus* XXV. 1867, pp. 408—9.

⁶ Susemihl l. c.

πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case¹. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δῆ.

(22) v (viii). v § 17 ἔτι δὲ ἀκρούμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἔτι, should give a second reason ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τίνες τὰ ἡθη διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς, the first being the ‘enthusiasm’ inspired by the melodies of Olympos. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: ‘enthusiastic’ strains inspire ‘enthusiasm’: and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that “rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, “short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the “soul undergoes a change.” But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully portraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: “because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody,” i.e. a purely instrumental performance².

(23) v (viii). v § 25 καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς * * εἶναι (διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker³ recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, i.e. after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων § 24.

(24) vi (iv), cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds⁴ for believing that this portion of Bk. vi (iv) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους καὶ δι' ἦν αἰτίαν, εἴρηται διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskilfully added by the compiler⁵, seems probable from the

¹ Susemihl *ib.* p. 411, *Q. C.* IV. 20,
also Böcker independently *op. c.* p. 18.

² Susemihl *Philologus* XXV. 1867. 411
—413, *Q. C.* IV. 20, Spengel *Arist. Stud.*
44, 45.

³ *op. c.* p. 18.

⁴ Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1866.

554—560.

⁵ See Cook Wilson in *Journal of Philol.* X. 80, 81.

fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 δώτι δὲ πλείους κτλ., is never redeemed: instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τοῦ μὲν οὐν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας
αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρη πλείω
πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. 3 § 1.

οὐδολογοῦμεν γάρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος
ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. 4 § 7.
καὶ γάρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἔξι ἐνὸς ἀλλ'
ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μορίων, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται πολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν
πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί,
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναυ-
σον, κτλ.

τρίτον δὲ <τὸ> ἀγοραῖον, κτλ
τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον
δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων
οὐδὲν ἡττον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν ὑπάρ-
χειν κτλ. 4 §§ 9, 10.

ώστε κτλ.....φανερὸν ὅτι τό γε
ὅπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστι τῆς
πόλεως μόριον. ** ἐβδομον δὲ τὸ
ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὅπερ καλοῦ-
μεν εὐπόρους. ὅγδοον δὲ τὸ δημιουρ-
γικὸν κτλ

.....ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας
εἴναι τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν.
4 §§ 15—17.

ώσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῷου προγρούμεθα
λαβεῖν εἰδῆ, πρῶτον μὲν ἄν ἀπο-
διωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν
ζῷον κτλ

εἰ δέτοσαῦτα εἴναι δεῖ μόνον, τούτων
δὲ εἰεν διαφοραί, ... ὁ τῆς συζεύξεως
τῆτούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει
πλείω γένη ζῷων κτλ....ώσθ' ὅταν
ληφθωσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχό-
μενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἰδη
ζῶν, καὶ τοσαῦτι εἰδη τοῦ ζῴου ὅσαι
περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων
εἰσίν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ τῶν
εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. 4 §§ 8, 9.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγ-
καῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἴδει διαφε-
ρούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γάρ ταῦτι εἴδει
διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσ-
άντας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς
ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς
τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.

μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο,
καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται
τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δὲ
ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ
τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρ-
χία. 3 § 6.

ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς
αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη
μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐ-
πόροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἐπὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους
εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς, ταῦτα ἐναντία
μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μο-
ρίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ
τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστᾶσι, καὶ
δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημο-
κρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 4 §§ 18, 19.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. IV (VII), *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν* (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. IV (VII) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην¹: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.

(25) VI (IV). 6 §§ 2, 3. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔχεστιν, ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔχεστι μετέχειν. δλως μὲν γάρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἔξειναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔξειναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν.

The clause διὸ...μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διὸ of which it could be the effect. Thurot² would find a place for it after προσόδων οὐσῶν, but he has to admit that ἔξειναι σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is ἔξειναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow³ gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατικὸν after ἔξειναι: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

¹ "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. IV (VII)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.

² *Etudes sur Aristote* 60, 6
³ *Bemerkungen* pp. 13, 14.

has been laid down the clause διὸ...μετέχειν comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert δ' after σχολάζειν.

(26) VI (iv). c. 12¹. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enumerated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, ἐπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἱρετή: what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κρείττον whether their preponderance comes from τὸ ποιὸν or τὸ ποσόν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει...τούτων; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων...πληγθεῖς; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων...ὁ μέσος. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ τὸν νομοθέτην...τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, τίς κοινοτάτη κτλ. Moreover from 12 § 6, ὅσῳ δ' ἀν ἀμευνον right on to the end of c. 13, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Polities (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12².

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry τίς τίσιν αἱρετή is broken off abruptly at ὁ μέσος in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. VII (vi). 1. 5, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτεῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν, εὑργατι πρότερον—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, δεῖ δ' ἀεὶ...τούτοις, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bücheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, δεῖ...τούτοις + 12 § 6, c. 13 §§ 1—6, ὅσῳ δ' ἀν ἀμευνον...ἐτέρων μόνον in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος and τοῦ δ' εὐ μεμιχθαι, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἀρχεσθαι, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after ὅλως.

(27) VIII (v). 1 § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ...ἐκείνων, ὅτε δὲ...

¹ See Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 564 ff.; also Böcker *op. cit.* § 11, pp. 24—32.

² The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: cp. *Analysis* p. 121 f.

μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον κτλ., and in § 10 another ἐτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτε δὲ κτλ., where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holders of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτε δὲ οὐδὲ...ἢ τὴν *μοναρχίαν* is in § 11 between *πολιτεΐᾳ* and *πανταχοῦ*¹.

Wilson² discovers a parallel version of I §§ 2—7, δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον...στάσεων εἰσιν, in I §§ 11—16 πανταχοῦ γὰρ...τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλὰ γεγένηται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὄμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἵστον, τούτου δ' ἀμάρτανόντων, ὁσπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γάρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἵστους ὅτιοῦν ὄντας οἰεσθαι ἀπλῶς ἵστους εἶναι (ὅτι γάρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὄμοιώς, ἀπλῶς ἴστοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίστους ἐν τι ὄντας δῆλος εἶναι ἀνίστους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γάρ ἀνιστοὶ ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἀνιστοὶ ὑπολαμβάνονται εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

όμολογούντες δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἵστοι ὥστιν, ἴστοι δῆλοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν,

οἱ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τὶ ἀνιστοὶ, πάντων ἀνίστων ἀξιοῦσιν ἔαντος. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. §§ 13, 14.

Further "the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated "in a shorter form" in 2 §§ 2, 3: "there is here then perhaps another "re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book "and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3." Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. III; at I § 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c. 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with I §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if I §§ 11—16 is another recension of I §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, στασιάζοντι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις...ἴστοι ὄντες,

¹ Susemihl *Quæst. Crit.* v. p. 10.

² *Journal of Philology* x. 84.

should precede 1 § 11, *πανταχοῦ γάρ κτλ.* At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 3¹.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, *γίνονται μὲν...ἐπηρεασθεῖς*, have for their subject the cases where *στάσις* has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, *μεταβάλλοντι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλούς*, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δι' αὐξῆσιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This *αὔξησις* may be *κατὰ τὸ ποσόν* or *κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, *μεταβάλλοντι δὲ καὶ...πρὸς πολλούς* (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow *δυναστείας* at the end of 3 § 8².

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, *ὅμονοσῶν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ...ἢ Ἰφιάδου*. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered *κατὰ γάμους η δίκας*, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16; while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated³.

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy⁴, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (*e.g.* Lucretius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskilfully with Aristotle's materials⁵. In proportion as this is

¹ Susemihl *Politica tert. ed.* p. xxiii; Böcker *op. cit.* 37.

² Böcker *op. cit.* 40, 41.

³ Susemihl *Quæst. Crit.* v. 12, 13.

⁴ "Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shewn not only that the passage *cannot* be placed in its old position, but that it *must* be placed in its new." Postgate *Notes* p. 24.

⁵ "Hoc est uerisimillimum: ipsum Aristotelem omnes has particulas, quas in altera Politicorum recensione siue uberiori tractare siue continenti exposi-

tionis ordini inserere sibi proposuerit, in margine hic illic adnotasse; posteros autem, qui ediderunt libros, cum nescirent, quid notis illis voluisse scriptor, ineptissime confusas in hunc, quem hodie tenent, locum contulisse, quem fortasse reuera mutilatum lacunosumque deprehenderant." Böcker *op. cit.* 32, 33. There was no place for footnotes in an ancient book: but some instances in the above list—*e.g.* (3) (11) (15) (21) (23) (27) (29)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the remark of Weldon *Translation* p. 100 n. 2.

admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes; and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotelem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos: certe cur ab eo ipso in libris celerrime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, inco-
"hatis potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem
"esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam".

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the *Politics*¹ carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies². The most important change introduced is to make Bk. I. cc. 8—11, περὶ χρηματιστικῆς, precede the discussion περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, thus inserting them in I. c. 3 § 3 between χρηματιστικῆς and πρώτου δέ. That the topics of Bk. I. would be thus better arranged may be admitted; but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. I. in the following order: c. I, c. 2 §§ 1—6 παιδίας; then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

ἢ δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἡδη γνομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν <ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν>. [ἢ δὲ φίσις τέλος ἐστι.] οἷον γὰρ ἔκαστον ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεῖσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἔκαστον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἰπερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἔκεινων. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34.

Then follows 2 § 7 δὼ καὶ τὸ πρώτον...τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

¹ Susemihl *Politica tertium ed.* p. XXVI.
Cp. also p. XIII.

² Aristotelis *Politicorum liber primus* ex recensione M. Schmidt (Jena 1882. 4to). The arrangement adopted is justified in an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. 1882. 801—824. Compare with

<ἢ δὴ> πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 1252 b 28.

<μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ> αἰτίᾳ³. τὸ <γάρ> οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον. ἢ δὲ αὐταρκεία [καὶ] τέλος, <ῶστε> καὶ βέλτιστον. 2 § 8, 1252 b 34 1253 a 1.

what follows Susemihl *Politica tertium ed.* (Teubner) pp. XXIV—XXVI.

³ Even Krohn *Zur Kritik* 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the οἰκεῖων συναγωγῆ.

⁴ αἰτία <α> for ἀτι.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει ἡ πόλις
ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἔκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. ἀναιρουμένου γάρ
τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται [ποὺς οὐδὲ χειρ] εἰ
μὴ ὄμωνύμως [ῶσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν
λιθίνην. διαφθαρέσσα γάρ <οὐκ> ἔσται
τοιάντη.] πάντα γὰρ τῷ ἔργῳ ὥρισται
καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιάντα
οὖτα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ’
ὄμωνυμα. 2 §§ 12, 13: 1253 a 19

—25.

What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, i.e. §§ 9, 10 ἐκ τούτων
...ἐπιθυμητῆς, §§ 10—12 διώτι...πόλιν, §§ 15, 16 φύσει...κρίσις: also
c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικῆς. Then cc. 8—11 in the following
order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειν (the preceding sentence of
8 § 1 ὅλως...ἥν is enclosed in brackets)...οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 δῆλον...
ζώων: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ οἰκεν...γίνεται μᾶλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὕτη...
χρημάτων κτήσις: 9 §§ 2—12 λάβωμεν...ό κατὰ φύσιν: 9 §§ 14—18 τῆς
δ’ οἰκονομικῆς οὐ <σης> χρηματιστικῆς...δρον: 10 §§ 4, 5; c. 11; c. 12 § 1
as far as γαμικῆ. The rest of c. 3 follows, i.e. §§ 3, 4 πρῶτον [δὲ] περὶ¹
δεσπότου...βίαν γάρ: cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης...θηρευτική, after which ἡ δεῖ χρῆσθαι...τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον]
should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 φανερὸν δὲ...ἰσων ἀρχῆ:
lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς (in 12 § 1) to the end. TR.]

¹ The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of *aὐτάρκεια* is found three times, and the passages where

it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle (p. c. 804) because, if the end of the state is *εὐ ζῆν*, it cannot be *aὐτάρκεια*. This then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Krohn calls it, 'our old recension', has been formed by the comprehension of heterogeneous materials.]

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good : 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the *Politicus* of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state : 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life : 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy : 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth ; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong : 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual : 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes : 2 §§ 15, 16.

PART I: OF THE FAMILY: B. I. cc. 3—13.

A. Of the Family in general. There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (*χρηματιστική*); the relation of this subject to that of the family (*οἰκονομική*)¹ is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.**I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5.**

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(a) The nature and justification of Slavery: cc. 4—6.

(i) The nature and character of the slave: he is an animate chattel, c. 4.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature: cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5.

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6.

(β) The view quoted in the *Introduction* from Plato's *Politicus* that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.

(περὶ πάσης κτῆσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς: of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

¹ [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense.

The more common equivalents are, for *χρηματιστική* 'finance', 'money-making art'; for *οἰκονομική* 'household management', 'domestic economy'. Tr.]

(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (*χρηματιστική*) to a theory of the family or economic science (*οἰκονομική*): cc. 8—10.

(a) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Proof that the first is inadmissible: acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (*ὅτι μὲν οὐν...*).

(γ) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange simply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital: 9 §§ 7—18.

(δ) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the *natural* species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3.

(ε) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application: c. 11.

(a) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4.

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade: whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(b) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artizans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(β) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(γ) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to

the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched : 11 §§ 7—13.

III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations; also in the relation of master and slave : cc. 12, 13.

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children : c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to inanimate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free : 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it : that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(α) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9:

(β) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave : 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not in themselves, but in relation to another : 13 § 11 (*ἐπειδὴ...*).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves: 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity : 13 §§ 15, 16.

PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION: B. II.—VIII.

A. CRITICAL PART.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. 1 §§ 1, 2.

II. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL POLITIES: 1 § 3—8 § 25.

a. PLATO'S IDEAL STATE IN THE *Republic*: 1 § 3—5 § 28.

(a) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: cc. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word "all". Plato's view would not be correct if "all" meant "all collectively", but only if "all" meant "each individual":—a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike: their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.

(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood-relations: 4 §§ 2—6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens: all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when thus generalized all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5—9. <For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4.>

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties: and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in their case: 4 § 9 (*ἀλλὰ μῆτρες...*), § 10.

(ii) **Arguments against community of property : 5 §§ 1—13.**

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state, the cultivators are not the owners of the soil: 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to *meum* and *tuum*, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5—8.

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble: 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (*σωφροσύνη*), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality: 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c. are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption: 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair; he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism: the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(7) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14—28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (a). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c. instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now: 5 § 16.

(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: 5 § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory: 5 §§ 18—24.

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: 5 § 24 (*άρνοτον δὲ καὶ...*).

(vi) To keep the same rulers always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato's part requires it: 5 §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: 5 §§ 27, 28.

b. The ideal polity of Plato's *Laws*: c. 6.

(a) Comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws*; the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: 6 §§ 1—5.

(β) Criticism of the state in the *Laws*: 6 §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory: 6 §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: 6 §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully: 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: 6 §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: 6 § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: 6 § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen's real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: 6 § 15 (*καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκουμέδων...*).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the *Laws* is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, i.e. a Polity (*πολιτεία*) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme: 6 §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: 6 § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too preponderant in this constitution of Plato's: 6 §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: 6 § 22.

c. Phaleas' scheme of polity : c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme : 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism : 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10, holds also against Phaleas : if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited : 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small : 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires : 7 §§ 8, 9, §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property : 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed : 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens ; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object : 7 §§ 22, 23.

d. Hippodamas' scheme of polity : c. 8.

[(a) Introductory remarks on Hippodamas himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution : 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into artizans, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land ; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations : 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4.

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions : 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war : 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates : 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism : 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible : 8 § 7 (*ἀπορήσει δ' ἀν...*)—§ 10.

(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view: yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: 8 § 10 (*έτι οι γεωργοί...*).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jurymen should vote, §§, any better: 8 §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, 8 §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: 8 §§ 23—25.

III. CRITICISM OF THE BEST AMONGST ACTUALLY EXISTING POLITIES : CC. 9—12.

(a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General prefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: 9 § 1.

(β) The defects of the Spartan polity: 9 §§ 2—36.

(i) Social defects: 9 §§ 2—19.

(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: 9 §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: 9 §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: 9 §§ 14—19.

(ii) Political defects: 9 §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephoralty, 9 §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, 9 §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, 9 §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: 9 §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (*ναυαρχοί*), 9 § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, 9 § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, 9 § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, 9 § 36.

(d) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.

(a) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained: 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(β) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities: 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two: 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the *κρητικοί* is worse managed even than the ephoralty: 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

(c) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.

(a) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephoralty, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(γ) To what extent

(i) the democratical element: §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mischievous to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—12.

(δ) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices: 11 §§ 13, 14.

(ε) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the insecure favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

(d) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.

(a) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(β) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3,

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 3—6, upon Solon's constitution.

[IV. APPENDIX.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not: 12 §§ 6—14.

- (a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycurgus, Zaleukos, Charondas: 12 §§ 6, 7.
- (b) Philolaos, 12 § 8,
- (c) Charondas, 12 §§ 8—10,
- (d) Phaleas, 12 § 11,
- (e) Plato, 12 § 12,
- (f) Draco, 12 § 13,
- (g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,
- (h) Andromadas, 12 § 14.]

B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

I. FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

B. III. cc. 1—13.

First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question ‘What is a state?’ and this introduces the further question ‘What is a citizen?’: 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (*δικασται*), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens: 1 § 2—2 § 5.

β. The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

γ. Is the excellence (*ἀρετή*) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

[(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.]

(b) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, i.e. his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their inmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (*ἀρεταί*) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or dianoetic excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artizans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.

Second group of principles. Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit: 6 § 2—13 § 25.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.

(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms: 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich; the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (*δικαίων*) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (*τὸ κυρίως δικαίων, τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν*): c. 9.

(β) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend: cc. 10, 11.

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (*οἱ ἔτικτοι*), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (*εἷς δὲ σπουδαιότατος*), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, 11 §§ 1—5; but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the

citizens should entrust the details of state business: 11 §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, 11 §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, 11 §§ 13, 14.

(iv) Second objection, 11 §§ 15, 16: how disposed of, §§ 16, 17.

(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: 11 §§ 19—21.

(γ) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: cc. 12, 13¹.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (*aperī*=capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with affluence: c. 12. Polities where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—*This whole discussion, (1) and (2), or something similar, is lost.*

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to ostracism and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

¹ [Bernays supposed cc. 12, 13 to be another version of cc. 9—11: see *Introd.* p. 42.]

II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:
B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).

A. Monarchy and the best constitution in the strict sense, Pure
Aristocracy: III. c. 14—V (VIII).

MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (*διαφοράς*).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (*ράδιον...*)
—§ 15.

- (a) The office of the Spartan kings; §§ 2—5.
- (β) Despotic monarchy amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.
- (γ) *Αἰσχυλητεία* or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.
- (δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age; §§ 11—13.
Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.
- (ε) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15.

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place: 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility: 15 §§ 3—16.

(a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man: 15 § 3—§ 5 (*πάστων*): 16 § 5 (*ό μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands:

15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἵστως... κάλλιτον*): 16 § 4 (*ἀλλὰ μῆν δύσα .*)—§ 5: 15 § 6:
15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (*ἀλλὰ μῆν οὐδὲ...*)—§ 10=16 § 10 (*εἰσὶ δὲ*)—§ 13:
15 § 10 (*εἰ δὴ*)—§ 13 (*θημοκρατίαν*).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual: 15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἵστως...*)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (*εἰσὶ δὲ*)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings; 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves *ipso facto* allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 § 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (*δημοκρατίαν*).

(γ) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 14 (*έχει δ' αὐτοπλαν*)—16 § 2 (*βασιλεύς*).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(ε) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (*δοκεῖ δέ τισιν*)—§ 4.

(ε) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(α) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (*δεσποτεία*) or a normal republican government (*πόλιτεία*); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen; yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—25): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

PURE ARISTOCRACY: THE TRUE NORMAL FORM OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION: B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—3.

(a) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.

[(β) A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 § 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(ii) For the individual it is not the tyrant's life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.]

OUTLINE OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION:

B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

(a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(B) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(C) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(D) The position of the city, 5 § 3 ($\tau\hat{\eta}\pi\delta\pi\lambda\kappa\epsilon\omega\pi\ldots$)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea; 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(a) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artizans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-

ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (*δοῦλοι καὶ περιουκοί*) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(d) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(b) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (*περὶ δὲ...*)—§ 14.

(a) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9;

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(b) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(c) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (*μηθὲ θυμωεῖσθαι*), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (*περιουκοί*) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(c) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages: cc. 11, 12.

(a) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (*άγορὰ ἀλευθέρων*) with the principal temples and the gymnasium for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(B) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (*incomplete*).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (*φύσις*), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) The Education of the citizens: IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7 (*left incomplete*).

Its unity: iv (vii): 14 §§ 1—8.

Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.

The means to be employed: iv (vii) § 6—end of v (viii).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(B) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(1) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(2) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (*ἕτι*)—§ 21 (*ἀνθρώπων*).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (*τέλος τε...δουλείαν*).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.

(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preëminence ; all the others ought however to be practised, since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practise in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtue. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a onesided military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans : even capacity in war, which is all they strive to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods : 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (*<ὅτι>...*)—end of B. v (viii).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind ; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction : yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end : 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth ; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity : c. 16.

(i) The proper age for marriage : 16 §§ 1—10.

(ii) The leading principles which determine it : 16 §§ 2—4, §§ 6—8.

(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(β) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, § 3.

(γ) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (...*βούλησιν*). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(δ) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7 : and

(ε) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality : also

(f) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37 (?) for men and 18 for women : 16 §§ 9, 10.

(2) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties : 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents : 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child : 16 § 14.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants : procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded : 16 § 15.

(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

(7) Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (*ωστε...*)—§ 18.

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

(1) In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (*τὴν δὲ ἔχουμένην...*)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: § 7—§ 14, § 13, § 14, § 12.

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (*διεξελθόντων...αὐτοῖς*).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: IV (VII). 17 §§ 15, 16, V (VIII).

(1) **General introductory remarks.** Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: IV (VII). 17, §§ 15, 16.

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2.

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.

(4) **The right educational course:** V (VIII), cc. 2—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 § 1—3 § 12.

(a) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

(β) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

(γ) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

(δ) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure: but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (*δῆλον*); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (*ἐπι οὐδὲ*)—§ 12.

(ii) Athletic exercises (*γυμναστική*) : cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(a) As was stated above, IV (vii). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises : 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided ; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done ; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalizing them by excessive exertions : 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training : 4 § 7 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(iii) Music : cc. 5—7.

(a) Statement of the question : Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely aesthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification ? 5 § 1—§ 4 (*εἰρηνέων*).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself : 5 § 4 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν*)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question : Music can and should subserve each of those three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment ; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life this alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4) : yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15 : and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young : 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question :

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians : 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves : §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows :

(a) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes : 6 § 6 (*φαρεπόν...*)—§ 8.

(b) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young : 6 §§ 9—16.

(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (*ápporíai*) and rhythms:

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homeopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed : 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing : also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young : 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) *The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.*

B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS: B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

Introductory remarks: B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

- i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity : 1 §§ 1—7.
- ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight : 1 § 8.
- iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions : 1 §§ 9—11.
- iv. The department of constitutional theory which remains for treatment defined : 2 § 1. Order of merit of the degenerate forms of government : 2 §§ 1, 3. The arrangement to be followed in the succeeding exposition : 2 §§ 4—6.

The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions: VI (IV), c. 3—VIII (V).

i Enumeration of all possible constitutions: VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(1) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.

(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined : 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state : 4 §§ 7—19.]

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy : 4 § 20—6 § 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (...διαφορά).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny : 4 § 22 (*δημοκρατία*)—§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (*δυναστεία*) : 5 §§ 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely : 5 §§ 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (a) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (β) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity: c. 7—9 § 5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy : 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity : c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all : 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.

(γ) Genesis and organization of Polity : 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 § 4.

(iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of

illusory devices. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 13 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10. (v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (*πολεμεῖν*). (vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9. (vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

ii The best constitution on the average (*ἀριστη ταῦ πλείσταις πόλεσσι*): c. 11.

(1) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (*πόλεως*).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (*kai σφένται*)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(II) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(III) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.

iii What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (*τις πολιτεία τιστ καὶ ποια ποιοι συμφέρει*): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (*ὅπου...*)—§ 5.

- (i) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.
- (ii) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 3,
- (b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (*ὅπου...*), (c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (*ὅπου δὲ...*)—§ 5, (d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (*this is wanting*).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII (VI).

- (i) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV). CC. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(β) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10;

- (i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (*πάντες*);
- (ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (*τὸ δέ τινας...*)—§ 9;
- (iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;
- (iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(γ) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained: and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Polities: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: c. 15.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 15 §§ 1, 2.

(β) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 2 (*ἴσται δὲ...*)—§ 4.

(γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.

(δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (...*τὸν αὐτόν*), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistrates, 15 § 9 (*καὶ πότερον...*)

(ε) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.

(i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.

(ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different; i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.

(iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.

(ζ) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.

(i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.

(ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (C) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.

(η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.

(δ) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.

(α) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.

(β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.

(γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (*δικαίωτες*); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.

(δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.

(II) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: VII (VI) cc. 1—7.

(α) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Democracy: I § 5—c. 5.

(a) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: I §§ 5—10.

(β) The principles of Democracy enumerated: 2 §§ 1—4.

(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(ε) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(f) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15: and

(η) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (*τὴν το τελευταῖς...*)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

—(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (2) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(b) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum; 5 §§ 9—11.

(c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(β) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army, 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.

(III) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (*incomplete*).

- (a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.
- (b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3...21.

Superintendents (α) of the markets (*ἀγορανόμοι*), § 3. (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (*άστυνόμοι*) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (*ἄγρονόμοι, ὄλωροι*); (δ) financial officers (*ἀποδέκται, ταύλαι*), § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (*μυήμονες, ἔπιστράται*), § 7. (ζ) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8—13. (η) Military officers (*στρατηγοί, πολέμαρχοι, παναρχοί, κτλ.*), §§ 13—15. (θ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (*εἰδήσιοι, λογισταῖ, ἀξερασταῖ*), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (*πρόθουλοι, βουλῆ*), § 17. (κ) Officers to superintend public worship (*ἱερεῖς κτλ.*), §§ 18—20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

- (c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.

v The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

1 Preliminary Observations: 1 §§ 1—8, §§ 9—11, § 8:
3 § 14: 1 §§ 11—16.

- (a) Statement of the whole question: 1 § 1.
- (b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: 1 §§ 2—7.
- (c) Two species of revolution, 1 §§ 8—11:
 - (a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8—11: whether
 - (i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply
 - (ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or
 - (iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.
 - (β) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.
- (d) Special application of the remarks in 1 §§ 2—7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds; 3 § 14, 1 § 11 (*παραχωθ...*)—§ 15.
- (e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, 1 § 16.

ii The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common : cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry : the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections : 2 § 3 ($\pi\hat{\omega}$... $\pi\hat{\omega}\lambda\epsilon\sigma\omega$).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution : 2 § 4—3 §§ 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(a) General enumeration : 2 §§ 4—6.

(β) Consideration of them in detail : 3 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8 ; 4 §§ 8—10 : and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues ($\delta\alpha\tau\alpha\epsilon\pi\theta\epsilon\lambda\alpha$), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (A) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13 :

(B) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(e) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 12, 13 :

(α) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.

III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government; cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY, CC. 5—7.

(A) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (*ἐγινότο... πρύτανος*)¹.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(B) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5².

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (*κυριεύται...*)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(β) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

¹ Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3).

² If § 5, *καὶ ἐπ' Ἐρυθρᾶς... πολιτείας*, be genuine we must add: "In the same way

a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."

(iii) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public means, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enmity owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotical character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark : an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11¹.

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war ; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs ; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13.]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another : 6 § 18.

(c) In Mixed Aristocracies and Polities: c. 7 §§ 1—13.

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2 ;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 2, 3 ;

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 3 ;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 3 ,

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power, 7 § 4 .

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Polities consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 5, 6. [Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place ; that is, to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction : 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

(D) Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken in common.

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14 .

¹ Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.

(ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: cc. 8, 9.

(A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction: 8 § 1.

(B) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Polities and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in VI (iv), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Polities and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated: in particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals: if this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14;

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14;

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, nay even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 § 21.

(8) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and lastly virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification indeed in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification in a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(9) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(n) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which infallibly leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—§ 11 (*δημοσιος*).

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (*μεγυπτων δέ*)—§ 16.

(β) Monarchies: c. 10—c. 12 § 6.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY: C. 10.

(A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (*δραπεῖν*).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (*τυραννίς*) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (*δραπεῖν*).

(B) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general:
10 §§ 13—28.

(a) General statement

(i) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 13, 14, and (a) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(3) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the usurper; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(b) These points of view presented in detail: 10 §§ 15—18.

(i) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20;

(a) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20;

- (3) from contempt for the ruler, 10 §§ 22—25;
- (4) from greed of gain (*largely wanting*), 10 § 25;
- (5) from ambition, 10 §§ 26—28.

(c) Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships: 10 §§ 29—38.

(a) Tyrants and tyrannies: 10 §§ 29—34.

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (1) under a royal or aristocratical, or (II) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or

(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: C. 11, C. 12 §§ 1—6.

(a) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(B) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34.

(1) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(1) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5:

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6:

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;

- (6) draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10,
- and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10,
- (8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, 11 § 10,
- (9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 12;
- (10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13;
- (11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 § 14.
- (12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 15, 16.

Or (8) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poses as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented; no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always bestow distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet prefer to rest his rule upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.

(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(*c*) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case : 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other : 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms : 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form; but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form : 12 § 10 (*ο δ' αὐτὸς*)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition *from* Tyranny or *into* the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.

(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Aristocracy at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under strict limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained, 12 § 18. (*This is almost entirely wanting.*)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. *The third main division of the work, treating of Legislation, is entirely wanting.*

Symbols and Abbreviations.

Γ =codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit
vetusta translatio latina Guilelmi de Moerbeka.

M^a =cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 ord. sup.

P^1 =cod. Parisinus 2023.

P^1 (corr.¹)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

p^1 =correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

Π^1 =the agreement of $\Gamma M^a P^1$ in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

P^2 =cod. Parisinus Coislinianus 161.

P^2 (corr.¹)=correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.

P^2 (corr.²)=correctiones nigriores.

P^2 (corr.³)=correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.

p^2 =correctiones rubrae.

P^3 =cod. Parisinus 2026.

S^b =cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.

P^4 =cod. Parisinus 2025.

T^b =cod. Urbinas 46.

P^5 =cod. Parisinus 1858.

U^b =cod. Marcianus Ven. append. IV, 3.

P^6 =cod. Parisinus 1857.

V^b =cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

Q =cod. Marcianus Venetus 200.

W^b =cod. Reginensis 125.

M^b =cod. Marcianus Venetus 213.

C^c =cod. Camerarii deperditus.

Q^b =cod. Laurentianus 81, 5.

A^r =cod. Aretini deperditus.

R^b =cod. Laurentianus 81, 6.

$Ald.$ =editio princeps Aldina.

Π^2 =the agreement of Ald. and all existing MSS. except $M^a P^1 P^6$ in a reading.

Π^3 = " " " " " except $M^a P^1 P^2 P^3 P^5$ in a reading.

Π =codex archetypus deperditus superstitem librorum et Aldinae.

$Bas.^1$ =Basel ed. of 1531. $Bas.^2$ =Basel ed. of 1539. $Bas.^3$ =Basel ed. of 1550.

$Bk.^1$ =the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.

$Bk.^2$ =the *Politics* reprinted in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).

$Susem.^1$ =Susemihl's critical edition, 1872. $Susem.^2$ =his edition of 1879.

$Susem.^3$ =his ed. in *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, 1882. $Susem.^4$ =the present work.

Note that $P^{4,6}$ (corr.)=the corrector of P^4 and the corrector of P^6 ; but
 P^2 and P^4 (corr.)=the first hand of P^2 and the corrector of P^4 .

[$\delta\rho\xi\omega\nu$] Bernays=Bernays proposes to omit $\delta\rho\xi\omega\nu$ from the text.

< $\kappa\lambda\ \text{ολκονομικ}\hat{\eta}$ > Rassow=Rassow proposes to insert $\kappa\lambda\ \text{ολκονομικ}\hat{\eta}$ in the text.

? Susem.=Susemihl conjectures; but

Γ (?)= Γ may have had the reading in question.

$\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\tau\iota\tau$ * * denotes a lacuna; that after $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\tau\iota\tau$ some word, or words, has been lost.

The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over: where they occur in the MSS. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

Bekker 4to.
p. 1252 a

Schneider
c. I. § 1

1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὄρθμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἔνεκεν συνεστηκίαν (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆλον ὡς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων η̄ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας

1252 a 1 [ἐπειδὴ... γ τολιτική] Schmidt || 5 καὶ before τοῦ is omitted by Π¹ R^b Ar. || κυριωτάτη before πασῶν M^a P¹

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περὶ οἰκονομίας, cc. 3—13 (the latter a necessary preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκιών). The prevailing tone is dialectical, and the contents of Bk. I. are nearly exhausted by a list of the problems (*ἀπορίαι*) started for discussion: (1) the difference between a city-state and a family, between πολιτεύομέν and οἰκονομούμενός, (2) the elements of the state, πόλις ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, c. 2, (3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσί φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἀλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, cc. 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστική to Economic, πότερον ἡ χρηματιστική ἢ αὐτὴν τὴν οἰκονομικὴν κτλ., cc. 8—11, (5) the capacity of the slave (and the artisan) for moral virtue, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς δργανικάς, 13 § 2 ff. See further the *Analysis* and *Intrad.* pp. 23—31.

c. 1 *The city is the highest form of association, having the highest good for its end:* § 1. *The city not an enlarged family, but an essentially distinct organization, as is evident when it is analysed into its simplest elements:* §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 i **πόλιν**] A 'city,' but at the same time a sovereign 'state.' **κοινωνία**—which includes any form of communication or social intercourse, κ. διλαχτικαλ, commercial transactions, exchange *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 9; *ταύτην τὴν κ. = τὴν γαμικήν διδιλλαν*, the marriage union *Pol.* IV(vii). 16. 2—denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the voluntary combination, association, or co-operation of free men with each other in

objects in which they have common interests (τόπου, γνώσης, so διλαχτής καὶ συμμαχίας κοινωνεύειν), or, as it is sometimes put, formed with a view to certain common advantages (χρήσεως μὴ ἐφημέρου ἔνεκεν: τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων χάριν). Hence by a natural transition, concretely (2) the associated body, the members who compose the union; so that η̄ πολιτική κ., 'civil society'—=the *community*, τὸ κοινόν (e.g. II. 3. 1 compared with II. 2. 2, IV[VII]. 14. 1). See further on I. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 **δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ**] seeming good, which may not really be the agent's true interest, although he thinks so, cp. IV(VII). 13. 2. (See this case fully elucidated *Nic. Eth.* III. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20, the solution being ὁ σπουδαῖος ἔκαστα κρίνει ὄρθως καὶ ἐν ἔκαστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι are often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to reality, but while δοκεῖν = *putari* to be thought, φαίνεσθαι = *videri* to appear, of an object present to sense; hence τὸ δοκοῦν = subjective opinion, τὰ φανόμενα = objective facts. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

4 **πᾶσαι μὲν... μάλιστα δὲ**] The clause with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπειδὴ: 'while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται), the highest and most comprehensive aims especially at the highest good.'

5 **κυριωτάτου**] Cp. III. 12. 1 and note SUSEM. (1)

Aristotle's proof, if we assume η̄ πολι-

περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὐτῇ δέ ἐστιν ἡ καλονυμένη πόλις (1) καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

§ 2 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἰνοται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν [εἶναι] τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλὴθει γάρ 10 καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἴδει τούτων ἔκαστον, οἷον ἀν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἀν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμουν, ἀν δὲ ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἡ βασιλικόν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἡ μικρὰν πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκῃ, βασιλικόν, ὅταν 15 δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀληθῆ·

9 εἶναι omitted by Π¹ (added after τὸν by a later hand in M¹) || 14 ἐφεστήκη M¹ (1st hand), ἐφεστήκει M² (corrector), ἐφεστήκει P^{14.6} Q Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b W^b L^b Aldine || 15 τὸς is omitted by Π² Bk. || 16 [ἀρχῶν] καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἡ Bernays (cp. III. 17. 7) needlessly

τική to be the 'art' concerned with ἡ κοινωνία ἡ τοῦ, is given Nic. Eth. I. 2 §§ 5—7; cp. εἰ γάρ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστω ἐν καὶ τόλει, μεῖζον γε καὶ τελεότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως....καλῶν καὶ θεώτερον θνητοῦ καὶ πόλεων, sc. τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν : which is more precisely described in the case of the 'city' as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.

ἡ πασῶν...πάσας περίθουσα] See n. on II. 2 § 7, where is explained, from Nic. Eth. VIII. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the inferior as 'parts' (ὑβρία) of itself.

§ 2 8 δοῦοι μὲν κτλ] Plato Politicus 258 E ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2 nn. Socrates too expresses himself to this effect in Xenoph. Memorab. III. 4 § 6 f. § 12 ἡ γάρ τῶν ἴδιων ἐπιμέλεια πλὴθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. SUSEM. (2)

πολιτικὸν] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-governed according to Greek ideas; so 8 § 15, 11 § 13, II. 7. 1 πολιτικοὶ (φιλόσοφοι καὶ ἴδιωται, cp. Nic. Eth. X. 9. 18) (σοφισταί). Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that ὁ ὡς ἀληθῶς π. should know psychology, N. E. I. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other sciences: hence joined with νομοθέτης, a theoretical statesman, student of politics: IV(VII). 4. 3, VI(IV). 1 § 3, VIII(V). 9. 9.

9 πλήθει κτλ] They assume that a king differs from e.g. a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. πλήθεις = numbers: 8 § 15, Rhet. I. 4. 10 (τὸ

πλήθεις τῆς φιλακῆς = the strength of the defensive force), cp. Metaph. I. 9. 24 ἀριθμός = τὸ πολὺ καὶ δλίγον.

10 εἶδει] or κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, 'specifically,' 'in kind'; εἶδει διαφέρειν = to be essentially different, because division into species takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἀν μὲν ὀλίγων] Schneider supplies ἀρχὴ here, and καλῶν before δεσπότην, but νομίζουσιν (εἶναι) would do just as well in the latter case, and in line 14, while either ἀρχὴ or ἐφεστήκη must be understood to follow ὅταν δὲ in line 15.

12 ὡς οὐδὲν κτλ] Whereas the state is composed ἐξ εἶδει διαφέροντων, II. 2. 3, where see n. SUSEM. (2 b)

Plato Polit. 259 B μεγάλης σχῆμα οἰκίσεως ἡ σμικρὰς αὐτὸλεις δύκος μῶν τι τρόπος ἀρχὴν διαλεγετον; ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν. ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν, ὃ νυνὶ διεσκοπούμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμην μὲν περὶ πάντα ταῦτα. Ταῦτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφέρειν.

13 καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν] sc. οὐκ εἴδει νομίζουσι διαφέρειν.

15 τῆς ἐπ. τῆς τοιαύτης] i.e. τῆς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, not τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, the regal science of government (Rassow Bemerkungen p. 3). SUSEM. (3)

Cp. n. on τοιαύτην c. 8 § 7. The one man supreme over the state is called a king; the ruler who follows out the principles of the same kingly science (when in office), but takes his turn (κατὰ μέρος) at governing and being governed, is a republican magistrate.

(1)

§ 3 δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ύφη-³
γημένην μέθοδον. ὅσπερ γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-
τον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γάρ ἐλά-
20 χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται
σκοποῦντες ὄφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέ-
ρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ
ἔκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δή τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψειν (Bk. 8vo. p.
25 ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κάλλιστ' ἀν οὗτω
§ 2 θεωρήσειν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρώτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ 4

§ 3 17 τὸ λεγόμενον] sc. 9 δι τοιούτων, all between being paren-
thetical. When such side-notes are im-
bedded in the text the construction of the
main sentence is often difficult to follow:
e.g. 2 § 2, § 9, 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 §§ 4—6, perhaps
13 §§ 6—8; II. 10. 7—9; IV(VII). 3 § 1,
13 §§ 2—4, 16 §§ 2—4: VI(VIII). 5 §§ 2—
4, §§ 18—24, perhaps 6 § 15—7 § 1,
7 §§ 6—8. In III. 9 §§ 6—8, VI(IV).
4 §§ 8, 9 and perhaps in III. 12 §§ 1, 2
the interruption of the original construc-
tion almost amounts to anacoluthia. See
Bonitz *Aristotelische Studien* II. III.

κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον] in ac-
cordance with the method of inquiry
which has previously been 'started' or
'traced out' or 'followed,' and so the
usual method of inquiry (Bonitz); *De
Gener. Anim.* III. 9. 1, 758 a 28 ff.; τὸν
ὑφηγημένον τρόπον *Pol.* I. 8. 1, *Nic. Eth.*
II. 7. 9. The participle is passive, as is
ὑφηγεῖται (ὑφηγηται) *Bk.* *Pol.* I. 13. 6.
See 3 § 1, 8 § 1 n. (66), III. 1. 2 with n.
(434) (Schneider). SUSEM. (4)

18 ὁσπερ γάρ κτλ] "As in other
subjects a compound has to be resolved
into its ultimate elements, these being
the smallest parts of the whole, so here
by inquiring of what elements a city,"
which is a compound III. 1. 2, "is com-
posed, we shall better discover the differ-
ence between the four types above-men-
tioned (*πολιτικός*, *βασιλικός*, etc.) and
whether systematic knowledge can be
attained about them severally." Although
he did not apply the mathematical method
of pure deduction to biological or political
sciences Aristotle derived both the pro-
cesses of Analysis and Synthesis and the
terms (*ἀναλύειν*, *σύνθετον διαιρεῖν*) from
geometry: see the instructive passages
Nic. Eth. III. 3 §§ 11, 12 ἤγειρν καὶ
ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὁσπερ διά-
γραμμα (a geometrical problem), *Metaph.*

VIII (Θ). 9. 4 1051 a 21—29 εὐρίσκεται
δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖσα, διαιροῦντες
γάρ εὐρίσκουσιν.

21 τρόπων and 23 τῶν φηθέντων
should be taken as above and not referred
to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται (*πόλις*) as the grammatical
precedent.

c. 2 Origin of the city from the
family through the village-community:
§§ 1—8. The city a natural institution
§§ 8—12, prior in the intention of nature
to the family and individual §§ 13, 14,
and of incalculable utility §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory,
as it is called by Sir H. Maine, applied
to the origin of society. The family living
under the headship of the father is taken
as the ultimate social unit. Until quite
recently this was the accepted view: see
Maine *Ancient Law* c. 5 esp. 122—135,
Early History of Institutions c. 3, *Early
Law and Custom* cc. 7, 8. There are
certain difficulties of this derivation of
the state which Aristotle avoids 'by mak-
ing the combination of families of different
stocks (*γένη*) depend on contiguity of
residence and on convenience.' See J. F.
Mc Lennan's criticisms *Studies in Ancient
History*, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is
something in Plato *Keph.* II. 369 a ff., *Laws*
111.676—682, Polybius VI.cc. 4—7, Cicero
De Rep. I. 25, 26 §§ 39—42 (with Lac-
tantius *Instit.* VI. 10), *De Off.* I. 17 §§ 53,
54, *De Fin.* III. §§ 62—67. A. C. Brad-
ley *Hellenica* 190—212 gives the best
commentary on cc. 1, 2; Oncken *Staats-
lehre* II. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 1 24 τὸ πράγματα φυόμενα] "things in their growth or origin"
(Shilleto); Plato *Keph.* 369 A, *Laws* 757 C.

§ 2 26 συνδυάζεσθαι] *Nic. Eth.* VIII.
12. 7 ἀνθρώπος γάρ τῷ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
μᾶλλον η πολιτικόν.

ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς (1) γενέσεως ἔνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, 30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιούτον καταλιπεῖν ἔτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ ἀρχόμενον φύσει διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γάρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον [φύσει], τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον φύσει καὶ 35 δούλον διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτὸ συμφέρει). φύσει μὲν 1252 b οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὐδὲν γάρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιούτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πε-

28 γενήσεως Stobaeus (p. 324) Susem.¹⁻² || 32 διανοίᾳ <τὰ δέοντα> ? Susem. || δεσπόζον [φύσει] Thurot || 33 ταῦτα after τῷ σώματι Π² Bk. || φύσει καὶ Ar., καὶ φύσει Γ ΙΙ Bk., ἀρχόμενον, [καὶ] φύσει Bernays

1252 b 2 ol is omitted by Π² Bk.

27 οἷον] "namely," introducing the two relationships (each of which needs a long parenthetical explanation) into which the family can be analysed, § 5.

28 καὶ τοῦτο κτλ] Cp. Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii 511, who quotes *De Anima* II. 4. 2, 415 a 26 φυσικῶτας γάρ τῶν ἔργων τοῦς ζῶντα τέλεια... τὸ παιδίσκαι ἔτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῶν μὲν ζῶν, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ίνα τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ὃ δύνανται. Individuals perish while the species, the kind, is immortal. So first Plato *Sympos.* 206 E, 207 C—208 B. SUSEM. (6)

οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως] not by design, or of deliberate purpose, η γάρ προαιρέσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας: instinctively.

30 ἄρχον κτλ] "governor and governed by nature" clearly = "master and slave" not as 1 § 2 "political ruler and subject."

31 On Aristotle's conception of φύσις in general Zeller *Ph. der Gr.* II ii 384—389, 422—431; Grant *Ethics* I. 279—285. Various senses of the term *Metaph.* V(Δ). c. 4.

32 τὴν σωτηρίαν] "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the 'slave by birth' on Aristotle's view is explained § 5 n. 15, 4 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (6)

τὸ μὲν γάρ κτλ] Cp. 5 §§ 8—10, 11 § 6 n. (103). SUSEM. (6 b)

33 ταῦτα = ἂ τὸ ἄρχον προορᾶ.

§ 3 34 Σιδ δεσπότη κτλ] "It is not simply, as Fülleborn (II. 75) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the establishment of this relationship: Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely": cp. 6 § 10 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, III. 6. 6 n. (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (7) Cp. 5 § 2.

1252 b 1 οὐδὲν γάρ κτλ] "For nature never fashions things niggardly, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their knife" (Shilleto).

2 τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν] "According to Hesychios, s. v., the Delphian knife has the upper part only of iron, λαμβάνοντα μετροσθεῖ μέρος σιδηροῦ; the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Göttling *De m. D. quae est apud Aristotelem* (Jenae 1856, 4) maintains it was a knife and spoon combined, for sacrificial purposes" (Schnitzer). Hence Göttling proposes μετστρον for μέτρος in Hesychios, as above. Oncken, II. 25—27, dismisses the obscure words of Hesychios in favour of Oresme's explanation: "suppose a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the back left rough and the other side sharpened to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough sort of tool would certainly be cheap enough." Cp. θελυσκολύχνια VII(IV). 15. 8 n. SUSEM. (8) Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοκερδῶν Makarios ap. Walzium Arsen. 179: with which agrees the explanation

μιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὐτῷ γάρ ἀν ἀποτελοῦτο κάλλιστα (I)
4 τῶν ὄργανων ἔκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεύον·)
§ 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει

5 τὸ after καὶ is omitted by Π² Bk.

in *append. prov.* I. 94 (tom. I. p. 393 of the *Corpus Paroemiograph.*, Gotting. 1839) Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα: ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκερδῶν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαυδίνων προαιρούμενων, παρθόνοις οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μέν τι τῶν ἵερεων ἐλάμβανον, τὸ δὲ τι περὶ μαχαίρας (?) for the use of the knife) ἐπράττοντο. *Athenaeus* IV. 74 p. 173: 'Ἀχαιός δ' ὁ Ἐρετρίες ἐν Ἀλκμαώνῳ τῷ σατυρικῷ καρκοτοῦσις καλεῖ τοὺς Δελφοὺς διὰ τούτων· Καρκοποιοῖς προοβλέπων βδελύτομα παρθόνον τὰ ἱερεῖα περιτέμνοντες δῆλον ὡς ἐμαγγίερον αὐτὰ καὶ ἔκαρπον. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ ἀποβλέπων καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἔφη· Ἄλλῳ δὲ Δελφῶν πλειστας ἀκοῦων | Φοίβε μαχαίρας [καὶ προδιδάσκων τοὺς σὸν προβάτους. It was from Thomas Aquinas *ad locum* that Oresme derived the explanation cited above. See Von Hertling *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 447. Mr W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to "a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pyrrhus, Pindar *Nem.* VII. 42."

3 ἐν πρὸς ἄν] There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows *De Part. Anim.* IV. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅποι γάρ ἐνδέχεται χρῆσθαι δυοῖν ἐτὶ δύνεται καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἔτερον, οὐδὲν ἡ φύσις εἴσωθε ποιεῖ ὥστερ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς εὐθέτειαν ὀβελισκούχνιον· δλλ' διοι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλειστοῖς ἔργα. SUSEM. (9) See *De Anima* II. 8. 10, 420 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices II. II. 13, VI(IV). 15, 6.

4 μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις κτλ] "if restricted in use to a single function." Fülleborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. SUSEM. (10)

§ 4 5 καὶ 8 τοῖς βαρβάροις κτλ] 'Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in barbaria they are not, because all—men and women—are slaves' (Jackson). In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν

δούλων Plato *Laws* 805 E. Fülleborn (II. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense indeed Congreve seriously takes the words, supplying τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν sc. τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τοῖς ἀρσεσὶ καὶ τοῖς δεσπόταις.)

"Fülleborn's objections arise from his having been misled by the omission mentioned above, in n. (10), and so having misunderstood the real sense of the passage. Aristotle's meaning is this: because the barbarian nations are slaves by nature, the men are not capable of respecting the freedom of the female sex in the women, and of according to them the position which by nature belongs to the woman in relation to the man; but treat them as slaves. And hence necessarily arises the perversion of nature, that in the marriage relation you have one slave ruling despotically over another. To the same cause, the servile character of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics (I. 6. 8 n.), Aristotle attributes the fact that they themselves are ruled by their kings as slaves; or in other words that the form under which the state exists amongst them is despotism, III. 14. 6 n., which in reality cannot be considered to constitute a state at all, a state consisting of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1, III. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. VI(IV). 4 § 11, a passage which is probably not genuine. Such a despotism is only an abnormally expanded family: ('non civitas erit sed magna familia,' Grotius *De iure belli ac pacis* III. 8. 2). It is a species of that which Aristotle denotes by ἔθνος, i.e. a mere aggregate of men of the same race, a tribe population or nationality, as contrasted with πόλις, a city-state: § 6; II. 1 § 3; III. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15; IV(VII). 4 § 11; VIII(V). 10 § 8 with nn.; Nie. *Eth.* I. 2. 8, 1094 b 10; Rhet. I. 5. 5 1360 b 31; cp. Schlosser I. 278. [Cp. ἔθνος = federation in Polybius and Diodorus, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues: δὲ ἔθνικάς χρεῖας 'for federal purposes' Diod. XVIII. 13.] See further n. (13): 5 § 8, 6 §§ 4—6 with nn. (47), (54), (56): 7 § 5, 8 §§ 12; IV(VII). 2 § 15, 14 § 21 with nn." SUSEM. (11)

6 τάξιν. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται (1)
ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διό φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ
βαρβάρων δ' Ἔλληνας ἄρχει εἰκός,

§ 5 ὡς ταῦτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν εἰ
ο δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας
οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα γυναικί τε βοῦν τὸ ἀροτῆρα

ὅ γάρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ
φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὓς δὲ μὲν Χαρώνδας καλεῖ ὄμοστιπύους, Ἐπι-
μενίδης δὲ δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὄμοκάπους· ἡ δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία·

9 ὄν before ταῦτὸ Γ, omitted by M^a P¹ || 12 ἐστίν· * * Susem.¹ wrongly, see Dittenberger *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1372 ff. || 15 ὄμοκάπους P¹ P⁴ L² Susem.¹ and M^b (corr.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenberger p. 1357 ff. and Commentary n. (17): ὄμοκάπους = ὄμοκήπους Ridgeway (also Shilleto in unpublished *Adversaria*: 'si Epimenides epicē poesi utebatur, certe ὄμοκάπους = ὄμοκήπους')

8 Euripides *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1400 Nauck. The words following are ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους, μῆτερ, Ἔλλήνων τὸ μὲν γάρ δοῦλον, οἱ δὲ Ἰλεύθεροι. SUSEM. (12)

9 ὡς ταῦτὸ κτλ] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not combated until a late period and then by but few: 3 § 4 n. (31). This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority; it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on 1. 5 § 10. That slaves are non-Hellenes is assumed quite as an understood thing in Xenoph. *Memor.* II. 7. 6, Demosth. *XII* (*c. Mid.*) 48. See however n. (64) on 1. 7 § 5. SUSEM. (13)

§ 5 10 πρώτη] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—"arises primarily the family." For the sense, πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαιότερον οἰκία πόλεως *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7. The three stages, οἰκία κάμη πόλις, are given by Plato *Laws* I. 626 c ff.

Hesiodos] *Works and Days* 405. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, κτητὴρ δὲ γαμετὴρ, ητις καὶ βοοῖς ἐποιο. SUSEM. (14)

12 ὁ γάρ βοῦς κτλ] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. 5 § 9

n. (46). If with both these passages we compare 4 §§ 1—4, it is evident that Varro's division *De re rustica* I. 17, which Grotius mentions *op. c. 1. 5. 3*, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: alii in tres partes (sc. dividunt) instrumenti genus: vocale et semivocale et mutum. vocale in quo sunt servi: semivocale in quo sunt boves: mutum, in quo sunt plastra. (L. Schiller.) SUSEM. (15)

12 η μὲν οὖν κτλ] μὲν οὖν, not δέ, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 ἐκ μὲν οὖν κτλ. Take κτητὴρ φύσιν with συνεστηκυῖα: "thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: sharers in one meal-jar as Charondas calls them; joint-holders of a piece of land in the phrase of Epimenides the Cretan. The union of a number of families first formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence is the village." Elsewhere in Aristotle ἀφήμερος = lasting for a day; so Bernays here, "for intercourse of less transitory duration."

14 Χαρώνδας] II. 12 § 7, § 11 n. (416); VI (IV). 11 § 15, 13 § 2 nn. Holm *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum* (Leipzig 1870) I. p. 153 ff., 401. SUSEM. (16)

Ἐπιμενίδης] See EXCURSUS I at the end of this book, p. 204. SUSEM. (17)

15 ὄμοκάπους] The reading is doubtful. (1) The mss. of the better family give ὄμοκάπους. (2) If Aristotle is quoting from a collection of oracles (*Xρησμοί*)

§ 6 πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κάμη. μάλιστα δ' ἔοικε (I)
17 κατὰ φύσιν ἡ κάμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὓς καλοῦστι τινες

16 ἔοικε after 17 κατὰ φύσιν P¹ II² Bk. || 17 ἀπ' [οἰκία] Heitland, but see the Comm.

scribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and ὁμοκάποντος, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For ὁμοκάποντος of the inferior MSS. is usually taken to be a compound with κάπη a trough, crib; hence any feeding-place; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable in *arsi* could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Göttling, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the families of the Cretans 'mess-mates,' because the οὐσεῖα were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of ὁμοκάποντος Dittenberger urges that 'it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read ὁμοκάποντος) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But ὁμοκάποντος = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.' Yet ὁμοκάποντος should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of 'hearts' meaning

homes or families*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. *Transactions* Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading ὁμοκάποντος (with ἄ), Doric for ὁμοκάποντος (κῆπος)=with a common plot of ground. SUSEM. (17)

"The Cretan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. Θάλεω I. 11. 12: κῆπος is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (*σιτόν*): cp. II. 5. 2 (*γύψεων* and *καρπός*). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original *οἰκία*: (2) *οἶκος*=joint family of Hindus or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (*κῆπος*) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine" (*Early Law* 237—253): after that, "(3) the *οἶκος* breaks up into separate *οἰκίαι* forming the κάμη (=the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (*ἴωγυλάκτες*)" (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye *La propriété primitive* cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn *Aryan Household* 176—191, and the criticism by D. Mc Lennan *Patriarchal Theory* c. 8: also Caillemer *Droit de succession* p. 34 ff., Jannet *Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte* (Paris 1880) p. 88.

ἡ 8' ἐκ πλεύσιν κτλ] Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Filleborn II. 95, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: 9 § 5 with note. SUSEM. (18)

16 πρώτη=simplicissima, quae tamquam pars inest alii (Bonitz).

§ 6 17 ἡ κάμη ἀποικία οἰκίας] i.e. all the rest of the village except the original

* So Grote, "each society having its separate meal-bin and fireplace." Cp. Gaelic teadhloch and coediche, J. F. Mc Lennan p. 123.

όμογάλακτας [παιδάς τε καὶ παῖδων παιδᾶς]. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον (1) ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευομένων τῷ γάρ [συνῆλθον] πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου,

18 ** παιδᾶς Schmidt, [παιδᾶς.....παιδᾶς] Susem. || 20 συνῆλθον wanting in II¹ (added by p¹ in the margin) || πᾶσα γάρ] πᾶσα δ' Schmidt in a former conjecture, transposing 18 διὸ.....20 συνῆλθον to follow 24 φέου (now withdrawn)

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. SUSEM. (18b)

18 ὄμογάλακτας] According to Philochorus *Frag.* 91—94, and *Frag.* 139 in Harpokration and Suidas (*s. vv.* γενῆται, ὄμογάλακτες, ὄργεων) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένη who were afterwards called γενῆται = kin, clansmen, were originally called ὄμογάλακτες = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider *Addenda* II. 471). Pollux VI. 37, VIII. 9 οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους ἔκαλουντο γεννῆται καὶ ὄμογάλακτες, γένει μὲν οὐ προσήκοτες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνάδου οὕτω προσαγορεύομενοι. SUSEM. (19)

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κώμη and the γένος is apparently indicated III. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλις defined as (a) ἡ τοῦ εὐ βῆν κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (b) ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία" (Heitland *Notes* 8). Even then no place in the development is found for φραγταὶ, φυλαὶ, or Aristotle's "associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals" *Nic.* *Eth.* VIII. 9. 5; cp. *Pol.* III. 9. 13 (Onccken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to συνοικισμός, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ὄμογάλακτες, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παιδᾶς τε καὶ παῖδων παιδᾶς be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was anciently applied to the clansmen (γενῆται). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens,—indeed Diakaiarchos (*Frag.* 9 Müller) appears to denote by στέρπα what is usually called the γένος: and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine *Early Law* p. 272 ff.)

Or the word may have first meant 'those of kin by descent through females only.' On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, McLennan *op. c.* 225—309: cp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* c. 8 esp. 230—234. "If ὄμογάλακτες = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the γένος depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Ridgeway). If so, may we similarly interpret ὄμοιπον and ὄμόκαρποι as survivals from a time when eating from the same meal-jar or sharing the same smoke, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See *Exc.* I to B. II.

Another meaning proposed is: 'those who offer the same milk', from a comparison of Sanskrit sapindā, samānodaya = those who offer the same cake, the same water: i. e. 'near kin', 'distant kin' respectively (Hearn *op. c.* 171): but for this there is no evidence.

διὸ = hence: viz. because the 'city' arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues *Laws* III. 68c D ff.: εὐ οἱ τὸ πρεσβύτατον δρχεῖ διὸ τὸ τὴν δρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέα... βασιλεῖαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλεύομενοι. 19 αἱ πόλεις = Hellenic city-states, τὰ θνη = non-Hellenic races or populations. As in IV(VII), 2. 10 ἦτο δὲ εὖ τοῖς θνεσι πάσαι τοῖς διναιμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν... οἷον εὖ Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρακῖς καὶ Κελτοῖς, Aristotle uses θνη on the grounds assigned in n. (11) as equivalent to non-Hellenes, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (Jews and Christians τὸ πρῶτον) Other reasons assigned III. 14§ 12, 15 § 11 nn. (657—9), VIII(V), 10 § 3 (1649). SUSEM. (19 b) Also, as Postgate suggests, VI(IV). 13 § 11. On the advantages of monarchy in a primitive society, see Bagehot *Physics and Politics* 65 f. (Jackson).

§ 7 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ λέγει [v. 3]
"Ομηρος,
παιδῶν ηδὲ ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸι οἱ μὲν
ἔτι καὶ οὗν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδη
ἐαυτοῖς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 ἡ δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ηδη, πάσης 8
ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ώς ἕπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν
30 οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὐσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν. διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει

21 αἱ is omitted by M^aP¹, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 σποράδες γάρ
καὶ οὕτω <ἀγχυγείτονες> Schmidt edits, σποράδες γάρ καὶ οὕτοι [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and
26 ὥσπερ γάρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἡ δὴ M^aP^{2.3-4.6} C⁴Q M^b
Q^bR^bS^bT^bV^bW^b Aldine Bk., ἡ δὲ U^bL^b || ἡ δὲ...1253 a i βέλτιστον transposed
by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδες. See his arrangement and alterations *Introd.* p. 96 ||
29 γενομένη Schneider || 30 οὐν is wanting in M^aP¹, but cp. IV (vii). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀπ. [.] 'Wherefore likewise the colonies' [*i.e.* the villages] 'because of their kinship' sc. βασιλεύονται.
So § 11 ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).

37 22 The quotation from Homer *Odysseus*. IX. 114 f. SUSEM. (20) Cited N.E. x. 9. 13. Plato has it *Laws* 680 B. Cp. Maine *Ancient Law* pp. 4—6, 125.

24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον] With the adverbial use comp. Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2. 7 καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύκουν.

24 ff. "A reminiscence of the famous saying of Xenophanes given by Clem. Alex. VII p. 711 B: 'Ἐλληνες δὲ ὥσπερ ἀνθρωπομόρφους οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρωποποιεῖς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑποτίθεται καὶ καθάπερ τὰς μορφὰς αὐτῶν ὄντας ἐκαστοι δια-
γνωραφοῦσι'" (Ridgeway).

See still stronger statements about the popular religion in *Metaph.* XII(A). 8 §§ 19—21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 + δὲ ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ] Cp. II. 2 § 8 with note and references, also n. on III. 3 §§ 3, 4; 9 § 10 (554). SUSEM. (20) b

"The union of several village-communities forms, when complete, an actual city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to promote a higher life." See Grote *History* II. 341—344 on city-state (& villages: on this deduction of the state generally A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* 197—199, who observes 194 n. that "freedom", though not in a mere negative sense, best answers to αὐτάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of

man's nature, external or spiritual, unsatisfied. In N.E. I. 7. 7 τὸ αὐτάρκεια = διονομούμενον αἱρέτῳ ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὶς ἐνδεῖ, the sole condition of a life that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp. N.E. X. 6. 2 οὐδὲντος ἐνδεῖς...ἄλλα αὐτάρκης.

29 ff. Compare c. 4 § 1; II. 2 § 8; III. 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff., 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp. ἡ γενών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ἥντος τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν, ως φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνιος καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἀρια πράξεων [χάριν] θετέονται εἶναι τὴν πολειτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ οὐ τοῦ συζῆν; further III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; IV (vii). 4 §§ 11—14, 5 § 1, 8 § 4, §§ 8, 9, 9 §§ 1, 2; VII (vii). 4 §§ 9—11; VII (vi). 8 § 3. These passages would prove (even if it were not self-evident) that the perfected and beautified life, made complete self-sufficing and satisfying, is one with the life of happiness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία); cp. n. (284) on II. 9 § 5. SUSEM. (21)

The implication of εὐ ζῆν and αὐτάρκεια which disposes of Schmidt's athetesis of the clauses where the latter conception comes in (*Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxxv. 1882. 804, cp. *Introd.* 97 n.) may also be studied in Nic. Eth. I. 7 §§ 6—8. In *De anima* II. 8. 10, 420 b 19—22, τὸ εὖ is opposed to ἀναγκαῖον, to ἐξ ἀνάγκης in *De part. animal.* III. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κτλ] Two proofs that the 'city' is natural. (1) It is the outcome and realization, the final cause, of the previous societies: they are natural, so also is the 'city'. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing;

ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γάρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, (1) ή δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γάρ ἔκαστον ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταῦτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔναις ἔκαστου, ὡσπερ § 9 ἀνθρώπου ἵππον οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτι- 1253 a στον· ή δὲ αὐτάρκεια [καὶ] τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φα- νερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρωπός φύσει πολι- τικὸν ζῶν ἐστί, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός

32 [ἢ δὲ...ἔστιν] Schmidt || 33 ἔναις after ἔκαστον M^a P^b

1253 a i καὶ before τέλος omitted by II¹ Bk. Bernays || τέλος. καὶ <γάρ> Bernays, αὐτάρκεια * * Bücheler; but see Comm. || καὶ before βέλτιστον omitted by W^b Ald. || ἡ.....βέλτιστον omitted by Q M^b T^b || * * ἐκ Schmidt, quoting 1278 b 19—28 || 2 [ἢ.....πόλις ἐστί] and ὅτι φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶν ἀνθρωπός ἐστι Schmidt || 3 ἐστι M^a, omitted by P¹ II² Bk. perhaps rightly || ὁ omitted by II² Bk. || φα- νέτερος ? Oncken wrongly || ἥτοι κρείττων ἡ ἀνθ. ἡ φαῦλος ἐστιν ἀνθ. Schmidt

but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller *Socrates and Socratics* p. 322—5. The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Republic* B. 11, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbes, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος] *Physics* II. 1. 8 193 a 30 f. φύσις in first sense = ὅλη mere potency; in second sense = ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ὥστερ γάρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὗτον καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν: II. 2 §§ 8, 194 a 28 f. ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὖν ἔνεκα· ὡς γάρ συνεχόδε τὴν κινήσεων οὐσίην ἔστι τὸ ἐσχατον, τούτῳ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὖν ἔνεκα.. βούλεται γάρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἐσχατὸν τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. *De anima* III. 12. 3. 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into bloom and bearing fruit" (Fülleborn). SUSEM. (22)

§ 9 34 f. ἢ τι...βέλτιστον] The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ὅτι πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν. And so in fact it is, only it must

be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former premiss). With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing; 'the end discloses the true nature of the thing', and 'political society alone' (*i.e.* no society short of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency'. Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible; e.g. *Metaph.* XII(A). 1 § 2, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (Freudenthal). SUSEM. (23)

1253 a i 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. *N.E.* IX. 9. 3: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, πολιτικὸν γάρ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. See also ib. I. 7. 6. "The dogma τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστι, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῶν, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that the πόλις differs from the οἰκία in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement, (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the exposition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the normal πόλις" (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἄπολις κτλ] "He who is cut

ἐστιν ἡ κρείττων ἡ ἀνθρωπος (ἄσπερ καὶ ὁ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς (1)
5 ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος'

§ 10 ἄμα γάρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἅτε περ
ἀξυξ ὥν ἄσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῆν ἀν- 10
θρωπος πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῶν μᾶλλον,
9 δῆλον. οὐδὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον
§ 11 δὲ μόνον ἀνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζών η μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ

6 [γάρ] Schmidt || [καὶ] Spengel partly recognising the fault in the ordinary construction; that ἄσπερ...ἐπιθυμητής is parenthetical was first shown by Jackson (*Journal of Philology* vii. 1877, p. 236 ff.); see Comm. || ἅτε περ omitted by L^a, erased in U^b || ἅτε περ...7 πεττοῖς transposed to follow 29 θεος Schmidt || 7 ἀξυξ ὥν omitted by U^b W^b L^c; with vacant space left, by P^{a-c}. Q M^b Ald. and 1st hand of P^d Q^b S^b T^b V^b; ἀξυξ.....πεττοῖς omitted by Ar., ὥν by R^b and P^d (1st hand); ἀξυξ ὥν was inserted by P^d (corr.^b), ἀξυξ by a later hand in Q^b S^b and by a later hand in the margin of T^b, δνεν ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων V^b (a later hand), δνεν ζυγοῦ τυγχάνων C^d also, δνεν γενήγος Bas.^a || πεττοῖς M^b, πετενοῖς Γ and p¹ in the margin, γρ. πετενοῖς P^d (corrector) in the margin, and a later hand in the margin of S^b || ζῷον after ὁ ἀνθρωπος Π^d B^c.

off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—(as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as ‘clanless lawless hearthless’; for he”, not the ἄπολις, but ὁ ὑφ' Ὁμήρου λοιδορηθεὶς, “is at once naturally unsociable and pugnacious)—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon” (Jackson).

§ 10 7 [ἀξυξ]. From an epigram of Agathias (*Anthol. Pal.* ix. 482, esp. 20—28) Göttling *De loco quodam Aris*. (Jena 1858) showed that ἀξυξ nearly resembles the ‘blot’ of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (*Academy* Jan. 8, 1876) take ἀξυξ to mean a ‘rover’, i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathias’ epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation from *Iliad* ix. 63, 64, where ἐκένος ὁ πολέμον ἤραται ἐπιδημούς ὄκροστος is the subject of which ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw

* Whether πόλεις was a name for this game or not, the πάντολαι πόλεις of Plato *Rcp.* iv. 422 ε (cp. the scholion) makes it likely that a compact body of pieces was called πόλεις; if an isolated piece was called ἄπολις, Aristotle’s allusion would be specially appropriate. Oncken, II. 27 f., has misunderstood Agathias’ epigram and Göttling’s dissertation no less than the present passage (Jackson).

(*Arist. Studien* III. 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless hearthless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or ‘rover’ is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer’s πολέμον ἐπιθυμητής ἐπιδημίον who is a φύσει τοιοῦτος, i.e. an ἄπολις φύσει, in whom the unsociable character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἄπολις is always or commonly aggressive; thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the ἀξυξ (Jackson). SUSEM. (24) (25)

διότι here, like στι, “that.”

διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν *De hist. anim.* I. 1. 12: πολιτικὰ δὲ ἐστὶ ζῷα ὡν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῷ γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον, ἀπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀγελαῖα. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, cranes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). SUSEM. (25 b)

9 For parallel passages consult Zeller II ii 424 n. (3); for Aristotle’s teleology, ib. 422—428, 488—497.

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνὴ mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see *De hist. anim.* IV. 9. 536 a 20, b 8 ff., *Probl.* X. 39, 895 a 7 ff., *Poet.* 20 § 2, 1456 b 22 ff. στοιχεῖον=φωνὴ ἀδιαλέπτος, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ’ ἐξ ης πέφυκε συνετή

ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἔστι σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ- (1)
χει ζώοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ
ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν
14 ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἔστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκλαν καὶ πόλιν.
19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκλαν καὶ ἔκαστος ἡμῶν
23 ἔστιν. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναι- (p. 4)
ρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὄμω-

11 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος (ἡδέως P⁶ U^b and 1st hand L^a) II² Bk. || ἔστι σημεῖον... 13
ἡδέος. These words are wanting in Q Q^b R^b (where † stands in the margin) S^b T^b and
V^b (1st hand; added by a later hand) || 12 ἐλήλυθεν W^b Ald. Bk. προῆλθεν P^{4.5}, M^b
U^b L^a || τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν] ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ P^{4.5}, M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk. ||
14 δηλοῦν] διελεῖν? Oncken, wrongly || 18 τούτων] τῶν τοιούτων Schmidt || 19 καὶ
πρότερον... 29 θεός transposed to follow 1252 b 27 θεῶν Schmidt. See his arrange-
ment *Introd.* p. 97 || δὲ Schneider, δῇ ΓΠ Bk.

γιγνεσθαι φωνή, καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰσὶν
ἀδιαίρετοι φωναί. SUSEM. (26)

15 τὸ δίκαιον governed by δηλοῦν :
and therefore also (for the purpose of
signifying) justice.'

§ 12–16 πρὸς=when compared with.
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ αἰσθησιν] moral per-
ception, *N. Eth.* II. 9. 8 ; IV. 5. 13, ἐν τῷ
αἰσθησι τὸ κόρλοις: not to mention passages
in Bk. VI; as 11 § 4 τούτων οὐν ἔχειν δεῖ
αἰσθησθαι, αἴτη δ' ἔστι νοῦς.

18 ἡ δὲ τούτων κ.] An objective geni-
tive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 12 κ.
τέπον, 'fellowship in goodness and
justice'. The 'city' is regarded as a
moral or spiritual society, church and
state in one.

19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει] It is
not in order of time γενέσει (in which
sense *N. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, quoted on § 5
above, asserts the direct contrary), but in
order of thought and of real existence
φύσει, κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ εἶδει, τῇ οὐσίᾳ, that
the state is prior to the family and to the
individual. On this distinction see esp.
Metaph. I. 8 §§ 3—7 989 a 15 ff.: IX(θ).
8. 8 1050 a 3 ff. ἡ ἐνέργεια προτέρα τῆς
διωδέωσις (the realized and actual pre-
cedes the possible) κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρό-
νον. ἀλλὰ μηδὲ οὐδὲ γε, πρώτον μὲν
ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὑστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῷ
οὐσίᾳ πρότερα οἷον ἀντὶ παιδός· τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἡδὴ ἔχει τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ οὐ: *Phys.* VIII.
7. 12, εδί a 14 what is in process of de-

velopment appears imperfect, δῆλος δὲ
φαίνεται τὸ γενέμενον ἀτέλες καὶ ἐπ' ἀρχήν
λόν, ὥστε τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὑστερον τῇ φύσει
πρότερον εἶναι. See below III. 1. 9, nor-
mal constitutions are prior to the di-
vergent, imperfect types. SUSEM. (27)

Other passages in *Grant Ethics* I. 239.

§ 13 τῷ ἀναιρούμενον κτλ] "for
if the whole body" except the foot or
hand "is destroyed, there will be neither
foot nor hand, except in an equivocal
sense such as that in which we call the
hand of a statue a hand; because a hand
in such circumstances" i.e. after the de-
struction of the rest of the body, "will be
spoilt for use," cp. 5 § 5 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
φύσιν ἔχοντις, καὶ μηδὲ τοῖς διεφθαρ-
μένοις, "and all things are defined by
their function and faculty, so that things
which are incapable of exercising their
functions and faculties (*μηχεῖτι τοιαῦτα =*
*μηκέτι ἔνεργα καὶ δυνατά**) must not be
said to be the things in question, but to
be equivocally called by their names"
(Jackson). Cp. *Manu* II. 157: 'as an
elephant of wood, as an antelope of leather,
so is a Brahmin unread in the Vedas.
These three bear the name' (Postgate).

If the text is correct, the above ex-
planation, in which Hayduck and Jack-
son independently agree, must be

* "Such as they were before, when they
formed part of the whole and fulfilled their
functions" (Cope). See the quotations n. (28).

νύμως, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γάρ ἔσται (I) τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὡρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε ²⁴ μηκέτι τοιαύτα δύτα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὅμως ^{§ 14} νῦμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει [καὶ] πρότερον ἡ ἔκα-¹² στος, δῆλον εἴ γάρ μη αὐτάρκης ἔκαστος χωρισθεῖς, ὅμοιος τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ δόλον, ὃ δὲ μη δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν ἡ μηδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος ²⁹ πόλεως, ὥστε ἡ θηρίον ἡ θεός.

^{§ 15} φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὄρμη ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνί-
αν ὃ δὲ πρώτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γάρ

²² λέγοι Bk.² and Susem.¹ following P² and perhaps Γ || ἀλλὰ φθαρεῖσα Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθίνην, ἀλλὰ (φθαρεῖσα γάρ) έσται τοιαύτη πάντα: hardly right || <οὐκ> έσται Rud. Schöll (*Comm. de legg. XII. tabb.* Bonn 1865, p. 43) which is not improbable: unless we are to bracket the words διαφθαρεῖσα γάρ έσται τοιαύτη. But see Comm. and *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. || 23 <ἢ> τοιαύτη? Jackson || δὲ] γάρ Γ apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ. κτλ. || 25 καὶ omitted before φύσει in II² and Paris. 963 || καὶ omitted before πρότερον by P² Ar. || προτέρα Γ P⁴ Q M^b T^b U^b V^b L^a, πρότερα P⁴, προτέρω Q^b R^b S^b || 28 μηδὲν Π² Bk. μηδὲν Γ Ar. || οὐδὲν Π² Bk. οὐδὲν M^b P¹ || 31 πρώτον P⁴-⁶. Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^a

accepted: διαφθαρεῖσα must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῦ ἔργου ἐστρημένη καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως: "in such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function and in its capacity to execute that function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name". But the parallel passages *De gener. anim.* I. 19. 7 726 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γάρ ἡ χειρ οὐδὲ ἀλλο τῶν μορίων οὐδὲν ἀνεψ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀλλης τούτοις δυνάμεως ἔστι χειρ οὐδὲ μόριον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μόριον ὁμονύμων: II. I. 42, 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γάρ ἔστι πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχήν, οὐδὲ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα δυωνύμως λεχθήσεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ δὲ σάρξ, ὥσπερ καὶ εἰ ἐγίγνετο λίθινα ἡ ἔνδιωσις. *De anima* I. 1. 9 413 b 18 ff. ὄφεως ἡτὶ ἀπολεπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὄφθαλμός, πλὴν δυωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος: *Meteor.* IV. 12. 3. 390 a 10 ff. ἀπαντά δὲ ἔστιν ὄφραρέντα τῷ ἔργῳ τὰ μὲν γάρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ὄληθες ἔστιν ἔκαστα, οἷον ὁ ὄφθαλμός εἰ ὄρβη, τὸ δὲ μη δυνάμενον δυωνύμως, οἷον ὁ τελευτὴς ἡ ὁ λίθινος lead to the conclusion that διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη is predicate. If so, and if τοιαύτη = a true hand, the sense requires the insertion of the negative, although

we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα δὲ: "for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function." δύων-μόριως] *Cp. III. 1. 7 n.* (438 b). SUSEM. (28)

^{§ 14} 26 χωρισθεῖσα] cut off from society, living in isolation, μονότητα γάρ χαλεπός ὁ βίος. Comp. the discussion in *N. Eth.* IX. c. 9 showing that friends are indispensable to Wellbeing: δεήσει τῷ εὐδαιμονίσασι φίλων στονδαῖσι... ἡ ταῦτη ἐνδεήσεται, i.e. not αὐτάρκης.

ὅμοιος τοῖς ἀλλοῖς ξεῖ κτλ.] "will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part": i. e., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be ὑπέρτερον not πρότερον.

29 ἡ θηρίον ἡ θεός] So § 9 ἡ τοι φαῦλος ἡ κρεπτωτα ἡ ἀνθρωπος. *N. Eth.* v. 9. 17 with Jackson's note, τοῖς μὲν γάρ οὐκ έστιν ὑπερβολή (τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀγαθῶν) οἷον Ιστος τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δὲ οὐθέν μόριον ὄφελιμοι, τοῖς ἀνάτως κακοῖς, so that the sphere of particular justice is restricted to human society: *ib. vii. 1. 2* ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίον έστιν κακαί οὐδὲ ἀρετή, οὗτος οὐδὲ θεός.

30 31 ὁ δὲ πρώτος κτλ.] *Cp. In-* trod. 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300). SUSEM. (28 b)

ὥσπερ γάρ κτλ.] "Both the grammar and the sense of τελεωθέν and χωρισθέν

καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστον τῶν ξώων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὗτῳ καὶ⁽¹⁾
 § 16 χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γάρ
 ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονή-
 σει καὶ ἀρετὴ, οὐς ἐπὶ τάνατον ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀν-
 οσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἀνευ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια
 καὶ ἑδωδήν χείριστον. οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ή γὰρ δίκη
 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστιν [ἥ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις].

3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ή πόλις συνέστηκεν,¹¹
 1253 b

32 [τελεωθὲν] and 33 [χωρισθὲν νόμου καὶ δίκης] Jackson || τελεωθεῖς and 33 χω-
 ρισθεῖς Spengel || ὁ wanting in II² Bk., but inserted in the margin of P⁴ || 35
 ἀρετὴ? due to 36 ἀρετῆς, having displaced a word like τέχνη Freudenthal (cp.
 Met. I. 1. 6 p. 98ο b 27 f.) or καρτερός Susem.; not ἔρωτι Lindau, δρέπει Hampke,
 nor ὀργῇ Schmidt: hardly κράτει Schnitzer. [Φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ] Conring Madvig.
 [καὶ ἀρετῇ] Schneider, <ἐπὶ> φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ Welldon, * φρονήσει Thurot,
 φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετὴν Reiske (this makes bad worse, Montecatino protested against it),
 χρήσει καὶ ἀρετὴν Oncken. See Susem. Quaest. Crit. II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. || 38 [ἢ...
 ..κράτει] Hampke, [δίκη] Spengel || δίκη δικαιοσύνη Reiske Thurot

νόμου καὶ δίκης appear strange, and 26 χωρισθεῖς is used in a different connexion (Jackson). Spengel (and lately Ridgeway) would make the participles masculine. But the concord is not too harsh; ‘at fortasse, ut saepius, liberiore constructione uititur Aristoteles’ (Susem.). For the thought, Plato *Laws* 765 E₂ παντὸς γάρ
 δὴ φυτοῦ ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὀμηθεῖσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῆς αὐτὸν τῆς φύσεως κυριωτάτη τέλος ἐπιθέναι τὸ πρόσφορον...καὶ ἀνθρώπων. ἀνθρώπος δέ, ων φαμέν, ἡμερον...μὴ λειανὸς δέ η μὴ καλῶς τραφέν ἀγριώτατον ὄποια φύει γῆ.

§ 16 34 ὁ δὲ κτλ] ‘Man is born with weapons to be used by (*i.e.* to subserve) wisdom and virtue; weapons which are, however, especially liable to abuse’ (Montecatino): φρονήσει the dative of reference (Jackson). Most editors make it causal or instrumental. “But (1) what can ‘weapons for practical wisdom and virtue’ mean? Hardly weapons for the *exercise*, but rather such as serve for the *attainment*, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὄπλα shows that the former are meant. (2) It is essential to the thought that we should learn whence man, of all creatures, gets these dangerous double-edged weapons, so eminently adapted for purposes mutually opposed (*ravarria*), for good and for evil. Whereas that they are for good needs not be stated: Aristotle’s teleological standpoint implies it.’

SUSEM. Cp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 13 (Spengel).

37 ή δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν κτλ]

III. 10. 2 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν.
 SUSEM. (28 c)

Jackson keeping the last clause ή δὲ δίκη κτλ (which he holds to be a parenthetical explanation of δίκη in ή γάρ δίκη κτλ, rightly placed last in a Greek sentence) would translate: “now justice belongs to a state”, *i.e.* can be found only in a πόλις, “δίκη or the administration of law—which is the determination of what is just—being a regulation of the political community.” Cp. *Nic. Eth.* V. 6. 4 ή γάρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου ff. with Jackson’s notes.

c. 3 *Economic has three parts treating of the relationships which make up the household, (1) δεσποτική (2) γαμική (3) πατρική: §§ 1, 2. The relation of (4) χρηματιστική to economic is obscure: § 3. Upon δεσποτική, which we take first, there are widely divergent views § 4.*

Roughly speaking the rest of the book treats of (1) δεσποτική in cc. 4—7, (4) χρηματιστική in cc. 8—11, (2) and (3) in cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 *The household needs implements which may be animate or inanimate: such an implement is called a chattel (κτῆμα), and is πρακτικόν, for use not for production: §§ 1—4. The thrall (κτῆμα ἐμψυχόν) defined §§ 5, 6.*

c. 5 *But are there any persons answering to this definition, φύσει δοῦλοι? § 1 As it is advantageous to both and to each, and therefore just and natural that body should be subject to soul, appetite to reason,*

ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγ- (II)
κειται πόλις ἔξ οἰκιῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἔξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία
συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
5 δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἔκαστον ζητητέον, πρώτα δὲ
καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος καὶ πόσις
καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκε-
§ 2 πτέον ἀν εἴη τί ἔκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ ἔστι 2
δεσποτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν-
10 δρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ
ἀνόμασται ἴδιῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὴ αὐταὶ τρεῖς ἀς εἰπο-
§ 3 μεν. ἔστι δέ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκη P^{4.6}; Q M^b U^b W^b L^b Ald., while Q^b R^b (which has however † in the margin) S^b T^b and V^b (1st hand) omit ἀναγκαῖον...4 συνέστηκεν (a later hand has inserted the words in the margin of V^b) || περὶ οἰκονομίας (οἰκίας Bk.² following the mss. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) εἰπεῖν πρῶτον P^{4.6}; Q M^b U^b W^b L^b Ald. Bk. in place of πρῶτον.....εἰπεῖν || σύγκειται after 3 οἰκῶν P^{4.6}; Q M^b U^b L^b Ald. Bk. || 3 οἰκονομίας] οἰκίας Γ P^{2.3}; Q M^b U^b L^b Bk. Bernays || πάλιν ἡ οἰκία Γ apparently, πάλιν οἰκία P^{2.3}, C⁴ and a later hand in V^b, ἡ οἰκία πάλιν M^b P¹, αἵθις οἰκία P^{4.6}; Q M^b U^b W^b L^b Ald. Bk. || 4 συνέστηκεν] συνίσταται P^{4.6}; Q M^b U^b W^b L^b Ald. Bk. || 5 πρῶτος] <καὶ> πρώτος Bender || 7 τούτων σκεπτέον after 8 ἀν II² Bk. || 9 καὶ is wanting before γαμικὴ in M^b M^b || 10 πατρική Ar. apparently (cp. c. 12 § 1), τεκνοποιητική Bk. following Γ and the mss. (W^b Ald. omit ἀνώνυμον.....τεκνο- ποιητική), τεκνοποιητική Dindorf (Steph. Thes.): πατρική was abbreviated πάτη; this became ποική or ποιητική, and was then wrongly emended || 11 δὴ Susem.^a, δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. || 12 δ' ἦτι or δὲ τι <ἦτι> Susem., δὲ <δέ> τι: i.e. δὲ <τέταρτον> τι (after first suggesting δ' ἦτι <τέταρτον> τι) Schmidt, probably right || [μέρος] Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. II ii 693 n. 4, ed. 3)

§§ 5, 6, *beasts to man, female to male, § 7, so it is better (i.e. § 11 advantageous and just) that a man whose function is bodily service, who is a mere adjunct of another, should be subject to his superior in excellency of soul, §§ 8, 9. Nature designs to mark this distinction upon the bodies of the two, but does not always succeed.* §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult *Introd.* pp. 24—26, the excellent dissertation of L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aris. von der Sklaverei* (Erlangen 1847, 4), Hildenbrand op.c. 395—406, Oncken II. 29—74, Becker and Hermann *Charikles* III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 386—373. SUSEM.

c. 3 § 1 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίας δὲ κτλ] In his last manner Aristotle means "the parts of Economic" or household-management "correspond to those of which the household consists". This at least gives better sense than to read οἰκίας: see 12 § 1.

The οἰκίας μέρη, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three 'pairs' of relationships συνέστηκεν (or, 2 § 5, κοινωνίαι).

4 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἔλ. κτλ] by the method noticed I § 3 n., 8 § 1 n., III. I. 2 n. (434). SUSEM. (29)

5 πρῶτα] The ἀσύνθετα of I § 3.

§ 2 9 γαμική = 'conjugal', πατρική = 'paternal' relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ἡ γαμική ὄμλα, the marriage union, IV(VII). 16 § 1 = simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἀνδρική, Göttling ποσταχή (sic) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin *maritalis*. Strictly πατρικός = hereditary, as e.g. in III. 14. 6: but in Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8, VIII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for 'paternal'.

τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς ὅπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον. (II)
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. (p. 5)

15 πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἴπωμεν, ἵνα τά τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρέαν ἴδωμεν, κανένα εἰ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανο-
§ 4 μένων. τοῖς μὲν γάρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική καὶ βα-
σιλική, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν. νόμῳ γάρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον,
φύσει δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ.
4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστί [καὶ ἡ κτητική +

15 [δὲ] Schmidt, who transposes πρῶτον [δέ].....1256 a 1 τρόπον (cc. 3 § 3—7
§ 5) to follow 1259 a 39 γαμική (c. 12 § 1); see *Introd.* p. 97 || 17 δυνάμεθα Μ³ Π¹
C¹, δυνησθεθα Γ (?) Susem.^{1,2}, *poterimus* William || 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν εἴπομεν οὖν <δέ>
Schmidt || [καὶ.....24 οἰκονομίας] Susem. On 23—33 cp. Susem, *Qu. Cr.* II. 7 ff.

§ 3 13 τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος] 8 § 1,
9 §§ 12—18, 11 § 13. SUSEM. (29 b)

15 ἵνα κτλ] 'first in order to observe what has a direct bearing upon practical use, and secondly for our theory, to ascertain any facts which may enable us to improve upon the views at present held'.

§ 4 20 καθάπερ εἴπομεν κτλ] 1 § 2 f.
ερ. 7 § 1 nn. SUSEM. (30)

τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν] Comp. below 6 § 1 foll. with *nn*. The only representative of this view of whom we have certain knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidamas of Elaia, a disciple of Gorgias (see III. 2. 2 n.), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the obstinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: ἐλευθέρους ἀρχῆς πάντας θεούς, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἢ φύσις πεποικέσσει, Aristot. *Rhet.* I. 13. 3, with scholiast. Compare Spengel (ii. 179) [and Cope] on that passage: and esp. Vahlen *Der Rhetor Alkidamas* (Vienna 1864. 8). 14 ff. Possibly (see 7 § 3 n.) Aristotle was acquainted with the lines of the comic poet Philemon (*Fragm. inc.* xxxiv Meineke, cf. Meinecke's ed. p. 410) καν δοῦλος ἐστι, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει. | φύσει γάρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἔγενθη ποτέ | ἡ δὲ αὐτὸν τῷ τοῦ πάντα κατεδουλώσατο. SUSEM. (31)

Zeller *Socrates* p. 322 n. 3 is inclined to attribute this view to the Cynics.

21 νόμῳ...φύσει] On this famous antithesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natural' see *Soph. Elench.* 12 § 6 173 a 7 ff.,

Grant *Ethics* I. 149—151, and esp. Sidgwick *Journal of Philology* v. 73—77.

22 διόπερ κτλ] Wherefore slavery (τὸ δεσπόζειν) is unjust also, as resting on mere force (Wyse).

c. 4 § 1 23 ἡ κτητική=the theory of the acquisition of property. Göttling and Bernays in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in what follows κτητική everywhere denotes the same thing as χρηματιστική in the wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 3 § 3, see 8 § 1 n. Property, as being indispensable for living, belongs to the household: hence by analogy it follows that every chattel is an instrument for the householder's use, and that the slave is an animate instrument of this kind. But from the fact that the theory of acquisition or even the theory of property is a part of the science of household management, no such conclusion follows, even when taken in connexion with the first premiss, which is sufficient of itself to prove it in the manner indicated above. Besides, the words bracketed anticipate the decision which at 3 § 3 is distinctly postponed to c. 8, and the way in which the question is raised 8 § 1 presupposes that no such decision by anticipation has yet been given. The statement made here does not agree with the results of cc. 8—11; for not the whole theory of property and its acquisition,

μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας] (ἀνευ γάρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον (II) 25 καὶ ξῆν καὶ εὖ ξῆν)· ὥσπερ δὴ ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἀν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει § 2 ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν δὲ ὄργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερ- νήτῃ ὁ μὲν οὐλᾶς ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρωφεὺς ἔμψυχον· ὁ γάρ 30 ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὄργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν ἔστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις

25 καὶ εὖ ξῆν wanting in ΓΜ^a and P¹ (first hand, added in the margin) || δὴ Susem., δὲ Π¹ Ρ^{2.3.} C⁴ M^b, δὲ ἐν Q Q^b R^b S^b T^b V^b Bk.; wanting in P^{4.5.} U^b W^b L^a Ald. Hence [δὲ] Susem.^{1.2.} || 26 μέλλοι Koraes and perhaps Γ || 27 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν οἰκονομικῶν P^{2.3.6.} Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C⁴ and the 1st hand in V^b (the dative in V^b by a later hand); [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] and 30 οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> Rassow Susem. Thurot once proposed to omit 30 οὕτω καὶ and transpose 27 οὕτω καὶ.....30 ἐστίν to follow 31 ἐστι || 31 [ἢ... 32 ἐστι, καὶ] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the 'natural' part concerns *οἰκονομική*, and that only indirectly. My defence of the words, *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 510, is exposed to objections not then foreseen: it would seem that this is an un-Aristotelian interpolation. SUSEM. (32)

24 ἀνευ γάρ κτλ] Cp. 2 § 8 n. (21). Mere life, bare existence, *ξῆν*, is of course the immediate end of the household and of household management: good life or well-being, *εὖ ξῆν*, is the end which the state has in view; but indirectly the state and its end is the end of the household 2 §§ 2—9. Consequently we find that side of *οἰκονομία*, which is directed towards securing the fitness of those belonging to the household, and so towards the perfecting of life, ranked above the use and preservation of property, or the side which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 n. SUSEM. (33)

25 ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις=the arts which form distinct professions: 'as the craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must be provided with suitable tools &c.' Bernays. In any case the phrase means 'the arts' properly so called; immediately below they are termed productive or creative (*τοιχίσις*, *ποιητικὰ ὄργανα* § 4 with n.) as contrasted with the merely practical activities to which Economic and the art of life belong. According to Aristotle these productive arts are to be subdivided into (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or 'fine arts'. In the sphere of practice the end lies in the activities themselves, *ἐνέργεια*: in the sphere of the

arts, in certain definite special products, *ἔργα*, distinct from the activities which produce them: *Nic. Eth.* I. 1. 2, 1094 a 3 f., διαφορὰ δὲ τις φανεραὶ τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα ταῦτα, I. 1. 5 1094 a 16 διαφέρει δὲ οὐδέν τὰς ἐνέργειας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἡ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθειών ἐπιστημών, II. 4. 3 1105 a 26, VI. 2 5 1139 b 2, II. 5. 3 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this distinction Schlosser prefers to explain ὡρισμέναις τ. as arts restricted to definite distinctive ends. But can this be expressed by the one word *ὡρισμέναις*? Fülleborn wavers between this explanation and his own, which makes ὡρ. τέχ.=definite special arts & the one all-embracing art of life. But conduct or the art of life—even if we include in it the perfecting of life—embraces at the most only the practical activities; and from what has been said it follows that the technical or productive activities, *ποιησίς*, would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV (VII). 3. 3 n. SUSEM. (34)

§ 2 30 ἐν ὄργάνου εἶδος] is classed with, ranked under the head of, implements: cp. τὰς ἐν ὕλῃς εἶδει ἀρχὰς *Meta.* I. 3. 3 983 b 7, the material sort of causes; ἐν μορφῇ εἶδει *De Caelo* I. 1. 7 268 a 5. The same idiom frequently where *εἶδος* and the genitive are almost a paraphrase for the thing in question: νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ ποιητείας *Pol.* III. 15. 2, cp. VI (IV). 6, 9 ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος.

31 τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον κτλ] "the chattel is an instrument to aid him in

πλῆθος ὄργάνων ἔστι, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον. καὶ (II)
 § 3 ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργάνων πᾶς [ό] ὑπηρέτης. εἰ γὰρ ηδύ- 5
 νατο ἔκαστον τῶν ὄργάνων κελευσθὲν ἡ προαισθανόμενον ἀπο-
 35 τελεῖν τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασὶν ἡ τοὺς τοῦ
 Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτους θείον
 [ὑπο]δύεσθαι ἀγώνα, οὗτος αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐτὰν καὶ τὰ
 πλήκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἀν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
 § 4 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δοῦλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα
 1254 a ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἔστι, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικόν· ἀπὸ

32 [καὶ] before ὁ δοῦλος so that the apodosis begins here Thurot || 33 ὁ wanting in M*, erased in P⁴ || 34 προαισθανόμενον Koraes || 35 αὐτὸν Π || 37 δύεσθαι P¹ Π² Bk. || οὕτως <ετ> Susem.¹ following William's translation *sic si, οὕτω καὶ Schmidt* || αὐτὰν only Γ and a later hand in C*: the rest have αὐταῖ.

1254 a 1 [τὰ μὲν...4 μόνον] Schmidt

living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further 1. 2 § 5 n., 6 § 10 n. SUSEM. (35)

33 ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργάνων] an implement superior to other implements; see 7 § 3 and *De part. animal.* IV. 10. 21. 687 a 21 ἔστι γάρ (sc. ἡ χείρ) ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργάνων. For this relation δοῦλος = ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, ὄργανον = ἀψυχος δοῦλος Eaton cites *N. Eth.* VIII. 11. 6

§ 3 35 Δαιδάλον] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato *Meno* 97 D, Suidas s. v. Δαιδάλος ποιῆματα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusive lifelikeness; and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato *L. c.*). See Brunn *History of the Greek Artists* I. 14—23. SUSEM. (36)

36 ὁ ποιητὴς] Homer *Iliad* xviii. 376 δόφρα οἱ αὐτόματοι θείον δυσαλαρ' ἀγώνα. SUSEM. (36 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lytton's *Coming Race*.

§ 4 1254 a 2 ποιητικά=for production (of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικόν 'for action'=merely for use, i.e. as we see from 8 § 2 the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy consumption is either *productive* or *unproductive*, and the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers' or the consumers' point of view: Mill 1. c. 3, Sidgwick *Principles* 1. c. 3 § 7.

On the distinction here made between ποιητικός and πρακτικός cp. *nn.* (34, 40) and Zeller *op. c.* II ii 164, 177 ff., 580, 586, 652 ff. Consult also the special treatises Ed. Müller *History of the Theory of Art in Greece* II. 38 ff., 374 ff., Teichmüller *Forschungen (Aristotelian Researches)* II. 12—62, Reinkens *Aristotle on Art* 1—12, 169—179; Susemihl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CV. 1872. 319 f., Rich. Schultz *De poetica Aristoteleae principiis* (Berlin 1874. 8), Walter *Theory of Practical Reason in Gk. Philosophy* (Jena 1874. 8) p. 80 ff., 245 f., 276 ff., 296 ff., 504 ff.

Onccken very justly remarks, *op. c.* II. 39 f., that even from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at a conception of slave-labour so one-sided that even its capacity for production (i.e. of fresh objects of utility) is denied. "This could not be maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellas the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the

μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἔτερόν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (II) αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μός νου. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἰδεῖ καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὄργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν § 5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν. (P)

τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον. τό τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἔστι μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου· ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μόνου, ἐκείνου δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότου δοῦλος ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου.

§ 6 τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων τις δῆλον (ό γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἀνθρωπος ὅν, οὗτος φύσει δοῦλος ἔστιν, ἀλλου δὲ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπος, ὃς ἀν κτῆμα γένεται [δοῦ-

§ 5 δ' wanting in M^a and perhaps also in Γ, hence [δ'] Susem.¹ || 6 καὶ δέονται Π¹ P²⁻³ C⁴ W^b Ar. Ald., δέονται δὲ P⁴⁻⁶. Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^c Bk. || 10 ἀπλῶς Γ and p² (but ἐρυθρεία [sic] ἔστι τοῦ ὅλως mg.³ P², i.e. a marginal note in dark yellow ink), ἀπλῶς ὅλως M^a Π¹, ὅλως all other sources Bk. Susem.¹⁻². || The clause 15 δὲ...16 ἔστιν is noticed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Metaphys. p. 15, 6 ed. Bonitz || 15 ὁν Π¹ Paris. 963 Alex. (apparently) and P⁴ (corrector in margin), δὲ P²⁻⁶. Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^c Ar. Ald. Bk. and the 1st hand in P⁴ C⁴: no doubt also in P³ (an erasure here), γρ. δὲ p¹ in margin, ἔστιν a later hand in C⁴ || 16 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ P¹⁻⁶. W^b L^c Ald., ἀλλ' οὐδὲν M^a || η Γ M^a || δοῦλος ἔστιν ορ δοῦλος η Γ apparently, δοῦλος ὁν M^a C⁴ and P¹⁻²⁻³. Q M^b (1st hand), ἀνθρωπος ὁν δοῦλος ὁν P⁴, ἀνθρω-

production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle." SUSEM. (37)

§ 5 ο κτῆμα...μόριον] Eaton compares Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἔως ὅτι ἡ πηλικού καὶ χωρισθεῖ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as it were parts of oneself.

10 ἀπλῶς ὅλους] "belongs absolutely to another". To express relation to and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with εἶναι, as here and Pl. Rep. IV. 433 B τοιαῦτα οἰα εἶναι τοῦ, or (2) ἔνεκα with the genitive, as in Metaph. I. 2. 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and Rhet. I. 9. 27 ἔλενθέρου τῷ μὴ πρὸς

ἄλλον γένεται.

12 ο δὲ...ὅλως ἐκείνου] Eth. End. VII. 9. 2 1241 b 19 οὐ γάρ δὲ ἔστιν (sc. δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος), ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός...τοῦ δεσπότου δὲ δοῦλος ὥσπερ μόριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δὲ ὄργανον ὥσπερ δοῦλος ἀψυχος.

§ 6 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because 'the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it πέφυκε ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει': Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 2. 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἔτερον ἔχοντι τὴν δύναμαν, Pol. IV (VII). 1. 12 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμαν καὶ πορφύρην, also IV (VII). 4. 10; Plato Parm. 134 D τὴν δύναμαν ἔχειν η ἔχει, Rep. IX. 588 B τὸ τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον πράττειν ην ἐκάπερον ἔχει δύναμαν.

15 ο γάρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτλ.] Conversely in Metaph. I. 2. 19 982 b 25 we have a definition of the free man δυνάμως, φαμέν, ὀλεύθερος ο αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (38)

5 λος ἐστίν], κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν· πότερον (II)
 δ' ἐστί τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δικαιόν τινι
 δουλεύειν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ
 ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ § 2
 ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γάρ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
 οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί.
 καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι
 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖν. καὶ εἰδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ
 25 ἀρχομένων ἐστίν (καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτιώνων
 § 3 ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπους ἡ θηρίου· τὸ γάρ ἀποτελούμενον
 ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιώνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖν
 τὸ δ' ἀρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον). ὅσα γάρ ἐκ πλειόνων 9
 ποιοῦνται p¹ P⁶ Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^a Ar. Ald. Bk. and, with γρ. before these words,
 corr.¹ in the margin of P²², a correction in red ink on the margin of Q, and M^b (corr.
 in margin); [ἀνθρώπος ὁν] Koraes. Dittographia whichever of the two—δοῦλος ἐστίν
 or ἀνθρώπος ὁν—gave rise to all the other readings || 23 καὶ εὐθὺς.....24 ἀρ-
 χειν Susem.¹ transposed to immediately precede 28 ὅσα, but see Dittenberger ὥρ. c.
 p. 1375 f. who has now been followed in punctuation. Cp. Comm. || 24 [καὶ εἰδη
 ...28 ἔργον] Schmidt who thinks the proper context is before φανερὸν 1259 b 18,
 and if so conjectures ἐπειδή εἰδη || 25 [ἢ] ἀρχὴ Koraes || 26 ἀνθρώπων ἡ θηρίων
 Schmidt || 27 ὑπὸ Bk.² instead of ἀπὸ

17 χωριστόν] Hereby opposed to μόριον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of ὁ φύσει δοῦλος is ὄργανον ἐμψυχον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν, δολος δλον ὁν, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτῆμα 'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in N. E. v. 6. 8 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any φύσει δοῦλοι, for whom a slave's estate is greater good and just?

§ 1 20 τῷ λόγῳ...ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικῶς or διαλεκτικῶς ζητεῖν as opposed (a) to ἀναλυτικῶς or ἐκ τῶν κειμένων, (b) to φυσικῶς ζητεῖν or ἐπισκοπεῖν: Waitz *Organon* II. 354, Zeller *Phil.* II ii 171 n. 2. Eaton rightly compares IV (VII). 1. 6.

§ 2 21 τῶν συμφερόντων] Under the limitation laid down III. 6. 6, see n. (7).

24 εἰδη πολλὰ] Cp. Nic. Eth. VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5: Plato *Zeus* III. 690 A. The variety implies a gradation.

25 καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων κτλ] This passage is referred to IV (VII). 3. 2, see the note: cp. IV (VII). 14. 19 τοῦ γάρ δεσποτικῶς

ἀρχεῖν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ
 μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. SUSEM. (38 b)

Cp. also VIII (V). 11. 34.

§ 3 26 τὸ γάρ ἀποτ. κτλ] Cp. Nic. Eth. II. 6. 4 πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐ ἀνὴρ ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον εὐ-
 ἀποδίδωσιν (Elaton).

28 τούτων ἔργον] The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato Rep. I. 353 A: τούτῳ ἐκάστου ἔργον, ὃ ἀνὴρ μόνον τι ἡ καλ-
 λιστα τῶν ὅλων ἀπεργάζεται.

ὅσα γάρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition καὶ εἰδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστί, not to the particular explanation attached to it καὶ ἀεὶ βελτίων..ἔργον. SUSEM. (39)

The sentence is parenthetical as in I. 1. 3, where see note. "For wherever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled. This follows from the whole order of nature (ἐκ causal, as e.g. ἐκ προαιρέσεων, 2 § 2) and is seen to hold good of living things."

συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ (II) 30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἀπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχό-
§ 4 μενον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς
ἐμψύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις
ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσως ἐξωτερικωτέ-
ρας ἔστι σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ἡδον πρώτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς¹⁰
35 καὶ σώματος, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἔστι φύσει τὸ δὲ ἀρχό-
§ 5 μενον — δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον
τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-
τιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀν-
θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν φ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἦ

31 [καὶ τοῦτο...32 ἐμψύχοις] Schmidt || 33 <ἐν> ἀρμονίᾳ? Susem. || 35 ἀρχό-
μενον—(to mark a break in the construction) Bonitz || 39 μοχθηρῶν ἢ μοχθηρῶν] pes-
tilentium et prave William; apparently Γ had φαύλων which Bücheler approves,

§ 4 31 ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως] The conclusion is based upon the whole order of nature: it is a universal natural law, not a special law applying to living organisms (Bernays). SUSEM. (38 c) It is not probable that ἐκ with genitive=a partitive genitive (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 235 b 11), for the only support for such a use is the spurious treatise *Περὶ φυτῶν*, 836 a 39, τὸ φυτὸν οὐκ ἔστι ἐκ τῶν στερομένων ψυχῆς, and 828 b 17. It would be an improvement, but hardly correct, to render 'taking the whole of nature this is preeminently true of living things'.

32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι κτλ] αἰδὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιωτός ἔστιν ἔνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὅμοιως ἐν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν IV (VII). 14. 10.

33 ἀρχή, οἷον ἀρμονίας] "Even in things without life there is a species of dominance, in music for instance": each musical 'mode' being ruled by its key-note, ἡ μέση (originally the note struck by the middle string of the heptachord*). Compare *Probl. XIX.* § 33 920 a 21 ἡ γάρ μέση καὶ ἡ γερά: § 36 920 b 9 τὸ ἡμίσθιον ἔστιν ἀπάσαις sc. ταῖς χορδαῖς, τὸ δὲ ἔχει πως πρὸς τὴν μέσην: § 44 922 a 23 ἐπειδὴ τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν ἀκρων τὸ μέσον μόνον ἀρχή τις ἔστιν ... 27 φθόγγος ὃν ἡ μέση καλούμενη μόνη ἀρχή ἔστι θατέρου τετραχόρδου. On the technical sense of ἀρμονία=εἶδος δια-
ποσῶν see Exc. III. on Bk. V (VIII). Another political simile from the 'modes', *Eth. Eud.* VII. 9. 4: ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρμονῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, inas-

* The term 'dominant' for the fifth above the key-note in a modern scale is quite different.

much as some are ὀρθαλ, others παρεκβάσεις. Giphanius and others wrongly take ἀρμονίας as qualifying ἀρχή=dominance in the sense, that is, of a blending or subordination of parts. Cp. *De Anima* I. 4. 1 τὴν ἀρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναρτίων ἔναι. This would be the sense of συμφωνία, rather than of ἀρμονία, in music: *Probl. XIX.* 38 921 a 2.

§ 5 ἐξωτερικῶν ἔστι σκέψεως] "would perhaps involve a discussion somewhat outside the subject". Obviously the simple meaning here as in ἐξ. πράξεις IV (VII). 3. 8: not to be pressed (as by Thurot *Etudes* 219 f., Ueberweg *Hist. of Phil.* Eng. tr. I. 143) to signify 'those parts of Aristotle's strictly scientific works which are "dialectical" i.e. controversial, rather than "apodeictical" i.e. purely scientific.'

34 τὸ δὲ ἡδον κτλ] The enumeration is interrupted at ἀρχόμενον by the qualifying phrase in parenthesis δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν... ἔχειν in such a way that even the first member (ἡδον) is only quoted by its first division into soul and body, while the second subdivision into rational and irrational parts of the soul is not added until the enumeration is resumed, § 6. We should expect δεύτερον, τρίτον to correspond with πρώτον, in place of them we find τέλον and ἔτι δὲ in § 7. SUSEM. (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine what is κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle's meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 οἷον γάρ ἔκαστον ἔστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεῖσης ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν ἔναι ἔκδοστον. Cp. *N. Eth.* IX. 9. 8, *Cic. Tusc.* I § 32 (Eaton).

(11)

1254 b μοχθηρῶς ἔχόντων δόξειν ἀν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα (p. 7)
 § 6 τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἔστι οὐ
 δ' οὖν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῷῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ δε-
 σποτικὴν ἄρχην καὶ πολιτικὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-
 ματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὄρέξεως πο-
 λιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἔστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-
 σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-
 χῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ
 λόγου ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἔξιστον ἡ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν.

erasing φαύλως καὶ just afterwards; μοχθηρῶς, due to a mistaken correction written over μοχθηρῶν, may have displaced φαύλως, as Schmidt once suggested; now he suspects μοχθηρῶν ἡ: [ἡ μοχθηρῶς ἔχόντων] Studemund

1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φύσιν wanting in M^o and P¹ (1st hand), but added in the margin by p¹ || P^{2,3} have περὶ for παρὰ || 6 [καὶ βασιλικήν] Oncken, perhaps rightly

§ 6 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in *Nic. Eth.* v. 11 § 9, I. 13 § 18, III. 3 § 18, 12 § 6. Cp. also Plato *Phaedo* 80 A ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅστις ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλείειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προσάρτεται, τῷ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν; *Phaedrus* 237 f., not to mention *Rep.* ix. 589 E, 590 C, D (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἄρχει see *Nic. Eth.* v. 6, 8 f., II § 9 with Jackson's notes; VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5, II §§ 1—6.

8 τῷ παθητικῷ...λόγον ἔχοντος] Cp. IV (VII), 15, 9 with n. (935). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, *nous*, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. IV (VII). 7. 5 n. (786), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 497 f., 509 f., 566 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, IV (VII). 14 § 9 f., 15 §§ 9, 10, where see the notes, cp. also III. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: i cognitive reason (*ἐπιστημονικόν*), ii reflective or opining reason (*λογιστικόν*, *δοξαστικόν*). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which attains to a mere idea or opinion (*ὑπόληπτος* = unverified belief, assumption, *δόξα*) but


falls short of true knowledge, and more especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (*βούλευτικόν*, see I 3 § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflexion from which Aristotle has borrowed the name (*λογιστικόν*) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in n. (34) on I. 4. I that the practical reason is again divided into (1) *διάνοια πρακτική*, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) constructive, i.e. technical, reason, *δ. ποιητική*, which when developed becomes *τέχνη*, artistic skill*: see *Nic. Eth.* VI. 1 § 5 f.; 2 § 3, § 5; 4 § 3, 5 § 8, 12 § 2; *Metaph.* VI. 1. 5 1025 b 25 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views Susemihl *Studies in the Nic. Eth.* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879. 737 ff.

If we combine with the above the results stated in the note on I. 13. 6 we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

* In the *Politics* however *τέχνη* generally denotes (1) Art as opposed to Nature, (2) the total activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the construction of new products — the exercise of crafts and industries of all kinds, including occasionally even *practical* aptitudes such as Household Management (*οἰκονομική*). This is the sense in 2. § 1 above, where the former of 'arts proper' are accordingly distinguished from practical aptitudes by the addition of *ἀριστεράς*. cp. n. (34). It is only in I 3 § 6 that *τέχνησταται ἔργασις* = occupation where artistic skill is most required: see n. (102).

§ 7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις ὡσαύτως τὰ 12
11 μὲν γὰρ ἡμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βέλτιον τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ
πᾶσι βέλτιον ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-
τηρίας οὐτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν
κρείττον τὸ δὲ χείρον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.
15 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώ-
§ 8 πων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστάσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος ισ-
καὶ ἀνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων

13 ἔστι Ατ. (?) est igitur, Susem.³ (a misprint) || 14 Π³ Bk. omit καὶ || 16 διε-
στάσις τοσοῦτον Μ⁴, διεστάσις τοιούτον Ρ¹ || ψυχῆς σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θήριον? Thurot,
more correctly; but perhaps an improvement upon Aristotle himself || 17 δὲ
wanting in Μ⁴ Ρ¹⁻³ Q¹ T¹ Ar. Ald. and Ρ² (1st hand, supplied by corr.²)



Now in the *Politics* we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the *ἀληθητικόν* or *δρεκτικόν* (cp. *De Anima* III. 7. 2 οὐχ ἔτερον τὸ δρεκτικόν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὐτε τὸν αλιθητικόν ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or percipient side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, *ἥθος*. Cp. I. 13. 6 n., *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10 f.; VI. 12 § 6. SUSEM. (40)

§ 7 10 πάλιν... 13 ἔτι δέ] See on § 4 a 34 above. ὡσαύτως] Here again, in man's relation to the animals we see the same thing: clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruler and ruled and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. SUSEM. (41, 42)

Cp. 2 § 2 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (Congreve).
11 τὰ ημέρα τῶν ἀγρίων] Plato *Po-*
liticus 264 A, διηρητο τὸ ζῷον τῷ τιθασῷ
καὶ ἀγρίῳ, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τιθασένεσ-
θαι φύσιν ημέρα προσείργαται, τὰ δὲ μὴ
ἔχοντα δηγμα. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific *De part. animal.* I. 3. 13 643 b 3, πάγκα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, δσα
ημέρα, καὶ δηγμα τυγχάνει δηγμα.

13 τὸ ἄρρεν κτλ.] Cp. 12 § 1 nn. (108, 109), 13 § 9 ff. (117, 120). SUSEM. (42 b)

14 κρείττον... χείρον] Elsewhere τὸ θῆλυ is declared to be ὡσπερ ἄρρεν πεπ-
ρωμένον, or ἀναπηρία. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex: *Rcp.* V. 455 E ἐπὶ πάσιν ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ὄντος *Latas* VI. 781 Β ὁ σφεδὲ ή θηλεία μητρὸς φύει ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, *Timaeus* 42 A, B: τὸ κρείτ-
τον τοιούτον εἶη γένος... ἀνήρ, 90 E f.

15 ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 δσοι... 17 θηρίον] Cp. III. 11.
5 κατοι τὸ διαφέροντα εἴοι τῶν θηρίων, ὡς
ἔποι εἰπεῖν: How is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle's own psycholo-
gy? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is at most but a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyments, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition ἀνδραπο-
δωδία" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli *Aris-*

ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν (II) 19 βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οὓς βέλτιόν ἔστιν § 9 ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἔστιν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄλλα μῆι ἔχειν τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἄλλα

18 ἔστιν M^a, ἔστιν P^{2,3,4}. Q M^b T^b Ald. Bk., ἔσται S^b || 20 ηὔπερ Bücheler for εἴπερ, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1366 f. || ἔστιν ἄρα ? Susem.; since no δὲ corresponds to the preceding μὲν οὖν and μέν Thurot suspects some deeper corruption, a lacuna, it may be, before ἔστι γὰρ || 21 ὁ δυνάμενος... 22 καὶ suspected by Schmidt || 23 λόγου Π^a Ar. Bk. Schneider Spengel, perhaps rightly || [αἰσθανόμενα] Bender [ἄλλα] Spengel αἰσθάνονται ? Schneider

toteles Pädagogik 69). The passages to consult are III. 4 § 11, IV(vii). 17 § 7, § 9; also v(viii). 6 § 8, IV(vii). 15 § 5 with the notes: *Nic. Eth.* I. 5 § 3; III. 10 § 8, 11 § 3: IV. 5 § 6: and the further references under ἀνδρασθοῦσις Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 54 b 30 f. SUSEM. (43)

19 οὓς βέλτιον κτλ.] Plato *Rep.* IX. 590 D ὡς ἀνενοεῖ παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεσθαι μάλιστα μὲν οὐκεῖν ἔχωντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μῆι, ἔξωθεν ἀρχεσθωτος: a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole doctrine of natural slavery.

20 τοῖς ἀργείνοις] τῷ σώματι, τῷ παθητικῷ μορφῇ, τῷ θρήψῃ, τῷ θῆλαι (Congreve).

§ 9 21 διδ καὶ ὄλλον ἔστιν] As a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far: from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse, Cic. *De Rep.* III. § 37 (Congreve). SUSEM. (44)

22 ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μῆι ἔχειν] In c. 13 § 14 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*) is ascribed to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children (see note), for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the mere suggestions of the instincts and passions of sense; *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 6, III. 12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here asserting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see n. on § 6), the appetitive soul, in IV (VII). 14 § 9, cp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 15 f.: namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by

practical reason. As the power to reflect is to Aristotle amongst the most essential peculiarities of the practical reason—see n. (40) on § 6—this cannot with any consistency be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where see note) if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part under which is included the possession of practical reason. At the most there can be merely an approximation to the state here described. See further on c. 13 § 12. Λόγος, which here=reason, is the *βούλευτικὸν* of 13 § 7 (see n.); more precisely, ὄρθος λόγος in the *Ethics*, right or sound understanding as the law and criterion of human action in the sphere of practice and morals. Preéminent skill in the exercise of this λόγος is φρόνησις=insight, prudence: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 652 f., Walter *op. c.* 353—503. Aristotle is consistent when he allows φρόνησις to none but the φύσει δεσπότης: I. 13. 8 n. (115), III. 4. 17 n. (497). But if the φύσει δοῦλοι were wholly devoid of practical reason of his own he would, by Aristotle's own definition, cease to be a human being and to possess even the scanty remains of capacity for human and moral virtue which is left him according to c. 13 §§ 1—14: cp. *Poetics* c. 15 § 1 with my note (19 b). He would then be reduced to the level of the brute, in himself unable to resist the promptings of sensual desires. See n. p. 211. SUSEM. (45)

23 λόγῳ αἰσθ.] On αἰσθῆσθαι, αἰσθάνεσθαι see n. (570) upon III. 11. 9. SUSEM. (45 b) If λόγον is the right reading, then the copula is omitted as if αἰσθανόμενα were an adjective: "the other animals (are) not attentive to reason, but obey their passions."

παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρέα δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν¹⁴
 25 ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τάναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ'
 ἀμφοῖν, παρά τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζῷων.
 § 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα
 ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ
 πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δὲ ὄφθα καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς
 30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἔργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρῆσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν
 βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
 χρέαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τού-
 ναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς^(p. 8)
 ψυχάς ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ως εἰ τοσοῦτον γένουιτο διά-
 35 φοροί τὸ σῶμα μόνον θσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-
 λειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἀνάξιους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.
 § 11 εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ
 τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅμοίως ῥάδιον ιδεῖν
 τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 ποιεῖ P³⁻⁶. QM^b S^b T^b Ar. Ald. and 1st hand of P² (emended by corr.²) || μὲν
 <ταπεινὰ καὶ>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ὄφθα]
 ριθρὰ Reiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L^a. [οὗτος...32 εἰρηνική] Schneider and Schmidt,
 perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων ἔτερων or a little before <τῶν δούλων>
 τοὺς μὲν Heitland wrongly: Aristotle's meaning would have been clearer if he had
 added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχάς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted
 after δουλεύειν; but it came first: βούλεται μὲν οὖν....τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς

34 f. καὶ ἡ χρέα δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ.] "Moreover the service afforded by the slave is not very far removed from that of domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (*note* the dative) towards the necessities of life." Comp. Plato *Polit.* 289 B: slaves and domesticated animals as species of the same genus περὶ ζῷων κτῆσιν τῶν ἡμέρων πλὴν δούλων; also c. 2 § 5 above n. (15); and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSEM. (46)

§ 10 27 βούλεται] Nature designs, but is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).

32 χρέα] "including services in war as well as in peace."

34 ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε κτλ] Cp. IV (VII).
 14. 2. Congreve and Eaton compare Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental worth is necessarily and naturally presented in a harmonious external form; and in the very beauty of the race, of which he was thoroughly conscious, Aristotle finds direct proof of its superiority to the barbarians. What a complete justification this for the slavery of the black

and coloured races! Zeller *op. c.* II ii 691 n. (2). See on I. 2 § 4 n. (13).

Lang however from another point of view justly remarks *op. c. Essays 6o*: "we must remember no one would have been more bitter than Aristotle against the negro-slavery on plantations of modern days. To turn the servants of the noble life into tools of limitless money-making would have been, in his view, unnatural. We must remember also, that he would have held up the promise and reward of freedom, to stimulate his serfs to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in prospect, and friendship in the meantime, with every lovely rite of divine service performed for their sake, there may have been worse lives than those of the Greek slaves." SUSEM. (47)

§ 11 38 οὐχ ὅμοιως ῥάδιον ιδεῖν κτλ]
 Eaton compares Nic. Eth. I. 13. 16 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὄφωμεν τὸ παραφερό-
 μενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὄφωμεν. Should we not rather think of Plat.
Phaedr. 250 D E, Xen. Mem. III. 10. 3?

1255 a ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦ- (II)
 λοι, φανερόν, οἵς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον
 6 ἔστιν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντα φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγου- 10
 σιν ὄρθως, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἴδειν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν
 5 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ
 δουλεύων ὁ γάρ νόμος ὀμολογία τίς ἔστιν, ἐν φ τὰ κατὰ
 § 2 πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν. τοῦτο δὴ
 τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ρήτορα γρά-

1255 a 1 ὅτι...b 3 δύναται is cited by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 6, p. 932 B sq.
 5 καὶ before κατὰ omitted in Π³ Μ^b Ar. Ald. Plut. and in Ρ³ (1st hand—added by a
 later hand) || 6 ἐν ὦ Bas.³, ἐφ' φ omitting the following φασίν Bernays; Hampke
 punctuates δουλεύων (b...τις ἔστιν), ἐν φ κτλ., cp. Hermes XIX. 577 n.

c. 6 There is then one species of slavery, which is natural. But there is another species, conventional slavery: § 1. The justice of the convention which allows prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves is unconditionally challenged by some (A) and defended by others (B): § 2. The reason why there are these conflicting views, and why nevertheless they have a common ground, is the implication of virtue and superior force. The issue turns on what constitutes right and justice: § 3. Weakness of the one view (A), which implies a denial of the right of superior virtue to rule: § 4. Others (C), again, argue that all slavery, so far as it is legal, is just: but the war might be unjust, and they would refuse to apply their principle consistently to captive Greeks: § 5. This refusal leads them back to τὸ φύσει δοῦλον: § 6. Illustration from the conception of nobility: § 7. Men are marked off for true freedom and true nobility by virtue (ἀρετὴ): § 8. Recapitulation: §§ 9, 10.

See EXCURSUS II.; Hampke in *Philologus* XXXIV. 1866. 172—175, who compares IV(VII). 2 §§ 12—18; in *The Transactions of Camb. Philol. Soc.* II. 1883 Jackson pp. 111—116, Postgate pp. 119—123, Ridgeway pp. 128—130; and Susemihl in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—588. The chapter reminds us of N. *Æth.* I. cc. 8—12, in so far as Aristotle is testing his theoretical conclusions by a comparison with various received opinions.

§ 1 1255 a 1 ff. "It is thus plain that in certain cases there are natural freemen and natural slaves, for the latter of whom the estate of slavery is both advantageous and just. And yet it is easy to see that those who maintain the opposite" viz. of

the doctrine of natural slavery (against Ridgeway 129 f) "do, to a certain extent, argue correctly. For the terms slavery and slave are used in two senses. <Besides the natural> there is also the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered in war are declared the property of their conquerors."

6 ὁ γὰρ νόμος...7 φασίν] Xenophon *Cyr.* VII. 5. 73 νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δίδιος ἐστιν, οἷαν πολεμούντων πόλεις δλῆρι, τῶν ἀλόντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῷ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα (Congreve). It is well known that customs and usages purely conventional and resting on mere tradition were called νόμοι by the Greeks and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws: III. 16 § 9 ἐπὶ κυριότεροι καὶ περὶ κυριότερον τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσὶν, and VII. (VI). 5 § 2. Yet these "unwritten laws" are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a definite law-giver: see on II. 9 §§ 12, 14. SUSEM. (48) Cp. Grote *Plato* I. 249 f., 252 n.

§ 2 7 "This conventional right is by many jurisconsults arraigned, like a demagogue, of unconstitutionalism." Yet 'slavery among the ancients was at first an unmixed blessing — an important conquest of the spirit of humanity. When men were altogether barbarous they killed their prisoners.' Lecky *Hist. of Rationalism* II. 254.

8 γράφονται παρανόμων] "This indictment was laid against any private citizen who had proposed or carried an unconstitutional law or popular decree, i.e. one which contravened laws or decrees in force at the time and not previously

φονται παρανόμων, ώς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου (II) το καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον τὸ βιασθέν. καὶ τοὺς μὲν οὐτως δοκεῖ τοὺς δὲ ἐκείνως, καὶ § 3 τῶν σοφῶν. αὕτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὁ 17 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγ-

11 ἐκείνως [καὶ] Koraes, wrongly

repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. A decree (*ψήφισμα*) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the *βούλη* previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the *βούλη* on the same subject which it could contravene' (Meier and Schömann *Attischer Prozess* 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. SUSEM. (49)

9 ὡς δεινὸν κτλ.] "on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues." The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῖς μὲν εἴναι δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι and 3 § 1, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν, where see note. SUSEM. (49 b) Note the genitive after ἀρχόμενον, "subject of the coercer".

11 "This then is their view: others again take the former view" (*ἐκείνως*): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1: δοκεῖ *ἐκείνως* repeats the *φασίν* of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (A) the opponents (*τοῖς μὲν*), and by (B) the defenders of conventional slavery (*τοῖς δὲ*); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (C) the *τρίτες* of line 22.

§ 8 12 "The reason of the conflict" between (A) and (B) "and what" at the same time "makes the (two opposed) views overlap." The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (A) and (B) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διαστάτων χωρὶς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force.

Bernays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51)

13 *λόγοις*, often taken as = arguments, or again as = propositions, should be explained more widely as "the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them," thus nearly = views or reasonings (Postgate *op. c.* 121, 123 n.), "platforms" (Heitland), theories.

ἐπαλλάσσειν, as in I. 9. 15, VI(iv). 10. 2, VII(V). 1. 3; see Heitland's examination of these passages *Notes* 11—13, and the passages collected by Jackson *op. c.* 114 n. Bonitz *Index* s.v. compares *ἐπαφορίζειν* and explains that from the sense of "to alternate" it comes to be applied *ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque coherent*. "Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion" (Susem.). Oncken took it of 'arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments.' Heitland and Jackson of 'propositions overlapping': but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust: the latter holds that it is the *λόγος* of (A) and (B)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which 'overlap': because the "slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just." (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. II. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινὰ κτλ.] "in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort." These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that *βία* carries with it *ἀρετὴ*: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.

χάνοντα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ (II)
 15 ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν
 μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μό-
 8 4 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὔνοια
 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν
 κρείττονα ἀρχεῖν) ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό-
 18 20 γων οὐτε ἴσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχοντιν οὐτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς

17 εὐνοίᾳ Lambin, wrongly: <μετ'> εὐνοια? Schneider

14 χορηγία=means, resources: ἡ ἐκ-
 τὸς χ. favourable external circumstances,
 external goods *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 § 4; so of
 the individual *Pol.* IV(VII). 13 § 3. In a
 wider sense, anything with which the state
 requires to be furnished, even population,
 territory IV(VII). 4 § 2, § 4.

13—16 ὅτι...βίᾳ] Füllborn remarks
 with truth that the qualifications neces-
 sary here (amounting in all to *ceteris
 paribus*) really make the whole theory
 futile, because 'other things' in this
 connexion are so seldom 'equal'. Bodily
 qualities, superior numbers and wea-
 pons, all sorts of external circumstances
 often largely contribute to victory. Con-
 quest is no valid proof of the higher
 excellence of the conqueror: besides, the
 one kind of mental capacity which has
 contributed to his victory is no guarantee
 that he also possesses the other which
 qualifies him for wise government, above
 all for the exercise of despotic rule over a
 conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle
 would be borne out by a belief in the
 moral government of the world*: in the
 main, success attends upon the most
 capable nations. SUSEM. (50)

15 ὥστε δοκεῖν κτλ] "hence it seems
 that force to coerce is never independent
 of virtue, but that the dispute turns on
 the nature of right and justice."

§ 4 17 f. ("For this reason some take
 the mutual goodwill" of governors and
 governed "to constitute right, others stand
 on the naked right of the stronger to
 rule.") The parenthesis is due to Ridge-
 way; Heiland saw that 'this remark
 breaks the course of the argument' (p.
 14). The grounds for the view of (ii),
 which had not been stated above §§ 1, 2,
 are now given by διὰ τοῦτο.

τοῖς μὲν] Clearly again the unqualified
 opponents of slavery. SUSEM. (50 b)

Jackson, 115 n., first proved that one
 meaning of εὐνοίᾳ is 'loyalty: the will-

* [And no less by the scientific doctrine of
 the survival of the fittest.]

ing obedience which an inferior renders
 to a kind and considerate superior". To
 take it solely to mean 'the goodwill of
 governors to governed' seriously invali-
 dating the protest of the anti-slavery party
 παρὰ φίσιν εἶναι τὸ δεσπότειν; masters
 might always urge the plea that they held
 their slaves from disinterested motives.
 Giphanius notes well: benevolentia et
 bona existimatio magistratus et dominos
 peperit. Cp. VII(vi). 5 § 4, § 10; VIII(v).
 11 § 11: ἀναγκαῖον εἴνειν εἶναι ταῖς τυ-
 παρρυσὶ sc. τοῖς διδόνοις καὶ τὰς γυναικας.

18 τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἀρχεῖν] Cp.

Thuc. v. 105. 2, Plato *Gorgias* 483 c f.

19 ἔτει answers the sentence 15 ὅτε
 δοκεῖ... "If however these two views stand
 opposed and apart, the former has neither
 force nor plausibility, (implying as it does)
 that the superior in virtue has no right to
 rule and be master." χωρὶς is used pre-
 dictively, διαστάντων is the opposite of
 ἔταλλάττειν: if the point of contact be-
 tween the two views be lost, if they
 stand opposed without any community.
 For the sense of *separation* the passage
 quoted by Jackson (see p. 208) *De
 long. et brev. vita*, 464 b 26, is most
 instructive πότερον ταῦτα μακρόβια καὶ
 τὴν φύσιν ἰγνεῖν τῶν φύσει συνεστῶτων,
 ἡ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχὺβιον καὶ τὸ
 νοσῶδες, ἡ κατ' ἔντας μὲν νοσεῖς ἐπαλ-
 λάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς
 βραχὺβιοῖς, κατ' ἔντας δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει
 νοσώδεις εἶναι μακρόβιος ὄντας. Others
 (Schneider, Jackson, Postgate, Ridgeway)
 take διαστάντων=si per se rationantur, 'if
 disentangled,' each taken separately.

20 ἄτεροι λόγοι=one of the two sets
 of arguments advanced, that of (A).
 Postgate (op. c. 123) thinks ἄτεροι λόγοι
 would be clearer. Schneider took it =
neutra ratio; to which Hampke rejoined
 that this sense requires οὐδέτεροι. Jackson
 however still maintains that it is a true
 plural 'as in 13 τοῖς λόγοις', but then
 we should have ἀμφότεροι: his novel
 and ingenious interpretation, op. c. 115 f.,

§ 5 οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως (II)
 δ' ἀντεχόμενοί τινες, ὡς οἰονται, δικαιού τινός (ό γὰρ νόμος
 δικαιού τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν,
 ἥμα δὲ οὐ φασιν. τήν τε γὰρ ἄρχην ἐνδέχεται μή δι-
 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-
 μός ἀν φαῖτι τις δούλον εἶναι εἰ δὲ μή, συμβῆσται τοὺς (p. 9)
 εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν
 § 6 συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐ βούλονται
 λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ-
 30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἀλλο ζητοῦσιν ἡ τὸ φύσει δούλον ὅπερ ἔξ
 ἄρχῆς εἴπομεν ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν
 § 7 πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 19

24 δια] δῶλος Π¹ P⁶ M^b T^b L^a (γρ. ἄμα p¹ in the margin), ἀπλῶς apparently Ar. ||
 27 καὶ ἐκ δούλων transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ἀγαθόν Schmidt || 28 αὐτὸς Montecatino and perhaps P³. Over this word p² has the gloss τοῦτο εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατηθέντας which M^a has in the text after ληφθέντας || 32 πανταχοῦ] ἔξ ἄρχῆς Π¹, γρ. ἀπαν-
 ταχοῦ p¹ in the margin

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 τούτων τῶν λόγων as a singular of one view and hence infers that ἀπεροι λόγοι denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'.

ώς οὐ δεῖ, epexegetic of λόγοι, 'the view namely that...?' But Jackson following Heinsius makes it depend on πιθανόν: "plausibility to shew that it is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule". Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (A)? He admits εὐρεῖα as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal πολιτείᾳ, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take δῶλος with ἀντεχόμενοι. "Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or their ancestors] "happen to have been taken prisoners and sold" :— as Plato was by Dionysios. The view of (c), 22 τινες, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent incon-

sistencies. δῶλος was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (op. c. 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used ἔτι δέ'. It will be found upon comparison of *De Anima* I. 5 §§ 10, 11 410 b 2 and *Meteor.* II. 3 §§ 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that δῶλος and ἔτι δέ are used in parallel clauses to introduce *distinct* objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διόπερ κτλ] "Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to barbarians": αὐτὸς used absolutely for αὐτῷς <τοῖς Ἑλλήνας> which comes to the same thing as 33 αὐτοῖς. Eaton compares the noble conduct of Callicratidas, Xen. Hell. 1. 6, 14.

30 οὐδὲν ἀλλο κτλ] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (A) and (B).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ] Nic. Eth. v. 7. 1, 1134 b 19, τὸ μὲν φύσει <δικαιον> ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν (Congreve). τὸν αὐτὸν κτλ] Cr. III. 13. 2 ἡ εὐ-γένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οἰκουτλίους. SUSEM.(52)

περὶ εὐγενείας αὐτοὺς μὲν γάρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγε- (II)
νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἴκοι μό-
35 νοι, ὡς ὅν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ'
οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ η̄ Θεοδέκτου 'Ελένη φησὶ

θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον ρίζωμάτων
τίς ἀν προσεπεῖν ἀξιώσειν λάτριν;

§ 8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδενὶ ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-
40 ρίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς
1255 b δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπον καὶ ἐκ

33 αὐτοῖς Π¹ P⁴ Plat., αὐτοῖς P³ S^b T^b and 1st hand of P³ (emended by corr.²) ||
παρ' αὐτοῖς Γ M^a Plat. and perhaps P¹ || 35 καὶ omitted in P^{3.3}. Q M^b S^b T^b Ald. and
P⁴ (1st hand), Ar. leaves καὶ ἐλεύθερον untranslated || 36 καὶ before ἡ is omitted by
Bk. || Ἀλελύη for 'Ελένη Γ M^a || 37 ἔκγονον Ar., ἔκγονον P¹, ἔκγονον Γ M^b
P^{3.4.6}. Ald. Plat. ἐκ γόνου P² Q M^b, ἔκγονοι S^b T^b || 38 ἀξιώσει M^b P^{1.2.4}. Ald.
Plat. and P³ (a later hand) || 39 οὐθεὶν Π² Ar. Plat. Bk., οὐδὲν Π¹

35 ὡς ὅν τι] "which implies the existence of an absolute, as well as a relative, nobility and freedom".

36 On the tragic poet Theodektes of Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of Aristotle who is rather fond of quoting from him, see Susemihl's note (103) on *Poetics* 11 § 1, Bernhardy *Griech. Literaturgesch.* II b p. 64 f., Welcker *Die griech. Trag.* III. 1069 ff. [also Cope *Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philol.* III. 260 f., *Int. to Rhetoric* 53 f., note on *Rhet.* II. 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in Nauck's *Trag. Graec. frag.* SUSEM. (53)

§ 8 39 δταν 84] From VI(IV). 8. 9,
VIII(V). 1. 7 (cp. III. 13. 3, *Rhet.* I. 8. 5) we learn that true nobility is a combination of wealth with high excellence hereditary in a family, ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος ἀρχαῖος. How far this third or intermediate view of slavery and the limits within which it is justified as natural agrees with that of Aristotle himself, is more clearly seen from the discussion in IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, where see nn. (780, 781). The question there is, to what are we to ascribe the higher endowments and 'virtue' which distinguish the Greeks from other races and make the latter their born slaves? Only Aristotle there more precisely restricts this relation to the Asiatic portion of the non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does before III. 14. 6, δουλικώτεροι τὰ οἵη οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν

'Ασταν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἐυρώπην. The other references are I. 2 § 4, 5 § 8 f., 6 § 4, 7 § 3 f., 8 § 12: IV (VII). 2 §§ 15, 16, 9 § 18, 14 § 21 with the notes.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows, in the main, the indications of his master. Plato in like manner condemns the enslavement of Hellenes by Hellenes; *Rep.* v. 469 B f., 471 A f. Ideas which Plato only suggested, *Rep.* VIII. 549 A, IX. 590 C, *Politics* 309 A, Aristotle works out systematically: see on I. 5 § 9 n. (46) and the next note: *Introd.* p. 24 f.; Zeller *op. c.* II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 458 f.] SUSEM. (54)

1255 b 1 ἀξιώσει κτλ] So above 5 § 10
βοῶλεται... πολιτικὸν βλον. Cp. III. 13 § 3 n., *Rhet.* I. 9 § 33, Theognis 535 f. οὐποτε
δουλεῖη κεφαλὴ θεῖα πέφυκεν | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ¹
σκολιή, καύχανα λοξὸν ἔχει. | οὐτε γάρ ἐκ
σκλλῆται ρόδα φύεται οὐδὲ νάκινθος | οὐτε
τοτ' ἐκ δούλης τέκνον δενθέρειον (Ca-
merarius): also Plato *Cratylus* 394 D (Schiller). Oncken remarks: "what Aristotle requires however as the visible and palpable mark of innate slavery is not the deformity which Theognis has in view, but a greater endowment of rough muscular force. He overlooks the fact that the domestic service of the slave hardly demands more strength than the military service of the freeman, who needs a good deal besides mere erect stature". SUSEM. (55)

θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίου, οὗτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ φύ- (II)
σις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ²⁰
οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δῆλον,
καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τῷ
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τῷ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τῷ μὲν
ἀρχεσθαι τῷ δ' ἀρχειν, ἥν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἀρχειν, ὥστε
§ 10 καὶ δεσπόζειν, τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ
10 γάρ αὐτὸς συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ δλφ καὶ σώματι καὶ
ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι
τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος διὸ καὶ συμφέροντι
ἐστι τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῦς

1255 b 2 γενέσθαι M^a P^{1,4,6} Q T^b || ἀγαθόν, <καὶ ἐκ δούλων δοῦλον> Schmidt,
cp. a 27 || 3 τοῦτο after ποιεῖν M^a P¹ || πολλάκις μέντοι οἱ ΑΓ. πολλάκις, οἱ μέντοι
ΓΠ Plut. Bk. which, though unsatisfactory, might perhaps be defended: see Ditten-
berger op. c. p. 1371 f. || 5 The text can hardly be sound: <εἰσι καὶ> οὐκ Camot,
Bk.², perhaps the best suggestion; οὐκ <δεῖ>? Susem.³, οὐκ <ἀμφισβητήσει> or
οὐχ <ἀπανταχοῦ>? Schmidt formerly: <ὅτι> Bojenes; οὐκ is omitted by W^b Ald.
Lambin Göttling, εἰ for 4 καὶ and <ἢ οὐ> before δῆλον Lambin, οὐκ for 4 οὖν Göttling, οἱ
μὲν <εἰ μὴ> Thurot || οἱ μὲν φύσει] φύσει <τινὲς> οἱ μὲν and 6 <δῆλος δὲ> καὶ ὅτι
Schmidt now edits || φύσει wanting in M^a and P¹ (1st hand, added in the margin by
P¹) || 7 τὸ is omitted before δεσπόζειν by P³ || τὸ μὲν and 8 τὸ δ' ΑΓ. Nickes,
who would prefer 6 τοῦ μὲν...7 τοῦ δὲ...τοῦ μὲν...8 τοῦ δ' || 8 In M^a P¹ ΑΓ. ἀρχειν
and ἀρχεσθαι are transposed || 12 τὸ σώματος in some older mss. probably came
after μέρος where it is repeated by Γ M^a and P¹ (1st hand)

2 ἡ δὲ φύσις κτλ] So above 5 § 10
συμβαλνει...ἐλεύθερον. Fülleborn remarks
with truth that this admission quite invalidates all practical application of Aristotle's theory. It is even possible for a Greek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic (see on 1. 2:
4 and above n. 54), to be a natural free-
man: e.g. Hermias, Aristotle's friend
and the uncle of his wife, who had actually
been a slave: see on II. 7. 17. Hence the
non-Hellene may even prove to be the
natural master of the Hellenes. SUSEM.
(56)

§ 9 5 οὐκ εἰσιν] Fortunately we can
check the text (see Crit. Notes) by the
directly opposed statement with which
c. 6 opens, by § 6, § 10, and the next
words, line 6, ἐν τισι κτλ "in certain
cases there is a clearly marked distinc-
tion of this sort, where namely....."

9 τὸ δὲ κακῶς] sc. ἀρχειν.

§ 10 τὸ γάρ αὐτὸς κτλ] See 1 § 3 n. (7).
11 δὲ δοῦλος...12 κεχωρισμένον δὲ

μέρος] This is said of property (κτῆμα)
generally and of the child Nic. Eth. v. 6.
8 quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (57)
See however Jackson's note ad loc.

12 διὸ...13 πρὸς ἀλλήλους] In Nic.
Eth. VIII. 11 §§ 6, 7, 116: a 32 ff., it is said
that there can be no friendship between
master and slave γνῶν slave: ἐν οἷς γάρ
μηδὲν κοινὸν ἔστιν τῷ ἀρχοτι καὶ ἀρχο-
μένῳ, οὐδὲ φίλοισι οὐδὲ γάρ δίκαιον. The
relation is like that of a craftsman to
his tools, of soul to body, of master to
slave. ὠφελεῖται μὲν γάρ πάντα ταῦτα
ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων (cp. τὸ αὐτὸς συμφέρει of
the text), φίλα δ' οὐκ ἔστω...δὲ γάρ δοῦ-
λος ἔμψυχος ὄργανον, τὸ δὲ ὄργανος ἔψυχος
δοῦλος. γὰρ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐδὲ ἔστιν φίλα
πρὸς αὐτὸν, γὰρ δὲ ἀνθρωπος δοκεῖ γάρ
ἔναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα
τὸν δινάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθή-
κης, καὶ φίλα δῆ, καθ' ἔστον ἀνθρωπος.
Zeller II ii 692 f., following Ritter, rightly
calls this an inconsistency which does the
philosopher honour. The author of the

φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένοις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, (II) 7 ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμου καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τούναντλον· φανερὸν δὲ 16 καὶ ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐ ταῦτον ἔστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολι-
τική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ὥσπερ τινὲς φα- (p. 10)
στν. ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἔστιν, καὶ
19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γάρ πᾶς οἰκος),
§ 2 ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἵστων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό- 22
της οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι,

14 τούτων] τοιότοις Susem.¹⁻³; τοιότοις <εἶναι> ? Susem., τοιότοις <καὶ> Schmidt at one time: τούτων was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὗτοι φιλιω-
μένοις Koraes || ἡξιωμένοις transposed to follow 15 νόμον Schmidt || 15 φανερὸν
... 20 ἀρχὴ transposed to follow 1256 a 1 τρόπον Schmidt || 16 καὶ before ἐκ τούτων
would perhaps come better after those words

Eudemian Ethics, VII. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff., withdraws the concession: since there is the same relation between soul and body, craftsman and tools, master and slave, in these cases there is no association (*κοινωνία*) possible. οὐ γὰρ δι' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς (the two members of such a relation are not independent). οὐδὲ διαιρέτων τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ ἀμφο-
τέρων τὸ ἑνὸς οὐ ἐνεκά ἔστιν (the good of the one is not separable from the good of the other, the good of both is the good of that one of the two for whose sake the other exists). τό τε γάρ σῶμα ἔστιν δργανον σύμφυτον, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότου δούλος ὥσπερ μέριον καὶ δργανον ἀφαι-
ρετόν. That even a slave is a man is emphasized in another fragment of Philemon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4, viz. 'Εξουκιζόμενοι 28: καν δούλος οὐ τις, οὐδὲν ἄττον, δέσποτα, ἀνθρώπος οὐτός ἔστιν, οὐ ἀνθρώπος γ. Cp. Becker *Charikles* III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 357. Consult further *Pol.* IV (VII). 8 §§ 1—4 n. (801); I. 2. 3 n. (7); III. 6. 6. SUSEM. (57 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's Euripides, Pref. to vol. I. pp. xiii f. with ref. there given, esp. *Hel.* 728, *Melanippe* fr. 506 (515), *Phrixus* fr. 823 (828); also Oncken II. 33 ff.

c. 7 Δεσποτεία then, or rule over slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1. Nor does the relation of δεσπότης depend upon science: § 2. In what sense there may be a science of the duties (1) of slaves (2) of slaveowners (the latter quite distinct from ἡ κητική sc. δούλων): §§ 3—5.

§ 1 17 τινεis] Plato. See on 1 § 1 n. (2). SUSEM. (58)

"It is plain that here and 1 § 1 Aristotle is thinking of Plat. *Polit.* 258 E sq. esp. 259 B. It is however a mistake to attri-

bute the doctrine, without qualification, to Plato, who at 268 D introduces a long and elaborate myth with the express intention of warning us, that though the shepherd-king of the theocratic period exercised all regulative functions indiscriminately, this state of things ended with the Saturnian age. See by all means 274 E sqq. From this point to the end of the dialogue the Eleate is mainly engaged in discriminating the πολιτικός from a host of rivals. Clearly the doctrine in question is at variance with the whole tenor of the *Republic*. May we not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph. *Memorab.* III. 4 § 12, *Oecon.* 13 § 5, to Socrates?" (Jackson).

19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ... 20 ἀρχὴ] Compare IV (VII). 8 § 4 (ἐξ δούλων), VI (IV). 11 § 8 (ἐξ των καὶ δούλων), also II. 2 § 6, III. 16 § 2, 17 § 1 and n. (132) on II. 2 § 4. On the other hand see III. 4 § 5 with n. (471). SUSEM. (58 b)

20 Α similar distinction between ἡ τῶν θεούθερων καὶ τῶν ἀρχῆς and ἡ δεσποτικὴ is seen in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, § 8, where Jackson refers to *Pol.* IV (VII). 14 §§ 6, 7, § 19. See his notes.

§ 2 21 οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην] As is asserted in the passage of the *Poli-
ticus*; cp. c. 1 § 2 n. (2), 3 § 4. ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι] But does this latter at once exclude the former? As was shown in n. (54) on c. 6 § 8, Plato is very far from denying the one because he asserts the other. He too, like Aristotle, regards the more capable as the natural ruler, but for that very reason assigns the perfect art of ruling, of whatever kind, to those alone who in the strict sense have knowledge, i.e. to the philosophers: for, on the Socratic principle that all virtue or

όμοιώς δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος ἐπιστήμη δ' ἀν^(II)
εἴη καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλικὴ μὲν οἶν περ ὁ ἐν
§ 24 Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευσεν (έκει γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθὸν
§ 3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας), εἴη δ' ἀν καὶ
ἐπὶ πλείον τούτων μάθησις, οἷον ὄφοποιητικὴ καὶ τάλλα τὰ
τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἔτερα ἐτέρων τὰ μὲν
ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν

29 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

§ 4 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πάσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσὶ· δεσπό-²³
τικὴ δ' ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἡ χρηστικὴ δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπό-
της οὐκέτι τῷ κτᾶσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι
δούλους. ἔστι δὲ αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ
34 σεμνόν· ἀλλ' γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δεῖ
§ 5 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάπτειν. διὸ δύσοις ἔξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς
κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταῦτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ

23 ἐν ταῖς M^o P¹ Susem.¹—wrongly, see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1362, ἐν [ταῖς]
Susem.² || 24 ἐπαίδευεν Π² Bk. || 26 τούτων] τῶν τοιούτων Π² Bk. || ὄφοποιητικὴ³
P²⁻³ Q S^b T^b Ald. Bk. διακονήη P⁴, διακονήη Ar. || 27 ἔτερα] ἔργα Q S^b T^b Ald.
and 1st hand in P³⁻⁴. (γρ. ἔτερα in the margin of P⁴, the right reading is inserted in P³
by a later hand, but subsequently erased)

excellence (*ἀρετή*) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect. Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the *Ethics* he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted: see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 627 f. SUSEM. (59, 60)

κατὰ=in virtue of, as in *καθό*. The term ‘master’ is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα κτλ] The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the ennobling refinement and perfecting of existence. SUSEM. (61)

29 A verse of the *Pankratiast*, a comedy by Aristotle's younger contemporary Philemon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (*ἀναγωγή*) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

tion (Ludw. Schneider). See IV (VII). c. 8 f.; c. 14 § 12 ff. SUSEM. (62)
§ 4 32 οὐκέτι τῷ κτᾶσθαι] Below c. 8 § 2 τὸ γάρ έσται χρῆσομένη τοῖς
ταῦτα τῷ οἰκλα παρὰ τὴν οἰκ.; III. 4. 11
τὴν περὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖο <ἀρχή δεσποτική>,
δὲ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον. SU-
SEM. (63)

33 οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα] IV (VII). 3. 2
οὐδέν γάρ το γε δούλῳ, ὃ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι
σεμνόν, VI (IV). 15. 3 αἱ δὲ ὑπερτεικαὶ⁴
<τῶν ἐπιμελεῶν> καὶ πρέσ ἀς, ἐν εὐπορῶ-
σι, τάπτουσι δούλους. But see I. 13. 14
and n. (123). SUSEM. (64)

§ 5 36 The overseer, *ἐπίτροπος*, or house-steward, *ταμίας*, was himself a slave: Pseud.-Arist. *Oecon.* 1.5 § 1 1344 a 26, 6 § 5 1345 a 8 ff., Xen. *Oecon.* 12. 2, Aristoph. *Knights* 947 f.; Becker *Charikles* III. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 363. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of *παιδαγωγός*. SUSEM. (64)

Translate: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.

δὲ πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. η δὲ κτητικὴ ἔτέρα ἀμ- (II)
φοτέρων τούτων, οἷον [ἡ] δικαία πολεμική τις οὖσα [ἡ θηρευ-
τική].

8 περὶ μὲν οὐν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν III
1256 a τρόπον ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεω-

38 [ἡ] Susem., ἡ Schnitzer wrongly: ?[δικαία] or ?[τις οὖσα] Susem. || [ἡ θηρευ-
τική] Susem.³, [ἡ] Jackson || Conring and Spengel suspect the whole sentence 37
ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ... 38 θηρευτική, Schmidt all from 37 ἡ δὲ κτητικὴ... 1256 a 3 μέρος τι ἡν

37 ἡ δὲ κτλ.] With κτητικὴ supply δούλων. But it may be inferred from c. 8 § 12, διδ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσις κτητικὴ πω-
λοται (ἢ γάρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ἡ δὲι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ θηρά καὶ τῶν άνθρώπων
ὅσοι πεφικότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, that under the one genus 'offensive war' Aristotle includes two species: (1) the chase, a war against wild animals, (2) war conducted for the capture of slaves.

πολεμικὴ	
πρὸς τὰ θηρά	πρὸς τὸν φύσει δούλους (θηρευτική)

If this be so, he knows nothing of an art of 'man-hunting': and the words at the end, 38 ἡ θηρευτική, must be an interpolation. Cp. further 1. 2 § 4 n. (11), 6 § 8 nn. (54, 56), IV (VII). 2 § 15 οὐ δει πάντων πειράθαι δεσπόζειν ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, δοκερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπιθοίην ἡ θηραία ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν πν. (727, 728): IV (VII). 14 § 21, where one object of military training is τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξιῶν δουλειῶν. SUSEM. (65)

This view, that θηρευτική is a species of πολεμική, Jackson cannot accept. On the contrary, from 8 § 12 (just quoted) he infers that to Aristotle (as to Plato *Soph.* 222 B, *Law* 823 II) πολεμικὴ is a species of θηρευτική: see his note on that passage. He translates here, "the art of acquiring slaves, that is, the just art of acquiring slaves, is distinct from both of these, from δουλικὴ and δεσποτικὴ, 'being a species of the art of war or the art of hunting.'

cc. 8—11 περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς.

c. 8 In what relation does χρηματιστική stand to Economic? Is it (1) the same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3) a subsidiary science? It is not the same, for it serves a different purpose, accumulation: §§ 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or not is disputed, and must be decided for

each of the various species of χρηματιστικὴ separately: § 3.

Review of the various natural modes of subsistence: §§ 4—12.

The natural art of production (κτητική), which has for its object the accumulation of natural wealth within due limits, is a branch of Economic: §§ 13—15.

For this section of the work consult Ludw. Schneider *Die staatswirtschaftlichen Lehren usw.* (The theories of Political Economy in the *Politics*), pt. I Deutsch-Krone, 1868, pt. II Neu-Ruppin, 1873; Glaser *De Aristotelis doctrina de divitiis* (Königsberg 1856. 4) with Bendixen's review in *Philologus* XVI. 498 f.; Hampke *Bemerkungen* (Remarks on *Pol.* I.) Lyck, 1863; Schnitzer *Zu Aristoteles Politik* in *Eos* I. 1864. 499—516: Susemihl on *Pol.* I. cc. 8—11 in *Rhein. Mus.* XX. 1865. 504—517: Büchsenisch *Zu Aristoteles Politik* I. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. für Philol.* XCIV. 1867. 477—482, 713—6. SUSEM. (66)

There can be little doubt that Aristotle wrote with especial reference to Plato: *Rep.* II. 370 B—372 A, *Law* XI. 918 A—920 C (cp. VIII. 831 E, 849 D), *Soph.* 219 A f., 222 B ff., 223 C, D, *Politicus* 287 C—290 A, etc.

§ 1 1256 a 1 χρηματιστικὴ is applied (1) to the whole art of acquisition, being thus completely identical with κτητική. In this sense the term was introduced at 3 § 3 (cp. 4 § 1 n.) and this holds throughout c. 8, and in 9 § 4. In a narrower sense it is used (2) for the acquisition by exchange, μεταβλητική, of the kind of wealth which in Aristotle's view is unnatural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange again at a profit. In this sense χρηματιστικὴ 'money-making, profit-making' = καπηλεκή 'trade.' So from c. 9 § 1 onwards. Again in 9 § 12, 10 § 3 it is used (3) for that part of the art of acquisition which, as opposed to (2), is directed solely to natural wealth and is intimately connected with Economic. Plainly (3)=ἡ ἀναγκαῖα χρηματιστική,

ρήσομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦ- (III)
λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἡν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν
ἄν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἔστιν
5 ἡ μέρος τι ἡ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ
κερκιδοποιητικὴ τῇ ὑφαιντικῇ ἡ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργικὴ τῇ ἀν-
δριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὅρ-
§ 2 γανα παρέχει, ἡ δὲ τὴν ὄλην λέγω δὲ ὄλην τὸ ὑποκε-
μενον, ἐξ οὐ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια
10 ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν). (p. 11)

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἡ χρηματιστικῇ, 2
δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι τις
γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονο-
μικήν); πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔστι τι ἡ ἔτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμ-

1256 a 5 [ἢ] ὑπηρετικὸν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικὸν Bender, certainly not right. That M^a
omits ἡ is quite unimportant || 6 κερκιδοποικὴ P^a-^b. Q S^b T^b Ald. Bk. and a later
hand in P^b, κερκιδοποικὴ P^b (1st hand) || 9 ἔριον Γ P^b Susem^{1,2} || 10 χαλκὸς Γ P^b
Susem^{1,2}, χαλκὸς M^a || 11 τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ Sylburg for οἰκονομικῇ (ἡ οἰκο-
νομικῇ corr.² of P^b and Bk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ] περὶ M^a P^b S^b T^b

(1) = ἡ μὴ διαγκαλα of c. 9 § 18; and (1)
the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the
getting of gain. SUSEM. (69)

2 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] "in
accordance with the procedure adopted,"
namely, that from part to whole. See
1 § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29); III. 1 § 2 n.
(434). SUSEM. (66)

Ἐπειπο... ἦν] "since the slave is, as we
see, included under the head of property,"
being defined as *κτῆμα*, a chattel.

5 καὶ εἰ ὑπῆρ. κτλ.] The more precise
way in which this third possibility is ex-
pressed leads us to anticipate a decision
in its favour (Hampke). However when
the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1 —
3, it only has a preference given it; it is not
exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks.
That the question, in which of the two
senses *χρημ.* is auxiliary to Economic, is
never taken up is most surprising. We
can only conjecture the answer from
passing hints: see on 10 § 2. SUSEM. (67)

7 ἡ μὲν δργανα... ἡ δὲ τὴν ὄλην]
The one provides tools to work with, the
other raw material to work up (Oncken).
SUSEM. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato *Politi-*
cus 287 C, διπλαὶ <*τέχναι*> παρεχοντο
δργανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαιντικὴν... ἐτίθεμεν ὡς
συναρτίους: 288 D, E τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις

σώματα παρέχοντες ὥν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημι-
ουργούσιν διπλαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν νῦν εἰργόται
(Jackson). So too the conception of
ὑπηρετικαὶ τέχναι comes from the *Politi-*
cus 281 E: δοσι μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸν μὴ
δημιουργοῦσι, ταῦτα δὲ δημιουργόσας δργανα
παρασκευάσουσιν ... ταῦτα μὲν ξυναρτίους
<*τέχναι*>. The Eleate quotes τὰς μὲν
περὶ τὸ ἀτράκτους καὶ κερκίδας as the
first examples of ξυναρτίαι τέχναι (Eaton).

§ 2 8 ὄλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον κτλ] Plato
denotes this by τὸ πρωτογενές ἀνθράκους
κτῆμα *Politicus* 288 E: but ὄλη occurs in
Phil. 54 C φημι δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἐνεκα...
πάντα δργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὄλην παρατίθεσθαι
πᾶσι.

11 τὶς γὰρ κτλ] See π. (63) on c. 7
§ 4. SUSEM. (68) What art
is to use the household goods if it be not
Economic (*παρὰ* = except)?

14 Two alternatives are given in
§ 1, ἡ μέρος τι ἡ ὑπηρετικὴ, and it is
not easy to see what has become of the
latter in the statement here πότερον μέρος
αὐτῆς ἡ ἔτερον εἶδος and in § 3, 17 ἡ
γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι ἡ ἔτερον γένος.
For reasons given in Excursus III. on Bk.
I. p. 209 φ. v., both alternatives of § 1
should be supposed included under μέρος,
that term being so loosely used as to in-
clude even an auxiliary science. SUSEM.
(69)

§ 3 φισβήτησιν, εἰ γάρ ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρή- (III)
ματα καὶ κτῆσις ἔσται. ή δὲ κτῆσις πολλὰ περιεληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ
πλούτος, ὥστε πρώτον η γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰ-
κονομικῆς η ἔτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου η περὶ τὴν τρο-
φὴν ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ κτῆσις].

§ 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδῃ γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν οὐ γάρ οἰόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι δια-
φέροντας τῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γάρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαῖα τὰ δὲ σπο-

15 *el γάρ*] *εἰςπερ* Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen (*Poetic* p. 128 f. ed. 3) has shown that *el γάρ* can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen's comma after 16 *ἔσται* must be a full stop. But perhaps *διαμφισβήτησιν. el γάρ...κτῆσις ἔσται*, ** with the punctuation of previous edd., is right || 16 *ἔσται*, η δὴ κτῆσις Bernays || 17 ** ὥστε Conring Susem.¹ 'The lacuna began with ὥστε or ὥσπερ,' Hampke Schnitzer. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, *ad loc.* and *Addenda* || *οἰκονομικῆς Garve, χρηματιστικῆς Γ Π Αρ. Bk.* || 19 [καὶ κτῆσις] ? Susem.: καὶ κτῆσις? Stahr || 22 πεποιήκασι after *διαφέροντας* M¹ P¹ || 23 *τε* omitted by M¹ P¹

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes *el γάρ* to mean "if namely" as in Alcidamas *De soph.* 11, 12 ἀρ' οὐκ εὐηθες ἡμᾶς ἀλληρι τῷ ποιεῖσθαι μελέτην λόγων; *el γάρ* οι τοῦς ἀνόμασιν ἐξεργασμένοι... ἀποτισταὶ καὶ φθένοι τὰς τῶν ἀκούστων γνωμὰς ἐμπιπλάσιοι, and Aris. *Rhet.* III. 17. 11 εἰ γάρ Ἀχιλλέα λέγων Πηλέας ἐπανεῖ, εἴτα τὸν Θέον, ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ ἀνθρακοῦ, η (ms. η) τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ η τοιούδες ἔστιν. Elsewhere γάρ appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 8. 6 οἱ χρήσμοι δὲ καὶ ηδεῖς ἐπὶ πλείων διαιμένουσιν ἐως γάρ (so long namely as) ἀν πορίσωσι ηδονάς η φωτειας ἀλλήλους: so ἐπει γάρ *Rhet.* II. 25. 10, η γάρ *Pol.* VI (IV). 8. 6, ὅτε μὲν γάρ VIII (V). I. 8. "See however Spengel Aris. *Poet.* n. Vahlen's neueste Bearbeitung p. 13 ff." (Susemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in *Rhet.* I. 5 § 7 (and *Pol.* II. 7 § 21) are γῆς, χωρίων κτῆσις, εἴτι δὲ ἐπιπλων κτῆσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων: also νομισμάτων πλῆθος which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like δεύτερον which expressly corresponds to this, cp. *Poet.* 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and η περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessities of life—shelter

clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls 'instruments for life and wellbeing,' including slaves—if directly produced or acquired by plunder without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the δεύτερον. This view is supported by the actual use of *τροφὴ* in a wider sense than food, for sustenance generally; "subsistence," § 8, 10 §§ 1, 3. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of *χρηματιστικὴ* which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science: but this does not affect the present question.)

Or, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "secondly" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective (see on § 12 n. 74), this is not one. SUSEM. (70)

πότερον is dependent, like πόθεν line 15, upon ἔστι τοῦ χρ. θεωρῆσαι.

§§ 4, 5 That the way in which animals support themselves determines their mode of life is more fully stated *Hist. animal.* I. I. 23, 487 b 33 ff., VIII. I. 11, 589 a 4 ff.; and the proof is given in detail *ib.* VIII. cc. 2—11. Under καρκοφάγα are included animals who feed on berries,

ραδικά ἔστιν, ὅποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ (III)
 25 τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς
 βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα ἐκάστῳ ἥδυ κατὰ φύ-
 σιν ἀλλὰ ἔτερα ἐτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων καὶ τῶν
 § 6 καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἀλληλα διεστᾶσιν ὄμοιως δὲ
 30 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι.
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν (ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέ-
 ρων τροφὴ ζῷων ἀνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν ἀναγκαῖον
 δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομὰς καὶ
 34 αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν
 § 7 γεωργοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἔτεροι ἐτέ-
 ρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ λῃστείας, οἱ δὲ ἀφ' ἀλιείας, οἵσοι λι-

25 τὰ δὲ παμφάγα omitted by the 1st hand in P¹ (supplied by P³ in the margin), τὰ
 δὲ by M⁹ || 26 καὶ] κατὰ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 30 πολέ] πολλοὶ P⁴ S^b T^b
 Ald. and probably also Q, multis (?) William || 31 οὖν] γάρ Γ apparently || 33
 μεταβάλλειν after τοῖς κτήνεσι M⁹ P¹ || 36 ἀλιείας Ald. ἀλιείας M⁹ P¹⁻²⁻³⁻⁴

roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than πονφάγα=herbivorous. In *Hist. animal.* σαρκοφάγος 'carnivorous' is chiefly used: ζωοφάγος hardly ever.

§ 5 26 **ῥαστώνας** facilities: "to enable them to get at their food and capture it." By τοθτων understand ζῷα primarily, though καρπός would be included. Bernays reads καρδ for καὶ: "to give them facilities for the capture of their food."

§§ 6—8 Smith *Wealth of nations* Introd. Chap. Mill *Pol. Econ.* I. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, *Hist. anim.* I. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff., he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. n. above on 5 § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotus describes, IV. 186, would represent these νομάδες. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory νομές of Hellenic democracies, VII (VI). 4. 11.

32 "The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

§ 7 36 **λῃστείας**] It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. I. 5 precisely informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful οὐκ ἔχοντος πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξην μᾶλλον, ep. Hom. Od. III. 73, IX. 252: and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. I. 5 II. 32, IV. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, 2 § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see *Introd.* 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (I. 47 n.) adduces as a parallel. See *Introd.* 27 f. SUSEM. (71)

μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμούς ἡ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι- (III)
κοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀπ' ὄρνιθων ἡ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον
39 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ-
§ 8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτό-
φυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-
1256 b πηλείας κομίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη- (p. 12)
στρικὸς ἀλιευτικὸς θηρευτικός. οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύντες ἐκ τού-
των ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ἢ
τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν
5 νομαδικὸν ἄμα καὶ ληστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευ-
§ 9 τικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὡς ἀνὴρ χρεία
συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη ε
κτῆσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαινεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσιν,
9 ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτως καὶ τελειω-
§ 10 θεῖσιν. καὶ γάρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ-
τίκτει τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφὴν ὡς ίκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
οὐ ἀν δύνηται αὐτῷ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἡ φωτοκεῖ ὅσα δὲ ζωοτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις

41 [ἐργασίαν...b 1 τὴν] Schmidt

1256 b 1 πορίζονται II² Bk. perhaps rightly || γεωργικὸς is wanting in Γ Μ*, and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow θηρευτικός || 3 τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον Bernays, τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον Γ ΙΙ Bk.; τὸ ἐνδεές τοῦ βίου Bas.³, τὸ ἐνδεές κατὰ τὸν βίον Reiske (better) || [ἡ...4 εἴναι] Schmidt || 8 δεδομένη II² Bk. || 13 γενο-
μένοις II² Bk.¹

37 τοιαύτην] 'such as before described' i.e. 'suitable for fishing'. The same use of the pronoun in I. 1. 2, and in II. 4. 4 δέ τοιαύτους (i.e. 'less friendly') εἴναι. See Cope on *Rhet.* I. 5. 6.

36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato *Laws* VII. 823 B: πολλὴ μὲν ἡ τῶν ἐνθύ-
δρων (sc. θῆρα), πολλὴ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτη-
νῶν, πάμπολον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ πεζὰ
θηρεύματα, οὐ μόνον θηρίων ... καὶ κλω-
τεῖαι καὶ ληστῶν...θῆραι. See also n. on
7 § 5.

39 ἡμέρων] cultivated.

§ 8 40 δοσοι γε αὐτόφυτον] "derive their employment from natural growth." Nature is used now for what is primitive to the later development.

41 κατηλεῖται=retail trade; ἐμπορία=wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, "huckstering". Plato *Laws* VIII. 849 D, XI. 918 D, *Soph.* 223 D.

1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν = subsistence,

support: see n. (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (72)

2 οἱ δὲ κτλ] "Others select out of these some which they combine in order to pass an agreeable existence, supplying by an addition the deficiency in independence of a more meagre mode of life" (Cope).

§ 9 7 συναναγκάζῃ=constrain: σύν intensive as in συμπληροῦν.

§ 10 12 ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἡ φωτο-
κεῖ] Aristotle erroneously believed that insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or maggots which are then transformed through several metamorphoses into the perfect insect: see Aubert and Wimmer *Introd.* to the *De generatione animalium*. p. 14, Meyer *Thierkunde des Ar.* p. 201 f. What he says of the difference between worm and egg serves in particular to explain this passage. Thus *De gener. anim.* II. 1 §§ 8—12, 732 a 25 ff.: one species of animals, the viviparous, bring forth young like themselves fully developed; others bear offspring not yet organized or of perfect form, and of these the vertebrates

14 ἔχει τροφὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά- (III)
 § 11 λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὄμοιως δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένοις] οἰη-
 τέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῷων ἔνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
 καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
 19 τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοηθείας ἔνεκεν, ἵνα
 § 12 καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ἄλλα ὅργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ
 φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἔσται (ἢ γὰρ θη-

15 [γενομένοις] Götting, τελειωθέσιν Ar. Susem.¹⁻². γενομένοις ΓΜ⁹ Π⁹ Bk., γεννωμένοις Π¹ (1st hand), ἄλλως γενομένοις Π¹ (corr.¹ in the margin), γενομένοις (=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the *Ethics* II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένοις] Bernays, [δῆλοις ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in Π¹ is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰλλα Π¹), a repetition of the preceding: παν (sic) Π⁴ (1st hand), τὰ πάντα Π⁴ (corrector) || 20 γένηται Μ⁹ Π¹ || γοῦν Conring Susem.², which suits the sense but is against Aristotle's usage, γάρ? Susem., οὖν Γ Η Ar. Bk. Bernays || 23 [διὸ... 24 αὐτῆς] and 23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμικῇ also 24 [ἢ δεῖ... 26 πόλεμον καὶ πρώτον] Schmidt, who transposes the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θηρευτικῇ. See Qu. Cr. III. 5 ff.

(τὰ ἔναιμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (τὰ ἄναιμα) breed worms. The difference between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a part and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg; but if the whole of the young animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also *Hist. anim.* I. 5. 3. 489 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (κένημα) is called an egg when one part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the whole of the germ by its organization and growth: cp. *ib.* v. 19. 2. 550 b 28 ff. ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκαλῆκων οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τιθέται τὸ ζῷον, ὁσπερ ἐκ τῶν φῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλοι αὐξάνεται καὶ διαθρούμενον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, and *De gener. anim.* IIII. 2. 4. 752 a 27 f. οὐχ ὁσπερ οἱ σκαλῆκες αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ φῶν) λαμβάνει τὴν αὐξησιν. It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present passage of worms is in reality only true of eggs. All that the former receive from the parent worm is that capacity for perfect self-development which is wanting in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 n. (96). SUSEM. (73)

14 τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν = the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ δέρου, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις = air, heat respec-

tively: see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 838 n 8 ff. with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 γενομένοις] "after they are born." The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12 is common to all the Socratics and was probably derived from Socrates himself: Xen. *Mem.* I. 4. 5 ff.

§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ κτλ] This does not directly follow from the foregoing. Some intermediate thought has to be supplied: < it must further be assumed that amongst men themselves the less perfect are formed for the service of the more perfect>. Cp. also n. (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (74)

"There are at least four ways of taking this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanius Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἡ both refer to πολεμική. (2) Lambin, Schnitzer, Stahr refer αὐτῆς to πολεμική, ἡ to θηρευτική. This is plainly absurd: for if θηρευτική can be used against men as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος πολεμικῆς, but at least as extensive as πολεμική. (3) Garve, followed by Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητική, and ἡ to θηρευτική. There are three objections to this: (a) It proves too much; for if we deduce the right to make war from the right to hunt, why should not captives be eaten?—a notion which Aristotle (?) IV (VII). 2. 15 expressly repudiates with abhorrence. (β) Wars of

ρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρός τε τὰ θηρία καὶ (III) 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἄρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον ὅντα τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον.


§ 13 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἔστιν· ὃ δεῖ ἡτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ.

26 ὅντα after τοῦτον Π³Bk. On τοῦτον p² gives the gloss τὸν θηρευτικὸν, this θηρευτικὸν has crept into the text in Γ M^a after τοῦτον τὸν || πόλεμον is added after πόλεμον by M^a P¹ and P² (corr.), καὶ πρώτον by Γ: but, as Schmidt observes, this πρώτον has arisen from ἀ=ἴνη || 27 κτητικῆς after κατὰ φύσιν M^a P¹ || τῆς οἰκονομικῆς] τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ Thurot, [μέρος] Schneider Hampke Thurot: but see Comm. || 28 [ἔστιν...ὑπάρχει] Schmidt || διὰ ψ Thurot (*Revue critique*, 1869, p. 84 f.), διὰ δ Schnitzer, ὃ Lambin Reiske, δ<τι> Zwinger, <καὶ> δ Bernays: in *Revue critique*, 1872, p. 57 f. Thurot considers the sense given by the last three suggestions necessary: δ Rassow, who transposing δ...ὑπάρχῃ to follow οἰκλας and reading οὐ for 29 ὁν has the following order ἔστιν· οὐ ἔστι θησαυρισμός...ἢ οἰκλας ἀ δεῖ ητοι...ὅπως ὑπάρχει

defence or to regain liberty can hardly be called hunting: the notion of hostility is the wider. (γ) The clause ὡς φύσει δίκαιον assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is not therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders: *quoniam sit ut opes bello etiam parandi ratio a natura quodammodo proficiscatur*, making πολεμικὴ an epithet of κτητικῆς and μέρος αὐτῆς=μέρος πολεμικῆς κτητικῆς; he also refers ὃ to θηρευτικῆς. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing φύσει after κτητικῆς: and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in -ική so combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive." SUSEM. *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 6 f. Then translate: "hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)" viz. of natural warfare, and θηρευτική, § 7, is αὐτόφυτος ἐργαστὴ. "It" i.e. war "has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—αὐτῆς=κτητικῆς, ὃ=θηρευτικῆς—is supported by Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to πόλεμον. He translates: 'natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (1) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is θηρευτικὴ proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a

branch of war which has a natural justification.' He adds: "The διαιρετις then is



From 7 § 5 it would appear that πολεμικὴ is still further divided. So Plato, *Soph.* 222 C, includes ληστικὴ, ἀθραποδοτικὴ, and τυραννικὴ under the general head of πολεμικὴ, which is one of the two branches of ἡμεροθηρικὴ."

25 ὡς φύσει δίκαιον] Consult the refl. given n. (65) on 7 § 5. SUSEM. (75)

§ 13 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν κτλ] See Exc. III. on B. I. p. 210. SUSEM. (75. b)

28 With the changes proposed by Madvig and Rassow (see critical notes) translate: "one species of acquisition then is a branch of economic science, that branch namely whose task it is to collect a store of objects necessary for life and useful for civil or domestic society, objects which ought therefore to be at hand for the householder or to be provided to his hand by his science (Economic)." Others (Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays, Thurot) either change δ, or else extract from it the sense of 'since', 'in so far as', taking ὡς ἔστι θηρ. χρημάτων = the means to a store of commodities (or possessions, κτημάτων): a rendering not very clear, see § 14. SUSEM. Jackson, for the most part agreeing with Bernays, interprets ὡς ἔστι θηρ. χρημάτων 'things capable of being stored' (here perhaps anticipated by Götting ταῦτα τὰ χρήματα ὡς ἔστι θηρ.); he

ῶν ἔστι θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ (III)
 § 14 χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἡ οἰκίας. καὶ ἕοικεν δὲ γ' ἀληθινὸν τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τῆς τουαύτης κτήσεως
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρος ἔστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων
 φησὶ ποιῆσας (p. 13)

πλούτου δὲ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται.

§ 15 κείται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαις τέχναις οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅργανον ἄπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἔστι τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὅργάμων πλήθος ἔστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον.

9 ἔστι δὲ γένος ἀλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 10

29 ὡν ἔστι] φεύγετι Madvig (this I think needed whether we emend with Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays or transpose with Rassow): μέρος ἔστιν. φεύγετι θησαυρισμὸς.....οἰκλας, δεῖ... ὅπερχε Susem.² provisionally || ὡν] ὥν Schmidt || κτημάτων Bernays (perhaps rightly) for χρημάτων || 32 ἀγαθῶν P²⁻³. Q S^b T^b Ar. and P¹ (1st hand), ἀγαθῶν P¹ (corrector¹) || 35 κείται omitted by M^a, κείται γὰρ om. by P¹ (1st hand—supplied by p¹ in the margin) || 37 οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν Γ, οἰκονομικῶν [καὶ πολιτικῶν] Schütz, but see Comm. || 38 [διτι...39 δῆλον] Schmidt || 39 καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς Schütz also proposes to bracket, but see Comm.

translates "in so far as Economic must either find ready to hand, or itself provide that there may be found ready to hand, necessities of life and utilities which are capable of being stored for the common use of state or family."

30 True wealth is for use: δῶς δὲ τὸ πλούτειν ἔστιν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν τῷ κέκτησθαι καὶ γάρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἔστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλεύστος Rhad. I. 5. 7.

§ 14 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such property absolutely necessary to secure independence of all external aid.

οὐκ ἄπειρος] See 9 §§ 13, 14. The notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in Epicurus apud Diog. Laert. X. 144: ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὕρισται καὶ εὐπειστός ἔστι, ὁ δὲ τῶν κερῶν δεκῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐμπίπτει. The earlier political economists believed in a possible "glut of capital": Mill P. E. I. 5 § 3.

Σόλων] Frag. 13, 71 Bergk. SUSEM. (76)

§ 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. IV (vii).
 1 § 5 n. (695), 1 § 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔκτος ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὅργανος τι, τὰν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἡ βλάστειν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ μηδὲν ὅρλος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῦς ἔχουσιν. SUSEM. (76 b)

37 ὅργάνων πλήθος κτλ] in other

words, means and appliances for life, and for the life of wellbeing and perfection as the end of the household and of the state. But cp. Exc. III. SUSEM. (77)

The definition of wealth as "instruments" (given also 4 § 2) is commanded by J. S. Mill *Political Economy* I. 10 as adding distinctness and reality to the common view. His definitions are "any product both useful and susceptible of accumulation"—with which comp. 1256 b 29—and "all useful or agreeable things which possess exchange value." Mill too restricts the term to material wealth.

38 τοῖς οἰκονόμοις κτλ] See again Exc. III. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b).

c. 9. *The other species of κτητικὴ, viz. χρηματιστικὴ, the art of money-making, § 1. Origin of exchange in the infancy of society, §§ 2—6. Origin and use of money: §§ 7—11. Distinction between natural κτητικὴ and this χρηματιστικὴ: §§ 12—15. Cause of the confusion between them: §§ 16—18.*

§ 1 40 τὸν μάλιστα κτλ] "which is especially called money-making" χρηματιστικὴ (2) of 8 § 1 n. "and fairly so called; to which is due the opinion that wealth and property have no limit." But 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.

41 δίκαιον αὐτὸν καλεῖν, χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ (III)
 1257 a πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἡν ως μὲν καὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν
 ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δὲ
 4 ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δὲ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας
 § 2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς η
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις
 ἔστιν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ'
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δὲ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος,
 9 οἷον ὑποδήματος ἡ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-
 § 3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-
 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἡ τροφῆς
 χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
 § 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
 15 μεταβλητική πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρώτον ἐκ τοῦ
 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ίκανῶν

41 οὗτο Bas.³ in the margin

1257 a 1 [ἢ...5 μᾶλλον] Schmidt || 3 [ἐκείνη] κειμένη Γ (?—posita William) Susem.^{1,2} || 6 χρῆματος Γ M⁴ and p¹ in the margin || 7 καθ' οὐτό] after ὁμοίως Koraes || 9 ὑπόδησις M⁴ P¹ || 12 [ἢ ὑπόδημα] Koraes, Scaliger proposed to transpose these words to follow χρῆσιν, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Comm. n. (78)

§ 2 1257 a 6 ἐκάστου γάρ κτλ] “Compare *Eud. Eth.* III. 4, 1231 b 38, where we find the same classification of χρήσεις, though the use in exchange is

reckoned a species not of ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν χρῆσις, but of ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The two classifications are as follows:—

Politics
 καθ' αὐτὸν οἰκεῖα
 καθ' αὐτὸν οὐκ οἰκεῖα
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός

ὑπόδεσις
 μεταβλητική
 ως ἡ εἰς τις
 σταθμῷ χρήσαιτο
 τῷ ὑποδήματι

Eud. Eth.
 καθ' αὐτό
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός”

(Jackson).

9 ὑπόδεσις = wearing, ἡ μεταβλητική = the use in exchange. The shoe when used as an article of exchange preserves its proper nature, it is still to be worn by somebody; although as it is not made to exchange this use is οὐκ οἰκεῖα.

§ 3 10 καὶ γάρ... 12 ὑπόδημα] This is true. The question is always how much money or food the shoe as such, and not the leather used in making it, is worth: the labour has to be paid for as

well as the materials (Götting). Cp. n. on § 8 (83) and *Introd.* 28. SUSEM. (78)

12 [ἢ ὑπόδημα] as a shoe.

§ 4 14 ἔστι γάρ... πάντων] sc. χρῆσις. “All things have a use in exchange.” We now speak of the two *values* of a thing, value in use and value in exchange.

15 ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρώτον) (τὸ δὲ ὕπτερον, derived in the first instance from a natural origin [whatever it may afterwards become].

ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς ¹²
χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική ὅσον γὰρ ἵκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
γει καίον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ
τοικουνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἔστιν ἔργον
αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ἥδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
τῶν αὐτῶν ἔκουνώνυμον πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων * *. ὅν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον <ἢν>
²⁴ ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ] τῶν (p. 24)
§ 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἔθνων, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ
χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ' οὐδέν,
οἷον οἶνον πρὸς σῖτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη- 13

17 [ἢ καὶ...19 ἀλλαγὴν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] τις φύσει χρηματιστική Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς] μεταβλητική Bernays || 20 [τοῦτο...οἰκία] Schmidt || ἔστω] νῦν Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in II¹ and Ar., it is supplied by p¹ in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koraes || ἐτέρων <ἐδέοντο> Schneider, ἐτέρων <ἡπέρουν> Schmidt, ἐστέροντο Koraes, <ἐτέροι> ἐτέρων Bernays (on which see Comm.): Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρων <ἐτέροις ἡπέρουν>? Susem. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἐδέοντο || Koraes added ἢν || 24 καὶ is wanting in Γ, [καὶ] Susem., καὶ <νῦν> Schmidt and Bernays (perhaps rightly): Busse transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 ff. Michael of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70^a refers to this passage

17 ἢ καὶ δῆλον...καπηλική] Barter is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes on to show. Money is an artificial means of facilitating this, not of natural origin but only due to custom and convention, see §§ 8—11 nn. (82, 83): though when applied within due limits it is not contrary to nature. The whole explanation would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly observes, had Aristotle definitely stated what he means by 'trade' (καπηλική=huckstering, retail trade): viz. that it is a buying and exchanging "not for one's own wants, but in order to sell again". As it is, this is left to be inferred from the context. SUSEM. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ κτλ.] "For the necessity of exchange is confined, as we saw, to the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants." Cp. τοσανῆς=only so much 13 § 12.

§ 5 21 δᾶλ' ἥδη] but not until the society extended. Since trade is introduced at a later stage it is not 'natural'. Possibly directed against Plato's primitive state, the ἀληθινή, ὑγίης, θῶν πόλις, Rep. II. 371 A—D: ἀγορά δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ νόμισμα ἔνυμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκα γενή-

σται.

22 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. κτλ.] Bernays thought the addition of a word for "lacked" unnecessary, "because this idea is implied in κεχωρισμένοι". If so, as κεχωρ. <ἐτέροι> ἐτέρων=separated (or divided) one from this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ. πολλῶν should mean 'separated from many things'. But as Bernays gives 'division of possessions' i.e. separate property 'was introduced for many things' he must intend κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν to stand for 'living in divided possession of', or in respect of, 'many things': a sense hardly possible in any case and quite inconceivable if the participle has a different construction with ἐτέρων. SUSEM. Postgate would govern πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων by ἐκουμένων, supposing πολλῶν to be opposed to πάντων (as πλεότων is, II. 5. 27), and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary division of the joint-household into two: "again when the original household split into two, each half continued to hold in common a large part of the stock, viz. all that the other half left it".

23 κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις] Comp. 2 § 5 n. (18). SUSEM. (80)

29 τικὴ οὐτε παρὰ φύσιν οὐτε χρηματιστικῆς ἔστιν εἶδος οὐδέν (III)
 § 7 (εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἦν). ἐκ
 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ' ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγου. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ
 γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὡν ἐνδεῖς καὶ ἐκ-
 πέμπειν ὡν ἐπλεόναξον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπο-
 § 8 ρίσθη χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἔκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
 35 ἀναγκαῖων διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτον τι συνέθεντο¹⁴
 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων
 αὐτὸ δὲ εἰχε τὴν χρέαν εὑμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ξῆν, οἷον

32 γενομένης Koraes, γνωμένης II Bk. || ἐνδεῖς] ἐνέδει Bernays || 37 Koraes
 conjectured <οὐκ> ὅν, but see Int. p. 28 ff. and Comm. n. (87) || ξῆν] <μετα-
 κομ> ξεν Reiske, certainly right as to the sense, <βαστά> ξεν Bernays (less good)

§ 7 31 κατὰ λόγου, as one might have inferred. Lindau 'by agreement'. But can the words bear this meaning? The proof which follows seems to show that this phrase expresses subjectively the same thing as 33 ἐξ ἀνάγκης in objective fashion. SUSEM. (81) Similarly IV (vii). 16. 10. Bonitz commenting on 989 a 30: "quod rationibus ad rem pertinentibus accommodatum est et consentaneum."

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ...] "when the supply extended to foreign countries."

§ 8 34 οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον κτλ] Yet money is not by nature, but has its origin in mere convention! Here again Aristotle falls into the contradiction noticed in n. (71), seeking the true nature of man in violation of his own principle, before instead of in the normal development of civilization. Hence he ignores the fact which on other occasions (*Poet.* 4 §§ 1—6) by no means escapes him, that there is no unconditional antithesis between nature and art, nature and convention, nature and civilization: that innumerable arts institutions and conventions take their origin from man's inmost nature in the course of its development. It is precisely so with the state, and as with the state so with money. That in history too the law of a rational necessity controls chance is a thought not sufficiently acknowledged in his works: see *Poet.* 9 §§ 2, 10, with my notes, and Reinkens *op. c.* 289 ff., who somewhat exaggerates. Cp. also below on II. 9 § 12 n. (296), § 30 n. (339), III. 3. 9 n. (466). SUSEM. (82)

35 διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κτλ] On the origin of money compare *Nic. Eth.* v. 5 §§ 10—16 (1133 a 19 ff.); of which the substance is as follows.

All things which are to be exchanged must be somehow commensurable: and for this purpose money has been introduced, which serves as a sort of medium, for it measures all things, e.g. how many pairs of shoes are equivalent to a given house. The standard or common measure is in reality demand; but demand is conventionally represented by money which gets its name (*νόμισμα* = currency) because it is not by nature but by convention (*νόμῳ*), so that it is in our power to change and demonetize it (i.e. render it no longer current). If we do not require a thing now, money is still the guarantee of a future exchange, to take place if we require the thing at some other time. And although the value of money itself occasionally changes, yet it tends to be more constant than that of any other thing. All other commodities should therefore have a price set on them, that so exchange may always be possible. SUSEM. (83)

36 δ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δη] Schneider thinks this is not implied by the nature of money, since certain tribes use cowries as a medium of exchange, and the Ethiopians stones with marks engraved upon them (*Λίθοις ἐγγεγλυμένοις* Ps.-Plato *Eryx.* 400 b). We admit the truth of this; yet only a metallic currency can fulfil the proper end of money, and from the nature of the case the really civilized races have always availed themselves of it. Aristotle however has failed to recognise this sufficiently: see § 11 n. (87) and *Introd.* 29. SUSEM. (84)

37 χρέαν recalls χρησίμων: a commodity useful in itself which adapted its use handily to the purposes of daily life.

σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ- (III)
τον ἀπλῶς ὄρισθεν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ἵν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως
§ 9 αὐτούς· ὁ γάρ χαρακτὴρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείου. πορι- 15
1257 b σθέντος οὖν ἥδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς
θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
μὲν οὖν πρώτον ἀπλῶς ἵστως γινόμενον, εἴτα δι' ἐμπειρίας
4 ἥδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον
§ 10 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ
νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πόθεν
ἔσται πλῆθος [χρημάτων] ποιητικὴ γάρ [εἶναι] τοῦ πλούτου
καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γάρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέαστι νο- 16
9 μίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν
§ 11 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ
νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-

38 καν el M^o II^a Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἐπιβαλλόντων M^o II^a Bk.

1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P^{2.3}. Q S^b T^b Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand) || γενόμενον
? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || ποιητικὴν [γάρ] Schmidt, who transposes
ποιητικὴν...8 χρημάτων to follow 10 καπηλικήν || γάρ] 8 Bernays, inserting γάρ after
the next following καὶ, thus: χρημάτων · ποιητικὴ δ' εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου · καὶ <γάρ>
χρημάτων καὶ γάρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι
omitted by II¹ || τοῦ omitted by M^o, bracketed by Koraces; ὄντως? Susem. || 8 Giphanius
proposed to omit γάρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὸ || πολλάκις after τιθέασι
M^o P¹ || 9 διὰ τὸ διὸ? Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τὴν, καὶ
<εἶναι>? Susem.; Schütz rejects καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (οἱ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ) || 11
νόμῳ Lambin, perhaps rightly: yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 σίδηρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money: cp. Plato *Comicus Peis.* 3 χαλεπῶς ἀνοικῆσαμεν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ | ὃντος σιδηρόντος τοῖς νομίσμασιν | χώνται. These coins were commonly called οἱ σίδηροι, cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 249. ἀ το τοιούτον ἔτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Kidgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities: see Gardner *Types of Gk. Coins* p. 4 ff., Head *Coinage of Lydia* p. 11.

τὸ μὲν πρώτον κτλ.] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta, Pseudo-Plato *I. c.* 6 Λακεδαιμονίων σιδηρῷ σταθμῷ νομίζουσι. Cp. Xen. *De Rep. Laced.* 7. 5; Plutarch *Lys.* 17 (ὅβελοκοι, spits), *Lyc.* 9; Polybius VI. 49; and H. Stein *On the Spartan iron money* in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* LXXXIX. 1864.

332 ff. SUSEM. (85)

§ 9 1257 b i Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ἀλλαγῆς with πορισθέντος rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities" not μεταβαλλόμενον < τὸ νόμισμα>, "will produce the largest profit".

§ 10 8 καὶ γάρ...10 καπηλικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* B. IV. Cp. Mill *Pol. Econ.* pp. 1—4. Even in *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 νομίσματος πλῆθος is only one of many 'elements' of wealth.

§ 11 11 νόμος παντάπασι] An allu-

θεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς (III) οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλά-
κις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἀπόπον τοιούτον
15 εἶναι πλούτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν (p. 15)
Μίδαν ἔκεινον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς
§ 12 πάντων αὐτῷ γινομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ 17
ζητοῦσιν ἔτερόν τι τὸν πλούτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὥρθως
ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γάρ ἔτέρα ἡ χρηματιστική καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ
20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική,
ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ χρημάτων με-
ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γάρ
§ 13 νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπει-
ρος δὴ οὐτος ὁ πλούτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

12 οὐδὲ Bk., οὐτε II. || 20 αὐτῇ] ἡ? Schmidt || [καὶ αὐτῇ... 24 χρηματιστικῆς]
Schmidt, who transposes καὶ αὐτῇ... 30 κτῆσις to follow 1257 a 5 μᾶλλον || ἡ after
μὲν corr.² of P² || 21 ἡ P⁴⁻⁵; Q (?) L⁹ Ald., ἡ S^b, γ Rassow || Bernays omits χρη-
μάτων after διὰ || 24 δὲ Giphanius || οὐτος omitted by II²

sion to the derivation of *νόμισμα* = money, currency, from *νόμος* = convention, *current* custom: see *n.* (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be *νόμος* rather than *νόμιμος*, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato *Eryxias* I. c. 5, *n.* (85) (Schneider). SUSEM. (86)

ὅτι μεταπιθεμένων κτλ.] Although Aristotle himself, § 12, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is οὐδὲν φύσει, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see *n.* (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. SUSEM. (87)

With this comp. *N. E.* v. 5 § 11, ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἀχρηστον, § 14 πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ νόμισμα) τὸ αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τοὺς δένατας ὅμως δὲ βαύλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

14 καίτοι κτλ.] "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore, when in fulfilment of his insatiate prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16 Μίδας] This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenos and restored him to Dionysos, who in

return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid *Metamorph.* xi. 90—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. SUSEM. (88)

§ 12 17 διὸ ζητοῦσιν κτλ.] A possible reference to previous writers, see *Introd.* 20 *n.* (1). SUSEM. (88 b)

19 ἔτέρα ἡ χρ.] Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστικὴ (3) of 8 § 1 *n.*

21 διὸ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς] "by exchange of commodities. And this species, i.e. ἡ καπηλική, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange;" i.e. trading begins and ends with money. *στοιχεῖον*, main constituent, seems to mean indispensable agent in exchange. Elsewhere called guarantee, τῆς μελούσης ἀλλαγῆς οἷον ἐγνωτῆς, *N. E.* § 14; and ὑπαλλαγμα τῆς χρεας, representative of demand *ib.* § 11.

§ 13 23 καὶ ἀπέρος δῆ]) "In the words of the line from Solon, 8 § 14" (Bernays). SUSEM. (89)

25 ὥσπερ γάρ ή ἰατρική τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἄπειρόν ἐστι καὶ (III) ἔκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἄπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γάρ ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον (πέρας γάρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς 29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
 § 14 πλούτος καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρηματιστικῆς] ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γάρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.
 διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὅρῳ<μεν> συμβάνον τούναντλον· πάντες
 34 γάρ εἰς ἄπειρον αὐξούσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.
 § 15 αὖτον δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γάρ ή χρῆσις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected *εἰσι*: but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ'...31 ἔργον suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικὴ P² (corr.²), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Gurlitt recommend ταῦτα instead of τοῦτο); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurot Schütz, ab Bernays, οὐ<σης> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οἱ γάρἔργων once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας. This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φόστε> ? Susem. || διὰ <τι δὲ> τῷ μὲν * * φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ὅρῳν Sylburg, ὅρῳ Γ Π Αρ. || 34 νόμισμα, αὖτον * * διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on *eis ἄπειρον*: medicine is without end *in respect of* health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined.

27 τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος = means to the end.
 28 πέρας...πάσαις] "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, nay even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that: and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahr and others (*Introd.* p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this

9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further IV (VII). i § 5 n. (695), n. (700). SUSEM. (90)

§ 14 30 Ιf οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the householder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.

31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρήματα ποιεῖν as Schneider says. τῇ μὲν "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schütz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.

34 εἰς ἄπειρον] Cp. [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* 4 §§ 6, 7: ἀργύριον δὲ οἴδεις πω οὔτω πολὺ ἀκτήσατο θοτε μὴ έτι προσδείσθαι.

οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are engaged in traffic.

35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικὴ is the cause of this mistake.

§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει] See on 1. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικὴ overlaps, through being concerned with the same article.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἐκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς (III) ἔστι κτήσεως χρῆσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύτον, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἔτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὔξησις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισι τοῦτ' εἶναι § 16 τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργου, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἡ σφέσιν οἱόμενοι δεῖν ἡ αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὖσαν εἰς ἅπειρον. αἴτιον 19 δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ 1258 a μὴ τὸ εὐ ζῆν· εἰς ἅπειρον οὖν ἐκένης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὖσης, καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἅπειρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. οὗσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπειὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ (p. 16)

36 ἐκατέρα Ar. and the mss. used by Sepulveda, ἐκατέρα Γ Π Bk. ἐκατέρα Schneider, ἐκατέρᾳ and then τῷ χρηματιστικῷ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 37 κτήσεως χρῆσις Göttling (after Schneider, or rather Fülleborn, had proposed to omit the whole clause 36 τῆς γὰρ...37 χρῆσις), χρῆσεως κτῆσις Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 39 οἰκονομίας P. S. T^b

1258 a 1 οὖσης] ιούσης Sylburg (but see on 1257 b 25) || 2 δσοι.....3 ἐπιβάλλονται noticed by Eustath. on the Iliad p. 625, 36 || 4 ὑπάρχον Koraes (perhaps rightly)

Here two χρῆσεις ἐπαλλάσσονται because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ.] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'.

39 διατελοῦσην κτλ.] "persist through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely": νομίσ. οὐσιῶν = their substance or capital in money, Bonitz s. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of νόμισμα, for which idiom see Waitz *Org.* I. 283 and cp. ἡ τοῦ δρυιθος οὐσία 693 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14: ταῦτης τῇ διαθέσεως = τοῦ διατελεῖν ἡ σφέσιν κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αἴτιον δὲ κτλ.] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer' says Fülleborn 'when expressed as follows: men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the ennobling

of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 δσοι δὲ κτλ] "those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments": whereas, on Aristotle's own theory, the true embellishment and perfecting of life, i. e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensable condition: all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Wellbeing. See Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 609: cp. IV (vii). 1 §§ 7, 8. SUSEM. (92)

3 ἐπιβάλλονται] 'throw themselves upon' (cp. Hom. Il. VI. 68, ἐνάρων ἐπιβαλλόμενος) 'desire' in the same metaphorical sense as δρέγεσθαι, ἀντέχεσθαι. But otherwise II. I. 1 'to adopt'. For the intransitive use of the active see I. 13 §§ 8, 13. In Nic. Eth. I. 5 §§ 1, 2 διπλανοτικὸς βίος is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains Rep. IX. 580 ε. f., money is the means to this life, so that φιλοκερδές, φιλοχρήματος are convertible terms with τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν: hence δ χρηματιστικός ἀνήρ comes to be compared with δ φιλότιμος and δ φιλόσοφος.

§ 17 ἔτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερ-

βολῇ γάρ οὕσης τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς
ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητούσιν· καν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-
κῆς δύνωνται πορίζειν, δι’ ἀλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶνται,
ιο ἐκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας ²⁰

§ 18 καὶ ἴατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ’ ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ
πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ως τοῦτο τέλος ὅν, πρὸς δὲ
τὸ τέλος ἄπαντα δέοντα ἀπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαλας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς,
ιο καὶ δι’ αἰτίαν τίνα ἐν χρεὶ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ
τῆς ἀναγκαλας, ὅτι ἔτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν
ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ἀπειρος ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα
10 ὄρον· δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ ²¹

12 ὄγελαν Μ^α Ρ¹ || 13 [τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαλας] Schmidt || μὴ is transposed by
Hampke and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαλας—but wrongly || 16 [καὶ περὶ... 19
ὅρον] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thurot || 18 ἡ Schneider (perhaps
rightly, unless we prefer to omit ἡ.....τροφῆν) || αὐτῇ Welldon || 19 Bender
considers the whole of c. ιο δῆλον...b 8 ἐστιν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (95)
|| Schmidt transposes 19 δῆλον...38 ἤψων to follow 1256 b 30 οἰκιας

§ 17 8 καν μὴ κτλ] “And if they cannot procure this” (*ἀπολαυστικὴν ὑπερβολήν*) “by mere accumulation they attempt it by some other supposed cause, perverting each of their faculties to attain it.”

§ 18 13 πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματισ.] Compare Plato *Rep.* I 342 D: the true *ἰατρος* πο χρηματισής, and 346 C, D: ἡ μισθωτικὴ accompanies the other arts to provide remuneration.

14 σπαντάν=meet in, conspire, tend to: referre ad.

19 ὄρον=standard, limit. Properly ‘boundary’, ‘definition’, like ὄρισμα.

§§ 16—18 In the several points Aristotle is quite right, but in reality all this makes against him. For it shows that the fault lies with the men and not with the ‘arts’. If men misuse not medicine merely, but moral virtues like courage, as a means to their own avarice and craving for pleasure; if they can follow agriculture, cattle-rearing, etc. in the same spirit; why are commerce trade and banking to be unceremoniously rejected merely because they can serve such men as a still readier and more successful means to the satisfaction of their desires? Why should it be culpable in any one to

carry on such pursuits merely to gain a living by them? (Glaser). It is true that if there were no stock exchange there could be no speculation in stocks, and then no one would be tempted to such excessive indulgence in it as is certainly liable at times to endanger the morality of whole nations [as e.g. at the time of the South Sea Bubble]. But without the shadow no light; civilization is impossible without luxury. ‘In spite of many great evils which money has brought into the world it is to this invention alone that we owe the fact that nine-tenths of mankind are now no longer forced to serve that fortunate minority, the owners of real property. Think of the time when money was still scarce in Europe; the land then belonged almost exclusively to the clergy and the nobility. Money alone introduced a new species of commodity of inexhaustible ownership, which stands open to all to acquire’ (Schlosser). ‘Aristotle forgets, too, that, even before money was invented, people might find no limit to wealth-seeking. The *Ἰωνὴ δοτέρος* of Odysseus, *Od.* xiv. 96, went beyond the limit of his consumption, and its aim was, not nurture, but power, as he could make

20 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ οὐ, <ἀλλὰ * *> (III) ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἡ

20 [καὶ πολιτικοῦ] Schmidt || οὐ, <ἀλλὰ ἔτερον. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἔστι πάντα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα χρήματα τοιεῖν> or something similar? Susem. (see Comm.), οὐ * * Schmidt. Conring and Schneider suspected some loss || 21 τοῦτο] τῶντα (a conjecture retracted by Schneider) Schmidt Bender; if taken here, it must be repeated in 35, and so Bender || 23 <εἰς> τροφὴν? Schneider, τρόφον Oncken, but wrongly

grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks" (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole householder (*οἰκονόμος*); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (*Introd.* pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, aesthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: "when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow" (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (banalistic), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (103). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on Bk. I, and Plato *Laws* VII. 806 D f.—all paid labour, see n. (102), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

velopments of Plato's social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with more prudence and reserve. See *Introd.* p. 21 nn. (1) and (3), p. 33 n. (7). SUSEM. (93)

c. 10 *Decision of the question raised in c. 8 § 1: §§ 1—3. Usury the most unnatural form of gain, §§ 4, 5.*

§ 1 19 δῆλον δὲ κτλ.] "But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the householder and statesman or not, but" ... Then comes a lacuna which may tentatively be filled as follows: "but, <so far as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only so far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself; for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these> must be given already." But the briefer and somewhat different restoration given in the critical notes is also admissible: "but <of some one else. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living:> nay there must be definite materials found him beforehand." SUSEM. (94)

23 οὕτω καὶ τροφὴν κτλ.] "so nature must provide land or sea or something else as means of support." Lambin and Göttling make γῆν ἡ θελατταὶ epexegetic of τὴν φύσιν and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato *Laws* 891 C, τὴν φύσιν ὅντας ταῦτα αἴρα, sc. πῦρ καὶ θύρας καὶ γῆν καὶ δέρα. But the above rendering best agrees with 8 §§ 9, 12, 10 § 3.

24 θάλατταν ἡ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖ- (III)
 § 2 ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γάρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια
 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνῶναι δὲ τὸ ποιον
 χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἡ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γάρ ²⁵
 ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις, διὰ τί ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς
 29 οἰκονομίας, ἡ δὲ ιατρικὴ οὐ μόριον καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς
 § 3 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ζῆν ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ περὶ²⁶
 ὑγείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὗ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ιατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ²⁷
 τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὗ, ἀλλὰ
 τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ
 35 φύσει τούτῳ ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γάρ ἔστιν ἔργον τροφῆν τῷ

24 ταῦτα] αὐτὴν Glaser (wrongly), πάντα? Oncken, τὰλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὐ] οὐδὲ? Schmidt || 29 δεῖ after ὑγιαίνειν M^a P¹, δεῖν P⁴ || 32 ὑγείας Ald. ὑγείας M^a P^{1.2.3.4}. || τοῦ ιατροῦ] τῇ ιατρικῇ P⁶ Q L^a and P⁴ (1st hand—γρ. τοῦ ιατροῦ in the margin), while in S^b T^b V^b ἀλλά.....οὐ is omitted || 33 ἰδεῖν <ἔστιν> and 33 οἰκονόμοιν <ἔστιν> Welldon || 33 τῶν omitted by P^{4.6}. Q L^a || χρημάτων] χρηματιστικῆς P⁴ and γρ. p¹ (in the margin), χρηματιστικῶν P⁶ L^a, χρηματιστικῶν Q || 34 After τῆς P^{4.6}. C^c Q L^a Ar. (probably also M^b U^b) insert κέρδους || 35 ταῦτα Bender for τούτα, cp. n. on I. 21

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, *postea* (Bonitz): answering *τούτῳ μὲν*. "And then it is the householder's duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ὡς δεῖ)."

§ 2 25 οὐ γάρ κτλ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ is related to οἰκονομικὴ as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed 8 § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of χρηματιστικὴ provides the household with the needful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessities of life are certainly called elsewhere, 8 § 15, + §§ 1—4, the *instruments* (*δργανα*) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (οὐ δὲ βλος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly

procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic χρηματιστικὴ, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is e. *to* required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though indemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSEM. (95)

28 ἀπορήσειν ἀν] χρηματιστικὴ (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 3 34 μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γάρ κτλ] It was explained in n. (73) on 8 § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far

γεννηθέντι παρέχειν παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὐ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ (III)
§ 4 λειπόμενον ἔστιν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ (p. 17)
πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.

διπλῆς δ' οὐσίας αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλί-
40 κῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαῖας καὶ ἐπαινου-
1258 b μένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς Ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γάρ κατὰ
φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἔστιν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὁβολο-
στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν
§ 5 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' φπερ ἐπορισάμεθα. μεταβολῆς γάρ ἐγένετο χάριν,
5 ὃ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸς ποιεῖ πλέον. θεον καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἶληφεν.

38 <ἢ> ἀπὸ Schneider || 39 [καπηλικῆς...40 μὲν] Schmidt

1258 b 1 μεταβλητικῆς II^o Bk. and γρ. p¹ (in margin); [μεταβολικῆς] now, perhaps
rightly, μεταβλητικῆς <καὶ> formerly, Schmidt || 3 ἐπ' Jackson, ὑπ' Bk.², ἀπ'
ceteri || τὴν omitted by M^a, [τὴν] Jackson (unnecessary) || κτῆσιν, <ἐπὶ τόκῳ
χρωμένοις> now, <ἐπὶ τ. χρωμένην αὐτῷ> formerly, Schmidt || 4 ψπερ ἐπορισάμεθα]
δπερ ἐπορισθη II^o Bk., φπερ ἐπορισθη Schmidt || 5 αὐτὸν Γ Ar.

this is intended to apply to the animals which according to him are produced from worms. SUSEM. (96)

36 παντὶ γάρ κτλ] "for every animal has for its sustenance the remainder of the matter out of which it grows." Hence the animal and vegetable world is nature's reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς Ψε-
γομένης] Attested in equally general terms by Plato *Larus* xi. 918 d: compare Andoc. i. 137, Diog. Laert. i. 104. An Athenian would find capital for mercantile concerns, but he considered it on the whole disreputable to engage in them personally (Becker *Char.* ii. 134 ed. 2, Eng. Tr. p. 281). SUSEM. (97)

2 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] If *neuter*, the profit made from mutual exchange. But more likely *masculine*, derived from men defrauding and overreaching one another; the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection to trade altogether.

μισθία] Demosth. XXXVII *Adv. Pan-*
tænetum § 51: μισθίοις, φησίν, Ἀθηναῖοι
τοὺς δανεζούσας. SUSEM. (97 b)

ἡ ὁβολοστατικὴ = obol weighing, petty usury; Lysias *Adv. Theomni.* I. § 18 p. 117 explaining the law τὸ ἀργύριον στάσιμον εἶναι ἐφ' ὅποιοι ἀνθράκαι οἱ δανεζῶν says τὸ στάσιμον τοῦτο ἔστω οὐ διηγή-
ταιναι ἄλλα τόκον πράττεσθαι ὅποιοι
ἀνθράκαι. Cp. also Aristoph. *Clouds*
1146, Antiph. *Neot.* frag. 1, Meineke 92
in Athen. I. 108 E (Cope). The insecurity of the principal lent was the main

cause of a high rate of interest. Thus upon bottomry the average rate charged was 20 per cent., which would go to cover insurance, [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* III.
9. On house-rents the return was only 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of a paper medium of the nature of bills of exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contributed to the same result: Büchsenhülfz *Besitz und Erwerb* pp. 98, 496 ff.

3 διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ] "According to the texts both of Bekker and Susemihl ὁβολοστατικὴ is hated because it draws a profit from coin instead of from commodities exchanged by means of coin. But the explanatory sentence—μεταβολῆς γάρ ἐγένετο χάριν, ὃ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸς ποιεῖ πλέον—seems to show that ὁβολοστατικὴ is hated because it seeks to accumulate coin instead of using it in the furtherance of exchange. In order to reconcile the explanatory sentence and the sentence explained, read in the latter ἐπ' instead of ἀπ' or ὑπ', omit τὴν with M^a, and restore Bekker's δπερ. In this way we obtain an appropriate sense: 'ὁβολοστατικὴ is hated because it is directed to the acquisition of coin, instead of to the end with a view to which coin was invented: for it was to further exchange that coin was introduced, while interest multiplies coin itself'" (Jackson).

§ 5 5 τόκος] "Perhaps from Plato *Rhef.* VIII. 555 E, οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύ-
ψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τούτους ὄραν, τῶν
λοιπῶν τὸν δεῖ ὑπεικούτα ἐμέντες ἀργύριον

δμοια γάρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτά ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ (III) τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἔστιν.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ IV 10 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαῖαν. ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον 14 ἕππων κτῆσις πολα τις ἡ βωῶν ἡ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ § 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων (δεῖ γάρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλά τε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν πολοῖς τόποις.

7 ἔκ is omitted by II² Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps rightly: it is added by P⁴ (corrector) || 10 δὲ] γάρ Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλεύθερον? Jackson || 12 δὲ] δὴ Lambin, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by II² Bk. || κτήματα] κτήνη Bernays

τιτρώσκοντες καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῷ πόλει. Still earlier in Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 846, ἀξια γοὺν εἰ τόκου, τεκοῦσα τοιούτον τόκον" (Ridgeway). Cp. also Plato *Rep.* vi. 507 A, *Politic.* 276 A.

With 3—8 διὰ τὸ κτλ comp. Plato *Laws* v. 742 C, VIII. 842 B. Every one will agree with Füllborn that this proof is sophistical. But Stahr rightly observes: 'it was not until capital itself attained its complete development, that is, only in recent times, that the justification and reasonable necessity of interest became clear. The history of capital recounts the gigantic efforts that had to be made, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, in order to its formation. From the point of view of universal history the high rate of interest in ancient times has perhaps been a favourable means to that end; yet its immediate effect, in conjunction with a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was to excite repulsion in men with moral natures and this led them decisively to condemn interest altogether, as Plato did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole theory of exchange the following shape: 'he first includes under the term Ἐξ- change (ἀλλαγή) all buying and selling barter. Next he subdivides this genus into two species, the one good and praiseworthy, the other not so. The former belongs to Economic. It exchanges the surplus stock of the household for commodities which the household needs; or if

this surplus stock be sold for money it is with no intention of making a profit, but only to purchase other necessaries with the proceeds. The other species is distinguished by the intention of making a profit, and this exchange with a view to gain is χρηματιστική in the narrower sense or trading proper. It is again subdivided into two branches: the one includes all traffic in commodities whether in exchange for other commodities or for money, the other is traffic in money alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle regards this last as wholly detestable: the former as less bad, but still bad enough' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (98)

c. 11 Production viewed on the practical side. Cp. *Analysis* p. 100.

§ 1 10 χρήσιν=practical application, as in 9 § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its limitations solely in the nature of the case generally; but in practice the nature of the particular locality where we live, and therefore the climate, the character of the soil, &c, determine whether we are chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-rearing, to mining or commerce by sea, whether there can be preserves of fish and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or of cattle must be procured, and so on (Schütz). SUSEM. (99)

11 For ἐλεύθερον) (ἀναγκαῖαν, strictly limited, cp. *Metaph.* 1. 2 § 11 982 b 27: αὐτῇ (First Philosophy) μόνη ἐλευθέρα τῶν ἔτιστημῶν, and § 14 983 a 10, ἀναγκαῖοτεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς.

ἀλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἰτα περὶ γεωργίας, (IV)
καὶ ταύτης ἥδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιτ-
¹⁹ τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ζῷων τῶν πλωτῶν ἡ πτηνῶν, ἀφ'
§ 3 ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη-
²¹ ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
φορτηγία παράστασις διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἔτερα ἑτέρων τῷ
τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-
²⁴ καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρία (ταύ-
²⁶ της δὲ ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων
καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων). τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρημα-
τιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὃσα ἀπὸ γῆς

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνιτῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly || 27 τρίτον] τέταρτον II¹ and
P⁴ (corrector), ἀλλως τρίτον p¹ in the margin || 29 ὅσα] οὖσα Bernays

§ 2, 17 εὐθηνεῖ=thrive, have abundant offspring: see Verrall *Trans. of Camb. Phil. Soc.* II. p. 165.

18 ἥδη and here (when we come to this) we find two kinds: agriculture proper and fruit-growing. The technical terms perhaps of Apollodorus, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in particular of the vine would be included under ἡ πεφυτευμένη; see Steitz *Hesiod's Works and Days* (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f. SUSEM. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία=inland trade. SUSEM. This is the view of the commentators generally, but Cope disputes it. He remarks: "φορτηγὸς and its derivatives φορτηγεῖν, φορτηγικός, φορταγωγός, φορταγωγεῖν, seem to be always applied to commerce carried on by sea, whether ναῦς or πλοῖος be expressed or not (the sense of 'porter' given in the lex. seems not necessary in any of the passages, cp. Theogn. *Frag.* 679, Aesch. *Frag.* *Phryg.* 242). For this reason, and because commerce by land at Athens and in Greece generally was so utterly insignificant in comparison that it might well be passed over without notice, I rather think that Aris. means by ναυκληρία building and letting out ships for traffic, and by φορτηγία commerce proper, the transport of goods on board of them, perhaps including also land transport. On this view Xenophon's distinction *De Rep. Laced.* 7 ὁ μὲν γεωργεῖ, ὁ δὲ ναυκληρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἐμπορεύεται, would correspond to Ar-

istotle's here."

ταράστασις virtually=καπηλική, stataria mercata, hominum nimirum in foro consistentium.

24 ἀσφαλέστερα] For definition of ἀσφάλεια in this connexion, see *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτῆσθαι ὡστ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν (Jackson).

ἐπικαρπία=profit additional to the principal (ἀρχαῖον): see on § 11.

25 μισθαρία κτλ.] Cp. § 6 below. In any case the division is incomplete. The occupations distinguished in § 6 as τεχνικῶτας, which are not unskilled manual labour nor service for wages, are here omitted: see n. (102, 103). Moreover in v(viii). 2. 5, where μισθαρικαὶ ἔργαται are said to be degrading and βάνανσοι, the term has quite a different meaning, see n. (981). SUSEM. (101)

§ 4 26 Βγ ἀτεχνοί καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνον χρήσιμοι Cope understands the θῆται in a general division of the population; farm-labourers, porters, etc.

29 ὅσα κτλ. is in loose apposition to εἶδος χρῆμα, "all the wealth or property derived from land and such of its useful products as are employed by the proprietor himself," like the καρπὸς of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία. Even if Bernays' οὖσα is right, we cannot accept his punctuation (a colon after 28 πρώτης, no parenthesis, but a single sentence from ἔχει to 31 μεταλλευτική) or his translation of οὖσα ἀπὸ γῆς; 'directed to the land'. SUSEM.

(IV)

ζο καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, (φ. 12)
 § 5 οἶον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ
 ἥδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γάρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλ-
 λευομένων ἔστιν. περὶ ἱκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἔρηται
 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν
 § 6 πρὸς τὰς ἱρασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ
 § 7 τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,
 βαναυσόταται δὲ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,
 δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέ-

31 ὑλοτομία] ἡ λατομία Thomas Aquinas and Susem.¹, but wrongly || 33 περὶ...
 35 ἐνδιατρίβειν Susem. transposes to follow 39 ἀρετής; see *Introd.* p. 78 || δὴ Susem.,
 δὲ Γ II Bk., omitted by Ar. || 35 εἰσὶ...39 ἀρετής was first seen by Montecatino to
 be out of place, it was erroneously transposed by Piccart to precede 27 τρόπον δὲ ||
 36 P⁴⁻⁵. Q Ald. S^bT^b Bk. insert τῆς before τύχης || 38 ἀγεννέσταται M^aP¹⁻⁴. Q Ald.,
 perhaps rightly

30 ἀκάρπων] Compare *Rhet.* I. 5. 7: κάρπων δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσοδοι (Jackson).

31 ὑλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γένη, εἴδη interchanged: cp. 8 § 2 ἔτερον εἶδος with § 3 ἔτερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης] "where chance has least play": where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman's hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. Walter op. c. 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (552) on III. 9. 8, also v(VIII). 2. 5 with n. (981). SUSEM. (102)

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐμπειρία τέχνης ἐπολέμει, ἡ δὲ ἀπειρία τύχης, *Metaph.* I. 1. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 βαναυσόταται κτλ.] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13; III. 4 § 12, 5 § 4, 8 6; IV(VII). 9 § 3, 14 § 7; V(VIII). 2 § 5, 8 6, 4 § 6, 6 §§ 3—6, 8 16, 7 § 7; VII(VI). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes; Plato, *Laws* v. 741 E, 743 D f., cp. VIII. 831 c f., 846 d f.; Xenoph. *Oec.* 4 § 2 f., cp. 6 § 6, 10 § 10 — show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the servile (cp. n. 43) and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large

(see further Herod. II. 167). 'Servile' occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are 'artistic' (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the "sedentary" crafts, *téχναι ἔδραιαι* *Eud.* Eth. I. 4. 2, 1250 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage; v(VIII). 2. 4 n. (980). Similarly we read in Plato *Rep.* vi. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and mars the soul; Xen. *L.c.* says that it hurts men's bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (*καθῆσθαι*) cooped up indoors (*σκιατραφεῖσθαι*), or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace; and Pseudo-Plato *Erasst.* 137 B that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent *κυντάσσοντα* (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: 'he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property', Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 142 (Eng. tr. *Socrates and Socratics* p. 170 n. 1). Compare Xen. *Mem.* III. c. 10. With the definition of servile employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6 b) and c. 5 § 7 ff. SUSEM. (103)

For λωβῶνται see v(VIII). 4. 1: the workmen themselves 'spoil' or 'deprave' their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.

39 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς. (IV)
 33 <περὶ ἑκάστου δὴ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται
 34 <καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς
 § 7 <τὰς ἔργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐνίοις 4
 40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρητίδη τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
 1259 a Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Δημητρίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ
 πεφυτευμένης, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν
 ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελέσ· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα
 4 σποράδην, δι’ ᾧ ἐπιτευχήκασιν ἐνιοὶ χρηματιζόμενοι,
 § 8 δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γάρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτα ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι
 τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου.
 τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ μὲν
 διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
 § 9 ὅν. ὀνειδιζόντων γάρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελούς
 10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὐσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν
 φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὅντος
 εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβώνας διαδοῦναι τῶν
 ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ’ ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου
 μισθωσάμενον ἄπ’ οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ καιρὸς
 15 ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἄμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα

40 χάρητι (χάρητι M^a) δὴ Π Ar. Bk. Bernays

1259 a 6 οἷον.....18 σπουδάζοντι seems to have been used by Hieronymos of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I 26 // 13 ἐλαιουργεῖων P¹ and Hieron. ἐλαιουργῶν Γ Susem.¹⁻², ἐλαιούργων P⁴, ἐλαιουργιῶν M^a Q (?) S^b T^b, ἐλαιουργεῖων P²⁻³. Ald. Bk. Bernays, ἐλαιουργιῶν L^b

39 δῶν ... ἀρετῆς] “where excellence” of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence “is least needed.” No doubt lending money on interest is particularly meant, to § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. SUSEM. (104)

§ 7 40 περὶ τούτων] With the transposition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, exact particulars in detail.

1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Δημητρίῳ
Also mentioned by Varro *R. R.* I. 1. 8, and several times in Pliny’s *Natural History*. SUSEM. (105)

3 ὅτῳ ἐντυμελέσ=whoever is interested in the subject. We are referred to written works in *Rhet.* I. 4. 13, 1360 a 30.

§ 8 6 τὸ Θάλεω] Nic. Eth. VI. 7. 5
1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller I. 168 ff. [Eng. tr. *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 211 ff.]

SUSEM. (105 b)
8 διὰ τὴν σοφίαν] Aristoph. *Clouds* 180, *Birds* 1009.

καθόλου τι] The device (κατανόημα) is of general application, depending (as explained in § 12) on the possession of a monopoly. See Boeckh p. 52 f. Eng. tr.

§ 9 12 ἀρραβώνας διαδοῦναι κτλ] “paid deposits in advance to engage the various oil-presses”: ἀρρ.=earnest money, as guarantee for the execution of the contract: διὰ δ. because the sums were distributed, paid to various owners. Quite apart from the external authority for ἐλαιουργεῖων (Hieronymos), it seems more business-like to engage the oil-mills, six months beforehand, than the workmen.

13 ὀλίγον μισθ.] “taking them at a low rental, because there was no one to outbid him”: ἐπιβάλλειν=add, make a higher bid, run up the price.

ὅν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδεῖξαι, (IV)
ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἔστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἀν βούλωνται, ἀλλ'

§ 10 οὐ τοῦτ' ἔστι περὶ ὁ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον εἰ τὸν τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ το εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐάν τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διδ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνιαι (p. 19)

τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορῶσι χρημάτων· μονο-
§ 11 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὠνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος το παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπράτο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ τῶν σιδηρεών, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπορίων οἱ ἐμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις

§ 12 ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι ζο μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὑρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτον ἔστιν (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι § 13 μονοπωλίαν)· χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων πόρων, ὥσπερ οἰκίᾳ, μᾶλλον δέ. διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον.

12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δε-
σποτική, περὶ ἣς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ

16 συλλέξαντος P⁴ Ald., συλλέξατε S^b T^b || 25 ἐμποριῶν P^{2.3.}, πορίων M^a || 28 τοῦτο S^b Bk. || ὁ omitted by M^a P¹ || 30 αὐτοῦ II Bk. || 31 ὄραμα] εὑρημα Camerarius, θεώρημα? Koraeis || Θάλη καὶ τούτῳ Susem.^{1.2.}, Thali et huic William, perhaps rightly || 37 μέρη omitted by II² (added by a later hand in S^b) || 38 [περὶ ...πρότερον] Schmidt

§ 10 21 ἔνιαι] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampsakos are instances given by Ps. Aristotle *Oeconom.* II. 18 1348 b 33, 4 § 4 1346 b 25, 8 1347 a 32.

§ 11 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα] "on" or "in addition to his capital of fifty talents he received a hundred more": he made a profit of 100 talents on his original fifty. The preposition has the same force in τόκοι ἐπίτριτοι *Rhet.* III. 10. 7, and the analogous fractions.

§ 12 28 Undoubtedly Dionysios the elder who is mentioned III. 15. 16 n. SUSEM. (108)

31 ὄραμα] 'discovery': cp. Dem. *adv. Mid.* § 60 533, 25, οὐδεὶς πάποτε τοῦτο εἶδε τὸ πλεονέκτημα 'had an eye to this

advantage' (Postgate). Also Plato *Phaedr.* 267 A εἴδον ὡς τιμητέα.

§ 13 35 διόπερ κτλ] See Exc. III. and *Introd.* p. 31 n. (1). SUSEM. (106 b) Possibly an allusion to Eubulos.

c. 13 *The remaining branches of Economics: the relations of the head of the household (1) to his wife, (2) to his children.*

§ 1 37 ἐπεὶ...ἥν] c. 3 §§ 1. 2. SUSEM. (107) Comp. Nic. Eth. v. 6. 9 διδ μᾶλλον πρὸς γνωτά ἐστι δίκαιον ἡ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον with Jackson's note, "in Vol. III. 6 § 7 however οἰκονομική as an epithet of ἀρχή is used to include all three relations." Justice between man and wife is really ἀνώνυμον, 3 § 2.

γαμική, * * καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέ- (V)
 40 ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ
 1259 b γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ
 ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θῆλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ που συνέ-
 στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-
 5 τέρου καὶ ἀτελούς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς 2
 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχοντας καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἵσου
 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως
 δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχηγόν τὸ δὲ ἀρχητας, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι
 καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς εἴπε

39 γαμική * * καὶ γὰρ Conring; Bernays by altering ἀρχεῖν into ἀρκτέον, Ar. by translating ἀρχεῖ, ignore the lacuna: ἔστιν ἀρχεῖν, a Paris ms. 2042. See the Comm.

1259 b 2 πον] πως II¹ (emended by p¹)

39 γαμική**] There is here a considerable lacuna. For the sense some such restoration as the following may be proposed: "Economic science has, we saw, three branches, treating of (a) the relation of master and slave which has been discussed above, (β) the paternal and (γ) the conjugal relation. < Further we saw that in general a slave is only a piece of property, persons as well as things being included under that head; and it is not the acquisition but the use and maintenance of property which is properly a part of economic science. This science may therefore be divided into (1) the guidance and rule of the *persons* of the household, (2) the right use of the *property*. The former includes the treatment of the conjugal and paternal relations: the relation of master and slave would come partly under the one, partly under the other. The householder has to care for the improvement and excellence of all that belongs to the household, and hence for the improvement and excellence of the property; but property is only a means to the end which the household seeks to attain, and the living chattel is more important than lifeless objects. It is therefore the householder's main task to direct aright the free members of the house." > In c. 12 the differences in this rule as exercised over the different free members of the family are parenthetically specialized, but in c. 13 the leading thought itself is resumed and explained. Cp. Thurot *Études* p. 14 f., Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* XX, pp. 212—215 (where however some mistakes need

correction), Büchsenschütz *op. c.* 716. SUSEM. (107 b)

1259 b 1 πολιτικῶς] like a magistrate in a republic, or, more precisely, an aristocracy, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10 § 5, 11 § 4. Cp. Zeller II ii 619 n. (1). SUSEM. (108)

§ 2 4 ἐν μὲν οὖν κτλ] Here follows a discussion, as to (1) how far the rule of the husband over the wife may fitly be compared with republican government, despite certain differences between them; (2) how far the rule of a father over his children may be compared with monarchial government. Cp. further I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b) and 13 § 9 n. (117). SUSEM. (109) "In most cases where citizens rule over citizens rulers and subjects change places, for they (*τὸν ἀρχοντας καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον* nom. to *βούλεται* and to *ἱγεῖται*) tend to be on an equality in nature and to differ not at all": *τὴν φύσιν* an adverbial accus. as II. 2. 6 *τὴν φύσιν λεύτεις*, IV(VII). 1. 10 *ποιός τις τὴν φύσιν*, cp. 15 below *φύσιν διαφέρειν*. Yet some have taken *τὴν φύσιν*, as subject of *εἶναι*, to mean the spirit of republican citizenship, or the 'natures' of the citizens.

8 σχήμασι, outward signs, insignia: λόγοις, titles.

ώσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς κτλ] Herodotus tells this story, II. 172. Amasis, who had deposed his predecessor Apries (Hophra), was at first despised by the Egyptians on account of his low birth. Whereupon he had a statue of gold made out of a foot-bath, in which he and his guests had been accustomed to wash their feet. When this statue was set up the Egyptians paid it due reverence, and

§ 3 τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτῆρος λόγον· τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ (V)
τοῦ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική·
τὸ γὰρ γεννησαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἀρχον καὶ κατὰ πρε-
σβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἰδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς "Ομη-
ρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἴπων

πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

(p. 20)

15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα δια-
φέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ
πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεννησας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

13 φανερὸν τούννυν δτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 3
περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφύχων κτῆσιν, καὶ
20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἡ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, διν καλούμεν
πλούτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἡ δούλων.

§ 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειν ἄν τις, πότερον ἐστιν
ἀρετὴ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὄργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμι-

ωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, ἡ οὐκ ἐστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ

§ 3 τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε
γὰρ ἐστιν, τί διοισουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἐστιν, ὅντων
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἀτοπον)· σχεδὸν δὲ 4

15 After ἀπάντων p² adds as a gloss δηλοντί πατέρα εἰπών, and this πατέρα εἰπών
has crept into the text of ΓΜ^a || 17 τὸ] τὸν ΓΡ^b Ar. before νεώτερον || 18 * *
φανερὸν [τούννυν] ? Schmidt; see on 1254 a 24 || 26 εἰτε] εἰτι P^c S^b T^b, εἰ τι P^{a,b,c}
Ald. || 28 δὲ] δὴ M^a P^{1,2,4} Q S^b T^b Ald. and P^c (corr.²)

Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. SUSEM, (110)

§ 3 9 δὲ] (κατὰ μέρος 1 § 2. The husband holds, as it were, permanent office.

11 κατὰ φ.) by right of affection.

12 δτερ ἐστὶ κτλ]=and this gives a form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monarchy. III. 14. 6. Bernays takes εἶδος as 'essential nature', but compare Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 4, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱῶν κοινωνία βασιλεῖας ἔχει σχῆμα.

16 τῷ γένει δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν] So too in Pindar's words, ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένεσι, ἐκ μάις δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφοτεροι Nem. 6. 1, men are of one race with the gods, earth being the common mother of both. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse ὡς δμόθεν γεγάσι θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἀν-

θρωποι Works and Days 108 (J. G. Schneider). See Steitz op. c. 50 f. SUSEM. (110 b)

c. 13 Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household; §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.

Cp. Analys. p. 101, Introd. p. 31.

§ 1 18 τοιννυ traducendo ad novam cogitationem inservit Bonitz Ind. Ar. quoting Physics 1. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3, 9. Perhaps it only resumes a thought previously expressed, 'then', 'accordingly': see n. (107 b). Bernays gives 'It is clear beforehand then.' SUSEM.

20 Here πλοῦτος=ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, but in 8 § 15 it is πλῆθος ὄργάνων.

21 μᾶλλον ἡ δούλων] Cp. n. (33) on 4 § 1 καὶ δῆμος καὶ εὑρίσκων SUSEM. (111)

§ 2 25 τῶν μᾶλλων ἔξεων sc. τις=τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν; Rhet. I. 6. 9 with Cope's n.

ταῦτόν ἔστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, (V)
 30 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναικὰ σώφρονα
 εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἔστι καὶ ἀκό-
 § 4 λαστὸς καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; [καὶ] καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἐπισκε-
 πτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ
 ἀρετὴ ἡ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γάρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-
 35 καγαθίας, διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν ἀρχεῖν δέοι ἀν τὸν δὲ ἀρχεσθαι
 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γάρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον οἴον τε διαφέ-
 ρειν τὸ μὲν γάρ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν εἰδει διαφέρει, τὸ
 40 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἡττον οὐδέν)· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, ^ε
 θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γάρ ὁ ἀρχῶν μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δι-
 45 καιος, πῶς ἀρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθή-
 1260 a σεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γάρ ὁν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει
 τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν
 ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταῦτης δὲ εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
 5 φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφηγεῖται πε-
 5 ρὶ τὴν ψυχήν· ἐν ταύτῃ γάρ ἔστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δὲ
 ἀρχόμενον, ὁν ἑτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον (p. 21)
 ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ^ε

30 σώφρονα after 31 εἶναι II² Bk. || 31 καὶ before ἀκόλαστος omitted by II¹ || 32
 καὶ before καθόλου omitted by Γ M^o || 37 διαφέρει τῷ Αρ.

1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ omitted by Π Αρ. Bk. || ὑφηγεῖται II² Bk. and p¹ in the
 margin, ὑφηγεῖται <r>Schütz; yet ὑφηγεῖται can also be used passively || 6 μὲν
 εἶναι φαμέν M^o P¹, μὲν φαμέν εἶναι P⁴ (corrector)

§ 3 31 πῶς...σώφρων] Compare Nic. Eth. III. 12. § 1119 a 33: we apply the term *δικαλασία* to the faults of children so far as they bear a certain resemblance to the vice of intemperance (*ἀκόλαστα*). SUSEM. (111 b)

§ 4 37 εἴδει διαφέρει] see on 1 § 2.
 § 5 126 a 3 ὥσπερ καὶ...ἀρχομένων]
 sc. διαφοραὶ εἰσι, as explained § 2 ff.

§ 6 4 ὑφηγεῖται] "this is indicated (or, given in outline) in the case of the soul." The participle ὑφηγημένος (i § 3) seems evidence that the verb is used passively (Bonitz Ind. Ar.); but Schütz' suggestion <r>gives the middle a fair sense: "to this result the relations which exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSEM.

6 ὁν ἑτέραν...7 ἀλόγου] "and we say that a different kind of excellence belongs to the one and to the other of these, I mean to the rational and irrational parts of the soul." Namely intellectual or dianoetic virtue (*ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ*) to the

rational soul; moral virtue (*ἥθικὴ ἀρετὴ*, excellence of character) courage, temperance, etc. to the irrational appetitive soul; Zeller II ii 614—658. The dianoetic virtues are discussed in B. vi of the Nic. Eth. and the latest detailed investigation of this subject, Walter *op. c.* 283—537, gives the following results.

Each of the three kinds of reason, theoretic, creative, and practical in the narrower sense (see n. 40), has its particular dianoetic virtue, or it may be, virtues. Practical wisdom or insight (*φρόνησις*), if not the only virtue, is at all events the most indispensable and important virtue of the practical reason (Walter p. 356 ff.); see on 5 § 9 n. (45); III. 4 §§ 7, 8 *nn.* (474—6), §§ 16, 17 *nn.* To theoretic reason belongs (i) *νοῦς* in the narrower sense, intelligence, comprehending in itself the two extremes of all indemonstrable knowledge, which must be assumed for every syllogism and

§ 7 ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων. ὅστ' <ἐπεὶ> φύσει πλείω τὰ [ἀρχοντα (V)
καὶ] ἀρχόμενα (ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπου τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου
τοῦ ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός), καὶ πᾶσιν

8 ὅστ' <ἐπεὶ> Bernays, while Susem.¹⁻²⁻³ had simply ὅστε || πλείω τὰ Ramus,
τὰ πλείω Γ ΠΙ Bk. || [ἀρχοντα καὶ] Susem.⁴, especially as otherwise the insertion of
ἐπεὶ, l. 8, is untenable || τοῦ ἀνὴρ] πατήρ? Koraes

for scientific demonstration ; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest : (ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysic ; and (iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as dianoetic 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in *Kunstlehre des Arist.* (*Aristotle's Theory of Art*) p. 62 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a dianoetic excellence, though it can lead to one, *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 7, 1140 b 21 f.¹

For the 'excellences of character' cp. § 8 6 n. (40) : in regard to temperance in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (106 b), 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 16 n. (491), IV (VII). 1 § 4 n. (693). SUSEM. (112)

7 τοίνυν] See on § 1. 'But' or 'now it is clear' (Bonitz).

§ 7 8 ff. "Since then there are by nature various sorts of things subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

¹ Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this artistic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter's conception of them, p. 512, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 20 σύνεσις, apprehension,—see *Pol.* III. 4 §§ 16, 17 nn. (497, 8), VI (IV). 4. 14 n. (1186)—is adduced as a dianoetic virtue along with σοφία and φρόνησις. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and here this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues : we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work."²

Bernays defending the order of the mss. translates from τὰ ὄποια as follows : "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues : all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection ;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason³ i.e. that which makes the ruler a ruler "is supreme master" ; if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue. " Those again who obey need severally so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work."⁴ This however does not meet Thurot's objections, *Études* 16 ff. "The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest intellectual virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest moral virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the moral virtue of the irrational part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the intellectual virtue of the rational part. Indeed the words which Bernays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the dianoetic virtue." Cp. *Hermes* XIX, pp. 588—592, *Quæst. Crit.* VI. p. 9 f. SUSEM.

² ἀλλος γάρ τρόπον] See 12 § 1, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς. SUSEM. (113)

ένυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἔνυπάρχει δια- (V)
φερόντως (ό μὲν γάρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,
τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἀκυρον, ὁ δὲ πᾶς ἔχει μέν,
§ 8 ἀλλ' ἀτελέσ): ὅμοιως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
15 ηθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'
16 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον
διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν <διαινο>ητικὴν
ἀρετὴν (τὸ γάρ ἔργον ἔστιν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ
19 λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἐκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
21 αὐτοῖς. <ὅμοιως τοίνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
15 <ηθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'
16 <οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον.>
§ 9 ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν <ἐκάστον ἴδια ἡ> ηθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρη-
21 μένων ἀπάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
οὐδὲ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ φέτο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'

14 δομίως.....16 ἔργον Thurot Susem. transpose to follow 20 αὐτοῖς: see *Introd.*
p. 79 || Bernays transposes ἀναγκαῖον, Welldon ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν to follow 16 ἀλλ' ὅσον,
and both punctuate 15 ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον δεῖν, rejecting Thurot's proposed transposi-
tion. See Comm. || 15 After ὑποληπτέον corr.² of P² inserts γάρ, Ar. δε (so also
Koraeis in his commentary) || 16 αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ Γ II || 17 διαινοητικὴν Thurot,
ηθικὴν Γ II Ar. Bk. Bernays || 20 <ἐκάστον ἴδια ἡ> ηθικὴ Susem.⁴ ἴδια ἡ ? Susem.
earlier, οἰκεῖα or οἰκεῖα ἡ Schmidt, [ηθικὴ] Thurot || 21 ἀπάντων Π¹ P⁴, πάντων P²⁻³.
Q S^b T^b Ald. Bk. || 22 ὁ Σωκράτης P⁴, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) approves

12 δὲ μὲν γάρ...βουλευτικόν] Just the same thing is said in other words 5 § 9 n. (45). See also n. (115). SUSEM. (114)

13 ἔχειν μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀκυρον] Cp. n. (117). This can establish a difference of degree only, not a difference of kind, between the virtue of a man and of a woman. See III. 4. 17 n. (495). SUSEM. (114 b)

§ 8 17 τὴν <διαινο>ητικὴν ἀρετὴν] It is self-evident that only the 'dianoetic' virtue of practical life, φρόνησις or practical wisdom, is here treated: see n. (45) (112); IV(VII). 1. 4 (693). Where it is a question of executing another's command, as it is always and unconditionally with the slave, there this virtue belongs only to him who gives the command, he who obeys having merely 'right opinion' about it. All the difference now is, whether he can attain this right apprehension more or less easily, thoroughly or carelessly: III. 4. 18 n. (498). Compare also nn. on III. 4 § 16 (493), § 17 (497), §§ 7, 8 (474—6). But so far as a natural slave, who is denied every capacity for deliberation, can be said to

have ever so small a share of approximate intellectual virtue in the department of practice, such virtue consists merely in the fact that one slave understands his master's commands and knows how to execute them better, more quickly, and more aptly than another. SUSEM. (115)

19 ἐκαστον] sc. ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν δ. ἀρ. ἐπιβάλλει] 'so far as is incumbent on them.' Impersonal; cp. *De long. vitae* I. § 4, 461 b. 33, λεκτέον δοὺον ἐπιβάλλει τῷ φυσικῷ φιλοσοφίᾳ: Herod. II. 180 τούς Δελφούς δὴ ἐπέβαλε παρασχεῖν.

16 ὅσον ἐκάστῳ] sc. ἐπιβάλλει.

§ 9 20 <ἐκάστον ἴδια ἡ> ἀρετὴ κτλ.] "that the moral virtue of each of the above classes is peculiar to itself." Bernays translates as if he had before him the words inserted.

22 Σωκράτης] The historical Socrates unquestionably did so, Xen. *Symp.* 2. 9; cp. Zeller *op. c.* II i 221 [Eng. tr. *Socrates and Socratics* p. 145 n. 1]. But here no doubt Aristotle has in view the Platonic Socrates; amongst other passages in *Meno* 71 D.F., to which he alludes

ἢ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἢ δ' ὑπηρετική, δύοις δ' ἔχει καὶ (V)
§ 10 περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπι-
25 σκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γάρ οἱ λέγοντες ἔξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι
τὸ εὐ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιού-
των· πολὺ γάρ ἁμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἔξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρε-
§ 11 τάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ
ποιητής εἰρήκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων·

30

γυναικὶ κόσμου ἡ σιγὴ φέρει,

9

ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δὲ παις ἀτελῆς, δῆλον ὅτι

²⁴ καὶ, which Ar. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἦ τὸ Π¹ Ρ⁴⁻⁶. L¹ W^b Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar., τὸ Ρ²⁻³. S^b T^b || τοιούτον for τῶν τοιούτων M^a Pl. || 31 ὁ before πᾶς omitted by Π¹

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon *L. c.*, Plato (*Rep.* v. 452 E f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degree: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the *Laws*) in the public messes: see II. 5 § 1 n. (153), 6 § 5 n. (196), 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (II. 1 § 3 ff., 7 § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on II. 2 § 9, Zeller *op. c.* II i 775 [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 481]. Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 168-170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in *Hist. Anim.* IX. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 δοςα 21 ff.: τὰ θῆκα μαλακώτερα καὶ κακουργότερα καὶ ἥπτον ἀπλά καὶ πρωπελέστερα καὶ περ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφὴν φροντιστικώτερα...ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμος μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσλεπτη, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ φειδέστερον, εὐαπτητότερον δὲ καὶ μημονικότερον, ἕτι δὲ ἀγρυπνύτερον κτλ. Cp. *De gener. anim.* IV. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller II ii 688 with n. (3). SUSEM. (116).

23 ή μὲν ἀρχική κτλ] Cp. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495); also I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b), 12 §§ 1, 2 nn. See on the other side n. (130) on I. 13 § 11. SUSEM. (117)

§ 10 24 κατά μέρος] 'in detail'.

²⁵ The same protest in *Nic. Eth.* II. 7 § 1, cp. 2 §§ 3, 4.

26 τὸ εὐ̄ λχεῖν] Plato Rep. IV. 444 E
ὑγεία τις καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς: Gorg. 506 D

τάξει τεταγμένον ἔστιν η ἀρετὴ ἐκδοσου.

27 of ἐφ. κτλ] As Gorgias does in Plato's *Meno* 71 B f., where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle is here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the *Meno* insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the *Ethics* Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to III. 2. 2. SUSEM. (118)

§ 11 28 6 ποιητής] Sophocles *Ajax*
293. See further *n.* (117). SUSEM. (119)

31 ἐπειδὴ καὶ λόγος "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his educator."

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (*Nic.* *Eth.* I. 9. 10, III. 12. 5 ff.); on this see IV(vi) 13. 5 n. (875); but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely *timor et respectus*, as Aristotle inexactly puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8–11 compare *Poetics* 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Susemihl's edition. SUSEM. (120)

τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς (V)
§ 12 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἥγονον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δοῦλου πρὸς δεσπότην.

ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τάναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον,
35 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως 10
μῆτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μῆτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων. ἀπο-
ρήσειε δ' ἄν τις, τὸ μὲν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἀρά καὶ τοὺς (p. 22)
τεχνίτας δεήσει ἔχειν ἀρετήν· πολλάκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν
§ 13 ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλείστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ
40 δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι-
βάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τε-

32 αὐτὸν Γ (*ad se ipsum* William) || 33 τὸ τέλος] τὸν τέλειον P⁴⁻⁶. W^b L^a Ar. Ald.
Bk. || 36 ἐλλείψῃ P³ (but ἐλλείψῃ corr.¹) Göttl. Bk.² Susem.¹⁻²⁻³ perhaps rightly
|| [ἀπορήσειε...β 2 τεχνίτων] Schmidt || 37 ἀρά Γ Π² (yet Q perhaps has ἀρά) ||
39 ἡ<ο>. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ> διαφέρει<ν> Schmidt. || τούτων Π¹ (emended apparently
by p¹) || 40 Whether Ar. read αὐτῷ in his ms. after τοσοῦτον as I once assumed
from his translation, is more than doubtful: τοσοῦτον <αὐτῷ> ?Schneider || ἐπι-
βάλλει] ἐπιβαλλεῖ Schmidt || 41 <δούλωκῆς> or <ὑπηρεικῆς> before ἀρετῆς
?Susem. (see Comm.); yet in 38 ἀρετὴν alone expresses this || περ omitted by
Γ M^a, hence [περ] Susem.¹

§ 12 35 ἀρετῆς.....36 ἔργων] But how on Aristotle's own psychology and theory of virtue is even this minimum of moral virtue, which is the condition of his serviceableness, possible in the slave, if he shows no trace of deliberation or purposed action of his own? See *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 2, 3, Walter *op. c.* p. 169 ff., 212 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II ii 590 n. (3). Yet all goodness or badness of character and conduct is derived from the quality of the προαίρεσις, i.e. from the bent of the will in intention and purpose: *Poet.* 6 §§ 5, 6, 17, 15 § 1, n. (884) on *Pol.* IV (vii). 13 § 9. Plato speaks far more humanely on this subject *Law* vi. 776 D, where he admits that ere now many a one has found in his slaves men on all points of more approved virtue than his brothers or sons. But in this he contradicts the fundamental assumptions which he makes in common with Aristotle; cp. Zeller II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 459]. Aristotle himself grants that even slaves may have a noble character, *Poet.* 15 § 1, καὶ γὰρ γυνὴ ἐστὶ χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, κατοι γε τοις τούτων τὸ μὲν χειροῦ τὸ δὲ δῶλος φαῦλον ἐστίν. If he is more consistent elsewhere, his consistency only involves the whole theory in self-contradiction in another way, and discloses all the more its untenableness on internal grounds: see 5 § 8 n. (43),

§ 9 n. (45): also p. 211. SUSEM. (121)
39 ἡ introduces Aristotle's own view: "or shall we rather say..." more freely; "surely here is a very great difference."

§ 13 40 κοινωνὸς [ζωῆς] whereas the citizens are κοινωνοί βίον: *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 4, τοῦτο δὲ εὐτὶ κοινωνῶ βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτόρκειαν: the slave is excluded from βίος, ib. x. 6. 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδης μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.
ὅ δὲ πορρώτερον] 'further removed', less dependent on his master.

τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλει ἀρετῆς] sc. αὐτῷ: just so much of virtue as of slavery falls to his share. The verb intransitive but personal. Comp. III. 6. 3, καθ' ὅσον ἐπι-
βάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ἔντρου καλῶς: IV (vii). 1. 10, ἐκάπτω τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον διοντερ ἀρετῆς: Herod. IV. 115, VII. 23, Dem. *De Cor.* § 254, p. 312, 2.

"This special virtue, i.e. excellence of function, of the free workman differs from the true virtue of man in being something inferior and approximating to that of the slave: see n. (103) on 11 § 6 with the references, esp. III. 4. 12 n. (486)." SUSEM. (122)

Mr T. L. Heath objects to this, that if τοσοῦτον is the subject of ἐπιβάλλει, the change of subject from δ δὲ is surely very harsh. "Indeed, without αὐτῷ, is it not inconceivably harsh? I think the sentence would go much better, if we could

1260 b χνίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος (V)
τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.

§ 14 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ ίι
δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ <τὸν> τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν
5 ἔργων [δεσποτικήν]. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους
ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθε-
τητέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.

§ 15 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ
δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ

1260 b 4 <τὸν> Schneider following Ar.; τὸν for τὴν Scaliger Reiske || 5 [δε-
σποτική] Giphanius (cp. the Comm.); Koraes conjectures ἐπιστήμην, Bender δουλική;
δεσποτική, transposed to follow ἐπιτάξει, Schmidt

make δὲ the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate 'the artizan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.' Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει *De cœlo* I. 5 § 10, 272 a 25 θῶν γάρ ἡ ἐτέρα [γραμμῇ] ἐπιβάλλει τῆς ἐτέρας, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἔκεινη τοσούτοις, where ἐπι-
βάλλει contrasts with ἀπολένθαι. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἀπαλλάσσει?" In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require *abτῷ* with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἀρετῆς by itself also strange? (See *Critical Notes*). If something like δοῦλον or τῆς τοιαύτης has been lost, *abτῷ* may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect 'he shares in servile virtue in so far as his condition approximates to a slave's.' SUSEM.

1260 b 1 ἀφωρ. τινά ἔχει δουλείαν = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. *Rhet.* I. I § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope's note: also ὀρισμέναις above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, 'detached from the master.' That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artizans (who had largely sprung from them, III. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 4 <τὸν> τὴν διδασκ. ἔχοντα]
"the person who instructs him in routine duties." This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from δεσποτική. The discussion on the 'virtue' of the slave results in a more precise determination of δεσποτική and its elevation by an exten-

sion of its functions. The master may entrust his steward with the employment and direction of the slaves in his service, as Aristotle ironically remarks, 7 § 5: but he must himself develope in them the minimum of virtue which they require for this. Cp. n. (64) on 7 § 5. In line 5 δε-
σποτική must be wrong: δουλική is what we require, and Bender would accordingly insert it in the text. But neither δουλική nor δεσποτική is free from grammatical objections; I prefer therefore to bracket the word. SUSEM. (123)

Here δεσποτική or δεσποτεῖ is the art of making good servants. The household like the state exercises a moral superintendence over its members, 13 § 1, and its head is responsible for their moral improvement.

5 οἱ λόγου...6 μόνον] "Those who permit no conversation with slaves, and hold that we should merely give them orders." Plato *Laws* 777 E, τηρεῖ οἰκέτου πρόστητων χρὴ σχέδον ἐπίτραξιν πάσαν γιγνεσθαι. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on § 12. SUSEM. (124)

Plato's view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Eliot.

6 νουθετητέον] Plato ib. κολάζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους δεῖ καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὃς ἐλευθέρους θράπτεσθαι τοιεῖν.

7 μᾶλλον] Because the slave, albeit unable to deliberate rationally himself, yet, as an adult, understands better than the child the rational admonitions conveyed to him by others (Fülleborn II. 184). Compare n. (120) on § 11 above, and n. (45) on § 9. SUSEM. (125)

§ 15 8 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον] Compare the close of c. 7.

ιο ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὄμιλίας, (V)
 τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὐ διώ-
 κειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ [τὰς] πολιτειας ἀναγ-
 καῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπει γάρ οἰκλα μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα 12
 δ' οἰκλας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου δεῖ βλέπειν
 15 ἀρετήν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν
 καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαῖαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαῖους
 § 16 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν αἱ μὲν
 γάρ γυναῖκες ἡμίσυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν
 20 οἰκονόμοι γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ' ἐπει περὶ μὲν τούτων
 διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἀλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος
 ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἀλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν,
 καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναμένων περὶ τῆς
 ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

12 Nickes omits τὰς, following Ar. || 13 διελθεῖν Schmidt || 17 καὶ is omitted by Π¹, [καὶ] Susem.^{1,2*} || 20 οἰκονόμοι Γ, οἱ κοινωνοὶ ΙΙ Bk., qui gubernant (οἰκο-
 νόμοι;) Ar. || [ἐπει... 21 λεκτέον] and 22 [λέγωμεν καὶ] Schmidt || 24 πολιτειας τῆς
 ἀρίστης ΙΙ² Bk.

11 τὸ καλῶς sc. ὄμιλεῖν (Congreve).
 πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὐ <ὄμιλεῖν> διώκειν,
 how the right intercourse ought to be
 followed: cp. τὸ δὲ κακῶς <ἀρχεῖσθαι καὶ
 ἀρχεῖν> ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν, 6 § 10.

12 ἐν τοῖς...πολιτείας] This discussion means the scheme of the best state more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come down to us in B. IV(VII) and V(VIII), this point was never reached, nor the question of the proper training and education of the women. Cp. *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (126)

15 διαγκαῖον] Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (33).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ] Cp. V(VIII).
 1. I, VIII(V). 9. 11 ff., and Nic. Eth. v.
 2. II, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς
 ἐστι τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ¹
 παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν κτλ, with Jackson's notes. The all important term πολιτεία will be fully explained in B. III (1 § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will

be found to be a much wider term than 'constitution' or 'form of government' (τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English word 'polity' is still. See vi(iv). 11.
 3, *Blos tis étri* τόλεως, and n. (466) on III.
 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς=is an important means towards the excellence of the city: literally "makes a difference with regard to..." So IV(VII). 14. 7, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις.

§ 16 18 αἱ μὲν... Λευθέρων] Cp. II. 9
 §§ 5, 6 n. (285). Plato *Laws* VI 781 B, οὐ γάρ ἡμίσυ μόνον ἐστίν, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. SUSEM. (127)

20 οἰκονόμοι, administrators, τῆς πολιτείας suits Aristotle's views elsewhere at least as well as οἱ κοινωνοὶ: see III. 4 §§ 14, 15; IV(VII). 14 §§ 4—6.

21 αφίντες κτλ] "let us dismiss the present discussion as complete, and carry on our subject from a fresh starting-point. And first let us review those theorists who have put forward a scheme for the best form of polity." With τοὺς νῦν λόγους cp. τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, III. 6. 3.

EXCURSUS I.

EPIMENIDES I. 2 § 5.

THE most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. I. 109—115 (cp. Suidas *s. v.*), whilst of modern writers Heinrich *Epimenides of Crete* (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck *Kreta* III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess *De Epimenide Crete* (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese *Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time* pp. 12—14 (in *Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet*, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly¹ received the requisite religious sanction². In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Urlichs *On the Rhetra of Lycurgus* in the *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1848. 217—230, Duncker *History of Antiquity* VI. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer *De ephoris Lacedaemoniis* pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Greifswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert *Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta)* p. 185, Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* p. 31 f. (Göttingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato *Laws* 1642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. I. 111—two epics, *Kouρῆτων καὶ Κουβάντων*

¹ If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see *n.* on II. 9. 23), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

² Trieber (*Forschungen Berlin* 1871. 8) *Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution*, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-

ably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the disproportionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.

γένεσις καὶ θεογονία, and *'Αργοῦς ναυπηγία τε καὶ Ἰάσονος εἰς Κόλχους ἀπόπλους*, with prose works *περὶ θυσιῶν* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας*—never had any existence : they are a mere invention of the romancer Lobon of Argos in his work *περὶ παιγνῶν*, as Hiller has shown in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. 1878. 525 ff. Other works really appeared under the name of Epimenides, of which some were forgeries attributed to him, others the writings of a later Epimenides. The Fathers mention a work *On Oracles*, *περὶ χρησμῶν*, which can hardly be a prose writing by him, but rather a collection of his oracles ; if it is here that the hexameter *Κρῆτες δὲ φεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστίπες ἄργα* occurs, which the writer of the *Epistle to Titus*, l. 13, attributes to one of the Cretan prophets, *ἴδιος αὐτῶν προφήτης*, without mentioning his name. Theodoret indeed ascribes the verse to Callimachus, but in his hymn to Zeus (l. 8) only the first words are found : hence Epiphanius (*c. haer.* l. 14) and Hieronymus (T. VII A. p. 707 Vall.) remark that Callimachus on the contrary first took them from Epimenides : cp. Lübeck *Hieronymus* p. 12 f. However that may be, the word quoted by Aristotle most probably occurred in a hexameter, very likely in a collection of oracles which Aristotle had before him, of which Epimenides was the reputed author. Moreover, in *Rhet.* III. 17. 10, 1418 a 23 f., Aristotle says that Epimenides did not divine the future, but only interpreted the obscurities of the past, *περὶ τῶν ἐσορένων οὐκ ἐμαρτεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μέν, ἀδήλων δέ* ; and this could hardly be affirmed except upon the evidence of such a collection. What connexion there was between this published collection of his oracles and the one which was jealously guarded at Sparta, it is impossible to say. SUSEM. (17)

EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1–8, 1255 a 5–b 3.

THE recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in *n.* (51) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of *εὖροι*, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 δὰ γὰρ... 19 ἀρχεῖν form a parenthesis, and hence that the *ἐπει* following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural ; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude : the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The (unwritten) law in question consists in the universal agreement that prisoners captured

in war are the slaves of their conquerors (*ἐν φὰ τὰ καὶ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν*). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule¹. This then is their view (*ἱ οὐτῶς*): the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, *ἔκεινος*, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (*ιο διστανταί χωρὶς*) and in conflict (*ἀμφισβήτησις*), yet they have a common point of contact (*ἐπαλλάττονται*), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written *ποιεῖ δέ* in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (*ἀρετὴ*) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (*ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν δὲ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός*); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (*χορηγία*). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (*ὅστε δοκεῖ μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (*διλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν*). Just for this reason (*διὰ τοῦτο*) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: *i.e.* in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish "normal polities" from "degenerate forms" (*παρεκβάσεις*). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

¹ [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words *ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός* are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle's explanation

of their common statement *μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in *ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ...ἄγαθοῦ τινός* as the *cause* but not the *matter* of the partial agreement between (A) and (B): and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously *διστανται* and *ἐπαλλάττονται*, (4) to the sense given to *ἀρετοὶ λόγοι*, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about *τὸ δικαίον*.]

position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), *ἄτεροι λόγοι*, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (*ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐτε ἴσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχοντιν οὐτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δέι τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρχεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν*). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written *ἄτερος λόγος* for *ἄτεροι λόγοι*.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (*ὅλως* to be taken with *ἀντεχόμενοι*) adhere to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see *Introd.* p. 25). SUSEMHL.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 a 7—26: viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just¹; while Aristotle declares that in practice *some* slavery is just, *some* slavery unjust. "In 1255 a 12—21" he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

"Now the *λόγοι* of (A) and (B)

- i. All slavery is unjust
- ii. All slavery is just

¹ [Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]

ἐπαλλάττονσιν: i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττονσιν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as *ἀρετή* with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies *ἀγαθόν* of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is *βία*, there there is *ἀρετή*, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of *δίκαιον*. That is to say, on the assumption that *βία* is always accompanied by *ἀρετή*, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined *βία* is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined *βία* is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they *διεστᾶσι χωρὶς* and no longer *ἐπαλλάττονσι*, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), *ἄτεροι λόγοι*, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine *ὡς δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δευτέρειν*¹.

He adds in a note: "In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something *ἰσχυρόν* and *πιθανόν* to urge against (A), (A) has something *ἰσχυρόν* and *πιθανόν* to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything *ἰσχυρόν* or *πιθανόν* to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything *ἰσχυρόν* or *πιθανόν* to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take *τοὺς λόγους* and *τὰν λόγων* to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', *ἄτεροι λόγοι* to be 'the theory *adverse* to (A's) theory and the theory *adverse* to (B's) theory', i.e. 'the theories of (B) and (A)'." He agrees with Heitland (*Notes* p. 11) that *ἐπαλλάττειν* means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: "But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) *All X is Y* might be said to overlap *Some X is Y*, and (2) *Some X is Y* and *Some X is not Y* might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that *ἐπαλλάττειν* marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that *All X is Y* could not be said to *ἐπαλλάττειν Some X is Y*. For this reason, as well as because *ἐπαλλάττειν* understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis

¹ Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words of § 4 (especially *ἔτει*, *ἄτεροι*, *ὡς δεῖ* as construed with *πιθανόν*) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable

interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of *τὸ βέλτιον κατ’ ἀρετὴν* to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSEM.

in διαστάντων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάντων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of κεχάρισται in μκ 1, 464 b 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontraries stand to one another.]

Bernays' rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in n. (51), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought).

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all nobler elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, *which precludes slavery*; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, *so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule*, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just *merely because the law sanctions it*; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

EXCURSUS III.

THE RELATION OF *χρηματιστική* TO *οἰκονομική*: I. 8. 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἡ χρηματιστική, δῆλον...πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔστι τῇ ἡ ἔτερον εἶδος, ξεινὸν διαμφισθήτησιν. The most obvious course is to understand ἔτερον εἶδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (*ὑπηρετική*), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hampke—see n. (67) on I. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of *χρηματιστική* as stands in a natural relation to *οἰκονομική*, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by omitting *μέρος*, so that the direct branch of *χρηματιστική* is not there said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', *οἰκονομική*, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Büchsenschütz rely on the received text

of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of *χρηματιστική* is really a part of *οἰκονομική*, but that the 'natural' part of indirect *χρηματιστική*, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to *οἰκονομική*. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of *χρηματιστική*, with which the householder is concerned, is related to *οἰκονομική*; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of *οἰκονομική*, in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that *οἰκονομική* has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, *χρηματιστική* with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schütz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of *χρηματιστική* most closely allied to *οἰκονομική* cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense¹. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV(vii). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 n. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that *ἔργον τίσεως* denotes something which is not connected with *οἰκονομική* either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and *πάροις* is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus *χρηματιστική* has three meanings, (1) = *εὔγνωστης*, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8: and, in a narrower sense, (2) = *μεταλλήγονη* or *μεταλλαγῆ*, & μὴ διαγνώσις of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = *διαγνώσις*, & τιμὴ φύσις, 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. n. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly *παραλλήλης* or *παραβαλλῆς* as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under *εὔγνωστης* and

¹ If Ruchtmann had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered

in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.

that which is alien to it : but sometimes it is found in the narrower acceptance of retail trade proper, *καπηλική*, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 3. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle *Arist. Forschungen* II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οἰκονομική*, is, as Oncken has pointed out¹, a perverse way of raising the question. For *χρηματιστική*, conversely, has a wider field than *οἰκονομική* : even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a *χρηματιστική* (8 §§ 13—15; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of *οἰκονομική*². Cp. the notes on 8 §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. SUSEM. (69)

NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in *notes* (45) and (121) on 5 § 9 and 13 § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls *τὸ βουλευτικόν*, he would be without reason altogether ; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression *ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν*, 13 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolical and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolical, statement *κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσούτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν* 5 § 9: reason is present in the slave only, so to speak, as a *δίναμος*, not as a *ἔξις*; and Aristotle avails himself of the

¹ *Staatschre* II. 81: "It is just like putting the question : Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species ? For that *χρηματιστική* has the wider generality and that *οἰκονομική* is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what *χρηματιστική* is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of *οἰκονομική* to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (?) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that *χρηματιστική* is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth ; that *οἰκονομική* teaches us to apply to the mainte-

nance of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, (a) that only the smaller and less essential branch of *οἰκονομική* in Aristotle's sense has this function, 13 § 1, (b) that as it has to do with consumption, while *χρηματιστική* is concerned with acquisition, even this branch of *οἰκονομική* is not related to *χρηματιστική* simply as particular to universal.

² Schütz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the omission of *καὶ πολιτικῶν* and *καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*, 8 § 15. He failed to see that it was also necessary to reject *πόλεως* ἢ in 8 § 13 *sub fine*, that these words indeed must be the first to go.

hyperbole μὴ ἔχειν to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the *Poetics*, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἥθη) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἀνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ὑπέροιτο τραγῳδία, ἀνευ δὲ ἥθων γένοιτ' ἄν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀῆθες τραγῳδίαι εἰσὶν καὶ δῆλος ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιούτοι. Comp. *Hermes* XIX. 1884, p. 592. SUSEM. Plato too, *Rep.* IV. 441 A, says λογισμοῦ δὲ εἴναι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκούσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.

NOTE ON I. 2 § 13: 1253 a 20—24.

ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμονύμως, ὡσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γὰρ) τῷ ἐργῳ φωρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμόνυμα. The words of n. (28) p. 150 “if *τοιαύτη*=a true hand” will admit of further elucidation. Schöll, who maintains this to be the meaning of *τοιαύτη*, ‘*talis qualis esse debet vera manus*’ (Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* IV. p. 5), cites as analogous the use of *τοιούτοις* in *De part. animal.* 1. 1 §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς ἔχει τὴν αὐτήν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν, ἀλλ' ὁμος οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπος. ἔτι δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι χείρα <τὴν> ὀπώσοιν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκῆν ἢ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμονύμως, ὡσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον *Ιατρὸν*. οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται ποιεῖν τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι λίθινοι τὸ ἑαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος *Ιατρός*. ὅμοιως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν *τοιούτων* ἔστι, λέγω δὲ οἶον ὀφθαλμός, χείρ (where Schöll has himself added τὴν). The citation is the more apposite because Schöll takes διαφθαρεῖσα χείρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χείρ, ‘manus corporis extincti, *ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ὅλου*, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.’

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Schöll contends, διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and *τοιαύτη* predicate, and that διαφθαρεῖσα means ‘a dead man's hand,’ may not *τοιαύτη* mean simply ‘homonymous,’ a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἔσται *τοιαύτη* is parallel to οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλ' ὁμόνυμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettori p. 14 (ed. of 1576): “posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formatam, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur: neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est.”

B.

1260 b 27 ἐπεὶ [δέ] προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς (I) πολιτικῆς, τὸς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μά-
λιστα κατ' εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἀλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολι- (p. 25)
30 τείς, αἷς τε χρῶνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων, καὶ εἰ τινες ἔτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρη-
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τὸ τ' ὄρθως ἔχον ὁφθῇ

1260 b 27 δὲ omitted by Π¹ Ar., and γάρ would make a better transition. See *Intr.* p. 14, n. 3 || 28 τὸς Π¹ and Π⁴ (corr. in the margin over an erasure), § II² Bk. Π⁴ (1st hand) || 31 καν P¹ Π² Bk. (perhaps rightly) || τυγχάνουσιν Π³ (1st hand) and perhaps Γ, τυγχάνουσιν M⁴ Π¹⁻²⁻⁴ C⁴ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk.¹ and a later hand in Π³ || εἰρημέναι Schneider, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1368 f. || 32 τ' omitted by M³ Π¹

Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, *Metaphysics Physics Psychology &c.* Here cc. 1—8 deal with **Political Thinkers**, cc. 9—12 with **Existing Constitutions**. See *Introd.* p. 32.

c. i Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors: § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's *Republic*? § 3.

§ 1 1260 b 27 προαιρόμεθα] This is evidence (as against Götting *Preface* p. xviii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state; see Spengel *Ueber die Politik* p. 11, and compare IV (VII). 13. 4.

κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to I. 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, ἡ πολιτικὴ κοιν., was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. 1.

29 κατ' εὐχήν] For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); IV (VII). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3,

10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9; VI (IV). 11 § 1 with notes. SUSEM. (128)

In Plato εὐχαῖς δμοι= a chimerical scheme, e.g. *Rep.* 456 C, οὐκ ἀρά ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς δμοις ἐνομοθετούμεναι, 499 C, δικαίως ἀν καταγελώμεθα, ὡς ἀλλως εὐχαῖς δμοις λέγονται; and in 540 D μὴ εὐχαῖς εἰρηκέναι is explained by ἀλλὰ χαλεπά μέν, δυνατά δὲ πῦ. Thus εὐχή=an ideal, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. *c. Timoer.* 722, 19, εἰ γάρ αὐτὸς καλῶς μὲν ἔχοι, μὴ δυνατὸν δέ τι φράσαι, εὐχῆς οὐ νόμον διαπράττοι· ἀν ἔργον. Similarly optare in Latin. By ζῆν μάλιστα κατ' εὐχήν Aristotle implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances.

30 τινες τῶν πόλεων] See IV (VII).

14. 15 n. SUSEM. (128 b)

εὐνομεῖσθαι λεγομένων] e.g. by the historical Socrates *Xen. Mem.* III. 5. 15, IV. 4. 15; Plato *Crito* 52 E, Ps.-Plato *Mino* 320 B. Add *Nic. Eth.* 1. 13. 3.

31 ἵνα κτλ.] 'in order to note what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of ingenious speculation at all hazards (as the search for some new form of polity, distinct from these, might seem to imply) but from the

καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἔτερον μὴ (1) δοκῆ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ 35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.

§ 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρώτον ποιητέον, ἢ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἡτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μή. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς 40 κοινωνεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἢ γάρ πολιτεά κοινωνία τις ἔστι, καὶ πρώτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γάρ τόπος εἰς 1261 a ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολῖται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως).

§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γάρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ 5 γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλους, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γάρ ὁ Σωκράτης

33 τῇ P¹, omitted by Γ M¹, hence [τῇ] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι Π² Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 πολιτεά II, πόλις Susem.¹⁻² Ar. (?) and Γ (?), civitas William || 41 τοῦ τόπου after κοινωνεῖν M¹ P¹ || εἰς ὁ τῆς Γ, λοβῆς II Αγ. ||

1261 a 2 ἀλλὰ... b 15 αἰρετάτερον. Eubulos, in Angelo Mai's *Script. vet. nov. coll. Vat. II.* p. 671 sqq., attempts to refute this passage || ὅσον M¹ C⁴ Q^b T^b πάντων omitted by Γ, [τάντων] Susem.¹ but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1363 f. || 6 πλάτων πολιτεά M¹ P¹, πολιτεά τοῦ πλάτωνος Q^b U^b W^b L^b Ald.

defectiveness of all schemes hitherto framed that we have undertaken this investigation.'

34 σοφίζεσθαι=affect wisdom, show one's cleverness, whence σοφιστής. Elsewhere in the treatise simply 'to devise,' 5 § 19, VI(iv). 13. 1, VII(vi). 14. 19.

36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι] Shilleto compares Thuc. VI. 40, Plato *Soph.* 264 B, *Tim.* 48 C, *Laws* X. 892 D, for this sense 'to take up.'

§ 2 37 ἢ περ πέφυκεν] The natural beginning, seeing that every state is a form of association, κοινωνία, I. I. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (129)

38 ἡτοι πάντας πάντων κτλ.] The same alternatives are given IV(vii). 8 § 8 — 9 § 2.

41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not universally true. Mere contiguity of residence is not enough to constitute citizenship: III. I § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea of territory in the germ.

§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκήσεσθαι] Eaton proposes a reflexive sense, "direct itself

aright," comparing Thuc. VI. 18 τὴν πόλιν τριψεσθαι αὐτὴν περι αὐτὴν and other instances.

6 ἄκετ] Rep. IV 423 e f. v 449 c—466 d. This passage and v(viii). 7. 9 justify the inference that ὁ Σωκράτης with the article v(viii). 7. 9, means throughout ὁ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ., Socrates, the character in the Platonic dialogue, in keeping with Aristotle's cautious manner of referring controversially to contemporary thought. Not directly named, as a rule, Plato lurks under Socrates (cp. nn. 116, 199), as under τινὲς, τις τῶν πρότερον, and the like. See Campbell's apt remarks on similar reticence in Plato, *Introd. to Theaetetus* p. xxxiv, ed. 2.

cc. 2—5 An Examination of Plato's Republic.

c. 2 *Communism would not secure Plato's end, which is the utmost possible unity. Excessive unification subverts the city, reducing it to a family or an individual: §§ 1, 2. The elements of the city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-*

φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναικας εἶναι καὶ τὰς⁽¹⁾
κτήσεις. τοῦτο δὴ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, η
κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;

2 ἔχει δὲ δυσχερεῖας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς³
γυναικας κοινάς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι τὸν
τρόπου τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.
ἔτι δὲ πρός, τὸ τέλος ὁ φησὶ τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν

10 ἔχει... 1269 a 27 διαφοράν noticed by Mich. of Ephesus op. c. f. 188^b || δὴ Γ Ρ¹
Π², perhaps rightly || 11 κοινάς <καὶ τέκνα> Spengel || 13 ἔτι δὲ πρός, τὸ Bernays,
ср. τοσούτος γάρ καὶ ἔτι πρός, De Soph. Elench. 4 § 7, 166 a 34 f.: ἔτι δὲ [πρός] τὸ
Susem.¹⁻²⁻³, tracing it to a variant πρὸς δὲ τούτοις of ἔτι δὲ: yet the punctuation
πρὸς τὸ τέλος with Thurot's construction ("as regards the end," making ὡς μὲν
εἴρηται νῦν subject to διδίνατο) is not impossible: πρὸς δὲ τέλος φησὶ Busse

iated from an offensive and defensive alliance (*συμμαχία*) and a race or tribe (*τόνος*): § 3. It is this which makes reciprocity the political safeguard, § 4, allowing the citizens to become alternately rulers and subjects, although a permanent governing body would be better, §§ 5, 6; allowing also a change of functions among the officials, § 7. Further, the greater independence (*αὐτάρκεια*) secured in the city essentially depends upon a degree of unity lower than that of the family, § 8.

See Grote's *Plato* c. 35, III. pp. 160—242, Oncken I. 171—193 and various monographs quoted in the *Introd.* p. 32 n. 4, p. 33 n. 7. The main defects of this criticism are at once apparent; Zeller, *Platonic Studies* p. 203, 290, has rightly traced them to an excessive striving after logical clearness; a tendency to reduce the Platonic utterances to a number of precise dogmatic propositions and to test the independent validity of each empirically, without regard to its inner connexion with the whole system of idealism. Hence it comes about that the spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly ever adequately appreciated, while now and then there is a captions, almost pedantic, disposition to get at external results and to fasten on details with but little insight into their true relative importance. "Several objections urged by him turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and if judged by Plato from his own point of view would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections" (Grote). This is the sober fact, and serves to account for the piquant charges of injustice, sophistry, and *mala*

sides sometimes brought against Aristotle. § 1 10 πάγτων and 11 κοινάς are unintentional misrepresentations of the kind just criticized. The 'marriage laws' in question affect only Plato's Guardians, and do not establish *community* of wives at all, in the strictly literal and unfavourable sense of the term (which would be a gross libel, we are told, on the philosopher who made marriage, so to speak, a 'sacrament'). Indeed they seem to aim at an impossible strictness, hardly less exacting than vows of celibacy (Zeller *Plato* p. 489 Eng. tr.). And this must have been Aristotle's judgment: he never attacks them on the score of license, but only on grounds of public expediency. Moreover the aim of these laws and the arguments by which they are defended are such as to lay them open to the inexact and invidious appellation even at the hands of impartial modern critics. See e.g. Dr Jowett's remarks *Plato* III. p. 160 ff.

11 δι' ην αἰτίαν = αἰτία δι' ην "that which he assigns as the reason why such legislation is necessary does not appear to result from his proposals": συμβάντος following as if τούτῳ δι' δ had preceded. In 4 § 5 is a similar attraction. The 'reason' in question is the fundamental assumption of the Platonic state that the utmost possible unity is desirable: communism, within certain limits, is a means to this unity.

13 Thurot would translate: "further in view of the end which he says ought to be set before the city his present statement (of his scheme) is impracticable." But it is simpler to take τέλος as subject; πρός may be adverbial (see *Crit. Notes*): "the

είρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται. (1)
§ 2 λέγω δὲ τὸ μιαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα
16 πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γάρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης.

καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊοῦσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλ-⁴
λον οὐδὲ πόλις ἐσται· πλήθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις,
γινομένη τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἀνθρώπως δ' ἔξ
20 οἰκίας ἐσται· μᾶλλον γάρ μίαν τὴν οἰκλαν τῆς πόλεως φαίημεν (p. 24)
ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὅστ' εἴ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο
§ 3 δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γάρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἔκ
πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔξ εἰδει δια-
φερόντων. οὐ γάρ γίνεται πόλις ἔξ ὄμοιων. ἔτερον γάρ συμ-

14 εἰρηται] διήρηται Zwinger || δεῖ omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, inserted by corr.¹⁾ || διελθεῖν M^a P²⁻³ C⁴ Q^b T^b, εἰπεῖν? Susem. || 15 ὃ omitted by Π² Bk. and the 1st hand of P⁴ (inserted between the lines and by a later hand in the margin) || 16 πᾶσαν before 15 ὡς ἄριστον Π² Bk. (in P⁴ corrected by a later hand in the margin) || 18 οὐδὲ] οὐ M^a P¹ || ἡ omitted by M^a P¹; hence [ἡ] Susem.¹⁻² || 21 ἥνα <μᾶλλον ἥνα>? Riese, needlessly || καὶ after εἰ omitted by Γ M^a, [καὶ] Susem.³; notwithstanding Dittenberger's protest, ὦφ. c. p. 1361, καὶ is not indispensable, see III. 16 § 9, 1287 b 6 || 22 δ' ἐκ Π², ἐκ omitted by Π¹, δὲ [ἐκ] Susem.¹⁻², perhaps rightly || 23 εἰδει] εἰδούς C⁴ Q^b T^b, εἰδεῖν P⁶ U^b, in P⁴ the word stands over an erasure

end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain)." For νῦν= in the case supposed, see 3 § 1, 8 § 10: νῦν δ' (on the scheme of Hippodamas) ἕταν ἔχουσιν.

14 διδεῖν=analyze, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: III. 13 § 6,
14 § 2, De gen. et corr. 1. 1. 1 τὰς τε αὐτὰς διαιρετέον.

§ 2 16 λαμβάνει γάρ κτλ] Rep. IV 422 D f., 423 D f.; v 449 B f., 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, "the end is impracticable" in c. 2; then the second, "the means are unsuitable" in cc. 3, 4, 5 §§ 1-13; lastly, "the many other difficulties" in c. 5 §§ 14-28 (Thurot). Comp. Analysis pp. 102, 103. SUSEM. (130)

17 μία μᾶλλον] too much of a unity.
18 πλῆθος γάρ τι] See 5 § 15, III. 1 § 2, § 12.

22 οὐ ποιητέον...πόλιν] With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, I. 1. 2 ep. note (2 b) and Introd. p. 23, i.e. with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4-4 § 10, 5 §§ 14-24.

The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family. SUSEM. (131)

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the *Republic*, the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.

24 οὐ γάρ...ἔξ ὄμοιων] Apparently contradicted by III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, VI(IV). 11 § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὄμοιων (Eaton). The present statement is repeated III. 4. 5 where uniformity of moral excellence is disclaimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by N. Eth. V. 5. 9, οὐ γάρ ἐκ δύο λαρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἔξ λαρῶν καὶ γεωργῶν, καὶ ὅλως ἔτερων καὶ οὐκ τοσων ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῖς δὲ τοσαθῆται. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed Pol. IV(VII) cc. 8, 9. See on I. 7. § 1 n. (58 b).

συμμαχία] A confederation is a different thing from a state: see III. 3 § 5, 9 §§ 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The

25 μαχία καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γάρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἄν θ (I)
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθέας γάρ χάρω ἡ συμμαχία πέφυκεν), ὡσπερ ἀν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἐλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥσι κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἶον Ἀρκάδες)· ἐξ ἀν δὲ δεῖ ἐν
§ 4 γινέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ίσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός

26 τῷ (τῷ P⁴) αὐτῷ P⁴C⁴Q^bT^bU^b || 27 ἐλκύση Π²Bκ., ἐλκύση M* || διοίσει...
Ἀρκάδες transposed by Susem,¹ to come before ἀλλὰ πότερον 1261 a 2, but wrongly ||
28 καὶ πόλις] πόλις καὶ ? Susem. || 29 ἀλλά] πάλαι Schneider, [ἀλλά] Schlosser Garve
|| Ἀρκάδες * * Conring, οἷον <νῦν> Riese; but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1376 ff. and
the Comm. below || 30 γινέσθαι? Susem. || εἶδει <δεῖ> διαφέρει Bücheler (prob-
ably right), εἶδει διαφέρειν M*

separate autonomous states, the Lacedaemonians and their allies, for example, are homogeneous.

25. τὸ μὲν answered by 29 ἐξ ἀν δὲ. The one (the alliance for war) will be of advantage from its mere size however much alike in kind, just as (it will be of advantage) if a weight shall pull more (than another): i.e. like a heavier weight which turns the scale. The more members the stronger the alliance.

27 διοίσει κτλ.] "Upon something similar", the character of the constituents, whether *heterogeneous* (so as to allow of reciprocity) or *homogeneous*, "will depend the difference also between a city and a race, provided the race does not live with its population separated over a number of villages, but like the Arcadians." Not observing the parenthesis and taking ὅταν μὴ ὥσι κεχωρ. as epexegetical of τῷ τοιούτῳ the editors have referred this remark to the process of συνοικισμός, the change from village life by which a Greek θῶρας was consolidated into one city. But (1) the Arcadians must surely be cited as an example of a race and not (as they would be upon that view) of a city: (2) this is not a distinction between θῶρας and πόλις universally, but between one θῶρας and another. (3) We should then expect μητέτι, or οἷον <νῦν> or something equivalent: and the exact force of the future and of τῷ τοιούτῳ (not τούτῳ) would be missed. (4) In that case Arcadians means simply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegeatans, Mantineans and others might equally claim to belong to the Arcadian league (τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν). Hence Dittenberger, in *Gött. gel. Anzeigen* 1874 p. 1381, rejects the supposed reference to συνοικισμός and takes ὅταν μὴ κτλ. as a

limiting clause, which excludes from the comparison the cases where the people live κατὰ κώμας and opposes to the city-state only such 'races' as the Arcadian.

29 Ἀρκάδες] Who are meant? The interpretation of the passage turns upon this. When Plato, *Symp.* 193 A, writes διώκται θῆμεν ὑπὸ θεῶν καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Δακεδαιμονίων the words spaced show that the Mantineans are meant. Demosthenes *Or. XVI* uses Ἀρκάδες nine times and Μεγαλοπόλιται seven times of the same people whose city was entitled in full ἡ μεγάλη πόλις τῶν Ἀρκάδων. There everything is clear from the interchange of terms. But if the words "when they live like the Arcadians" indicate an θῶρας so well known as to spare Aristotle further explanation the instance chosen ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be before all things perspicuous. Understand then neither the Mantineans with Schneider, nor the Megalopolitans with Camerarius, nor with Giphanius the Maenaliens and Parrhasians in the southwest before the founding of Megalopolis; none of these exclusively; but the entire population of Arcadia, as the word naturally means. See *Note on Arcadia* at the end of B. II.

"Further compare 1. 2 § 4 n. (11), § 6 (19); III. 13. 19 (607); IV(VII). 4. 11 (760)." SUSEM. (132)

46 ἀν δὲ δεῖ] Whereas (in the case of the city-state) the elements which must coalesce into one are (? must be, see *Crit. Notes*) specifically distinct. So that it would not make a single city, III. 3 § 5, 9 § 9, to join by an external tie two such similar units as the civic body of Corinth and that of Megara: the conditions for reciprocity would be wanting.

§ 4 30 τὸ ίσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός] Not 'equal retribution' but the propor-

31 σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον¹ (I)

tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

"As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in *Nic. Eth.* v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who render, the one service, the other τυχὴ καὶ γέρας *Nic. Eth.* v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλογίας, 'reciprocal proportion', to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the Ethics p. 88 ff. In *Nic. Eth.* v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ μὴ καὶ λόγητα, i.e. 'reciprocal proportion' as opposed to the 'retaliation' of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλογίας, i.e. καὶ λόγητα λόγων, and ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ λόγητα, i.e. καὶ λόγητα ἀπλῶς, τὸ τον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is the equivalent of ἀντιπεπονθός καὶ ἀναλογίας in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in *Nic. Eth.* ix 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον is τὸ καὶ δέξιαν VIII(v) 1, 1301 b 37, at VII(vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὲν is said to consist in τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ δέξιαν, τὸ καὶ δέξιαν in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν λογικὸν. See my notes on *Nic. Eth.* v 3 § 7." JACKSON.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, *Ethics* I. p. 52 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* are a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. The common source may be Plato's *Διὸς κράτος*, the true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, of *Laws* VI 757 B, C: τῷ μὲν γάρ μείζονι πλειστῷ δέ ἀλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμεται, μετρίᾳ διδόσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ δῆ καὶ τιμᾶς μείζοις μὲν πρὸς δρεπτῷ δει μείζονι κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal pro-

portion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (*κοινωνία*) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible: it can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (*N. E.* VIII. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands: and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further I. 2. 16, III. 10. 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—I. 7. 1 n. (58 b), IV(VII). 8. 4 (797), VI(iv). 11. 8 (1293); III. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, I § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also III. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4—7 διόπερ τὸ λογικὸν ἀριθμὸν are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of *dissimilar* members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (*αὐτάρκεια*) be also taken into account, § 8.

Camerarius, and long before him Eu-bulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑλευθέροις καὶ ἵστοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἄμα⁽¹⁾
 γάρ οὐχ οἶον τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἡ κατ' ἐμιαυτὸν ἡ
 § 5 κατά τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἡ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
 35 τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ μετέβαλλον
 οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ οἱ αὐτὸι σκυτοτόμοι
 § 6 καὶ τέκτονες ήσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ** βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ⁶
 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ βέλ-
 τιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν διὰ τὸ τὴν

32 ἄμα] διλλὰ P¹ in the margin || 33 γάρ] δὲ Γ M⁶ || 34 ἦ] καὶ Ar. (probably right) || 35 μετέβαλλον M⁶ P¹ Susem.^{1,2} || 36 ἀεὶ after οἱ αὐτοὶ P²⁻⁴ C⁴ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P³ (omitted by the 1st hand in P⁰) || 37 ἐπει] ἐκεὶ Bernays, who by omitting with Koraes τὰ which follows skilfully removes all traces of the lacuna after δέ discovered by Conring and Schneider (viz. ἐκεὶ δέ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὴν κ. τὴν πολιτικὴν δῆλον): <οὐχ> οὕτω Schlosser—equally wrong; cp. the Comm.: <βέλτιον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ταῦτα ἔργον ἀεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πέφυκε δὴ> βέλτιον or something similar Thurot

3 § 3; 4 § 5 ff., § 4; 5 § 11, §§ 14, 15,
 §§ 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it may easily be seen that this does not affect the soundness of his reasoning which, as even the language shows, is directed more especially against *Republic* v. 462, where Plato is showing how the abolition of family life would be the means of making all the citizens of his ideal state feel as the members of a single family (cp. n. 140) or even of a single man (καὶ οἵτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, αὐτῇ sc. τῷδε ἀριστα διοικεῖται). Is this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to prescribe for the state the end of representing so far as possible an individual man? "Aristotle's argument is that unity when applied to the state is an analogical term, and that Plato's use of it subverts the very ground of the analogy" (Eaton). Comp. also Oncken I. 173 f. SUSEM. (133)

32 τοῦτο=τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός. There must needs be reciprocity even amongst free and equal citizens, as in the ideal state.

ἄμα γάρ... 39 δυνατόν] All cannot rule at once: the only possible alternatives are (a) a perpetual ruling body, ἀεὶ or καθάπαξ (cp. I. 13 § 4) τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν: (b) alternation or rotation of functions, μεταβάλλειν, ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κατὸ μέρος (cp. I. 1 § 2, III. 6 § 9). Comp. IV(VII). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this argument recurs.

§ 5 35 ὥστε apparently redundant

after συμβαίνει, as in VI(IV). 5. 3 συμβέ-
 βηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτειαν εἶναι, and so
De Sensu i § 5, 437 b 8 οὐ συμβαίνει ὥστε
 δοκεῖν. Similarly with other verbs: *Pol.*
 VIII(V). 9 § 8 ἔστω ὥστ' ἔχειν ikaros,
Phys. VIII. 6. 2, 258 b 17 ἔστω δ' ἐνθε-
 χόμενος ὥστ' εἶναι ποτε.

§ 6 37 ἐπειδὴ δὲ * *) The difficulty is that, if no lacuna be assumed, οὕτωs properly refers to μὴ δεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ, and this is against the sense. To take οὕτωs=οὐ νῦν οὕτωs (see c. 1 § 3), with Lambin, ita ut sunt, is as forced as to insert οὐχ with Schlosser.

"The sense is satisfied if we supply something like this: But <as in fact the work of a carpenter is always done by a carpenter and never by a shoemaker, and from the nature of the case each work is more successful when executed by the same persons, who make this their sole business, and as therefore> it is better it should be so with political society" ... (Thurot). SUSEM. (134)

39 ἐν οἷς δὲ κτλ] "But where it is not possible, because all are naturally equal," τὴν φύσιν adverbial accus. with *Iou*s; comp. n. on I. 12 § 2 "and at the same time therefore it is but fair, whether a good or a bad thing for ruling," as opposed to obeying, "that all should take a turn at it—this retirement in rotation of the equal citizens from office imitates an original dissimilarity." φαῦλον=an unsatisfactory arrangement, e. 7 § 5, the thought being perhaps different from Plato's in *Rep.* I. 345 D ff., whether office

1261 b φύσιν ἵσους εἶναι πάντας, ὥμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον, εἰτ' ἀγαθὸν (I) εἴτε φαῦλον τῷ ἀρχεῖν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἵσους εἴκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι § 7 ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχούσιν οἱ δὲ ἀρχονται [κατὰ μέρος] 5 ὥσπερ ἀν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν ἀντὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἔτεροι ἑτέρας ἀρχούσιν ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων ὡς 7 οὐ πέφυκε μίαν οὐτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσί τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς 9 πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ· κατοι τὸ γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σφέζει ἔκαστον.

1261 b 1 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk., δὲ Bas.³ || 2 τῷ Susem., cp. Pl. *Prot.* 334 A—C, *Euthyd.* 292 D; τὸ Γ II Ar. Bk., <πρὸς> τὸ Thurot || τοῦτο] ἐν τούτοις Π² Ar. Bk. (Montecatino), γρ. ἐν τούτοις p¹ in the margin || τοῦτο δὲ] οὕτω δὴ Welldon || δὲ μιμεῖται] δὲ μιμεῖσθαι Π² Ar. Bk. γρ. δὲ μιμεῖσθαι p¹ in the margin, δὲ μιμεῖσθαι Montecatino || 3 τὸ ἐν] τῷ ἐν Heinsius Susem.²⁻³, a correction more plausible than sound, τὸ to be taken with τοῦτο || οἰκεῖν Π² T^b and C⁴ (1st hand), οἰκεῖν C⁴ (corrector), οἰκεῖν a later hand in P³ (the 1st hand having left a lacuna) || τὸ ἀνομολόγου Susem., τὸ δὲ (τόδις Γ) ὡς ὄμολος Γ M^a Susem.¹ in the text and P¹ (1st hand), ὄμολος P²⁻³, ὄμολος Π³ C⁴ Bk., γρ. ὄμολος p¹ in the margin, τὸ δυσομολός Schmidt (possibly right; I should adopt it if the word occurred elsewhere in Aristotle) || εἶναι ΓM^a and P¹ (1st hand), τοῖς Π²⁻³⁻⁴⁻⁶ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. and γρ. mg. p¹, τῆς C⁴ U^b || 4 κατὰ μέρος omitted by Π¹, παρὰ μέρος Vettori Bk. || 5 καὶ omitted by Π² Ar. Bk. || 7 οὕτω Π² Bk. || οὕτως after εἶναι M^a P¹

is or is not a source of individual advantage. τοῦτο τὸ οἰκεῖν = this yielding of the retiring magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office; μιμεῖται is the counterpart or reflexion of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

1261 b 1 ἀμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον κτλ] Compare III. 16 §§ 2—4 with n. (672), IV(VII). 3 §§ 5, 6 n. (740); further n. (58 b) on 1. 7, 1, n. (133) and (797) on IV(VII). 8, 4. SUSEM. (134 b)

2 τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ with the demonstrative resumes the δὲ with the relative 39 ἐν οἷς δὲ: so IV(VII). 9 § 5, ἢ δὲ ... ταύτη δὲ. The two recensions of the text here widely diverge; see the *Critical Notes*. Bekker's text is nearly that of P¹; ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοῖς ισούς οἰκεῖν ὄμολος τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Thurot *Etudes* pp. 22—24 has shown the usual modes of interpreting this text to be unsatisfactory. The infinitive may indeed be governed by βέλτιον, and εἰκασί (or ἀρέσαται) may be understood with τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς: but whether τὸ...οἰκεῖν be taken as subject or object of μιμεῖσθαι the result

is equally futile. If *object*, the sentence means 'where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality!' If *subject*, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is 'imitated' by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural *inequality*.

§ 7 5 ὥσπερ ἀν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι] as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενόμενος δὲ ἄλλοι in *Nic. Eth.* IX. 4. 4.

δρχόντων] gen. abs. "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation: τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον = 3 ἐν μέρει.

7 τινες] That is, Plato: see esp. *Rep.* V 462 B. Cp. n. (133). SUSEM. (135) Also 464 B μέγιστον γε πόλει αὐτῷ ὄμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν.

8 καὶ... (φανερὸν) δι... is the construction.

9 κατοι...σφέζει ἔκαστον] οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ. "Cp. III. 10. 2 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρέτῃ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτήν with n. (561 b)." SUSEM. (135 b)

"What is this 'unity' which seems to Plato so beneficial, to Aristotle so

§ 8 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ζη- (I)
πι τέντι τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστε-
ρον ἐνός, πόλις δὲ οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἥδη τότ' εἶναι πόλις, (p. 25)
ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους·
εἴπερ οὖν αἱρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐν
15 τοῦ μᾶλλον αἱρετώτερον.

mischievous? It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the *ὁμόνοια* of *Nic. Eth.* ix. 6, 1167 a 22, as appears from c. 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic *πόλις*. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization'. Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the *πόλις*, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior *κοινωνίαι* which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior *κοινωνίαι* —for example, *οἰκία*, *σύντηλοι*, *συντριῶται*, *φιλέται*, *δημόται*, *θιασώται*, *ἐρανισταί* *Nic. Eth.* viii. 9 § 4 f., 1160 a 9, q.v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior *κοινωνίαι*, which *μορίοις* ἔσκαστ τῆς πολιτικῆς sc. *κοινωνίας* *Nic. Eth.* viii. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior *κοινωνίαι* to the supreme *κοινωνία*. He thinks, in fact, that the *πόλις* is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticisms arise directly from the theory of the *πόλις* which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of *φίλα* in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the *Nic. Eth.*" JACKSON.

§ 8 10 ἐνοῦν is infinitive, 'the endea-

vour to intensify the unity of the state is not so desirable.'

12 *βούλεται* = tends, means; the meaning of a state is then first realised or fulfilled when...

14 εἰπερ οὖν κτλ] Cp. I. 1. 8 ππ.
(20 b, 21); III. 1 § 12 πόλιν τὸ τῶν τοι-
ούτων πλῆθος ικανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ἔωνται,
n. (447), 9 § 14 n. (500), IV(VII). 4 § 11
(759), 5 § 1 τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ
δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐτάρκειας (764), 8 § 8 ἡ
γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἔστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ
πρὸς ἕωνται αὐτάρκειας n. (804). SUSEM.
(136)

Add IV(VII). 4. 14 δῆλον τοινικῶς οὐ-
τοῖς ἔστι πόλεως ὅρος ἀριστος, η μεγαλη
τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπερβολή πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν
ἵνων εὐσύνοντος.

cc. 3, 4 Objections to communism, chiefly to the abolition of separate families. Even supposing Plato's end, i.e. the most perfect civic unity, to be desirable, his communistic scheme is not the best means to secure it. A series of detached remarks, so closely allied in some cases that it would not have been difficult to bring them together under one and the same head. See fuller details *Analysis* pp. 102, 103; and compare throughout Pl. *Rep.* v.

The Platonic scheme, as Grote (III. 207) reminds us, is only partial communism. Modern communistic theories contemplate individual producers handing over the produce of their labour to be distributed among themselves by official authority. But the producing and labouring classes in the *Republic* are not communists at all: they are private proprietors with separate families, taxed only with the maintenance of a body of public functionaries, the guardians. Hence the arguments advanced by Aristotle, however just in themselves, have little direct application to the scheme which he is ostensibly criticising; they belong to a far wider enterprise on which he has embarked, an advocacy of the principle of individualism against socialism in general, beginning (1 § 2) with the inquiry into the limits of community and subsidiary

3 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά-⁽¹⁾
 λιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται
 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἡματινοὶ λέγωσι τὸ ἔμδον καὶ τὸ
 μὴ ἔμδον τοῦτο γάρ οἰεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν
 § 2 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γάρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 21 ως ἔκαστος, τάχ' ἀν εἴη μᾶλλον ὃ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω-
 κράτης (ἔκαστος γάρ νιὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ-
 ναικα δὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἔκαστου
 δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὥστας). νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως φήσοντιν
 25 οἱ κοινᾶις χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-
 τες μέν, οὐχ ως ἔκαστος δὲ αὐτῶν, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
 § 3 πάντες μέν, οὐχ ως ἔκαστος δὲ αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν παρ-
 λογισμός τὸς ἐστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γάρ πάν-
 τες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἀρτια διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ

19 ὁ omitted by M^o P¹, [d] Susem.¹, but see Dittenberger *op.c.* p. 1359 || 25 τοῖς
 omitted by M^o P¹ (?) rightly || 27 πάντες omitted by Γ M^o || 28 τὸ omitted by M^o
 P¹ || 29 διττὸν καὶ <ἀμφιβολον> or else 30 τοῖς <κατὰ φιλοσοφias> λόγου Thurot;
 an ingenious suggestion, but not (as I once thought) necessary

to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the *Republic* would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato's avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (*esprit de corps*) to supersede nearer family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τοῦτο = τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms *mine* and *not-mine*.

18 κατὰ τὸν λόγον] with ἀποδείκνυσθαι, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of *mine* and *not-mine*: ἐὰν πάντες...μὴ ἔμδον is explanatory of λόγον. For κατὰ=by, cf. *Metaph.* Θ. 8 § 14, κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτο τὸν λόγον φανερὸν ὅτι...1050 b 3.

19 ὁ Σωκράτης] In Plato's *Republic* V 462 C: ἐν ὑποτινῇ δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό κατὰ ταύτη τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἔμδον καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔμδον, αὐτη ἄριστα διοικεῖται. SUSEM. (187)

§ 2 20 'All' has two senses, (1) each individual, *pro se quisque*; (2) the whole body collectively. If 'all' is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what Socrates means ("proposes to do").

24 συμβαινόντων] "circumstances": the joys and sorrows of life *Rep.* 462 E.

νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως] But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term 'all'. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say "mine" in this sense.

26 πάντες) (ως ἔκαστος] Another instance in III. II. 2. Also VI(IV). 4. 26 where the distinction is skilfully worked in: μόναρχος γάρ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἕκ πολλῶν οἱ γάρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ως ἔκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες.

§ 3 28 τὸ γάρ πάντες κτλ] The terms "all" and "both" and "odd" and "even" by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἀρτια] See § 27: τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ ἀρτιον) ἐνδέχεται τῷ δὲ ψεύτηρι τῷ δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, *De Soph.* El. 4 § 7, 166 a 33: παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαρρεοὺς ὅτι τὰ πέντε ἐστι δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἀρτια, 'to (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἔστι τὸ πάν- (1)
 τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ δυνατόν, ὡδὶ^{§ 4} δὲ οὐδὲν ὅμονοητικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ
 λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων 10
 κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἴδιων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν
 35 ἡπτον, ἡ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς
 ἐτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-
 τικαῖς διακονίαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίστε χεῖρον ὑπηρε-

30 ἔστη P²⁻³ Q^b T^b || 34 φροντίσουσι ? Susem. || 35 ἡπτον ἡ (less than) T. L.
 Heath || ὅσον] ὅσων P⁴ T^b U^b || 36 φροντίσοντος ? Susem.

and (is) three, odd and even' (Eaton).
 SUSEM. (138)

Walford and Postgate would take *περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια* to be predicates of *πάντες* and *ἀμφότερα*. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of *ἀμφότερα*, 2 + 3, and of *περιττό*. As *ἀμφότερα*=sum of two things, so *περιττό*=an *odd* sum total, *ἄρτια*=an *even* sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits *De Soph.* El. 20 § 2, 177 b 7, *οὐ διτὸν τὸ παρὰ διαρρεούν*, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as *ὅσος* and *ὅση* be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις} in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικούς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider): in Aristotle's phrase they admit of *σύνθετος* and *διατεταρτος*, illicit combination and disjunction. See *De Soph.* El. 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20: *καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀμφότερον καὶ τὸ ἄπαντα πλειον σημαίνει*, the words 'both' and 'all' have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare VIII(v), 8. 3: *παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὃντις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἔκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα* (illicit *σύνθετος*). SUSEM. (139)

31 ὡδὶ μὲν] as ὡς ἔκαστος; ὡδὶ δὲ=collectively.

32 οὐδὲν ὅμονοητικόν] Since democrats may quarrel, although *πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἔκαστος δὲ* they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato's main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say "mine".

§ 4 Then comes a sensible practical suggestion. Comp. Jowett, *Introd.* to Plato's *Republic* p. 166 f., who refers to the statistics of mortality in foundling

hospitals.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ] 'In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care most about their private matters and less for the public concerns.' The zeal and attention of individual owners are checked and chilled by division of ownership. So with the sons who are a 'common possession' of the Guardians.

35 ἡ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει] 'or (only at most) in proportion to their stake in them.' Since the whole clause answers to *μάλιστα* and *ἡπτον*, the verb would seem to be impersonal: 'as much as it falls to each man's share' to care. For the impersonal use, see I. 13 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. VII. 23 *μέριον δύον αὐτοῖσιν ἐπιβάλλει*: hence Herod. IV. 115 *ἀπολαχώντες τῶν χρημάτων τὸ ἐπιβάλλον*=their due share. Camerarius cites Ptolemy as using the word to express 'proportional parts' in astronomical calculations. The same thought recurs 166 a 3 in the words *ὅπόστοις τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν*. If the society consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction $\frac{1}{1000}$. But such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοις κτλ] 'Each is more likely to neglect them, amongst other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants it sometimes happens that the work is not so well done by many as by few.'

§ 5 According to Plato's regulations, Rep. V 457 C—464 B, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes who are full citizens of his ideal state, are to be taken from their mothers directly after

§ 5 τοῦσι τῶν ἐλαττόνων. γίνονται δὲ ἑκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδεὶς, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν
1262 αἱ δύμοις ἐστὶν νίος· ὅστε πάντες δύμοις ὀλιγωρήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὕτως
ἐκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακῶς,
ὅπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἡ τοῦ δεῖνος, τοῦ-

1262 a 1 ἐτελ Bücheler, ὅτι ? Susem., ἐτι Γ' Π' Ατ. Bk. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (*Hermes* VII. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. lixix, I somewhat hastily acceded. If ἐτι be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέξει Γ (?) Ατ. (?) Susem.¹⁻² || 3 τῷ ἀριθμῷ Τ^b || ὅν omitted by Π^a Ar. || τοῦ δεῖνος Π Ar. and also probably Γ, *huius filius* William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: ὀλιγωρήσουσιν. κρέττον ἄρα τοῖοι ἀνεψιδην εἰραι (transposed from 13) ἐνός τὸν αὐτοῦ μένον προσαγορεύοντος, <ἡ> δισχιλιῶν ἡ καὶ μυριῶν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον νίόν. ἐτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον <νίόν> λεγ<όντ>ων καθ' ἐκαστον τῶν χιλιῶν [ἢ] δύων ἡ πόλις ἐστίν, οὕτως ἐκαστος ἐμὸς λέξει <ώς καλ> τὸν εὖ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακῶς ὀπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὅν, καὶ τοῦτο διστάζων [εἰ μὴ ἐμὸν τὸν δεῖνος]. ἀδηλον κτλ

birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See n. (133). SU-
SEM. (140)

38 χλιδοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by *Rep.* IV 423 A. 'Now each of Plato's citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is *his* son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.'

39 οὐχ ὡς ἴκαστον] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 a 1 ἐτελ οὕτως κτλ] Almost word for word from *Rep.* V 463 E, πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ξυμφωνήσουσιν ἐνός τινος ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττοντος, ο-

νινδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ρῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἡ διτι τὸ ἐμόν κακῶς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression 'it is well with mine' or 'it is ill with mine.' Hence translate: "As [or if ἐτι be retained, "Further] each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term 'my son' to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says 'my son' or 'so and so's'; and this 'so and so's' applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists." To take ἐμὸς = my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by νίος in the preceding line, 6 τέκνον, 14 νίόν (cp. 4 § 7). In spite of the χλιδοι νιόλ (b 38) it is the elder generation, the 'fathers', that are meant by τῶν χιλιῶν ἡ δύων κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 δισχιλιῶν καὶ μυριῶν) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὕτως corresponds ὀπόστος...ῶν, as τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον to τοῦ δεῖνος; mine or A's or B's, and so on through all the thousand. When a 'father' uses the term 'my son' in Callipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other 'fathers'.

2 ἐμὸς] Editors compare Soph. *Antig.* 565, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μέντοι μὴ λέγε.

3 οἷον = I mean.

τον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἔκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἡ ὕσων ἡ (I)
 5 πόλις ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο διστάξων ἀδηλον γὰρ φ συνέβη γενέ- (p. 26)
 § 6 σθαι τέκνου καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω 12
 κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἔκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύον-
 τας δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 § 7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γάρ νίον αὐτοῦ ὁ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ

7 [ἔκαστον...8 μυρίων] Schmidt (transposed as above) || μὲν] δύομα Bonitz, perhaps rightly: yet the instances in which μὲν in Aristotle stands without any δὲ following have not yet been sufficiently explained: μηδὲν with a comma after (instead of before) τὸ αὐτὸ Bernays || προσαγορεύοντα Bernays, perhaps rightly: yet the plural may be intentional although the participle goes with ἔκαστον || 8 καὶ] ἡ Susem.¹ aut William || 9 [τὸ ἐμὸν] Schmidt || νίον αὐτοῦ M¹ P²⁻³⁻⁴ Ald. and apparently P¹ || ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Γ and apparently P¹, ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ M¹ P²⁻³⁻⁴ Ald., ἀδελφὸν [αὐτοῦ] Schmidt

5 καὶ τοῦτο κτλ] 'And even this he says dubiously, for it is never certain who of the citizens actually had a son or whose son, if born, was reared.' At first sight this seems to make against Aristotle; for if less than the thousand had sons, the fractional interest of each elder citizen, or 'father,' in the younger generation is increased. But then his chance of being childless is proportionately increased.

§ 6 "And yet is it better in this fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 elder citizens to use the term 'mine' (of any one), all calling him by the same name" viz. son 'or as it is used under the present system' with the addition of different names, as nephew, cousin, &c?

7 [ἔκαστον...8 μυρίων] Of course only those citizens are meant whose age entitles them to call a boy 'son' and not 'brother' or 'grandson'. Here τὸ αἴρετο=son. SUSEM. (141) With αὐτῷ μὲν κτλ may be mentally supplied διλεγαρούτας δὲ πάντων (Thurot).

8 δισχιλίων] Is this genitive after ἔκαστον, as above? Is it not more forcible if taken after τὸ αὐτὸ = the same relation? Each calls him 'mine', (which will result in) the whole body (*plural*) calling one person the same relation of some 2,000 people (T. L. Heath).

A different construction of § 6 is proposed by Bonitz; viz. to take ἔκαστον as the object, instead of the subject, of λέγειν, and to make δισχιλίων the genitive after τὸ αὐτὸ δύομα, which is a correction for μὲν i.e. "is it better in this sense to call each (of the younger generation) 'mine', using the same name [i.e. son] for 2,000 or 10,000?" In the same essay

(Hermes VII pp. 102—8) Bonitz defends the ms. reading ἔτι (a 1) on the ground that a new objection, No. 3, is there introduced. The last, No. 2 (§ 4 πρὸς δὲ τοῦτος...διλεγαρούσαντ) dwelt on the depreciation which the term 'my father' suffers. "The multitude of fathers, whom each of the younger men has, is prejudicial and fatal to the loving attention which a son otherwise receives from a father." In the passage which follows (1 ἔτι οὔτως...14 νίον) "the fact is viewed from the opposite side. The name 'my son' loses all value, as each one who uses it shares the problematic relationship with an indefinitely large number." With all deference to authority so weighty, it may be doubted if the two sides are opposed: at all events in a 13 (κρείττον γὰρ κτλ) the point of view is the advantage of the younger generation no less than in a 1 (διλεγαρούσαν). Comp. Susemihl Quaest. Cril. VI p. 16 ff.

§ 7 9 8 μὲν γάρ κτλ] "For one and the same person is called by one man his own son; by another his own brother, or cousin; (by another) according to some other kinship either by blood relationship or by some connexion and affinity to himself in the first instance or else to his kin; and furthermore by another his clansman, his tribesman. For it is better to be actually an own cousin than in Plato's sense a son." There is at present a kind of community in relationship: only it does not extend so far and is compatible with *dis-similar* individual interests.

"For φάρορα, φιλέτην consult the following references: 5 § 17 n. (169), 11 § 3 with Exc. IV; III. 2 § 3 (451), 9 § 13

ιο προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτὸν, δὲ δὲ ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινὰ (I) συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἴματος ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδείαν αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἔτερος φράτορα, φυλέτην. κρεῖττον γάρ ἵδιον ἀνεψιόν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ § 8 τον νιόν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ μή τινας ια 15 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἕαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γάρ τὰς ὄμοιότητας, αἱ γίνονται τοῖς τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ 20 ἄλληλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευμένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι ιω τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κουνὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὄμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δέ τινες καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἱ σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὄμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦ- 4 σιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία Ἰππος. ἔτι δὲ ιι 25 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ράδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους [ἀκοντίους τοὺς δὲ] ἔκουσίους καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὥν

12 αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Γ ΙΙ || ἢ εἴτε? Susem. || ἔτερος Lindau, ἔτερον Γ ΙΙ Ατ. Bk., ἔτερον Bernays, ἔταιρον Spengel || 13 <ἢ> φυλέτην Bas.³ Bk., aut contributem William || ἔταιρον <ἢ> φράτορα <ἢ> φυλέτην Schmidt || 27 [ἀκοντίους τοὺς δὲ] Bender, ἀκόντιους [τοὺς δὲ ἔκουσίους] Congreve; τοὺς δὲ ἔκουσίους omitted by P², which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(558); VI(IV). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); VII(VI). 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); VIII(V). 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1564), 8 § 19 (1626)." SUSEM. (141)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp. Jowett on the *Republīc* p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις] derive their convictions; so in IV(VII). 1. 6.

§ 9 19 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους] Books of travel round the world, as in *Rhet.* I. 4. 13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), *Meteor.* I. 13. 13, II. 5. 14. Such books were also called περίπλοι and περιηγήσεις.

Usually πραγματεύεσθαι takes περί; but once, *Rhet.* I. 2. 5, it has πρός. In *Pol.* IV(VII). 14. 8 we have τοῦτ' ἀν εἰτ τῷ πομοδέτῳ πραγματεύεσθαι, ὅπως...

20 τιστὶ τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων] See Exc. I. to B. II p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also I. 2. 4 n.

(11) and n. (116). SUSEM. (142)

24 [ὥσπερ... Ἰππος] The same remark in *Hist. Anim.* VII. 6. 8, 586 a 12 (Schneider). Further compare *De Gener. Anim.* IV. 3. 1, 767 b 5: μὴ ἔοικως τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἥδη τρόπον τινὰ τέρας ἐστιν· παρεκβέβηκε γάρ ἡ φύσις ἐν τοῖς γένεσι τρόπον τινά (Eaton). SUSEM. (143)

Δικαία here probably means "domicile": Xenophon *Cyneget.* 7 § 4, *Memorab.* IV. 4. 5: φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ Ἰππον καὶ βοῦν τῷ βαυλαμένῳ δικαίου ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδαξόντων (Jackson).

c. 4 § 1 25 τὰς τοιαύτας] the following.

27 [ἀκοντίους τοὺς δὲ] ἔκουσίους] Can it be said that a divine law forbids involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c, but permits it in other cases? On the contrary, responsibility ceases for involuntary acts; nothing but negligence is then punishable; nor can we talk of such acts being allowed. But

οὐδὲν διστόν ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς (I)
 μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπωθεν·
 30 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ὀμοούντων ἡ γνω-
 ριζόντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
 § 2 νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν. ἀπὸπον δὲ 15
 καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ποιήσαντα τοὺς νιόντας τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-
 λεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλῦσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρή-

29 ἀπόθεν Μ⁹ P¹,⁴ L⁹ Ald. || 30 ἀλλά] ἀ Π¹ [γρ. ἀλλά corr.¹ in the margin of
 P¹] || 32 μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν Jackson, <μὴ> μηδέμια Schneider, μηδέμια Π⁹ ΑΙ. Bk.
 Susem.,^{1-2,3} μηδὲ μιαν Π¹ || 33 ποιήσαντας Γ Ar. and M⁹ (1st hand)

intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender). SUSEM. (144)

28 ὃς οὐδὲν διστόν] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken). SUSEM. (145)

32 λύσεις = expiations. Editors compare *Rep.* II. 364 E: ὡς ἀρά λύσεις τε καὶ καθαροὶ ἀδικημάτων δὲ διστών καὶ παι-
 δίων [ἡσυάν] εἰσι μὲν ἐπὶ γάστρας εἰσι δὲ καὶ τελευτήσαντις, ἀς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν: Eur. *Or.* 510 φόνον φόνῳ λύσαι, 597 μι-
 ασμα λύσαι. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age. Grote, *Hist.* I. 34, compares Thuc. I. 126—128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κτλ.] All the editors assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηδέμιαν, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γνωριζόντων ἐν-
 δέχεται μηδέμιαν γίνεσθαι λύσαι, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made'. He ought however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made'. Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ, <οὐ>δεμίαν." JACKSON.

§§ 2, 3 ἀπὸπον δὲ κτλ] *Rep.* III. 403 A, B: οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέον μανικὸν οὐδὲ ξνγγενές ἀκολασίας τῷ δρθῷ ἔρωτι. οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα αὕτη ἡ θεονή (sc. ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίτια) οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἐραστῆ τε καὶ παιδοκοὶ δρθῶς ἐρῶσι τε καὶ ἐρωμένοις...οὕτω δὴ, ὡς οὐκε, νομο-
 θετήσεις ἐν τῇ οἰκισμένῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ

νέος παιδικῶν ἐραστῆν, τῶν καλῶν χάριν
 ἔτι πειθη...εἰ δὲ μὴ, φόγον ἀμονστας καὶ
 ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέσοντα. With this com-
 pare v. 468 C, where the gallant soldier
 is rewarded with the right to kiss his com-
 rades upon the expedition, καὶ μηδεὶς ἔξε-
 ται ἀπαρνηθῆναι ὅν δὲ βούληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα
 καὶ, ἐάν τις τοι τύχῃ ἐρών ἡ ἄρρενος ἡ
 θηλελας, προθυμότερος ὢ πρὸς τὸ ταριστέα
 φέρειν. See also Zeller's *Plato* p. 455 f.
 SUSEM. (146)

34 τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν μὴ κωλῦσαι κτλ] This objection might apparently be met, like the last, n. (145), by some sort of defence. It would however be open to reply on behalf of Aristotle that if the relation of Guardians to one another is seriously to be taken as that of parents and children, brothers and sisters, it is unseemly at any rate to make such strong concessions to sensual passion—whatever may have been Aristotle's own opinion on the direction it took in Greece (see on 10 § 9). Besides, the Platonic institutions take precautions against the "marriage" of those who are actually parents and children,—a fact overlooked by Oncken, who (t. 181) attributes to Aristotle an objection which he neither did nor could bring against Plato on that score—but none at all against the "marriage" of actual brothers and sisters: comp. *Rep.* v. 461 E, ἀδελ-
 φοῖς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφάσ δῶτε δὲ νόμος συνοι-
 κεῖν, Susemhi *Plat. Phil.* II. 171. As Aristotle does not take especial exception to this it must be assumed that he did not feel his Greek sentiments excessively outraged, any more than Plato, by incest under this form. It is also significant that he has no word of blame for the deception whereby the rulers in the ideal state are directed to ensure that as many as possible of the ablest guardians of both sexes procreate children, and as few as possible of those who are inferior, *Rep.*

35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἂς πατρὶ πρὸς νίὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν (I) ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔραν § 3 μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην (p. 27) μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λιαν δὲ ἴσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινομένης· ὅτι δὲ μὲν πατήρ ἡ νιός, οὐ δὲ ἀδελφὸς ἀλλήλων, § 4 μηδὲν οἰεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἕοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς γεωγοὺς 41 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινάς εἶναι τὰς γυναικας καὶ τοὺς παιδεῖς b 8ας ἡ τοὺς φύλαξιν· ἔττον γάρ ἔσται φίλα κοινῶν ὅντων τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. ὅλως δὲ 1262 b 24 85 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὡν προστίκει τοὺς ὄρθως κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναικας. φίλιαν τε γάρ οἱόμεθα μέγιστον εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γάρ ἀν ἥκιστα στασιάζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλισθ' ὁ Σω-

35 εἶναι omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 40 ἕοικε...b 3 *νεωτερίζειν* Thurot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 *κοινωνίαν*, Susem. to follow 1262 b 24 *πολιτευομένους*, *Introd.* 79 || δὲ Γ Π Bk., δὴ Susem.; the alteration stands or falls with the transposition

1262 b 4 *συμβαίνειν* P⁴ T^b U^b and Q^b (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 οὕτως omitted by M^a P¹ || 7 τε omitted by M^a P¹, *quidem* William, but nothing can be inferred from this with regard to Γ

v 457 c—461 e. See Zeller's *Plato* p. 455, 477—8; Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II 170. SUSEM. (147)

χρήσις=endearments.

35 δὲ πατρὶ.....ἀπρεπέστατον] But the words *ἀπρεπέστατον*, *κρέαν*, *μόνον* (*ἀπρεπέστατόν* *εστιν*) according to Greek ideas. Such power lay in a 'little word' to extinguish the fiercest passions, *Laws* VIII 838 B.

§ 3 37 δέ ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν] True there is no other reason assigned, but there may well be irony under the terms *ἄμοντα* and *ἀπειροκαλία* (see the quotation n. 146): especially when viewed in connexion with the noble conception of Socrates' moral character and the language of gallantry at the same time put into his lips by Plato. See *Appendix I* to Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus*, esp. pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-

figure and etherialize gross passion was pitched in too exalted a strain of romanticism. Plato himself renounced it afterwards. His matter-of-fact disciple simply ignores it.

§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a later marginal note by the author.

§ 5 1262 b 3 δέλως δέ] Comp. I. 6. 5 n. "Such a law must bring about the very opposite to that which ought to be the result of well-framed laws and to that which was Socrates' own reason (c. 2, § 1) for thinking that the institutions regarding women and children ought to be thus ordered."

This criticism seems unfair. Such private friendships and affections as Aristotle is thinking of do not, according to Plato, promote concord in the state generally, but rather divert men's attention from the whole community into private channels, and by creating private interests tend to selfishness and disunion. So the Spartan love of domesticity is censured; *Rep.* VIII 548 A, B.

ιο κράτης, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φῆσι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, (1) καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἑρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἵσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀριστοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἑρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούντων συμφυῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὅντων [ἀμφοτέρους] ἔνα· § 7 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἔνα, ἐν 17 15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῆ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ νιὸν § 8 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα νιόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺν εἰς πολὺ ὕδωρ μιχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κράτιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄνομά-

13 συμφῦναι P²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμφυῆαι P⁴ (1st hand), συμφυνῆαι P⁴ (corr.) || [ἀμφοτέρους] Congreve || 14 εἰ τὸν ἔνα Conring, εἰ τὸν ἔνα <συμβαίνει> ? Susem., εἰς τὸν ἔνα Tyrrell || 19 καὶ] κατὰ Lambin, καὶ <περὶ> Koraes in his Commentary; καὶ <κατὰ> Bernays and independently, but hesitatingly, Vahlen (Ztschr. f. d. östr. Gymn. XXIII. 1872. p. 539), but Bernays makes ἀναγκαῖον δὲ (omitting the comma before διαφροντίζειν) depend on συμβαίνει, while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly preferable to that proposed for διαφροντίζειν (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly judges, not absolutely necessary: either ἀναίσθητον εἴναι can be supplied with Vahlen, or the acc. τὴν οἰκειότητα κτλ taken as the object of διαφροντίζειν, with Congreve and Susem.¹; then ἀναγκαῖον δὲ is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bender (partly anticipated by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον δὲ || τὴν πρὸς] εἴναι πρὸς Spengel

§ 6 10 φιλίας] Cp. VI[IV], 11. 7: ἡ γάρ κοινωνία φιλικῶν. SUSEM.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἑρωτικοῖς λόγοις] Plato *Symposium* 192 C sq. comp. 191 A. Hug in p. x of his edition of that dialogue considers ἑρωτικοὶ λόγοι to be another title for the *Symposium*; but this could only be allowed if the text read "Plato in the discourses on love" whereas it is "Aristophanes in the discourses on love," and there is nothing to hinder our supposing "contained in Plato's *Symposium*." Moreover Plato's own theory of love in its fulness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is "seeking the other half of ourselves" 205 D; cp. 212 C. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato's Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the *Symposium*. SUSEM. (148)

12 ὡς τῶν ἑρώντων κτλ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of ὅτι or accusative and infinitive.

§ 7 14 ἐνταῦθα κτλ] "In this case either both will be spoiled or at least the one absorbed in the other."

15 ὑδαρῆ] watery, i.e. diluted)(un-mixed, ἄκρατος: Aesch. *Agam.* 770 ὑδαρεῖ σαίνει φιλότητη, *Poetics* 27 § 13, 1462 b 7 ὑδαρῆ μόδον, a tame spun-out plot.

16 ἥκιστα λέγειν=least likely to apply the term 'mine': 3 § 5. Owing to a feeble esprit de corps they would take little pains to assert the relationship. "Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the 'diluted friendship' pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections between individuals he wishes to discourage; the unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out." (Grote III. 220 n.)

§ 8 18 οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα] 'So too is it in the end with the mutual affection implied in these names': συμβαίνει sc. ἀναίσθητον εἴναι,

20 των τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἡκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (I)

τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἡ πατέρα ὡς νιὸν ἡ νιὸν ὡς πατρός, ἡ ὡς

§ 9 ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γάρ ἔστιν ἡ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλέειν, τό τε ἵδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν· ὧν

24 οὐδέτερον οἶν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. <ἔοικε

§ 4 24 41 <δὴ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς γυ-

b 1 <ναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἡ τοῦ φύλαξιν· ἡττον γάρ ἔσται φιλα

2 <κοινῶν δυτῶν τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι

3 <τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν.> ἀλλὰ 18

§ 9 25 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ

20 τούτων δι' ἡ φροντίζειν and [δὲ] Spengel: τούτων <διαφρονθῆναι>, διαφροντίζειν

Camerarius: τούτων <διαφρονθῆναι or διαφθαρῆναι, ὡς> διαφροντίζειν? Schneider:

τούτων δια <ρρέν>, φροντίζειν Madvig: τούτων, <ὡς> διαφροντίζειν Korae in the

text, but the absolute accus. is also possible without ὡς || ἀναγκαῖον δν] ἀναγκάζειν Bender (no comma before διαφροντίζειν) || 21 νιοῦ] νιῶν P², Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. ||

ὡς after 21 ἀδελφοῖς Ridgeway || 25 γενόμενα Susem., γενόμενα II Bekk., γεννώμενα

? Göttling

The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern *οἰκείότητα* by διαφροντίζειν; so that either ἡ πατέρα κτλ. is the subject of διαφροντίζειν, as Congreve and Susemihl think, or as Ridgeway *Transactions* II. 132 proposes ἡ πατέρα κτλ. is to be regarded as exegetic of the wider term *οἰκείότητα*. He translates: 'so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato's least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 πατέρα ὡς νιὸν κτλ.] "that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another." Ridgeway aptly compares VIII(V). 11. 21 ταῦτα ὡς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἰδίων, *Metaph.* M. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see *Critical Notes*.

§ 9 23 τὸ ἀγαπητόν has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique; = μόνον (Eaton, quoting *Odyssey* II. 365 μόνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητός); and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. SUSEM.

See Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 7. 41: καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν (μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἔστι), καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἀλλῶν, where it must have the second meaning, as *unicus* in Catullus 64. 215.

§ 9 24 25 γεωργοῖς] Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato's ideal

state, τὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν πολιτῶν πλῆθος of § 18, all who are neither ἀρχότες nor ἔπικουροι; properly including (§ 9) τεχνῖται and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See 5 § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class excites Aristotle's fears: see 5 §§ 19, 20, 22.

41 χρήσιμον] Comp. VIII(V). 11. 15 (Eaton). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—9 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligences of Aristotle's style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before. Comp. n. (164) on 5 § 14. SUSEM. (149)

1262 b 2 τοιούτους=ἡττον φιλικούς: cp. I. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether disclaim such a policy; see *Rep.* 416-7, 463 B. See n. on 5 § 20, 1264 a 27.

§ 9 25 περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν] In Plato's ideal state, as children of the Guardians grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,

26 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τού· (I)
τῶν εἰς ἑκένους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν, τίνα ἔσται τρόπον·
καὶ γυνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας (p. 28)

§ 10 τίσι τίνας διδόσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον
30 ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, οἷον αἰκίας ἐρωτας φόνους·
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ
μητέρας οὐ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλα-
κας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας,
ώστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας
35 κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἔχόμενον II
δὲ τούτων ἔστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα
τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι

28 <γάρ> γυνώσκειν Bernays, perhaps rightly || 31 προσαγορεύουσιν
Koraes || 32 τοὺς φύλακας before of τε II^o Bk.; omitted by M^oP^o || 33 φύλαξ
III^o, φύλαξ εἰς p^o II^o Ar. Bk.

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See *Republic* III 415 B, IV 423 C. SUSEM. (150)

27 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν] Schlosser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSEM. (151)

There does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, *Rep.* 423 C, *Tim.* 19 A (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἀλλὴν λαθρὰ διαδοτέον πόλιν, ἐπανέκομένων δὲ σκοπούτας δεῖ τοὺς ἄξιους πόλιν ἀνέγειν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπανόψιτων χώραν μεταλλάσσειν), and that other regulation about exposure *Rep.* V 460 C (τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόων, καὶ ἔαν τι τῶν ἐπέρων ἀνάπτηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσι).

28 καὶ γυνώσκειν κτλ] But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSEM. (152)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-

union would follow the recognition of the facts.

29 τίσι τίνας διδόσι] This clause depends on γυνώσκειν.

§ 10 πάλαι = above, §§ 1—3. So in III. 14, 14, τὸν πάλαι λόγων, VIII(V). 11.
24. Obviously Aristotle shuns with horror (as we should) from these crimes against blood relations: but there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, "that serious mischief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation."

34 ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι] "so as to be on their guard," as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.

c. 5 *Objections to community of property*: §§ 1—13. See *Analysis* p. 103.

§ 1 37 τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κτλ] This issue is not decided in what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 5—8 excludes the first and third of these alternatives in their application to all the land, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, IV(VII). 10. 10 n. (834), we perceive that even the second suggestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory, whereas Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato's Callipolis the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and so far they

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν (II)
 § 2 εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν. τοῦτο δὲ ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ⁴¹
 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναικας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω
 1263 a δὲ [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν] πότερον κάν γέ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ'
 ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, πᾶσι τάς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλ-
 τιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις * *, οἷον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς δὲ

39 ἢ μὴ κοινὴ after εἶναι M^o P¹. In Γ' δὲ was perhaps repeated before εἶναι || [πότερον—40 κτῆσιν]? Schmidt and then a colon after νενομοθετημένων

1263 a 1 [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν] Susem. || 2 πάσας Γ' Susem.^{1,2} Freudenthal (perhaps rightly), πασῶν M^o || πᾶσι <τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ> τὰς or πᾶσι <τὰς χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ> τὰς Spengel, * * τὰς Susem.^{1,2} || τε γε Koraes Oncken Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὰς κτήσεις Koraes Oncken || 3 καὶ] ἢ Schlosser Koraes Oncken, κατὰ Bernays || χρήσεις <ἢ μόνας τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις> Freudenthal, χρήσεις <ἢ τὰς κτήσεις μόνον ἢ τὰς χρήσεις> Busse, χρήσεις <ἢ> Heinsius Hampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See *Rep.* III 416 c, IV 419, V 464 c, and comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians:—cp. n. (196) and I. 13. 9 n. (116). Thus, as Oncken I. 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical fiat, while Aristotle B. 1 c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between them that Aristotle believes community of property to be possible apart from community of families: whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term

without settled and independent house-keeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see *Introd.* p. 27. SUSEM. (153)

39 πολιτείαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτεύεσθαι. The phrase recurs VI(IV). 1. 4. We find καθ' ἄς πολιτεύονται, II. 7. 1; the accusative in I. II. 13 ταῦτα πολιτεύονται, and in τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς II. 7. 14, is not quite similar.

§ 2 40 χωρὶς σπέψαιτο ἀπὸ] separately from = independently of. Comp. Plato *Phaedo* 98 c διαφέντες ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπὸ ἀλλήλων, "to separate them." This is the sense of ἀπὸ in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διηργάζεν τοῦ ὅντος as Aristotle puts it. Compare πόρρο ἀφ' ἡμῶν *Problems XVIII.* 10, 917 b 14, and *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8. 1 οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς = the families are separate.

2 κτῆσις) (χρήσις; ownership, fee-simple) (usufruct, income returned.

3 οἷον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. "I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as

καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ⁽¹¹⁾
§ τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἡ τούναρτίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ-
γεῖν κοινῆ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἴδιας χρή-
σεις (λέγονται δέ τινες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν
§ 3 βαρβάρων), ἡ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινούς. ἔτε-²
ρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἀν εἴη τρόπος καὶ
10 ῥάμν, αὐτῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς διαπονούντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις
πλείους ἀν παρέχοι δυσκολίας, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι

8 κοινούς] χωρὶς Hampke

public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill *Pol. Ec.* II. c. 1 calls thorough-going Communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier. γῆπέδα, plots of ground, farmsteads, like οἰκόπεδον, emphasizing the site of the property.

4. ἔντα] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tarentum VII(vi). 5. 10. But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and θῶν, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his *Νόμιμα* or *Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*; cp. IV(vii). 2. 11. That work being lost, the most apposite references are from Diodorus v. 44, of the Vaccaeans, a Celtiberian tribe: v. 9, of the exiled Cnidians and Rhodians who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari): v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Nearchus in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain συστίτια.

7. τίταν] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glaris) and amongst the village communities (deltas) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (*Bell. Gall.* vi. 29). Strabo VIII. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Diod. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the

ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: Maine *Village Communities* p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Laveleye's *Primitive Property*: see pp. 109, 145 ff. (of the English trans. by Marriott). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together: and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household: i.e. something analogous to συστίτια; L. H. Morgan *Anc. Society* pp. 187, 200 ff., 535—538.

§ 3 8. ἀτίτους] a distinct body. αἰτῶν=the citizens themselves; αἰτῶν ἀτροῖς διαπονούντων=when they are ἀντρυποί, Thucyd. I. 126.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the γεωργοί and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Oncken). SUSEM. (154)

10. τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις is nomin., the subject of ἀν παρέχοι and not the object of διαπονούντων.

11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do." This is the standing difficulty of communistic schemes, see Mill *Pol. Econ.* II. 1 § 3.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἵσων ἀλλ' ἀνίσων ἀναγκαῖον (II)
 ἑγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνον-
 τας] πολλά, δὲ λιγα δὲ πονοῦντας τοῖς ἐλάττῳ μὲν λαμβάνουσι,
 § 4 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν-
 θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.
 δηλοῦσι δὲ αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
 πλεῖστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-
 κρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα (p. 29)
 20 προσκρούομεν οἱς πλεῖστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας
 25 τὰς ἑγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας
 τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερεῖας· ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον
 25 ἔχει [καὶ] ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὄρθων, οὐ μι-
 κρὸν ἀν διενέγκαι. ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἔξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν.
 25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἔξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-

12 ἀλλ' ἀνίσων omitted by P²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b Ar. Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand; added in
 the margin) || 13 [ἢ λαμβάνοντας] Congreve, μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας omitted by U^b Ald.
 || 18 διαφέρονται Koraes || προσκρούονται for προσκρούοντες Congreve || 20 χρώμεθα
 P¹ || 22 νῦν after τρόπον ἔχει M^a P¹ || 23 καὶ after ἔχει omitted by Π¹ || ἔθεσι
 Π² Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖν governs τῶν ἀνθρω-
 πικῶν πάντων; "to share in all relations
 of human life, especially such as affect
 property."

17 συναποδήμων] N. Eth. VIII. 9
 §§ 4, 5; συμπορεύονται γάρ ἐτι τοι συνα-
 φέρονται, καὶ ποριζόμενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον.

18 διαφερόμενοι... προσκρούοντες] Par-
 ticipial construction with ellipse of copula,
 as perhaps in I. 5. 9 αἰσθανόμενα.

τῶν ἐν ποσὶ] things near at hand, im-
 mediately before us: Herod. III. 79 :
 ἔκτεινος τῶν μάργων πάντα τινὰ τὸν ἐν ποσὶ¹
 γνόμενον.

προσκρούοντες] Comp. N. Eth. IX. 4
 § 1, τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκρουότες = friends
 who have broken with each other.

20 τὰς δ. τὰς ἑγκυκλίους] for the daily
 round of services. Cp. I. 9. 9 (Eaton),
 also II. 9. 9 n. 291. SUSEM. (155)

§ 5 22 ὄλλας τοιαύτας] Aristotle
 never urges (1) that communism will
 diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2)
 that it will relax the checks on an increase
 of population. The Hellenic idea of the
 omnipotence of the state precluded these
 objections. The conclusion at which he
 arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill
 Pol. Ec. ib. p. 128: "We must compare
 communism at its best with the régime of
 individual property, not as it is, but as it

might be made. The principle of private
 property has never yet had a fair trial in
 any country."

δύνεται νῦν τρόπον κτλ] δύνεται τρόπον νῦν
 ἔχει with the epexegetic ἐπικοσμηθὲν κτλ
 is the subject of διενέγκαι: "the order of
 things at present existing if improved by
 good manners and the enactment of wise
 laws would be far superior": έθεσι, some-
 what wider than morality, see § 15; ways,
 habits, instincts.

"This is in reality not so much proved
 as stated; still it is not laid down simply
 on the strength of § 4. Oncken I. 184 goes
 decidedly too far in saying the attacks on
 community of property lack all precision
 and point, and that the doctrine is not
 refuted on its own merits like the com-
 munity of families. He fails to notice
 what is pointed out by Zeller *Platonic
 Studies* p. 289 that the words of § 6—"all
 will thrive better under a system of private
 property because then each one labours
 assiduously for his own advantage"—
 apply to property exactly the same argu-
 ment which was used with most effect to
 refute on its own grounds community of
 wives and children and was for that reason
 twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n.
 (149)." SUSEM. (156)

σεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἴδιας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινάς, ὅλως (II)
 § 6 δὲ ἴδιας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἑγκλήματα
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς
 ἴδιον ἐκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντες· δι’ ἀρετὴν δὲ ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρῆ-
 30 σθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τοὺς
 τρόπους τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὖτως ὑπογεγραμμένον, τοὺς
 ὡς οὐκ ὁν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλώς οἰκουμέναις
 § 7 τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ’ ἄν. ἴδιαν γὰρ ἔκαστος τὴν κτῆσιν
 ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρῆσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρῆται
 35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται
 τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἴδιοις, ἔτι δὲ ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἄν

28 μᾶλλόν τε? Susem. || 29 ἐκάστου προσεδρεύοντος Π¹ Π² Βκ. (perhaps rightly) ||
 33 γένοιτ? Susem. || 35 ὡς κοινοῖς Susem.^{1,2}, tamquam William || 36 ὡς ἔτιτα? Susem. ὡς εἰς πᾶσαν? Schmidt, ὡς [εἰπεῖν] Giphanius, ὥστε? Koraes || ἀν (?) Γ

26 For ὅλως= in general, almost like ἀπλῶς, comp. III. 9. 4, VIII(v). I § 3, I § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τι as here to πῶς.

§ 6 27 The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction: the article implies 'those grounds of complaint specified above.' Each will set about his own task, e.g. the cultivation of land.

29 οὐ ἀρετὴν κτλ] Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, *in all that relates to use friends go shares in property.*

"Comp. IV(vii). 10. 9 with n. (831). Giphanius observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely introduced here because Plato (*Keph.* IV 424 A) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misconstrues it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted it, the former restores it to its original sense. See Zeller's *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 345 n. 2, Eng. tr." SUSEM. (156 b)

31 ἐνίαις πόλεσιν] See the commandment passed on the Tarentines, VIII(v). 5. 10. SUSEM. (157)

ὑπογεγραμμένον] prescribed, laid down as a rule to follow. Often in Plato. Eaton refers to *Laws* V 734 E, νόμους πόλεις πότισιν ὑπογράφειν, *Protag.* 326 D ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψατο; add *Repib.* 424 A, 449 C.

32 ὡς=implying that.

33 τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ] either is or might become.

§ 7 34 τοῖς δὲ χρῆται κοινοῖς] Here even Aristotle's political theory has a certain dash of socialism; only in

the main he stops short of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go far beyond them. It is also justly observed by Oncken I. 183, that in general wherever, as was the case in Greece, the freemen are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling caste as a whole stands in a certain communistic relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further n. (166). SUSEM. (158)

35 οἷον καὶ ἐν Δακεδαιμονίᾳ κτλ] Xenophon *De Rep. Laced.* 6 §§ 3. 4 relates in the main the same facts, first, as to slaves and helots; and as to horses, with the more precise limitation that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he sees a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully unhurt. As to dogs, he still more definitely restricts this usage to the chase. Those who require the dogs invite their owner to go hunting; while he, if he has not the time, readily sends them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about produce growing in the fields: what he does say is that after a meal in the country people left the remainder of the food they had prepared in store-chambers: others, detained while hunting and in need of food, might, if they had no provisions with them, break the seals of these store-chambers and take what they required, leaving the rest behind and replacing the seal. SUSEM. (159)

§ 8 δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερὸν (II) τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιουν εἶναι μὲν ἴδιας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνωνται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου 40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιον ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον εἰδιφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιον τί. μὴ γάρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἔκαστος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν. § 9 τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φίλειν ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν 5 ἔκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἑταῖροις ἥδιστον· ὁ γίνεται τῆς 8 10 κτήσεως ἴδιας οὐσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ [οὐ] συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν τοιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀνατροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν [τὸ] περὶ τὰς γυναικας

37 ἐφοδίων] *pro viaticis* William || <τοῖς> or <πᾶσι τοῖς> before κατὰ Sauppe, before ἐν Susem., <τοῖς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, *Ztschr. f. d. östr. G. XXV.* 1874. p. 487, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς Oncken, [ἐν] ταῖς ἀγροῖς Bernays, <ταπεῖον> ἐν or <ταπεῖον> ἐν v. Leutsch, ταῖς ἀγραῖς Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραν] θήραν Bücheler, perhaps rightly

1263 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by II¹ || 3 τὸ omitted by Q^b T^b U^b and P² (1st hand; added by corr.³) || 4 καὶ τὸ P¹ Ar., καὶ τὸν ΓΜ^b P²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b U^b, τὸν Ald. || φιλοχρήματον <καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον> ? Koraes, accepted by Bernays || 5 ἔκαστος P³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. and P² (1st hand; emended by corr.³) || 6 ἑτέρους II¹ Susem.¹⁻² || 7 οὐ after δὲ omitted by II¹ || 9 τὸ after μὲν omitted by II¹, τῷ Bernays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc. οἱοι τῷ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. Above δὲ ἀρετὴν.

νομοθέτου ἔργον] Undoubtedly Aristotle hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296). Herein he agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or underestimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). SUSEM. (160)

40 ἐτί δὲ κτλ] "Again, even to the pleasure we feel, the difference that it makes to call a thing our own is unspeakably great." An expression like οὐράνιον ὅσον, θαυμάσιον δοσον, nimium quantum.

41 μὴ γάρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ or μήποτε with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended: ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. "It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose."

§ 9 1263 b 2 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. Nic. Eth. IX. 8. 1, 1168 a 28,

Rhet. I. II. 26, 1371 b 18; also *Plato Lazarus* V 731 D (Eaton). Congreve quotes *Nic. Eth.* IX. 4. 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους... οὐκεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀληθυθέναι. SUSEM. (161)

3 καθάπερ κτλ] "just as the love of money means to love it more than is right"; Pl. *Rep.* I 347. B τὸ φιλάργυρον εἶναι διείδος λέγεται (Veltori). Comp. also *Nic. Eth.* IV. 4. 4, φέρομεν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπανωτέρα μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

§ 10 7 συμβάναι] of awkward consequences involved in a theory: συμβάνει dicunt ubi factis ex aliqua hypothesi conclusionibus ipsa hypothesis refutatur (Bonitz).

8 ἀναρροῦσιν ἔργα] "destroy the functions."

9 σωφροσύνης] Even Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii p. 697, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato's commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence

10 (ἔργον γάρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὐσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο-^(II)
σύνην), ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ [τὸ] περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γάρ ἔσται
φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὁν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδε-
μίαν· ἐν τῇ γάρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθε-
ρίας πιστήτος ἔργον ἔστιν). εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύ-⁸
15 τη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἀν εἶναι δόξειν·
ο γάρ ἀκροάμενος ἀσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσε-
σθαι φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν πᾶσι πρὸς ἄπαντας, ἀλ-
λῶς τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοι-
20 νὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ φευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων
§ 12 κολακεῖας. ἀν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ⁹

11 ἐλευθερίατη P¹, ἐλευθερίατα M⁹ || τὸ after δὲ omitted by II¹, τῷ Bernays
|| 13 τῇ after γάρ W^b Ald. Bk. and perhaps Q^b || 15 ἀν after εἶναι δόξειν M⁹ P¹ ||
17 τινὰ (τινὶ M⁹) before φιλίαν M⁹ P¹

in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic 'community of wives' being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true; but then neither is this the point of Aristotle's objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato's state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, *σωφροσύνη*. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual's moral freedom. Further, see n. (206 b). SUSEM. (162)

10 [ἔργον καλὸν] Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a 'moral action' (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done *τοῦ καλοῦ ἔργα*), with that peculiar implication of 'nobleness' which runs through the *Nic. Ethics*.

12 πρᾶξις ἐλευθέριος] for which private property, e.g. money, is required. Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 8. 4 τῷ μὲν ἐλευθερῷ δεῖσθαι χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράγμα τὰ ἐλευθέρια; ib. § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίνι δὲ δύσοντις; ἀποτορ δὲ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμοι μά η τοιούτον.

13 ἐν τῇ γάρ χρήσει... 14 [ἔργον ἄστι] for the use of one's possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero's *usus virtutis*, *Acad. post.* I. 38 is analogous to *ἔργον* in this sense.

§ 11 17 φιλίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν] Comp. Dante *Purgatorio* xv. 55—57, che per quanto si dice più lì nostro, | tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno, | e più di caritate arde in quel chiostro; 73—75, e quanta gente più lassù s'intende, | più v' è da bene amare, e più vi s'ama, | e come specchio, l' uno all' altro rende.

ἀλλῶς τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις] Here he evidently has in mind Plato's expressions, *Republ.* IV 425 C: τί δέ, τὰ ἀγοραῖα ξυμβολαίων τε πέρι κατ' ἀγορὰν ἔκαστοι ἀ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ξυμβόλους οὐκ οἰχύσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἕδω ἐκπῆσθαι πλήρη τὸ σώμα; Although not precisely the same evils are enumerated there and here, nor expressly derived from the institution of private property, yet in fact Aristotle's words quite accord with the view of the *Republ.* Comp. §§ 20, 21 with nn. (174, 175). SUSEM. (183)

Add *Rep.* 465 C: τὰ γε μὴ συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν δκων καὶ λέγεων ὡν ἀπτλαγ-
μένοι ἀν εἰν, κολακεῖας τε πλουσίων [τενη-
τες] ἀπορας τε καὶ ἀλγηδόνας δσας ἐν...
χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀναγκαῖαν
τοχοντι, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἔξαρού-
μενοι. Eaton quotes Aristoph. *Eccles.* 657 sq.

§ 12 22 ἀν οὐδὲν γίνεται] This is begging the question, though it may fairly be surmised that communism would not cure all these evils.

διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι- (II)
νωνοῦντας πολλῷ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὄρῳμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς
25 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-
νωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-
§ 13 μένους ἴδιᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν
ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων
ἀγαθῶν· φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.

30 αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν
§ 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὄρθην. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῶς μίαν
καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντη. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς
οὐκ ἔσται προϊοῦσα πόλις, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἔσται μέν, ἐγγὺς δὲ οὖσα
τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κανεὶς εἰ τις τὴν
35 συμφωνίαν ποιήσειν δύοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.

25 τὸδε] τῶν P⁴Q⁴U^b Ald. || 32 πάντας p¹ II² Bk. || έσται M^a and P¹ (1st hand) || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow έσται μὲν || 34 έσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem^{1,2}, crit William

23 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κτλ] "Since we see just those people who are joint owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have their estates separate." Are these the *συναπόδημοι* of § 4? Or is the reference to commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κτλ] The cases of quarrels seen to arise out of partnerships are few, it is true; but then we compare them with the large number of those who have separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀδύνατος] Compare Grote III. pp. 217—222. "This supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance. Plato's project contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated: the reasons offered to prove it impossible are principally founded upon the very sentiment adverted to. The truly forcible objection is the sentiment itself." Plato impugns it and declares it to be inapplicable to his guardians: amongst whom as he conceives, a totally different sentiment of obligation would grow up. Similarly "if Sparta had never been actually established and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable."

30 παρακρούσεως] "fallacy" as in *De Soph. El.* 17 § 3, 175 b 1, Demosth. c. *Timocr.* § 194, 760 27 φενακισμοῦ καὶ παρακρούσεως ἔνεκα.

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ] the incorrectness of his first principle: see 2 § 2. Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who from Aristotle's own admissions v(viii). I. 4, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως μόριον γὰρ ἔκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and I. 4, 5 τὸ τε μόριον οὐ μόνον ἀλλου ἔστι μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλον, argues that "the broad principle is common to him with Plato," though "each has his own way of applying it."

General Objections to the scheme of Plato's Republic: §§ 14—28.

§ 14 Here too it would have been as well to state that these remarks are nothing new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although as new points arise out of them (see *Analysis* p. 104) there is much greater justification than there was in the case of c. 3 §§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8: cp. n. (149). SUSEM. (164)

33 προϊοῦσα] advancing (to a certain degree of unity), "if its unity be carried far"; explained by γνωμένη μία μᾶλλον in 2 § 2.

34 ὥσπερ κανεὶς κτλ] "as if one were to turn the concord of parts into unison, or the rhythm into a single step." See *Probl. XIX.* 38 § 3, 921 a 2, συμφωνία κράσις έστι λόγοις ἔχοντων ἔνταξιν πρὸς ἀληθείαν.

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices singing one part with the instruments playing another: cp. *Probl. XIX.* 39,

(II)

§ 15 ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὅν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παι-¹⁰
 δεῖν κοινὴν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν
 εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου-
 δαίαν, ἄποπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
 40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
 1264 a νομοθέτης ἐκοινωσεν.
 § 16 προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς
 οὐκ ἀν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἰχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν
 εἴρηται μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρώνται

39 <δεῖν> διορθοῦν Spengel || 40 ἔθεσιν p¹1264 a 1 ἐκοινωσε P²⁻³⁻⁴ and P¹ (corr.), ἐκοινώησε M^a and P¹ (1st hand) || μὴ
 P¹ || Bk. 9 omits αὐτὸν || 2 θεσιν Ατ., θεσιν Bernays (hardly right)

Chappell *History of Music* pp. 11 f., 16. Whereas in δύοφωνα one or more sets of voices or instruments give the same notes. Similarly βαθμός, ἡ τῆς κυρτήσεως τάξις (Pl. *Laws* II 665 A), is the orderly succession of steps in dancing or notes of music of certain definite lengths. The unit or element of which long successions of 'times' are composed is βάσις, 'step' in dancing, 'foot' in metre. This is clear from *Metaph.* XIV (N) 1. 10, 1087 b 33, τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅτι μέρον σημαίνει, φανερὸν. καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἔστι τι ἔπειρον ὑποκείμενον, οἷον ἡ ἀρμονία δέσις (in music a quarter-tone, the smallest interval), ἐν δὲ μεγάλεσι δάκτυλος ἡ ποδὸς ἡ τι τοιούτος, ἐν δὲ βαθμῷς βάσις ἡ συλλαβὴ. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of βάσεις, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat.

§ 15 36 πρότερον] §§ 5—8. SUSEM.
 (165)

37 κοινὴν ποιεῖν] widen it so that all shall share in it.

τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδεῖαν κτλ.] Comp. 7 § 8 n. (338), and below §§ 18, 19. SUSEM. (165 b)

39 τοῖς τοιούτοις=such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 θεσιν, φιλοσοφίᾳ, νόμοις] Comp. φύσις, ίθος, λόγος of IV(VII). 13. II n. (887). SUSEM. (166)

φιλοσοφίᾳ] in the wider sense, 'culture' as in 7 § 12. So *Rhet.* II. 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Alkidamas. An approximation to Isocrates' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις] Aristotle's fond-

ness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7, n. (158)—is here seen in a new direction, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 §§ 7, 8, IV(VII). 10 §§ 9, 10 and *notes*. Compare further *notes* 168, 192, 208—11, 234, 236 b. SUSEM. (166)

§ 16 1264 a 3 οὐκ ἀν θλαθεν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the doctrines he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or wide-spread beliefs. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Grote rejoins that the same objection (like the objection of impossibility) would apply to the novelties in his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a communistic state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4 οὐ συνήκται] have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοῖς δ' οὐ χρένται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (8 § 21 n.), has always existed and always will exist Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for innumerable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less

§ 17 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ' ἀν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔρ- 11
6 γοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γάρ
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πό-
λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς.
ώστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβῆσται νενομοθετημένον πλήν μὴ γεωρ-
10 γεῦν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
§ 18 χειροῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς
ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὕτ' εἰρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥάδιον

7 αὐτῶν Ald., αὐτὴν Thom., αὐτὸς Böcker, αὐ Bernays, ἄττα Jackson, αὐτικά Welldon || 8 φατρίας M^a P^{2,3} Q^b T^b Ald. Susem.^{2,3}, φατρίας P¹ || 9 οὐδὲν after δῆλο M^a P¹ || 10 καὶ νῦν] τοινυν Triber

extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II ii 792. Comp. Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* vol. ciii. 1871. p. 135 ff.: IV(vii). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (828). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle's advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Socrates. Comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 483 f. SUSEM. (167)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Hermann *The historical elements of Plato's ideal of a state*, in *Gesam. Abhandl.* VII. 140; "Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece: he has but applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination." It is at least obvious that the Spartan ἀγωρῆ is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote III. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 417 conjectures that the system of relationship propounded in *Rep.* v 461 D, *Zim.* 18 c, D was derived from "traditions not known to us": and Curtius (*History of Greece* I p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society *Rep.* IV were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):—two features of the scheme which bear in

a high degree the stamp of originality.

§ 17 5 τοῖς ἐργούσι] "actually in process of formation." The plural is used as well as the singular ἐργῷ with or without the article, in prose or poetry.

8 εἰς συσσίτια] See n. (166). That Plato too intended this, was shown in n. (153) on § 1. From the expression here and in § 15 we might be led to believe that this was not the case. Comp. § 19 n. (170), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184): 6 § 3 n. (187), § 5 n. (195). SUSEM. (168)

φατρίας] The form φατρία (as in Aeschines II § 147), not φατρία, is supported by the *Corpus Inscr. Att.* II. No. 599, l. 1 with Köhler's remark; Philippi *Contributions to a history of the Athenian citizenship* (*Beiträge u. s. w.* Berlin 1870) p. 177 nn., 35, 56; Büermann *Three Studies in Attic Law* in *Jahrb. f. Phil. Suppl.* IX, p. 615. At the same time φφ is often written in the cursive MSS. with a small hook to φ, so that φ and φφ can hardly be distinguished with certainty from one another. In such a case therefore it may be advisable to depart from the one safe principle of following the oldest manuscript authority and to retain the only rational form φφ even against the codices. Comp. 3 § 6 n. (141). SUSEM. (169)

10 καὶ νῦν] Here again, as so often in these chapters and elsewhere, νῦν does not mean 'at the present time' but 'actually', and ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν is but a limiting expression for ποιῶσιν.

§ 18 11 δ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας κτλ.] "has never explained what is the nature of the entire polity which (these) members of the community share. Yet the bulk of the state is made up in effect by the bulk of citizens other than the guardians." For οἱ δῆλοι πολίται, see § 20, and n. on 4 § 4.

εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ- (II)
 λων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὃν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότε-
 15 ρον καὶ τοὺς γεωργοῦς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἡ [καὶ]
 καθ' ἔκαστον ἴδιας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναικας καὶ παιδας ἴδιους
 § 19 ἡ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γάρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν- 12
 των, τι διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἡ τι πλεῖστη
 τοὺς τύπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἡ τι παθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι
 20 τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐὰν μή τι σοφίζωνται τοιοῦτον οἷον Κρῆτες;
 ἐκείνοι γάρ τάλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀφη-
 § 20 ρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κτῆσιν. εἰ δέ, κα-

15 καὶ after ἡ untranslated by William and Ar. || 16 καὶ after δὲ omitted by
 II¹ || 19 ἀρχοντι or something similar, in the place of ὑπομένοντι, Lambin
 and Thurot: Bernays omits 18 ἡ τι πλεῖστη....ἀρχὴν with Ar. and transposes
 αὐτῶν to follow 20 ἀρχὴν || μαθήντες P¹ II² Bekk. Bernays, but ταῦθηνtes P⁴ (corr.)
 || ὑπομενοῦσι Ar., ὑπομένουσι Γ II || 21 ταῦτα Γ, πάντα Ar. (?), Koraes || ἀφέντες
 Q^b T^b U^b and P⁴ (1st hand) || ἀπειρήκασι P^{2,3} Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. and apparently
 P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§ 19 17 *εἰ μὲν γάρ κτλ]* Aristotle might well have spared himself the consideration of this possibility. It is strange that he has not learnt from Plato whether this third order of citizens is to have community of families and of property; whether, in other words, just those characteristics which, like their education, are distinctive of the two upper classes in the ideal state, are to be extended to the third, or not. It is not easy to imagine a stronger case of inability to transport oneself to an opponent's sphere of thought. In fact he cannot be acquitted of very culpable carelessness in the use of the work he is criticizing. As regards community of property at any rate, Plato has most expressly said *Rep.* III 417 A, IV 419 that nothing of the kind is to exist amongst citizens of the third class, leaving room for no doubt whatever as to his real opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent. For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better reason, raised an objection which is only intelligible if these institutions are *not* supposed existing in the third class of citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (179); also n. (168) and the references there given. SUSEM. (170)

18 *ἡ τι πλεῖστη γεωργῶν γυναικες*] See *Critical Notes*. The sense we require is not, "what compensation will those receive who submit to their rule?" (which is repeated in the next sentence), but "what

advantage will the rulers have over their subjects?" The older commentators endeavoured to extract this by taking τοῖς ὑπομένοντις τὴν ἀρχὴν = τοῖς ὑπομένοντις ἀρχεῖν, "those who undertake to govern." But this is against the sense of ὑπομένοντι in the next clause: "or what inducement will (the rest of the citizens) have to submit to them?"

20 *σοφίζωνται* = devise or contrive (Eaton).

οἷον Κρῆτες] See on 9 § 3 n. (281) and Exc. III. This statement is confirmed by the *skolion* of the Cretan poet Hybrias there quoted. See also IV (vii). 10. 1 n. (820). SUSEM. (171)

21 *τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες*] "while allowing their serfs the same rights with themselves in other things, have deprived them" ... (ἀπειρήκασι would be 'have prohibited'). As we now know, *οἰκέτες* was the proper term for these serfs, but they are called *δοῦλοι passim* in the inscription of Gortyn.

"The arguments in §§ 20—24 (*εἰ δέ, καθάπερ...γεωργῶν γυναικες*) are in the main quite correct, but apply just as much to Aristotle's ideal state as to Plato's (Oncken). Yet see n. (177)." SUSEM. (172)

Comp. Grote III. pp. 213—215, who lays stress on the spiritual pride, and contempt for the *δῆμος*, certain to be nurtured in the breasts of the guardians.

θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἑκείνοις ἔσται τὰ (II)
τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-
λει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας
ἄλληλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἰον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ
§ 21 γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή- 13
ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαια, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-
ζοκράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
οἰον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
§ 22 τοιούτων, ἀποδιδούς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ
κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἀποφορὰν φέρουν- (p. 32)

24 Congreve brackets μᾶ

§ 20 23 ἑκείνοις=τοῖς ἄλλοις πολί-
ταις, the citizens of the third class. τὰ
τοιαῦτα] family life and separate pos-
sessions.

24 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας?] What will be the means of uniting them? How will they associate as fellow-citizens with the two upper classes, who have such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ κτλ] This is the very re-
proach which Plato levels at the existing
polities: ἔκστη αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πά-
πολλαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλεις... δύο μὲν γὰρ κάν
διοιν ἥ πολεμαί ἄλληλαις, ἥ μὲν πενήτων,
ἥ δὲ πλοντιών. *Rer.* IV 422 E; and VIII
551 D (*Eaton*). SUSEM. (173)

26 οἰον φρουρούς] *Rer.* III 415 D, E;
IV 419 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶν, φαῖ ἀν., ωστε ἐπι-
κουροι μισθωτοί ἐν τῷ πόλει φαίνονται κα-
θηθαν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἥ φρουροῦντες.
SUSEM. (174)

27 πολίτας is predicate: "his ci-
zens are the farmers and the artizans, &c." As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger
and more generous conception of the
purpose of political institutions than any
we find elsewhere in Greece, even in
Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the
people as not members of the common-
wealth. IV(VII). 9. 3. Plato not only
treats them as integral parts of the state,
but in a sense makes them the ultimate
object of his solicitude. It is for them
that he sacrifices the private pleasure of
the guardians, and compels his philo-
sophic rulers to descend into the cave.
Both rulers and guardians are truly public
servants, whose duty it is to protect and
benefit their fellows, *Rer.* 463 B.

§ 21 29 φησὶ] *Rer.* V 464 D: τί δέ;
δίκαια τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἄλλη-
λους οὐκ οἰχήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν; Cp. n.

(163). SUSEM. (175)

καὶ τούτοις] just as much to the citi-
zens of Callipolis (*ib.* διθερ δὴ ἵπτάρχει τού-
τοις ἀπασιδόστοις οὖσι); for by I. 27 the
farmers, artizans &c. who make up the
third class, are citizens.

λέγει ὁ Σωκρ.] *Rer.* IV 425 C, D: ἥ
καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ ἀπτα ἥ
ἀστυνομικά ἥ ἀλιμενικά ἥ δοσα ἄλλα
τοιαῦτα, τούτων τοιμήσομεν τι νομοθετεῖν;
ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄτοιν. Cp. n. (163). SUSEM. (176)

31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ.] Comp.
IV(VII). 12. 7 n. (865). SUSEM. (176 b)
"Laws concerning city-police and
market-police." Dionysius says of the
Roman aediles (VI. 90) σχεδόν ἑοκαστ
πις κατὰ τὰ πλείστα τοῖς παρ' Ἑλλησιν
ἀγορανόμοις.

32 Take μόνον with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This
objection proceeds from an acute apprehension that in outward aspect the ideal
state would not greatly differ from an
ordinary Greek city, in spite of its stand-
ing army, half Amazons, and its govern-
ment of experienced military officers
distinguished as savants, who (like the
Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in
India) are at another stage of develop-
ment, and belong intellectually and mor-
ally to a wholly different world from
the mass of the population.

§ 22 33 κυρίους ... φέροντας] How
precisely the connexion is to be under-
stood was explained in n. (153) on § 1.
Practically the result is much as Aristotle
represents it, and this is certainly man-
aged differently in his own pattern state.
SUSEM. (177) Pl. *Rer.* V 464 C:
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῆς λαμβάνοντας,
μισθὼν τῆς φυλακῆς, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναδί-
σκειν, IV 416 D, E: τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια, δοσι
δέονται ἀνδρεῖς ἀδηγταὶ πολέμου σώφρονές

τας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεπούς καὶ φρονη- (II)
 35 μάτων πλήρεις ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίσις εἰλωτέας τε καὶ πενεστείας
 § 23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γάρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὅμοίως εἴτε¹⁴
 μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἔχομένων, τίς ἡ
 τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δὲ οὔτε
 39 εὑρεῖν ῥάφδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρόν, τὸ ποίους τινάς εἶναι
 § 24 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σφέσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κουιωνίαν. ἀλλὰ
 1264 b μήν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις
 ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες
 αὐτῶν; κανὸν εἴ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναι-
 κες *. ἀπόπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πα- 15
 5 ραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς
 § 25 ἄνδράσιν, οἵς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀεὶ γάρ ποιεῖ τοὺς

35 πενεστείας P^{2,3}T^b || 36 [καὶ δουλείας] or καὶ <τοιάντας> δουλείας Susem.,
 καὶ περιοικας Schneider, μνιας or <κοινὰς> δουλείας Schmidt || 37 διώρισται
 <καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν> καὶ ? Susem. || 39 ποίους τινας P^{2,3,4} Q^b Bk. || εἶναι <δεῖ>
 Scaliger <δεῖ> εἶναι Spengel

1264 b 3 κἀν..γυναῖκες. These words in II¹ come before 2 ὥσπερ (p¹ corrected
 this in the margin): Sylburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Koraes transpose
 them to precede 2 τίς οἰκονομήσει, Koraes reading 1 εἰ τε for εἰ γε. Thurot first
 discovered the lacuna

τε καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ταξαμένους παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων
 πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς το-
 σούτοις δύον μῆτρε περιεῖναι αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν
 ἐνιαυτὸν μῆτρε οὐδένι.

ἀποφόρδαν] a rent in kind.

34 χαλεπούς κτλ.] troublesome and
 full of arrogance.

35 τὰς παρ' ἐνίσις...πενεστείας] See
 9 § 2 n. (280). SUSEM. (178)

36 δουλείας] Ridgeway *Transactions*
 p. 132 thinks the word means "the serf populations of states like Argos and Crete,
 called Γυμνήσιοι at Argos, and Ἀφαριται
 in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the
 word is used of the Helots, ἦν δὲ ἡ δου-
 λεία ἐπαναπτήται. So also by Plato, *Laws*
 776 D of the Mariandyne.

§ 23 εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα κτλ.] We are re-
 called to § 18; the question, περὶ ὧν
 οὐδὲν διώρισται, is the tenure of property
 amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether
 it is equally necessary here" < as in the
 case of the Guardians, to have com-
 munitism > "or not, has certainly not
 been determined, as matters stand." ταῦτα
 =κοινά πάντα of line 17 above.

37 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἔχομένων] "Nor
 about the following points: what consti-

tution and education and code of laws
 are in force in the case of the citizens
 at large."

40 sc. διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ σφέσθαι.
 The construction as in 1260 b 16 n.

§ 24 ἀλλὰ μήν κτλ.] But supposing
 he intends to leave their property in in-
 dividual ownership, and yet to introduce
 community of wives, where are the wo-
 men to be found to superintend house-
 hold matters as the men manage the
 work in the fields?

"What was said in n. (170) applies
 again to this argument in the mutilated
 state of the text." SUSEM. (179)

1264 b 4 ἐκ τῶν θηρίων] Rēp. v
 451 D. SUSEM. (180)

πουεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, δτι] should
 show by a comparison from the lower
 animals that.... In *Rhet.* II. 20 § 2, § 5
 παραβολή=simile.

§ 25 7 ἀεὶ γάρ κτλ.] In the Plato-
 nic state the government is not actually
 in the hands of the same individuals in
 perpetuity. None except members of the
 highest order, the philosophers, are eligi-
 ble as rulers, but they enter the ruling
 body by rotation. SUSEM. (181)

αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἵτιον γίνεται καὶ παρὰ (II)
τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἥπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ-
§ 26 μοειδέστι καὶ πολεμικοῦς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ
11 ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις
ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυ-
σός, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φῆστι δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γνομέ-
νοις μίξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ’ ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον
§ 27 τοῖς τεχνήταις μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 16
16 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, δλην φῆστι δεῖν
εὑδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ

9 ἡ πουθεν δὴ P^b⁶ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. and P^a (corr.²), ἡ πουθεν δὴ P^a (1st hand), ἡ πουθεν δὴ P⁴, ἡ πουθεν δὴ P¹, εἰπουθεν δὴ ΓΜ^a, ἡ πού γε δὴ Vettori Bk.¹, ἡ πού δῆθεν? Götting, ἡ δῆπονθεν γε Spengel || 13 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || εὐθὺς ΙΙ² Bk. & P¹ (1st hand)

9 ἀξίωμα=dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, ἀξιώσις, and that of others, ἀξίωμα.

10 θυμοειδέστο...ἀνδράσι] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians in the narrower and inexact sense (φύλακες=δηλικούροι) from whom the first class (ἄρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (διαλεκτικῇ). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher commands, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper: see Rep. VII 536 D ff., comp. n. (970) on IV(vii). 17. 15 and Zeller's *Plato* p. 480 n. (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on III. 1 § 10 n. (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), IV(vii). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and Exc. I to B. v(viii). As Eaton remarks, θυμοειδέστ = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (Rep. II 375 B, 376 C) for his caste of warriors: comp. III. 16 § 1 n. (641), IV(vii). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). SUSEM. (182)

§ 26 ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκ. κτλ] "Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it

does not recognize the promotion of ἐπικουροι to be φύλακες." JACKSON.

13 φῆστι δὲ] Rep. III 415 A. SUSEM. (183)

εὐθὺς γν.] directly they are born, at the moment of birth: εὐθὺς of time is not good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the *Republic*: the objection of Adelmannus at the opening of B. iv that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419 —421 C.

15 ἔτι 82...17 νομοθέτην] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 B, οὐ μὴ τρόπος τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκιζομεν, δτος ἐν τι ἡμίν έθνος ξοται διαφερόντως εβδαιμον, ἀλλ’ δτος δτι μάλιστα δην ἡ πόλις: but Aristotle has not attended to another passage v 465 D—466 B, where this thread is taken up (μέμνησαι οὖν δτι ἐν τοῖς πρόσθετοις οὐκ οἶδεν δτοι λόγοις ἡμῖν ἐπέτηξεν, δτι τοῖς φύλακας οὐκ εὑδαιμονας ποιοῦμεν) and to the later discussion IX 680—692 B, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato's ultimate decision is the very opposite: that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians can attain to perfect happiness (465 D ξένουσι τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, δτι οἱ Ολυμπιονίκαι ξώσι, μακαριώτερον). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179): and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). Moreover in IV(vii). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εβδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος

εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἡ [μὴ] πάντων μερῶν ἡ (II) τινῶν ἔχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὀντεπ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖσθαι, τίνες ἔτεροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἵ γε τεχνῆται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων.

6 ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἣς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν, ταύτας III τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑτέρας σχε- (p. 33) δὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ὕστερον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν 30 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, <καὶ 40 <περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων> καὶ § 2 31 τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαιρεῖται δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ

18 μὴ πάντων ἡ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Bojesen // *et* μὴ Vettori, but then *et* μὴ πάντων should be transposed to come after 19 τινῶν // [μὴ] πάντων Lindau Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 698 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Busse transposes the second μὴ to precede τινῶν // ἡ τινῶν omitted by Bojesen // 20 ὥστερ M^o P¹ (1st hand—emended by p¹), and P² (corr.¹), ὥστερ the remaining authorities including Γ, rendered *quorum et* by William // 26 τὰ is omitted by Π² Bk. // 30 καὶ is inserted after τέκνων by Π³ // After κτήσεως Susem. inserts the clause καὶ περὶ...φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 1; *Introd.* p. 79 f. // the last καὶ κατὰ? Schmidt, accepting the transposition // 31 δέ] γὰρ Π² Ar. Bk.

τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, δλλ' *els* πάντας τοὺς πολίτας: where see note. SUSEM. (184)

18 ἡ τινῶν κτλ] “or unless at least certain definite parts,” viz. the most important, “attain happiness.” SUSEM. (185)

19 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] “For happiness is not a thing of the same sort with evenness, which may be an attribute of the sum (of two numbers) where it is not an attribute of either of the numbers themselves.” The sum of two odd numbers, 3 + 5, is even.

c. 6 Comparison of the Republic and the Laws: §§ 1—5. Examination of the polity proposed in the Laws: §§ 6—22.

See *Analysis* p. 104, *Introd.* p. 33 with notes; Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 203—207, and pp. 1—144 generally; Oncken I. 194—209; Van der Rest pp. 181—344.

§ 1 27 ἐνταῦθα] In the *Laws*. Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to

be genuine. According to Diog. Laer. III. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus after Plato's death.

28 περὶ ὀλίγων κτλ] “has precisely determined very few things.” In this comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws* Aristotle's tendency to look for definite results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially prominent. He is in no way concerned to exhaust the differences between the two polities: indeed the whole discussion started with the dogmatic inquiry, ‘what are the limits of community in civil life?’ I § 2. But one cannot help seeing that the deepest ground of this difference, the altered philosophical standpoint and the change in the conception of the state, has escaped him; had he clearly recognised this, he would not have expressed himself as he has in § 5 (Zeller). See however § 4 (T. L. Heath).

31 τῇ τάξιν] Understand διώρικε, though the change of construction is unusual.

32 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (III) προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, 35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἡ μετέχουσι τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἡ μῆ, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναικας οἴεται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε

39 λόγοις after πεπλήρωκε Susem.¹⁴² following William's translation: it is omitted by M^o P¹ Bender

§ 2 32 For the repetition of *els* compare IV(VII). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word *Rep.* IV 423 A.

τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 182 SUSEM. (186). Supply ἑστι. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of *these latter*." He quite correctly takes the *δρόχοτες* to be a committee chosen out of the *ἐπίκουροι*: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coopted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the *λογιστικὸν* and the other two parts which make up τὸ *ἄλογον*; but in the state the wide distinction is between *δρόχοτες* and *ἐπίκουροι* together, i.e. *φύλακες* in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται on the other.

§ 3 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κτλ] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: *ā fortiori* it prohibits the artisan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller *Plato* p. 470 f. SUSEM. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διώρικεν] Yet see *Rep.* V 468 A.

ἄλλα τὰς μὲν κτλ] Consult the note following. SUSEM. (188)

38 συμπολεμεῖν] *Rep.* V 451 E, 457 A, 466 E, 471 D.

39 τοῖς ξεσθεν κτλ] But in the *Repub.* Plato treats of the community of children and wives V 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 535 A, X 595 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 E—376 E, III 412 C—IV 445 E, V 466 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B (comp. II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 541 B), of the women's share in the duties of the guardians V 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul X 608 C—621 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the *Republic*? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? SUSEM. (189)

"In answering the question What is

40 τὸν λόγον· καὶ περὶ τῆς ποιητείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι (III)
^{1265 a} § 4 τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι 2
 τυγχάνουσιν ὅντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν. καὶ
 ταύτην βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μι-

40 τὸν λόγον untranslated by William, Ar., [τὸν λόγον] Susem.^{1,2}; but Γ is uncertain and it is better to follow Π², as I now think, or else with M^a P¹ to omit λόγοις

the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? it is convenient to distinguish the subject of the *conversation* from the subject or subjects of the *work*. Thus in the case of the *Republic*, though the thesis *ὡς ἀμείνον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικία* is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the *καλλίπολις*, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis *ὡς ἀμείνον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικία* which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in consequence of its originality, both for the reader and for Plato himself (*περὶ πολιτείας ηγε τὸ κεφάλαιον Τιμaeus 17 c*), a special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way irrelevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is no more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce." JACKSON.

§ 4 1265 a 1 τῶν δε νόμων κτλ] This is quite incorrect: in the *Laws* about equal parts are taken up with constitutional theory and with legislation, and the constitution in the narrower sense is treated much more fully than in the *Republic* (Suckow *Form der plat. Schriften* 132 f.). Aristotle (n. 466 on III. 3. 9) agrees with Plato in including under the constitution, in the wider sense, the regulation of education. From his point of view therefore the whole of the *Laws* from the middle of B. v to the end of B. viii with a large part of B. xi may be said to be *περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*, while books ix, x, xi and the rest of B. xii are a code of laws, *νόμοι*. SUSEM. (190)

Oncken (I. 194—199) appeals to this passage in support of his view that the first four books of the *Laws*, and part of the fifth, are a later spurious introduction (*τὸ προόμιον τῶν νόμων*, 734 E) with which Aristotle was wholly unacquainted.

2 καὶ ταύτην βουλ. κτλ] "and while endeavouring to make it more universally applicable to the existing states he gradu-

ally works it round to the other polity once more." *κοινοτέραν*=common to many states, an average polity. Cp. § 16 and VI(IV). 2. 4.

"When he wrote the *Republic* Plato looked upon the pattern constitution there described as by no means impracticable. He declares that its immediate introduction might be secured without difficulty under a definite condition, which though not indeed easy, nor of frequent occurrence, was yet by no means impossible: v 471 c f., 473 c, vi 497 A f., 499 B — 502 c. In the *Republic* moreover he knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the first and the existing constitutions. But in the *Laws* he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the *Republic* (though he still holds it to be the best) is an impracticable ideal: v 739 A f., VII 807 B, IX 853 c, cp. 874 E f.; III 691 c f., 692 B f., IV 713 c f. For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitutions, not without expressing the apprehension that if the attempt were made to call this into life much in it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual result would be only a pattern state of the third order: 739 A—E, 745 E ff., cp. VII 805 B. Here too the possibility of thus realizing it, though only to a limited extent, is made dependent on a condition, very similar though not entirely the same as the condition which is indispensable for the realization of the state planned in the *Republic*; namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (*τύραννος*) with an inclination for philosophy, young, of good disposition and as yet uncorrupted, in conjunction with a philosophic lawgiver: IV 709 E ff., V 735 D. Cp. Zeller *Plat. Stud.* 16 ff., Plato (Eng. tr.) p. 483, 512 f., 531, 538 f., 546; Suckow, op. c. 133; Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 619, German trans. of the *Laws* 976 ff. Aristotle seems to have rightly apprehended this relation between the two: at all

§ 5 κρόνον περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἔτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ (III)
5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα
ταῦτὰ ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ
παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-

1265 a 4 eis] πρὸς II^o Bk. || 6 δίδωσιν P⁴ U^b Ald.

events he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken *op. c. I.* 101, that the state of the *Laws* is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the *Laws* to frame something intermediate to that of the *Republic* and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the *Republic* so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained.” SUSEM. (191)

§ 5 4 ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ.] But supposing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle's ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the *Republic* as does that of the *Laws*? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 n. (238); 9 § 2 (279), § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (365); 11 § 10 (393); IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), *Introd.* p. 22 n. (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the *Laws*: see on IV(VII). 17 § 1 n. (950), § 15 (970); V(VIII). 4 §§ 7—9, *nn.* True, Plato's divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 n. (213), 7 § 4 n. (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the *Laws*, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable

indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV[VII]. 10 §§ 9—11, see also *nn.* on II. 5 § 1, 6 § 15); and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 *nn.* He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (*Introd.* 34, 56, IV(VII). 16 § 15 f. *nn.*); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the *Republic* (see on II. 3 §§ 5, 6 n. 140), had in the *Laws* abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a milder way: *n.* (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle's ideal state stands even nearer than that of the *Laws* to the state depicted in the *Republic*, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV[VII]. 16 §§ 1—10, *nn.* 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato's, and ethically regarded a modern view (*Exc. I. to B. II p. 327*), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself. SUSEM. (192)

7 παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the *Republic* is the rule of the philosophers; see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II i 761 f. (Eng. tr. *Plato* 466, 467 ff.); and in the *Laws* this is dropped. Aristotle overlooks this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state: in the scheme of the *Laws*, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves: *Laws* V 741 B ff.; VII 806 D ff.; VIII 842 C f., 846 D, 850 D; XI 915 B ff., 919 D ff., 921 C; XII 952 D ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that

χομένους ξῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὀσαύτως πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ (III) φησὶ δὲν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων 10 τῶν ὄπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων.

§ 6 τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους 9 λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ [τὸ] ξητητικόν, κα- λώς δὲ πάντα ἵσως χαλεπόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος

9 καὶ before γυναικῶν omitted by Γ (?) and by P¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹) || 12 τὸ before ξητητικόν omitted by M¹ P¹

is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics: *Law* VII. However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the *Republic* is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called 'nocturnal assembly.' It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office; while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by cooptation, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavours thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See *Law* I 632 c, XII 951 D ff., 961 A ff. Cp. n. (970) on IV(VII), 17 § 15. SUSEM. (193)

καὶ τὸ τῶν ἤργων κτλ] *Law* V 741 E, VII 806 D—807 D, VIII 842 D, 846 D, XI 519 D ff. SUSEM. (194)

ἀναγκαῖον=necessary for support, cp. III. 5. 3; IV(VII). 10. 7 where the antithesis is to τὰ εἰς εὐδημοσίην καὶ περιοιλα.

8 καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὀσαύτως] Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, § § 17 n. (168), § 24 n. (179), that even in the ideal state of the *Republic* Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. SUSEM. (195)

πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ κτλ] As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the *Republic*, as was stated in n. (153) on 5 § 1; but in the changed sphere of the state in the *Law* he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to

maintain it in the later scheme: VI 780 D ff., VII 806 E, cp. VIII 842 B, 847 E. Further compare I. 13 § 9 n. (116), II. 7 § 1 n. (231 b). SUSEM. (196)

9 χιλίων] *Repub.* IV 423 A, where however this number is given as only the minimum, ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη καὶ ἐὰν μάρον ὡς χιλίων τῶν προπολεμοῦντων. SUSEM. (197) Yet Grote (*Plato* III. p. 206 n. b) observes that the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence that this was intended by Plato. Comp. *Politicus* 292 E for the possible number of the rulers.

10 πεντακισχιλίων] More precisely 5040; *Law* V 737 E, 740 C f., 745 B ff. etc. SUSEM. (198)

§ 6 II τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ] "Now all the discourses of Socrates display genius acuteness originality research." περιττόν, out of the common, extraordinary: cp. *Metaph.* I. 2. 13: κομψός, ingenious, subtle, as VI(IV). 4. II κομψῶν τούτῳ οὐχ ικανός δὲ ἐργάται. Both better taken of the thought than with some editors of the style. (Thus Götting *Commentariolum de Ar. Pol.* II. 3 gives for κομψόν 'compta pulchritudo,' grace or finish.)

τοῦ Σωκράτους] Aristotle then erroneously takes the Athenian stranger in the *Law* to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The *έρως* should rather be considered as personifying enlightened Athens. See Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 667 ff., Trans. of the *Law* p. 998 f. SUSEM. (199) Yet all the same this stranger, 739 C—E, apparently assumes responsibility for the proposals of "Socrates" in the *Republic*.

12 καλῶς δὲ πάντα] sc. έχει, for everything to be right: "but to be right on all points may well be a hard task." χα- λεπά τὰ καλά. Bernays however renders χαλεπόν=too much to ask.

13 τὸ νῦν ἐρ. πλῆθος] The construction changes; he begins as if δεήσεται were to follow.

δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας (III)
 15 ἡ τινος ἀλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἡς ἀργοὶ πεντακι-
 σχλίοι θρέψονται, καὶ παρὰ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπόν-
 § 7 των ἔπερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι (p. 34)
 κατ' εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ τὸν 4
 νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε
 20 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ-
 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ξῆν

14 δεήσει τοῖς τοιούτοις after 15 ἀπεράντου Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γ p¹,
 περὶ Μ⁹ Π² Bk. and P¹ (1st hand) || τούτοις Welldon || 18 μηδὲν] μὴ Μ⁹ Π¹, omitted
 by Q^b || 19 τε τὴν by P¹, τε τὴν by M⁹ || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before
 εἰ by Π¹ and in the margin of P⁴, adopted by Susem.^{1,2}: a doubtful case, the words
 would then bear the sense of μάλιστα μέν. Schmidt inserts them after προσθεῖναι (μὲν
 answered by δὲ 28)

14 Βαβυλωνίας] Cp. III. 3. 5 n. (462).
 SUSEM. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλῆθος] unlimited in size.

16 ης κτλ] But how does this calculation agree with that made about Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare nn. (306), (311). Even granting that the present is the more correct statement, how much smaller must we imagine the number of citizens to be in Aristotle's own ideal state according to the data given IV(VII). 4 §§ 5—14? (Schlosser). Suppose these data reduce the number by one half, one half the same objection would still apply to Aristotle. On the other hand it is interesting to observe how near his penetrating intellect comes to a discovery of the fact, that the idleness which belonged as a right to a privileged minority of freeborn landholders was really the fundamental evil of the Hellenic state. Confined however to the circle of opinions current in his own age and nation, the philosopher turns back when on the very threshold of the truth: and follows Plato in adopting this fundamental evil as an inalienable primary good for his own model state. SUSEM. (201)

§ 7 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν... μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme on the most favourable supposition, yet not so as to be impracticable." Cp. *Laws* V 742 E: τὰ δέ μὴ δυνατὰ οὖν ἀνισθαίται βούλησθαι, sc. διακοσμῶν.

ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχήν] A reference to the expression used by Plato *Laws* IV 709 D εἴκασθαι δύνατο...καὶ νομοθέτης, *Repub.* VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ήμᾶς

εὐχάς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπά μέν, δινατὰ δέ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ ἀλλαγὴ εἰρηγναι; cp. VI 502 A—C δρόστα μὲν εἶναι ἀ λέγομεν, εἰ γένεσθαι, χαλεπά δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. On his part however Aristotle also appropriates the expression: see the references in n. (128) on I § 1, esp. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι κακάπερ εὐχομένοις, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον IV(VII). 4 § 2 n. (750). SUSEM. (202)

18 λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ κτλ] This is not expressly to be found anywhere in the *Laws*, but Aristotle had a perfect right to infer it from IV 704—709 and V 747 D. SUSEM. (203)

20 Εἰ δὲ καλῶς κτλ] But this even Plato himself has by no means overlooked; see *Laws* V 737 C θύκος δὴ πλῆθος ικανὸς οὐν ἀλλως δρόσις γίγνοιτ ἀν λεχθεῖς ή πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν πλησιοχώρων πόλεις (Schlosser). Aristotle brings the same objection against Phaleas, 7 § 14 ff. (Eaton). Compare n. (210) on 6 § 13. SUSEM. (204)

Cp. IV(VII). 2. 18 τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστιν ἰδεῖν, ἐdu τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποιά πρὸς ποιῶν δακητῶν.

21 εἰ δεῖ κτλ] See *Jahrb. f. Phil.* XCIII. 1866. p. 329. The sense is clear from the parenthesis: 'if the state is to be independent and secure against aggression.' Editors who retained the ms. πολιτικῶν extorted much the same sense out of it, explaining it to mean simply a "national" life, the life of a πόλις; or a "social" life, a life of activity, πράκτικη. Thus Victorius: a moribus aliarum civitatum non penitus abhorre quae fines etiam imperii proserne conantur. Shilleto

βίον πολεμικόν (οὐ γάρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοι- (III)
ούτοις χρήσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἢ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν
§ 8 οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω τόπους)· εἰ δέ
25 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν
κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἡττον δεῖ φοβερούς εἶναι τοῖς
πολεμίοις, μὴ μόνον ἀλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀπ[ελθ]οῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλήθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὄραν δεῖ, μὴ ποτε⁵
βέλτιον ἑτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον. τοσαύτην γάρ
30 εἶναι φησι δὲν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ τις εἰπεν
§ 9 ὥστε ζῆν εὐ (τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἐστι σω-
φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν)· ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ

22 πολεμικόν Muret, πολιτικὸν ΓΠ Ar. Bk, διπλιτικόν Montecatino, <ἡγεμονικόν
καὶ μὴ μόνον> πολιτικόν Thurot || πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωστικόν Γ, πολιτικὸν μὴ μονωτι-
κόν P¹, πολιτικὸν μὴ μονώτερον M², πολιτικὸν μὴ μονοτικόν P⁴ (in the margin):—all
glosses || 23 ὅπλοις] ὄπλοις Oncken, νομίμως? Susem. || 25 <καὶ> μὴ Schmidt ||
28 ἀποῦσιν Bender || 30 εἰ is omitted by Π¹. Were this right εἰπεν would have to
be altered, with Bas.³, to εἰπειεν || 31 ἐπειδὴ Susem. ἔτι δ' ΓΠ Ar. Bk. Susem.¹⁻²

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. *Protag.* 322 Η πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἡ μέρος πολεμική,
absolutely political and having therefore
as one ingredient πολεμική." The expression
recurs IV(vii). 2 § 3, §§ 5, 6 (a probably
spurious chapter) and 6 § 7, where
see *Critical notes*.

23 ἀ χρήσιμα κτλ] Cp. vii(vi). c. 7
§§ 1—3 (Eratom.). SUSEM. (205)

§ 8 24 εἰ δέ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον κτλ]
"But if any one refuse to approve of a
life such as this" i.e. warlike "for the
state at large any more than for the individual."
Whether war is the end of the state
is a question debated IV(vii). 14
§ 13 f., 15 §§ 1—6. Plato in the *Laws*
1 628 C, VII 803, VIII 839 A, holds that it
is not.

28 τὸ πλήθος really belongs to the
dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it
might not be better to define otherwise,
by a clearer definition, the amount of
property which one man may hold." It is
characteristic of the writer to require
analysis and precise definition, τὸ σαφές,
τὸ διωρισμένον.

29 τοσαύτην γάρ εἶναι φησι] *Laws*
V 737 D Τῆς μὲν εὐσῆη πόσους σώφρονας
ὅντας Ικανὴ τρέψειν πλεῖστος δ' οὐδὲν προσ-
δεῖ. With what follows compare 7 § 7 n.
(237 b). SUSEM. (206)

31 καθόλου μᾶλλον] "For this (term)
is too vague (cp. μὲν μᾶλλον, 2 § 2) since
men may live frugally and at the same
time wretchedly"; literally, in hardships

and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and IV(vii). 5 § 1,
and σωφροσύνη III. 4 § 16 can only
mean 'parsimoniously', 'parsimony'. But
in II. 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12 n. (242),
1. 13 § 2 f., § 6 (112), IV(vii). 1 § 4 (691),
3 § 3, 15 §§ 2—4, 16 § 8 the meaning is
temperance or self-restraint in reference
to eating and drinking and the appetite of
sex: and it is from this side that the virtue
is depicted in *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 10, 11 (1117
b 23 ff.). There however Aristotle himself
explains how extravagance leads to pro-
fligacy and to excesses in this direction,
and that *ἀστορ*, properly a spendthrift,
comes to mean a profligate; *ib.* IV. § 3,
1119 b 30, § 35, 1121 b 17. In *Nic. Eth.* IV.
3 § 4, 1123 b 5, 4 § 4, 1125 b 13 σώφρων
has yet another meaning: viz. modest.
Lastly, Van der Rest observes that the
next objection brought against Plato
affects only a certain inexactitude of ex-
pression and not the thought, which is no
other than that followed by Aristotle, of
a right mean between excessive wealth
and excessive poverty: see esp. *Laws* V
741 E: *Χρηματισμὸς γάρ οὐδὲ ἐνεστιν ἐν τῷ*
τοσαύτῃ κατασκευῇ: and next note. SUSEM.
(206 b)

32 ὅρος] A better definition would be,
to live frugally and liberally. "Comp.
IV(vii). 5. 1 n. Εἰενθερίως ἀμα καὶ σω-
φρόνως; II. 7. 7 n. τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέων;
VI(iv). 11. 4 τῶν εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτήσις ἡ
μέση βελτίστῃ πάστων." SUSEM. (207)

σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἔκατέρῳ τῷ μὲν τὸ (III) τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ' 35 εἰσὶν [ἔξεις] ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὗται, οἷον οὐσίᾳ πράως [μὲν] ἡ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι § 10 περὶ αὐτὴν ταῦτα. ἀτοπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ επεὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖ- 40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀδριστὸν ως ἴκανῶς ἀν ὄμαλισθησομένην εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων, 1265 b § 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ ὄμοιως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὄποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα- 5 ράζυγας μηδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τε ἐλάττους ὥστι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε

33 ἔκατέρῳ Koraes, ἔκατερον Γ ΙΙ Ατ. Bk. || τῷ] τὸ Π² Ατ. Bk. || τῷ] τῷ Π²
Ar. Bk. and M^a (1st hand) || 34 τῷ] τῷ Π² Ar. Bk. || τῷ] τῷ Π² Q^b Ar. Ald. Bk.
|| ἐπιπόνως] *laboriose vivere* William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence *ξῆν* Susem.¹⁻² erroneously || 35 [ἔξεις] Susem. || ἀρεταὶ] *alpera* written by an un-
known hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori
and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneider as a gloss
upon ἔξεις || χρῆσιν] *ξῖν* Π¹. Apparently William translated from the following
order: αὐταὶ αἱ ἔξεις εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν ἔξιν τῆς οὐσίας, Ατ. from the following:
αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶν ἔξεις περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by Γ Π² Bk.
|| 37 ἔξεις Susem.³, χρῆσις Γ ΙΙ Ατ. Bk., αἱρέσις Madvig: Bernays conjectures περὶ⁴
τὰς κτήσεις ἀνάγκαιον αὐτὰς εἶναι ταύτας, not happily || εἶναι after 38 αὐτὴν Π² Bk.
|| 40 ἀρμαλισθησομένην Madvig for ἀν ὄμαλισθησομένην

1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bender who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οὖν τε for δεῖ
δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ || 4 περάζυγας Γ Μ^a and Π¹ (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after
p¹ had emended it to παράζυγας

33 χωρὶς] if the two be separated.

34 τὸ ἐπιπόνως (*ξῆν*).

35 ἀρεταὶ...αὐταὶ] These are the only virtues that have to do with the use of property. *οἷον* = I mean.

§ 10 38 ισάζοντα] *Laws* v 740 B—
741 A. SUSEM. (207 b)

"Tis strange that while equalizing their properties he should not regulate the numbers of his citizens."

39 δλλ' ἀφεῖναι κτλ] This too is very inexactly expressed. All that Plato in the *Laws* intends, indeed all that he is able to effect, is to keep the number of citizens unalterably the same: i.e. exactly 5040 elder men, as many younger men, with twice that number of women. All beyond that number must, as he expressly prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the normal family: only when there is childlessness or death does it become necessary that there should be other children in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and to be adopted by the childless (Schlosser). As it stands at present, the polemic does not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the means proposed by Plato to avoid an excess of the prescribed number to be impracticable or impossible to realize he should have proved his point, as he easily might have done. SUSEM. (208)

§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ ὄμοιως ἀκριβῶς= ἀκριβεστέρον: "whereas that requires to be fixed with a great deal more nicely in the supposed case than at present." Cp. 7 § 18 οὐκ *ἴσων π.*

+ παράζυγας] the cadets; like παρῆ-

(III)

§ 12 πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἀν ώρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας, τὴν τεκνοποίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἀν (p. 35) συμβαίνη τελευτῶν τινας τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν § 13 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δὲ ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς 11 ἄλλαις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις, ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἰκους ἵσους φήσῃ δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, 15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρώτον ἀνίσους είχον τοὺς κλήρους πάντες κατὰ μέσην τούτων πῶς ἀν οἰδηθε βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέον θστερον. § 14 γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τούναντίον ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς ἀν οἰδηθε βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέον θστερον· ἐλλέλειπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας

11 ἄλλαις Γ M^a, πλείσταις P¹ P² Ar. Bk. (πλ over an erasure P³) || 12 [Φείδων... 17 θστερον] Schmidt || 14 καὶ] κατὰ Bernays || 15 τοὺς κλήρους before ἀνίσους P² Bk., before είχον M^a P¹ || πάντας Bk.² || 17 ἀν after βέλτιον P² Bk.

οροὶ ἶπποι, supernumeraries outside the traces, the elder brother being the yoke-horse, ἕνγιος ἶππος.

§ 12 6 Take μᾶλλον with τῆς οὐσίας.

7 ὡστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς] Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Exc. II to B. II. SUSEM. (209)

Grote III. 228—231: Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognise the common element in the positive and prudential checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, *Laws* V 740 C—E, cp. Grote III. p. 229 n. (g). Perhaps what Aristotle deprecates is the 'laisser faire', ἀφεῖσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δέ ἀφεῖσθαι κτλ] Aristotle (?) repeats this 7 § 5. SUSEM. (209 b)

12 ἡ δὲ πενία κτλ] See *Laws* V 744 D; also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy *Rep.* VIII 555 D—557 A.

Φείδων ὁ Κορίνθιος] Nothing is known of any such ancient lawgiver of Corinth. He is supposed to be different from the better known Pheidon of Argos, about whom see VIII(v). 10. 6. Yet he is called

a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar *Olymp.* XIII. 20; τοῦτο δέ φησιν, ἐπειδὴ Φείδων τις ἀνὴρ Κορίνθιος εὑρε μέτρα καὶ στάδια. This is one of the serious difficulties in this chapter mentioned *Introd.* p. 33 n. 4, 14 (4). There is always the heroic remedy; see *Critical Notes* and M. Schmidt in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882. p. 822.

16 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] A decidedly unfounded assertion, as was explained in the note on § 10. Aristotle (?) repeats this objection against Phaleas, 7 § 5: comp. n. (204) on § 7. SUSEM. (210)

§ 14 17 θστερον] IV (VII). 10 § 11 f. and esp. 16 § 15 I. n. (946). From the latter passage it is seen of what means he is thinking. To prevent any increase in the fixed number of the citizens Aristotle sanctions the procuring of abortion. Cp. *Introd.* p. 56 and n. (192) on § 5. SUSEM. (211)

18 Ὄλλακται κτλ] *Laws* V 734 E: the warp is necessarily stronger and firmer than the woof, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγράψι πόλεσιν ἀρκοντας δεῖ διακρίνεσθαι τινὰ τρόπου ταῦτη καὶ τοὺς συμκράτης παιδεῖα βασανισθέντας ἐκάστοτε κατὰ λόγον. As a matter of fact this objection of Aristotle's is altogether unfair. In the *Laws* Plato has done exactly that which Aristotle here requires: he has prescribed for all the citizens of his model state the same course of training, on the ground of which he expects them to discover for themselves which among them

τας πώς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ (III) 20 δεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κρόκης, § 15 οὗτῳ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἔχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν πάσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πενταπλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός; καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαιρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ' οὐ 25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἔκαστω ἔνειμε

19 ὅπως ΙΙ² Bk. || 20 δεῖν] δή Koraes; Conring would omit δεῖν here or in 21. Bergk, while defending δεῖν, suggested <οὐ> δεῖν <ἄλλο η> *Fünf. Abhand.* p. 65 n. 2 (Leipz. 1883) || 21 δεῖ ΙΙ¹ || [ἐπει...26 οἰκεῖ] Schmidt, perhaps rightly, cp. nn. (213) (214) (215) || 25 συμφέρει Μ^ο Π¹ L^ο Ald. and P²⁻³ (1st hand), συμφέρη Γ Π⁴ Q^ο T^ο U^ο Bk. and P² (corr.¹) and a later hand in P³

are better fitted for the warp and which for the woof, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. SUSEM. (212)

It is the professed object of the *Epinomis* to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle's silence respecting it: Zeller *Plato* p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

20 στημόνιον...κρόκης] Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 107 took these terms in the *Laws* to refer to the appointment of magistracies and of the laws for them. But in Pl. *Politicus* 283 B, 309 B, the brave and energetic natures are the warp and the gentler and weaker natures the woof.

21 δεῖν] Taking up the preceding δεῖν of line 20.

§ 15 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes.

22 μέχρι πενταπλασίας] Here and 7 § 4 Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato's meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount

of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in *Laws* v 744 E (cf. vi 775 E ff.) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The recurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSEM. (213)

23 Σα. τι τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κτλ.] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state: see IV (VII), 10 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (214)

25 δύο γάρ οἰκόπεδα] One home-stead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: *Laws* v 745 E, vi 775 E ff., cp. VIII 848. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar IV (VII). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. IV (VII), he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt's suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSEM. (215)

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two *οἰκήσεις* *Laws* 745 E, or, as Aristotle puts it, *οἰκόπεδα*, *οἰκίας*: Aristotle recommends two *κλῆροι*, not two *οἰκήσεις* or regular establishments" (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-

(III)

§ 16 διελῶν χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις ὁ
ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε δλιγαρχία,
μέση δὲ τούτων, ἥν καλοῦσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλι-
τευόντων ἔστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευά-
ζο ζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἀλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἵσως.
εἰ δὲ ὡς ἀριστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλῶς.
τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακωνῶν τις ἀν ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἡ κάν
§ 17 ἀλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔνοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ 10

27 βούλεται after μὲν M⁴ P¹ || 29 [εἰ μὲν... 1266 a 6 δημοκρατικό] Schmidt, prob-
ably rightly, cp. n. (223) || 30 πολιτείαν II³ Bk. and P²⁻³ (1st hand) γρ. πολι-
τειῶν P² (corr.¹ in the margin), in P³ πολιτειῶν was written over it by a later hand,
but again erased || 32 τις after ἀν Π² Bk.

sion κλῆροι. Even supposing that, in contradistinction to him, Aristotle really intended to provide only one of the two estates with a dwelling-house, how can he have believed that to farm two estates in separate localities would thus be made easier than if they had dwellings upon them? Is it not clear that the opposite will hold good? Nay more, what idea are we to form of two such detached properties, one near the town and one in the country, unless there are farm-buildings and a house upon the latter? If this be so, the above supposition is *a priori* impossible. Even Plato does not arrange that the country house shall be a regular establishment in the sense of being *always* inhabited, but the son who inherits succeeds to it as soon as he is grown up and married, and so sets up the second establishment there (*Law* VI 775 E f.). In Aristotle's best state such an appropriation of the second dwelling-house is certainly excluded, because there, when the heir marries, he succeeds his superannuated father as citizen and consequently as proprietor of both the family properties (see note and *Excursus* on IV[VII]. 16 § 10, 1335 a 32—35); but that is the sole point in which Aristotle diverges from Plato in this matter. To what purpose he would destine this second house can only be conjectured: it may be to lodge the superannuated father, perhaps with the lands belonging to it as a sort of retiring pension. In any case the inconsistency, as Aristotle's text has come down to us, is unquestionable. SUSEM.

26 διελῶν χωρίς=distinct, separate homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις] The entire arrangement of the constitution tends neither to

oligarchy nor to democracy but to something intermediate known as Polity. Plato's citizens are the heavy-armed men: *Law* VI 753 B, πάντες μὲν κοινωνοῦσι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἵρεσις, ἀπόστοτερ ἀν ὅπλα ἵππικα ἢ πεζικά τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκο-
μητικῶσιν. This is the criterion of a 'Polity'.

28 πολιτείαν] Compare III. 7 § 4 with the notes and references there given. SUSEM. (216)

29 ὡς κοινοτάτην κτλ] "as the most universally adapted for cities at large" VI (IV). c. 11 with n. (1282) on § 1. SUSEM. (217)

31 πρώτον=highest, normal. So διπρώτος συλλογισμός. Comp. I. 2. 5.

32 Plato's arrangement *Rep.* B. VIII implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν] i.e. a constitution which, like the Spartan, has the character of an Aristocracy to a greater extent than Polity. The term may be thus explained: true Aristocracy coincides with Aristotle's best constitution; but in a transferred and secondary sense this name is earned by such constitutions as combine aristocratical with oligarchical and democratical elements, like Carthage, or only with democratical elements, like Sparta; this is stated VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, cp. VI(IV). 9 § 6 ff., 2 § 1 n. (1133), 8 4 n. (1141), 10 § 1, 11 § 2. Further consult *Excursus* I. on Bk. III and the notes to III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601), § 24 (614); 14 § 15 (633), 17 § 3 (677), § 5 (678); VI(IV). 2 § 2 (1136—7). Of course such mixed constitutional forms are nearer to the true Aristocracy than is Polity, which is a blending of Oligarchy and Democracy: VI(IV). cc. 8, 9. See on this the notes to

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμι- (III)
 35 γυμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἴναι
 γάρ αὐτὴν οὐ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-
 κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
 δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἑφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
 40 ἑφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἑφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα- (p. 36)
 τεῖσθαι δὲ κατά τε τὰ συστήτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν
1266 a καθ' ἡμέραν· § 18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δέον συγ- 11

34 πολιτειῶν] πολιτῶν ΓΤ^b || 35 τὴν omitted by ΓΜ^a || τῶν omitted by Ρ¹
 || 39 τῶν omitted by Μ^aΡ¹, [τῶν] Σusem.^{1,2} || 40 ἑφόρων Π³ and Ρ³ (1st hand,
 emended by a later hand)

III. 7 § 4 (536, 538); VI(IV). 2 § 4 (1141),
 7 § 4 (1237). SUSEM. (218)
 § 17 33 ἔνοι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Cp. IV(VII). 14 § 16 n. (911), VI(IV). 1 § 6 n.
 (1123). Thus we learn that two schools of political theorists, to one of which Ephorus perhaps belonged¹, dissented from the writer's opinion and agreed in regarding monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy as elements of the Spartan constitution; while the second school (40 οἱ δὲ) added tyranny as a fourth element. It is strange that in this passage Aristotle (?) takes up no definite position in relation to the two views and does not oppose to them his own. Presumably he judged it sufficient, in order not to enter on a longer digression, to have denominated this constitution a mixed aristocracy. From the explanations which he has devoted specially to it we learn that he looked upon the council of Elders as the aristocratical, the Ephors as the democratic element in it, 9 §§ 19–28, but at the same time also as in a certain sense related to *τυραννίς*: see on 9 § 20. He finds another democratic element, though such in intention only, in the common messes, 9 § 32. He regards the Spartan kingship as far too limited to give the constitution any particular colouring: III. 14 §§ 3, 4; 15 §§ 1, 2; 16 § 1. It is still more strange then that Aristotle (?) only mentions here the views of those other theorists on this subject, passing over in total silence that expressed by Plato himself in the *Laws* IV 712 C ff. (cp. 111 692 A f., 693 E), a view which stands much nearer to his own, representing the Spartan constitution as

¹ See on this *Introd.* p. 35 n. 3 and Susemihl's critical edition p. LXII.

mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to *τυραννίς*, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, *Laws* XII 962 E, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice: οἱ δὲ σοφάται, ὡς οἰνται, πόθε ταῦτα τε (liberty and dominion over others) καὶ τὰ τυαῖτα ξύμπαντα [βλέποντες νομοθετοῦνται], εἰς ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράσειν, εἰς δὲ τὰλλα αὐτοῖς δεῖ βλέπειν; presumably his predecessors were to some extent the same who are here noticed. Compare further *Excursus I* to Bk. III. SUSEM. (219)

Isocrates Lacedaemonios μάλιστα δημοκρατούμενος τυγχάνειν dicit *Areopag.* § 61 (Spengel).

§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] *Laws* III 693 D f. εἰσὶ πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τωές...καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορέειν μοναρχῶν ὄρθρον, τὴν δὲ αὐτὸν δημοκρατῶν: Persia is the extreme case of the one, Athens of the other: δεῖ δη οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τοῖτον: 701 E; VI 756 Β μέσον δὲ ἔχοι μοναρχῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ηὗ δεῖ μεσεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν: cp. IV 712 D f. However what Plato really says in these passages is somewhat different, viz. that a good constitution must hold the mean between democracy and monarchy. Moreover he expressly guards against being supposed to derive anything in his mixed form of the state from *τυραννίς*, IV 712 C: τίνα δὴ ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχουμεν ἐν τῷ τῷ πόλει προστάττειν;...οἷον δημοκρατίαν τινὰ δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν ή ἀριστοκρατίαν ή βασιλικήν. οὐ γάρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγους ἀν: and in the *Republic* he has already himself

κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννί- (III)
δος, ἂς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἄν τις θελη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας
ἢ πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μηγύνοντες[·] ἡ γὰρ ἐκ

1266 a 3 *χειρίστους* P² and P³ (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || *πᾶσιν Γ* ||
 4 [ἢ...5 βελτίων] Riese, see Comm.

pronounced democracy and *τυπαρίς* to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls *Oligarchy* and *τυπαρίς* the two worst forms of government, see on VI(iv). 11 § 21 n. (1305): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the *Laws* it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with *τυπαρίς*: III 691 D—701 E, IV 710 E, 712 c ff.: kingship or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the *Laws*, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and *τυπαρίς*. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if it were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the *Laws* a combination of oligarchical with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constituents of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (*πολιτεία*): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 5 (193), § 14 (212), § 21 (229); Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 624—631, Translation of the *Laws* p. 980; also Zeller *Plato* p. 535 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this state of the *Laws* without a certain monarchical head; for in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (*Studien* 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing

that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remark (*op. c. I.* 209): "taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us." The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the *Laws*, the 36, or (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 *νομοφύλακες*, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them*; in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a *τυπαρίς*, though there were five of them: and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the *πολιτεία*, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. SUSEM. (220)

* βέλτιον οὖν κτλ.] That is, in the particular case here given (cp. n. 223) they are more in the right: they either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one com-

* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a decided mistake, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.

5 πλειόνων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων]. ἔπειτα οὐδὲ ἔχουσα (III) φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρατικά· μᾶλλον δὲ ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
 § 19 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτῶν κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορωτοῖ τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δὲ ἀφεῖσθαι, τοῦτο δὲ ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι

pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made: for *any* three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than *these* two. SUSEM. (221)

ἢ γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ.] 'This statement made thus universally is not in keeping with the philosopher's thought. He does not blame Plato for not combining elements enough, but because he would construct a polity out of the two corrupt elements' (Riese). On Aristotle's own principles a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, must be better than one of oligarchy, democracy, and *τυραννίς*. As was shown in the last note, the preceding sentence, rightly understood, is a simple deduction from what has been laid down above, and needs no additional reason, least of all one which erroneously extends it beyond the limits of this right interpretation and lays it down as universally true. The chapter contains difficulties enough, but this is beyond the limits of all that we dare attribute to Aristotle himself: surely this illogical generalization is interpolated. We shall however be obliged to go some way further than this, I think. For even one who, like myself, either rejects or mistrusts Schmidt's other hypotheses in this chapter will nevertheless be unable to deny that the entire passages §§ 16–18, 1265 b 29 *et* μὲν...1266 a 6 δημοκρατικά, and § 22, 1266 a 22 ὡς...25 σκέψις, do most violently interrupt the connexion and leave the impression that they are non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is strengthened by the strange statements noticed in *nn.* (219, 220). SUSEM. (222)

5 ἔχουσα sc. ἢ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις πολιτεία μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν. See *n.* (220).

7 ἐγκλίνειν =to betray a tendency towards, as in VIII(v). 7. 7.

§ 19 8 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτῶν] "For selection by lot from a body elected previously by vote belongs

to both" i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy]. This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (*ἀγοραρόμοι* and *δότνομοι*), and of the superintendents of the games (*ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται*): *Laws* VI 756 B–E, 763 D f., 765 B–D. SUSEM. (223)

See R. Darest *Le système électoral des Lois de Platon* in *Annuaire de l'association pour l'enc. des études grecques*. XVII. 1883, pp. 65–74.

9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ.] *Laws* VI 764 A: *Iτω δὲ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ξύλογον ὃ βούλομενος, ἐπάναγκες δὲ τοῖς τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμαῖς ἵμιον μένω, ἐὰν μὴ παρὸν ἐξετάζεται τοῖς ξύλογοις, τρίτῳ δὲ τιμήματι καὶ τετάρτῳ μὴ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ δῆμος ἀφεῖσθαι.* SUSEM. (224)

10 φέρειν is *suffragium ferre*, to vote: with acc., to vote for certain candidates for office.

καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (*ἀγωνίας ἀθλοθέται*) *Laws* VI 765 C, and of the council VI 756 B–E: but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20. SUSEM. (225)

11 τοὺς δὲ ἀφεῖσθαι] Not however at the election of *ἀγοραρόμοι* and *δότνομοι*, *Laws* 764 A: *χειροτονεῖται δὲ πᾶς πάντας δὲ μὴ θέλων, ἐὰν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἵμιον μένω*. SUSEM. (226)

τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cp. τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται, 2 § 6.

12 καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι πλείους κτλ.] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (*νομοφύλακες*) no such regulation is found: *Laws* VI 753 B, 766 A f.: nor for the supreme board of control (*εὐθυνοι*) XII 945 E ff.: nor again for the military officers (*στρατηγοι*, *πτεραρχοι*, *φιλαρχοι*, *ταξιαρχοι*) 755 B ff. And as

13 τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημά- (III)
§ 20 των. διλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἱροῦν- 12

regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a *majority* of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a *minority*, namely the *doruvēmos*, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (*ἀθλοθέται*) must be elected from the third or the second class. SUSEM. (227)

13 τὰς μεγίστας sc. ἀρχάς. τίμημα is a property qualification, *census*. See *Laws* 744 B—E.

§ 20 14 τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν] Thus described in *Laws* 756 B—E: 'The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (πρώτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἀπαντας φέρειν οὐδάγκησι, η̄ ζημιαδισθαι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τὴν δοξάνην ἥμιλα). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (τὴν δ' ὅπερα λέπτα φέρειν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταῦτα καθάπερ τῇ πρόσθετῃ); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (τρίτη δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρειν μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, ἐπάναγκες δὲ εἶναι τοὺς τῶν τριῶν τιμημάτων); but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (τετάρτη δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ συκροτάτου τιμημάτων ἀπαντας); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.' The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced

first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by sortition, to 90 from each class. The passage continues: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny: these are to form the council for the year' (Dr Jowett's translation).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only their half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided there are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, *Plato* III. 363 n. 9. (β) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day. (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (360 + 360 + 270 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election: there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνεχθῶσι, τούτους μὲν κατασημήνασθαι... πέμπτη δὲ ἡμέρᾳ τὰ κατασημανέντα δύοματα ἐκενεγκεῖ μὲν τοὺς ἀρχοντας λεῖψι πάσι τοῖς πολλαῖς). The voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (ἐκλέξαντας) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

αἱροῦνται μὲν κτλ] For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second: and next from the third, save that it is not compulsory on all (to vote),

15 ταὶ μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης [ἀλλ'] ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμή- (III)
 ματος, εἴτα πάλιν ἵσως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,
 πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ'> ἡ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμη-
 μάτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς
 § 21 πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων ἵσον ἀφ' ἐκάστου τιμή-
 το ματος ἀποδεῖξαι φῆσι δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ
 § 22 αἵρεσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν 13
 οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-
 την πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν καὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθησομέ-
 25 νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·

15 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, from Plat. *Laws* vi. 765 B ff. Schmidt (and probably Ar.), ἐπά-
 ναγκες Γ II Bk., [*ἐπάναγκες*] Schlosser Susem.¹ || [ἀλλ'] Madvig, ἀλλ' trans-
 posed to 17 before ἡ Susem.¹; ἀλλὰ <*πρώτον*> Lambin, *πρώτον* Bender, as Muret
 before him changed ἀλλ' into σ' (=90) || 16 *ἵσως* Nickes (Plato has *κατὰ ταῦτα*),
ἴσως Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ || τῶν τρίτων Oncken || 17 [*πλὴν*] Madvig || οὐκ
 [*πᾶσιν*] Bender || <ἀλλ'> ἡ Susem., ἢν Γ II Ar. Bk. Bender, πλὴν Götting in his
 edition and Madvig, ἡ Götting in *Jenaer Lectionskat.* 1855, εἴτα <δ'> ἐκ τῶν τρί-
 των οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες <πλὴν ἀλλ'> ἡ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμημάτων, ἐκ τε κτλ
 ? Susem. Of course ἀλλ' ἡ οὐ πλὴν would do just as well as πλὴν ἀλλ' ἡ || εἰτ'
 ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν <ἀλλ'> οὐ πάλιν ἐπάναγκες ἡν τῶν τετάρτων τοῦ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων
 <φέρειν μὴ βούλομένους>; ἐκ δὲ κτλ Schmidt || εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες
 πλὴν τοῦ ἐκ τῶν τριῶν· εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις Welldon || [ἐκ] Susem.
 (Plato omits it) || τριῶν τιμημάτων Götting *Jenaer Lectionskat.* ut sup., from
 Plato; τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων Γ II Ar. Bk., τριῶν [ἢ τετάρτων] Götting in his edition,
 Madvig; Engelhardt Spengel Bender and Jowett omit τρίτων ἡ || 18 [τῶν τε-
 τάρτων] Engelhardt Bender Susem.; but [τοῦ τετάρτου] with Sylburg is perhaps as
 good: τῶν τεττάρων Camot Sepulveda's mss. Vettori² (and a marginal note from his
 own hand in the copy of his 1st edition in the Münich Library), τῶν τιμημάτων
 Götting in the *Jenaer Lectionskat.* l. c. || ἐπάναγκες <ἢ> Schmidt || 20 δὲ Π¹
 (emended by p¹) || [22 ώ...25 σκέψις] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. n. (223) ||
 23 οὐκ omitted by Π¹ (supplied by p¹) || *μοναρχίας* ὀλιγαρχίας Heinsius Schmidt
 || <οἰσθαι> δεῖ Schmidt || συνεστάναι Π¹ P² (1st hand) P² (corr.¹), συνεστάναι Π²
 Bk. and P² (1st hand—altered by corr.¹) and P³ (corr.¹), perhaps rightly || 24
 <καὶ> ἐκ τούτων Schmidt

but only on those of the three (higher) classes, and (in electing candidates) from the fourth (class) it is compulsory only on the first and second.

§ 21 19 εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων κτλ] More accurately stated, there is *first* an election of 180 candidates belonging to each class out of the larger number first returned, and in a similar manner: *secondly*, a selection of one half of these, go from each class, by lot, to make up the whole number of 360. *Vide supra.* SUSEM. (228)

20 [*ἴσονται δὴ κτλ*] Thus those who

belong to the highest classes and who are superior men will be a majority (of the voters); because through the absence of compulsion some citizens of the popular party will abstain from the election.

21 *βελτίους*] I.e. men who take a higher interest in political life. So far, then, even this oligarchical regulation contains an aristocratic element. SUSEM. (229)

§ 22 24 τῶν ὕστερον...σκέψις] VI(IV).
 c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, 11. SUSEM. (230)
 25 ἐπιβάλλῃ=devolves (upon us): see

ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἔξ αἱρετῶν (III) αἱρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γάρ τινες συστῆναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

7 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦ-IV
30 τον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· εἰσὶ δέ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι,
αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι (p. 37)
δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυιῶν καὶ καθ' ἣς πολιτεύονται νῦν
ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γάρ οὔτε
τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναικας ἄλλος
35 κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν,
§ 2 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαλών ἄρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γάρ
τινι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετά-
χθαι καλῶς· περὶ γάρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασι τὰς στάσεις πάν-
39 τας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρώτος·

30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as *τρόπον* to be spurious and of late origin, but see *Int.* p. 33 n. 4 and *Comm.* *nn.* (213, 215) || 31 αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Spengel, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν Γ Π Αρ. Ekk., αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Piccart. See p. 80 || 37 ἀναγκαῖον erased by ^p1, omitted by Π² Ar. Ekk., possibly a variant of μέγιστον || 39 Φαλέας Π¹, and so throughout || πρώτως Q⁶ Ar. perhaps rightly, πρώτως Piccart

on l. 13. 13 and reff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortynian inscription lately found, *οἱ ἐπιβάλλοντες=οἱ ἐπιβάλλει*, the next of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cf. *λεκτόν κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα λόγον De gen. anim. 1. 2. 1. 716 a 3:* and *Pol. vi(IV). 13 § 7 τὸ πόσον ἐπιβάλλει*.

26 τὸ ἔξ αἱρετῶν αἱρετούς] ‘it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.’ This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of *νομοφύλακες*. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control. SUSEM. (231)

27 συστῆναι] This apparently portends something like the wire-pullers and caucus of our day. Comp. VIII(v). 3. 9.

c. 7 Examination of the polity proposed by Phaleas. See *Analysis* p. 105.

§ 1 31 For the antithesis comp. l. 7. 5 πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφίας, II. 12. 1 οὐκ ἕκουσθαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ ὕπτιων, ἀλλὰ διελέσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον: Pl. *Tim.* 19 Ε τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν γένος φοβοῦμαι μή δύστοχον ἄμα φιλοσόφων ἀδρῶν γὰρ καὶ πολιτικῶν.

33 τούτων διμφ.] that of the *Republic* and that of the *Laws*.

35 συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with *n.* (196): also *n.* (153) on § 2 and (116) on l. 13. 9. SUSEM. (231 b)

36 τῶν ἀναγκαλών] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments: practical requirements] fanciful theories.

§ 2 37 μέγιστον τετάχθαι] The sentence is inverted; with τετάχθαι καλῶς take τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας; the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περὶ...τετάχθαι, is subject of δοκεῖ εἶναι μέγιστον. ‘Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.’ There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye *Primitive Property* Preface xxvii—xxxii, also pp. 149, 158 ff., 223.

39 διὸ Φαλέας...πρώτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. Exc. II to B. II) it is clear that Phaleas was younger than Hippodamas: but if πρώτως is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagreness of his proposal, its lack of all finished execution as com-

§ 3 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἵσται εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο ²
 1266 b δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπὸν φέτο ποιεῖν, τὰς
 δ' ἥδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μέν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστ' ἀν
 ὄμαλισθηναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-
 8 4 νειν δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος
 6 φέτο δεῖν ἔαν, πλειον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-
 χίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-
 περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.

§ 5 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς οὔτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὁ λα-
 10 θάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττοντας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν
 τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν ἔαν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγε-
 θος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χω-

1266 b 2 δ' ἥδη Γ, δὴ Π¹ Π², δὲ Μ^α ΑΓ. || 3 τὰς omitted by M^α Π¹, [τὰς] Susem.¹
 perhaps rightly || 5 [Πλάτων...8 πρότερον] ? Susem. The brackets are necessary if
 Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 ἔαν omitted by Π¹,
 [ἔαν] Susem.¹, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Bender || 12 τόν τε
 νόμον Bas.², τὸν γενέμενον Μ^α U^b

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. *nn.* 255, 256 on 8 §§ 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phaleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artizans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Böckh *Staats-haushaltung der Ath.* I. p. 65 and Roscher *Thukydides* p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel *Studien* p. 163 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 390, and thence to Chalcedon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 8. 27, Theopompos *Frag.* 65 in Athenaeus XII 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phaleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great

hindrances to this hypothesis. SUSEM. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθὺς should be taken with the participle.

2 τάχιστα] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4 6 ἔαν = *laissez faire*.

8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 n. (213). Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. SUSEM. (233)

§ 5 9 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ κτλ] This remark was made before, 6 §§ 10—13, cp. n. (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. SUSEM. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρῃ = exceed, rise above. 'If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.'

12 ἀνάγκη...λύεσθαι] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phaleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phaleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. SUSEM. (235)

ρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας^(IV)
 § 6 ἔργον γάρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὐ-
 15 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὐ-
 σίας ὀμαλότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, οἷον
 καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἔστι οὐμος ὃς κωλύει
 κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὅσην ἀν βούληται τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
 οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λοκροῖς νόμος
 20 ἔστι μὴ πωλεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φανερὰν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβη-
 87 κυῖαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασφέειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυ-
 θεὶν καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
 αὐτῶν οὐ γάρ ἔτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠρισμένων τιμημά-^(p. 38)
 των εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν). ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἴσοτητα μὲν 5

18 δόπσην Ald. Bk., δόπσην or δσην Ar., ὀπόστην P^{2,3,4} Q^b T^b U^b || 19 οἱ νόμοι]
 ἔνοι Bücheler, probably right || 24 ἔστι] εἰς τὸ P^{3,4} U^b Ar. Ald. and P^a (1st hand,
 γρ. ἔστι corr.³ in the margin), εἰς Q^b T^b

χωρὶς=quite apart from the violation of the law, it is a defect that many citizens should decline from wealth to poverty. Comp. 5 § 2, χωρὶς ἀπό.

13 φαῦλον κτλ] Comp. 6 § 13 n. and 17(vii). 16 § 15 ff. n. (946). SUSEM. (236)

14 ἔργον to be taken as b 2 ἔργω-
 δόστερον 'it is hard for such people not to
 encourage sedition.' In III. 15. 8 also
 ἔργον ἀρτό=it is improbable, in the same
 way as μόλις 'with difficulty' comes to
 mean 'hardly ever.'

§§ 6, 7 The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognized (1) by Solon's legislation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Lycori which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Leucas, where the disuse of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy. Yet the size of properties needs regulation, if, when equalized, they are not to be over-large or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaos at Thebes), VII(vi). 4. 9 (the Aphytaeans and Oxylos in Elis), VIII(v). 7-9 (Thurii). See further Laveleye *op. c.* pp. 161-165 Eng. trans., A. Lang *Essay XIII*, esp. p. 89; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom.' An early equal distribution (Maine's *Village Communities* p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece. Long after them Phaleas, and Plato in

the *Laws*, 744 E, desire a return to the old usage.

διότι μὲν...όμαλότης] At this point then Aristotle's own socialism begins to come out more clearly than before. See notes on 5 § 7 (158), § 15 (166); 6 §§ 10-14 (208-211), and 7 § 5 (234). Further comp. n. (192) and *Introd.* p. 33. SUSEM. (236 b)

17 Like the law of Oxylos prohibiting mortgage, VII(vi). 4. 9, Solon's σεισάθεια, or relief measure, restored mortgaged lands to their proprietors: γῆ μελανοῦ τῆς ἑγώ ποτε | ὅρους ἀφεῖλον πα-
 ταχοῦ πεπηγότας | τὸ πρόσθε δουλευοντα
 νίν δ' ἐλευθέρα. His graduated assessment must also have tended somewhat to equality. But in addition to this Schömann, *Antiquities* p. 330 Eng. tr., and Curtius, *Hist. I.* 329 Eng. tr., represent Solon as enacting a special law, that there should be a maximum limit to the acquisition of landed property: Grote (III. 182) thinks no such inference borne out by the present passage.

παρ' ἄλλοις] It is not known where.

19 ἐν Λοκροῖς] Presumably the Epizephrian Locri, where Zaleucus was legislator, c. 12 § 6.

§ 7 22 καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα] Cr. VII(vi). 4. 9 ἡ δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι
 νερομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἔχειναι τὸν
 πρώτους κλήρους with note, and on the
 custom at Sparta, c. 9 § 14 n. (300).
 SUSEM. (237)

24 ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν κτλ] But then
 there may be equality of possessions and

25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἡ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε (IV)
 τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ξῆν γλίσχρως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς
 οὐχ ἵκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ
 § 8 τὸν μέσον στοχαστέον. ἔτι δὲ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειν
 οὐσίαν πάσιν, οὐδὲν ὅφελος· μᾶλλον γάρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
 30 ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστι μηδ παιδευομένοις
 ἵκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλὰ τοσαντανάντιαν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι
 ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οὔτεται γάρ δυοῖν τούτοιν ἰσό-
 τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τὰς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.
 § 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν
 35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὅφελος· ἔστι γάρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν
 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἣς ἔσονται
 προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ-
 § 10 φοτέρων, ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς
 κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τούναντίον δὲ περὶ
 40 ἑκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γάρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνι-
 1267 a σον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαι· οὐδενὶ καὶ
 1267 a 2 δὲ ἵγε τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἥδε καὶ ἐσθλός),

27 ποιῆσαι ἴσται Γ apparently || 28 τάξει M^a P¹ || 31 ἀντικούειν M^a, εἰποιεῖν
 p. 24. Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P², εἰποεῖν P³ (1st hand) || 38 ἐπει...
 1267 a 17 πολιτεῖα = 1267 a 37 ἴσται... b 13 εἰπεῖν. See the text arranged in parallel
 columns *Introd.* p. 80 f. || ἐπει Spengel, ἴσται Γ Π Ατ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, ὅτι
 ?Susem. || 39 διὰ τὴν omitted by M^a, διὰ by P¹
 1267 a 2 δὲ M^a P^{1,2,3} Ald. || καὶ omitted by Γ and M^a (1st hand)

yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small.

26 γλίσχρως] stingily, 'so as barely to make a living.' Demosth. *c. Arist.* 689, 25 ὡς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα (θησαυροὺς οἰκοδομεῖτε), *c. Pant.* γλίσχρως καὶ μόδις: Plato *Rep.* VII 553 C γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ συμπρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος, thrifuly and gradually, by saving and working.

28 τὸν μέσον στοχαστέον] See this more precisely defined in *c. 6* §§ 8, 9; IV (VII), 5 § 1, with the notes: also VI (IV), 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in *n.* (207). SUSEM. (237 b).

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phaleas must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessities of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally,

(c) for higher gratifications. Phaleas can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambition which produces a tyrant.

30 τοῦτο δέ οὐκ ἔστι κτλ.] Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (296) and Exc. II on Bk. II p. 333. SUSEM. (238)

36 οὐ ησ=ώστε ἐκ ταύτης.

§ 10 38 στασιάζουσι] Cp. VIII (v). I. II πανταχοῦ γάρ διὰ τὸ ἀριστον ἡ στάσις.

40 This opposition of οἱ χαρίεντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in *Nic. Eth.* I § 3, 4. There joined with πρακτικοὶ, in *Pol.* VII (VI), 5. 10 with τοῦτος.

1267 a 1 ἄντις θανάτου sc. αἱ κτήσεις.

2 Homer *Iliad* IX. 319. SUSEM. (239)

The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.

§ 11 οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἀνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὃν ἄκος (IV)
 εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἴστητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ
 5 ῥιγοῦν ἡ πεινῆν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν.
 ἐάν γάρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν
 § 12 ταύτης ιατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν, οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν
 ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσίᾳ βρα- 8
 10 χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνῃ τρίτον δ', εἰ τινες
 δύναιντο δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἀν ἐπιζητοῦν εἴ μη παρὰ
 § 13 φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. αἱ γάρ ἀλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ
 ἀδικοῦσι γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
 τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγώσιν (διὸ καὶ

3 θ' Susem.³, δ' Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.¹⁻³ in the text || 8 ἀνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν or
 ἀνεπιθύμητοι (cp. Clem. Al. Strom. VII. p. 742. A. B.) Bojesen, ἀν ἐπιθυμοῦσεν Γ Π
 Ar. Bk., ἀν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν? Schneider following Lambin's translation, Bernays omits the words || 11 δύναιτο] βούλοντο Π¹ Π² Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly || αὐτῶν Π¹,
 αὐτῶν Γ Μ² Ρ^{2,3,4} Ald. || 12 ἐπει II Ar. Bk.: ἐπι or ἐπει <δ> Rassow. Then the apodosis begins with ὥστε. William does not translate ἐπει: hence [ἐπει] and
 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ Susem.^{1,2} erroneously for ἀδικοῦσι γε

§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in *Rhet.* I. 12. 17 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοῖς ἔχοντας ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐρ-
 δεῖς τὸς τὰν αγακάδα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς
 ἀπόλαυσιν, where see Cope's note.

6 ἕάν γάρ μεῖζω] sc. τῆς τῶν ἀναγ-
 καίων ἐπιθυμίας 'For if the desire goes
 beyond the necessities of life.' Compare
Nic. Eth. VII. 4. 2 1147 b 23 ff. Εστον τὰ
 μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, (viz.
 τὰ σωματικά, e.g. τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν,) τὰ
 δὲ αἰρετά μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δὲ ὑπερ-
 βολὴν; these are οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα; νίκη,
 τιμή, πλοῦτος are examples: and VII. 14.
 2 1154 a 15 ff. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
 έστιν ὑπερβολὴ, καὶ ὁ φαῖδος τῷ διώκειν
 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν (sc. φαῦλος) έστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ
 τὰς ἀναγκαίας (Congreve). SUSEM. (240)

§ 12 8 ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 12. 2 1152 b 36 ff.
 ἐπει καὶ ἀνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡ-
 δοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι: X. 3.
 7 1173 b 16 ff. Διυποιο γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθη-
 ματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ
 τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροδιμαῖς δὲ καὶ ὄρ-
 ματα πολλὰ καὶ μνῆματα καὶ ἀπίδεις. Taken
 from Plato *Phil.* 51 b—52 b where occur
 αἱ περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ
 τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν δομῶν αἱ πλεῖσται,
 καὶ αἱ τῶν φθόγγων; also αἱ περὶ τὰ μα-
 θήματα ἡδοναῖς. (Eaton.) SUSEM. (241)

One could hardly have supposed that
 this last was a fruitful source of crime.

9 ἄκος] Here is a digression into the
 region of practical suggestions and expe-
 dients, in the same spirit as VII(VI). c. 5,
 VIII(V), cc. 8, 9.

10 ἐργασία] constant employment.
 σωφροσύνη] Cp. n. (206 b) on 6 § 9.
 SUSEM. (242)

Here this word means self-restraint
 generally, and not thirst, as before.

11 παρὰ φιλοσοφίας] As in 5 § 15,
 'culture.' The education of the citizens
 and the elevation of the masses are the
 leading ideas of B. v(viii).

12 αἱ γάρ ἀλλαι sc. ἡδοναῖ.
 ἀνθρώπων δέονται] Compare *Nic. Eth.*
 X. 7. 4 1177 a 27 ff. τῶν μὲν γάρ πρὸς
 τὸ ἔγχρι ἀναγκαιῶν..., τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις viz.
 τοῖς πρὸς τὸ ἔγχρι ἀναγκαῖον, ικανῶς κεχορη-
 γημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιο-
 πραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ὁ
 σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἀλλων
 ἔκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφός καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν...
 οἵους αὐταρκέστατος: IX. 4. 5 1166 a 26 f.
 (Eaton.) SUSEM. (243)

§ 13 14 τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ρ.] 'It
 is not to keep out the cold that men be-
 come tyrants.' Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 7 1134
 b 6 ff. μασθός ἄρα τις δοτός <ἐπει οὐδὲν
 αὐτῷ πλεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἰπερ δίκαιος>,
 τοῦτο δὲ τιμῇ καὶ γέρας· στρέψει μὴ ικανά τὰ

(IV)

15 αἱ τιμαι μεγάλαι, ἀν ἀποκτείνη τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ (p. 39)
τύραννον· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον
§ 14 ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται
κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύσονται καλῶς,
δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.
20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολε-
§ 15 μικῆν ισχύν, περὶ ἣς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἰρηκεν. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ
περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γάρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς
χρήσεις ίκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κιν-
δύνους· διόπερ οὕτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὡν οἱ
25 πλησίον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν
οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὐθὲν οὔτως διληγην ὥστε μὴ δύ-
§ 16 νασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκεῖ-¹⁰
νος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τούτο μὴ λανθάνειν, [δ] τί
συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἄριστος ὄρος τὸ μὴ λυσι-

17 ἐπι τὰ.... 37 πολιορκίας transposed by Susem. to follow b 13 ἕτερον || δεῖ
κατασκευάζεσθαι Susem,¹ wrongly from William, <φι> λεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι? Schmidt, βούλεται κατασκευάζεσθαι? Susem,¹, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1365, βούλενται
κατασκευάζειν M^a || 20 ἄρα] γάρ? Koraes, but see Dittenberger *I. c.* || 24 ὡν]
ὥστε Spengel, but see Vahlen *Aristot. Aufsätze* II. p. 21 (Wiener Sitzungsber., phil.-
hist. Cl. LXXII. p. 23) || 25 ἐπιθυμῶσιν P¹, ἐπιθυμοῦ M^a || ἀμύνεσθαι Ridgeway
|| 26 οὐτ' <οὐδελαν>? Schmidt, but κτῆσιν can be understood from what precedes ||
28 [δεῖ...b 13 ἕτερον] Bender, [δεῖ...37 πολιορκίας] Susem,¹, probably right: see
Comm. || τι Conring, δ τι Stahr Susem,¹ in the text, δτι Γ ΙΙ Αρ. Εκ., φ τι
Lindau. Bender retains δτι and suggests πλῆθος <τι>

τοιάντα, οὗτοι γίγνονται τύραννοι: IV. 1. 42,
1122 a 3 ff.: meanness is shown in petty
gains,—those who take on a large scale,
despots who plunder cities and not temples,
are called πονηροί, δεσμεῖς, ἄδικοι, but
not mean, δελεύθεροι (Eaton). SUSEM.

(244)

διὸ] The crime is greater because the
excuse is less: it is not ὅτα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα.
Hence the higher reward given to those
who punish it.

§ 14 19 δεῖ δὲ κτλ] The same criti-
cism as was passed on the *Laws*, 6 § 7.
That the constitution must necessarily
have reference to the maintenance of the
military force follows directly from the
assumption of the military régime which
Plato and Aristotle make without reserve.
Cp. again VII(VI). 6. §§ 1—5.

§ 15 24 πλῆθος sc. τὴν κτήσεως. ὡν =
ἥστε τούτων; as ἐξ ἣς, § 9.

25 οἱ πλησίον = οἱ πλησι, *Rhet. I. 5.*
17 where see Cope's note.
ἀμύνειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας may perhaps

be defended by Plato *Phaedrus* 260 ο
πολεμούσι ἀμύνειν. But see *Critical Notes*.

27 πόλεμον...δμοιων] to support a
war even with an equal or similar power,
τοι καὶ δμοιων = a state of the same stand-
ing, an equal.

§ 16 We should not fail to decide
what limit to property is advisable.

28 δεῖ δέ κτλ] This limitation has been
sufficiently noticed in the preceding § 15,
yet the repetition might be justified, if it
now appeared under a new form, much
sharper and better defined. This would
not be the case unless the second expla-
nation of τοις οὐν κτλ, as given in the
next note, were correct. But, as is there
shown, this can hardly be accepted. That
being so, there is certainly then fairly
good reason to suspect, with Bender, that
it is now appended solely for the purpose
of introducing the anecdote about Eubu-
los. SUSEM. (245)

29 Τοις οὐν...ζι οὐσίαν] 'Perhaps
the best limit of wealth is that its excess

30 τελεῖν τοὺς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' (IV)
 § 17 οὗτως ὡς ἀν καὶ μὴ ἔχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἶνον Εὔβου-
 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ-
 σεν αὐτὸν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,
 λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἔλατ-
 35 τον τούτου λαβῶν ἐκλείπειν ἥδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ' εἰ-
 πὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννονυμον παύσα-
 § 18 σθαι τῆς πολιορκίας. || ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 11

34 ἔθελεν δεῖν Γ? (debet William) || 35 ἐκλιπεῖν Π² Bk. || 37 ἔστι μὲν...b 8
 ἀδικῶνται, with which goes b 9 οὐ.....13 ταῦτα, is believed by Susem. to be another
 recension of the preceding 1266 b 38 ἐπει...1267 a 17 πολιτειας. See *Introd.* p. 81

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, 'but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less.' The ellipse may be filled up thus, ἀλλ' οὗτως πολεμεῖν λυ-
 σιτεῖν ὡς ἀν ἐπολέμησαν καὶ μὴ ἔχόντων, sc. τῶν ἤπτόνων, τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. Our wealth should never tempt aggression: we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep': *Republic* IV 422 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the costs of victory, but when (even if it conquers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of ὑπερβολὴν and οὐσίαν, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute: ἀλλ' οὗτος συμφέρει ὡς ἐν συνέ-
 φερε μὴ ἔχόντων (τῶν κρεπτόνων) τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. It can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Artaxerxes Mnemon and at the commencement of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochos, the confusion in Asia Minor, more particularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphlagonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time ἀνὴρ φιλόσο-

φος, i.e. probably one of Plato's scholars, like his freedman and successor Hermeias. Through the medium of his business he found he could execute such a scheme as this, and make himself absolute ruler (*tύραννος*) of Atarneus on the Aeolic coast of Mysia, and of the stronghold of Assos in the Troad with the adjacent districts: *Vita Aristotelis* in Westermann's *Bιογράφοι* p. 402, Suidas s.vv. 'Αριστοτέλης, 'Ερμειας, Strabo XIII. 610. Böckh (*Hermeias of Atarneus* in his *Ges. Kl. Schriften* VI. 183 ff.) tries to show, as others have done, that this event happened before 359 B.C.; that in 359 Autophradates as general of the Persian king marched against Artabazos and took him prisoner, and that in the course of this same campaign he laid siege to Atarneus. The suggestion by which Eubulos raised the siege is, as Böckh remarks, one worthy of a banker. We know that he maintained his power down to his death: also that it was not before 345/44 that his successor, the eunuch Hermeias, Aristotle's friend (see I. 6. 9. n. 56) was overthrown by the Rhodian Mentor, the Persian commander-in-chief, and that solely by stratagem deceit and treachery. SUSEM. (247)

Bergk's posthumous paper *On the chronology of king Artaxerxes III, Ochos, in Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII. 1882. pp. 355—362 fixes the fall of Hermeias and the escape of Aristotle and Xenocrates to Mitylene (and thence to Athens) in the year 345/44. Comp. Susemihl in Bursian's *Jahresber.* XXX. 1882, pp. 4—7.

36 σύννονυμον γενέσθαι, to become thoughtful, to reflect.

That §§ 18—20 are parallel to §§ 10—13 has been explained *Introd.* p. 80 f.

§ 18 37. ἔστι μὲν...38 πολιτειας] Comp. line 3 ὡς ἄκος...4 οὐσίας.

τὰς οὐσίας ἵσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV) πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ 40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῦντες [ἄν] ὡς οὐκ ἴσων δύντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ § 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ' 1267 b ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρώτον μὲν ἴκα-
νὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἥδη τοῦτ' ὡς πάτριον, ἀεὶ δέον-
ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἔως εἰς ἀπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἀπειρος γὰρ ἡ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἡς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
§ 20 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμα- 12
6 λίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευά- (p. 40)
ζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ
δύνασθαι τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἀν ἥττους τε ὧσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶν-
§ 21 ται. || οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἴστορητα τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν. περὶ 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἴστάζει μόνον, ἐστι δὲ καὶ δούλων

38 *Iotas* after *eisai* II² Bk., perhaps Γ; possibly right || 40 ἀν II² Bk., omitted by Π²

1267 b 5 ἀρχή is corrupt: ἀκη Scaliger, ἀκε Schneider, ἀρωγή M. Vermehren,
ἀλκή? Madvig probably right, <ἀταλλαγῆς> or <*larpetas*> ἀρχή Schmidt; ἀρκετ
Koraes, certainly not right

38 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls
στασιάζοντας of § 10.

39 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ] a 16 ὥστε πρὸς
τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας κτλ.

καὶ γὰρ ἀν κτλ] "For even then (ἐὰν
ἴσαι αἱ κτήσεις, § 10) the higher classes
would be discontented, as they lay claim
to something more than an equal share,
and hence are often found aggressive and
factious."

40 οὐκ ίσων] ἀλλὰ πλεονεκτος: on the
ground that they deserve something more
than an equal share, something proportion-
ately greater. Comp. III. 13, 13 and
Thuc. VIII. 89. 4 πάντες γὰρ αἰθημέρων
δέξιοσσιν οὐχ ὅπως ίσοι ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρώ-
τος αὐτὸς ἔκαστος εἴσαι. In Thuc. I. 132
§ 2 μὴ ίσος=superior.

§ 19 1267 b 2 διωβολία] This refers
to the so-called θεωρικόν, a grant of public
money to provide for shows or public
amusements introduced at Athens after
Pericles' time. In the first instance at
those festivals only at which plays were
exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price
of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was
paid from the state-chest to the lessee of
the theatre for every citizen present.
(Every one who went to the theatre re-
ceived a counter which he gave up on
going in; the lessee collected from the
state the two obols for every counter; but

he had to pay a rent out of his receipts
and to keep the theatre in repair. See
Benndorf *Beiträge* in *Zeitschrift f. d. öst.*
Gymn. XXVI. 1875. p. 23 ff.) Subse-
quently the poorer citizens received the
like dole for all the other festivals, and
these outgoings swallowed up no small
part of the revenues. See Böckh *Public Econ.* of *Athens* p. 217 Eng. tr., Schö-
mann *Antiquities* I p. 341, p. 438 ff. Eng.
tr. An Attic obol=1¹/3d. of our money,
a little more than five farthings, or 11
German Pfennige; Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172. SUSEM. (245)

4 ἡς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ]
Comp. a 5 διτοις χωρίσαι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν.

§ 20 6 τὸ τοῖς μὲν 7 πλεονεκτεῖν]
Substantially the same remedy as in § 12
τρίτον δὲ εἰ τινες...δοτος.

§ 21 The argument from inconsis-
tency is pressed from opposite sides here
and in 6 § 15. Phaleas must have meant
to include personal property, § 3.

10 ίσαι δὲ καὶ δούλων κτλ] Comp.
Rhet. I. 5. 7 πλούτον δὲ μέρη νομίσμα-
τος πλήθος, γῆς χωρίων κτῆσις, ἔτι δὲ
ἐπιπλῶν κτῆσις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ
ἀνδραπόδων, where Cope explains ἐπι-
πλῶν as "moveables" opposed to fixtures,
such as houses and land. Hence furni-
ture, even if of bronze, Xen. *Oecon.* ix. 6,
Thuc. III. 68.

καὶ βοσκημάτων πλούτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευή (IV)
πολλὴ τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων ἢ πάντων οὐν τούτων ἴσο-
§ 22 τητα ἡγητέον ἡ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἡ πάντα ἑατέον. φαὶ- 13
νεται δὲ ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μι-
15 κράν, εἰ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ
§ 23 πλήρωμά τι παρέχονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἰπερ δεῖ δη-
μοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν
'Επιδάμνῳ τε, καὶ Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι,
τούτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.
20 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἄν
τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκὼς ἢ μὴ κα-
8 λῶς. Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφῶντος Μιλήσιος, ὃς καὶ τὴν τῶν V

16 δεῖ] δὴ P^a-^c Q^b T^b U^b L^a Ar. Ald. and P^a (1st hand, emended by corr.¹⁾) ||
17 δεῖ] καὶ with a comma after 16 εἰπερ Bernays; if so, ἐργαζομένους <μόνους>
Susem.; probably right, but see Comm. The same sense can be obtained by Well-
don's punctuation εἰπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ, καθάπερ
provided ὡς be inserted after 18 τε καὶ || 18 ὡς inserted by Morel Bk. before Διό-
φαντος, omitted by II; the translations of William and Ar. are no warrant that they
had ὡς in their mss. || 21 τι] τις Π^a || 22 [ὅς 28 βουλόμενος] Congreve; the
See Comm.

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι=public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημιουργός=λαρύς): also ναυπηγοί and others, Plato *Gorg.* 455 B with Dr Thompson's note, *Poliū-*
eus 259 A.

16 πλήρωμά τι παρέχονται τῆς πόλεως] Exactly Plato's expression *Rep.* 371 Ε πλήρωμα δὴ πόλεως εἰσὶ καὶ μισθωτοί (Eaton). SUSEM. (248)

Comp. III. 13. 13, VI(IV). 4. 12.

§ 23 17 ἀν 'Ἐπιδάμνῳ κτλ] "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phaleas could hatch the thought that the handicrafts throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, was that only the artizans who worked for the community were to be public slaves"; Böckh *Staatsb.* I. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnos. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους to mean 'those who do common work for the whole community'; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas' proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration

suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2 = 395/4 was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. "Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnos allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνιοι ἐπιδημεῖν καὶ μετοικεῖν παρεῖχον τῷ βουλομένῳ: V. H. III. 16" (J. G. Schneider). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnos see further III. 16 § 1, VIII(V). 1 § 10, 4 § 7 nn. SUSEM. (249)

Bernays renders: "But if (this proposal is to be tried), state-slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnos and as Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens."

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamas of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 105 f.

§ 1 22 Ἰππόδαμος] See Excursus II to B. II p. 331 ff.: also K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo Milesio* (Marburg 1841). SUSEM. (250)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hildenbrand pp. 58—61, Oncken I. 213—218, Henkel 162—165. See also

πόλεων διαιρεσιν εύρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος (V)
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως
25 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει
καὶ κόμης, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλεευῆς δὲ οὐκ
ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρό-
νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν δλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος,]
πρώτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησέ τι περὶ πολιτείας
§ 2 εἰπεῖν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλῆθει
31 μὲν μυρίανδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην ἐποίει γὰρ
ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-
33 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον. διήρει δὲ εἰς τρία μέρη <καὶ> τὴν

23 πειρᾶ (not παιρᾶ as Susem.¹ gave) P^{2.3.4} Q^b T^b (?) U^b || 26 κόμης] κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ Π^a Ar. Ek. Bernays and γρ. p¹ in the margin, καλλωπισμῷ Bender, κόσμῳ Ridgeway, κοσμήσεις Welldon || ἦτι δὲ omitted by T^b Sepulveda's codices Bender Ridgeway Welldon, ἔπ' Bernays || 28 λόγος P^{2.3} T^b, σπουδαῖος W^b L^a Ar. Ald. || 32 μὲν omitted by M^a Q^b || 33 τὰ L^a and U^b (corr.), τὰ M^a P^{1.2.3.4} Q^b T^b Ald. and U^b (1st hand) || <καὶ> τὴν Schmidt

M. Erdmann *On Hippodamas and symmetrical town architecture in Greece* in *Philologus* XLII. 1883. pp. 193—227.

22 ὁς καὶ... 28 βουλόμενος] Fülleborn remarked long since: "every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamas. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man's vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it." And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastos than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (252)

23 κατέτεμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets; Pindar *Pyth.* 5. 84 εὐθύνομος κατέθηκε... σκυρωτάν οὖν.

25 ζῆν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words ἑσθῆτος must be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of Π¹ adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσμῳ, the reading of Π² (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. *Supp.* 246 for κόσμος, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλωπισμῷ or κοσμήσεις, which are the conjectures of Bender and Welldon respectively.

τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κόμης] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long

hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hesippus, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρωβύλος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φονεῖδ' ἡμῶν κομῶσι, Aristoph. *Knights* 580. See Becker *Charikles* III. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (251)

26 εὐτελοῦς] of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγος] a man of learning, as in IV(vii). 10. 3 and often in Herodotos (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετεωρόλογος.

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Oncken I. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamas § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artizans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle's criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (253)

§ 3 33 δύοις δὲ τρία μέρη κτλ.] So too Aristotle IV (vii). cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on II. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (254)

χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱεράν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ὅθεν (V) 35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱεράν, ἀφ' ὧν δὲ οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν § 4 ἰδίαν. φέτο δὲ εἰδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον περὶ ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαια γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ^(p. 41) ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν 40 τὸ κύριον, εἰς ὃ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρίσθαι δοκούσας δίκας τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τινῶν γε- 1268 a 5 ρόντων αἱρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας φέτο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἔκαστον πινάκιον, ἐν φυγάφειν, εἰ καταδικάξοι ἀπλῶς [τὴν δίκην], εἰ

35 ἱερά P³ Q^b T^b L^a and P^a (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || 37 δὲ καὶ εἴδη Γ apparently, possibly right || 40 δεῖ II¹

1268 a 2 φέτο omitted by W^b L^a Ald., in P⁴ inserted in the margin || 3 καταδικάξει P¹ and 1st hand of P^{2,3} (emended by corr.¹) || τὴν δίκην omitted by II¹

35 ἀφ' ὧν δὲ κτλ] Here there is just a germ of Plato's ideal state, when we consider that the soldiers answer to the second order, and the artizans and farmers together to the third order of citizens in the *Republic*. However even when viewed in this light the differences between the two schemes are as great as the resemblances. But the state proposed in the *Laws* may be described as hardly anything more than an improved working out of Phaleas' ideal. Comp. L. Stein *op. c. p. 162 f.* SUSEM. (255)

§ 4 37 φέτο κτλ] See Exc. II. to B. II p. 333 f. SUSEM. (255 b)

ὕβρις and βλάβη answer to crimes against the person and against property. Not precisely however; for ὕβρις implies insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings or honour, whether accompanied by violence or not. Whereas βλάβη implies loss or damage sustained, whether to person or property. See *Rhet.* I. 12. 26, II. 2. 5 with Cope's excellent comments.

39 ἴνοροθέτει δὲ...] This idea of a court of appeal is further evidence that Hippodamas had a fine sense for jurisprudence. It is appropriated by Plato also *Laws* vi 767 c—e, XII 956 c f. (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. SUSEM. (256)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.

§ 5 1268 a 1 οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In the Athenian courts the voting was secret; each jurymen (*δικαστῆς*) received two ballots, one for condemnation, the other

for acquittal; and there were two urns, one of copper, into which the ballot containing the verdict was thrown, the other of wood, into which the other, unused ballots were thrown. The ballots for voting were either differently coloured stones or small metal balls, or even differently coloured beans or shells. At what time the one or other of these were used is not known. Stones were certainly the most common; a black stone served for condemnation, a white one for acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a hole in it served for the former purpose, a whole one served for the latter purpose. Equality of votes was counted as acquittal. (Meier and Schömann *Attische Prozess* 720 ff.) SUSEM. (257)

Aristotle himself is our authority for the voting at Athens: see *Frag.* 1548 b 5—41 of the Berlin ed.

2 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ικαστὸν κτλ] Nearly the same arrangement was actually introduced amongst the Romans; a fact which shows how clearly this proposal testifies to a legal mind of great originality. At Rome the voting was by tablets in the manner here proposed, leaving it to the iudices to affirm not simply condemnation (C) or acquittal (A), but also a verdict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet). That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite unable to realize to himself the proper meaning of the proposal is a further proof of its originality (L. Stein.) Comp. n. (268) on §§ 13—15. SUSEM. (258)

δ' ἀπολόνοι ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <έᾶν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο (V)
 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γάρ οὐκ φέτο νενομοθετῆσθαι καλῶς ἀναγκά-
 § 6 ζειν γάρ ἐπιορκεῖν [ἥ] ταῦτα ἡ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ 4
 νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον,
 ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-
 λευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὡς οὕπω τοῦτο
 10 παρ' ἀλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὗτος
 § 7 ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ⁵
 τοῦ δήμου αἱρετοὺς εἶναι πάντας· δῆμον δὲ ἐποίει τὰ τρία
 μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δὲ αἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν
 καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὄρφανικῶν.

15 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἰππο-

4 ἀπολόνει M^a P¹ Q^b, ἀπολόνσι L^a || <ἔτε> Meier (*D. bonis damnatorum* p. 58)
 || <καὶ> τοῦτο Meier *l.c.* perhaps rightly || 6 ἡ omitted by Γ M^a, ἡ ταῦτα omitted
 by L^a and P¹ (1st hand, both words added by P¹) [ἥ] Susem.¹, but see Dittenberger
 ὥφ. c. p. 1360 f. || ἔτι δὲ ἐτίθει νόμον P⁴ in the margin, in the text ἐτίθει is omitted,
 ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον P²⁻³ Q^b T^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 9 τοῦτο τότε and 10 Ἔλλησιν instead
 of ἀλλοις Spengel, but see Dittenberger ὥφ. c. p. 1369 ff. and Comm. || 11 ἑτέρους
 P²⁻⁴ Q^b T^b L^a Ald. and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου after 12
 αἱρετοὺς Π² Bk. || 14 καὶ ξενικῶν omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹
 in the margin)

5 ἀναγκάζειν sc. τὸν νόμον.

§ 6 9 ὡς οὕπω κτλ] "just as if this law had not been made before elsewhere." So K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo* p. 44, who is defended by Dittenberger (*Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel. It is true that ως with the participle might equally mean (1) because in fact, as in Pl. *Phaedr.* 245 εἰς ταῦτην οὐρανούς φέρειν, or (2) because as he thought ως οὐκ δύνανται 5 § 6): but νῦν is not decisive in favour of (1), see *n.* (259).

οὕπω, ποι μήτω; cp. Lysias 14 § 10 ἐτέλμασεν ἀναβῆναι, ως οὐκ ἔξεσμενος τῷ πόλει δίκαιο λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ωστε τοῦ δεῖδους ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἡμέρας αὐτοῖς μέλον: Xen. *Cyr.* v. 1. 13 ως οὐκ ἀναγκάσαι τὸ διλέπτειν, αἵρια τὸν κλέπτοντα. The clause is virtually oblique, and the negative is reproduced unchanged.

10 ἔστι δὲ...νῦν] Here as often νῦν = as things are, "under the existing system" not simply = now, as Spengel explains it. Unless one follows Spengel in an untenable alteration of the text, the drift of the passage can only be a censure upon Hippodamos, which is even in this form quite intelligible, though it would certainly have been more clearly expressed as follows: "whereas a law like this was

already at the time in force at Athens." We cannot however prove the date of this Athenian regulation (on which Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 26 may also be consulted), but the present passage would seem to make it earlier than the treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite possible that Aristotle's censure is unfair; for who is to inform us that in its author's intention the scheme of Hippodamos was restricted to new proposals, never before realized? Cp. Hermann ὥφ. c. 43 f. SUSEM. (259) Cp. for νῦν § 5. c. 1 § 3, 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 οὐχ δημοσίων τότε (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ νῦν (as things actually are), *Rhet.* 1. 1 § 4, 1354 a 19 καθάπερ ἐνέλασ γε νῦν ἐστι τῶν πόλεων.

§ 7 11 τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας κτλ] All officials (perhaps even the priests) were consequently to be appointed by popular election and not by lot; comp. *Excursus* 11 p. 332. SUSEM. (260)

12 δῆμον...πόλεως] It would seem that Hippodamos did not state whether all three classes were eligible (Oncken). See however *n.* (262). SUSEM. (261)

13 τοὺς δὲ αἱρεθέντας] the magistrates elected to have the charge of state matters and of the affairs of foreigners and minors in the city.

δάμου τάξεως ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπορήσει δ' ἀν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν (V)
 § 8 διαιρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἵ τε γὰρ τεχνῖται καὶ οἱ γε-
 ωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες,
 οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὄπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῖται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε
 20 ὄπλα, ὅστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὄπλα κεκτημένων.
 § 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ
 τῶν τὰ ὄπλα ἔχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πο-
 λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν). μὴ
 μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πᾶς οἶλον τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν
 25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὄπλα
 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ φάδιον
 § 10 μὴ πολλοὺς οἴντας εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέ-
 χειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων κα-
 ταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τῇ χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνῖτας
 30 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), (p. 42)
 καὶ δύνανται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-
 σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ
 ὄπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφὴν εὐλόγως ἀν ησάν τι τῆς πό-
 λεως μέρος, μῦν δὲ ἴδιαν ἔχοντιν, καὶ ταῦτην ἴδιᾳ γεωρ-
 35 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινήν, ἀφ' οἵς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἔξουσι 7
 36 τὴν τροφὴν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἀν εἴη τὸ μά-

17 οἱ omitted by M^o Pl, [οἱ] Susem.¹ || 25 καὶ omitted by II^o Ar. Bk. || 26 γε
 omitted by M^o Pl, [γε] Susem.^{1,2} || 34 ιδίᾳ] ιδίᾳ II^o || γεωργῶν Ar. Morel Bk.

16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. 10
 § 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξις
 τῆς πολιτεῖης κοινωνίας I. 2. 16, or τῆς
 πολιτείας II. 6. 1, where the sense of
 ordering, arrangement, is as apparent as
 in II. 2 § 4, or II. § 9, or III. 1. 1.

ἀπορήσει δ' ἀν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle
 criticizes (§§ 8—15) (1) the entire division
 into classes, (2) the special position of
 the agricultural class, (3) the innovations
 in the administration of justice.

§ 8 20 δοῦλοι] This partly explains
 the proposal of Phaleas to make them
 δημόσιοι.

§ 9 21 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ.] Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to
 have been the intention of Hippodamas.
 SUSEM. (262)

Obviously he is applying his own
 standard πολιτης ὁ μετέχων ἀρχῆς.

22 πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of ma-
 gistracy Aristotle understands by this
 word is not clear and is not sufficiently
 explained by the notice, VIII(v). 6 § 6 n.

{1573}, of a magistracy under this name
 in Larisa. SUSEM. (263)

As ταγῷ are attested by an inscription
 for Larisa of 214 B.C. (Ridgeway *Trans-
 actions* II p. 138) it seems likely that Aristotle
 there uses a different term in order
 to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας οὐ κτλ.] Aristotle
 himself altogether excludes the farmers,
 tradesmen, and artisans in his ideal state
 from the rights of citizenship; which is a
 much stronger measure. But possibly he
 thinks it is not essential for those who
 are thus excluded to be attached to the
 constitution, but that if they are to be
 citizens, it is. SUSEM. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίνεσθαι=earn subsistence;
 so καταζῆν, καταγίγνεσθαι.

33 εὐλόγως ἀν κτλ.] They would
 then be in the position of the δῆμος of
 the *Republic*.

34 νῦν δι=whereas what Hippoda-
 mos proposes is that they shall have land
 of their own.

χιμον ἔτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης εἰ (V)
δ' ἔτεροί τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν
μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδε-
§ 12 νὸς μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ-
41 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τούς τε τὴν ἴδιαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν
1268 b γεωργούντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἀπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν
ἔκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκλας, καὶ τίνος ἔνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς
ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφὴν
λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολ-
§ 13 λὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς
γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο γάρ
ἐν μὲν τῇ διαιτῃ καὶ πλείσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνται γάρ
ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντίον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργεῖν M^a P¹ || ἔτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ M^a, a similar gloss τούτων
ἔτερον εἶναι p² in the margin || 39 αὐ] οὐν π² || τοῦτο after τῆς πόλεως M^a P¹ ||
42 Spengel thinks καρπῶς corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἀπορον, for which δυσπόριστον
seems to him to be required by the sense

1268 b i γεωργήσει II Bk., *ministrabit* William, *habeant ministrare* Ar., doubtless
on mere conjecture; hence erroneously ὑπουργήσει Vettori Susem¹⁻² and others ||
δύο οἰκλας can hardly be sound, δύοι οἰκλας Ar. Camerarius, <εἰς> δύο οἰκλας Ber-
nays, δύο [οἰκλας] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Böcker (not bad),
<δλῆς> τῆς Madvig, [καὶ] Bernays Susem.²; there is some corruption || 5 τὸ κρίνειν
ἀξιοῦν II Bk., δὲ κρίνειν ἀξιῶν Susem.¹⁻² wrongly from the translations of William and
Ar. || διαιροῦντα P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk., διαιροῦνται L¹ || δίκης II Ar., κρίσεως II²
Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γάρ Ar., δ' Γ II Bk. || 7 καὶ <μὴ>
πλείσιν ? Koraes || 9 καὶ omitted by Γ M^a || τούτων τῶν p¹ P²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b Bk.,
τούτων W^b L¹ Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται κτλ] Comp. n.
(201) on δὲ μή, § 5.

§ 13 42 τό τε πλῆθος ἀπορον κτλ]
“the amount of produce will be in-
adequate for the maintenance of two
establishments.” This again is a mere
assertion which ought to have been
proved. SUSEM. (265)

1268 b i γεωργήσει οἰκλας] See
Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend
the text as meaning to maintain two house-
holds by agriculture on the analogy of οἰ-
κλας οἰκείων.

§ 13 4 ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law
about passing sentence.

5 τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν κτλ] “the require-
ment that a verdict shall be returned
upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδί-

κάσει τὸ δὲ μή, § 5) when the charge in
the indictment is simple, whereby the
juror is turned into an arbitrator.” ἀξιοῦν
is infinitive.

6 τοῦτο γάρ κτλ] This is practic-
able in arbitration even (καὶ) where there
are several arbitrators, for they confer
with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλείσιν] At Athens a single
public arbitrator decided each case, but if
private arbitrators were chosen by the
parties to the dispute themselves, a body
of 3 or 4 might well have been more
common. SUSEM. (266)

8 ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστ.] In this respect
then the practice in the Greek courts of
justice was just the reverse of that in
ours. SUSEM. (267)

10 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς (V)
 § 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν
 ὁφείλειν μὲν ὁ δικαστὴς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δὲ ὅσου ὁ δι-
 καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρινεῖ
 δέκα μνᾶς (ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον ὁ δὲ ἐλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ
 15 δὲ τέτταρας (καὶ τούτου δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριοῦ-
 § 15 σιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-
 πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι [δ'] οὐδεὶς ἐπιορκεῖν
 ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἰ-
 περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἔγκλημα γέγραπται δικαῖος· οὐ γὰρ μη-
 20 δὲν ὁφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἄλλα τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς.^(p. 43)
 ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἥδη ἐπιορκεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὁφεί-
 § 16 λειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσι τι τῇ 10
 πόλει συμφέρον ως δεῖ γίνεσθαι τινα τιμήν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-

12 μὲν after δὲ Π² and perhaps Γ || δὲ Π¹, omitted by Μ⁴ and perhaps Γ ||
 13 κρινεῖ Bk.², κρίνει Γ II Ar. Bk.¹ || 15 δὴ] δὲ Π³ || 16 οὐδέν] οὐδὲ Γ Μ⁴ and Π¹
 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δὲ omitted by Π¹ || 19 γέγραπται δι-
 καῖος Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 21 ἄλλ'...22 μνᾶς omitted by Μ⁴ || 21 ἥδη
 omitted by Γ Μ⁴ and Π¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹), [ἥδη] Susem.¹ wrongly || 23
 γενεσθαι Μ⁴ Π¹

§ 14 12 ὁ δικαζόμενος may be either litigant. If the participle is *passive*, it denotes the defendant; if *middle*, the plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

13 8 μὲν γάρ...15 τέτταρας] "For he (the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the juror will decide for ten—or whatever the larger sum may be which is claimed by the former and the smaller sum which is awarded by the latter—while another (juror) will award five, and yet another, four" (Bernays). This seems slightly better than to understand πλεῖον, θασσον, πέντε, τέτταρας of sums awarded by different juries (dicasts).

15 μεριοῦσι] will estimate damages according to a graduated scale. Comp. Demosth. *adv. Lept.* 494, 4 δεῖ τοινι μερισθαι τὰ τῶν δωρῶν.

§ 15 16 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what way then are the votes to be counted, i.e. sorted? διαλογή=collecting and arranging: *diribitio* Cic. *Pro Plancio* § 14.

19 εἴτερος ἀπλῶς...δικαῖος] "if the indictment has been framed (not conditionally but) absolutely with justice." (It has also been proposed to put a colon before δικαῖος: "and justly too; for &c."). If the suit be for 20 minae, acquittal means that the defendant does not owe 20 minae, it says nothing about liability for

a smaller sum.

21 ἥδη] when we turn to the judge who condemns while not believing the twenty minae to be owing, it is quite true that he commits perjury. Comp. VIII (v). 8. 6 ὥσπερ δῆμος ἥδη οἱ δρυοι (Cope).

§§ 13—15 'L. Stein *op. c.* 162 n. rightly calls this whole criticism a misapprehension. If the judges, or jurors, are forbidden to converse with one another, it is certainly impossible for them to find *non liquet* in concert: it is however possible for all to reach the same result without consultation, and still more likely that only in this way can some one of them clear his conscience. And if, after the fact of a pecuniary indebtedness has been established, the jurors cannot agree upon the amount, then a conditional verdict is the only one possible, and in that case certainly there can be no final decision except by way of compromise. Thus this objection makes for Hippodamas, rather than against him' (Oncken). And lastly how is it made out that the 'majority of legislators' were right in excluding consultation amongst the jurors? At any rate our modern regulation (see n. 267) has pronounced them to be wrong. Cp. also n. (258) on § 5. SUSEM. (268)

§ 16 23 οὐκ ἀσφαλές] "the proposed

λέσ τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκοῦσαι μόνον· ἔχει (V)
 25 γάρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἀν τύχη, πολιτείας. ἐμ-
 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἐτέραν ἀποροῦσι
 γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἡ συμφέρον τὰς πόλεσι τὸ
 § 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἀν ὃ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ
 οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-
 30 ρει κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται γάρ εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινας νόμων λύσιν ἡ
 πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπει δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, η
 § 18 ἔτι μικρὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστελλασθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ,
 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἀν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ
 κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,
 35 οἷον ἴατρικὴ κινηθεῖσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ
 καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπει μίαν
 τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικήν, δῆλον δτι καὶ περὶ ταύ-
 § 19 την ἀναγκαῖον ὄμοιως ἔχειν. σημεῖον δ' ἀν γεγονέαι φαίν-
 ται ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γάρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν

27 τὸ <μὴ> W^b L^a Ald. || 30 γάρ Spengel, δ' Γ II Bk. || 32 μικρὰ Π^a
 Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,"—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24 Ἐχει γάρ κτλ] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see *n.* on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman defatores. ἀν τύχη=should it so happen; and so *εἰ τύχοι, τυχόν, εἰ τυχεῖ*.

25 ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. διποροῦσι γάρ τινες] Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16—25 Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?

With this interesting discussion compare *Rhet.* I. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengel); also *Plato Polit.* 294 A—302.

26 τοὺς πατρίους νόμους] 'The ancestral laws' would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (*οἷον ἑρεσμάτα*) to the written code, Plato *Laws* III. 68a Λ οἵδε γάρ γράμματα ἔστι πῶ, ἀλλ' έθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίους νόμους ἐπέμενοι ἔσθι. Comp. *Laws* VII. 793 B—D: see *n.* (48) on I. 6. 1, and II. 5 § 5, § 15.

§ 17—29 τῷ λεχθέντι=the proposal of Hippodamus.

εἴπερ μὴ συμφέρει κινεῖν] "in case it

turns out to be inexpedient": i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

30 ἐνδέχεται γάρ κτλ] "Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit." When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμοι = the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

31 διαστελλασθαι=enter into detail. It is used in *Topics* V. 3. 8, 131 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διορίσασθαι. Cp. Pl. *Rep.* VII. 535 B ποια δὴ διαστέλλει;

§ 18—33 βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34 ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III. 15. 4, *n.* (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8: IV (VII). 2 § 13 *n.* (726); 13 § 2 *n.* (870); III. 6 § 7 *n.* (531). SUSEM. (270)

35 μίαν.....37 πολιτικήν] It is Aristotle's invariable practice to rank Politics with the "arts and faculties": e.g. VI (IV). 1 §§ 1—3, *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 1.

§§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.

40 ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ "Ελ-¹²
§ 20 ληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναικας ἔωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε
λοιπά τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστί που νομίμων, εὐήθη πάμπαν ἐστίν,
1269 a οἷον ἐν Κύμη περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἐστίν, ἀν πλῆθος

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τέ γὰρ P¹⁻³, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο γὰρ P², ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ
P⁴, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο γὰρ Q^b T^b, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τότε γὰρ Bas.³, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τε γὰρ
Koraes, ἐσιδηροφόρουν γὰρ τότε Susem.¹ misled by William's version; see Ditten-
berger *op. c.* p. 1371

1269 a 1 κύμη ΓΜ*

40 [ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο] Thuc. I. 5 § 3
τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τόντος τοῖς πειρώ-
ταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς λγοστελας ἐμμεμένης;
6 § 1 πάσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐσιδηροφόρει, διὸ
τὰς ἀφράκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς
παρ' ἀλλήλους ἔφοδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν
διαταν μεθ' ὄπλων ἐποιήσαντο (J. G.
Schneider). SUSEM. (270 b)

41 τὰς γυναικας ἔωνοῦντο] The suitor
purchased the daughter of her father by
means of presents (ἔδνα): see Schömann
Greek Antiquities I. 52 [Eng. trans. by
Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider
compares marriage by *comptio* among the
Romans. SUSEM. (271)

There is a valuable note on the *λεῖδνα*
or *bride-price* in the English translation
of the *Odyssey* by Butcher and Lang.
"The *λεῖδνα* in Homer are invariably gifts
made by the wooers to the father or kins-
men of the bride, that is, the bride-price,
the *καλυμ* of the dwellers on the Volga...
The father of the bride was thus said
λεῖδνοσθαι θύγατρα (*Od.* II. 53), to accept
certain *λεῖδνα* as the price for his daughter,—what is called 'coming to terms
about the marriage' in *Iliad* XIII. 381
(*θύρα...συνώμεθα...ἀμφὶ γαμῳ*). As a rule
the woman would go to the highest bidder,
but in the case of a favoured wooer
it seems to have been not unusual either
to remit the price and give the bride
ἀνέδεδον (cp. Agamemnon's offer to A-
chilles, *Il.* IX. 141), or to return a portion
of the *λεῖδνα* after marriage (*Od.* I. 278,
II. 196), as is still the custom among the
Kanekas in New Caledonia." Homer
also mentions gifts from the wooers
to the bride, and *μεῖλια*, gifts from the bride's
father to his daughter: but *φερνή*, the
later word for dowry, does not occur.
Even in Pindar *λεῖδνα* is used in the sense
of *φερνή*: *Pyth.* 3. 94. (Eaton compares
Tac. *Cern.* 18; but that is the 'Mor-
gengabe,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1269 a 1 οἷον ἐν Κύμῃ] This
forcibly recalls compurgation, the estab-
lished legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic
peoples. That the oath might thus be
employed on behalf of the accuser is suffi-
ciently attested, although cases where it
is taken on behalf of the accused are
usually mentioned. The Greek custom is
confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn,
column 11, lines 36—44. The law has
prescribed certain fines, the price to be
paid for the ransom of an accused person
charged with adultery and in the power
of his captors. But he may plead that he
was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp.
[Demosth.] *c. Neaeram* § 66 1367, 10
ἀδίκως εἰρχθῆναι ω̄ μοιχόν. If so, the
captor must support his charge by com-
purgators, whose number depends on the
amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four
are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200
staters: i.e. if the aggrieved husband is a
full citizen. (β) Two are necessary if
the aggrieved husband is an *ἀρέταρος*,
i.e. free but not a full citizen: while
(γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf
(*οἰκέτης*), the serf's lord (*πάτρας*) and one
other compurgator must appear. The
fine for (γ) is $\frac{1}{2}$ staters, for (β) 10 or 20
staters. The Cretan text of the law runs
thus: αἱ δὲ κα πονει δολοσαθθαι [i.e. τὰν
δὲ φωνῇ δουλώσαθαι], ομοοι τοι ελοντα το
πεντεκονταστατερο [τοῦ πεντεκονταστατή-
ρου] και πλιανο πεντον αυτον, Φιν αυτοι
[εαυτῷ] Φεκαστον επαραμενον [*ἐπαράμενον*],
το δ' απεταιρο [τοῦ δ' ἀρεταρον] τριτον
αυτον, το δε Φοικεος τον πασταν ατερον
αυτον, μοικιον' ελεν [*μοιχῶθ' ἐλεῖν*] δολο-
σαθθαι δε μη [μη]. And if he shall plead
that (the captor) overmastered him, the
captor shall swear—in the case of the 50
staters or more, himself with four others,
each imprecating on himself: in the
case of a clanless man, himself with two
others: in the case of a house-thrall,
his lord with one other—(an oath) that he
took him in adultery and overmastered
him not. See Zitelmann in *Das Recht
von Gortyn*, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. J.
Roby *The twelve Tables of Gortyn* in the

τι παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ (V)
 § 21 συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ξητοῦσι δὲ
 δῆλος οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἀλλὰ τάγαθὸν πάντες εἰκός τε τοὺς
 5 πρώτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἡσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν,
 ὄμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ
 λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄποπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς
 τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἐάν
 § 22 ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γάρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, (p. 44)
 10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι·
 καθόλου γάρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν 13
 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσὶν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι κινη-
 τέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσὶν ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
 § 23 ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβεῖας ἀν δόξειν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γάρ
 15 ἢ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δὲ ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς
 νόμους φαῦλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἔατεον ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν

6 ὁμοίως Π¹ Αχ. || 7 τὸ omitted in Π² || 8 ἐὰν Γ Αχ. || 11 γραφῆναι
 Π² Βκ.

Louv Quarterly Review II. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of δολοσαθθοῦ 'beguiled,' as if from δολοῦν.

§ 21 5 εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἡσαν] It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, *aetnōchōter*; see Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. 62 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth *Polit.* 271 ff., cp. *Symp.* 191 b f. In *De Gen. Anim.* III. II. 25, 762 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio aequivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (272)

εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσ.] This agrees with the view explained in n. (167) on § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato *Timaeus* 22 C: πολλαὶ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γεγνασοῦ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔνονται, πινὴ μὲν καὶ ὑδαι μέγισται, μυρτοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἐπερι βραχύτεραι: *Laws* III 677 A B. πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι καταλιποῦσι τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν ὅλῃ βραχὺ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λειπεσθαι γένεται. SUSEM. (273)

6 ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ] "were much the same as the ordinary silly people" of today; cp. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 314. ol

τυχόντες recurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3.

ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark *Politicus* 274 B f.: αὗτοι δὲ δοθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἀφίλακτοι γεγονότες δημοτάσσοντο ὅτε ἀντών (sc. τῶν θηρῶν), καὶ ἐτράπησαν καὶ ἀπέχονται κατὰ τοὺς πρότοις ἡσαν χρόνοις...ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλαις ἡσαν ἀποταλματικοῖς. SUSEM. (274)

Cp. *Protag.* 321 C: man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

8 οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους] Positive law as contrasted with the δόγματα and δύραφα νόμμα discussed in §§ 19—21. See VII(VI). 5. 2 τιθέμενοι δὲ τοιούτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους. The distinction is best explained by Cope *Introdr. to Rhetoric* pp. 239—244.

§ 22 9 ὥσπερ γάρ...12 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσὶν] See III. 16 § 11 with n. (652) f. and n. (637) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 n. (579): the ruler or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing."

§ 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.

νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων οὐ γάρ τοσοῦτον ὀφελήσεται (V)
κινήσας, δσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθείς.

§ 24 φεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐ¹⁴

το γάρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον ὁ γάρ νόμος ἴσχυν
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο
δ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥαδίως

μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους

§ 25 καινοὺς ἀσθενῆ ποιεῖν ἔστι τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ

εἰ καὶ κινητέοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ή
οὐ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ή τισίν; ταῦτα γάρ ἔχει μεγά-
λην διαφοράν.

9 διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν (ἄλλων γάρ
ἐστι καιρών) περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς VI
30 Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν δύο

17 ὀφελήσεται τις M^o P¹, ὀφελήσεται <δ> Susem.¹⁻² misled by the translations of William and Ar. || 18 βλαβήσεται ὁ Schneider || ὑπάρχουσιν Bernays, which I should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων after 17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρὰ Π¹, πλὴν corr.¹ of P^{2,3}, πλὴν παρὰ Π³ Bk. || 23 νόμον P² T^b and P³ (1st hand altered by corr.²) || 25 καὶ before κινητέοι omitted by ΓΜ^o, [καὶ] Susem.¹⁻² || κινητέοι Π³ || καὶ πάντες P⁴ Q¹ T^b L^b Bk. || 28 διὸ...1273 b 24
ἥσυχας noticed by Michael of Ephesus

17 οὐ γάρ τοσοῦτον κτλ] Comp. Rhet. I. 15, 12 οὐ λειτελεῖ παρασφέσθαι τὸν λατρὸν (to outdo your doctor): οὐ γάρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ λατροῦ δοῦν τὸ ἔθισταν ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἀρχοντί; Thuc. III. 37 χείροις νόμους ἀκινήτους χρωμένη πόλις κρέσσων ἔστιν (Eaton). Eur. Bacchae 971 f., οὐ γάρ κρέσσον ποτε τῶν νόμων | γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ μελετᾶν.

§ 24 19 φεῦδος δὲ κτλ] 'These remarks are very true. This is a difference between the sciences or arts and the laws. In the former only he who follows the science has to act and his action on an improved method proceeds from conviction: whereas, if the laws are altered, all must act according to the new law and though unconvinced of the need for alteration' (Schlosser). SUSEM. (276)

21 παρὰ τὸ θος] "has no force to secure obedience apart from habit." The Critical Notes show how the 'conflate' reading, πλὴν παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 24 ἐπι δὲ...27 διαφοράν] Plato's utterance *Latos* 1 634 D exactly agrees with this: ὃμην μὲν γάρ (Cretans and Lacedaemonians), εἶπεν καὶ μετρίως κατεσκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰς τῶν καλλιστῶν

δὲ εἴη νόμων μὴ δητεῖν τῶν νέων μηδένα τέλον, ποιὰ καλῶς αὐτῶν η μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, ...γέρων δὲ εἰ τὸ τι ξιννοεῖ τῶν παρ' ὅμιν, πρὸς ἀρχοντά τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιωτὴν μηδενὸς ἐναρτίον νέου ποιεῖσθαι τοῦς τοιούτους λόγους. Oncken, I. 252, strangely alleges this passage of the *Lates* as a proof of its author's design 'to strangle the healthy common sense of men in the name of political order.' SUSEM. (277)

28 νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν] See *Introd.* pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (278)

This implies that the question has to be decided elsewhere in the treatise.

c. 9 Examination of the Spartan polity.

See *Anal.* p. 106. Since Göttling's *Excursus*, pp. 463—471 of his edition, this chapter has been most fully treated by Oncken I. 218—299, II. 317—376, who writes with especial reference to Grote's memorable chapter on Lycurgus and, in vol. II, to the later monographs by Trieber *Forschungen* and Gilbert *Studien*. See p. 35 note 3. The fragments of the *Poliies* 1557 b 38—1560 a 28 should be compared. See also Jannet *Les institutions sociales à Sparte*.

εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν (VI) ἀρίστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἔτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

§ 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν 35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολὴν, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν· τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ράδιον λαβεῖν. Υ τε γάρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἶλωτες (ἀσπερ γάρ ἐφεδρεύοντες

33 <ἢ> ὑπεναντίως Scaliger, ὑπεναντίως <ἢ μὴ ὑπεναντίως> Susem. would prefer: but no alteration is needed || αὐτοῖς] αὐτῆς M^aQ^bT^bL^a and P⁴ (1st hand), αὐτῷ P¹, αὐτῷ P⁴ (corr.), αὐτῷ Ar. || 34 <πόλει> πολιτεύεσθαι? Madvig || 37 πενεστία M^aP⁴ and P^{2.2} (1st hand, altered by corr.²P² and a later hand in P³) || 38 οἱ omitted by M^aP¹L^a, [οἱ] Susem.^{1.2}

§ 1. 31 μία μὲν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success: "whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed." πρὸς = when judged by a given standard.

32 εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν...ὑπεναντίως] sc. νενομοθέτηται. So § 18 ὑπεναντίως δὲ...πρὸς ταῦτην τὴν δύορθωσιν.

The Helots or Serfs: §§ 2—4.

§ 2 34 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...35 ὁμολογούμενον δοτίν] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle's own ideal state. Cp. also n. (192) on 6 § 5; c. II § 10 n. (393); IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 8; 10 § 9 with n. (813), and *Introd.* p. 22 n. (3). SUSEM. (279)

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήγ] leisure free from imposed labour: I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5.

36 τε followed by 38 δέ.

ἢ τε γάρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία κτλ] Compare § 22 n. (178). Wherever in Greece bodies of serfs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the freer lot of Provincials (Περιοίκοι) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* i p. 191—194, Eng. tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194—200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert *Studien* p. 76 ff.). The Penestae

were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archemachos *Fr.* 1, from Athenaeus VI. 264 A: Βουτῶν τῶν τὴν Ἀραλαν κατοικηάντων οἱ μὴ ἀπάραντες εἰς τὴν Βουτίαν, ἀλλ' ἐμφιλοχωρήσαντες παρέδωκαν εἴσοδος τοῖς Θετταλοῖς δουλεύειν καθ' ὄμολογας, ἐφ' ϕ αὐτες ἔξασιν αὐτοῖς ἐς τῆς χώρας, οὔτε ἀποκτενοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ὃς τὴν χώραν ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς συντάξεις ἀποδώσουσιν' οὐτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὄμολογας καταμελναντες καὶ παράδοντες εἴσοδος ἐκλήθησαν τότε μενόται, νῦν δὲ πενέσται: and Theopompos *Fr.* 134 in Ath. vi. 265 B, C: Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Θετταλοὶ φανήσονται κατασκευασμένοι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οἰκούντων πρότερον τὴν χώραν, ἦν ἐκείνοι νῦν ἔχουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιῶν, Θετταλοὶ δὲ Περφαβῶν καὶ Μαγνησίων καὶ προσηγόρευσαν τούτις καταδουλωθέντες οἱ μὲν εἶλωται οἱ δὲ πενέσται. On the similar relation between the Mariandynians and the people of Heracleia see n. (777) on IV(VII). 6 § 8. SUSEM. (280)

Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mariandynians *Law* VI 776 c, d.

38 [φεδρεύοντες] always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 δέ γάρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς τοὺς εἴλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθεστήκει.

(VI)

§ 3 τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν) περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδέν ³
 40 πω τοιούτον συμβέβηκεν. αἴτιον δὲ ἵσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιώσας
^{1269 b} πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-
 μαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς ^(p. 45)
 κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες
 ἔχθροι πάντες ἥσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες·
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ
 πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περαιώσις καὶ
 8 2 Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς ⁴
 ἐπιμελείας ἐργάδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὄμιλῆσαι
 τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἵσων ἀξιούσιν
 10 ἕαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβούλευονται
 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <δέ> οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἔξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον
 8 5 τρόπον, οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλωτέαν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ σ
 περὶ τὰς γυναικας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαιρεσιν τῆς πο-

1269 b 3 περὶ οἰκους M^a and apparently Γ (praedia circa domus William) || 5
 ἀφίσταντο Bas.³ in the margin || 6 περραιβοῦς ΙΙ² Bk. Susem.¹ || 9 ἀνεψέντοι
 Triebel (perhaps rightly) || 10 κακοπαθῶντες P¹ (1st hand, perhaps rightly), γρ.
 κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες corr.¹ of P¹ in the margin || 11 <δέ> οὖν or γοῦν Susem., οὖν
 Γ ΙΙ Ar. Bk. || 12 ἐπι...1270 a 8 πάλω] Plut. Lyk. 14 quotes similar statements
 from Aristotle, but, as Heitz (*Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* p. 30) rightly
 judges, from his Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία

§ 3 40 αἴτιον δέ τοις] It might be thought that one very material reason was the much freer and less oppressed position which, according to Aristotle's own evidences 5 § 19 n. (171), the Cretans granted to their dependants (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 n. (355), § 5 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374). SUSEM. (281)

1269 b 3 περιοίκους] See c. 10 § 3 and Exc. III.

5 τοῖς Θετταλοῖς] dativus incommodi. ἀφίσταντο sc. οἱ πενθόται.

§ 4 7 τό γε τῆς ἐπιμελεῖας κτλ.] "the task of attending to this; how, namely, we ought to associate with them"—the sentence τίνα δεῖ...τρόπον being dependent on the noun ἐπιμελεῖας, just as in IV(vii). 16. 1 πότε χρή πουεῖσθαι τὴν δημό-
 λιαν is dependent on ἐπιμελητέον. We may render: "It would seem too that apart from everything else there is the irksome task of seeing that we behave to them as we ought: for when allowed their freedom, they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their lords: if treated harshly, they plot revenge and

cherish hatred."

11 δῆλον κτλ.] The truth of this remark no one will wish to question. But does Aristotle really know of a remedy? He hopes to get over the difficulty in his own 'best state' by taking men of non-Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent freemen of different nations but only of the gentler races: IV(vii). 10 §§ 13, 14, n. (840); cp. IV(vii), 8 § 8 (815), and n. (304) with Exc. III. Supposing all this could be so fortunately arranged, would it have been any real remedy? SUSEM. (282)

The women of Sparta: §§ 5—12.

§ 5 13 ἡ περὶ τῶν γυναικας ἀνεσις] So Plato speaks *Laws* I 637. Σ δευτέρων τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὑμνόν ἀνεσιν, and Euripides *Androm.* 595 οὐδέ ἂν εἰ βούλοτο τις | σώφρων γένοιστο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη (Eaton). SUSEM. (283)

πρὸς τὴν προαιρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας] 'judged by the intention of the constitution,' the second point of view for criticism as mentioned in § 1. The other, the standard of the best constitution, is here

λιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γάρ (VI)
 15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνῆ, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς
 τοῦ δίχα διηρήσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἴς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλῆ-
 θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως
 ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικας, τὸ ἡμίσου τῆς πόλεως δεῖ νομί-
 § 6 ζειν εἶναι ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεὶ συμβέβηκεν ὅλην γάρ
 20 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικήν, κατὰ
 μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας τοιοῦτος ἔστιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν
 ἔξημέληκεν· ζώσι γάρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἄπασαν ἀκολασίαν
 § 7 καὶ τρυφερώς. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ
 τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἄλλως τε κάν τύχωσι γυναικοκρα-
 25 τούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολε-
 μικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἡ κάν εἰ τινες ἔτεροι φανερώς

14 *εὐρούλαρ* P⁴T^bL^a Ar. Ald., corr.¹ of P²⁻³ and p¹ in the margin (wrongly) ||
 15 [ἀνὴρ καὶ] Oncken || 16 *εἰς τε* ὥστε M^a and, with *εἰς τε* written over it, Γ
 apparently || 18 δεῖ νομίζειν after 19 *ελατ* P¹ II^b Bk. || 21 τοιοῦτος ἔστιν M^aP¹,
 φανερός ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἀν P² Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly, φανερός ἔστι τούτον τυχών Bender
 || 24 τυγχάνωσι Ald. and corr.¹ of P²⁻³, τύχωσι καὶ M^a || 26 [i] Schneider ||
 φανερώς omitted by ΓM^a and P¹ (1st hand, added by p¹ in the margin); [φανερώς]
 Susem.¹

called the Wellbeing or Happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) of the state (Congreve). This then, and not *εὐρούλαρ*, is the right reading. For the best constitution is precisely that which most contributes to the 'best life' or Happiness. See I. 2 I. n. (128): I. 2 § 8 n. (21); and especially III. 18 § 1 n. (683), IV(vii). I. § 1 (685), § 2 (687), § 11: I. 2 § 2, § 5 (714), 9 § 3 I. (806), 13 § 3. SUSEM. (284)

15 *οἰκίας μέρος*] So I. 3 § 1, 4 § 1,
 13 § 15.

καὶ πόλιν...νομίζειν] "one must regard the state as nearly divided into two." But the construction is not plain: is it ἔγγὺς <οἰσταν> τοῦ δίχα διηρήσθαι? This would be supported by v(iii). 6. II, VIII(v). I. 16, where ἔγγὺς is almost an adjective. Or it might also be νομίζειν διηρήσθαι ἔγγὺς τοῦ δίχα <διηρήσθαι>.

16 From Euclid *Elem.* I. 10, I. 9, III. 30 it is seen that δίχα διαιρεῖν = to divide into two *equal* parts. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 4. 8 with Jackson's note.

17 *ὥστε ἐν ὅσαις κτλ.*] From this it is seen, as indeed before from I. 13 § 16 nn. (116) (137), that Aristotle intended to introduce into his ideal state a public education and training for women, although this education was certainly not to be

common to boys and girls. Cp. *Introd.* pp. 49, 52 (2). In the *Law* vi 781 B Plato had expressed himself still more forcibly: οὐ γάρ ἡμῖν μόνον ἔστιν, ὡς δόξειν ἀν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικας δεκοσμήτως περιορίσαν, δῶρο δὲ ἡ θῆταια ἡμῖν φύσις ἔστι πρὸς ἀρέτην χειρῶν τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, τοσούτῳ διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ πλεῖν ἡ διπλάσιον ελατ. Aristotle however says quite the same thing *Rhet.* i. 5. b 1361 a 10 ff., δῶρο γάρ τὰ κατὰ γυναικας φαίλα ὥσπερ Δακεδαιμονίους, σχέδον κατὰ τὸ ἡμίσου οὐκ εὐδαιμονόσι (quoted by Eaton). SUSEM. (285)

§ 6 20 καρτερικήν] of hardy endurance.

22 ἔξημέληκεν] has disregarded his aim. This picture of luxurious living is indirectly confirmed by Plato *Rcp.* VIII. 548 A, B; ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὅτε κεκτημένοι ταμεία καὶ οἰκεῖα θησαυρούς, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων ἀτεχνῶν νεοττάδις, ἐν αἷς ἀναλόσκοντες γυναιξὶ πολλὰ ἄν δαπανῶντο: cp. 550 D.

§ 7 23 ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον] Wealth must needs be in esteem, because the unbridled luxury of women is a very costly business. SUSEM. (286)

26 Κελτῶν] See *Note on the Celts* at the end of B. II. SUSEM. (287)

§ 8 τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ (VI)
οἱ μυθολογῆσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεῦξαι τὸν Ἀρην
πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὄμιλαν
30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακώχιμοι πάντες
οἱ τοιούτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Λάκωσι τοῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ;
§ 9 διφρεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι

28 πρῶτος M⁴ P¹, perhaps rightly || ἀρη P²⁻³ Q^b Ald. Bk. || 32 διώκητο
M⁴ P¹

§ 8 28 ὁ μυθολογῆσας πρῶτος] Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and customs, *etc.* (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are direct inventions of individuals, who consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and thoughts. Cp. also v(viii). 6 § 13 n. 1078. SUSEM. (288)

29 ἢ γὰρ κτλ.] 'In his assertion, that martial races are also the most amorous, Aristotle is supported by the views of modern anthropologists' (Fülleborn). SUSEM. (289)

30 κατακώχιμοι] easily captivated, with ὅτδε v(viii). 7. 4, with &c Nic. Eth. x. 9. 3; with πρὸς one might say "easily allured to."

31 διὸ παρὰ κτλ.] Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 268 Eng. tr. is certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that the prevailing condition of things with us in this respect would have appeared to an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (*γυναικοκρατία*), although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly answer the question proposed by J. G. Schneider (see n. 295 b) and by Oncken: whether true womanliness can have thriven under so rough a treatment of the marriage relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public table, slept in a tent, and only paid stolen visits to his wife; where consequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common duty and mutual improvement, where parental duty was removed and the natural field for the wife's activity abolished. If

in the latter respect Aristotle mistook the cause of the evil (as his retention of common messes for the men and his excessive public education prove), does this justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly incorrect? In reference to the first question, if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to hand over one's wife to another, if, as Schömann himself thinks, *op. c.* p. 267, a Spartan woman, to whom proposals were made by another man, hardly felt herself insulted by them but referred the lover to her husband, then (as Fülleborn and Schömann after him have remarked) the boast of the Spartans, that adultery was never heard of amongst them, does not amount to much: adultery here only means an intrigue with another man without the husband's permission. The further boast of the Spartan women, that they were in an especial degree good housewives (Schömann *op. c.* p. 268), must accordingly be reduced to its proper dimensions. Plato however concedes (*Laws* VII 805 ε f.) that though the Spartan women did not weave and spin, occupations which they left to their female slaves, they yet led an active life: since they had nearly half the responsibility for the management of the household and the education of the children. Certainly there is some exaggeration in the charges of license and love of power brought against them, and this must be moderated from the above points of view: but it is quite as certain that they are not all pure inventions. Oncken refers his readers to the proof given by him *Hellas and Athens* II. 85. Cp. *Introd.* p. 36 n. (1). SUSEM. (290)

32 ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς] during their supremacy. Cp. § 10 n. (292): VIII(v). 6. 13, ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλεινῶν ἀρχῆς, 7 § 14 ἐπὶ Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων: and *De Cadeo* III. 2 § 7, 300 b 30, ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος, during the reign of Love.

τί διαφέρει γυναικας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν (VI)
γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταῦτὸ γάρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' οὐ- (p. 46)
25 σῆς τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἰπερ,
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
§ 10 Λακώνων ἡσαν. ἔδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς·
χρησίμοι μὲν γάρ οὐδὲν ἡσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν,
θόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλειό τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν 8
40 οὖν ἔοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυ-
§ 11 ναικῶν ἄνεστις. ἔξω γάρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας
1270^a ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους
πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσηνίους·
σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδο-

35 εἰπερ II Bk.; ἦπερ Sylburg Susem.¹ misled by William's version *nisi ad bellum*
|| 36 τοῦθ' τοῦτον Spengel

1270 a 1 τῆς οἰκείας (*oikias*? Γ Ar.) omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand), added by p¹
in the margin || 4 πρωδοπεποιημένους Bk. Susem.¹ by a misprint (corrected by
Bender)

§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See 5 § 4 n.
and I. 7 § 2. SUSEM. (291)

§ 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς]
'at the time of the Theban invasion'
under Epameinondas 369 B.C. SUSEM.
(292)

38 χρησίμοι κτλ] "For they were of no use, any more than the women in other cities, but they caused more confusion than the enemy." It is significant that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon (*Hellen.* vi. 5 28 al μὲν γυναικες οὐδὲ τὸν καπνὸν ὁρῶσαι ἡρεχοντο, ἀλλ' οὐδέποτε λούσαι πολεμίου) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 31 καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ διωμένων ητοχάστειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὐσῶν πρὸς τε τὴν κραυγὴν καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῶν πολεμίων) speak much more strongly on this point. Onceken observes quite rightly, that this was the first opportunity the Spartan women had for putting into practice the brave speeches they had been making for centuries; they might at least have displayed a quiet bearing, even if they were not to be taken at their word. SUSEM. (293)

Bernays renders: 'although the women in other cities are of use' [on such occasions]. But is it so? The *Septem* of Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, *Laws* 806 B.

§ 11 1270 a 1 ἔξω γάρ κτλ] According to Plutarch *Lycurg.* 1, in his account of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-

ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C. (J. G. Schneider). See this passage among the *Fragments* 490, 1558 a 13, Rose = 485 in Rose Aristot. pseudop. = 76 Müller. Further compare especially Gilbert *Studien* 72 ff. 158 ff. SUSEM. (294)

The passage is as follows: οἱ μὲν γάρ Ιφίτῳ συνακόδαινοι καὶ σινδιαθέντες τὴν Ὁλυμπιακὴν ἐκεχειραν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν, ὃν ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμήριον προσφέρων τὸν Ὁλυμπιασι δίσκον ἐν φονομονάρᾳ τοῦ Λυκούργου διασώζεται καταγεγραμμένον. E. Curtius, *History Eng.* tr. I. p. 191, adopts this date. Even so, there would be a grave chronological difficulty if these Arcadian wars be supposed to precede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the main fact Aristotle is correct. A long period of camp-life, of war in which the Spartans lived perpetually in the field, must have preceded the complete establishment of the system and the institutions which are referred to the Lycurgean legislation*. Such a period we find in the tedious and difficult conquest of Laconia by its Dorian invaders.

4 πρωδοπεποιημένους] Note the double formation of perfect.

* I entirely agree with Wilamowitz *Homerische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884, p. 267 ff., that Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the supposed Lycurgean legislation never had an existence; and I also regard the account which he gives of the real state of things as altogether correct. SUSEM.

5 πεποιημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γάρ ἔχει^(V1))
 μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναικάς φασι μὲν ἄγειν ἐπιχει-
 ρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουνον,
 § 12 ἀποστῆναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν γενομέ-⁹
 νων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς
 io οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δεῖ συγγράμμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν,
 § 13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄρθως καὶ μὴ ὄρθως. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-

7 ἐπὶ] ὑπὸ ? Koraes || 8 γενομένων M^oP¹ || 11 τοῦ] τὰ Q^bT^b and P⁴ (1st hand), γρ. τοῦ P⁴ in the margin

5 πολλὰ γάρ ἔχει μέρη κτλ] Cr. Plato *Laws* I. 630 Ε οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι
 μόριον καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαινότατον ἐτίθει [δ' Λυκοῦργος] βλέπων, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρε-
 τήν: Thuc. I. 84. 3 πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ
 εὐθυνοὶ διὰ τὸ εὔκοσμον γιγνόμεθα: v.
 66. 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (294 b)

6 φασι] As to whether this is an
 anonymous quotation from Ephorus, or
 an appeal to oral tradition, see *Introd.*
 p. 35 n. (3). Cr. also below n. (310) on
 § 7. SUSEM. (295)

7 ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουνον κτλ] Precisely so
 Plato *Laws* VI. 781 A τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναικας
 οὐδαμῶς ὄρθως ανομοθέτητον μεδεῖται...ἀλλ'
 δ καὶ ἄλλως γένος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 λαθραιότερον μάλλον καὶ ἐπικλονώτερον
 ἔφη, τὸ θῆλυν, διὰ τὸ δύσθενός, οὐκ ὄρθως
 τοῦτο εἴξαντος τοῦ νομοθέτου δύστακ-
 τον ὄντα φεβόη. This Plutarch must have for-
 gotten, when (*Lycurg.* 14) he attacks Aristotle alone on account of this same remark
 and tries to refute him. The facts which
 he adduces with this object prove simply
 nothing: but directly afterwards (c. 15)
 he gives a detailed account of the Spartan
 custom of lending wives, and this does
 not make the assertion, which he appends
 to it, very credible: viz. ταῦτα δὲ οὐτως
 πραττόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τότε το-
 σοῦτον ἀπείχει τῆς ὑστερον λεγο-
 μένης γενέσθαι περὶ τὰς γυναικας
 εὐχερεῖται, ὥστε ὅλως ἀπιστον εἶναι τὸ
 τῆς μορχελας παρ' αὐτοῖς. Even he does
 not venture to deny the subsequent laxity
 of the women at Sparta. (J. G.
 Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of
 the events which happened and there-
 fore clearly of this mistake: but the ques-
 tion before us is not who is, or is not,
 excusable; but whether as a matter of
 fact (a legislator) is right or wrong."

9 ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς...τι ὄρθως] Thus Aristotle
 is not unaware that the author of
 a code or a constitution is by no means
 able to proceed simply at his own good

pleasure, but is tied down to the given
 circumstances: cp. § 22 n. (322), 12 § 5
 (409); VI(iv). i § 3 ff. n. (1116), c. 6, 11
 §§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.: VII(vi), c. 4. It is
 only in case these circumstances are
 highly favourable that he considers his
 own best constitution possible. But this
 is still a long way off the knowledge that
 a nation's constitution and code of laws
 are in general the product *primarily* of
 its individuality and history, and only
secondarily of the legislator's wisdom or
 unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle omit
 forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of
 his own examination in that 'he never
 purposes to account for the constitution
 by the circumstances under which it
 arose, or to fathom the necessities which
 confronted the legislator. Instead of this,
 Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual
 state, is treated like Plato who con-
 structed an imaginary state. Aristotle's
 criticism neither is nor claims to be his-
 torical criticism in our sense of the term,
 which is more concerned to explain the
 connexion of the facts than to award
 praise or blame. He is as one-sided
 in pointing out the defects of this poli-
 tical structure as the admirers of its ex-
 cellences had been in earlier times and
 continued to be later on. Nor could it
 have been otherwise: for neither he nor
 they had the requisite historical data for
 appreciating the personal responsibility of
 Lycurgus.' Nor have we even now:—as-
 suming that we still retain our belief in
 the existence of such a person as Lycur-
 gus. Moreover in spite of his recogni-
 tion of the force of circumstances Aristotle
 shares with Plato 'and all the political
 theorists of Greece the belief in the om-
 nipotence of positive legislation, as if
 mighty historical developments which are
 not of today or yesterday could be simply
 swept out of the world by a command or
 prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus
 responsible for things for which no legis-

ναικας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, (VI)
οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ'
αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.
15 * *. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν
§ 14 τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειν ἀν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ-
βέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν
μικράν διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἤκειν ή χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ
τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως ὠνεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ η πωλεῖν
20 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὅρθως ποιήσας, διό-

12 ἔοικεν omitted by ΓΜ* || 13 αὐτὴν Μ*Π*Βκ., αὐτὰ Ar. || 14 αὐτὰ Ar. ||
ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 15 * * μετὰ γὰρ Susem., see Comm.; μετὰ δὲ Zwinger ||
17 λιαν omitted by Μ*Π* [τὸν] τὸν Μ*, τῶν Π* || 18 ἤκει ? Congreve || 19
τὸν νόμον Μ* and perhaps Ar. || 20 οὐκ before ἐποίησεν inserted by Π* (erased
by corr. Π*), οὐδεῖν ? Bender

lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the *effects* could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him' (Oncken). Cp. also *n.* (82) on I. 9 § 8: *n.* (238) on II. 7 § 8; Exc. II on Bk. II; *n.* (339) on § 30 below; (466) on III. 3 § 9; (552) on III. 9 § 8; II. 5 § 8 *n.* (160): IV(VII). 14 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law' (cp. *n.* 48 on I. 6. 1 and Exc. II to Bk. II), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see *n.* (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: I. 2 § 15, ὁ πρώτος συστήσας, *n.* (28 b): or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ὁ μυθολογῆσας πρώτος, *n.* (288).

'In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism' (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see *nn.* 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.

§ 13 15 μετὰ γὰρ κτλ] Possibly we should alter γὰρ into δέ, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last *n.*), which is referred to in § 13, see *n.* (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion: this may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ κτλ served as reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γὰρ of the text is an inconsistency. SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. VIII(V). 7 § 10 ἐν Δακεδαμῷ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἐρχονται *n.* (160). SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus. The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitadeus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given

vai δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἔξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς Βουλομένοις. (VI)
καίτοι ταῦτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.
§ 15 *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν*
24 πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων.

21 καταλιπεῖν M^o P¹ Susem.¹ || 22 ταῦτὸ P¹, τοῦτο II^o Bk.¹ || 23 [ἔστι] ἐπι
 Bender very temptingly, yet *ἔστι* would then be required after *τῶν πέντε μερῶν* || δῆ
 Susem.¹ wrongly, see Comm. || *καὶ* omitted by II^o, [*καὶ*] Susem.¹: if we read *ἔστι* with
 Bender, it is not needed || 24 γενομένων Koraes

away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch *Agis* 4, cp. Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnished? See further the next note. SUSEM. (299)

ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν] Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice; it was held dishonourable to sell. 'With this agrees the omission of Sparta, 8 § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law' (Oncken), as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions; comp. n. (237). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, *with the design that this equality should be perpetual?* (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, IV(vii). 10 §§ 9—12 n. (835);—cp. nn. on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 15 (214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phaleas—6 § 10 ff. (208—211), 7 § 5 (234)—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about: nay more, for having taken

as good as no means whatever? The 7th fragment of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* attributed to Herakleides (Müller *Frag. hist. Gr.* II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristotelian work *On the Spartan constitution*, see n. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that *τὴς δ' ἀρχαλα μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστι* is not one here. Cp. n. (310 *) on § 17. Gilbert, op. c. 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the 'ancient portion' (*ἀρχαλα μοίρα*), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislator to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert's whole method of explaining this *ἀρχαλα μοίρα* has already been briefly, but correctly, refuted by Frick in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CV. 1872. 667. SUSEM. (300)

21 *διδόναις δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν]* Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land. SUSEM. (301)

22 *καίτοι ταῦτὸ συμβαίνειν κτλ.]* Cp. VIII(v). 8 § 20 s. fin. n. (1628). SUSEM. (301 b)

§ 15 24 *τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο]* two fifths.

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων κτλ.] why the number of heiresses in Sparta was disproportionately large Aristotle considers it superfluous to show, because it is readily understood that in the many long wars an unusually large number of sons fell

25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν (VI) μηδεμίαν ἡ ὀλίγην ἡ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. ** νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι (p. 47) δοῦναι τε τὴν ἐπίκλητρον ὅτῳ ἀν βούληται· καν ἀποθάνῃ μὴ διαθέμενος, ὃν ἀν καταλίπη κληρονόμον, οὐτος φ ἀν § 16 θέλῃ διδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἵπ-
30 πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὄπλιτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χιλίου τὸ πλῆθος ἥσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12 δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην
μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο
§ 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-

25 ἦν omitted by Π¹, [ἥν] Susem.¹⁻² doubtfully || 26 * * νῦν Bücheler, see Comm. n. (304): νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι δοῦναι <δύσην ἀν τὸ θέλγη> καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναι > τῷ κτλ Welldon || 27 τε omitted by M^o Π¹, [τε] Susem.¹⁻² || 28 ὃν ἀν καταλίπη, <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος οὐ φ ἀν καταλίπη <τὴν> κληρονόμον, οὗτος Koraes || 30 τρισμυρίους] τρισχίλους Π¹ in the margin || 33 οὐδὲ μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὑπήνεγκε Susem.¹⁻² misled by William's version *nullam enim plagam pertulit* || 34 μὲν omitted by Π¹: [μὲν] Susem.¹⁻²

(Bender). Aristotle's statement concerning the great wealth of Spartan women is confirmed by Plutarch's from a yet later time *Agis* 4. 7. ἦν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακωνικῶν πλούτων ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὸ πλείστον. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (302)

The Spartan name for them is ἐπιτάδηνες, ἐπιτάματίδες.

25 καίτοι βέλτιον] Here again later authors are apparently better informed of the facts than Aristotle. We are told that dowries had actually been prohibited, and that down to the time of Lysander none were ever given; see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 265 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (303)

26 νῦν δὲ ἔξεστι κτλ] It is obvious that this sentence forms no antithesis to the preceding and thus νῦν δὲ gives no sense. All however is right if one imagines something like the following to have fallen out before νῦν δὲ: <And besides it would have been necessary to prescribe who had the right and obligation of marrying heiresses, > whereas at present every father can marry his daughter to any one he pleases, and if he die without a will his heir at law bestows her upon whom he pleases.' SUSEM. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means 'heir': here it must mean the person entitled to the rights of the deceased, the next male relation of full age, or, if there were more than one such, the eldest of them. SUSEM. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king by Herod. VI. 57: δικάζειν δὲ τοὺς βασιλέας...πατρούχον τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐσ τὸν Ικνέαται ἔχειν, ἣν μη περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἔγνησται.

§ 16 29 δυναμένης] Of course Aristotle makes this calculation, as Oncken remarks, with regard to the total population of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non-Spartan descent. In any case it is rather too high an estimate, as this total population amounted to only 400,000 at the most: see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other hand the reading, or rather conjecture, τρισχίλους would not merely give a number far too small, but also one out of all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry. SUSEM. (306)

30 οὐδὲ χλίους] 'In the time of Agis B.C. 241 (Plut. *Agis* c. 5) the Spartans were but 700, and only 100 retained their family allotments' (Eaton). SUSEM. (307)

33 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν] The battle of Leuctra. Cp. further § 34 n. (3+5), IV(VII), 14 § 21 n. (916): V(VIII), 4 § 4, § 7 n. (1008). SUSEM. (308)

οὐχ ὑπήνεγκε] The negative to be taken closely with the verb: under one blow the city sank. Cp. Aristoph. *Knights* 1377 δεξίως οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, Plato *Phil.* 23 Λ ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀπεταύει τῶν νικητηρίων: and below *Pol.* VI(IV), 4. 30 οὐ πολετελαν.

34 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν] Here

35 ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὡστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι (VI)
 τότε δινγανθρωπίαν πολεμούντων πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ φασιν
 εἶναι ποτε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας καὶ μυρίους οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴτ'
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως
 § 18 ὡμαλισμένης πληθύειν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ 13
 40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθω-

37 τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας At. Bücheler Susem.², τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text and probably Γ; Thurot first suspected an error

again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not provincials (*περιουσούς*) and Helots. According to Xenophon, *Hellen.* VI. 4. 15, 1000 Lakedaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Σπαρτιάτας who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, *De Rep. Lac.* I. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (309)

§ 17 34 λέγουσι δέ κτλ] It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, IX. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Tisamenos the Elean and his brother Hegias μούναι δὴ τάνταν ἀνθρώπων ἐγένετο Σπαρτιέρος πολιῆται' (Congreve). Cp. also n. (312). (Plutarch *Instit. Lac.* 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the strangers who submitted to the Lycorean discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τῆς ἀρχῆθεν διατεγμένης μορφας, which they were not permitted to sell. Cp. n. 300.) Ephorus however, as Trieber shows, had the following story, *Frag.* 18 found in Strabo VIII. 364. The first kings Eurysthenes and Procles had divided Laconia into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the περιουσούς were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Trieber and Susemihl once supposed: but this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephorus. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidae and

Talhybiadae: see Schömann p. 193, 208, 225 f., 249 Eng. tr.; Gilbert p. 52 ff., 57 ff., 149 f.; Frick in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cv. 1872, p. 655 ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreigners proper; whereas Aristotle might mean the μόδακες, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such μόδακες were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lysander, Gylipos, Kleandridas, for example, belonged to their number, see Schömann p. 200 Eng. tr. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the νεοδαμώδεις, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of νεοδαμώδεις is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schömann p. 198 Eng. tr.—Comp. § 11 n. (295) and esp. *Introd.* p. 35 n. (3). SUSEM. (310)

35 ὡστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι] and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time. The indicative would have been used in *oratio recta*: hence οὐ, not μή, in *obliqua*. Thucyd. V. 40 ὡστ' οὐχ ἥγεσθαι and Demosth. *De falsa leg.* §§ 166, 167, 351 with Shilleto's Appendix B.

36 καὶ φασιν εἶναι κτλ] Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demaratos in Herod. VII. 234 reckons them at about 8,000 (Eaton). SUSEM. (311)

37 εἴτ' ἔστιν ἀληθῆ...εἴτε μή] Aristotle himself then doubts it. SUSEM. (312)

38 βέλτιον...39 τὴν πόλιν] "It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property" than by the admission of aliens.

§ 18 40 ὑπεναντίος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν] is an obstacle to a correction of these evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 1 for

1270 b σιν. βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ώς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς (VI) Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παιδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς § 19 νιόντας ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καίτοι 5 φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῶν γυνομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλούς γίνεσθαι πένητας.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρ- 14 χὴ κυρίᾳ μὲν αὐτῇ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἔστιν, γίνονται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ἂστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀνθρωποι σφό-

1270 b 2 προάγει Spengel || τοὺς πολίτας omitted by M^o P¹ || 8 αὗτη Ατ., omitted by ΓΜ^o Welldon || 9 παντός Sauppe (*Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum* p. 94 f.), πάντες ΓΠ Ατ. Bk.

construction. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας κτλ] 'stimulates the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phaleas did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See 6 § 10 ff. nn. (208—211), 7 § 5 ff. nn. (234, 235). SUSEM. (313)

4 ἄφρουρον] not liable to military service, [ἱεψφρουρον: φρουρά is a Spartan word for στρατί, found frequently in Xenophon's *Hellenics*, II. 4. 29 ἔξαγει φρουρά, so IV. 7. 2, V. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φρουρά φανειν = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 75, Βρασίδας φρουρά έχων.

τέτταρας] Aelian *Var. Hist.* VI. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso *Sparta* I. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Trieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see n. (321) on § 21. SUSEM. (314)

§ 19 4 καίτοι φανερὸν κτλ] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting

men would be prevented by equality and inalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous surmise, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the μάρτιοι (see n. 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. 'The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Öncken). SUSEM. (315)

The Ephorality §§ 19—24. Amongst other monographs see A. Schäfer *De ephoris commentatio* (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein *The development of the Ephorality* (Jahresber. des Gymn. in Konitz, 1870), Urlich in *Rhein. Mus.* VI. 1847, p. 221, G. Dum *Entstehung und Entwicklung des spartanischen Ephoratu* (Innsbruck 1878).

8 αὗτῇ] in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δήμου] Thirlwall (IV. 377) supposed the δῆμος to include the ιπο-

10 δρα πένητες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὥνιοι ἡσαν. (VI)
 § 20 ἐδῆλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν
 τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις διαφθαρέντες γάρ ἀργυρόφ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-
 χὴν εἶναι λιαν μεγάλην καὶ ἴσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν αὐ-
 15 τοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτη συν-
 επιβλαπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίᾳ γάρ ἐξ ἀριστο- 15
 § 21 κρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ
 ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ἡσυχάζει γάρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς (p. 43)
 μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τὴν
 20 τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμα-

10 ἀν εἶσαν? Schneider || 12 Ἀνδρίοις Ar., ἀνδρῶισ even Bk.¹, ἀνδρεῖοι P³ (1st hand, emended by a later hand), ἀντρεῖοι Γ M⁴ and P¹ (1st hand), ἀνδρεῖοι corr. of P¹ (τ altered to δ), γρ. ἀνδρῶισ p¹ in the margin || 14 [ἀντρὸς] Oncken, αὐτὸς Ridgeway || αὐτὸς ἡράγκαζον καὶ τοὺς Susem.², reges ipsos populares fieri compulerant Ar.; regere populum se ipsos cogebant reges William, whence αὐτὸς ἡράγκαζον[το] καὶ [οἱ] Susem.¹ || 16 ἀριστοκρατεῖα P²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b || 19 τὴν om. by II² Bk.

μελεῖς as well as the δομοι, and so too K. F. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schömann *Antiquities* p. 245 Eng. tr. See Busolt 'The Lacedaemonians and their allies' I. p. 21 f. (Leipzig, 1878). For παντός, not παντες, see § 22, 10 § 10.

10 ἀρχεῖον=magistracy, board: so § 21, 10 § 10 τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον.
 ὄντος] See below 10 § 12 n. (370 b) and Thuc. I. 131. 2 ὁ δὲ (Ιανσαρτας) πιστεῖνος χρήματα διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν (Eaton); also *Rhet.* III. 6, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γάρ (his colleagues) χρήματα λαβῖντες ταῦτα ἐπράξαν, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμην (Götting). SUSEM. (316)

ἡσαν] were often. 'Why this tense? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were so or not?' (Congreve). It is imperfect in § 14 ἡκεν, § 16 ἡσαν, § 20 ἡναγκάζοντο, συνέβαινε.

§ 20 II ἣν τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις] what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ νῦν=recently, compare VIII(v). 10 § 31 καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονίσου, n. (1699). SUSEM. (317)

14 καὶ ἴσοτύραννον] Cp. Plato *Laws* IV. 712 D καὶ γάρ τυραννίδει δοκεῖ μου προσεικέναι [ἢ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι πολιτείᾳ]. τὸ γάρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστῶς ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῷ γέγονε. See c. 6 § 17 n. (219). SUSEM. (318)

δημαγωγεῖν=to conciliate, flatter *an individual* like a demagogue, in VIII(v).

6 § 6, 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly serves to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. SUSEM. (319) If therefore αὐτὸς be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in §§ 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αὐτὸς is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Busse who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17, 1265 b 38, δημοκρατεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν δῆμου εἶναι τοὺς ἐφόρους." SUSEM.

16 ἢ οἱ ἀριστοκρατεῖα] See n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. SUSEM. (320)

§ 21 17 συνέχει=is the keystone of the constitution.

19 διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην] Not Lycurgus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, VIII(v). II § 2, Theopompos. See n. (314) on § 18. SUSEM. (321)

εἴτε διὰ τὴν τύχην] Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. 12 § 5 n. (409). SUSEM. (321 b)

20 συμπέπτωκεν] Cp. ἀπό συμπτώ-
 ματος c. 12 § 5.

§ 22 σιν δεῖ γάρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα (VI)
 βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά
 οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν,
 οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν—ἀθλον γάρ ή ἀρχὴ
 25 αὗτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν—, ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν—κα-
 § 23 θίσταται γάρ ἐξ ἀπάντων—) ἀλλ' αἰρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν 16
 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μέν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὃν
 νῦν (παιδαριώδης γάρ ἐστι λίαν). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεων μεγά-

22 ταῦτα P¹, ταῦτα ΓΡ⁴, τὴν αὐτήν or [ταῦτά] Schneider, <κατά> ταῦτα Bernays; either this or τὴν αὐτήν is right || 24 ἀθλον...ἐστιν] Trieber considers these words to be a gloss from Demosth. *Lept.* § 107; even Giphanius remarks on the agreement of the two passages "valde miror": see Comm. || 26 ἔδει] ἡδη M¹ P¹
 || 28 κρίσεων εἰσὶ μεγάλων Π² Bk.

§ 22 21 δεῖ γάρ...22 διαμένειν ταῦτά]
 Cp. VI(iv). 9 § 10 n. (1267), 12 § 1
 (1307); VII(v). 5 § 4 (1434); VIII(v).
 9 § 5 (1634). SUSEM. (322)

The order (which Stahr, and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is δεῖ πάρτα τὰ
 μέρη (subject) τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν
 πολιτείαν τὴν μ. σ. (object of βούλεσθαι)
 εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν. If a constitution is
 to be preserved, all classes in the state
 must desire its existence and continuance.
 Hence we are led to Bernays' or
 Schneider's correction.

23 οὕτως Κχουστων=βούλονται τὴν πο-
 λιτείαν διαμένειν (Congreve). Comp. 10
 § 10, of the δῆμος.

24 καλοὶ κάγαθοι] This expression
 in Aristotle—see e.g. VI(iv). 8 § 3 ff.—
 always denotes the more educated and
 capable men: and this meaning in the
 present passage is confirmed by the addition
 ἀθλον γάρ ή ἀρχὴ αὐτῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς
 ἐστιν, which Trieber hardly has sufficient
 grounds for regarding as an interpolation.
 Hence Unger in *Philol. Anzeiger* v.
 1873, p. 370 has rightly protested against
 the completely mistaken assertion of Gil-
 bert op. c. 151 ff., and Frick *De ephoris*
Spartanis 28 l. 7, who prefer to understand
 by it the nobles. From passages like 11
 §§ 3, 4 and VI(iv). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert
 p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who
 reads without preconceived opinion will
 see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows
 nothing of an election of Senators at
 Sparta, for which only certain families
 were eligible (as was the case in Crete
 c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary
 nobility within the pale of those pure
 Spartans who had the right to take part
 in the popular assembly. Nor can the

opposite of this be inferred from VI(iv). 9
 § 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of election
 may very well have been such that
 in practice members of certain families
 were successful time after time: see
 VIII(v). 6 § 21 n. (1586). SUSEM. (322 b)

ἀθλον γάρ κτλ.] To be a member of
 this body is a reward of special excel-
 lence, or at least it should be: see below
 § 25, Demosth. xx. *Adr. Leptin.* § 107 ἕκεῖ
 μὲν γάρ ἐστι (at Lacedaemon) τῆς ἀρετῆς
 ἀθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίῳ γενέσθαι μετὰ
 τῶν ὄμοιων: Plut. *Lyc.* 26. SUSEM. (323)
 26 καθίσταται γάρ sc. η ἐφορεία ἐξ
 ἀπάντων. Cp. 10 § 10 δέλλα τὸ τῆρα αἴρεσθαι
 εἰπάντων εἶναι, n. (370). SUSEM. (323 b)

§ 23 28 παιδαριώδης κτλ.] Here
 Aristotle calls the whole method of electing
 the Ephors childish, yet he says of the
 election to the senate § 27, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν
 ἐστι παιδαριώδης, it is childish as to the
 means of ascertaining the results. Con-
 sequently the mode of election was prob-
 ably not the same for the two offices.
 Plato again describes it in the case of the
 ephors as approximating to a nomination
 by lot *Lawz* iii. 692 A, ἔγγις τῆς
 κληρωτῆς δινάμεως. This points to aus-
 pices (Urlachs *Rhein. Mus.* N. S. VI.
 1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to
 determine whether electors were chosen
 by the people and then, after observing
 certain signs, they appointed the new
 ephors, as Urlachs thinks: or whether,
 according to Schömann's conjecture p.
 240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons
 were nominated by the people, and the
 five selected from them in accordance
 with certain auspices. SUSEM. (324)

Schneider had suggested that as in
 the election of the Senators (see n. 333)

λων εἰσὶ κύριοι, ὅντες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώ- (VI)
 30 μονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς
 § 24 νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη
 τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὕτη μὲν γάρ ἀνειμένη λίαν
 ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκλη-
 ρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῦν ἀλλὰ λάθρᾳ τὸν νόμον
 35 ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἥδονῶν. ἔχει 17
 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς.
 8 25 ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γάρ ὅντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ίκανῶς πρὸς
 ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχα ἀν εἴποι τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει (καί-
 τοι τό γε διὰ βίου κυρίους ἔναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφι-
 40 σβητήσιμον) ἔστι γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας

30 τὰ inserted after κατὰ by Π² Bk. || 32 πολιτεῖα Scaliger, probably right || αὐτὴ Π² Bk. || 38 εἶποι P¹, εἶπη M¹ and P⁴ (corr.; what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined), εἶπει Bk.¹ P² (a later hand) and P² (1st hand, ε is erased), εἶποι Q^b T^b Ald. and P³ (1st hand), εἶπειν Bk.²

the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (I. 281 f.) adopts this view. Göttling (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that electors designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

κρίσεων μεγάλων] The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits, especially in all actions arising from contracts; see III. I § 10 τὰς τῶν συρβολατῶν <δίκας> δι-κάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας ππ. (443-4). Schömann *op. c.* 237, 246, 250 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (325)

30 κατὰ γράμματα] There were no written laws in Sparta: Schömann *op. c.* 251 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (326)

Comp. μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄλλ' αὐτο-γνώμονας, 10 § 11.

§ 24 31 οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη] inconsistent with (the design of) the polity.

32 ἀνειμένη λίαν] The ephors had a separate mess-table to themselves, Schömann *op. c.* 245 Eng. tr., and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things to provide a far more elaborate *cuisine* than the ordinary soup, the 'black broth' of Sparta (J. G. Schneider). SUSEM. (327)

34 ἀλλα λάθρῳ...ἥδονῶν] Cp. § 35 ππ. (346-7), IV(VII), 15 § 6 n. (927). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-vaunted strictness of manners had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan avarice even be explicable? SUSEM. (328)

§§ 25-28 *The Senate or Elders.*

§ 25 37 ἐπιεικῶν...ίκανῶς] 'If only honest men, sufficiently trained to manly excellence, entered the senate.' No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution; but frequently it was not carried out: see § 22 n. (323). SUSEM. (329)

39 κρίσεων μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. I § 10 n. (443 b), VI(IV), 9 § 9, διλόγους ἔναι κυρίους θαύματος καὶ φύγης n. (1266). SUSEM. (329 b)

40 ἔστι γάρ, κτλ.] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests: IV(VII), 9 § 9 ππ. (816-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the *Laws* he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of νομοφύλακες (see above *ππ.* on 6 §§ 18, 19), under 50 or over 70 years of age: *Laws* VI 755 A f. 'Compare also *Rhet.* II. 14. 4 ἀκμάζει...ἢ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἔνδος δεῖν πεντήκοντα: Herod. III. 134 αὐξανομένη

1271 α γῆρας) τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν (VI)
νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ώς οὐκ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ
§ 26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ κατα-¹⁸
χαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς ἀρ-
χῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτὸς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι
νῦν δὲ εἰσίν. δόξειε δὲ ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐ-
θύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λιαν τὸ δῶ-
ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύ-
§ 27 νας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἦν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατά

1271 α 3 δὲ] γάρ Spengel || 5 ἀντευθύνους Sylburg, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ
ἥν αἵρεσιν ποιοῦνται...κρίσιν or rather κατὰ τὴν...γερόντων ἡ τε κρίσις Bender, much
too violently

τῷ σώματι συναίξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες· γηράσ-
κοντι δὲ συγγράσκονται καὶ εἰς τὰ πρήγματα
πάντα ἀταμβλύνονται, Livy vi. 23. cum
corporibus vigere et deflorescere animos,
Lucr. III. 445, pariter cum corpore et
una crescere sentimus pariterque senescere
mentem' (Eaton). SUSEM. (330)

1271 α 1 δὲ answers b 37 ἐπιεικῶν
μὲν, the intermediate words from κατροι
being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3, 4
τὸ μὲν γάρ τῷ ποσῷ...ξεῖ ὃ δὲ δεῖ κτλ.

ὥστε...ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are
trained in such a way that even the legislator
cannot trust them.' Camerarius long
since asked how Aristotle came to this
conclusion. Presumably from the fact he
mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that
every senator (as well as all the other
officials and even the two kings) was
placed under the control of the Ephors.
SUSEM. (331)

§ 26 3 φαίνονται δὲ κτλ] Cr. c. 11
§ 4 μεγάλα βλάπτονται καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἥδη
n. (34). SUSEM. (331 b)

5 δόξειε δὲ ἀνὴρ κτλ] It might be held
(cp. 8-§ 18) that the board of Ephors
controls all the officials. But this is too
vast a trust to commit to the Ephorality
and it is not in this sense that we assert
the necessity for responsible control.

8 τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον] Because
the superintendence and control exercised
by the Ephors was far too unlimited and
violent (J. G. Schneider). See above
§ 20 n. (318). SUSEM. (332)

§ 27 9 κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν κτλ] "The
proceedings are described by Plutarch
(*Lycurg.* c. 26) in the following manner.
After the assembling of the 'people,' i.e.
of all the Spartiates who possessed the
right of voting, some men selected for

the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring
building from which no view was afforded
of the place of meeting, though the voices
of the assembled crowd could easily be
heard. Then the candidates for the vacant
office passed silently one by one through
the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while
the people, according to the various de-
grees of favour with which they regarded
them, made their feelings known by
correspondingly loud or feeble acclama-
tions. The party confined in the building,
to whom the order in which the candi-
dates appeared by lot was unknown,
observed on which occasion the acclama-
tion was the loudest, and the candidate
who was thus greeted was regarded as
the popular choice.....Aristotle's judg-
ment upon these proceedings is quite
intelligible in an age in which the man-
ners of the people had long degenerated
from their ancient purity and simplicity.
For obviously there was nothing easier
than to turn the whole election into a
mere fraudulent farce, and to determine
the result beforehand" Schömann p. 231
f. Eng. tr. One of the main questions
that arise is, how the committee which
decided on the loudness of the acclama-
tions was itself appointed:—and on this
point we have no information (Oncken).
Besides, this mode of election is only a
peculiar survival of the primitive election
of chiefs by acclamation in a rude anti-
quity, retained in a time for which it
had long since ceased to be adapted.
In general the votes of the Spartans in
the popular assembly continued to be
taken *viva voce*, by acclamation, βοή:
and only in case of a doubt as to the
decision did an actual division of the

(VI)

ιο τε τὴν κρίσιν ἔστι παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι (p. 49)
τὸν ἀξιωθησόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχει δεῖ γὰρ καὶ
βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.

§ 28 νῦν δ' ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης ¹⁹
φαίνεται ποιῶν φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολί-
τας τούτῳ κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων. οὐδεὶς
γὰρ ἀν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὢν. καίτοι τῶν γ'
ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων τὰ πλέοντα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ
§ 29 φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ ²⁰
δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιόν ἔστιν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν
20 ἡ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἄλλὰ κάν βέλτιον, * * γε
μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἄλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἔκαστον

10 τὸ] τὸν Bk.³, perhaps through a printer's error || 14 κατασκευάζει P¹ and
P⁴ (corr.) || 15 τούτοις p¹ P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand) || 16 ἀν
omitted by M^a P¹ || 17 τῶν omitted by II² Bk. 1 || διὰ omitted by M^a, perhaps
by Γ, [διὰ] Susem.¹⁻² || 19 βέλτιον...20 μὴ βέλτιον] μὴ βέλτιον.....20 βέλτιον II²
Bk. (μὴ over an erasure P³) || 20 κάν Γ, μὴ II Ar. Bk., μὴ el καὶ Schneider
Susem.¹⁻² || <βέλτιον γε> or <δεῖ> γε Susem., <συνολοῖς> γε Schmidt || 21
αὐτοῦ Bk. αὐτοῦ ΓΠ

assembly take place. See Schömann p. 236 Eng. tr. Further compare § 23, n. (324). SUSEM. (333)

10 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schlosser and Filleborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the proposers might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δεῖ γὰρ κτλ.] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller *Plato* p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also 11 § 12 n. SUSEM. (335) Add *Keph.* 347 B ff., 517 D, 519 C.

§ 28 13 νῦν δὲ ὅπερ κτλ.] But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (*τούτῳ=τῷ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι*, a personal canvass). See Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* IV. 2.

16 τὸν γ' ἀδικημάτων τὸν ἐκουσίων] Here the term ἀδικημα is used in a sense

different from that of *Rhet.* I. 13. 16, 1374 b 8 ἐστι δ' ἀδικήματα θνα μήτε παράλογα δέποτε πονηρά τε ἔστιν, or the un-Aristotelian passage *Nic. Eth.* v. 8. 2 where every ἀδικημα is also ἐκούσιον. SUSEM. (336)

Note esp. *N. E.* v. 8. 2: ἀδικημα δέ καλ δικαιοπράγμα δρισται τῷ ἐκουσίῳ καὶ ἐκουσίῳ· δταν γάρ ἐκουσίον ὃ, ψέγεται, ἀμα δὲ καλ ἀδικημα τῷτ' ἐστιν· ὥστ' ἐσται τι διδικον μὲν ἀδικημα δ' οὕπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκουσίον προσῆ; also *N. E.* v. 7 § 7, both with Jackson's notes: also the table, p. 109, of his edition of *Nic. Eth.* v.

17 τὸ πλαστα συμβαίνει κτλ.] Here Lycurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. 5 § 9: ψέγεται δικαίως...τὸ μᾶλλον ἡ δεῖ <χρήματα> φιλέν. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, 'an ambition which is contented with this prospect until then must have a very tenacious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state' (Oncken). SUSEM. (337)

The office of king: §§ 29, 30.

§ 29 20 ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] III. cc.

14-17. SUSEM. (338)

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον] 'that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct': an elective monarchy.

§ 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδὲ αὐτὸς (VI) οὔτεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς κάγαθούς, δῆλον ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὡς οὐκ οὖσιν ἵκανῷς ἀγαθοῦς ἀνδράσιν· διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον 25 συμπρεσβευτὰς τοὺς ἔχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ 21 συστίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτηται τῷ καταστή- § 31 σαντι πρώτου. ἔδει γάρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἔκαστον δεῖ 30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-

25 ἐφόρους Götting || 27 φιλίτια Π¹ (emended by corr. of Π¹)

§ 30 22 ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), 25; 17 § 5 n. (678); VI (IV). 2 § 1 ff. nn. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare 11 §§ 3, 4 nn. (381—3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (I. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism: and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth *The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcviil. 1868. 1—9: E. Curtius *History of Greece* I p. 186 ff. Eng. tr.: Schömann *op. c.* 208, 225 f., 541—4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. SUSEM. (339)

34 ἐξέπεμπον κτλ] Two ephors regularly accompanied the king on an expedition: see Schömann *op. c.* 242 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (340) Cp. Xen. *Rep. Laced.* 13 § 5, πάρεστι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐφόρον δύο, οἱ πολιτραγμανοῦσι μὲν οὐδέν, ἢν μὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς προσκαλῇ· ὥρωντες δὲ τι ποιεῖ ἑκαστος πάντας σωφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός. Τεν ἔμβουλοι were given to Agis, Thuc. v. 63.

25 συμπρεσβευτὰς] A less forcible word, like συναποδημούντας, might have been expected.

26 τὸ στασιάζειν] Grote II. p. 464. Schneider compares Plut. *Agis* c. 12, τοῦτο γάρ τὸ ἀρχεῖον (the Ephors) ισχύειν ἐκ διαφορᾶς τῶν βασιλέων τῷ τὰ βελτίωνα λέγονται προστιθέμενον τὴν ψῆφον, διαν δέρπες ἐοιῆγε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον.

The public messes: §§ 31, 32.

§ 31 27 φιλίτια] The derivation is uncertain: Plut. *Lyc.* 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps οὐεῖδ to sit; if indeed φιλίτια is the true form and φιλίτης = [ε]φε-εδ-ιτης (?), see n. on 1272 a 22. Clearly ἀδρεῖα was the older Doric name, and συστίτια is only an Attic term.

28 θεῖα γάρ κτλ] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 nn. (363, 365): IV (VII). 10 § 10 (834). Plato's criticism, *Law* VIII 847 E, is precisely the same: τροφῆς δὲ καὶ δανομης τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἔγγρης τῆς τοῦ Κρητικοῦ νόμου έουκεν ὀρθότης ἀν τις γεγονέντη κατὰ τρόπον γλυγεσθαι κτλ. 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινόν) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth' (Oncken); or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied; cp. Schömann *op. c.* p. 291 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (341)

For the σύνοδον = πρόσοδον the lex. quote Herod. I. 64 χρημάτων συνόδους = contributions. But here the singular (*σύνοδον*) and the entire phrase στὸ κοινόν (sumpta publico) εἴναι, favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. VII (VI). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; τῆς συνόδου ταυτῆς = τῆς ἐκληπτολα. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see Schömann pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν = contribute.

λωμα οὐ δυναμένων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τούναντίον (VI)
 § 32 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-
 τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δὲ
 ἡκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νενομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν
 35 γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
 οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
 § 33 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοῖς ναυάρ-²²
 χους νόμῳ καὶ ἔτεροι τινες ἐπιτειμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτι-
 μῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἵτιος ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν
 40 οὐσι στρατηγοῖς ἀιδίοις ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἐτέρα βασιλεία
 § 34 καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὧδι δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή-
 τον τοῖς σειεν ἄν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτειμηκεν^(p. 50)

31 συμβαίνη, apparently M^a (1st hand), συμβαίνει Q^b T^b Bk. || 36 οὗτος after
 ἔστιν (ἔστιν M^a) M^a and P¹ (1st hand) || 37 αὐτῶν P², αὐτοῦ P³ (1st hand, altered
 by a later hand), αὐτοῖς Π³ || 40 δίδιος Π² Ar. Bk., δὲλλως δίδιος p¹ in the margin
 || 41 καθέστηκεν was apparently omitted by Γ

§ 32 37 μὴ μετέχειν] That is, they ceased to be full citizens (*δρυοις*). They were then, in all probability, included under the term *ἐποκελοες*, Xen. *Hell.* III. 3. 6. See Schömann *op. c.* pp. 217—220, 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures the messes as *ἡκιστα δημοκρατικόν*, it is not likely that the persons thus disqualified were included in the *δῆμος*, as Thirlwall supposed IV. 377.

The office of admiral: § 33.

§ 33 38 Ἐπειοὶ τινες] See *Introd.* p. 9. n. 1. SUSEM. (342)
 39 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσι = in addition to the kings. The command of the army was the most essential feature in the royal power at Sparta: see III. 14 § 3 n. (616), § 14, n. (631), § 15: also n. (381) on II. 11 § 3, (620) on III. 14 § 13. Compare also II. 10 § 6 n. (360). We can hardly follow Oncken (1. 293) in assuming that Aristotle's criticism here implies a further reference to Lysander's plans for the entire overthrow of the kingly power, VII (V). 1 § 10 n. (1498). A design entertained by one distinguished holder of the office, such as Lysander undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed without further ado to the institution of the *ναυάρχος* as a whole. Certainly a startling anomaly was introduced into the political structure of Sparta by the necessity which gradually arose for the employment of a fleet: and it is significant 'that of four native Admirals (*ναυάρχοι*) in whom Sparta trusted in

the last period of the Peloponnesian war, two, Phrynis and Deinrades, were Provincials (*περιάκοι*) and two, Lysander and Gylippus, were *μάθακες*' (Oncken). Further compare VII (VI). 8 § 15 n. (1473): Beloch *The office of ναυάρχος at Sparta in Rhein. Mus.* XXXIV. 1879. 117—130. SUSEM. (343) The Spartan government took the same view as Aristotle does here when they nominated Agesilaos to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to secure unity in the operations, 395 B.C., Xen. *Hellen.* III. 4. 27: Τοῦ δὲ αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τῷ ὑπὲρ Κύμης ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκοτελῶν [the ephors] ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὅπως γεγνώσκοι καὶ καταστήσασθαι ναυάρχον δινῶν αὐτὸς βασιλεῖος. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοιῷδε λογισμῷ, ὡς εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἀρχοι, τό τε πεζὸν πολὺ ἀν λαχυρότερον εἴναι, καθ' ἐν οὐσῃ τῆς λαχύρος ἀμφοτέροις, τό τε ναυτικόν, ἐπιφαινομένον τοῦ πεζοῦ ἐνθα δέοι.

The military spirit: §§ 34, 35.

§ 34 1271 b 1 Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νό-
 μοις] 1 625 C—638 B, esp. 630 E, quoted
 in n. (294 b) on § 11. Compare II 660 ff.
 666 E, III 688 A f., IV 705 D: or even
 earlier *Republie* VIII. 547 E ff. τῷ δέ γε
 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δῆγειν,
 ... ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς θυμοκιδέσι τε καὶ ἀπλαυστέροις
 ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μᾶλλον
 πεφυκτας η πρὸς εἰρήνην, ... καὶ πολεμοῦσα
 τὸν ἀελ χρόνον διάγειν. The same
 criticism in IV (VII). 2 § 9, 14 §§ 15—18,
 15 § 6 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς: V (III). 4 § 2

πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, (VI) τὴν πολεμικήν αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες § 35 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἡσκηκέναι μηδεμίαν ἄσκησιν ἔτεραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ ²³ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τάγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι’ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς § 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαίλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἐστιν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένοις πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων

1161 b 3 αὐτῇ M^a P¹ || χρησίμη <μένον>? Susem. || 5 ἡσκηκέναι] ad virtutem exercitari William doubtless on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἀρετὴν wrongly inserted by Susem.¹⁻² || 6 τούτῳ P¹, τούτῳ P⁴ Q^b Ar., P² (1st hand, altered by corr.¹), and perhaps also Γ || 7 μὲν omitted by Γ M^a, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.¹ || γίνεσθαι after τάγαθὸν M^a P¹ || 12 ἀναγκαζομένοις P²⁻³ Ald.

οὗτε πρὸς μίλαν...οὗτε πρὸς μέλιστα ταῦτην; § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the notes. SUSEM. (344)

4 ἐσφύζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ.] Repeated in substance IV(VII). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐξελθίεργτας νῦν, § 22 τὴν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀνάσιν, ὥστερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰσήνη ἀγοντες. αλιτος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, 15 §§ 5, 6: VII(VIII). 4 § 4 τοὺς Δάκωνας ἴσμεν...νῦν...καὶ τοὺς γηγενεῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοὺς πολεμικοὺς λειπομένους ἔτερων: where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the Πολιτεῖαι; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins θαυμάζω τῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ἀρχεῖσθαι μὲν ἔθεσαν, ἀρχεῖν δ' οὐκ ἡπιστάντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι. SUSEM. (345)

δρεῖντες=after they had won their empire, when they had become a sovereign people.

§ 35 8 τὰ περιμάχητα] i.e. external goods: cp. Nic. Eth. IX. 8 § 4, 1168 b 15 ll. οἱ μὲν οὖν...φίλαντοι καλοῦσι τοὺς ἔντοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς... ἐσπουδάσαντο [οἱ πολλοί] περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἀριστα δύτα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητα ἐστιν: § 9

1169 a 20 f. προφέται [οἱ στοιδαῖοι] καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ δλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθά, περιποιούμενος ἐπιτῷ τὸ καλόν. SUSEM. (346)

9 τούτο μὲν καλῶς] They are right in thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(VII). 1 § 3 n. (697), 15 § 6 nn. (927-8)." SUSEM. (346 b)

ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κτλ.] See above § 24, n. (328) and again IV(VII). 15 § 6 nn. SUSEM. (347)

The finances: §§ 36, 37.

§ 36 12 ἀναγκαζομένοις] if they are compelled.

14 τὴν πλείστην γῆν] Only the smaller part of the land belonged to the Provincials (τερποικοι). SUSEM. (348)

οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν...εἰσφοράς] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (I. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamus say: πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (sc. χρυσοῦ) Ἐλλείπομεν καὶ οὐτε ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὐτε ἔτοιμος ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν (Vettori). Cp. also what Pericles says (I. 141. 3) αἴτοιργοι εἰσὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὐτε ἰδίᾳ οὐτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἔστιν αὐτοῖς. SUSEM. (349)

§ 37 τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τούναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ- (VI)
16 φέροντος· τὴν μὲν γάρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς
δ' ἴδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦ-
τον εἰρήσθω (ταῦτα γάρ ἔστιν ἡ μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἐπιτιμή-
10 σειεν). ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μέν ἔστι ταύτης, VII
ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἡττον γλαφυ-
ρῶς. καὶ γάρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα μεριμῆσθαι
τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἡ τῶν Λακώνων τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα

15 τε] δὲ Γ || 16 γὰρ omitted by P⁴ Q^b T^b || 22 δὲ] τε M^a P¹, quidem Wil-
liam, γε Γ?

§ 37 16 τὸν δ' ίδιωτας φιλοχρημά-
τους] As early as the first quarter of the
sixth century B.C. Alcaeus (*Fr. 50*) quotes
the saying of Aristodamos, a Spartan,
'money makes the man' as in full force at
Sparta: *ὦ γάρ δῆτος Ἀριστόδαμον φασ'*
οὐκ ἀπλάμανον ἐν Σπάρτᾳ λόγον | εἴπην.
χρηματ' ἀνηρ, πενίχρος δ' οὐδεὶς πελετ'
ἰσλος οὐδὲ τίμος. Amongst well-known
instances of peculation or corruption
Eaton quotes Leotychides, Pleistoanax,
Astyochos, Kleandridas, Gylippos, Ly-
sander; to which he adds Plutarch's own
admission, *Lycurg. 30*: *Ἄγιδος δὲ βασιλέ-
οντος εἰσερρήν νόμισμα πρώτον εἰς τὴν
Σπάρτην καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομίσματος πλεονεξία
καὶ πλούτους ἔγινε ἐπέδη διὰ Αἰγαίων, ὃς
αὐτὸς ὁν ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἐνέλησε
τὴν πατρίδα φιλοπλοντίας καὶ τρυφῆς.*
Besides the corruption of the ephors,
§ 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (331 b),
11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have
spoken confidently of that of the kings
and admirals. There was a well-known
oracle, ἡ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρτης δέει,
ἀλλο δὲ οὐδέν, quoted in Aristotle's *Polity of Lacedaemon Frag. 501*, 1559 b 28
(= *Aristot. pseudepi. 496*=88 in Müller's
Fr. hist. Gr. II. p. 131), and even
Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it, *Fr. 3.*
See further Xenoph. *De Rep. Lac.* 14. 3
and the statement in Ps.-Plato *Ale.* 1.
122 E. f., quoted by Eaton; *χρυσός καὶ
ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσσιν Ἑλλήσισι δύον
ἐν Λακεδαιμονιὶ λόγῳ.* This may very well
be an exaggeration; the writer of the
dialogue is however generally well informed
on historical matters, see Cobet *Mnemos. N. S. II. 1874. 369 ff.* Compare
with this the instances of great wealth
possessed by Spartans, some of which
have been collected by Grote *Greece IX.*
321 f., Gilbert *op. c. 154 f.* If the Spar-

tiae, with the exception of the kings,
ever were prohibited from possessing
gold and silver—a statement which H.
Stein in the dissertation quoted in *n. (85)*
on I. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—it was at
a very early time that the prohibition
was removed. For gold and silver money
were first coined by Pheidon king of
Argos (whose age is, I admit, very vari-
ously estimated, 760 or 670 B.C.), and even
down to the time of Croesus gold and
silver were scarce in Greece; see *n.*
(1653) on VIII(v). 10 § 6 and Böckh
Public Economy I. p. 6 f. Eng. tr. H.
Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce
this supposed prohibition to the fact,
that gold and silver money remained un-
known for a longer time in the secluded
valley of the Eurotas than in the trading
districts on the coast; and thus the
Spartans retained their old iron money
in use for a long time, first in bars, and
afterwards as a sort of coinage (see
Schömann *op. c. p. 275 Eng. tr.*) and
employed it even later *along with gold*
and silver money for internal trade. See
however Trieber *op. c. III. SUSEM. (350)*

c. 10 The Cretan polity.

Congreve refers to the article *Crete* in
Smith's *Geogr. Dictionary*. See also
Schömann's *Antiquities of Greece I. 295*
—310 Eng. tr.; Oncken II. 377—409;
Höck *Kreta* (Göttingen 1823—9. 3 vols.).

21 γλαφυρῶς] neatly, 'less finished'
(Congreve).

22 καὶ λέγεται διὰ] Ephorus *Frag. 64*,
in Strabo x 48? This passage is: *λέ-
γεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν, ὡς Λακωνικὰ εἶη τὰ
πολλὰ τῶν νομίσμάτων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ'
ἀληθές, εὐρῆθας μὲν ὑπὸ ἐκείνων, ἡερβω-
κέναι δὲ τὸν Σπαρτιάτας.* Comp. *nn.* on
§§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. *Introd.*
p. 35 n. (3). SUSEM. (351)

§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἥττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VII)
 25 τὸν Λυκοῦργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ
 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλεῖστον δια-
 τρίψαι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποι-
 κοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἥσαν, κατέλαβον δὲ οἱ
 29 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-
 § 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν

25 ἐπιτροπείαν P¹ and 1st hand of M² P³ (in P³, altered by a later hand) || τὸν Χαρίλλου P¹ || Χαρίλλου Bas.³, see Comm. || ἀδ τότε omitted by Π¹ Αγ., [τότε] Susem.¹ || 27 περὶ] περὶ τὴν Η³ Bk. || 28 Λύκτιοι] κρῆτες Π¹, ἄλλως λύκτιοι p¹ in the margin || 30 [διὸ.....40 Κάμικον] Susem. see Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι] Spengel

24 διαρθροῦν=quasi per membra et artus distingue et certum in ordinem redi-
 gere (Bonitz): to articulate, elaborate
 (Welldon).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δ.] Ephorus
I.c. (Strabo x. 482) relates that Lycurgus,
 as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous
 child of his brother Polydectes, for certain
 reasons which are stated went to Crete
 and did not return until Charilaos himself
 had assumed the government. Compare
 Plutarch *Lycurg.* cc. 2—5; Triebel *op. c.*
 p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel *Die Quellen in*
Plutarch's Lykurgos 22 ff. (Marburg
 1870.) SUSEM. (352)

25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos
 in VIII(v). 12 § 12 (see n.); probably we
 should restore it here, or else read Cha-
 rillo斯 there. SUSEM. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ'...κατοικοῦσιν] "And
 the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos
 had found the system of the laws es-
 tablished at that time amongst the inhab-
 itants." In just the same way Ephorus (*I.c.*
 481) replies to those who claim a Lacedae-
 monian descent for the Cretan institutions
 on the ground that the Lyttians were a
 colony from Sparta and that colonists
 generally preserve the usages of the
 mother state. He urges that many col-
 onies did not do this and that many
 Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta,
 yet had the same institutions as the
 Spartan colonies in Crete. On these con-
 siderations of Aristotle and Ephorus,
 then, the Lycegean institutions at Sparta,
 so far from being genuinely Spartan,
 were not even of Dorian origin, but had
 belonged in the first instance to the pre-
 Dorian population of Crete; unless indeed
 even these earliest inhabitants of Crete
 are to be regarded as Dorians (as they are by Ottfried Müller *The Dorians*

I. p. 36 ff. Eng. tr.). But this view has
 been refuted by Triebel p. 81 ff. In
 opposition to the view of Ephorus and
 Aristotle, which is in itself improbable,
 he has sought to maintain the truth of
 that combated by Ephorus, that Spartan
 institutions actually passed over into
 Crete with the Spartan settlers. Compare
 n. (356) on § 4. Polybius moreover IV. 54.
 6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the reading
 there also) as the oldest of the Cretan
 towns and likewise as a colony of Lacea-
 daemon. Triebel has shown conclusively
 p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there
 never really existed any specially 'Dorian'
 political or social principles, such as are
 presumed to have found their highest and
 completest embodiment in Sparta. SU-
 SEM. (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention
 merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants
 of the pre-Dorian population, if after all
 the Spartan and other Dorian settlers
 had accepted the same institutions? Ari-
 stotle cannot have contradicted himself
 in such a manner as this, or have written
 such nonsense. It is much more likely
 that some learned Peripatetic added this
 in order to tack on the following remarks
 about Minos, his maritime power, and
 his death. He did not however perceive
 that they are not at all appropriate to this
 connexion, and that to speak of Crete as
 favourably situated for maritime supre-
 macy over the Hellenes agrees but ill
 with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16:
 where the remoteness of the island is
 said to have shut it off from external
 complications and from foreign dominion.
 SUSEM. (355)

Grote II. 484 n. 2 has another way
 out of the difficulty. He takes the word
 as in Thuc. I. 17, "the neighbouring

31 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω (VII) πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δὲ η̄ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς² (p. 51) πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων 35 ιδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον § 4 τόπου καὶ Ρόδου. διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἔχειράσατο τὰς δ’ φύκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτῃ τησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.]

§ 5 ἔχει δὲ ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Δακωνικήν. γέ-³
1272 a ωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περίοικοι,

32 [τὴν.....νόμων] Stahr || 34 πάσῃ.....35 πάντων noticed by Theodoros Metochit. *Miscell.* p. 644 ed. Kiessling || 34 πάσῃ] μέσην Bücheler wrongly || 35 τῇ μὲν τῇς] τῇς μὲν Γ M^a || 36 μακρῷ] διλγον before τῇς Πελοποννήσου P⁴ || τῇς.....τῇ δὲ omitted by Q^b T^b and P³ (1st hand, added in the margin by a later hand and then again erased) || 37 ρόδον II² Ar. Bk. || 40 Κάμικον Vettori, Καμικόν Bas.¹ in margin, perhaps rightly, κάμικον Γ M^a P¹⁻²⁻⁴ Ald., καμικον P³, καμεικον Q^b T^b, *Camerinam* Albertus Magnus and Ar.

1272 a 1 τε omitted by M^a P¹

states” (?). The words of Ephorus in Strabo x. p. 737 are: τοὺς δὲ Κρῆτας διλγαρῆσαι (sc. τῶν νομίμων) κακωθειῶν τῶν πολεμῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Κρωτῶν, τῶν πολεμικῶν μέραιν δὲ τινα τῶν νομίμων παρὰ Λυκτίους καὶ Τορτυρίους καὶ ἄλλους τοις πολειχοῖς μᾶλλον η̄ παρ ἐκείνοις. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Λυκτίων νόμιμα ποιεῖσθαι μαρτύρια τοὺς τὰ Δακωνικὰ πρεσβύτερα ἀποφαινοντας³ ἀπόλονος γὰρ θντας φυλάρτειν τὰ τῇς μητροπολεως έθη⁴ ἐπει ἀλλως γε εἴησθε εἶναι τὸ τοὺς βέλτιον συνεστῶτας καὶ πολιτευομένους τῶν χειρόων ἥηλωτάς ἀποφαίνειν.

34 ἐπίκειται=commands the whole sea (Congreve).

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete lost its fleet and maritime supremacy. Cp. Thuc. I. 4: Ephorus *Frags.* 64 (Müller I. 250) καὶ γὰρ ναυκρατεῖν πρότερον τοὺς Κρῆτας...νῦν δὲ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ ναυτικόν.

41 Ιχεὶ δὲ ἀνάλογον...Δακωνικήν] Triebel p. 86 ff. shows that, although the points of difference as well as of resemblance are not brought out forcibly enough, yet in the main the whole comparison is just. He tries to make it probable that from its quite peculiar character the similarity can only be explained by a real transference from Sparta to Crete. Oncken on the other hand, II.

377, finds a reason both for the resemblance and the limitations to it in the one point which Aristotle has not mentioned, “the fact that in Sparta as in Crete a dominant race of the same Dorian descent broke in from a foreign land upon an old political order, overcame it by violence, and then directed their whole energies to the task of maintaining themselves uncontaminated and *unassassable* at the head of their new settlement.” Polybius vi. 45, 46 goes still farther and even denies that there were any resemblances at all between the two polities. SUSEM. (356)

He insists (1) on the absence of any legal restriction on the possession of land or money, and (2) on the annual tenure of offices (as contrasted with the life-long tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerusias) and the democratic character of the Cretan governments. Undoubtedly as we approach Roman times the power of the ἐκκλησία increases: Höck III. pp. 64—97, who supports his case from inscriptions, infers that a democratic revolution had subverted the governments of Aristotle's time.

§ 5 1272 a 1 οἱ περίοικοι] See n. 355 and esp. Exc. III. to this book p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (357)

καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ (VII)

Λάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἄνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες, ἢ καὶ
§ 6 δῆλον ὅτι ἐκεῖθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ
5 μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ
καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀρι-
θμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέρουσιν,
οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες βουλήν, ἵστοι βασιλεῖα δὲ πρότε-
ρον μὲν ἦν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
§ 7 οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ-
πι χουσι πάντες, κυρίᾳ δ' οὐδενός ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἡ συνεπιψηφίσαι
τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἡ τοῖς

Λάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκαστος εἰσφέ-
15 ρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολι-
§ 8 τείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως)

3 φιλίτια ΓΜ¹ and P¹ (1st hand, apparently altered by p¹) || ἀντρεῖα Μ¹, ἄν-
δρια Π² Βκ., ἄλλως ἄνδρια p¹ in the margin || 8 βουλὴν "a gloss under which
lurks a Cretan name" Spengel || τρώτον Γ Thomas Aquinas and Ar., perhaps
rightly || 11 ἀλλη P² and P³ (1st hand, emended by corr.²)

3 ἀνδρεῖα=meals of men: or more
precisely, clubs or companies of men who
messed together: see n. (378) on 11 § 3.
SUSEM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρῆτες] The same re-
mark is found in Ephorus *i.e.* 482, with
the object of proving the same conclusion.
Comp. also Plut. *Lycurg.* c. 12. But
that Ephorus repeats this argument
three times, is a very inexact statement
of Trieber, p. 100: for at p. 480 the ex-
pression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσίτοις ἀ
καλοῦσιν ἄνδρεῖα and p. 483 εἰς τὰ συσσί-
τια ἔχουσι τὰ ἄνδρεῖα. SUSEM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of
Sparta was the constitution of every inde-
pendent Cretan town. We learn from
the inscriptions that little places like
Hierapytna, Priausos (Praesus), Saxos,
Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλὴ,
and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors
and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f.
SUSEM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέροντες] See § 11. SUSEM. (361)
§ 7 οἱ ἐκκλησίας δὲ κτλ.] Cp. 11
§§ 5, 6 with Exc. IV. Although the
simple verb ἐπιψηφίζειν does not mean
"to vote," but "to put to the vote," yet
so far as I know συνεπιψηφίζειν is
everywhere found in the sense of "vote

approvingly," i.e. "confirm by a vote,"
auctores fieri: Polyb. XXII. 13. 1, Plu-
tarach *De Garrulitate* 511 F. Here it can have no other meaning. The only doubt
is whether we should take it literally (1) that the popular assembly was bound to
ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had
the right, without proper debate and
without amendment, simply to confirm
or reject the proposal previously decided
by others. That question will be dis-
cussed in n. (389). SUSEM. (362)

Aesch. *De Fals. Leg.* 35 has the middle
voice in the same sense. Compare κατα-
σιωπᾶν with both meanings (1) to be very
silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In
the Gortynian inscription the assembly
in the market-place and the stone from
which the speaker addressed the people
are twice mentioned X. 34, απτανεθεὶς
δε κατ' ἀγοράν καταβελμενος τοις πολια-
ταις απο το λαο, ο απαγορευοντι, i.e. ἀν-
αφανεσθαι [he must adopt] δε κατ' ἀγοράν
κατεβλένειν (Hom.) των πολιτῶν ἀπό τοῦ
λαο (cp. Soph. *O. Col.* 196) οἱ ἀπαγορεύ-
οντι, adoption shall be in the market-
place, when the citizens are assembled,
from the stone where they make speeches:
and again XI. 10.

16 εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31.
Cp. n. (341). SUSEM. (363)

ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γυνομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά- (VII)
τῶν ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ * * φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περί-
οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-
νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοὺς συστιτίους, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-
§ 9 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναικας καὶ παιδες καὶ ἄνδρας πρὸς 5
δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσιτίαν ὡς ὀφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφιλοσόφηκεν ὁ
νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ
πολυτεκνώσῃ, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὄμιλίαν, (p. 52)
25 περὶ ἣς εἰ φαύλως ἡ μὴ φαύλως, ἔτερος ἔσται τοῦ δια-

18 καὶ ἐκ Q^b T^b Lambin Bk., perhaps Γ; [ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] Götting, [ἐκ] Congreve || καὶ <ἀπὸ μορφῶν τῶν>? or καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν>? Susem., see Comm., [καὶ] Lambin, καὶ <ἐκ τῶν> Congreve || καὶ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων or else after ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ by transposition, Schmidt || 21 [καὶ γυναικας.....
26 διασκέψασθαι καιρός] Oncken; but see the Comm. || 21 πρὸς δὲ.....26 καιρός transposed by Susem.¹ to follow 27 φανερόν, but wrongly || 24 ποιήσας is corrupt, <κομμῆν> ποιήσας or something similar? Susem., better ποιήσας Schmidt

κοινοτέρως] ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 § 31, in a more public fashion.

18 ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public domain." Zitelmann pp. 139, 140 conjectures that the citizens had the right of pasture on this domain-land. By the law of inheritance in the Gortynian inscription, certain of the cattle with the house in the town pass to the sons as *praeceipitum*; but the daughters have a share of the land which is cultivated by *κλαρωταί*.

οἱ περίοικοι] See Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (364)

§ 8 19 τέτακται μέρος] Partly on this model, partly on that of Hippodamos (8 § 3 n.), is based the division of the land in Aristotle's ideal state, IV(VII). 10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the temples, (2) of the syssitia, (3) of private individuals, (1) and (2) together forming the public land. In the state of the *Law* there is no public land, although Plato mentions the Cretan institution with approval, VIII 847 E quoted in n. (341) on 9 § 31. SUSEM. (365)

20 ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κτλ.] If we understand this as e.g. Schömann does, *op. c. 307* Eng. tr., that the mess-funds maintained the members of the family, wives daughters younger boys and slaves, who had their meals at home, then the whole of Oncken's proof (II. 385), that καὶ γυναικας καὶ παιδες καὶ ἄνδρας is a spurious addition, falls to the ground. Such slight inaccuracies of expression, due to excessive brevity, are no uncommon thing in

Aristotle. The sense might be made clearer by a slight insertion thus: 'one part is set apart for the worship of the gods and for the state expenditure, the other for the public messes <and the entire maintenance of the households of the citizens>, so that all, men women and children, are kept at the public cost.' Schömann rightly remarks that this explains why an Aeginetan stater had to be paid for each slave: see Exc. III. p. 337. Oncken however gives a different explanation (II. 387), he makes each of the subject population (?) contribute an Aeginetan stater. SUSEM. (366)

§ 9 22 ὀλιγοσιτίαν] Our only authority for a Cretan ἀνδρεῖον, Heracleides Ponticus, and the writers quoted by Athen. IV. 142 f., Dosidas and Pyrgion, do not enable us to verify this statement: Schömann p. 308. They kept up the old practice of sitting at table: *Cretes quorum nemo gustavit unquam cubans*, Cicero *pro Murena* § 74. Their moderation in drinking: [Plato] *Minos* 320 A.

23 πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν κτλ.] See Schömann p. 304 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (367) Also Zitelmann *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 101 and the inscription itself II. I, 6, 8, 9.

25 ἔτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καιρός] Since Aristotle thought it so important for his own ideal state to maintain uniformity in the number of citizens (see c. 6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5: IV(VII). 16 § 15 ff. with notes), and is not too nice about the means of securing that end, it would

σκέψασθαι καιρός). ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον (VII) τέτακται τοῖς Κρητὶν ἡ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν, τὰ δὲ § 10 περὶ τὸν κόσμους ἔτι χείρον τῶν ἐφόρων. ὃ μὲν γάρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις 30 (γίνονται γάρ οἱ τυχόντες). ὃ δ’ ἔκει συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἔκει μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν ἐνταῦθα δ· οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάν- 34 τῶν αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ’ ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς § 11 γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀν τις εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμονίῳ γερόντων (τὸ γάρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ’ αὐ- 38 § 12 τογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν 40 δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γάρ λήμ-

26 δὴ Lambin, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. || 29 τούτων Π² Bk., τούτῳ ? Sylburg, <τῷ> τούτων Bernays || 34 γενῶν] γερόντων Γ || 35 ἐκ τῶν] ἐκ τινῶν Π¹ || 36 εἰ- πειειν Π² (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), εἰποεις Μ⁸ Π¹ Q^b T^b Ald., εἰποι Π⁴ and Π² (corr.²) || τῶν Bas.^a, ὧν ΙΙ || γερόντων Congreve, γενομένων Π¹ Ρ^{2,3,4} T^b Ar. Ald. Bk., γενομένων Q^b || 37 γέρας] γηρας Γ || 40 καλῶς· οὐδὲν] καλῶς· οὐδὲν Γ Bk. and perhaps Ar.

have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See *Intrad.* p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, II. 389 ff., tries to prove that § 9, as far as *καιρός*, is interpolated, are wholly untenable: and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here; we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. SUSEM. (368)

§ 10 30 γίνονται γάρ οἱ τυχόντες] Ephorus *Fr.* 64 (in Strabo p. 482) gives the same statement as Aristotle here, that the senators were chosen from those who had been *Κόρηται* but adds that only tried and approved men were selected. There is no divergence in the facts here, but only in the judgment upon them: though it is of such a kind that, as is

stated in Exc. III. p. 336, Aristotle must have depended upon other accounts than those of Ephorus for the facts on which he based his judgment. Furthermore even in Sparta those who had been Ephors must frequently, to say the least, have entered the senate. SUSEM. (369)

32 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν κτλ.] See c. 9 § 22 n. (323 b). SUSEM. (370)

34 ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν] Called *στράτος* in the Gortynian inscription v 5 οκ' ο αιθαλενταρτος εκοσμιοι οι συν κυλλαι=when it was the turn of the 'troop' of the Aethalians to assume office and Kyllos was *κύριος ἐπάρχυμος*. Comp. Hesych. *στάρτοι* (*sic*) = αἱ τάξεις τοῦ πλήθους. Similarly in the oath of Dreros, Cauer *Select. inscrip.* 38, ἐκ τῶν Αἰθαλέων κοσμιετῶν τῶν σύγκυλαι.

35 κεκοσμηκότων] like ὁ ἄρξας, ὁ βασιλεύς, the aorist being more usual.

§ 11 38 μὴ κατὰ γράμματα] without written rules to guide them. Cp. 9 § 23.

§ 12 See II § 2.

40 λήμματος] They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles' bribe to the ephor Klean-

ματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ' (VII)
 § 13 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων. ἦν δὲ ποιοῦνται
 τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης ἴατρελαν, ἀποτος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ
 δυναστευτική. πολλάκις γάρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς τ
 κόσμους ἡ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτᾶν ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἔξεστι
 δὲ καὶ μετοὖν τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ὀρχήν. ταῦτα δὴ
 πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἡ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βού-
 § 14 λησιν· οὐ γάρ ἀσφαλής ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φανδόταν τὸ
 τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἦν καθιστᾶσι πολλάκις οἱ ἄν μὴ δίκαιοι βούλων-
 ται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν ὅ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει τι πολιτείας
 ιο ἡ τάξις, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἔστιν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μᾶλλον. εἰώ-
 θασι γάρ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἀναρ-

41 γ'] τ' apparently Ar., γάρ Susem.¹ wrongly, *enim* William, whence nothing is to be inferred about Γ

1272 b 1 διαφερόντων Γ M^a and perhaps Ar., διαφερούντων P⁴ (1st hand) || § 8 δὲ Congreve, rightly, I think || 6 πάντα πάρεστι P¹ (1st hand), πάρεστι P¹ (corr.) || 8 οἱ ἄν Koraes, δταν Γ II Ar. Schneider Bk. || 9 τῶν δυνατῶν (not here but before 8 ἦν καθιστᾶσι) P² Ar. Bk. and p¹ in margin; so transposed, δυνατῶν <τινὲς> or even better <ύπδ> τῶν δυνατῶν? Schneider || Heinsius transposes εἰάθασι ... 12 ἀλλήλους before 9 ὅ καὶ δῆλον κτλ. || 11 γάρ Susem. following Bernays' translation, δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ || διαλαμβάνοντες] suspected by Bonitz (*Ind. Arist.* 183 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Susem.¹, ίδιᾳ λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, needlessly if we alter μοναρχίαν into ἀναρχίαν || ἀναρχίαν Bernays, μοναρχίαν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹

dridas, Plut. *Per.* 22). Hence the office is not such a prize as to excite the cupidity of the commons.

41 τοῖς ἐφόροις] Cr. 9 § 19 n. (316).
 SUSEM. (370 b)

1272 b 1 τῶν διαφερούντων goes with πόρων: at a distance from any who are likely to corrupt them.

§ 13 3 δυναστευτική] Α δυναστεῖλα is the worst and most extreme form of Oligarchy, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of government: VI (IV). 5 § 2 δταν πάντι πατρὸς εἰσὶν καὶ δρχγ μὴ δ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχοντες n. (1215); 6 § 11 n. (1228); 14 §§ 7—9 nn. (1328, 1331); VII (VI). 7 § 3 n. (1447); VIII (V). 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (1509); 6 §§ 11, 12 nn. (1586, 9); 7 §§ 12, 13 n. (1606); 8 § 7 n. (1613), § 11 n. (1617).
 SUSEM. (371)

Thebes at the time of the Persian war is an instance: Thuc. III. 62, 3.

5 μεταξ...ἀπαιτεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν] to resign office before their term (of a year) expires. The verb is ἀποστήναι in the Gortynian inscription ε' κ' ἀποσται=ἢν ἀποστῆ; or (?) ḡ=ἢ (after) ἄν ἀποστῆ.

§ 14 8 τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας=the fact of the suspension of the office of Κόσμος, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cf. Thuc. I. 138 καὶ τὸν Ἐλληνικὸν ἀλπίδα, ἦν ὑπεριόδιον αὐτῷ δυνατόν; II. 42 πεντας ἀλπίδα, ὡς καὶ ἐπι διαφυγῶν αὐτὴν πλοιησειν (Shilleto).

οἱ ἄν μὴ κτλ] Oncken (II. 393) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Κόσμοι. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartans and Cretan senators, and between the Ephors and Κόσμοι, in all the essential features of the authority of these offices, it is clear on the contrary that, as in Sparta III. I. 10 nn. (443-4), so in Crete, the Senate had criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offenses, and the Κόσμοι appeared, like the Ephors, as accusers in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no prosecutor there is of course no judge. SUSEM. (372)

11 διαλαμβάνοντες=by forming parties

§ 15 χίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ τοι τι διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διά τινος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λίεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p. 53)
 15 ἔστι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις * * τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται, σφέζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον ἔνεγκλασίας γάρ τὸ πόρρω § 16 πεποίκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρητίν, οἱ δὲ εἰδωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὐτε γάρ ἐξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς 20 κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὃς πεποίκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἑκεὶ νόμων.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαῦθ' ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-

15 [ἐπικίνδυνος] *valde periculosa* William on his own conjecture probably, hence λαοὶ ἐπικίνδυνος Susem.^{1,2} wrongly || τῶν βουλομένων and 16 δυναμένων II² Ar. Bk. "because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Bernays; <δυτῶν> τῶν βουλομένων Bas.³, <ἀπὸ> τῶν β. Busse. If the dative is right an infinitive has dropped out, as Bücheler saw || 21 φανερὴν Bk.¹, a misprint || 23 εἰρήσθω before τοσαῦθ' I² II² Bk.

from amongst the people and their own friends. SUSEM.

§ 15 17 [ἔνεγκλασίας] Acc. plur. 'The distance has kept out aliens as effectually as a formal prohibition.' No foreigner could come to Sparta and live as a resident alien (*μέτοικος*): strangers stopping there for a time were strictly watched and, as soon as it seemed advisable to the Ephors, dismissed: see Schömann p. 276 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (373)

§ 16 18 διό καὶ τὸ τῶν π. κτλ.] Consult however n. (281) on § 3: where also a different reason, it should be observed, is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that the Cretan states, even if at war, assist one another against the revolted *περιοίκοι*. SUSEM. (374)

19 οὕτε γάρ] It is the isolation, not the strength, of the Cretans that secures their independence; for (1) they are not strong enough to acquire foreign dominion (*ἔξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς*), while (2) their internal weakness is now patent.

20 νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος κτλ.] There are two events to which this passage, taken by itself, may refer. (1) With Höck, *Kreta* III. 61 f., we may understand it of the Phocian war. Phalaecus, the last leader of the Phocians, after withdrawing from Phocis came at last with his mercenaries to Crete: by a stratagem he conquered Lyktos and drove out the inhabitants who turned to their

mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid they received under the command of Archidamos, who beat the mercenaries and reestablished the Lyktians in their city. Phalaecus however stayed in the island and fell at the siege of Kydonia B.C. 343. See Schäfer *Demosthenes* II. 339 f. Or (2) we might with Fülleborn (II. 253) refer it to the despatch of Agesilaos with the mercenaries of his brother Agis II, who was allied with the Persians and sent the expedition directly after the battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete. The Lacedaemonians with their mercenaries effected a landing successfully and met with no material resistance; see Schäfer III. p. 163 f. As therefore both events suit, if, when he wrote the passage, Aristotle had been acquainted with the second he would certainly have spoken of *two* foreign wars, and not of one only: thus it seems as if this passage were composed before the latter of the two events took place. But it need not be inferred from this that the completion of the book, so far as Aristotle did at all complete it, could not have been of a much later date. Aristotle often worked at several of his treatises at the same time. Cp. *Introd.* p. 66. SUSEM. (375)

ξενικός = of mercenaries (Congreve). Better, 'foreign.' For III. 14. 7 *ξενικὸν* as opposed to *οἱ πολῖται* means a foreign force, though a force of mercenaries.

11 τείας· πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ VIII
 25 πολλὰ περιττώς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ' ἔντα παρα-
 πλησίως τοῖς Λάκωσιν. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τρεῖς ἀλλιγ-
 λαις τε σύνεγγύς πώς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ διαφέρου-
 σιν, ή τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ή Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτη τούτων ή τῶν
 29 Καρχηδονίων. καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ' αὐτοῖς
 § 2 καλῶς· σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν δῆμον
 ἐκούσιον διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στά-
 σιν, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἶπεν, γεγενήσθαι μήτε τύραννον.

§ 3 ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσ- 2

24 καὶ καρχηδόνιοι alter καλῶς M^oP¹ || 28 ή before Λακωνικὴ omitted in M^oP¹,
 [ἡ] Susem.^{1,2} || 30 σημεῖον τε? Susem. || <εὖ> συντεταγμένης Schneider, εὖ
 τεταγμένης Bergk (*Comm. crit. spec. VI*, Marburg 1850), one or other seems necessary;
 bene *institutae* Ar.: πόλεως for πολιτείας Bender || 31 ἐκούσιον Spengel, ἔχονταν
 Γ II^o Bk., omitted by M^oP¹, untranslated by Ar.; ἔχοντα Bergk, ησυχα Hampke,
 ἔκοντας W. Wagner (*De Plantis Aulicis*, Bonn 1864 p. 37), all before Spengel:
 ἔχ<οντα ἔξ>οντας Sauppe, ἔχοντας <κύρων> Bender following Lambin's transla-
 tion *populum rerum compatem* || τὸ omitted by M^oP¹, crossed out by p²

c. II The constitution of Carthage.

On this chapter consult Kluge *Aristoteles de politia Carthaginienium. Accedit Theodori Metochitae descriptio reipublicae Carthaginensis* (Breslau 1824); Heeren *Ideas* vol. II. pt. I. *Works XIII.* 108—147; Movers *Die Phönizier* (Berlin 1849) vol. II. pt. I. p. 479 ff.; Mommsen *History of Rome*, vol. II. pp. 15—23 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (376)

§ 1 24 πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ κτλ] "are thought (a) to enjoy a good constitution, (b) with many features of unusual relative excellence, and (c) some which most nearly resemble the Spartan constitution." Of these three points Aristotle adopts two, (c) and (a), in the next two sentences giving more definite reasons for (a) in § 2, and passing on to (c) in § 3. But the further discussion § 3 ff. proves sufficiently that he also accepted the second point. Isocrates III. 24, and Julian, *Or. I.* p. 14 (Spanh.), also point to a similarity between the Carthaginian and Spartan constitutions which they declare to be the best actually established. Polybius VI. 51 f. and Cicero *De Rep.* II. 23 § 41 ff. compare them both with one another and with the Roman constitution, while Eratosthenes (in Strabo I. p. 66) praises the admirable character of the Carthaginian and Roman constitutions. SUSEM. (377)

The exciting struggle with Dionysios for Sicily must have called attention to the government of Carthage: see note on

1273 a 36 (Wyse).

§ 2 30 It is a sign that a government is thoroughly <well> organised when the popular element is attached to the system of its own free will.

31 διαμένειν, like μένειν 10 § 16, = abide by, remain loyal to, a government.

32 μήτε τύραννον] This assertion seems true. For the efforts of Hannibal (about B.C. 344) to make himself tyrant, mentioned by Aristotle himself VIII(v). 7 § 4, met with no success, see n. (1597); while the attempt of Bomilcar was not until after Aristotle's time, B.C. 308. That also ended at last unsuccessfully: see the same note. Lastly there was one Malchus between 600 and 550 B.C., who having been banished because he had been defeated in Sardinia procured his return by force of arms. He then summoned the popular assembly, justified his conduct before it, and had ten senators put to death, but made no change in the existing constitution. However he fell under suspicion of aiming at tyrannical power; in consequence, and as a punishment for his former violent proceedings, he was executed, Justin. XVIII. 7, so that this instance does not contradict Aristotle's statement. With regard to VIII(v). 12 § 12 see n. (1772). SUSEM. (377 b)

§ 3 "The points of analogy to the Spartan polity are the common meals of the clubs like the φιδίτια at Sparta, and

σίτια τῶν ἔταιριων τοῖς φιδιτίοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν (VIII)
 35 καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χείρον· οὐ μὲν
 γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσί, ταύτην δ' αἴρονται τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον
 § 4 τοῖς ἑκεῖ βασιλεῦσι καὶ γέρουσιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασι-
 λεῖς μήτε καθ' αὐτὸ τίναι γένος μήτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, τεὶ τι
 40 διαφέρον ἐκ τούτωντι αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν. μεγά-
 λων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἀν εὐτελεῖς ὡσι, μεγάλα βλά-
 1273 a πτουσι, καὶ ἔβλαψαν ἥδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.
 § 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τὰν ἐπιτιμθέντων ἀν διὰ τὰς 3

34 φιλετίοις II¹, corrected by p¹ || τὴν.....35 ἀρχὴν is noticed by Theodoros Metoch. Mlsccell. p. 667 Kiesl. || 35 <δ>οὐ Bernays || 36 γάρ omitted by P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. Bernays || 38 ἑκεῖ inserted after τοῖς by Q^b T^b and in the margin of P⁴ || 39 καθ' αὐτὸ Γ and γρ. p¹ in the margin, κατ' αὐτὸ P¹ (1st hand) κανταυτὸ M^a (1st hand), καταυτὸ M^a (correction), κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ II^b Bk. and p¹ above the line, κατὰ τὸ Ατ. (?) || μῆτε before τοῦτο Schneider, μῆτε II Bk. || εἰ τι Γ, εἰ τε M^a II^b Bk. and p¹ in the margin, ἢ Ατ. and P¹ (1st hand), εἰ τέ τι Welldon || εἰ τι διαφέρον ἐκ τούτων is corrupt: * * ἐκ τούτων Conring, who first saw that from ἐκ τούτων onwards Aristotle is speaking of the senate and not the kings: but this is true of the whole clause from εἰ τι. With approximate correctness τοῖς δὲ γέρουτας τῷ Schneider, τοῖς δὲ γέρουτας κατὰ πλοῦτον J. Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* XI. 595 f.) which is closer to the mss., εἰ δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων Bernays. On grammatical grounds I prefer Brandis' suggestion with Bücheler's slight change ἐτι δὲ τοῖς γέρουτας κατὰ πλοῦτον, or better still ἐτι δὲ γέρουτας κατὰ πλοῦτον, though I have not ventured to introduce it into the text

1273 a 1 καρχηδονίων or καλχηδονίων Γ

the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit). See Excursus IV. pp. 340—347. SUSEM. (378.9-81.2)

36 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων] See c. 10 § 10 n. (369). SUSEM. (380)

§ 4 38 "And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity," like the Heraclaeid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartiates is obscure. See Hdt. v. 72, Curtius *History* 1. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 208, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr.

39 μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ κτλ.] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. SUSEM. (383)

εἰ τι διαφέρον] See the *Critical Notes*. The sense required is "and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority."

40 καθ' ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly "elected rather than hereditary": Cope more cautiously "according to age." But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

μεγάλων γάρ κύριοι κτλ.] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b). But the conditional praise here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. SUSEM. (384)

41 εὐτελεῖς = cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in *Athen.* II. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα κτλ.] "Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences" sc. from the best type "are common to all the constitutions mentioned." And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge). SUSEM. (385)

παρεκβάσεις * * κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὅντα ταῖς εἰρημέναις (VIII) πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας 5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας * * τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὀλυγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γάρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν (p 54) τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἀν δημογραμονώσι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μή, § 6 τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἀ δὲ ἀν εἰσφέρωσιν οὕτοι οὐδια- ιο κοῦσαι μόνου ἀποδιδόσαι τῷ δῆμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρ-

3. *παρεκβάσεις* <τὰς τῆς ἀριστης τάξεως> or something similar Susem., cp. 9 § 1. Fülleborn first suspected a defect || 4 ὑπόθεσιν <ὑπεναντιων> Bernays; cp. also 9 § 1 || 5 πολιτείας <τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις> Susem., ἐκλίνει <τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις> Thurot, who discovered the lacuna || ἐκλίνει P², ἐκκλίνειν M¹ (corr.) || 6 γάρ τὸ Morel Bk. Bernays || 7 τὸ δὲ μὴ Π² Bk. Bernays. In Q^b τὸ is a correction of τὰ, apparently by the scribe himself || 9 τούτων καὶ Susem., καὶ τούτων Γ II Bk., καὶ τούτου Bernays || εἰσφέρουσιν Η² (emended by corr.¹ in P²) || οὗτοι omitted by Η¹, {οὗτοι} Susem.^{1,2}, perhaps rightly || 10 τὰ δόξαντα] τάξαντα M¹, ταξαντα P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹), τάξαντι Γ

4 With *τῶν δὲ* supply ἐπιτιμθέντων ἀν, and take πρὸς = when judged by.

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κτλ.] The whole passage requires to be read in the light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards of the criticism are more definitely stated: μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς η μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀριστην νενομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἔτέρα δὲ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τῶν τροπῶν ὑπεναντιων τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. The second, then, which is now under consideration is, how far the Carthaginian constitution, although not the best, that is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains faithful to its own distinctive principle. It is still to be regarded as an aristocracy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristocracy: more precisely a combination of aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy: see VI(IV). 2 § 4 n. (1141); 7 § 4 n. (1235), and cp. VIII(V). 7 § 4 n. (1597); 12 § 12 n. (1772), § 14 n. (1780): or else at any rate as a polity (*πολιτεία*) i.e. a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. Now the principle or fundamental assumption (*ἐπόθεσις*) or proper basis of every aristocracy is excellence and capacity: see esp. § 9 τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἰρεσθαι ἡρ., § 11 μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμάται, VI(IV). 8. § 7 δρός ἀρετὴ and n. (§36) on III. 7 § 3. Even in a nominal aristocracy, regard at least for these must stand highest: hence the more concessions are made to the oligarchical principle of wealth, or again to the democratic principle, at the expense of excellence or merit, the more the aristoc-

cracy departs from its own standard. Polity takes for its standard the complete adjustment and neutralization of Oligarchy and Democracy; hence the more the oligarchical principle on the one hand makes itself felt at the expense of the democratic or the democratic principle on the other at the expense of the oligarchical, the more violently does a Polity diverge from its own principle in the one or the other direction: see VI(IV). c. 9. Cato quoted by Servius on Virgil's Aeneid IV. 682, Polybius VI. 51. 2 and Cicero I. c. call the constitution of Carthage, less accurately, a combination of monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, optimatum potestas: Cicero, genus optimas), and democracy. SUSEM. (386)

6 τοῦ μὲν γάρ κτλ.] "For the kings in conjunction with the senators have full powers either to bring certain matters before the people or not, provided they are both agreed: otherwise in this case the people, too, have a voice."

8 πάντες = both; viz. the Shofetes on the one side, the Senators on the other. For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of the word: "πάντες ubi de duobus tantum agitur, i. q. ἀμφότεροι ὀποτεροσοῦν" (Ind. Ar.). Comp. Anal. Priora I. 28. 44 b 21 ὅσα πᾶσιν ἐπεται "i. e. ὀποτεροσοῦν, et maiori termino et minori" (Waltz); also VI(IV). 4. 2. See also Exc. IV, δῆμος, p. 347. SUSEM. (387)

Add Anal. Priora I. 27 § 12, 43 b 36, Meteorol. II. 4 § 1, 359 b 33, IV. 5 § 8,

χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς (VIII)
12 εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολι-

382 b 17, and *De Anima* III. 6 § 2, 430 b 4 (Vahlen).

§ 6 11 ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy: see on 6 § 16 n. (218) and Exc. 1 to B. III. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, VII(VI). 4. 4 n. (1415), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution VI(IV). 14. 4 f.: at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held VI(IV). 6. 1, the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, VII(VI). 4. 4; or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, VI(IV). 14. 4 n. (1322). And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. SUSEM. (388)

12 ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις κτλ.] In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors were allowed to take part in the debate: other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schömann *Antiquities* p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to listen to the resolutions of the government without really having the final decision in its own hands, and 10 § 7 (cp. n. 362) that it had in those states no greater powers entrusted to it than to ratify the decrees of the Cosmi, or the kings, and the senators, all this certainly looks at first sight as if the assembly had not the right to reject these decrees, and indeed many have so understood it [e.g. Höck *Kreta* III. 59 ff., Ridgeway *op. c.* p. 134]. But that these expressions should not be thus pressed is shown by the simple consideration that if the assembly

had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to provoke it in case the Shophetes and the senate were agreed: whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing it must be conceded to Oncken (I. p. 279 f.) and Gilbert (p. 137 f.) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch *Lycurg.* 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (*Rhetra*) by the kings Theopompos and Polydoros [*αἱ δὲ σκολιὰ δὲ δῆμος θλοτό, τοῖς πρεσβυτεράς καὶ ὄρχαγέτας διωστατήρας ἡμεν*] is, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should respect a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;— supposing further that Aristotle's language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal *Spartan* institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. Thus we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, *τοῦτο μὴ κυροῦ, δλλ' θλω δέσμοισθαι καὶ διαλέσειν τὸν δῆμον, ὃς ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιεῖν τὴν γράμμην παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον*, i. e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. SUSEM. (389)

(VIII)

§ 7 τείαις οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οἵσας πολλῶν ⁴
 καὶ μεγάλων ὑφ' αὐτῶν αἱρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν
 15 ταύτας αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας
 πλέονα ἀρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἔξεληλυθότες
 ἀρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ
 μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτε-
 ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ἵπο τινῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πά-
 20 σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.
 § 8 παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο- ⁵
 νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατά τινα διάνοιαν ἡ
 συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἄλλὰ καὶ
 24 πλουτίνδην οἰονται δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
 § 9 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἀρχειν καὶ σχολαζειν. εἴπερ οὖν
 τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτίνδην ὀλιγαρχικὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-
 τὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἀν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἥν-
 περ συντέτακται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-
 λιτείαν αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-
 30 λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τούς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τούς στρατηγούς.
 § 10 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ὑμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρεκβασιν εἶναι ⁶

16 πλέον M^o, πλειον P²⁻⁴ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. Susem.¹ P⁹ (later hand), πλειονας P³ (1st hand) || 17 μένορτες? Sylburg wrongly || τὸ] τὰς P⁴⁻⁶ and p¹ in the margin, τοὺς Q^b T^b || 18 καὶ εἰ.....ἔτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place || 19 τινῶν Koraes (cp. III. I. 10), τῶν II Ar. Bk., τῶν <αὐτῶν> Vettori: τῶν ἀρχείων πάντων P⁴⁻⁶ Ar. || 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Bender thinks not genuine || 28 [καὶ] Susem., untranslated by Ar., καὶ συντέτακται Congreve transposing, καὶ <παρεκβέ-
 βηκε> or something similar Thurot

§ 7 13 τὰς πενταρχίας] See Exc. IV.
 p. 348 f. SUSEM. (390)

19 ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχείων] Aristotle says "courts" in the plural; see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as aristocratical provided (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are mere appendages to different offices of state. Further cp. III. I §§ 10, 11 τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος...τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας, *nn.* (443, 4); also *nn.* (325) on 9 § 23 above, p. 348 and *Introd.* p. 54 n. 3. SUSEM. (391)

20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors at Sparta, see *nn.* (325, 329 b) on 9 §§

23, 25; on that of the kings Schömann p. 229 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates *op. c. 250 ff.* SUSEM. (391 b)

§ 8 23 ἄλλα καὶ πλουτίνδην] Yet apart from the ideal state—see *n.* (885) on IV(VII). 13 § 9 πάντες οἱ πολῖται—Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 12 §§ 5, 6: III. II 8. SUSEM. (392)

§ 9 30 τοὺς στρατηγούς] See Exc. IV. p. 349 f. SUSEM. (392 b)

§ 10 31 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ.] See 9 § 2 n. (279): compare IV(VII). 9 § 3, § 7, 10 § 9 n. "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payment." (Füllborn). See however Exc. IV. p. 348. SUSEM. (393)

τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γάρ τοῦθ' ὅρâν ἔστι (VIII) τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν 34 καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἴδιω-
b 6 τεύοντες. <βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
b 7 <δ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.> a 35 εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-
λῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὀνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,
§ 11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γάρ ὁ νόμος
οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν (p. 55)
ὅλην φιλοχρήματον. ὃ τι γάρ ἀν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ
40 κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-
θεῖν τούτους. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμάται, ταύτην
1273^b οὐχ οἶον τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθί-
ζεσθαι δ' εὐλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὀνουμένους, ὅταν δαπα-
νήσαντες ἀρχωσιν ἀτοπον [μὲν] γάρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὡν ἐπιεικῆς
δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὡν οὐ βουλήσεται
5 δαπανήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἀριστ' ἀρχειν, τούτους
ἀρχειν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
δ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

33 ταῦθ' Bk.^a, a misprint probably || 33 βέλτιστον P^{a,b}

1273 b 6, 7 βέλτιον.....σχολῆς transposed by Susem., *Introd.* p. 81 f. || 6 εὐπορίας P^a II Ar. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly

1273 a 35 δεῖ] δὴ T^b and Q^b (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὴ δεῖ P^{a,b} || 39 δ τι P^a, δπι M^a P^{a,b} Ald. Bk. and perhaps P^b || γάρ Ar., δ' Γ II (for which II^a in Susem.¹ is a misprint) Bk. || 40 πολιτεῶν Γ M^a

1273 b 1 τε.....τὴν] τ' εἴναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατήν P^a Bk. || 2 δ'] γάρ Spengel || τοῦτ' ὀνουμένους Γ M^a and P^a (1st hand, corrected by p¹ in the margin), [τοῦτ' ὀνουμέ-
νους] Susem.^{1,2}, τοὺς ὀνημένους Ramus || 3 μὲν is rightly omitted by II^a Bk. || 4 ὡν] ἀν Γ M^a || 5 ἀριστ' ἀρχειν Spengel, ἀρισταρχεῖν Γ II Bk.

35 εἰ δε...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-
λῆς] "But even supposing that means
must be taken into account, in order to
secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can
devote their whole time to their duties,
"it is a grave defect that the highest
offices, like that of Shofete or general,
should be purchaseable." Here he takes
up the condition postulated and justified
above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτινότητα κτλ.

36 τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὀνητὰς κτλ] The
same thing is said by Polybius vi. 56. 4
(Schlosser). SUSEM. (394) Mr Wyse re-
fers to Plato *Rcp.* 544 D: ὀνηταὶ βασι-
λεῖαι and such like intermediate polities
are to be found outside of Greece (*τερπ*
τοὺς βαρβάρους).

§ 11 40 τὸ κύριον] the supreme autho-
rity, i.e. the government: III. 6. 1 n. (523).

41 τούτοις=τῷ κυρίῳ. In c. 5 § 15,
7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative
weakness of direct enactments and go-
vernment interference. But public op-
inion can be legitimately educated and
influenced, and this is τὸ παιδεύεισθαι πρὸς
τὰς πολιτεῖας. See VIII(v). 9 §§ 11—15.

§ 12 1273 b 1 θείζεσθαι κτλ] "Nor is
it strange that the purchasers of place
should be accustomed to make a profit out
of it, when it has cost them dear." The
article with the participle need not be
suspected; the sense is "buying office as
they do." Cp. c. 8 § 10 οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ³
πορίζοντες=if they supply, whereas οἱ
πορίζοντες would be 'supplying, as they
do'=as they supply (Tyrrell).

5 διὸ δεῖ κτλ] Cp. 9 § 27 n. (335).
SUSEM. (395)

- § 13 φαῦλον δ' ἀν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἄρχας τὸν 8
αὐτὸν ἄρχειν ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γάρ
10 ύφ' ἐνὸς ἔργον ἄριστ' ἀποτελεῖται. δεῖ δὴ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο
ὅρūν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν
§ 14 καὶ σκυτοτομέν. ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικώτερον
πλείους μετέχειν τῶν ἄρχων, καὶ δημοτικώτερον κοινότερόν
τε γάρ, καὶ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κάλλιον ἔκαστον ἀποτελεῖ-
15 ται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολε-
μικῶν καὶ τῶν γαυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γάρ ἀμφοτέροις διὰ
πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι.
- § 15 ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὐσης τῆς πολιτείας ἄριστα <στάσιν> ἐκ- 9
φεύγοντι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἱεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες

6 βέλτιον.....7 σχολῆς. See on 1273 a 35 || 10 δὴ Susem., δ' Γ II (δὲ M^a) Bk.
|| 14 καὶ before καθάπερ Susem., καὶ after εἴπομεν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹: Bender,
with Bernays, accepts Susemihl's transposition, or else would omit καθάπερ
εἴπομεν || 15 τὸν αὐτῶν M^a (1st hand), ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν? Γ, ab eisdem William;
<οὐτως η̄ ὑπό> τῶν αὐτῶν? Susem., τῶν ἔργων Bernays, tempting but not certain;
[τῶν αὐτῶν] Bender, as due to the τῶν γαυτικῶν following: not bad || 18 καὶ in-
serted after οὐσης by P⁴⁻⁶ Q^b T^b || <στάσιν> Bernays, illud effugient Ar.: Schnei-
der saw an object was required for ἐκφεύγοντι, <τοῦτο> Kluge after Ar., <ἔριδας>
for ἄριστα Hampke. Cp. 11 § 2 || 19 τῷ πλουτίζειν Susem.¹⁻² following Schneider,
misled by William's rendering *inditando*

§ 13 Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic examples of shoemaker and flute player: cp. c. 2 § 5, 3 n., Pl. *Αρ.* II. 374 C.

§ 14 12 πολιτικώτερον more to the advantage (or, in the interest) of the state, which is in this way better administered (κάλλιον οὕτως ἔκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πολιτικῶν).

13 κοινότερόν τε γάρ] sc. ἔστιν. For thus the government concerns wider interests, is more comprehensive. This is given as the reason for δημοτικώτερον; the next sentence justifies πολιτικώτερον. On this paragraph consult further VI(IV). 15 §§ 5—8 n. (1352). SUSEM. (396)

15 τῶν αὐτῶν] Each of the *invariable tasks* incident to government is, with a proper division of labour, better and more quickly performed (T. L. Heath).

16 ἐν τούτοις γάρ κτλ.] The commander in chief alone has merely to command; the private soldiers alone have merely to obey; all ranks between have both to command and be commanded (Piccart). SUSEM. (397)

§ 15 19 αἱεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου] Cp. VII(VI). 5. 9, φίλον κέκτηται τὸν δῆμον.

δεῖ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιουκίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. The subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa may be classified as follows: (1) the so-called Liby-Phoenicians, i.e. the old Phoenician settlements and others recently founded by Carthage: unfortified towns, partly no doubt inhabited by a mixed Phoenician and Libyan population, which had to pay a fixed tribute and furnish contingents. Utica alone escaped a similar fate, and had its independence and its walls preserved to it from the pious feeling of the Carthaginians towards their ancient protectors. (2) The agricultural villages of native Libyans who had been transformed from free farmers into fellahs: they had to pay a fourth part of the produce of the soil as land-tax (Polyb. I. 72. 2) and were subjected to a regular system of recruiting. (3) The roving pastoral tribes (*ουαδᾶς*) who had to pay tribute and to furnish contingents. In the treaties of the Carthaginian state preserved by Greek writers (3) are called *θρῆν*, "tribes," and the villages occupied by (2) are called *πόλεις*, "towns," of subjects (Mommsen II.

20 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ γάρ ίῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν (VIII)
πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τουτὶ ἔστι τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιά-
§ 16 στους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἀντυχίᾳ γένηται
τις καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἀποστῆτων ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρ-
μακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.

(12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ Κρη-
τικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἴπερ δικαίως εὔδοκιμοῦσι,
12 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τῶν δὲ ἀποφηναμένων τι περὶ πο- IX
λιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκουνώντας πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ
ώντινωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ (p. 56)
30 ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἔνιοι δὲ
νομοθέται γεγόνασιν, οἱ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἱ δὲ καὶ
τῶν ὄθνεών τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοῖς καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἐγέ-
νοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἵον καὶ Λυ-
κούργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γάρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-
§ 2 στησαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' ε
36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον. διηγαρχίαν

25 περὶ...1274 b 26 ἀν (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188^b.
Götting pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. *nn.* (399, 423, 427)
|| κρήτης Μ¹ Ρ¹ || 26 αἴπερ] ε[περ]? Susem. (Γ may have omitted περ, quas Wil-
liam) || 27 τι omitted in ΙΙ¹, hence [τι] Susem.¹² || 32 νόμων inserted after μὲν
by ΙΙ² Ar. Bk. || 33 νόμων] μένον ΙΙ² Ar. Bk. || 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην ΙΙ² Bk.

p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. xx.
55. 4. It is the latter which are here
meant (*ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις*). We are not to
understand the passage, with Heeren (p.
42) and Movers (p. 358), of the foundation
of new colonies; but of appointments
like that of governor and assessor of
taxes which gave the holders the oppor-
tunity of enriching themselves at the ex-
pense of their subjects. (See Kluge p.
192 ff., who however incorrectly assumes
that such officers were sent to Liby-
Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.)
It was in accordance with the principles
of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to
give these appointments to decayed
nobles (as might be inferred from
Mommsen's account II. p. 17 Eng. tr.),
but according to Aristotle's explicit state-
ment to plebeians, or citizens who did not
belong to the ruling houses. SUSEM.
(398)

§ 16 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἡσυχίας] "No
spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e.
no means of terminating civic strife.
Comp. the judgment of Polyb. vi. 51
on the second Punic War.

c. 12 The Solonian Constitution: §§ 1—6.

For the historical bearings of this pas-
sage consult especially Grote cc. 11, 31;
Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 322—342 Eng.
tr. and *Athenian Constitutional History*
translated by Bosanquet (Oxford 1878).
Also *Case Materials for the History of
Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1874);
Oncken *Athen und Hellas* pp. 161—173;
Staatslehre II. 410 ff.

§ 1 28 οὐκ ἐκουνώνταν κτλ] see
I. 7. 5, II. 7. 1. Here legislation is ap-
parently a branch of practical politics;
cp. *n.* on πολιτικός, I. 1. 2.

33 νόμων, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας] This
distinction, which is quite in place here,
induced the author of the suspected pas-
sage, §§ 6—14, to believe that in Aristotele's opinion a list of mere legislators
was a further requisite. Whereas in fact
Aristotle intends with these words to
dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such
list drawn up by Aristotle the interpo-
lator supplied the supposed want on his
own account. SUSEM. (399)

§ 2 36 ἔνιοι μὲν οἴονται] *Introd.* p. 20

τε γάρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὐσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν (IX)
δῆμον παῦσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστῆσαι τὴν πάτριον,
μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι γάρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ
40 πάγῳ βουλῆν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρετὰς ἀρι-
στοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων
1274 a ἑκένα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὸν τε βου-
λὴν καὶ τὴν τὰν ἀρχῶν αἱρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι,

37 γάρ omitted by M^o P¹ || 41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια II² Ar. Bk., but see § 4, where Schneider restored the plurals κύρια...τὰ δικαστήρια...εληφθεῖσα...ταῦτα...

n. 1. The context shows that these eulogists of Solon were eulogists of a mixed constitution, and not of Democracy, as Oncken strangely maintains. Such a combination of oligarchical and aristocratical elements they found in the "old-fashioned" Solonian democracy: in other words, not merely a moderate Democracy, but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least a kind of Polity. SUSEM. (400)

Diels *Über die Berliner Fragmente der Ἀθηναϊκῶν πολιτεία* (Berlin 1885), p. 33, refers to Isocr. *Areop.* 16, *Antid.* 232, 312, for expressions of the current notion that Solon was the founder of Attic democracy; δέ Σόλων ὁ παλαιὸς ἦν φιλόδημος τὴν φύσιν.

37 λίαν ἄκρατον] Too unqualified.

38 τὴν πάτριον] The old-fashioned, as distinguished from the modern, democracy (ἡ νῦν δ.): comp. §§ 3, 4; VI(IV). 6 § 5; 14 §§ 7, 11, 12; VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 § 3; VIII(V). 5 §§ 10, 11 (*μεταβάλλοντι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην*) with the references in the notes. Comp. also VII(VI). 7 § 7 n. "modern oligarchies": III. 6 § 9 n. (532). Aristotle quite accepts the distinction, cp. §§ 5, 6: III. 11, 8; VI(IV). 11, 19 n. (1303). For he has no objection to raise against these panegyrists of Solon, except that they referred even the aristocratical and oligarchical elements of the combination to Solon, whereas in fact only the democratic accession was his doing. With the following sentences compare Schömann *The Solonian Heliaca and Ephialtes' coup d'état*, an article in the *Jahrb. f. Phil.* XCIII. 1866, 585—594: and R. Schöll *De synecorisi Atticis* p. 10 ff. (Jena 1876). SUSEM. (400 b)

"Inter eos qui Solonem laudant, ni fallor, Isocratem in Areopagitico intellegit; ita enim loquitur, ut Soloni et al-
reas ἀρχῶν et βουλῆς tribuat, at nihil
ille de δικαστηρίοις" (Spengel).

39 "by a happy blending (of other

elements) in the polity."

39—41 Parallel to the account given, probably by the same writers, of the Spartan polity 6 § 17.

§ 3 On this battle-ground of contending opinions there are at least three issues. (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting the views of the panegyrists of Solon [Grote, Fränkel], or is he correcting them [Thirlwall, Congreve, Schömann *Ath. Const. Hist.* p. 37 Eng. tr.]? (b) What is the exact sense of the last clause? [See Exc. v. p. 350 ff.] (γ) Is the statement it contains historically true? [Grote, Curtius reject it: Thirlwall, Schömann accept it.]

41 ξούκε] Schömann, Fränkel *Die attischen Geschworenengerichte* 62f. (Berlin 1878), and others lay far too much stress on this word ξούκε = 'seems', here and below, § 5 l. 15. Aristotle often speaks in a qualifying manner about things of which, in reality, he has not the slightest doubt. Thus ξούκε, l. 15, comes very close to φαίνεται l. 11; the force of which, as often in other writers besides Aristotle, is to express not so much what is merely apparent and probable, as what is obvious, what has come to light. SUSEM. (401)

See ξούκε l. 1. 6, VIII(V). 3 § 16, 9 § 2.
"The words express Aristotle's own opinion, because (1) the construction requires it (ἴσως μὲν οἰορτα...ξούκε δι), (2) the sense requires it; some thought that Solon established a mixed constitution, Aristotle contends that he only added a new element, the δικαστήρια" (Case).

1274 a 1 τὴν τε βουλὴν] What powers Aristotle might ascribe to the council of the Areopagus which Solon found existing and left unaltered, it is not easy to see from this. SUSEM. (402)

2 καταστῆσαι = laid the foundation for the democracy.

τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες § 4 αὐτῷ λῦσαι γάρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν ὄν. ἐπεὶ γάρ τοῦτ' ἵσχυσεν, ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δῆμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια § 5 μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον § 6 ἔκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αἴξων εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο § 7 προαιρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρ- § 8 ρίας γάρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφο- § 9 ρίας γάρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφο-

1274 a 4 θάτερα Κοραες, θάτεραν Η¹ Susem.¹ in the text, θάτερον Η² Ar. Bk. || 5 ἵσχυεν Η² Bk. || 7 μετέστησαν Tegge, κατέστησαν ΓΗ Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ || 8 ἐκόλουσε Γ Ar., ἐκόλουσε Q^b || [καὶ Περικλῆς] Sauppe, probably rightly, τὰ... 9 Περικλῆς omitted by Γ M^a

3 τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων] See Exc. v. p. 350 ff. SUSEM. (403)

μέμφονται τινες] See *Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. In representing that these critics of Solon were adherents of the oligarchy Oncken, II. 439, 440 n. (1), goes beyond Aristotle's own words. All that can be fairly inferred is that they were opponents of absolute democracy. But that does not prove them to be oligarchs; they might have been friends of a mixed constitution no less than Solon's panegyrist noticed just before or, comparatively speaking, Aristotle himself. SUSEM. (404)

4 λῦσαι γάρ κτλ.] For (they think) he neutralized the other forces in the state by making the court of law, a body chosen by lot, supreme over all matters.

§ 4 5 ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δῆμῳ] Cpr. VI(IV). 4 § 27 ὁ δὲ οὖν ταῦτος δῆμος ἀτε μέντος ὃν ἤπει μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ δρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός ... καὶ ἐστιν ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχῶν τῇ τυραννίδι, with notes. SUSEM. (405)

6 τὴν νῦν δημοκ.] 'The democracy of the present day' i.e. the extremest and most unfettered species: cp. VI(IV), 4 § 25 ff., 6 § 5; 14 § 7, § 11; VIII(V). 5 § 10 and the other references given in n. (400 b). SUSEM. (406)

8 Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε] Schömann *Antiquities* p. 341 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (407)

9 μισθοφόρα] Böckh *Economy of Athens* p. 232 Eng. tr.; also notes on v(VIII). 5 § 23 (1055), VI(IV). 13 § 5 (1260). SUSEM. (408)

Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σ.] Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon's panegyrists in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts¹ the historical statement of Solon's critics, but attacks the censure which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore 9 § 12 n. (296), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτώματος] accidentally, "in the course of events" (Susemib.), ναυαρχία=the supremacy at sea, like ναυαρχία; not found elsewhere in this sense.

13 ἐφρονηματίσθη] acquired overweening confidence in themselves, became aware of their importance. Eaton compares v(VIII). 6. 11 μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά

¹ This is strangely overlooked by Oncken II. 440 n. (1). As against Schömann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes these critics speak of Solon as having introduced the appointment of the Heliaca by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these censorious critics the form used is the singular, τὸ δικαστήριον, which had given some show to the meaning which Schömann has refuted: see Exc. v. This defense then is fatal to Oncken's position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (II. 494) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Heliaca. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon's critics and admirers in thinking that it was he who made the Heliaca, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear.

νηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαιύλους ἀντιπολιτευο- (IX)
 15 μένων τῶν ἐπιεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιο-
 τάτην ἀποδίδοναι τῷ δῆμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴρει-
 σθαι καὶ εἰθύνειν (μηδὲ γάρ τούτου κύριος ὡν ὁ δῆμος
 § 6 δοῦλος ἀν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρί-
 μων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιο- (p. 57)
 ου μεδίμων καὶ ζευγιτῶν καὶ [τρίτου τέλους] τῆς καλουμένης

14 ἀντὶ πολιτευομένων Γ P² Ar. || 16 ἀποδοῦναι? Schneider, perhaps rightly ||
 17 ὡν ὁ δῆμος κύριος Μ¹ P¹ Susem.², ὁ δῆμος ὡν κύριος [?] Γ Susem.¹ || 18 [τὰς δ'
 ἀρχὰς... 21 μετήν] Susem. Jahrb. f. Philol. XCIII. p. 331 Diels || 19 εὐπόρων
 P².³ Q^b T^b || πεντακοσιών μεδίμων Γ M¹ || 20 [τρίτου τέλους] Susem. doubtfully,
 τοῦ τέλους Spengel, who afterwards transposed καὶ to follow τρίτου τέλους; [τρίτου
 τέλους] and καὶ ζευγιτῶν transposed to follow 21 ιππάδος Oncken. But then we
 should expect καὶ <τὰς> ζευγιτῶν and might equally well conjecture καὶ τῆς καλου-
 μένης ιππάδος καὶ τρίτου τέλους <τοῦ τῶν> ζευγιτῶν

φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἥρων, and
 VIII(V). 4. 8 πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενό-
 μενος ἄλλος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ
 διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ
 θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατικὴν ισχυρο-
 τέραν ἐποίησεν, where see n. (1521).
 SUSEM. (410)

This is why in a fragment of his *Polity of Athens* Aristotle mentioned Themistocles' proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Polyaen. *Str.* I. 30 § 6): Diels *op.c.* p. 34.

14 Here as elsewhere Aristotle's sympathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy: the Moderates (*εὐεξεῖς*) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides (ὁ Μεληστοῦ), Nicias, and Theramenes (*Frag.* 369, Plut. *Nic.* 2), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon.

15 ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε κτλ.] But above, § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schömann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people; and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's admirers, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the nobles to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided.

SUSEM. (411)

17 καὶ εἰθύνειν] By this control over the magistrates is meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or perhaps even before the popular assembly direct; and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct. Cp. Exc. V.; further III. 11 § 8 n. (569), VI (IV). 11 § 19 n. (1303), 14 § 3 (1319), § 6 (1325), § 10 (1332); n. on 16 § 2; and VII (VI). 1 § 4 (1475). SUSEM. (412)

"With this statement of the ἀναγκαιότατα of democracy, compare the summary of the characteristics of true *lois* which Herodotus III. 80 puts into the mouth of Otanes: πάλιψ μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀρχεῖ, ὑπεσθίων δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλεύματα δὲ πάντα ἐτὸν κοινὸν ἀναφέρει [sc. τὸ πλῆθος]" (Jackson).

μηδὲ γάρ... δοῦλος ἀν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος] Here again is a substantial contribution to Aristotle's own views on the requirements of a good constitution. SUSEM. (413)

§ 6 18 τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons enjoyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded.

19 ἐκ τῶν πεντ. κτλ.] On these four Solonian classes see Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 329 ff. Eng. tr. Further see III. II. 8 n. (569), VII (VI). 4. 5 (1417). SUSEM. (414)

The order of the classes is not correct even if we omit the words τρίτου τέλους

ιππάδος τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετήν. (IX)

[*ιομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζε-⁵*
φυρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ
τὰς ἄλλας τὰς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι τὰς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ
§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δὲ [[καὶ]] τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὁνομακρί-
του μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ ιομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-
σθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρὸν ὅντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικήν τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον,
Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκου
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἀσκεπτίτερον τῶν
χρόνων ἔχοντες ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος ε

22 [*ιομοθέται.....β 26 ἀντὶ*] Bojesen || 23 αὐτοῦ Γ P¹, αὐτοῦ Μ⁹ Π² || 24 τὰς
before Χαλκιδικαῖς Schmidt would omit || 25 καὶ omitted by Η¹ Ar. || 27 αὐτὸν
omitted apparently in Γ, perhaps rightly || κακεῖ οτ καὶ <έκει> Tegge,
perhaps rightly || 28 μαντικήν omitted in Γ M⁹ || θέλητα (in Γ after ἑταῖρον)
and 29 θάλητος Γ M⁹ || 30 τῶν χρόνων Ar., τῶν χρόνων Γ Π Bk. || 31 ἔχοντες
Susem., λέγοντες Γ Η Ar. Bk., cp. Plat. Gorg. 501 C ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τῶν ἀμείνοντος

or, with Spengel, transpose them to go with *σεργατῶν*. Cp. H. Landwehr in *Philologus Suppl.* Band v. 1885, pp. 118 ff.

21 Comp. Julius Pollux VIII. 130 οἱ
δὲ τὸ θητικὸν οἰδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἥρχον.

A list of legislators: §§ 6—14.

Many of the arguments with which Göttling *Comm.* p. 345 f., impugned the genuineness of the whole chapter were answered by Nickes *De Aristotelis politi-
 corum libris* p. 55 ff., and Spengel, *Über
 die Politik* p. 11 note, *Arist. Studien* III.
 p. 18 f. Göttling was followed by Böckh and Bernays *Ges. Abh.* I. 172. The case must depend mainly on the language.

22 *Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιζεφύριοις*] i.e. the Locrians living on the promontory Zephyrion in Lower Italy. The laws of Zaleukos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to have been the first which were committed to writing: see Schömann p. 17 Eng. tr., *Antiq. iur. publ.* 89 n. (8). SUSEM. (415)

23 *Χαρώνδας*] Mentioned I. 2 § 5 n. (16), VI (IV). 11 § 15 n., 13 § 10. SUSEM. (416)

On his laws see Diod. XII. 15.

24 ταῦτα Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι] i.e. the colonies which Chalcis in Euboea planted in those countries: see E. Curtius *Hist.* I. 43 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (417)

§ 7 25 πειρῶνται δὲ τινες] Ephorus Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch *Lycurg.* 4, Triebel *op. c.* 67, 72, 101. SUSEM. (418)

The construction after *συνάγειν*, ὡς and genitive absolute in the one clause balanced by an accusative with infinitive

in the other, is awkward; but it can be nearly paralleled from Plato *Philebus* 16 C: *τὴν φήμην παρέδοσαν ὡς τῇ ἐρόει μὲν...θυτῶν, πέρας δὲ...ἔχοντων. δεῖν οὖν ήμας κτλ.* Cp. *Rer. II. 383* A λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν ὡς μήτε αὐτοῖς γόητας θυτας, μήτε ήμας παράγειν.

28 κατ with the accus. may mean "for the purpose" κατὰ θέαν ἥκειν, or "in connexion with," almost "practising his mantic art."

Θάλητρα] See EXC. VI. p. 352 f. SUSEM. (419)

29 To the arguments advanced against the genuineness of this portion of the chapter may be added one derived from the fact that here we have Θάλητος as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητρα of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic gen. Θάλεω 1259 a 7, the Doric Αρχέτρα 1340 b 6; comp. also the quotation from Alcaeus III. 14 § 10. Plato on the other hand regularly changes quotations from other dialects into Attic; cp. *Gorg.* 485 E, 505 E, with Dr Thompson's note (Ridgeway *op. c.* p. 135).

30 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κτλ.] This criticism is very just. SUSEM. (419 b)

The same date *circa* Ol. 29 or 664 B.C. is the best attested for Thaletas, who comes second, and Zaleukos, who comes fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgus between them whom the latest estimate only brings down to 776!

§ 8 νομοθέτης Θηβαίοις. ἦν δὲ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν (IX)
 Βακχιδῶν, ἔραστης δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος
 'Ολυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισῆσας τὸν
 35 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας· κἀκεῖ
 § 9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ὀμφότεροι· καὶ νῦν ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς
 τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὔσυνόπτους ἔντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
 τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δὲ οὐ συνόπτου
 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτὸν οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν
 40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἀποπτος
 ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ἐπως
 42^a^b ἀποπτος. ἥκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ
 τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ
 τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν
 4 ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἴδιας ὑπ' ἐκείνους
 § 11 νενομοθετημένου, ἐπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σώζεται τῶν κλήρων. Χα-
 ρώνδους δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον πλὴν αἱ δίκαια τῶν ψευδο-
 μαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δὲ ἀκρι-

33 βακχιδῶν Γ Μ^a (unless Γ had βακχιδῶν) βακχιαδῶν P¹ Π² Ar. Bk. Susem. 1^a ||

34 'Ολυμπίασιν Götting, perhaps rightly || 35 μητριᾶς? Spengel || 39 γραφὴν
 ΙΙ^a, corrected in the margin of P⁴

1274 b 1 τὴν omitted by P²^a || 5 σώζεται Bücheler || 6 οὐδέν ἐστιν ίδιον P¹,
 ίδιον οὐδέν ἐστιν P⁴, ίδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστιν P²^a Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. || ψευδομαρτυριῶν Scaliger
 and Bentley (*Phalaris* p. 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτύρων Γ ΙΙ Ar. || 7 ἐπίσκηψιν Scaliger
 and Bentley, ἐπίσκηψιν Γ ΙΙ (in P³ the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)

§ 8 32-33 τῶν Βακχιδῶν] The ancient royal house at Corinth; see E. Curtius *Hist.* I. 271—277, 434, Eng. tr. Schömann pp. 114, 153 Eng. tr. Compare also *nn.* (533) on III. 9 § 9, (1658) on VIII(v). 10 § 6. SUSEM. (420)

34 'Ολυμπίασιν] In the 13th Olympiad B.C. 728. See Grote II. 394.

§ 9 40 ἀποπτος—'seen from far' may be used for *visible*, as here, or *invisible*; but the former in late writers.

§ 10 1274 b 1 ἥκησαν μὲν οὖν κτλ] The interpolator here explains why he has related the history of Philolaos at such length, namely to make clear how this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if he really considered such a detailed explanation necessary, when its necessity or even utility is not further discoverable, then he ought at any rate *a fortiori* to have shown how a Corinthian stranger came to give laws to the Thebans. SUSEM. (421)

4 θετικούς] laws of adoption. The Cretan term for adoption, we now learn,

was ἀνάφαντις, ἀναφαιρεσθαι.

καὶ τοῦτ' ίστον ίδιως κτλ] Aelian *Var. Hist.* II. 7 relates that at Thebes it was forbidden under penalty of death to expose a child; but in case of pressing poverty the father might bring his child in its swaddling clothes to the magistrate, who then sold it by a regular contract to the lowest bidder (*τῷ τυμῷ ἀλαχιστην δώντι*), whom it had to serve like a slave when grown up, in return for its maintenance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Schneider, there is here a survival of the old laws which tended to preserve the original family estates unaltered by means of adoption. Hardly so, for the purchased child is bought as a kind of slave. On the further constitutional history of Thebes see Exc. I to B. VIII(v). SUSEM. (422)

§ 11 7 ἐπίσκηψιν] sc. ψευδομαρτυρῶν (Stobaeus says συκοφαντῶν) prosecution for perjury. Editors quote Pl. *Laws* XI. 937 n, [Dem.] 1139, 7.

βείᾳ τῶν νόμων ἔστι γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. (IX)

§ 12 **Φαλέου δ' ἕδιον η τῶν οὐσιῶν ὀνομάλωσις,** Πλάτωνος δ' η (v. 58)

ιο τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ
τὰ συστίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,
τὸ τοὺς νήφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμι-
κοῖς ἄσκησιν ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνωνται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,
14 ἡδέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ

§ 13 **ἄχρηστον.** Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρ-

χόυση τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν ἕδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδέν

8 τῶν νόμων omitted by Π¹ Ar., perhaps rightly || 9 φιλολάου Π¹⁻² Ar. and 1st hand of P²⁻³ (corrected by corr.¹) || ἀνομάλωσις Bk., ἀνωμάλωσις II, ὀμαλότης Spengel, ὀμάλωσις Chandler || 12 τὴν.....13 ἀσκητιν] Vettori first observed the harsh construction; either η.....ἀσκητιν or <δ περι> before τὴν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 13 γίνονται P²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b || 14 τούν P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τὴν M^a (1st hand)

§ 12 9 **Φαλέου δ' ἕδιον κτλ]** Even Fülleborn with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticisms. Cp. note (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamas he has said enough of the political ideas of mere theorists (*εἰργτας σχέδιον περὶ πάτρων*): also that in § 1 f. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Solon to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 399), wanted to append a list of legislators simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Göttling, to the same interpolator as the rest of the chapter. SUSEM. (423)

ἀνομάλωσις equalization: Rhet. III. 11. 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι (read ἀνωμαλίσθηαι; A^c, our almost unique authority, has δίω μάλιστα εἴναι) τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχοντι ταῦτῃ, τὸ ἐπιφανεῖ

καὶ διαμέσοι τὸ Ισον. See Cope's note. Not a *fresh* equalization, but a *breaking up* of the present distribution to restore equality; so ἀνανέμειν, ἀναδασμός, ἀνα-διδόναι ψήφους.

10 η τι τῶν γυναικῶν κτλ] Cp. 6 § 2 π. (153); 6 § 5 π. (196). SUSEM. (424)

11 ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην κτλ] Laws I 637 ff., 643 ff., II 664—672, 673 D ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for adducing it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp. π. (423) just above. SUSEM. (425)

12 καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κτλ] Laws VII 794 D—795 D. SUSEM. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram verborum facit, durior: videbatur enim vel eodem casu, quo prima duo protulit, dicere debuisse καὶ η ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν vel plene loqui hoc pacto: καὶ <δ περι> τὴν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκησιν (Vettori). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SUSEM.

§ 13 15 **πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρχούσῃ κτλ]** From π. (423) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Charondas Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in π. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which

έστιν ὁ τι καὶ μνείας ἀξιον, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζη- (IX)
μίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς
ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας,
20 ἀν τι πταισώσι, πλείω ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ
γάρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἡ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν
συγγράμμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύοντας ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ
§ 14 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ῥηγίνος νο-
μοθέτης Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περί τε <τὰ> φο-
25 νικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἔστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἴδιον γε οὐδὲν
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν.]

20 τι πταισώσι L^a, τι πταιωσι C^a, τυπτήσωσι Γ P¹⁻²⁻³⁻⁴ Q M^b Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. Bk.,
τυπτέσωσι U^b, τυπήσωσι M^b, τι ποιήσωσι Bas.³ || ἀποτίνειν Γ (?) Ar., ἀποτίνειν
M^b P¹⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b Ald. ἀποτίνειν P² || 21 γάρ omitted by Γ M^b || 22 ἀπέβλεψαν P⁴
Q^b T^b || 24 <τὰ> Koraes || 25 δέλλο Koraes

were made for an ideal state. But this does not mend matters because, as Draco was not the author of a constitution, there is a marked antithesis between them of quite another kind. SUSEM. (427)

17 πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης κτλ] Cp. *Rhet.*
II. 23, 29, 1400 b 21 καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην διὰ οὐκ ἀνθράκου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος· χαλεποί γάρ. Suidas s.v. Δράκων (Eaton). Aelian *Var. Hist.* VIII. 10,
Plut. *Solon* 17, Gell. xi. 18. 1—4 (J. G. Schneider). On Draco, the Athenian legislator shortly before Solon, see further E. Curtius *History of Greece* I. p. 301 f., 663 n. 115 [Eng. tr. I. 313]. SUSEM. (428)

18 On Pittacus see III. 14. 10 with
Exc. II. on B. III. SUSEM. (429)
νόμων δημιουργός has been objected to;
but Nickes cites αρετῆς δημ. IV(VII). 9. 7.

20 διὰ γάρ τὸ πλείους κτλ] Cp. *Rhet.*
II. 25, 7, 1402 b 11 ἐνστασις διὰ οὐκού
II. αἰνεῖσθαι οὐ γάρ ἀν μείζους ἤνημα ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ: Nic.
Eth. III. 5, 8, 1113 b 30 καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ
ἄγροιν κολάζεινται, ἐάν αἴτοι εἴναι δοκῆται
τῆς ἀγρολας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύοντι διπλά τὰ
ἐπιτίμα· κύριος γάρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυούσηραι
(Eaton). SUSEM. (430)

§ 14 24 Χαλκιδεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης] The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalcidice, which derived its name from its colonization by Chalcis in Euboea. This took place before the settlement of the western colonies of Chalcis, noticed in § 6 n. (417): see E. Curtius I. 428 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (431)

25 Laws of Charondas respecting
heiresses are mentioned by Diodorus XII.
18.

NOTE ON ARCADIA.

Σιοῖσι δὲ τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὡσὶ κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, δἄλλ' οἰον 'Αρκάδες: II. 2. 3.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see n. 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a *συμμαχία*, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of *ἔθνος*, however, conceived as analogous to a *συμμαχία*, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words *ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὡσὶ κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος*, 'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.' By the latter he means the *ἔθνος* which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwalled towns without political independence (*κῶμαι*). In other words it is the organization with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek nations: whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the *συμμαχία*, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see n. 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic *πόλις*." Dittenberger in *Gött. gel. Anz.* 1874, p. 1382. SUSEM. (132)

To Dittenberger's explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (1) that there is a reference to some *συνοικισμός* of Arcadians, and that the *πόλις* is distinguished from *ἔθνος* = *the unorganized race*. Then if it be granted that *ὅταν μὴ ὁσὶ=διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι* or *τῷ μὴ εἶναι*, the words will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus *μὴ κατὰ*

κώμας κεχωρισμένος will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the *συμμαχία* must consist in the isolated independence of the villages : the *ἴθνος Ἀρκαδικὸν* being composed *ἐξ ὥρων*, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tegea and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively : but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note *ad loc.*, it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle *may* have interposed at this point the remark that as the *πόλις* differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state ; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but *not* from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (*Notes* p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race is the *πόλις*; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (ii) to understand by *ἴθνος* the *organized* race or tribe, as something distinct from the *πόλις*, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows¹: Xenoph. *Hell.* vi. 5. 6 τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον συνήγον ἐπὶ τῷ συνιέναι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὁ τι νικῷ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἐπράττον ἔân τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι : *ib.* vi. 5. 12 ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος...καταλαβὼν πόλιν ὅμορον οὖσαν Εὔταιαν καὶ εὑρὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῃ ἥλικα οἰχομένους εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν ὅμως οὐκ ἡδίκησε τὴν πόλιν : *ib.* vii. 4. 2 ὁ Διοκομήδης πείθει τοὺς μυρίους πράττειν περὶ συμμαχίας. (Comp. Harpocr. p. 280 μύριοι ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει...συνέδριον ἔστι κοινὸν Ἀρκάδων ἀπάντων διελεκται δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστογέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκάδων πολιτείᾳ.) Xenoph. *Hell.* vii. 4. 12 καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ἡλεῖοι Δασιῶνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἔαντων ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι

¹ With what follows compare Freeman *Federal Government* pp. 197—207.

συντελοῦντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτιῶντο, ἔλεγον [οἱ Μαντινεῖς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαντινέων πόλις ἔγγυότο ἡ μὴν παρέξειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὅπόσους τις προσκαλοῖτο: VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμεινώντας ἐλογίζετο σφίσιν ὑπάρχειν... Ἀρκάδων τούς τὰ σφέτερα φρονοῦντας. ἦσαν δ' οἵτοι Τεγεᾶται καὶ Μεγαλοπολῖται καὶ Ἀστεᾶται καὶ Παλλαντιεῖς, καὶ εἴ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικροί τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταῦτας οἰκεῖν ἡγαγκάσσοτο.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινόν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (*μέριον*), a federal army (*ἐπάρχιον*) paid out of a common fund (Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4. 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (*πόλις*), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch. III. 165, Quint. Curt. VI. 1. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. xv. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis¹.

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words *κατὰ κώμας κεχωρισμένοι*. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the *unorganized* race, which lives κατὰ κώμας τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the southwest of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

¹ Plut. *Philip.* 13; Paus. VIII. 27. 7; Freeman p. 626 n. 4.

is it that (*a*) the league embraced Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraea, *πόλεις* which were not absorbed in Megalopolis: while (*b*) most of the townships or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are unmistakably called *πόλεις*, not *κώμαι*, in respect of their previous existence¹. It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new league that these places became *κώμαι*: previously they had been *πόλεις*². Nor is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing the *πόλις* (*i*) from a *συμπαχία* or federation of states (Staatenbund) and (*2*) from a federal state (Bundesstaat), and if Arcadia is the illustration of (*2*) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partizan might hold no doubt that the opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe and the *πόλις*, *ex hypothesi* all-important, disappears.

(III) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: 'when the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, but lives scattered and without political organization.'

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a *πόλις* or an *ἔθνος*. The view cited as (*i*) makes them both. Victorius³ and Camerarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the *πόλις*, implying that distribution of the population over villages or 'demes'⁴ (*κατὰ κώμας*) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how *any* tribe or region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

¹ Paus. VIII. 27 §§ 3, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: *πόλεις δὲ τοσαῖδε ὄποςας... πατρίδας σφίσιν ούσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπειθόντα οἱ Ἀρκάδες*. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term *πόλεις* which is often interchanged with *κώμαι*: cp. Thuc. II. 15 *κατὰ πόλεις φέστο*, but Isocrates X. 35 *στοράδην καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαν* (both of Attica before Theseus).

² Ib. VIII. 27. 7, *τῶν κατειλεγμένων πόλεων αἱ μὲν ἐς ἄπαν εἰσὶν ἐφ ἡμῶν ἔρημοι, τὰς δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται κώμαι, Γόρτυνα, Διπολία, Θεούσαν τὴν πρὸς Ὀρχομένη, Μεθύδριον, Τεῦθιν, Καλλίας, Ἐλισσοντα; 12 § 2 Μεθύδριον πόλιν μὲν οὐκέτι κώμην δέ ἐς τὸ Μεγαλοπόλι-*

τικὸν συντελοῦσαν (cp. the similar language of Xen. Hell. VII. 4. 12, as quoted above, with regard to a single city, Lasion, as a member of the Arcadian League).

³ Excipio, inquit, cum cives ipsius totaque illa multitudo, quae civitatem conflat, non fuerint per pagos distincti;...ut sunt autem, addidit, nunc Arcades, e quibus distantibus inter se intervallis locorum, domiciliaque habentibus valde diiuncta, conficiebatur tamen civitas. Victorius Comm. p. 78.

⁴ οὗτοι [sc. οἱ ἐν Πελοπονῆσῳ] μὲν γὰρ κώμαι τὰς περιοικὰς καλεῖν φασίν, Αθηναῖοι δὲ δήμους, Poet. 3 § 6, 1448 a 36. Dr Jackson has supplied this reference.

EXCURSUS I.

ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνει τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γάρ τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναικας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. II. 3. 9.

'Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.' From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotus (IV. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auseans (*Αὐσέες*) living near Lake Tritonis, west of the Lesser Syrtis. Of later writers Mela I. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Göttling): Nicolaus Damascenus, *Frag.* III. in Stob. *Flor.* XLIV. 41 (Müller *Frag. hist. Graec.* III. p. 458), of the Liburnians¹ (Eaton). Diodorus III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglodytae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotus (IV. 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view 'in order that they might all be brothers,' *ἴνα καστιγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκήσιοι ἔντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτε ἔχθει χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους.* The case of the Massagetae, cited by Congreve, Herod. I. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, I. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. 1, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrrhenians by Theopompos *Frag.* 222 in Athen. XII. 517 D, E, Müller *Frag. hist. gr.* I. 315², and of the Scythian Galaktophagi by Nicolaus Damascenus *Frag.* 123 in Stob. *Flor.* V. 73, Müller *Frag. h. gr.* III. 460³.

¹ Αἰθύριοι κοινὰς τὰς γυναικας ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐν κοινῷ τρέφουσι μέχρι ἔτῶν πέντε, εἴτα τῷ ἔτῳ συνειγέκαντες ἀπαγτά τὰ παιδία τὰς ὁμοιότητας πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρας εἰκάζουσι καὶ ἔκαστῳ τῷ δρμοιον ἀποδιδάσσου ταρπί.

² Θεόπομπος δὲ ἐν τῇ μη' τῶν λατοριῶν καὶ νόμοιν ἔται φησι παρὰ τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς κοινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναικας ταῦτας δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σφόδρα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ γυναιξίσθαι πολλάκις καὶ μετ' ἄνδρῶν, ἐνοτε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἕαντάς... τρέφειν δὲ τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πάντα τὰ γυνόμενα παιδία οὐκ εἰδότας διον πατρός ἐστιν ἔκαστον. Ἰώσι δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὸν ἀντὸν τρόπον τοῖς θρεψαμένοις κτλ. The description seems to owe much to Plato's republic.

³ εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ δικαιότατοι, κοινὰ ἔχοντες

τὰ τε κτήματα καὶ τὰς γυναικας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν πρεβυτέρους αὐτῶν πατέρας διοιδέσσιν, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους παῖδας, τοὺς δ' ἥλικας διδελφούς. [This is the system of nomenclature (in use in Hawaii and Rotuma and other islands of the Pacific), classifying and not describing the person addressed, which Morgan calls Malay. See *Ancient Society* pp. 491—423. If there is anything fabulous in the account of Nicolaus it must be sought in his further statements παρὰ τούτοις οὐδὲ εἰς οὐτε φθονῶν, οὐ φασίν, οὐτε μισῶν οὐτε φοβούμενος λατορίθη διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην. μαρχμοι δ' οὐχ ἡττον αὐτῶν αἱ γυναικες η οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ σιμπολεμοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ὅταν δέρη.]

It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken I. pp. 179—181. ‘Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside, a passage in the *Ethics* shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship; for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose; whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct; by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other’s diverse excellence¹. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents; for what is possessed in common strengthens their union: and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

‘Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves; for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions *one blood*, *one stock*, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors; for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.’ Comp. also Zeller, *op. c.* II. ii. p. 688. ‘Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato’s view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals’—and to use Zeller’s apt expression (*Plato* p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals ‘degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population’—Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

¹ διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρῆσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ήδονὴ ταῦτη τῷ φύλᾳ. εἰη δὲ ἀν καὶ δι’ ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰναι τοτε

γὰρ ἐκατέρου ἀρετῆς, καὶ χαίροντες ἀν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to develope out of the family a higher unity¹. That these considerations do not recur in the *Politics*, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his own premisses. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose.' SUSEM. (142)

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's conceptions², understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approximately the modern or monogamous family³. From the time of Plato⁴ and Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost universal⁵. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory untenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure: for the family is a *πολλαχώς λεγόμενον*, and what he assumes to be its simple and primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.]

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests. Beginning with the Auseans, Troglodytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus, nearly all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself⁶. The phrase *είναι κοινὰ τὰς γυναῖκας* is not likely to have been literally true, or to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases⁷. Few tribes are so

¹ It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice happily married.

² Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus, and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the *Politics*.

³ But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal instinct, however important in Callipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.

⁴ B. III. of the *Laws* is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.

⁵ McLennan's epoch-making work

Primitive Marriage is here followed. Down to the year 1857 its author accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin of society. See *Ene. Brit.* (8th ed.) Art. LAW, vol. XIII. p. 255 f.

⁶ That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much Aristotle collected in Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά, we cannot tell: the few extant fragments are of little value.

⁷ What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller information we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.

backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object)¹. It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of *μητρίς* for 'motherland' by Cretans and Messenians². Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race)³ and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain⁴. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side⁵. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager⁶. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman *gentes*⁷. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father's side. The levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy⁸.

¹ Called a totem in North America and a kobong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The asparagus was the totem of an Attic *γένος*; Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 οὗτοι Ἰωξῖδαι καὶ Ἰωξῖοι πάτριον κατέστη μήτρες δακτυλαὶ ἀσφαράγου, μήτρες στοιβῆς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ σύζεσθαι καὶ τυμᾶν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the *Fortnightly Review* Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870.

² Plato *Rep.* IX. 575 D, Pausan. IV. 26 § 3.

³ Herod. I. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. *Frag. Hist. Gr.* III. p. 461 (Müller) Λόκιοι τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον ή τοὺς ἄνδρας τεμῷσται καὶ καλοῦνται μητρίδεις, τὰς τε κληρονόμους τὰς θυγατράδας λείπουσιν, οὐ τοὺς οὐδὲς. Comp. the genealogies of Sarpedon and Glaucus, Hom. II. vi. 150 ff.; the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

⁴ Strabo III. 4 § 18, p. 165 τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Καρνάθαις τοὺς ἄνδρας διδόναι ταῖς γυναιξὶ προΐκα, τὸ τὰς θυγατέρας κληρονόμους ἀπολεῖπεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκδίδοσθαι γυναιξίν. ἔχει γάρ τινα γυναικοκρατίαν. The couvade among the same people, *ib.* § 17 p. 164 τεκούσα τε διακονοῦσσι τοῖς ἀδρόσιν, ἐκείνους ἀνθ' ἐαν-

τῶν κατακλίνασσαι. From Herod. II. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

⁵ Varro apud Augustin. *De civ. Dei* XVIII. 9: cp. Justin 18. 2, Suidas p. 3102. For the Locrians, Polyb. XII. 5 πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔνδοξα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἰη: Aristote apud Polyb. XII. 6, 1560 b 8 ff. δὸς καὶ τὴν δυνατίαν τῇ πόλει τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν εἰκότως ἐπέθεσαν καὶ τὴν σικείητηα τὴν κατὰ τὰς γυναικας προσεποιήσασαν, ἐτὶ δὲ τὰς φύλας καὶ τὰς συμμαχίας τὰς προγονικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεγεόντω.

⁶ Hom. *Iliad* II. 661 ff. (Tlepolemos), XXI. 95 cp. XXII. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus *Fab.* 229, 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer *Iliad* IX. 562 ff.

⁷ Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* § 6 p. 265 D η μὴ νεομοσμένου συγγενίδας γαμεῖν... πρότερον γάρ οὐκ ἔγαμοις τὰς ἀφ' αἵματος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς τιτθίδας οὐδὲ ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐκὲ συνεχώρησαν ἀνεψιαῖς συνοικεῖν: 8 108 p. 289 Ε δὲ τὶ δὲ τὰς ἔγγινη γένονται οὐ γαμοῖσι;

⁸ Deiphobos is an instance. Lycurgus declined to take his brother's wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though

The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the 'stocks' (*yévn*) and 'brotherhoods' (*φραρπιαὶ*) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see n. 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved¹. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, ὄμοσίντοι and ὄμόκαποι or ὄμόκαπνοι? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this v. l. The ὄμογάλακτες (l. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a *yévos* (for ὄμογάλακτες = γεννήται, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother's milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive *family* (*oikos*: l. 2 § 5) may have been known as 'sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.' This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning 'those who eat together' (coediche), and 'those who have a common residence' (teadhloch)². There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in ὄμογάστριος and ἀδελφός, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier φράτωρ, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek φράτωρ continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association³.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Polyb. XII. 6 παρὰ μὲν γάρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πάτριοι ἦν καὶ σύνηθες τρεῖς ἀνδρας ἔχειν γυναικαὶ καὶ τέτταρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλεῖον ἀδελφοὺς ὄντας, καὶ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ικανούς ἐκδισθαι

γυναικά την τῶν φίλων καλλί καὶ σύνηθες.

¹ The form of capture a marriage ceremony at Sparta, Herod. vi. 65, Plut. Zyc. 15, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1 § 5. In Crete, Ephorus apud Strab. x. p. 481 D. The Ionian etiquette (one consequence of capture), Herod. I. 146.

² *Studies in Ancient History* p. 123; Lang *Essays* p. 97 n.

³ This explanation seems the most

Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind¹; he has to admit that γάμος, γαμκός fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κοιωνία δουλης καὶ δούλου, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth², he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.]

EXCURSUS II.

HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS : II. 7. 1.

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV(VII). 11 § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiraeus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiraeus was called after him ἡ Ἰπποδάμειος ἀγορά; Xen. *Hell.* II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocr. p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654³. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent

satisfactory, though we might have expected some ruder mark of comradeship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the σιτόη, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellowship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." *Studies in Ane. Hist.* p. 122.

¹ See I. 2 § 23, II. 8 § 20 f., and III. II § 5 καί τοι τι διαφέροντι ένοι τῶν θηρίων, ως ένοι εἶπεν;

² An Orphic poet had described primitive men as cannibals, Sext. Emp. IX. 15. Kritias began his famous analysis of the causes which led to the origin of religion thus; ἦν χρόνος ὅτε ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος καὶ θηριώδης τοχός οὐ ἐπηρέτη, *Frag.* 1, 2 of *Sisyphus*, Sext. Emp. IX. 54. Cp. Moschion *Prag. inc.* vi (9) apud Stob. *Ecl.* I. 9. 38 p. 240 ff. Epicurus pursued further the same line of inquiry: Lucretius v. 922 ff.

³ ἔκτισθη κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ ὕπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ως φασίν, οὐδὲ καὶ ὁ Πειραιεὺς. [A very cautious statement.]

of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (*περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) under the name of Hippodamas the Thurian, and one on Government (*περὶ πολιτείας*) under the name of Hippodamas the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle: and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamas which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamas, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 *nn.* 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 *s. f. n.* 255 b) 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 *n.* 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 *n.* 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. *Oecon.* 4 § 3) leads its partizans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, Plut. *Pel.* 23). Hippodamas, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.' It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamas and the sophist Lycophron (III. 9. 8 *n.* 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to

attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual rights' in Lycophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lycophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable: still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice; but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does¹, with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. nn. 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue.' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

¹ *Staatslehre* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.

Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 f.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henkel): see 7 § 1. SUSEM. (250)

NOTE ON THE CELTAE: II. 9. 7.

On the Kelts see also IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, 1115 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 A' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian. Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fülleborn). Plato *Laws* 1 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. 1. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Servia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian *Anab.* I. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle *Meteor.* I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Keltic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotos (II. 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, his pupil Eudemos III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea.' The same story was told by Ephoros *Fr.* 44 (see Nicol. Dam. *Fr.* 104, Aelian. *V. H.* XII. 23): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff *Deutsche Alterthums-kunde* I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same

time undoubtedly fell into the other mistake of taking them to be Scythians : see Müllenhoff *op. c.* 474—495. Although Müllenhoff's views in regard to the amber island described by Pytheas and the neighbouring coast of the Teutons, and their position in and on the coast of the North Sea about the mouths of the Eider, allow of considerable doubt, yet this much at any rate seems certain, that in Pliny *N.H.* xxxvii. 35 Pytheas Gutonibus Germaniae genti etc., the words Germaniae genti are an addition by Pliny himself, and the word 'Gutonibus' is wrong. Pytheas himself meant the same tribe 'Teutones' who are mentioned further on in the passage (proxumisque Teutonibus). SUSEM. (287)

EXCURSUS III.

THE EPHORS AND THE Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑφόροι τὴν αἰτήν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἑφόροι πάντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν : II. 10. 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element; but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny: and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority: the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other: both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp: see *n.* 340 on 9 § 30 (Trieber). Compare *n.* (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-

manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the ἑφόροι are 'overseers', the κόσμοι are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephorus (Strabo p. 481 f.) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephors and Κόσμοι. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle *could* not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephorus. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephorus and that in the so-called Πολιτείαι which we have under the name of Heracleides¹ of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's Πολιτείαι, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his *Cretan Polity*. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephorus the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSEM. (360)

THE CRETAN περίοικοι.

φέρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι : II. IO. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan περίοικοι (see n. 355) with the Spartan περίοικοι, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. n. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (*Frag.* 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus VI. 263 E f., that there were three dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the Mnoitae, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the Aphamiotae, and (3) the περίοικοι, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects". Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. XV. 695 F (in Bergk *Poet. lyr. Gr.* no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hybrias boasts that the Mnoitae call him their lord². Kallistratos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. VI. 263 E, describes the Aphamiotae as

¹ Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.

² τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δουλεῖαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ιδίαν ἀφαμιώτας, τούτη δὲ περίοικους πηκόους.

³ Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry

spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.

ἴστι μοι πλούτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ἔφος
καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαυσῆιον, πρόβλημα χρωτός
τούτῳ γάρ ἀρδ. τοίτῳ θερίζω,
τούτῳ δεσπότας μνοῖας κέκλημαι.
τοι δὲ μὴ τοδεμῶντι ἔχει δόρυ καὶ ἔφος
... πάντες γάρν πεπτηῶτες ἀμόν
... προσκυνεῖν τι (με) δεσπόταν
καὶ μέγαν βασιλῆα φανέοντες.

'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called Clarotae¹; and earlier still Ephorus (*Frag.* 32 a, in Athen. VI. 263 F) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves Clarotae². It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called ἀφαίαις, as well as κλῆροι, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land : see Schömann *Antiquities* p. 298 Eng. tr. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan Helots either (a) both the clarotae and mnoītae ; or (β) the mnoītae, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain ; or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the clarotae alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term περίουκοι in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the clarotae. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans : nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words φόρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίουκοι would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (*Fr.* 1) in Athen. IV 143 A, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage³ I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations ; and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see n. 366 on § 8 *extr.*), Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his περίουκοι the clarotae. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if φόροι οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίουκοι can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the clarotae which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessaries of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

¹ καλούσι δὲ οἱ Κρήτες τοὺς μὲν κατὰ πόλις οἰκέτας χρυσονήρους, ἀφαμώτας δὲ τοὺς κατ' ἀγρόν, ἐγχωρίους μὲν δυτας δουλωθέντας δὲ κατά πόλεμον διὰ τὸ κληρωθῆναι δὲ κλαρώτας.

² κλαρώτας Κρήτες καλοῦσι τοὺς δούλους διπὸ τὸν γενομένου περὶ αὐτῶν κλήρου.

³ I read: ἔκαστος τῶν γυναικῶν καρπῶν ἀναφέρει τὴν δεκάτην εἰς τὴν ἑταῖραν, καὶ τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσδόους [άς] διανέμουσιν

οἱ προεστηκότες τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἑκάστους οἶκους with Haase (Miscell. Philol. prefixed to the Breslau *Winterkatalog* 1856—57), being unable to accept either the interpretation of the passage which Schömann doubtfully advances, for the reasons given by Haase, or Haase's own explanation of his conjecture, for the reason advanced by Schömann p. 307 n. 3 Eng. tr.

common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before *φόρων* is unavoidable, whether we supply <*ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν*>, or in agreement with Dosiadas <*ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν*> *φόρων*.

The term *περίοικοι* is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the freer position which these peasants occupied (cp. II. 5 § 19 n. 171, 9 § 3 n. 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cretan Dorians in the cities made use of purchased slaves: Schömann p. 298 Eng. tr. In IV(VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. nn. 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9. 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by *δοῦλοι* and by *περίοικοι*: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term *περίοικοι* by 'villeins' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cretan *περίοικοι* are, whereas the Helots are *δοῦλοι* pure and simple¹. The former might very well get the name *περίοικοι*, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schömann suggests p. 229 E. tr.² And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian *περίοικοι*, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cretan *περίοικοι* a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cretan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems³. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority⁴. We recognise the *περίοικοι* of whom Aristotle speaks in the *Foukées* of the code⁵, and the *περίοικοι*—*ἐντήκοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the *ἀφέταιροι* of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (*πολιαράται*) and from purchased slaves⁶: of the *μνοῖται* the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

¹ [Blackstone himself compares unemancipated villeins with the helots, *Commentaries* B. II. c. 6 vol. II. p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders *δοῦλοι* by Leibegene, *περίακοι* by Hintersassen. The Gortynian *οἰκέτες*, though a specially privileged class of villeins, are nevertheless called *δῶλοι*: *vid. infra.*]

² But when Schömann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once", for the term occurs three times, viz. 10 § 5, § 8, § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 [also in c. 9 § 3]. It is only in c. 5 § 19 that Aristotle calls them *δοῦλοι*. Höck (*Kreta* III. p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of: and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II. 381 f. 387 ff. may be taken

to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

³ The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the *American Journal of Archaeology* I, pp. 324—350, II, 24—45.

⁴ "Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's *περίοικοι* are not the *περίοικοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the *χλαρώται*: i.e. those who in the code are called *Foukées*." Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 63 n. 56.

⁵ We find *οἰκέτες* for *οἰκέτης* in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias X. 19, *οἰκήσος καὶ δούλης* (Bücheler). Comp. Kallistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

⁶ The *ἐνδοθείδια δώλα* or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II. 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (*χρυσώνητος*): Zitelmann *ib.* p. 64.

distinction of *πολιαται*, *ἀφέταιροι*, *Foukées*, answering to that of *Σπαριαραι*, *περίοικοι*, *Ἑλωτες* at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Höck, Grote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an *ētauria*; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain cattle (*τὰ καρπαίποδα*¹, *Code* IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (*δημόσιοι*), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (*κλῆρος*) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the *Foukées* who tilled it. To these *Foukées* he stood in the capacity of *πάστορας*, 'lord' or *patronus*. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The *ἀφέταιρος* was also a freeman like the *πολιατής*, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any *ētauria*², he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a *Foukēs* (100 staters, 10 staters, 5 drachmai = 2½ staters, *Code* II. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the serf and the freeman is 1 : 2 and 1 : 5, Zitelmann p. 102 n. 8).

The *Foukées* were not free men: *Foukēs* and *δῶλος* are used indifferently in the code³, and the terms *ἀφαιμώται* and *κλαρώται* do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villeinage or serfdom, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave⁴. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses: they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled *κλῆρος*⁵. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villein possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs⁶. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free⁷. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the *servus*, if indeed it be not that of the *cliens*, at Rome.]

¹ By the 'strong-footed' may be meant (1) all large beasts, as opposed to sheep and goats; or (2) oxen (cp. Pind. Ol. XIII. 81, where the scholiast says the word means a bull in the Delphic speech); or (3) horses and mules, like *μάνιχες ἵπποι*.

² It is probable that the *ētauria* as a division of the *φύλη* answered to the Attic *φρατρία*, and that admission to it was an indispensable condition before any one could become a full citizen. See Athen. IV. 22 p. 143, Zitelmann pp. 55, 161. In the Dreros inscription fines paid by the *Kόσμοι* are to be divided amongst the *ētaipla* (p. 337). At the foundation

of these close mess-companies lay, no doubt, an earlier and ruder tribal association (p. 330 f.); cp. Höck *Kreta* III. p. 126.

³ In the code, as by Aristotle, *δῶλος* is used to include any form of servitude.

⁴ Their tenure of the land might almost be compared with that of the privileged villeins who by gradual emancipation are on their way to becoming copyholders.

⁵ *Code* V. 26 *rās Fouklas οἱ τινὲς κ' λογτὶ* (= *ἄντες δῶσι*) *ἢ κλῆρος*.

⁶ v. 27, Zitelmann pp. 64, 144.

⁷ VII. 1, 2 Zitelmann p. 65 f. That the children follow the status of the mother is probably a survival of the matriarchate and female kinship; see above p. 329.

EXCURSUS IV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE: II. 11 §§ 3—8.

τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patricians, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek *φυλαὶ* and the three ancient Roman *tribus*, the latter to the Greek *φαρπίαι* and the 30 Roman *curiae* (see below on *γέρουσία*, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or ‘gentes’ that are here called *ἑταιρίαι*, ‘mess-associations’.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the *φιλίτεια* in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the *ωβαῖ*, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called *οὐοσίτια*: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables ‘in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence’ (*ib.* p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the *ἀνδρεῖα* in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. ‘In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20, 6, 29: c. 9, 12, 23: 1 Kings 1, 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the *οὐοσίτια* of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the *curiales* in their places of assembly or *curiae*.’ It is also to be remembered that *ἑταιρία* was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table: at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lyctians, *διῆρηνται δὲ οἱ πολίται πάντες καθ' ἑταιρίας, καλούσι δὲ ταῦτα ἀνδρεῖα* (*Frag.* 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B.). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens; ‘probably guilds under oligarchical management’ (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the *οὐοσίτια* at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called *ἑταιρίαι* in Greece (cp. *n.* 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake

of having compared a Spartan *public* institution with the arrangements of merely *private* associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The *circuli* and *convivia* at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy xxxiv. 61 § 5; their 'meetings' (*σύνοδοι*) also in Theodoros Metochita *Hypomn.* c. 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p. 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. SUSEM. (378)

ἢ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχῆ.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form: or possibly, as Movers conjectures, p. 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?): to these were added the highest magistrates, the two Shofetes (see below *βασιλεῖς*) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin xix. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen *out of the number* of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: *dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices diliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent.* Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals 'but beyond doubt the Shofetes [kings] and Gerusiasts [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless

cruelty,' comp. Diod. xx. 10 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority; and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. tr. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (*ibid.*) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people; and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate¹: see below *γερουσία* and *n.* (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (XXXIII. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6, *tum temporis consulem*: see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: *iudicūm ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant. res fama vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis obfendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices deerat. horum in tam impotenti regno... praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit. quaestor id pro nihilo habuit, nam... quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertisit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam*

¹ In Diod. XIV. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; nor, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words are: ης ἀναγνωθεὶς ἐν τῇ τῷ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ, and σύγκλητος is therefore the same as γερουσία, the

smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called σύγκλητος by Polybius. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybius' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of *γερουσία* for the small council and *σύγκλητος* for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (*n.* 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called *σύγκλητος*.

corum, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, in singulos annos iudices legerentur, neve quis biennium continuum iudex esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephorality. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 23 n. 325); and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (*μεγιστὴ ἀρχὴ*, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυρία τῶν μεγιστῶν αὐτοῖς ἐστι). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (*δόξειε δὲ ἀνὴ τῶν ἑφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εἰθύνειν τὰς ἀρχὰς*), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it: and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. (379).

οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (*Hannib.* 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy xxx. 7. 5, Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius V. 11, Nep. l. c., cp. Justin xxxi. 2. 6): and Polybios also vi. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades

(XXXVIII. 37. 2), remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidae, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election 'of a king' (*Zonaras Ann.* VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. XX. 10. 1 n. 1597; comp. however on the other side Diod. XIII. 80. 2)¹. It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad². It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in n. (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were dissevered. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin XXII. 7. 7, Diod. XIII. 43. 5, XIV. 54-5³, XV. 15. 2, XX. 29. 2, cp. 33. 2, Polyaen. I. 27. 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

¹ It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet *De Rep. Lacid.* speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

² Only the incorrect statement of Zonares l.c. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

³ Comp. Oros. IV. 6. The words κατὰ νόμον added to the title of King in these passages of Diodorus (κατὰ νόμους τότε

βασιλέωντα and βασιλέα κατὰ νόμον) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king βασιλεὺς κατὰ γένος, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in Diog. Laert. III. 82 f. τῇ δὲ βασιλείᾳ ἡ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν Καρχηδόνι, κατὰ νόμον πολιτικὴ γῆρ ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ ἐν Δακεδαιμονὶ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.

still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office: (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called "judges" or shofetes (see above, also Cato as cited by Festus s. v. *mansues*), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3, Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46. 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings praetors: but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l. c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is, it is true, in the last degree confused¹, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal B.C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 tum temporis *consulem*, Zonar. IX. 14 s. f. τὴν μεγίστην τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀρχήν). According to Cicero's statement, *De Rep.* II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life: but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7)²; and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l. c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship. SUSEM. (381).

ἢ γερουσία: § 3.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. tr.), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: *triginta seniorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis.* It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called *σύγκλητος*, even by Aristotle III. I. 10 (cp. n. 442), and although the terms *γερουσία*, *σύγκλητος*, and *συνέ-*

¹ Praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 138 n., proposed to alter rex into dux: but that here also rex denotes the Shofete and that the alteration is there-

fore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romae Consules sic Carthagine quotannis annui bini reges creabantur,

² πλέον ὅρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἀλλων.

δριον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage¹, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms *γερουσία* and *σύγκλητος* X. 18. 1 δέο μὲν...τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου and XXXVI. 2. 6 τριακοσίους ὄμηρους...τοὺς νιόὺς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Movers that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance; and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta²; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. 'It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general³ and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom'⁴ probably, see Polyb. I. 21. 6, 'the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed' (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), 'to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors' (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see 11 § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators⁵ (Valer. Max. IX. 5. 4 ext.

¹ As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. *Diod. XIV. 47. 2* (see p. 342 n. 1) and *XX. 59. 1* μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερουσίας ἐν Καρχηδόνι βουλευαμένη περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [καλῶς] ἔδεξε τοὺς συνέδρους τρία στρατόπεδα... ἐκπέμψαι. The σύνεδροι are the members of the γερουσία itself: the transaction takes place in the γερουσία alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word *συνέδρων* is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

² Duncker (*Hist. of Antiquity* II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators *exclusive of the kings*.

³ See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

⁴ Whether it was so "regularly", as Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

⁵ For the senators Mommsen (II. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four, although it may certainly be quite true

insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi aemulatio fuit : ille enim separato a plebe balineo lavabatur ; cp. Juven. v. 90 propter quod Romae cum Bocchare nemo lavatur, also Movers p. 501 n. 57). The deputies of the senate (*σύνεδροι*) with the army formed part of the general's council of war, Polyb. III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, καὶ πάντες οἱ γερουσιασταὶ Καρχηδονίων μετ' αὐτοῖς καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνιοι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ' αὐτοῦ, Polyb. VII. 9 § 1, § 4. Movers, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the *γερουσιασταί*; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for Movers to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. nn. 340, 360). SUSEM. (382)

δῆμος.

'The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not : if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions,' at Sparta and in Crete : §§ 5, 6.

Kluge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly ; that this was not the case may be seen from Livy XXI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, XXIII. c. 12 ff. However the senate and the shofetes might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to Polyb. VI. 51. 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (*τὴν πλειστὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίοις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὁ δῆμος ἥδη μετειλήφει, παρὰ δὲ Ρωμαῖος ἀκριβὴν εἰχεν ἡ σύγελητος*). And yet even this very war was decreed by the shofetes and the senate alone, Polyb. III. 33, Livy XXI. 18. SUSEM. (387)

that the latter are also called "senators" being elected, as a matter of fact, from by the Greek and Roman writers, as the (smaller and larger) senate.

αἱ πενταρχίαι.

This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. n. 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards *entered* the council of the Hundred, but only that they *elected* that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the shofetes at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy xxviii. 37. 2), and the censor (*praefectus morum*: Nep. *Hamilc.* 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by *principibus quibusdam et magistratibus* mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—*vectigalia publica partim negligentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant*, xxxiii. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (II § 7 s. f., III. I § 11 cp. nn. 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two shofetes as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (I) the Boards of Five and (II) the Council

of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose; and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two shofetes or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year: at any rate it appears to follow from Livy's account (see above n. 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above: unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. SUSEM. (390)

οἱ στρατηγοὶ.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above n. 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above n. 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian 'kings', exercised such a government: whereas Movers (p. 540) takes it to mean that 'the Shofetes were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.' The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 7¹, Cato cited in Gellius X. 24. 7, Frontin. *Strateg.* II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 8². The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of shofete and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly: yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

¹ There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once shofetes and generals, or

that the Hasdrubal in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.

² At least I take this to be the most probable view.

senate: see Diod. XIII. 43. 5 (*κατίσησαν*; cp. above *n.* 381), XX. 10. 1 (*ἡ γερουσία...στρατηγούς...ἀπέδειξε*). But it may be conjectured that the election required to be confirmed by the popular assembly. At least when Hannibal was elected by the army the Senate was not satisfied with an approval of the act on its own part, but invited the popular assembly to confirm it, Polyb. III. 13. 4; and such a confirmation may have been requisite for the appointment of the senators and shofetes, in case it did not entirely rest with the popular assembly to elect them (see above *n.* 382). SUSEM. (392 b).

EXCURSUS V.

THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3.

Ἴοικε δὲ Σόλων...τὸν δῆμον καταστήσατ, τὰ δικαιοτήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show¹, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Müller and Oncken² have put upon the singular form *τὸ δικαιοτήριον* here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaeae, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure.³ It is another matter when Fränkel *The Attic δικαιοτήρια* p. 63 f. infers from III. 11. 8 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Heliaeae to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Fränkel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Müller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates; that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon's legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Fränkel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

¹ This exposition Fränkel has not quite fairly passed over.

² The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-

tions over again. Cp. *n.* (409). I do not defend everything which Schömann has stated, as is clear from the sequel.

precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account¹. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Fränkel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Fränkel's explanation be consistently applied to VI(IV), 14 § 3, § 6, § 10 (see nn. 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the Areopagus or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not 'obscure', but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon's fault but by the course of events²: though Fränkel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view³ that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian Heliaeae consisted, as Fränkel very ably proves (pp. 1—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff., cp. pp. 21—51) not only this Heliaeae as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another *ēkkλησια*⁴, as

¹ Fränkel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (445 B.C.) *ēθwvai* has the wider sense of "trials" generally, and not the later, narrower sense of "trials" of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge; Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 88 f. shows that the word has not even the former

sense in that place but means "punishments."

² ἀπὸ συμπτώματος.

³ For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what Aristotle may or may not have said.

⁴ It is indeed more than questionable whether *ālta*=*ēkkλησια*, popular assembly, is really only a shorter form of *ēkkλησια*

a representation of the popular assembly¹. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy². All this however does not exclude the possibility that on Aristotle's view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state: indeed on the analogy of VI(IV), 14, 6 (n. 1325) there is a certain probability even, that by his remarks in II. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings³. SUSEM. (403).

EXCURSUS VI.

THALETAS: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Gortyn (or according to Suidas, of Elyros) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeonian and cretan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukos cited in Plutarch *De Music.* 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (*Athenae.* v. 181 B), which were called Paeans and Hyporchemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Heracleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. *De Music.* 9. 1134 C, Schol. on Pind. *Pyth.* II. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeonian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephorus, Lycurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lycurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Pratinas *fr.* 8 in Plut. *De Music.* 42. 1146 C, Plut. *Philos. cum principibus* 5 p. 779 A, Aelian. *Var. Hist.* XII. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation: see Wilamowitz *et al.* pp. 87—94.

¹ Frankel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliaca possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

² And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

³ E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.

underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. I to B. I): the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Γόρτυν). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, *frag.* 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 c, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopaedia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. I. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger *De Thaleta poeta* Essen 1851. 4, Höck *Kreta* III. 339 ff., Bernhardy *History of Greek Literature* 3 ed. I p. 378, Christ *Metrik* p. 415 ff., also E. Curtius *History of Greece* I p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)

Γ.

1274 b 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τάς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς
 28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρίπον τοῦ-
 32 § 1 τον· τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἔκαστη καὶ
 πολα τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ
 ἔστιν ἡ πόλις. οὐν γάρ ἀμφισβητούσιν, οὐ μὲν φάσκοντες I
 35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οὐ δὲ οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ
 τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἡ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
 νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὀρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν,
 ἡ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκουμένων ἔστι τάξις τίς.

In the notes to this book *fr.* denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heylbut in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. p. 102 ff. See Exe. III. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, nor are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν..... 28 τοῦτον, was by all previous editors appended to B. II || 28 εὐρημένας Koraes; cp. II. 1. 1, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* 1368 f. || τοῦτον ** Thurot; τῷ <δὲ>? Susem. This δὲ is all that we require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some ulterior cause is uncertain, see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || 32 καὶ before τις ἔκδοτη omitted in ΓΑ., perhaps rightly || 38 ἡ τε? Susem. || ἔστιν (ἴστων P¹) after τάξις τις M¹ P¹

B. III includes two parts: a statement of General Principles, cc. 1—13, followed by a review of Monarchy, cc. 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See *Analysis* p. 108 ff., *Introd.* 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken II pp. 117 —174.

cc. 1, 2. *The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2. Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining citizens by descent I § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.*

Mr A. C. Bradley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in *Hellenica* pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitutions "proper," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So κυρίως with ἐλεγαθεῖ, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like ἀπλῶς to ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.

35 ἀλλα τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν] "that it is not the state which has done this or that but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. III. 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (455) on c. 3 § 2 below. SUSEM. (432)

36 πολ. καὶ τοῦ νομ.] See above on I. 1. 2, II. 12. 1.

38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of this organization is explained by § 1 πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἀλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων, n. (522). Comp. vi

(I)

§ 2 ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὅλων εἰς μὲν συνεστώτων δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος οὐ γάρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἔστιν.
 1275 a ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἔστι σκε- (p. 59)
 πτέον. καὶ γάρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις οὐ γάρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην ἔστι γάρ τις οὗ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὁν ἐν ὁλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις οὐκ
 § 3 ἔστι πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας πως τυγχάνοντας ταῦτα
 6 τῆς τῆς προσηγορίας, οἷον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἔστιν (καὶ γάρ μέ-
 § 4 τοικοι καὶ δούλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδὲ οἱ τῶν
 δικαίων μετέχοντες οὔτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά-
 10 ξεσθαι (τοῦτο γάρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινω-

1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς <μετοίκοις καὶ τοῖς> Bücheler, most likely right.

(IV). 1. 10 τάξις ή περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς,
 τίνα τρόπον νενέμενται, καὶ τὸ τὸ κέριον
 κτλ., n. (1129), VI(IV). 3. 5 n. (1156).
 SUSEM. (432 b)

§ 2 39 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ.] "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts" (Jebb).

41 τοι πλῆθος] "a body of citizens": namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, *Ikarōn tis abrāptēas fūn*, § 12 (Eaton). See notes (434), (447).
 SUSEM. (433)

1275 a 1 ὥστε τίνα κτλ] Schlosser's censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, I. 1 § 3 n. (4), 3 § 1 (20), 8 § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at I. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define πόλις by reference to πολίτης; on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser I. 218). In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes: so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. I. 12 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i.e. comparing I. 2. 8 n. (21), *adequate for the end of the state*. And just because this

is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in I cc. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Herein he is certainly right: the error is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See nn. (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM. (434)

§ 3 6 τοὺς ποιητούς] "honorary citizens" (Susemib). But probably cases like those of 5 §§ 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demosth.] c. *Nearer*. 1376, 15, τῇ ποιήσει πολίτας.

7 οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που] "Domicile does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, οὐδὲ ἔστιν η πόλις κοινωνία τόπου, with n. (357); on the other 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM. (434 b)

§ 4 8 οὐδὲ οἱ τῶν δικαίων] "nor the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": δικαια = iura.

10 τούτο] these civil rights, δικηγόροις καὶ δικάζονται.

τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων] "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below 9 §§ 6, 7 (Schneider) nn. 549, 550. SUSEM. (435)

νοῦσιν—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει— πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν (1) οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν § 5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πως μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παιδας τοὺς μήπω δι· 15 ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μέν πως πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λιαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τε τοιοῦτον ἔτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ζητοῦμεν δὲ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα § 6 τοιοῦτον ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεδμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ λένειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν [κρίσεως καὶ] ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δἰς

11 καὶ γάρ.....ὑπάρχει omitted by Π¹ Ar.: [γάρ] Götting, [καὶ γάρ.....ὑπάρχει] Susem.¹: Thurot proposed to transpose the words to follow 12 μετέχουσιν. Bender considers the whole passage 11 καὶ γάρ.....21 λένει spurious || μὲν οὖν here, as in IV(vii). 10 § 7, in the sense of μέντοι, which Schmidt proposed. This makes Bücheler's insertion all the more necessary || 12 ἀλλὰ νέμειν..... 13 μετέχουσι omitted in Q^b T^b Ald. and P¹ (1st hand, inserted in the margin) || 13 ὥστε] διὰ Vettori Bk. || 16 λιαν untranslated by Ar., [λιαν] Koraes, πολίτας Spengel, πλήρης Götting (in his lectures). Schmidt would transpose λιαν to follow 17 τοὺς δὲ. Possibly due to a variant πλήρης of ἀλλά: yet I do not venture to decide against λιαν ἀπλῶς = 'quite absolutely' || 17 ἀτελεῖν P²⁻³ Q^b T^b || * * ἢ Thurot Susem.¹: Conring assumed a lacuna higher up before 14 ἀλλά, Spengel proposed to omit καθάπερ there: but see Vahlen *Poetics* p. 276 ed. 3, cp. Cottm. || 19 δὲ Ar. Conring, γάρ Γ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς] πολιτική Stobaeus p. 328, [κρίσεως καὶ] Thurot || 24 διηρημέναι Γ II Bk., διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Susem.², probably right: determinatae Ar. ||

The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as μὴ ἔξειναι μήθ' ἐρχαιμῆσαι ἐλεύθερος, Pseud-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] *De Halloenes* §§ 9—13, Pollux VIII. 63, 88; Harpocration s. v. and Arit. *Frag.* 380, 1541 b 1: whence some infer that *αἱ ξυμβολαῖαι πρὸς τοὺς ξυμβάσους δικαὶ* of Thuc. I. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckhl *Publ. Econ. of Athens* pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in *Amer. Journal of Phil.* 1880. I. pp. 3—11.

12 νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην] "they must procure a patron." So at Athens: Meier and Schömann *Att. Process* p. 315 ff.,

561, 572: Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 353 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (436) Cp. Harpoc. τῶν προστάτηρ μὴ νεμόντων μετοικῶν (Wyse).

§ 5 13 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθάπερ καὶ παιδας κτλ] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz. children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. SUSEM. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς] Cp. 5 § 2. n. (505). SUSEM. (437 b) Add i. 13. 7.

20 ἔγκλημα διορθώσεως δεομ.] flaw or defect requiring correction, viz. by an added qualification, as citizen under age.

25 τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὀρισμένων χρό-⁽¹⁾
 § 7 νων ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 5
 μὲν οὖν ἀν φαῖται τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους,
 οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτα ἄρχῆς καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτά-
 τους ἀποστερεῦν ἄρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδέν. περὶ ὄνόματος
 30 γάρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γάρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ
 ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ
 § 8 χάριν ἀόριστος ἄρχη. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ-
 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἀν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάν-^(p. 60)
 τας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτος ἔστιν. δεῖ δὲ ε
 35 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα

μὲν omitted by Γ, perhaps rightly, unless it be changed to η with Spengel: Ar. leaves it untranslated || 27 ἀν φαῖται Γ P¹⁻⁴⁻⁶ fr., φαῖται M⁶, ἀντιφαῖται P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald., ἀν ἀντι-
 φαῖται? Götting || 28 καίτοι..... 29 ἄρχῆς omitted by Π¹, added by corr.¹ in the
 margin of P¹ || 32 οὕτω] τούτων or ταῦτης? Spengel || 34 πολίτου<λόγος>?
 Schneider.

§ 6 26 8 8' ἀόριστος sc. ἄρχων: in other cases the officer holds an undefined office; i.e. one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 13 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the δικαστὴς and ἐκκλησιαστὴς as themselves ἄρχοντες but only as parts of the complex ἄρχων, the δικαστῆρος or ἐκκλησία. A fortiori, the mere qualification for discharging these intermittent functions cannot make an ἄρχων when the actual discharge of them is not enough (Shute). In Aristophanes ἄρχειν = δικάζειν, e.g. *Plutus* 916, οἵκου δικαστὰς ἔξεπισθηδεῖς η πόλις ἄρχειν καθίστησαν; cp. n. (438).

§ 7 28 οὐδὲ...διὰ ταῦτα] that to serve on a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who wield the highest authority a claim to hold office.

καίτοι γελοῖον] Comp. Plato *Laws* 767 A, B: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄρχων καὶ τινα τρόπον ἄρχων οὐ πάντα φαῦλος γίγνεται τὴν

τέλος ἡμέραν, ὅπερ ἀν κρίνων τὴν δικηγρ ἀποτελεῖ). Hence the dikasts may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cp. Aeschines III. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. *Vesproe* 587 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀντιπεθύνοι δράμειν τῶν δ' ἀλλων οὐδεμί' ἄρχη). Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been re-elected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal: whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterruptedly" (Fränkel p. 21 f.). SUSEM. (438)

29 ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω κτλ] "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklēsiast. For the sake of distinction, we will call theirs an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 8 33 ἐφαρμόσας is intransitive. "Such then is [the notion, or definition of] the citizen which best applies to all who are so called." We find ἐπι with gen. after this verb, 2 § 3 and 11 § 5 below: but the dat. (4 § 2) or πρὸς with acc. is more usual.

35 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ] "Where classes of things (like πολίτης) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several

διαφέρει τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔστι πρῶτον τὸ δὲ (I) δεύτερον τὸ δ’ ἔχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ ἔνεστιν, ὃ § 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὄρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ 1275 b προτέρας οὖσας τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας πώς λέγομεν, ὑστερον ἔσται φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ 4 τὸν πολίτην ἔτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ’ ἐκάστην πολι- § 10 τελαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ’ ἔστι τοῦ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγ-

37 οὐδὲ ἔνεστιν Madvig, οὐδὲν ἔστιν Γ Π Ατ. Βκ., οὐδενεστιν fr. || [ἢ τοιαῦτα] Bas.²

πολιτεῖαι and, consequently, the πολίτης as determined in each of them, “one of these being primary, another secondary, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen.” If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὄμώνυμα. Here however πολίτης is probably παράνυμον, like ἄγαθόν in Nic. Eth. I. 6 §§ 8—12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as ‘good’ are such. See Zeller Plato p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In Ind. Ar. ὑποκείμενα is explained (1) res singulæ quæ continentur notionis alicuius universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas est notio referunt et a quibus suspensa est: e.g. Mel. A. 2. 4, 982 a 23, ὁ τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἰδέ των τάντον τὰ ὑποκείμενα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πράγματων (ut πολίτου) ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα (singulæ πολιτεῖαι ad quas referunt τοῦ πολίτου notio) διαφέρει.

35—38 “See Categ. I. 1 f.; things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὄμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὅνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος ἔτερος). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp. Waitz ad loc., Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. ὄμώνυμος [Grote Arist. I. 81 f.]: also I. 2. 13 above n. (28).” SUSEM. (438 b) Hence obviously πράγματα ‘things’ must be taken in the not uncommon sense of ‘classes’: comp. De Interpret. c. 7 § 1, 17 a 38, ἐπει δὲ ἔστι τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πράγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἔκστον. Any general notion,

however loose the connexion between the particulars which come ‘under’ it, is treated as a whole or ‘thing,’ if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ὑστέρας...προτέρας] Logically ‘posterior’ and ‘prior.’ Not ‘later’ and ‘earlier’ in time or historical development, but ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See I. 2. 13 n. (27). SUSEM. (439)

1275 b 1 ἡμαρτημένας] Plato’s word Rep. V 449 A, VIII 544 A. The participle ‘perverted’ has been converted into an adjective ‘wrong, perverse’: cp. 6 § 11, VIII(v). 1, 5, N.E. IV. 9. 35, VIII. 10. 4. In VIII(v). 1. 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἀπορευομένος=desperate.

3 ὑστερον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). SUSEM. (439 b)

§ 10 5 δὲ λεχθεὶς] The citizen as thus defined.

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ κτλ] But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle’s conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 nn. (598, 599): IV(VII). 9 §§ 7—9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3—5 with nn. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4, 5 nn. SUSEM. (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις] With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδὲ ἐκκλησίαν νομί-⁽¹⁾
 ζονσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζονται κατὰ μέ-
 ρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει
 το τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς,
 § 11 ἑτέρα δὲ ἵσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ
 Καρχηδόνα πάσας γάρ ὥρχαλ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.
 ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει γάρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γάρ ε
 ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἀρχῶν ἐκκλησιαστής
 15 ἔστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος τού-
 των γάρ η πᾶσιν η τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ
 (2) § 12 δικάζειν η περὶ πάντων η περὶ τινῶν. τις μὲν οὖν ἔστιν
 ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν (φέ γάρ ἔξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρ-
 χῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ηδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύ-

1275 b 7 <τι> Koraes || 11 <οὐ> τὸν? Schneider (afterwards rejected by him), Koraes, Trieber; [καὶ] Trieber. But see Comm. n. (444) || 13 γάρ after έχει omitted by P¹ Q^b, possibly by Γ; erased in P⁴ || 16 ἀποδίδοται Γ, perhaps right || βουλεύεσθαι Π² (emended by corr. of P⁴) fr. || 17 περὶ before τινῶν omitted by M¹ P¹, perhaps rightly || 19 καὶ Ar. Spengel, η Γ II (including fr.) Bk. Susem.¹ (in text)

would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." SUSEM. (441)

8 [συγκλήτους] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. IV to B. II p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. SUSEM. (442)

κατὰ μέρος] not "in turn" but "by sections."

καὶ τὰς δίκας...κατὰ μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two 'indefinite magistracies', the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found: the larger council specially convened (σύγκλητοι) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judicature into a special government department. SUSEM. (443)

9 ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] Comp. II. 9. 25, VI (IV). 9. 9 πη. (329 b), (1266). SUSEM. (443 b)

τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Rhet. I. I. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to σύμβολα which are κοινά." δίκας τῶν συμ.= civil suits, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 12 Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall

discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πάσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλος ὑπὸ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. IV. p. 348 f. and nn. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of δικασταί annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 325. SUSEM. (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος] "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator). And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between ἐκκλησία and βουλὴ on the one hand, Heliaca, νομοθέται, and Areopagus on the other.) SUSEM. (445)

§ 12 18 ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτι-

20 της τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἵκανὸν (1) 2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν). ὅρίζονται δὲ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, οὐδὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πλέον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. 25 οὗτοι δὲ ὅριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσι τινες τὸν § 2 τρίτον ἐκείνον ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν (p. 61) οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δὲ εἰρωνευόμενος, ἐφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοποιῶν πεποιη-

21 δὲ ΓΑρ., δὴ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τούτου ἔτι? Koraes ||

24 ἐπιπάππους P³ and corr. of P³, ἔτι πάππους Camerarius, accepted by Schneider and Koraes || 25 δὴ P³ II³ Ar. Bk. || ταχέως Camerarius, apparently right: πολιτικῶς, ταχέως ἀποροῦσι Spengel

κῆς] "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does virtually in § 7 (δέριστος ἀρχῆ). SUSEM. (446)

ἥδη is simply untranslateable: without going further, without anything more being necessary;

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν [ζωῆς] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. n. (21), II. 2. 8 n. (136) and the passage there cited. SUSEM. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens: νῦνος Εγράψε μέρους Ἀθηναίοντες τούς ἐκ δυεῖν Ἀθηναῖων γεγονότα.

23 πολιτικῶς] Like our word 'popular' or *popularis* in Cic. *De fin.* iv. § 24, v. § 12; i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation παχέως, pingui Minerva.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to I. 13. 10 (cp. n. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leontini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics:

Alkidamas (n. 31), Polos, Likymnios, Protarchos and Lycophron (nn. 297, 552) were its most eminent names. See Foss *De Gorgia Leontino* (Halle 1828), Frei in the *Rhein. Mus.* VII. 1850. 527 ff., VIII. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (Attic Oratory) I. p. 44, III. 2. 323 ff. Susemihl *Gorgias and Attic prose* in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXV. 1877. pp. 793—799, *De vita Tisiae* etc. (Greifswald 1884) p. xx ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' *Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad.* 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSEM. (448) Also Cope in *Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil.* III. 65—80.

The following passage, II. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in *Transactions of the Camb. Philological Soc.* vol. II pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (*Journal of Philology* XV. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaens by Lycophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon *Hellen.* II. 3. 4.

27 ἐρωνεύομενος=ironically, though the word could have the meaning "jestingly." But we are told Rhet. III. 7. 11, 1408 b 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωτας διπέρ τοπογλας ἔτοιτε, that Gorgias used to be ironical in his speeches. SUSEM. (449)

28 ὦφη καθάπερ δλμούς κτλ.] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magistrates." This untranslateable play upon words turns on the double sense of δημονύγοι, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. n. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or

29 μένους, οὗτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιη-⁽¹⁾
 § 3 μένουσι, εἶναι γάρ τινας λαρισοποιούς· ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν. εἰ
 γάρ μετεῖχον κατὰ τὸν ρήθεντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἵσταν
 [ᾶν] πολῖταν καὶ γάρ οὐδὲ δυνατὸν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου
 ἥ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἡ κτισάντων.

ἀλλ' ἵστως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι με-¹⁰
 35 τέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν
 ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆν πολ-
 § 4 λοὺς γάρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. τὸ δ'

29 *λαρισαίους* fr., *λαρισαίου* not *λαρισαῖος* Bk.² (so throughout) || τῶν omitted by M¹T^b || 30 [εἴναι.....λαρισοποιούς] Ridgeway || λαρισαῖος Camerarius, *larissacorum factores* Ar., *λαρισοποιούς* ΓΠ (including fr.) Bk.¹ || 32 ἵσταν ἀν P²⁻³Q⁶T^bAr. Bk., ἵσταν II¹fr. Ald. and, over an erasure, P⁴, ἥ ἄν U^b || καὶ γάρ οὐ P⁴Q⁶T^bL^bAr., οὐδὲ γάρ Susem.¹ misled by William's translation *neque enim* || 33 ἔκ omitted by P¹ and perhaps by Γ, [*ἔκ*] Susem. ¹⁻², perhaps rightly || οἰκισάντων [*ἡ κτισάντων*] Bender || 34 ἐκεῖνο Vettori (ms. correction in the Munich copy of his 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Aldine at Munich, *ἐκεῖνην* P⁴ and, with an erasure over *ει*, P¹: *ἐκεῖνη* Susem.¹ in text and perhaps M¹, *ἐκεῖνην* P²⁻⁶Q⁶B^bT^bU^bAr. Ald. and P³ (corrector), probably also M¹, accepted by Bender; *ἐκεῖνοι* apparently P³ (1st hand): Γ uncertain, *illi magis habent* William, whence *ἐκεῖνοι.....ἐχοντι* the editors from Vettori and Morel to Bekker || 35 οἷον <*ἄ*> Chandler || 37 δούλους καὶ ξένους M¹ (1st hand) and Valckenaeer (notes on Herod. p. 404) || καὶ δούλους <*καὶ*> μετοίκους Ar. Bk.², καὶ [δούλους] μετοίκους οὐ καὶ πολλοὺς μετοίκους? Göttling, μετοίκους καὶ δούλους Niebuhr (II. 305 n. 2, Eng. tr.), μετοίκους ξένους Spengel. See however Meier *De gentil. Att.* p. 6, Bernays *Herakl. Briefe* p. 155 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

'burgomaster,' and as this was so in parts of Thessaly (see Schömann *Antiq. iur. publ.* p. 84 n. 10, *Antiquities of Greece* p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been also at Larisa: while (2) at the same time in Attica, and the common language generally, it was the term for workmen or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The jest, when cited in this context, raises a presumption that the magistrates of Larisa bore this same title at the foundation of the city and had full powers to make citizens of whom they pleased: yet who in the world would spoil such a joke or pun by inquiring whether this was historically true? (But the jest would lose all its point if *δημιουργοί* be taken, as Oncelen suggests, to mean the founders, not the magistrates, of Larisa. For every town has its founders, and not merely Larisa and certain towns like it: nor does the word bear this meaning unless some more precise phrase be added.) Further comp. VIII(v). 6 § 6 n. (1573), 10 § 5 n. (1651): VI(iv). 4. 16 n.

(1188). SUSEM. (450) Cp. Thuc. I. 56 ἐπιδημουργοί.

30 εἴναι γάρ τινας λαρισοποιούς] "For (he said) some [of them] are Larisa-makers," i.e. hardware manufacturers. Why should Gorgias interpret his own joke? It is far more likely that this is a gloss by some one who did not see that ὄλμοι goes with *Λαρισαῖος* above; or perhaps believed that *λάρισα, λαρισίς* meant 'a kettle' on the analogy of *τάναγρα, ταναύλη*. In Anthol. Pal. vi. 305, τῶς Λαρισαῖος κυρογάστορας ἐψητῆρας, *Λαρισαῖος* is an *adjective*, and this makes against its supposed use as a substantive, and therefore against the emendation of Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 3 30 ἀπλοῦν] a simple question, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

37 πολλοὺς γάρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους] "for he admitted into the tribes many resident-alien of foreign and servile extraction" (δούλους = freedmen). It is well known that Cleisthenes abolished the four ancient tribes

ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἔστιν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότε-⁽¹⁾
 ρον ἀδίκως ἡ δικαίως. καίτοι κάν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορή-
 1276 a σειεν, ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταῦτὸ δυνα-
 § 5 μένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ' ὄρῳμεν καὶ ἄρ-
 χοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἄρχειν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ' οὐ δικαίως,
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἄρχῃ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἔστιν (ό γάρ κοινωνῶν
 5 τῆς τοιᾶσδε ἄρχῆς πολίτης ἔστιν, ὡς φαμέν), δῆλον ὅτι πο-
 3 λίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἡ
 μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφι-
 σβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πόθι ἡ πόλις ἐπραξε καὶ πότε
 9 οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται
 § 2 δημοκρατία. τότε γάρ οὕτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται
 διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,

39 καὶ Bk.², καὶ ΓΠ Ar. Bk.¹, προσαπορήσειν <ἄν> Götting, τις <ἄν> Spengel
 || τοῦτο W^b L^a Ald. Bk., τοῦτο M^a (1st hand), τοῦτο Γ P^{1.2.3.4} Q^b T^b M^a (corr).

1276 a 5 τῆς omitted by M^a P¹, [τῆς] Susem.¹ || θαμεν P¹ P² Ar. Bk. || 7
 συνάπτειν? Korres || 9 γίνηται Γ Ar.

(see p. 340) and established in their place ten local divisions, for which he retained the name φύλα: Curtius *Hist.* I pp. 382—387 Eng. tr., Schömann pp. 336, 365 Eng. tr. *Comp. n.* (588) on 9 § 13, VII(vi). 4. 19 n. (1427). SUSEM. (451)

Congreve supports the reading of Bekker² and Thirlwall (II. 74) by a comparison of IV(VII). 4 § 6 δοῦλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοικων καὶ ξένων, § 14 ξένων καὶ μετοικοι. But this is nullified by Aristoph. *Ach.* 503—8, *Eg.* 347 εἰ πον δοκίδιον εἴκασ εἰ κατὸ ξένου μετοικου, *Rax* 297 μέτοικοι καὶ ξένοι. That δοῦλος may be used of freedmen is capable of abundant proof: Athenaeus VI. 93, 267 B, Σ διαφέρειν δὲ φησι Χρύσιππος δοῦλον οἰκέτου γράφων ἐν β' Περὶ ὄμοιος, διὰ τὸ τοῦτο ἀπελευθέρους μὲν δούλους ἔτι εἶναι, οἰκέτας δὲ τοὺς μὴ τῆς κτήσεως ἀφειμένους: Lysias c. *Agorat.* § 64 δοῦλος καὶ ἐκ δούλων ἐστιν (of a citizen): Isaeus VI § 49, οὗτοι διδογονιμῆνη οὐστοι δοῦλη (of a freedwoman): Harpocration s. v. μετοικοι, cp. Boeckh *Publ. Economy* p. 48 Eng. tr. (the freedmen paid this tax). The proceeding of Cleisthenes was not more violent than that of Euphran at Sicyon: Xen. *Hell.* VII. 3. 8 ὃς δοῦλος μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πολίτας ἐτοιει: and the two commonest sources of an artisan population are cited side by side, *infra* c. 5 § 3 παρ ἑτοιο ἦν δοῦλοι τὸ βάναυσος ἡ ξενικόν. There

is no authority for δούλους μετοικους and if any change were needed Niebuhr's would be the simplest. See also Grote IV. 170 n. 1, Schömann *Constitutional History* p. 69 f. Eng. tr.

§ 5 1276 a 6 καὶ τούτους] Even those who have received the franchise in consequence of a revolution. SUSEM. (452)

7 πρότερον] § 1 n. (432). SUSEM. (453)

c. 3 The identity of the state depends not upon its territory but upon its constitution.

§ 2 10 Ινιοι] Possibly writers who advocated repudiation are meant: *In-* trod. p. 20 n. 1. SUSEM. (454)

11 διαλύειν=discharge, pay in full.

ως οὐ τῆς πόλεως κτλ.] "on the ground that it was a loan to the tyrant and not to the state." This question was really raised in B.C. 403, when after the expulsion of the thirty, the Athenian state debated whether it was obliged to repay a loan of 100 talents borrowed by them from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f., Isocr. vii. 68 f. (Vettori). The converse case, viz. that the credit of a service rendered by the expelled tyrants was claimed by the state, arose, when the Corinthians after the expulsion of the Cypselidae demanded that the offerings dedicated by this family at Delphi and Pisa should be inscribed with the name of the town, and the acts of their tyrants be thus regarded as acts of the state.

οὗτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ⁽¹⁾
κρατεῖν οὐσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον. * *. εἴπερ οὖν¹¹
καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες, κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον ὁμοίως
15 <οὐ> τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [τάντης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύ-
της πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

§ 3 ἔουκε δὲ ὁ λόγος οἰκεῖος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς
ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐ-
τὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας (p.⁶²)
20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔστιν· ἐνδέχε-
ται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι [τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους], καὶ
§ 4 τοὺς μὲν ἑτερον τοὺς δὲ ἑτερον οἰκήσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν

12 πολλὰ omitted by Ald. and P¹ (1st hand, added in the margin) || <ἐπι> τῷ
Lindau || 13 συμφέρον. <ἄλλὰ καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία οὐ σκοτεῖ τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον> or
something similar? Susem. || 14 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται] κατὰ δημοκρατίας ἐτράποντὸ
Susem.¹² following William's incorrect version *in democratiam versae fuerunt* || 15
<οὐ> Hayduck || "ταύτης is pleonastic" Eaton; [ταύτης] Thurot; τῆς αὐτῆς
Koraes (with mark of interrogation after 16 τυραννίδος and a comma after 14 τοῦτον
instead of before κατὰ) || 17 ὁ λόγος after οἰκεῖος P¹ II² Bk. || [πῶς] πότε Spengel
Susem.¹, see § 5 || 21 [τὸν.....ἀνθρώπους] Susem., dittoigraphy from 20, [τὸν τόπον
καὶ] Bücheler

The Delphians admitted the claim, the
Eleans rejected it: see Plut. *De Pyth.
orac.* 13. 400 E (Schlosser). Comp.
further n. (432) on 1 § 1. SUSEM. (455)

Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of
the United States and the bonds issued
by the abortive Confederate government.

λαβόντος] Comp. Thuc. III. 81 ἀπέ-
θανον...ἄλλοι (ἴνεκα) χρημάτων σφίσιν
διειλούμενων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων (τῶν
δανεισαμένων Schol.).

12 ὡς ἐνίας κτλ.] "for some forms of
the state rest upon superior force and are
not due to public expediency." This is
the second time that Aristotle refers be-
forehand to his doctrine of 'degenerate'
forms of government, more precisely laid
down in c. 6: see above nn. (439 b, 440).
SUSEM. (456)

13 συμφέρον. * *.] The lacuna may
perhaps be thus supplied: <But de-
mocracy also is a government of this
sort.> SUSEM. (457)

14 δημοκρατοῦνται] Ridgeway sug-
gests that William of Moerbeke took this
word to come from δημοκράτω, and
hence his rendering: *in democratiam
versae fuerunt*.

§ 3 17 ξούκε δέ κτλ.] But the true
grounds of this controversy lie deeper in
another question which now needs to be
investigated. SUSEM. (458)

20 ζήτησις] The most obvious mode
of investigation is concerned with the
place and the inhabitants.

21 διαζευχθῆναι] "disjoined," "sepa-
rated." Aristotle has in view the mea-
sure which the Greeks called δουκίζειν, cp.
VIII(v). 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town
was destroyed by its conquerors and the
inhabitants were driven to seek new
homes in the neighbourhood in a number
of unwalled villages and hamlets, as was
done to Mantinea by the Spartans in
385 B.C. This was an oligarchical mea-
sure: for the custom of living together
in a walled town was usually favourable
to democracy. The opposite and de-
mocratical procedure, the union of several
country places, hitherto unwalled, in a
single town was συνουκζειν: and directly
after the battle of Leuctra this was done
by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city
B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse
to the foundation of a common capital
of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See
Curtius *Hist.* IV, pp. 305, 417 ff. Eng. tr.,
Schömann *Antiq.* p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp.
also I. 2. 8 n. (20 b). SUSEM. (459)

§ 4 22 ταύτην μὲν οὖν πραοτέραν]
In this form the problem must be re-
garded as easier to solve, for the variety
of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates
a solution.

πραοτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γάρ τῆς πόλεως (I) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ξητήσεως). ὁμοί- 12
 25 ως δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε
 § 5 δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γάρ δὴ τοῖς τείχε-
 σιν· εἴη γάρ ἀν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τείχος. τοιαύτη
 δ' ἵσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαθυλάν καὶ πᾶσα ἡτις ἔχει περγραφὴν
 29 μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἡς γέ φασιν ἑλωκυίας τρίτην
 § 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν
 ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις
 (περὶ γάρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον
 ἔθνος ἐν ἣ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν πολι-
 τικόν). ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον,
 35 πότερον ἔως ἂν ἢ τὸ γένος ταύτῳ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν
 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

23 πρωτέαν Q^b T^b, Spengel thinks the word corrupt || 25 αὐτὸν τόπον P⁴⁻⁶ W^b
 L^a Ar. Ald. Bk. Susem.¹; perhaps also Γ, eundem locum William || 26 εἶναι μίαν
 M^a P¹ || 26 δῆ] δεῖ P¹ Q^b || 27 πελοποννήσω Γ M^a P^a || 28 καὶ πᾶσα...., 29 πό-
 λεως transposed to follow 30 πόλεως Ramus || 32 ποσδύ M^a P¹ || 33 θύρος omitted
 by Π^a Ar. and in P¹ where a lacuna of twice its length is left

23 πολλαχῶς λεγομένης] As in Greek there is only the one word *πόλις* for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in n. (459) it might well be asked, whether the *state* of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the *city*. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word *πόλις*, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (*Introd.* p. 22), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 n. (554). SUSEM. (460)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of *πόλις*, *πολιτικός*, by 'city' 'civic' rather than 'state' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 οὐ γάρ δῆ τοῖς τείχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. VII. 77. 7 ἀνδρες γάρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ ταῦς; Soph. Oed. Rex 56 ὡς οὐδὲν ἐστιν οὗτε πύργος οὔτε ταῦς ἔρημος ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐνοικούντων

ἔσω; Tac. *Hist.* I. 84 quid? vos pulcherrimam hanc urbem domibus et tectis et congestis lapidum stare creditis?" SUSEM. (461)

27 Πελοποννήσῳ] Cp. Pseudo-Lysias II (ἐπιτάφιος) § 45, περὶ ἀπασαν τὴν Πελοποννησου τείχος περιβαλεῖν, viz. the wall across the isthmus proposed in the Persian wars.

28 ἔχει περιγραφὴν] has a circumference of a nation; i.e. encircles a nation rather than a state.

29 μᾶλλον ἔθνους] Comp. n. (11) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (463)

ἢ γέ φασιν ἑλωκυίας] The capture by Cyrus is meant: Herod. I. 178, 191. Nothing is there said however of an interval of three days, but we are told that when the extremities of the town were captured the Babylonians who lived in the centre had not yet discovered that it was taken. See also II. 6. 6 n. (200). SUSEM. (462)

§ 6 31 εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν] The size is discussed in IV(VII). c. 4; the uniformity of race in VIII(V). 3. 11 f.; cp. n. (1531). See however *Introd.* p. 56. SUSEM. (464) Comp. for the phrase *solvare in alium diem*.

νων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὡσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν (1) τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἀεὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγινομένου νάματος τοῦ δὲ ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὸν δὲ πόλιν ἔτέραν; εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἔτέρας τῷ εἰδεῖ καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειν ἀν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὡσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἔτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἔτέραν, ἀν εἶδος ἔτερον τῆς συνθέσεως ἢ, οἷον ἀρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἔτέραν εἰλεγομεν, ἀν ὅτε μὲν ἢ Δάριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦ

1276 b 2 “πολιτεῖα is pleonastic or the text is corrupt” Eaton, πολιτεῖα Congreve, [πολιτῶν]? Susem. || 3 ἀ omitted by Π¹, δόξεις Μ¹ || 6 ἀνθρώπων omitted by Ρ⁴-Q⁵ T⁶ || The punctuation (comma for full stop after δόξεις) Welldon || 7 ἵ τῆς συνθέσεως ΙΙ² Bk || 8 εἶναι omitted by Q⁵ T⁶ and P⁴ (1st hand) || 9 λέγομεν Albert Ar. Morel, λέγομεν Γ II

37 ποταμούς] The allusion is to the *dicta* of Heraclitus ποταμοῖσι δις τοῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἀ λύβατη, *Frag.* 41, 42, 81 ed. Bywater (Eaton, Ridgeway).

§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτεῖα] Ridgeway rightly defends this, translating “For if the state is a kind of community, but it (*ἡ πόλις*) is in fact a community possessed by citizens in a constitution,” and adducing the ms. text of § 14 as another instance of the double genitive with *κοινωνία*. If any change is to be made at all, we should omit *πολιτῶν*, which, though grammatically unobjectionable, is superfluous and somewhat obscures the sense. Usually *κοινωνία πολιτῶν* or *κοινωνία* has been made the subject of the second sentence, and *κοινωνία πολιτεῖα* or *πολιτεῖα* its predicate, “and fellowship (of the citizens) is fellowship in a constitution” or “consists in a constitution.” SUSEM.

§ 8 7 εἶδος ἔτερον τῆς συνθέσεως] “if the kind of combination be different,” i.e. if the elements be differently combined.

8 ἀρμονίαν] See Exc. IV on B. v(viii). SUSEM. (465)

In these two modes the notes (φθόγγοι) are the same; but the Dorian mode is from E to e, and b natural is *μέση* or key-note; while the Phrygian mode is from D to d and a is *μέση*. Comp. Dio Chrysost. II. p. 21 ἀρμονία Δάριος καὶ

Φρύγιος ἀλλη καὶ Λύδιος.

§ 9 εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον] “On these principles then it is plain that we must affirm the identity of the city by a reference to its constitution.” It would be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this conclusion* in its literal sense his assertion 6 § 1 n. (523), 7 § 2 (535), 13 § 5 (592), that the constitution is nothing but the form of government, πολιτεία, κύριον. For the truth is that, like Plato, he includes under πολιτεῖα all which goes to condition the form of government as well as all that is directly conditioned by it. Thus, as Zeller II ii p. 551 rightly observes, he includes ‘even the main features of the commonwealth which find expression in the spirit of the state ‘administration and in the mode in which ‘the end of the state is conceived’: see IV(VII). 8 § 5 n. (800), 8 § 3 (806). Thus his notion of a polity or πολιτεῖα is not narrower but wider than our notion of a constitution. For when we speak with scientific precision the term ‘constitution’ usually denotes only the particular form which the political organism assumes, or the sum total of the rules regulating the distribution of political functions;—although no doubt, as a matter of fact, the text of a modern constitution does

* Oncken (II. 121—130) ascribes to him, as his real view, almost the exact opposite of this conclusion.

τον ἔχει τὸν τρέπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν (p. 63) ἔτερον ἡ ταῦτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἡ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἐτέραν πολιτείαν μεταβάλῃ ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἔτερος.

4 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἔχόμενόν ἔστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι II

14 μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν Π² Bk., μεταβάλλῃ Π³ Bk.

not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see V(VIII), 1 § 1 f. n. (973), VIII(V), 9 § 11 (1641). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, VI(IV)-5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from IV(VII), c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see nn. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, nay utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people: and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. VII § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. SUSEM.(466)

13 εἰ δὲ δίκαιον...λόγος ἔτερος] But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when

the state changes to another constitution is a different question.⁷ The point is not resumed in the sequel.

"This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question." SUSEM. (467)

cc. 4, 5 *Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen?* See Anal. p. 109, and Thurot *Etudes* pp. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the *Republic*, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. VIII, IX. Aristotle admits it *in some cases* (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers which he enjoys. This is in accord with N. E. v. 2. 11: *οὐ γὰρ τοις ταῦτα ἀνδρὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολιτῷ παντὶ*, on which see Jackson's note which disposes of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book v used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the *Politics*.

16 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων...18 μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν] Schlosser's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to

πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπου- (II)
 δαλου θετέον, οὐ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ἀλλὰ μην εἴ γε τοῦτο τυ-
 χεῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τινὶ πρῶτον λη-
 20 πτέον. ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν,
 § 2 οὗτος καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ ἀνο-
 μοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὅ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔρετης, ὃ δὲ
 κυβερνήτης, ὃ δὲ πρωφεύς, ὃ δὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχων τοιαύτην
 ἐπωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκάστου λόγος
 25 ἕδιος ἐσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμό-
 σει πᾶσιν. οὐ γάρ σωτηρίᾳ τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
 § 3 πάντων τούτου γάρ ἔκαστος δρέγεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὅμοίως τοίνυν
 καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, οὐ σωτη-
 20 ρίᾳ τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δὲ ἐστὶν η πολιτεία·
 διόπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πο-
 λιτείαν. εἰπερ οὖν ἐστι πλείω πολιτείας εἰδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαλου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε-

17 ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς M² Susem.^{1,2} and perhaps Γ || 19 πρῶτον omitted in P¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹ in the margin), πρότερος? Spengel needlessly || 20 κοινῶν II¹ || 23 τὴν τοιαυτην fr. || 25 ὅμως Veltori || 28 καὶ omitted by Γ M² || 30 διὰ P¹ II² fr. Bk.

inquire how far, under any constitution, the state can reach this goal touches a fundamental point in constitutional theory of the utmost generality; and constitutions may be classified as (1) better or best, (2) worse or worst, according as they are more or less adapted to this end. The present inquiry accordingly serves as the basis of the classification of constitutions in order of merit which follows in c. 6, and of the entire theory of the separate constitutions. This then, and this alone, is precisely the right place for cc. 4, 5. That they have defects in the execution we are not prepared to deny, since Aristotle must have himself intended materially to recast them subsequently (see n. 471; compare nn. 473, 478); but this intention was never carried out. SUSEM. (468)

One glaring defect in the execution is the frequent violation of the rule forbidding the hiatus, which is fairly well observed in the rest of B. III. There are 40 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total of 90 odd for the whole of the book.

19 τύπῳ τινὶ] in outline. A frequent expression: IV(VII). 16. 12, V(VIII). 7. 2, VII(VI). 8. 24, VIII(V). 2. 1; Nic. Eth. I. § 3, 3 § 4 ταχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ.

20 The simile of the crew is much

used by Plato: Rep. VI. 488 A ff., Politi-
cian 297 B, E ff.; in the latter passage joined with that of the physician which is perpetually recurring in B. III.

§ 2 22 τὴν δύναμιν is an adverbial accus. See n. on φύσις I. 12. 2.

23 κυβερνήτης] steersman, or pilot, answers in some respects more to the ship's captain, as he is skilled in navigation (Plato II. cc.) and responsible for the course of the vessel. Whereas the *ράνκηρος* or skipper, usually the owner of the ship, although nominally in command, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὅμοίως τοίνυν κτλ.] Some of the citizens take part in the administration of the state merely as members of the popular assembly, others merely as judges in the law courts or members of the council; others again in a higher degree by filling various official posts. (Schlosser has strangely mistaken the sense: he thinks that the skill of the captain, helmsman, helmsman's assistant in the simile answers to the excellence of the man; and the performance of a successful voyage to civic excellence.) SUSEM. (469)

28 η σωτηρίᾳ τῆς κοιν.]) the maintenance of the (political) union.

30 πρὸς] relative to. Congreve compares I. 13 § 15.

λείαν τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι (11)
§ 4 τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολίτην ὄντα σπουδαῖον
35 μὴ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἓν σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, φανερὸν
οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλουν τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελ-
§ 5 θεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ

33 τὸν δ'.....34 τελείαν omitted by M¹ P³⁻⁶ Q^b T^b fr. Ald. and P²⁻⁴ (1st hand, added by corr.³ of P² and in the margin of P⁴, and there τὴν is also above the line) || μίαν omitted by Albert Ar. (?) Bk. (who writes κατ') || εἶναι κατὰ Γ Bk. || 34 τὴν omitted by Bk. and P¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹), for P⁴ see above || 36 ἀλλὰ omitted in fr. III¹ (added by p¹) || 37 παρά? Susem., <κατὰ τὸν> περὶ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (*ἀνήρ*) rather than of the human being, because he regards the *ἀρετὴ* of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see 4 §§ 15-18 *nn.* (491, 495); I. 13 §§ 9-11, *nn.* (114 b, 117, 119). SUSEM. (470)

§ 4 36 ἐπελθεῖν τι or περὶ τινος are separately found: while VIII(V), 10. 1 ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας ἐξ ὦν φύσει-
περαι is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαπορούντας; "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state."
"But the sense seems to require that ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον should mean here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρά might be necessary = 'starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'." SUSEM.

§ 5 37 εἰ γὰρ εδύνατο] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike." But how does this agree with the passages quoted in *n.* (133) on II. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (*ἐπει τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις*) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4-6 § 1: see *n.* (684) on 18 § 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, 4 § 5, the arguments *pro* and *con* had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18 § 1 refers us back,

may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4 * or in the lacuna at c. 13 § 6 (see Introd. p. 43 ff. *n.* 599). But at c. 6 + § 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13 § 6 is too near to 18 § 1 to be meant by the words *ἐπει τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις*. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction: see § 6 *n.* (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); 5 § 1 (501). But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18 § 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18 § 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently IV(VII). 9 § 3, 13 §§ 9, 10, 14 § 8: VI(IV). 7. 2 (*nn.* 684, 808 and Introd. p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men: and this alone is reasoned out logically (see *n.* 468). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not

* Not directly after 4 § 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4 from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemihl in *Compos. der arist. Pol.* p. 24 f. *n.* (24).

ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, δει δ' ἡκα- (II)
 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὐ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ απ' ἀρετῆς, ἐπει-
 40 δὴ ἀδύνατον ὅμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, <δει δ' ἐκα-
 39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὐ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ απ' ἀρετῆς> οὐκ ἀν
 1277 a εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
 σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀρέστην
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγα- (p. 64)
 4 θοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοῦς εἶναι τοὺς
 § 6 ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας. [ἔτι ἐπεὶ ίξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πό-
 λις, ὥσπερ ζῶν εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχὴ ἐκ
 λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκία ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ
 κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πό-
 λις ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων

38 διωτὸν Bernays || δει δ.....39 ἀρετῆς transposed to follow 40
 πολίτας Thurot || 40 ἐπειδὴ δὲ P¹, ἐπει δὲ II² fr. Ar., ἐπει δ' Bk. Bernays, ἐπει
 Spengel || ὁμοίως P¹⁻⁶ Q^b T^b || 39 αὐτὸς II² Bk., αὐτὸς Γ, αὐτὸς fr.

1277 a 1 μια ἀρετὴ II² fr. Bk. || πολίτου <τε σπουδαίου> Schmidt || 3 πολιτελαν
 P¹ (1st hand), perhaps right: γρ. πόλιν corr.¹ in the margin of P¹ || 4 <ἄνδρας>
 ἀγαθοῦς? Susem., ὁμοίως Bernays, perhaps right || 5 πολίτας ** Thurot; but see
 Comm. n. (471) and (471 *) || [ἔτι ἐπει..... 12 παρατάραν] Susem.; see Comm. n.
 (473). Thurot suspected the § || 8 [κτῆσις] Bernays, [κτῆσις ἐκ] Welldon

all equally virtuous men, but it does affect the much more illogical inference that the inferior citizens of the best state have only civic virtue. On the contrary here the degree of civic excellence also must be regulated by that of individual excellence, and the special nature of the one by the special nature of the other; and one consequence of this is that which Aristotle in complete accordance with the facts lays down as a criterion of the best state, viz. that in its administration each is employed according to his special faculties and capacities and assigned to his right place. It may thence be inferred that Aristotle had no intention of permitting all the members of the governing civic body in the pattern state to fill all the various public offices in rotation, but that he assumed that this most virtuous civic body would always elect to particular state offices the fittest and most virtuous of its members. Cp. II § 8 n. (569). Consequently it must be allowed that the officers of state in the perfect city do not represent the union of the virtue of the citizen and of the man, as is here stated, but rather that they represent the highest and most perfect degree of this union: and so far from

being erroneous it is quite correct to say that Aristotle includes in this polity those who are not yet elected but are still eligible to such a position. Only they do not actually attain a complete confirmation of this highest individual virtue (which is at the same time the highest civic virtue) until they are elected to office: cp. further n. (521) on III. 5. 10. Nor should we forget that at IV(VII). 14. 8 n. (902) Aristotle makes only the virtue of the ruler (*πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχο-*
τος) equivalent to the virtue of the man: in the best state the rulers are primarily the popular assembly composed of the elder citizens, but in a still higher degree the men selected out of it who are elected to offices of state. SUSEM. (471)

40 ὁμοίως] See n. on II. 2. 3, 1261 a 24.
 § 6 1277 a 6 εὐθὺς=for instance, like
ab irico. The first instance that comes to hand.

7 ὀρέξεως] Appetite, or impulse; here put for the irrational part of the soul in general (Eaton). See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (472)

9 ἐξ ἀπάντων τε...εἰδῶν] But these constituents are not all citizens in the sense of the definition given c. 1 § 2, and yet this alone is material here (Thurot).

ιο συνέστηκεν εἰδῶν ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν (11)
 πάντων ἀρετήν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ
 § 7 παραστάτου.] διότι μὲν τοῖν τὸν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν ὁ
 ἐκ τούτων ἄλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε
 σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν
 15 σπουδαίον εἶναι * * ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν
 § 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δὲ εὐθὺς ἐτέραν εἰ-
 ναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντος, ὡσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων
 νίες ἵππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευέμενοι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ
 μὴ μοι τὰ κομψά
 ἄλλ' ὥν πῆλει δεῖ,

§ 9 ὡς οὖσάν τινα ἄρχοντος παιδείαν. εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρ-
 21 χοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δὲ ἔστι καὶ
 ὁ ἄρχομενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀν εἴη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,
 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου οὐ γάρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντος καὶ πολίτου,

12 λανθαστάτο? Schmidt || ἀπλῶς omitted by Π¹ || 15 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι Π² fr. Bk.
 || <ἀνδρα> ἀγαθὸν Bücheler, which I accept || τὸν τε Susem. || τολιτικὸν]
 πολιτηρίον oīs Congreve, followed by Bernays || 17 τοῦ added before ἄρχοντος by
 11² Bk. || 18 πολεμικὴν πολιτικὴν Göttling || 19 κομψά..... Spengel, κόμψ Π² fr.
 Bk. || 20 δὲ Π² At, Bk., ει δε συνη fr. || ἀρετὴ omitted in Π¹ || 22 ἀπλῶς ἀν εἴη
 Η² fr. Bk. || 23 τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνον inserted after μέντοι by ΓΜ¹ and P¹
 (1st hand, but μόνον is added by corr.¹, and the whole erased by p¹ in the margin),
 γρ. τοῦ δυναμένου ἄρχειν μόνον Π⁴ in the margin. Evidently a gloss

In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in n. (501) on III. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of II. 2. 3; comp. n. (133). SUSEM. (473)

§ 7 13 ἄλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς κτλ.] Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρίνικος, ἀγαθὸς refers to moral virtue (cp. n. 40). Just in the same way at 11 § 2 we have ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως in combination; where ἀρετή is 'virtue' simply, i. e. moral virtue. Cp. n. (563) and n. (703) on IV(VII). 1. 10. On the relation of φρονήσις (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see nn. (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with nn. (493, 497, 498). SUSEM. (474)

16 φρόνιμον] Cp. Nic. Eth. VI. 5. 5, διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοῦς τοιούτους φρο-
 νιμαν οἶμεσθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυνατὰ θεωρεῖν.

εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμενα τοὺς οἰκονο-
 μικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς: ib. vi. c. 8,
 which treats fully of φρονήσις or Practical
 Wisdom: Plato *Politic.* 292 D, 294 A
 ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν
 (Eaton). SUSEM. (475)

§ 8 17 λέγουσί τινες] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. SUSEM. (476)
 Mr Wyse finds the reference in Ps.-Plato *First Ale.* 121 D ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Εὐριπίδης] In the *Aeolus*, Frag.
 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV(VII). 14.
 1, n. (891). SUSEM. (477)

19 τὰ κομψά sc. ποικίλοις γενούσατο] let them not become versatile in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ κτλ.] Far more just is Aristotle's admission VIII(v). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned in such and such a way, ἐν ἐκάστῳ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πόλιν τὴν πολιτείαν (Thurot). Cp. n. (1630). SUSEM. (478)

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου] 'but in a

24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἵσως Ἰάστων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς (11).
 § 10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἴδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ τόδινασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δίνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἄρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολέμου ἀμφω, οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὄμοιών. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτε δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ οὐ ταύτα δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ἄρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ' ἐπί-

24 *Iowis* omitted in III (added by the corrector of P¹), [*Iowis*] Susem.¹ || τυραννεῖ P¹ and P² (1st hand, altered by corr.) || 26 δοκίμου ἡ δοκεῖ ἡ Giphanius, δοκεῖ μὲν ἡ Zwinger, δοκεῖ πον ἡ Welldon following Jackson, δοκεῖ αὐτη Rassow (cp. § 15, 1277 b 15), δοκεῖ δοκίμου ἡ Bernays. On this whole paragraph cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 387 f. || 27 οὖν δὲ? Susem. || 29 ἐπει] ἔως Schlosser, ὅτι Koraes, εἰ μὲν Rassow, εἰ? Susem. Yet ἐπει may be right, if the lacuna after 32 ἀμφοῖν is much larger than the mere loss of τοῦτο νῦν σκοπόμεν or something equivalent; or if Welldon's conjecture below is right || 30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ κτλ] apparently corrupt, Bernays translates as if he read ποτὲ μὲν δοκεῖ..... 31 ποτὲ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ; ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ? Susem.² doubtfully; <ποτὲ> οὐ ταύτα Welldon, much more probably, if 29 ἐπει is right || ἀμφότερα] ἔτερα Koraes, ἀμφω ἔτερα Bernays, highly probable || καὶ] καὶ Schlosser || [οὐ] Rassow, [καὶ] Spengel: if so, τὸν τε in place of τὸν δὲ || 31 ἀμφότερα P^{1,2,4}, ἀμφότερον Q^b T^b

specific citizen.' The gloss fairly gives the sense.

24 [Ιάστων] The famous tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius *Hist.* iv. pp. 443—451 E. tr., and Krafft's Art. 'Jason of Pherae' in Pany's *Realencyclopädie*. Götzling recalls another saying of his cited by Aristotle *Khet.* i. 12. 31, 1373 a 25, that he must do some wrong in order to have the power to do much right. SUSEM. (479)

ἴφη] Not φησι, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

πεινῆν...18ιώτης εἶναι] "he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject." Eaton compares the saying of Astyages to Harpagos, and of Demaratos to Leotychides Herod. i. 129, vi. 67 and what is related of Theras *ib.* iv. 147: and Aeschyl. *Prom.* 926; but in all these cases the point is essentially different. SUSEM. (480) Even Grote is caught napping here, for he represents Jason as saying that he felt hunger until he became despot (III. p. 36 n.).

§ 10 25 ἀλλὰ μὴν...27 καλῶς] Eaton compares Pl. *Laus* i. 643 ε: τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παιδῶν παιδείαν, παιδίσαντας ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἑραστὴν τὸν πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. SUSEM. (481)

27 εἰ οὖν...29 οὐκ ἀν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινετὰ ὄροις] "If then we lay down that the excellence of a good man is that of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is that of both," ruling and being ruled, "they cannot both be equally praiseworthy." It is the virtue of the good man which alone is one and perfect, § 3 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρα φαμέν κατὰ μιαν ἀρετὴν εἴω την τελείαν. Of civic virtue this is true *only in so far as* it denotes the excellence of rule (here declared to be the excellence of the citizen), but not in so far as it is the excellence displayed in due obedience. This latter then is a subordinate excellence. SUSEM. (482)

§ 11 Welldon, reading 29 ἐπει οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφότερα καὶ <ποτὲ> οὐ ταύτα δεῖν κτλ, translates "Since then it seems that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both (rule and subjection) and other cases where they ought [each] to learn only one." But this strains οὐ ταύτα = not both the same.

στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, * * κάντεῦθεν ἀν κατίδοι τίς. (II)
 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα
 § 12 λέγομεν, ἡ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, (p. 65)
 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον. θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. λέγω
 δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς
 πράξεις. δούλου δὲ εἴδη πλείω λέγομεν αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι
 πλείους. ἀν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες οὗτοι δὲ
 εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοῦνομα αὐτούς, οἱ ζῶντες ἀπὸ^{1277 b} τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἔστιν. διὸ παρ'
 ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἄρχων, πρὶν
 § 13 δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἄρχοντῶν
 μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἄγαθὸν] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ
 τὸν πολέμην [τὸν ἄγαθὸν] μανθάνειν, εἰ μή ποτε χρέας χάριν
 αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατένθεν M⁴, τούτεῦθεν II² fr. Ar. Bk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture for κάντεῦθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; ἔτεῦθεν Koraes Rassow || 33 [ἔστι..... 1277 b 8 ἀλευθέρων] Congreve || 34 λέγομεν δ Lambin, λεγόμενα Γ II Ar. || 38 χερνῆται p¹ and p⁴ (corrector) || 39 αὐτὸς P³ (1st hand, emended by a later hand), αὐτῶν or αὐτὸς Montecatino

1277 b 4 ἄγαθὸν] ἄρχοντα Rassow, [τὸν ἄγαθὸν] Susem.⁴, [ἄγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν] Susem.⁵, οἵτε πολιτικὸν οὔτε πολιτην τὸν ἄγαθὸν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτην τὸν ἄγαθὸν] Thurot || 5 [τὸν ἄγαθὸν] Welldon Susem.⁴ || 6 γὰρ ἔτι] γὰρ τοι Riese || τοτὲ.....7 τοτὲ Riese, τῶν.....τὸν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹, cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5 1332 b 37, τῶν.....τῶν Lindau, wrongly

32 * * κάντεῦθεν κτλ.] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer omission, we may eke out the sense as follows: "but the citizen's knowledge and experience of both <-> is now the question before us, > and may be understood from what follows." SUSEM. (483)

33 [Ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτικῆς] Not 'despotic' rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. "For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καὶ = even) to serve in domestic functions."

τὰ ἀναγκαῖα] More clearly expressed 11. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: cp. 1. 7 § 3.

35 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον] Cp. 1. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8 § 2 nn. (63, 68): also Xen. *Oecon.* c. 12. SUSEM. (484)

Plato *Politic.* 259 c ὡς βασιλεὺς ἄπτα χερσὶ καὶ ξύπαντι τῷ σώματι συλκεῖ ἄπτα

εἰς τὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται πρὸς τὴν τῆς φυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ βώμην.

Θάτερον δὲ καὶ δύν.] The other (the former) would inspire the servile spirit mentioned in n. (43) on 1. 5. 8. See III. 5 §§ 2, 3. SUSEM. (485)

§ 12 38 ὁν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆται] Cp. 1. 13 §§ 12, 13 with nn. (103, 123) and III. 5 § 4 with n. (507). SUSEM. (486)

1277 b 2 τὸ παλαιὸν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἄρχαιον 1. 2 § 7. This was the state of things at Athens under Solon's constitution.

3 δῆμον τὸν ἔσχατον] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more moderate democracy: see 11. 12. 3 n. (406) and the passages cited in nn. (400, 406). SUSEM. (487)

§ 13 5 εἰ μή ποτε χρέας κτλ.] "except in certain cases for his private use." Comp. IV(VII). 14. 7 with nn. (900, 901) and V(VIII). 2. 6 with n. (983). SUSEM. (488)

6 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] for (if he learns them

δεσπότην τοτὲ δὲ δουλον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει (II)
 § 14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέ-
 γομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἀρχοντα ἀρ-
 χόχμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἵππαρχεῖν ἵππαρχηθέντα, στρατη-
 γεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.
 διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἄρξαι μη
 § 15 ἀρχέθεντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ¹⁰
 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχε-
 σθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρ-
 § 16 χῆν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω.

7 <καὶ> τις? Susem. || 10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Susem.¹⁻², misled by the ver-
 sions of William and Ar. || 12 διὸ <καὶ> P⁶ Q^b T^b BK.

for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies.

8 δρούσων τῷ γένει=his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ δοχὴ is in accord with the soundest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 10 ἵππαρχεῖν κτλ] In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten τάξεις, one from each φύλον (see n. 451), and perhaps themselves called φύλα. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ταξιαρχος. Each such τάξης was divided into λόχοις or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λοχαγοι. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἵππαρχοι, and under them were ten φύλαρχοι, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοι, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις: but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive politico-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the ταξιαρχοι were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the στρατηγοι: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might carry on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schömann *Antiquities* p. 420 f., 422, 424 f.,

J. G. Droysen *Observations on the Athenian στρατηγοι* in *Hermes* ix. 1874, pp. 1—21, v. Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* pp. 57—67, and vii(vi). 8. 15 n. (1473).
 SUSEM. (489)

12 λέγεται κτλ] Comp. IV(VII). 14. 6 f. n. (898) ff. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in Diog. Laert. I. 60, Stob. *Flor.* XLVI. 22 (Eaton), but hardly on good evidence. SUSEM. (490)

§ 16 16 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ κτλ] Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thurot objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle's view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition: but the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own real opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, I. 13 §§ 7, 9, 10, nn. (114 b, 117, 119) so as to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (470). SUSEM. (491)

καὶ εἰ ἔτερον εἰδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς (II)
 καὶ [γάρ] ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία
 ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἰδη
 το ἔχουσα καθ' ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυ-
 ναικὸς ἔτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξαι γάρ ἀν εἶναι
 δειλὸς ἀνὴρ, εἰ οὖτος ἀνδρεῖος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία,
 καὶ γυνὴ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὗτος κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγα-
 θός, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἔτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός τοῦ
 μὲν γάρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἔστιν). ἡ δὲ φρόνησις
 ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετῇ μόνη. τὰς γάρ ἀλλας ἔσικεν

18 [γάρ] Götting, τῆς? Susem., γάρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Götting, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἀμφω and a colon after 17 ἀρχικῆς || 19 τοῦ ἥθους Susem., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Γ (before δῆλον δέ) II Ar. Bk., καὶ ἀρχοντος Rassow || 20 ως γάρ Π¹, ἀλλως ὥσπερ ρ³ in the margin || 23 ἀκόλαστος Susem., Triebel independently, apparently also Ar. *inhonesta*: see Bonitz *Zeitsch. f. Gymnasiatuv.* XXVI. 1872. 893—895, Susem. and Bonitz *ib.* XXVII. 1873. 797; δῆλος Ρ⁴ Susem.¹ in the text, Λάλος Π¹ Bk., δῆλος Π² Q³ Τ⁴, ἀλλως Ald. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Susemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 389

17 σωφροσύνης] See n. (206 b) on II. 6. 9. SUSEM. (492)

19 τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῆ] Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on I. 5 § 6 n. (40), § 9 (45), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115); III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). SUSEM. (493)

εἴη ἔχουσα κτλ.] "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). SUSEM. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestions would slightly modify the translation of § 16: "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling <and in being ruled>. For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the free-man who is subject to rule (*καὶ γάρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> ἀρχομένον*), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antisthenes maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρόνις II. 6 §§ 8. 9. So also 23 κοσμία 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant.

23 οὖτος κοσμία] "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on I. 13. 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. SUSEM. (495)

24 οἰκονομία ἔτρε] It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. I. cc. 8—10: see Exc. III. to B. I. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. *Mem.* II. 7. 12—14, *Oecon.* 7" (Eaton). SUSEM. (496)

25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις] By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing: that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (45), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115); III. 4. 7 nn. (474—5). Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 10. 2 ἡ μὲν γάρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτική ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κρατικὴ μόνον; also n. (498): VI. 4. 14 n. (1186), and *Rhet.* I. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἀρχιδύν τὸ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV(VII). 9. 5 n. (810). SUSEM. (497)

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τὰν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν (II)
 § 18 ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, (p. 8
 ἀλλὰ δοξα ἀληθής ὥσπερ γάρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ὄρχομε-
 νος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμειος. πότερον μὲν οὖν
 ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἡ
 ἔτερα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἔτερα, φανερὸν ἐκ τού-
 5 των περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεται τις τῶν ἀποριῶν. III
 ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ πότερον πολίτης ἔστιν φοινικεῦν ἔξ-
 35 εστιν ἀρχῆς, ἡ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν
 οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἰς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχᾶν, οὐχ οἶον
 τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν (οὗτος γάρ πο-
 λίτης). εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θε-

29 αὐλοποιὸς γάρ P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. and P¹ (1st hand) || 37 οὗτος γάρ πολίτης
 untranslated by Ar., suspected by Schneider; οὗτος γάρ πολίτης <ἀγαθὸς ὁ ὀνειρε-
 τος ἄρχειν> or something equivalent Thurot

§ 18 29 [δόξα ἀληθής] 'Right opinion' here denotes more precisely the capacity of rightly apprehending the order given in order to execute it aright, for which the person who executes it is often obliged to discover the ways and means either wholly or in part for himself. 'Right opinion' of this sort does not by any means correspond, as Eaton thinks, with that to which Plato applies the term, simply because the *φρίστος* to which Plato often opposes it (as in *Laws* 1. 632 c) coincides with philosophic knowledge. Hence Plato would not concede to right opinion, as Aristotle does *Nic. Eth.* vi. 10. 3, that *σύνεσις* consists in the right application of opinion so as to judge upon the report of another a matter coming within the sphere of prudence, ἐν τῷ χρήσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστιν, ἀλλον λέγοντος. Comp. the last note. See further 1. 13. 8 n. (115). SUSEM. (498)

[αὐλοποιὸς] This comparison is taken from Plato *Rep.* x. 651 D. Cp. 11 § 14 n. (574). SUSEM. (499)

c. 5 § 1 33 περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ.] "It is an erroneous assumption to think, as Thurot and others do, that this is an altogether different question from the one discussed in the last chapter. These opening words at once prove that Aristotle looks upon the discussion of c. 5 as most closely connected with the chapter preceding. There it was decided that the virtue of the citizen in republican states consists in his being qualified both

to rule and to be ruled: but in fact a restriction was needed in those cases where full participation in civic rights is granted to the lowest classes of the people, who live by manual labour, the mechanics and day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that owing partly to their want of leisure, partly to their degrading occupation, they cannot raise themselves to a higher life of virtue: and that therefore they are just as unqualified to rule as they are unable to claim, in the full sense of the words the title of ἀγαθοὶ ἀνθρεπτοι, virtuous and capable men. To append this restriction is the main object of c. 5, and goes more diffusely into details, §§ 4—7, respecting the position of this class" (Rassow *Bemerkungen* p. 10 f.). SUSEM. (500)

34 ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ] 'whether he only is really a citizen who has the right to share in office or whether the working men also ought to rank as citizens': as was indeed the case at Athens.

[πότερον πολίτης] It is true that Aristotle ought not to have raised the question in this form after deducing the definition of the citizen given in 1 § 2 ff.: comp. 4 § 6 n. (473). But in the following discussion he has taken care that no material disadvantage results from this formal defect. SUSEM. (501)

36 οἶον τε sc. ἔστι.

37 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν] τὴν πολι-
 τικὴν, including τὴν ἀρχικὴν, to command as well as to obey.

οὗτος = ὁ βάρανος: here would be an instance of a citizen not qualified to govern.

§ 2 τέος ἔκαστος; οὐδὲ γάρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἡ διά γε τοῦτον (III)
 1278 a τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαλνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γάρ οἱ
 δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι. τοῦτο ²
 γάρ ἀληθές, ώς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὁν ἀνευ οὐκ ἀν εἴη
 πόλις, ἐπει οὐδὲ οἱ παιδες ὥσταύτως πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ'
 § 3 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολίται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν,
 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις
 ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἡ ξενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦ-
 τοι καὶ νῦν ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολί-
 την. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὐτος πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πολίτου ἀρετὴν ἦν εἴπομεν
 10 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδὲ ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔρ-
 § 4 γων εἰσὶν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δὲ [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν ³

39 οὗτε.....οὗτε Spengel

1278 a 5 ἐκ προθέσεως Bas.³ in the margin, ἐκ προσθέσεως Casaubon || 9
 πολίτην * * Oncken, wrongly || 11 δ' [ἀναγκαίων] Susem.³, δὲ μη ἀφειμένων?
 Congreve, δὲ αὐτονυργῶ Schmidt, δὲ <μη ἀφειμένων τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply
 δὲ <μη>? Susem., δὲ ἄλλων Bernays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended
 (τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

39 [ἔκαστος] each native artizan.
 "What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as under Solon's constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (502)

§ 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners). The indispensable elements of a state (*ὅν οὐκ ἀν εἴη πόλις*) need not be all *citizens*.

1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γάρ κτλ] This reason is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves cannot come into the question: while the freedmen were regarded (and with good reason) as a special class of the resident aliens: see Schömann p. 351 of Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself considers them, if the reading is correct, c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the term, in accordance with its etymology *pέρικος* denotes only a permanent resident in a town of which he is not a citizen, though he *is* a citizen somewhere else [cp. Eur. *Hol.* 892]: and this condition is not fulfilled in the case of the freedmen" (Dittenberger). SUSEM. (503)

2 τοῦτο γάρ ἀληθές. κτλ] "For this is quite true that not all who are indis-

pensable to the city ought to be classed as citizens." A very important point for our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see IV(VII). 8 § 1 ff. n. (795). SUSEM. (504)

4 ὥσταύτως καὶ] equally with. See on II. 8 21 δούλοις καὶ.

5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up.

6 δὲλλ' ἀτελεῖς] "but under age." See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 b). SUSEM. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see Herod. II. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been 'learnt' from them by the Greeks.

8 η δὲ βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. IV(VII). 9 § 3, n. (809). SUSEM. (506)

9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης] "But if the artizan too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be affirmed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from menial functions" [including free artizans].

§ 4 11 τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μη κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this use see II. 9 § 2 τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν, and I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5); 'in respect of compulsory work

ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῆ βάναυσοι (III) καὶ θῆτες. φανερὸν δὲ ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς 14 ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὸν γάρ φανὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆ- § 5 λον. ἐπεὶ γάρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἰδη πολί- του ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολίτου, ὥστ' ἐν μέν τινι πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ τις ἔστιν ἦν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾧ κατ' ἀρετὴν 20 αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ γάρ οἶον τ' ἐπιτηδεῦ- (p. 67) 25 σι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζῶντα βίου βάναυσον ἢ θητικόν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς διληγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γάρ μακρῷν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάναυ- 24 σον δὲ ἐνδέχεται πλουτοῦσι γάρ καὶ [οἵ] πολλοὶ τῶν

12 κοινοὶ II² Bk. || 14 φανέν untranslated by Ar., suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture <δ φανερὸν> φανέν in the margin of Bas.³, and by Schneider. Bernays, "at the first glance": but can it mean this? ἐπάνω? Susem., <ώτ> φανέν would be less alteration, but hardly right: <τὸ> φανέν or τὸ γάρ φανέν Schmidt || 24 [οἵ] Schneider

those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers: 'οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι of 11. 7 § 23.

12 οἱ δὲ κοινῇ] Comp. I. 13 § 13: δὲ δοῦλοις κοινῶν ἡσήσ, δὲ πορρότερον δὲ γάρ βάναυσος τεχνῆτης ἀφωριμένην τιὰ ἔχει δουλείαν, with n. (122); I. II § 6 n. (103), III. 4 § 12 n. (486). SUSEM. (507)

13 θῆτες=έλειθεροι διὰ πεντακινέντην ἀργυρίῳ δουλειούστες Pollux III. 82.

φανερὸν δὲ ἐντεῦθεν] "In what position the artizans stand becomes clear upon slight reflexion from the following consideration": viz. that a variety of 'citizens' is implied by c. 1 § 8.

14 αὐτὸν τὸ λεχθὲν] Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανέν take it as =τὸν φανῆ; "if seen" (i.e. understood) "even our former statement makes (the matter) clear." δῆλον ποιεῖν absolute, as in c. 8 § 6, 1279 b 35; so φανερὸν ποιεῖν c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. "Yet in both passages a clause with δῆι follows equivalent to a substantive" (T. L. Heath).

§ 5 15 καὶ εἶδη πολίτου] "There must also be several species of citizens." See c. 1 §§ 8—11. SUSEM. (508)

18 οἶον εἰ τις ἔστιν ἦν κτλ.] Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (see n. 440 on

c. 1 § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (536), § 4 n. (538); c. 13 § 8 n. (593). SUSEM. (509)

20 οὐ γάρ οἶον τ'] See again n. (103). SUSEM. (510)

If we grant Aristotle's premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that "if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good" Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμημάτων μακρῷν =high property qualifications. Comp. VI(IV). 4 § 5 μακρὰν οὐσίαν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.

§ 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἑτᾶν μὴ ἀπε- (III)
26 σχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ
πολιτείαις προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος· ὁ γάρ
ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν, τὸν αὐτὸν τ

25 τὸν] τῶν Q^b T^b and P² [1st hand, emended by corr.¹⁾] || 26 ἀρετῆς Γ M^a ||

27 προσεφέλκεται καὶ] προσεφέλκει τινα? Riese. See my critical edition for other emendations, of which τοὺς ξένους (for τῶν ξένων) P⁴ is the oldest

25 *λv Θήβαις 81*] Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle commends this regulation VII(VI). 7 § 4. n. (1496), and justly too, as Schlosser long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be 'flooded' with alien or upstart elements. Further compare VIII(V). 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: nor indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. "In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, *Rhet.* 1. 7. 32, 1365 a 19: but his *Politics* nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations invariably incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the 'rough labour' of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur)." Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (*βάραντοι*) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, *Hellen.* p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral *βάραντια* which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Aris-

tote himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state IV(VII). 14 § 7; cp. V(VIII). 2 § 6 m. (982 a—3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the *βάραντος*. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of 'persons in trade,' not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or busy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which *βάραντοι* is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSEM. (511)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς] Hence ἀγοραῖος πιος IV(VII). 9 § 3, δῆμος VI(IV). 3 § 2, ἀγοραῖοι πλῆθος 4 §§ 10, 21 (Eaton).

27 προσεφέλκεται] drags in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demosthenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins.

28 γάρ ἐκ πολίτιδος] Whoever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSEM. (512)

§ 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ (III)
 30 μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ δί’ ἔνδειαν τῶν γυνητῶν πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται
 πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γάρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὔτω χρᾶν-
 ται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὴ ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦν-
 ται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρώτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν,
 § 9 τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἔξ ἀμφοῦν δαστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν ὁ
 35 οὖν εἶδη πλείω πολίτου, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλι-
 στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ "Ομῆρος ἐποίησεν
 ὡς εἰ τιν' ἀτιμητον μετανάστην."

ὥσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ’ ὅπου
 τὸ τοιούτου ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-
 40 κούντων ἐστίν.

31 τοιούτους [δά] πνρ' Bernays (without parentheses) || 32 ἀποροῦντες Γ M* ||
 δὴ Susem.³, δ' II (including fr.) Bk., untranslated by William Ar., [δ'] Sylbburg
 Susem.^{1,2}, γ' Susem. || 34 δαστῶν fr. Perizonius (on Ael. V. H. vi. 10), αὐτῶν
 Γ and all other mss. || 36—40 The right order given only by corr.³ of P¹; 36
 ὥσπερ.....38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν fr. P¹ (1st hand) and P⁴ (corrector), 37 ὡς εἰ.....
 38 μετέχων after 40 ἐστίν P^{2,3,6} Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand), 38 ὥσπερ.....μετέ-
 χων after 40 ἐστίν Γ M* || 38 ἐστίν ὅτου Bernays, omitting ἐστίν before 39 ἀπάτης
 and after συνοικούντων; not rightly

29 τοὺς νόθους] Under this name were included not only those children whose mother was not a citizen, but also the children of a citizen mother if she were not lawfully married to the father. The latter were always accounted citizens at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle is only thinking of the former. See Schömann pp. 556—8 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (513)

§ 8 “But as the admission of such persons to the franchise is due to a dearth of citizens of legitimate birth, as population increases they gradually pare off from the roll of citizens, first, the children of slave fathers or slave mothers.”

33 τοὺς δὲ δούλου.....δούλης] See preceding notes. SUSEM. (514)

ἐτρα τούς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] This remark has been rightly adduced to show that at Athens even in those times in which the bastard children of citizen fathers became citizens in their turn (*n.* 516) the children of a citizen mother by a father who was not a citizen were not reckoned citizens. The child followed the status of the father in both cases, although the former case was restricted to the periods in question. See Philippi *Contributions to a history of Athenian citizenship* p. 64, Schömann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the reference in *n.* 6, incorrectly given, is to the present passage). Compare too 9

§ 13 *n.* (§ 8) and VII(vi), 4 § 16 *n.* (1425).
 SUSEM. (515)

34 τέλος δὲ κτλ] This was done at Athens by a law of Pericles about 460 B.C., and by a law of Aristophanes in 403: Schömann p. 357 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (516)
 § 9 36 Ὁμῆρος] *Iliad* ix. 648, xvi. 59. SUSEM. (517)

37 “Like some unprivileged outlander,” i.e. settler from abroad. But in Homer the meaning of ἀτιμητον is probably “without any τιμὴ” or blood price attached to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with impunity, rather than “without τιμὴ” in the sense of civic privileges (Jackson).

38 ὥσπερ μέτοικος κτλ] ‘For he who does not share in the privileges (of citizenship) is no better than an alien settled in the place. But where such a principle is disguised, it is for the purpose of deceiving the joint settlers.’

ὅπου ἐπικεκρυμμένον] i.e. where the poorer citizens and the lower classes of people are nominally eligible (i.e. have not been formally deprived of the right of being elected) to the special offices of state; but precautions are taken by various means to secure that such persons are not easily elected to any of them: cf. VI(iv). 13 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (518)

39 τῶν συνοικούντων] Ridgeway proposes to take this in a narrower sense as

§ 10 1278 b πότερον μὲν οὖν ἔτέραν ἡ τὴν αὐτὴν <ἀρετὴν> θετέον, καθ' ἥν (III) ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἔτερος, κάκείνης δ' οὐ πᾶς ὑλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἡ δυνά-
5 μενος εἶναι κύριος, ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἡ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν
6 κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖας ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ IV
ταῦτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἡ πλείους,
καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφορὰ τίνες αὐ-
τῶν εἰσίν. ἐστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων

1278 b 1 <ἀρετὴν> Schneider Susem. following Ar., ἔτέραν <ἀρετὴν> Spengel, less probably, θετέον <ἀρετὴν> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine || 2 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων omitted by II¹ (added in the margin of I¹), [ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Susem.¹ || 3 <πᾶς ἡ αὐτή καὶ πῶς ἔτέρα, καὶ> ὅτι <βάρανος καὶ πολίτης>, or something similar, Thurot: see however Comm. n. (500) || 4 κάκείνης I¹ (corr.¹), κάκείνος Γ M¹ Π² fr. Ar. Bk.¹ I¹ (1st hand) and corr.¹ of I¹ (κάκείνος changed to κάκείνη and ο again written over η) || δ' omitted by II² fr. Bk. || ḥ.....
5 κύριος omitted in Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. and I³⁻⁴ (1st hand: added in the margin, but in P³ again erased) || 8 κανεὶς εἰ Π² fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M¹)

'joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an ἀποικία': and he quotes in support of this view VIII(V). 3 §§ 11, 12, δοῦσι ήδη συλλογες ἐδέχαντο ἡ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλειστοι διεστασίσαντο... ἐν Θουρίῳ Συνθερίται τοῖς συνοικήσασιν. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the σύροικοι are really μέτοικοι.

§ 10 1278 b 3 ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς] that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 n. (471).
SUSEM. (519)

τινὸς δ' ἔτερος] The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the depraved forms of government; viz. (1) the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (δυναστείᾳ), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master's rule (ἀρχὴ δεσποτική) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. SUSEM. (520)

4 κάκείνης δ' οὐ πᾶς] "And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over the public administration."

5 ἡ καθ' αὐτὸν ἡ μετ' ἄλλων] This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminently best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. SUSEM. (521)

c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ?

Compare A. C. Bradley *Hellenica*, pp. 222—230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία=an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. "Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκουμένων τάξις τοις VI(IV). 1 § 10 τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νερέ-
μηνται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τι τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τι τὸ τέλος ἐκδιῃτησι τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστιν: 3 § 5 with notes." SUSEM. (522)

Zeller has remarked (n. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express πολιτεία, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 s. fin.) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one

10 ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ (IV)
πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δέ ἐστιν
§ 2 ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς
κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι τούναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρ- (p. 68)
χίαις φαμὲν δὴ καὶ πολιτείαν ἑτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν
15 αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ὑποθετέον δὴ πρώτου τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρωπον κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς.
§ 3 εἰρηται δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ
20 οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μέν ἐστιν
ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῷον πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς
παρ' ἄλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· οὐδὲ
μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὃσον ἐπιβάλλει
§ 4 μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ

12 δημοκρατίαις P¹, δημοκρατίαις Sylburg, most likely right || 14 δὲ Spiegel,
δὲ Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 15 δὲ] δὴ? Casaubon wrongly ||
16 δὲ Q^b (1st hand, corrected by the same hand) Bk. || 17 κατὰ Bernays, καὶ Γ II
Ar. Bk. Susem.¹⁻² in the text || 19 δὴ P^{a-b} Q^b T^b fr. Ald. Bk. || καὶ added after
δὲ by P¹ Bk. P⁴ (corr.) and, if this may be inferred from Bekker's silence, Q^b T^b ||
20 καὶ before ὅτι omitted by Γ Bk. and all editors except Göttling and Susem. ||
21 δὲ omitted by II² fr. Bk. || 22 παρ'] περὶ M^a II² fr. and P¹ (1st hand) || πολι-
τεῖας Γ M^a fr. || οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted by II² fr., in P¹ added by corr.² on the margin

constitution may be superior to another" (Bradley).

τῶν ἀρχῶν] This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 τὸ πολίτευμα] 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. "This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (534); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (*κύριος*). So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9 and c. 13 § 5 n. (502)." SUSEM. (523)

πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστιν ἡ πολιτεία] 'the constitution is the ruling class': an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. The 'constitution' varies with

the 'government' or governing class.

§ 2 14 φαμὲν δὴ κτλ.] 'Accordingly we say that in these cases' (a democracy and an oligarchy) 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases.'

16 ὑποθέτον δὴ] We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.

"See n. (530) on § 7." SUSEM. (524)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους] In Book I. c. 2 § 9 ff. SUSEM. (525)

For the prepos. = 'in' cp. c. 18 § 1, ἐν τοῖς πρώτους λόγους (Postgate).

23 καθ' ὃσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ] 'to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life.' μέρος nom. to ἐπιβάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in II. 6 § 22, διαν ἐπιβάλλει ἡ σκέψις, and I. 13 § 13 (where however see note).

24 τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς] See n. (21) on I. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (526)

25 κοινὴ πᾶσι καὶ χωρίς συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. ἵσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόρον, ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς § 5 κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτερούστι πολλῆν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλυχόμενοι τοῦ ζῆν, 30 ὡς ἐνοίσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς.
 ἀλλὰ μήν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥά-
 διον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διο-
 § 6 ριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ή μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία,
 καίπερ ὅντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ
 35 φύσει δεσπότη ταύτου συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἀρχεὶ πρὸς
 τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέροντος οὐδὲν ἡττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ
 δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου
 § 7 τοῦ δούλου σφέσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν). ή δὲ τέκνων ἀρχῇ καὶ
 γυναικὸς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ην δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν,

25 χωρὶς <εἰκάστψ> Spengel || 26 καὶ συνέχουσι.....κοινωνίαν follow 27 μόριον in Π² Ar. Bk. Bernays and P¹ (corrector) the order of the text in Π¹ fr. || 28 ὑπερβάλ-
 λει P¹-4, ὑπερβάλῃ Π²-3 Q^b T^b fr. || 3] γάρ or γ' or (with only a comma before δῆλον)
 θ'? Susem. || 31 γι is added after ἀρχῆς by Π²-3 fr., perhaps rightly || λεγομένους]
 ἐνδέχομένους? Susem. || 32 διωτιζομέθα Q^b and perhaps Ar. || 39 [καὶ...πάσης]
 Susem., who also suspects ἡν...οἰκονομικήν; see Comm. n. (529)

§ 4 25 χωρὶς] to each separate individual.

26 συνέχουσι τὴν π. κοινωνίαν] Comp. Plato *Polticus* 301 E ff.

ἴσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι κτλ] Comp. Λ'ν.
 Eth. IX. 9. 9, 1170 a 25, εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ δῆν
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὸν; X. 4. 10 f. 1175 a 16, η
 δ' ἡδονὴ τελεῖ τὰς ἐνεργειὰς καὶ τὸ δῆν δῆν,
 οὐ δρέγανται...πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ
 δῆν αἰρομέθα η διὰ τὸ δῆν τὴν ἡδονὴν,
 ἀφείσθω. συνεργεύσθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα
 φαίνεται (Eaton). SUSEM. (527)

27 κατὰ τὸ ζῆν] in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 κατὰ τὸν βίον.

ἀν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man's true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5 31 τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους] Bonitz: the usual modes, Ind. Ar. 42+ b.43; i.e. the modes (usually) stated [ср.
 καὶ οὐδένα τρόπου τῶν εἰωθυτῶν λέγεσθαι

*Meta. I. 9 § 11]. But what we require is 'all the possible modes,' and so Bernays 'the modes in question.' This is supported by τὸ λεγόμενον L. I § 3, τὰ λεγόμενα δργανα & § 4. The modes of government in question = the modes of governing men. But even so we should rather expect τῆς λεγομένης ἀρχῆς τοὺς τρόπους: see *Critical Notes* and *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 271 n. (23). SUSEM.*

32 διελεῖν] distinguish. Comp. II. 2 § 1 n.

ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτερικοῖς]. See EXCURSUS I. to B. IV(vii). SUSEM. (527 b)

διορίζομέθα] not necessarily of accurate distinction.

§ 6 33 η μὲν γάρ δεσποτεία] See I. 2. 3 n. (7), I. 6 §§ 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side I. 4. 5. SUSEM. (528)

33 ὅμως ἀρχεὶ] Nevertheless the slave-owner's rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) to the interest of the slave.'

36 οὐδὲν ἡττον = μᾶλλον, predominantly.

37 φθειρομένου = while the slave is becoming useless, spoilt.

§ 7 39 καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης] This

40 ἡτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν ἡ <εἰ> κοινοῦ τινὸς ὀμφοῖν, (IV)
καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὡς ὄρῳμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
τέχνας, οἷον λατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν, κατὰ συμβεβηκός
δὲ καν αὐτῶν εἶεν. οὐδὲν γάρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην ἔνα
τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνιότ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-
§ 8 ιητῆς εἰς ἐστιν αἱ τῶν πλωτήρων ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης (p. 69)
5 ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ
τοιτῶν εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκός μετέχει
τῆς ἀφελείας, ὁ μὲν γάρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-
§ 9 νων εἰς γίνεται παιδοτρίβης ὡν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ε
ἀρχής, ὅταν ἡ κατ' ισότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκοῦα καὶ

40 εἴτε σοὶ ἦτοι Lindau || <εἰ> Susem., fr. omits ἡ <εἰ> || 41 ὥσπερ II² fr. Bk.

1279 a 1 [λατρικὴ] ἑρετικὴ Lindau || 2 [ἔτοι] Susem.^{1,2} mistaking William's version, εἶναι II¹ omitting 3 εἶναι || 6 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός P⁴ Q^b T^b || 7 ἀφελεῖας] ἀσφαλεῖας Q^b T^b Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand) || 8 διὸ.....10 ὁμοιότητα probably quite sound: * * διὸ Conring, ὁσι.....συνεστηκοῦα Ar. Ramus, τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν Spengel, Schlosser thought πόλις had been dropped, ὁμοιότητα <ἡ πολιτεῖα> Schnei-
der, but if the word has been lost it would be more likely to drop out after πολιτῶν

addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian: for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ἡ δὴ καλούμενοι οἰκονομικὴ free from suspicion, for the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand οἰκονομικὴ in a narrower and more special sense 'emphatically' (as Congreve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the *free* members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves I. 13 §§ 1, 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether οἰκονομικὴ and δεσποτικὴ can be so opposed in Greek; nor is this proved by I. 1, 2. SUSEM. (529)

40 ἡτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν] Comp. τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον N. E. v. 6, 9 and Jackson's n. But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the 'end' of the state mentioned, or rather recalled to our memory, in §§ 3—5 viz. the highest possible life, εὐ ζῆν. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in §§ 3—5, οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι, had to be prefixed to this passage. SUSEM. (530)

41 καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν...κατὰ συμβεβηκός δι] essentially...incidentally.

καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. Pl. Politicus 297 E: εἰς δὴ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπανι-

μεν πάλιν, αἱ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν δὲ τοὺς βασιλικὸς ἀρχούτας...τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἔτερον πολλῷν ἀ-
τάξιον λατρόν (Eaton); and earlier still,
Socrates Xen. Memorab. III. 9. 11 (Henkel). See further below c. 15 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 §§ 6—8: IV(VII). 2 § 13 n. (726), 13 § 2 n. (870); and above II. 8. 18 n. (170). SUSEM. (531)

1279 a 2 αὐτῶν] i.e. αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχούτων, cp. n. on I. 6. 6 αὐτούς. With this summary justification of δεσποτεία (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in Rep. IX. 520 D: ὃν καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος (ὁ ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχων τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος) ὑπὸ ὁμοιου ἀρχηταὶ οἰκουμενῆς ὁ βελτίστος, δοῦλοι αὐτῶν φανεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἀρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰκουμενοι δεῖν ἀρχεσθαι αἰτοῦ, ὥσπερ Θρασύναχος φέτο τοὺς ἀρχο-
μένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁμειον ὃν παντὶ ὑπὸ θείον καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μη, ξιναθεν ἀφεστῶτος.

§ 8 7 δὲ μὲν sc. ὁ κυβερνήτης, πλωτήρ (γίνεται).

§ 9 8 διὸ κτλ] "Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, their claim is to hold office in turn."

9 ὅταν ἡ κατ' ισότητα...καὶ καθ' ὁμοιό-
τητα=ὅταν ἡ ἔξι σων καὶ ὁμοιων sc. ἡ πόλις, supplied from πολιτικά.

"Although this is the case not only in

ιο καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μέν, (18)
 ὃ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα
 πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-
 § 10 πει τὸ ἑκένον συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ἀφελείας τὰς
 ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς
 15 ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ἡμαλίεναι ἀεὶ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν νοσα-
 κεροῖς οὖσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἀν οὕτως ἵστως ἐδίκων τὰς ἀρχής.
 § 11 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον το-
 σκοποῦσιν, αὐταὶ μὲν ὅρθαι τυγχάνουσιν οὕται κατὰ τὸ
 ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων,
 20 ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὅρθῶν πολιτειῶν.

12 τὸ] τῷ P⁴ Q^b T^b || αἵτοι P¹ AId., αὐτὸν ΓΜ¹ P^{2.3.4} || 13 κείνου fr., ἑκείνῳ Schneider (not necessary), κοινῇ Sylburg, κοινῷ Bojesen (wrongly), [συμφέρειν] Bernays || 18 αὐταὶ P¹ apparently, αὐταὶ ΓΜ¹ || 20 πᾶσαι καὶ Π³ Bk.

Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Polities, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSEM. (532)

10 πρότερον μὲν κτλ] "in early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after your interest as you formerly when in office looked after *his*: but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desire to hold it uninterruptedly; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after places."

11 λειτουργεῖν] of the onerous task of the magistrate e.g. in old Athens: *manus publicum dum gerit, commodo ciuum inseruit cum damno etiam rei familiaris.*

12 τὸ and 12 αὐτοῦ] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. II. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where δὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ίστως εἴναι πάντας reechoes the ὃ πέφυκεν of the text here) and I. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτικός, even if his essential identity with βασιλεὺς be assumed.

§ 10 15 οἷον d...16 ἀρχάς] Comp. ISOCR. VII. (*Panegyricus*) 24, 25: αἵτοι δ' ἦν τοῦ μὴ περιμαχήσαντος εἴναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅτι μεμαθηκότες ἡσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φειδεσθαις, καὶ μὴ...ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστους ὑπαρχόντων,

εἰ ποτε δεῖσθε, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπαρκεῖν. οὗτοι δ' ἀπειλούστοι σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἦν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὑρεῖν τοὺς βούλουμένους ἀρχεῖν ἢ νῦν τοῖς μηδὲν δομέμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποριαν ἀλλὰ ἀποτυργιαν ἔνδιμον εἴναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. SUSEM. (532 b)

§ 11 obviously goes with c. 7.

17 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον] This is τὸ δίκαιον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

18 ὅρθαι] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the *Politicus* Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks *ζοῖς Β τίς οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὅρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ηκώστα χαλεπή συγῆν, πασῶν χαλεπῶν οὐσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη;* Comp. τὴν ὅρθην (i.e. the ideal state) χωρὶς ἀποκρίναντες τοιτων ἐβδόμητρ, ib. 302 C. What Aristotle calls ὅρθαι, are the κερματας καὶ ἔννοια of the *Politicus*, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παράνομοι and ἀκόλαστοι of Plato.

κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον] As opposed to τὸ καὶ τοῖς δίκαιον.

19 τὸ σφέτερον explained by τῶν ἀρχόντων = τὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, e.g. IV. 114, VIII. 46.

20 παρεκβάσεις] 'perversions'; departs from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb παρεκβαίνειν is both intrans. and trans. = to violate, e.g. VIII(V). 10. 5. The noun = error in *Metaph.* XI(V). 2 § 13, 1089 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, Isaeus p. 62. 13, and so Nic. Eth. I. 5. 1.

δεσποτικαὶ γάρ, η̄ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔστιν. (IV)
 7 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἔχομενόν ἔστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπι- ν
 σκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶ-
 24 τον τὰς ἑρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται
 § 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ
 πολιτεύμα σημαίνει ταῦτον, πολιτεύμα δὲ ἔστι τὸ κύριον
 τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δὲ εἶναι κύριον η̄ ἔνα η̄ ὀλίγους η̄ τοὺς
 πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν οἱ εἰς η̄ οἱ ὀλίγοι η̄ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοι-
 νὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον η̄ τοῦ ἑνὸς η̄ τῶν ὀλί-
 γων η̄ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. η̄ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον
 εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, η̄ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
 § 3 καλεῖν δὲ εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν 2
 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν
 35 πλειόνων δὲ ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (η̄ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρ-

25 δὲ] θ' η̄ Welldon || τὸ Π¹ fr. (omitted by ΙΙ² Bk.) || 27 ὀλίγων Γ Μ¹ || 32 <μὴ>
 μετέχοντας Bernays || 34 τῶν omitted by Μ² Π¹, [τῶν] Susem.^{1,2} || ὀλίγων] οντων fr.

21 δεσποτικαὶ] like the sway of a master over slaves.

cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 11) *Threefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (a) one man, (β) a few, or (γ) the many, are supreme.*

§ 1 23 πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ] See *Excursus I. to B. III.* p. 447 ff. SUSEM. (533)

§ 2 25 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] See c. 6 § 1 n. (523); also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (534)

26 σημαίνει ταῦτα] For constitution we may substitute 'ruling body.'

πολίτευμα δὲ ιστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or 'sovereignty' lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the πολίτευμα includes the sovereign, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.

27 ἀνάγκη δὲ...η̄ τῶν πολλούς] But as early as § 4 ff. it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive; see nn. (538, 540, 543). SUSEM. (535)

Eaton compares Cic. *De Rep.* i. § 42, Tac. *Ann.* iv. 33, and for the dependence of the constitution upon the magistrates Cic. *De Legg.* III § 12.

28 ὅταν...πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι] But how, a Platonic might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?

32 τῶν μετέχοντας] sc. τῆς πόλεως. They may still be indispensable elements, c. 5 § 2 ω̄ ἀνεύ οὐδὲ ἀτῇ πόλις.

η̄ δεῖ κτλ] If they are to be called citizens, the inhabitants must share in the 'weal' which is the end of the city: *N. E.* VIII. 9 § 4 η̄ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμενεῖν.

§ 3 33 μοναρχῶν] A neutral word, convenient as including the two species βασιλεία and τυραννίς, Plato *Politic.* 302 D, E. In no single case of all the six is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 η̄ δια τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, η̄ δια τὸ ἀριστον] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, n. (386) on II. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy: and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: II. 6 § 16 n. (218), 9 § 20 (320), II § 5 ff. (386); III. 5 § 5 (509), 13 § 8 (593), 15 § 10

χειν, ἡ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τὴν πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦ-^(V)
 σιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύη-^(p. 70)
 38 ται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολι-
 τειῶν, πολιτεία. <καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι
 <τὰ ὅπλα.> συμβάλνει δὲ εὐλόγως. ἔνα μὲν γὰρ δια-
 40 φέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡ ὀλίγονος ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δὲ ἥδη χαλε-
 2279^b πὸν ἡκριβώσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολε-
 μικήν· αὗτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην
 τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν. καὶ μετέχουσιν

37 <πολεμικὸν> πλῆθος Zeller (*Griech. Phil. II. ii. 714 n. 1*) || The transposition of b 3 καὶ μετέχουσιν.....4 ὅπλα to follow a 39 πολιτεία by Schmidt (see *Introd. 82*) || 39 <οὐκ> εὐλόγως? Spengel who first saw that the text was unsound; * * συμβάλνει Thurot, afterwards accepted by Spengel || μὲν omitted by fr.

(655), 17 § 6 (680), VI(iv). 2 § 1 (1133),
 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—
 10 (1245), 15 § 10 (1356); VII(vi). 2 § 7
 (1402). Other references in n. (471) on
 III. 4. 5. SUSEM. (536) In *Khel.*
 1. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτεία] a constitutional government, a polity: a republic of the middle classes (so far as any Greek city can be so called). In this work without any other distinctive name, like the English Commonwealth; but in *N. E.* VIII. 10 called *τιμοκρατία*: see Exc. I.

§ 4 1279 b 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα]
 “Here it is the possessors of arms that share in the government”: more precisely, the heavy-armed; i.e. those who are in a position to equip themselves at their own cost with heavy armour and (as Zeller remarks II ii 748 n. 7) to undergo the gymnastic training requisite for this species of military service, to which time and leisure and also a certain material prosperity were essential. Accordingly this involves a moderate property qualification. Comp. Exc. I. to B. III.; II. 6. 16 with n. (216), VI(iv). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268); VII(vi). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point of view the Four Hundred at Athens restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens, Thuc. VIII. 97. 1 (Easton). SUSEM. (537) From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens was a Polity in this sense, and again from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγως] παραλόγως, almost = *εἰκὼν*, with good reason. See p. 82.

40 πλείους δὲ ἥδη...πολεμικήν] But when we come to the case of a larger number, it is hard for them to be perfectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλὰ

but on the contrary) at the most they can be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 2 Βιόπερ...3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν] The military character of Polity is also emphasized by the author of the interpolated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the nature of this form of government itself, as Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely any cogent reason can be found for making this such an inseparable and essential feature. He may have dimly perceived that the description of Polity as a mere blending of democracy and oligarchy without the addition of aristocratical elements,—as distinguished from those spurious aristocracies which, like Carthage, combine in themselves these three elements, VI(iv). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9 (cp. II. II. 5 n. 386)—by no means agrees with the recognition of Polity as one of the three normal constitutions, as defined by him; but that on the contrary (as was remarked *Introd.* p. 62) if this recognition is to remain valid, some account must be taken of merit also even in a Polity, and it must be presumed that a certain amount of excellence is spread generally amongst the citizens. And in accordance with the view here expressed about military excellence this may have induced him to transfer the warlike spirit of the Spartan system not so much to the other mixed aristocracies as to the remaining constitutions, which are most akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some measure to bridge over the chasm; for indeed he cites Sparta VI(iv). 9 § 6 f. n. (1262), as an example of a successful blending of democracy and oligarchy in Polity, though this involves him in inconsistency. At the same time by this

§ 5 αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὄπλα παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-⁴
5 μένων τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας,
δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. η μὲν γάρ τυραννίς ἔστι μοναρ-
χία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, η δ' ὀλι-
γαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, η δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐ-
10 δεμία αὐτῶν.

8 δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἐκάστη τού-
των τῶν πολιτειῶν ἔστιν· καὶ γάρ ἔχει τιὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ
δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀπο-
βλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖόν ἔστι τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ
15 τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἔκαστον ἀλήθειαν.
§ 2 ἔστι δὲ τυραννίς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο-
τικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὁστὶ κύ-

1279 b 6 οὖν possibly Γ, *igitur* William || 13 ἔκαστον (οἱ ἔκαστον) μεθόδῳ?
Koraes || μὴ] μηδὲν? Schneider, perhaps rightly if 15 τι, which is not in II¹ Ar.,
should be omitted || 16 δέ] δὴ or γάρ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || δεσποστικὴ?
Sylburg

immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unobserved found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For then in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely polities but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding *τυποκρατία* in Plato's *Republic* (Excursus 1.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, VI(IV). 8 §§ 1, 2, n. (1239). Comp. Zeller II ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. n. (535). SUSEM. (538)

§ 6 η μὲν γάρ τυραννίς] Earlier still Thucydides, I. 17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539)

7 η δὲ ὀλιγ... 9 ἀπόρων] Here then

the numerical standard completely disappears, see *nn.* (535, 538); as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See *n.* (544). SUSEM. (540)

c. 8 § 1 11 δεῖ δὲ... 12 ἔστιν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the *Politics*, except Bk. VIII(V), has no other object. SUSEM. (541)

12 τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλο-
σοφοῦντι] Comp. c. 13 § 14 *n.* (601), VI(IV).
15 § 4 *n.* (1350); also *Introd.* p. 70 f.
SUSEM. (542)

Further see VI(IV). 10. 1, V(VIII). 3.
12. Here *μέθοδος* = branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in II. I § 2 (a nearer parallel is *Nic. Eth.* I. I § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in *Nic. Ethics* this is the supreme end of theory: οὐ γάρ τις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις, οὐ γάρ ἵνα εἰδώμεν τι ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτό-
μεθα, ἀλλ' οὐ ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα.

μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν] "not to overlook or omit anything." Cf. *De Part. Animal.* I. 5 § 4, 645 a 5, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μῆτε ἀτιμώτερον μῆτε τιμώτερον.

§ 2 16 δεσποστικὴ κτλ.] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.

ριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V)
 19 τούναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι.
 § 3 πρώτη δ' ἄπορία πρὸς τὸν εἰορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἰεν οἱ
 πλείους ὅντες εὐπόροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δέ ἐστιν
 ὅταν ὁ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὅμοιως δὲ πάλιν κάνει πον συμ-
 βαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείτ-
 τους δὲ ὅντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δὲ ὀλίγον κύ-
 25 ριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν οὐκ ἀν καλῶς δόξειεν
 § 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάνει <εἰ> τις συν-
 θεὶς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δὲ ἄπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος (φ. 7.)
 οὕτω προσαγορεύοι τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ᾧ τὰς
 ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐπόροι ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὅντες, δημο-
 30 κρατίαν δὲ ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὅντες· ἀλλην
 § 5 ἄπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γάρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἄρτι λεχθείσας πολι-
 τείας, τὴν ἐν ᾧ πλείους εὐπόροι καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐλάττους οἱ
 ἄποροι, κύριοι δὲ ἑκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἰπερ μηδεμίᾳ
 § 6 ἀλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστιν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ τ
 35 λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους η πολλοὺς εἶναι
 κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς
 δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς
 δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς

19 [πλῆθος] Spengel, perhaps rightly || 20 <τοῦτον> τὸν? Susem. || 21 πο-
 λιτεία Schneider, perhaps rightly || 22 ὃ] εἰη M^a P¹ || συμβαλνη Γ M^a P²⁻³ Q^b
 T^b fr. Ar. Bk.¹, συμβαλνει Schneider, συμβαλη Sylburg || 23 δόξειε Π¹ || 26 κάνει
 <εἰ> Susem., κάνει P¹ Π² fr. Bk., ἔστιν (?) Γ M^a (?) Ar., si quis William || 28 προσ-
 αγορεύει Q^b T^b fr. Ald., προσαγορεύη Morel Bk. || 31 <οἱ> εὐπόροι Sylburg Bk. || 34
 παρὰ] τερή P³ Q^b T^b || 38 <διὰ> τὰς ἡγεμονίας Susem., if 39 διαφοράς is right

18 οὐσίας] property (in plural).

§ 3 20 πρώτη δ' ἄπορα] "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἄποραι affects τὸ δικαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of VI(IV). 4 § 6 οἱ ἀλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες, οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 ἔοικε τοίνυν κτλ.] "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an

accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end; essential qualities [cp. c. 9 § 1 n. on ὅπος] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐστιν ἴσως ἐν τῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὀποιμένων. So in I. 1. 2, IV(VII). 4. 4ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.

38 διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς ἡγεμονίας αἵτις γίνεσθαι διαφοράς] A διαφορά or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (ψ διαφέρουσι) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether

§ 7 ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς), φόδε διαφέρουσιν ή τε (V) 40 δημοκρατία καὶ η ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλούτος 1280 a ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἀν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταῦτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου § 8 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβάνει, καθάπερ εἴπο- μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς. εὐποροῦσι 5 μὲν γάρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' ἣς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.
 9 ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὄρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 8 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ

39 διαφορᾶς Γ, accepted by Koraes Bk. Bernays etc. Then *αἰτίας* is predicate and *πολιτείας* must be understood with *ῥηθείσας* or else inserted; thus *ῥηθείσας <πολιτείας>* Bernays: *ῥηθείσας <ἄπορα>* Koraes wrongly, see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 391 f.

1280 a 6 πολιτείας ** Conring, perhaps rightly; a transitional clause is needed

αἰτίας goes with *τὰς ῥηθείσας*, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect <*διὰ*> *τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας*, as § 8, δι' ἣς *αἰτίας*, "And for this reason too it follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Bernays (without inserting διὰ, but making *αἰτίας διαφορᾶς* the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, *τὰς ῥηθείσας* sc. *πολιτείας*, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See *Introd.* pp. 60 f., 63; c. 7 § 1 n., c. 15 §§ 10—13, vi(iv). 9 § 10, 11 §§ 9—11, §§ 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, viii(v). 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley *Hellenica* p. 225 ff.

§ 7 1280 a 1 δι' τ' ἴδετος ἀν τε πλείους] Here is a plain statement that any government whatever by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage vi(iv). cc. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and vi(iv).

4 §§ 5, 6. SUSEM. (543)

§ 8 5 δι' ἣς αἰτίας] 'on which

grounds both parties claim to be citizens,' viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.

Oncken I. pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly δρους = definitions, like δρουμός. Better, standards or determining principles; that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy; id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur (*Ind. Ar.*), οἷς δοκεῖ ὄρθου [ἢ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ δημοκρατίᾳ] viii(v). 9 § 14. The word was so used by Plato *Rep.* viii 551 c (comp. 562 B ἡ προύθετο ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο = ἵερπλοτος, ... δημοκρατία δρζεται ἀγαθόν = ἐλευθερία). We have had it before II. 6 § 9, 9 § 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Grant's argument *Ethics* I. p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, is disproved by its occurrence in the *Republic*.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The predominant element (7 § 2) or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

8 τὸ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν κτλ.] The state is a realisation of distributive

δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γάρ ἄπτονται δίκαιου τινός, ἀλλὰ (V)
 10 μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως
 δίκαιου. οἶον δοκεῖ ἵσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
 § 2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἵσοις· καὶ <γάρ> τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον
 εἶναι, καὶ [γάρ] ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄνισοις·
 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ'
 15 αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις σχεδὸν δὲ οἱ πλειστοὶ κρίται
 § 3 φαῦλοι περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισύν, καὶ
 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς,
 καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ
 πράγματος ἴσοτητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, (p. 77)

11 τὸ ἵσον δίκαιου? Vettori || 12 καὶ <γάρ> Bas.² || 12 καὶ...13 ἄνισοι omitted
 by ΓΜ⁴ || 13 καὶ γάρ ἵστιν Π¹ Π² Bk., γάρ transposed to come before 12 τὸ ἄνισον
 Bojesen, [γάρ] Schneider || 15 κρίται after 16 φαῦλοι Π² fr. Bk.

justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, *καὶ ἀξίας*: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as *wealth* or *free birth* in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 πάντες] Here again *μηδέποτεροι* might be expected. Comp. II. II. § 5 n. (387) and *Rhet.* II. 9 § 3 *ἄπασιν ὄμοιων δὲν ὑπάρχειν*=all who are envious or righteously indignant, 'both classes' (Shilleto).

10 ἄπτονται δίκαιου τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The *ἀξία* which oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice *in some measure*. See § 3, § 15; VIII(v). I § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν κτλ.] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἶον δοκεῖ κτλ.] 'Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.' They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial

equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights; i.e. they give equals to unequals.

§ 2 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσται...κακῶς] But they omit the qualification *for whom* equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment.

15 σχεδὸν δὲ πλειστοὶ κτλ] Comp. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSEM. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κτλ] "Hence since right means 'right for given persons,' and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to."

18 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] N. E. B. v. c. 3 (Bekker's c. 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διῆργηται γάρ ὄμοιων οἷς τε καὶ ᾧ. Comp. n. (584), also VIII(v). 1. 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (545)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Grant *Ethics* I. p. 53, but see Jackson's commentary on B. v. p. 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κτλ] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

"This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth: the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. VIII(v). 1. 2 f. n. (1493)." SUSEM. (546)

οι μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ (V) αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέ-
 § 4 ρους δίκαιον τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἀν κατὰ τὴν ἀνισοῖς ἀσιν, οἷον χρήματιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἀν-
 24 σοι εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀν κατὰ τὴν ἰσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερία, ὅλως
 § 5 ἰσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη-
 10 μάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνήσαν καὶ συνῆλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι
 τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσθ' ὃ τῶν δι-
 γαρχικῶν λόγος δόξειν ἀν ἴσχυειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἵσον
 μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν ταλάντων τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μνᾶν τῷ
 30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγυνο-
 8 6 μένων). εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν μόνον ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ
 εὐ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἀν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ζώων ἦν πό-
 λις· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ
 τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προάρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν, ὅπως
 35 ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν

22 νομίζουσι <τὸ> δίκαιον Spiegel, perhaps rightly || 24 ἐλευθερίᾳ Vettori,
 ἐλευθερία (or -η) Γ Ar., ἐλευθερίη M^a, ἐλευθεροις II^a fr. (the first iota above the line),
 ἐλεύθεροι P¹ || 27 διλγαρχιῶν P⁴ Q^b T^b || 29 ταλάντων Γ μνῶν II (including fr.)
 Ατ. Bk. (in P³ μν over an erasure) || εἰσενεγκάντα II^a fr. Bk. || 30 δὲ ὅντι M^a P³ T^b
 || 31 μόνον ἔνεκεν II^a fr., omitted by P¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹ in the margin) ||
 34 ἔνεκα M^a P¹

21 μέχρι τινὸς] See on § 1 above.
 'Because each side contends for a partial justice, but thinks it is contending for an absolute justice.'

§ 4 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Comp. c. 12
 § 2, and VIII(V). I § 2 f. nn. (584 b,
 1493). SUSEM. (546 b)

23 κυριώτατον] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 5 26 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι κτλ]
 'they have a stake in the city proportionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλάντων] A talent = 4715 German marks = £231 2s. 6d., a mina = 78½ German marks = £3 17s. approximately: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172 f. SUSEM. (547)

30 οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς...ἐπιγυνομένων]
 "ought not to have an equal share of the principal nor of the profits accruing." Congreve however suggests that the participles may be masculine, and so Bernays, with a different sense: 'either of those who originally contributed or of a subsequent generation of shareholders.' This can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 33 νῦν δὲ οὐκ κτλ] Comp. 1.

2. 8 and the further passages cited in n. (21). Also Nic. Eth. X. 6. 8, 1177 a 8 εὐδαιμονίας δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδες μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βλοῦ, and x. 7. 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, ἀντῆ σχολῆ. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated Pol. IV(VII). 15. 3 (Eaton). Cp. too nn. (925, 926) at that passage. SUSEM. (548)

35 οὐδὲ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν κτλ] "for commerce and mutual intercourse." Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse: viz. περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακοῦ διαστοιούσιν, § 8. Thereupon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential though indispensable conditions (κοινωνία τόπου, περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, §§ 9—12); and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, § 13, from which

χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους — καὶ γάρ ἀν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ- (V)
χηδόνιοι, καὶ πάντες οἱς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὡς
§ 7 μιᾶς ἀν πολίται πόλεως ἥσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ’ οὐτ’ ἀρχαὶ πάσιν ἐπὶ^{1280 b} τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστάσιν, ἀλλ’ ἔτεραι παρ’ ἑκατέροις, οὕτε
τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἔτερους,
οὐδὲ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδικος ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθῆκας μηδὲ
μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδική-
5 σουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας [πολιτικῆς] δια-
§ 8 σκοπούσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ὃς καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι

36 ἀλλήλους—] Thurot and Bonitz, to mark the anacoluthon. As far as the sense goes, the apodosis is at 1281 a 4 ff. δότερ κτλ. || τυρρηνοὶ P⁴ fr., τύραννοι P²⁻³ T^b and Q^b (1st hand) || § 38 συνθῆκαι] σωθῆναι P²⁻⁶ T^b and Q^b (1st hand), apparently P⁴ (1st hand), as συνθῆκαι is written over an erasure || 39 καὶ omitted by P⁶ T^b Ald. and the 1st hand in P⁴ Q^b (added by a later hand in Q^b) || 40 ἐπὶ τάσι Schneider transposing

1280 b 1 ἔτεροι] ἔτεροι Ar., Koraes, perhaps rightly || 2 τοῦ omitted by Π¹ fr., hence [τοῦ] Susem.¹⁻² || ἔτεροι M⁴ P¹ and perhaps Γ || 4 ἔξειν P²⁻³ T^b Ald. and Q^b (1st hand) || ἀδικήσουσιν Morel, ἀδικήσων Γ Π (including fr.) Ar. || 5 [δὲ] Koraes, as if the apodosis began here || πολιτικῆς omitted by Π¹ (added after ἀρετῆ by p¹ in the margin) || διακοπούσιν P¹ (1st hand, emended by p¹), διακο-
νοῦσιν Γ M⁴ fr. || 6 εὐνομίας <πόλεως μιλα> Bernays

the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the digressions dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ἕην μόνον ἔνεκεν (κοινωνοῦ) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εὐ ἕην, μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ ζωῆς ἔνεκα τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους καὶ τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν θεέον τὴν πολιτείην κοινωνίαν, δοσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτους προσήκει πλείστον μετέχειν πόλεως. Bonitz *Studien* III. pp. 139—141 (105—107).

36 Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχ.] This maritime alliance between Carthage and the Etruscans, which was formed soon after the beginning of the sixth century, B. C., to drive out the Greeks and keep them away from the western half of the Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus I. 166, Mommsen I. p. 153 Eng. tr., SUSEM. (649)

37 οἱς ἔστι σύμβολα] Comp. c. 1 § 4, n. (435). SUSEM. (650)

ὡς] as it were, like ὥσπερ.

§ 7 38 συνθῆκαι...σύμβολα...γραφαὶ] Usually συνθῆκαι=a general term for

a treaty or convention, usually of a public nature between two states, but also all private covenants: σύμβολα=a special kind of contract, viz. international commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier u. Schömann *Attisch. Process* p. 494 n. 49. Here συνθῆκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων are commercial treaties in general: σύμβ. περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν=special articles which made provision against the infliction of damage, or established a system of compensation for mutual injury (Cope).

40 ἀρχαὶ πάσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοιναὶ] magistrates common to them all appointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ ποίους τινὰς κτλ.] nor does the one state care what the character of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθῆκας] those who come under the treaty.

4 ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως κτλ.] The modest aim to which the modern state is restricted.

§ 8 6 εὐνομίας] “good government,” the goal and end of all political science; Nic. Eth. III. 3. II, 1112 b 14 (Eaton): οὐτε πολιτικός (βουλεύεται) εἰ εὐνοιαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῷρις λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους. SUSEM. (551)

δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐνομαζο- (V)
 μένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμ-
 μαχία τῶν ἀλλων τέπω διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀπωθεν
 10 συμμαχιῶν, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυ-
 κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητής ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' (p. 73)
 § 9 οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίους τὸν πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ 12
 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι
 τὸν τόπον εἰς ἔν, ὥστε ἀπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ
 15 Κορινθίων τοῖς τελέσειν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδὲ εἰ πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ιδίων ταῖς

7 ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κτλ.] ἐπιμελεῖαν P¹, ἐπιμελέας M² || 9 απωθεῖται, ἀποθεν M² P^{1,3,4} Q^b T^b Ald.
 Bk.¹ and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || 10 συμμαχιῶν Conting, συμμαχῶν Γ II
 (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 13 συνάγοις Π³ Bk.

7 ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κτλ.] "the city which truly and not in mere pretence deserves the name must give its attention to virtue." See A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* pp. 193 f., 210 f.

8 γίνεται κτλ.] For else the society is transformed into an alliance differing from all other leagues, whose members dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too is transformed into a compact and 'a guarantee of mutual rights' in the words of Lycophron, not calculated to make the citizens virtuous and just.

9 Ἀνκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής] See Exc. II. to B. II. p. 333 and *Introd.* p. 35. To all appearance Lycophron belonged to the school of Gorgias (*n.* 448): perhaps, as v. Wilamowitz conjectures *Hermetes* XIV. p. 173, he was the same as the erotic poet Lycophronides (Bergk *Poet. lyr.* III.⁴ p. 633 f.). He is specially known to us elsewhere only as the composer of an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining that one thing cannot at the same time be many and that therefore every combination of a predicate with the subject by means of the copula is inadmissible: also that nobility is only an imaginary good. Comp. Vahlen *The Sophist Lykophron* in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1865, p. 143 ff., Zeller *Pre-Socratics* vol. II. pp. 425, 477 Eng. tr. A sophist was originally any man of intellectual importance, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart them to others: hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (*ἐπιδείξεις*), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing; in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifogging quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved; although the movement towards freethinking* and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. *n.* (31) on I. 3 § 4. SUSEM. (552)

See Cope in the *Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology* vol. II. pp. 140—143: also his note on *Rhet.* III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Laonian party. See Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 4 § 6 αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ ἀφανιζούμενην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ δρόντα ἀναπάσθαι καὶ Ἀργος ἀντὶ Κορινθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτοῖς δρουδζεσθαι: v. I § 34, § 36.

10 ἐπιγαμίας] Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers or to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

* [A negative 'enlightenment' or 'illumination, Aufklärung.]

§ 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἔστιν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν (V)
χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν,
ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ
20 τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς
ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δὲ ἄλλο τι τοιούτον, κολ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν
μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,
§ 11 οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδὲ οὕτω πω πόλις. διὰ 13
τίνα δή ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γάρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς
25 κοινωνίας. εἰ γάρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος
μέντοι χρώτο τῇ ἴδιᾳ οἰκίᾳ ἀσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς
ώς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον,
οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀν εἶναι δόξειε πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴ-
§ 12 περ ὁμοίως ὄμιλοῖς συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν
30 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς
αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγ-
καῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπαρχόντων

18 ἄπωθεν fr. Bk.², ἄπωθεν II Bk.¹ || 19 εἴησαν P¹ Ar., εἰ ἦσαν ΓΜ² Π² || 20 εἰ omitted by Π³ || 22 μύριοι Ald. Bk.¹ || 23 πω Ar. (apparently) and Bk., πω possibly Γ (quidem William), του Π (including fr.) Susem.¹ || 30 ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι Π² fr. Bk.

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bachidae of Corinth (II. 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. VIII. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. SUSEM. (553)

τῶν ἱδίων ταῖς π. κοινωνημάτων] 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὐδὲ εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 nn. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-

mann p. 123, p. 207 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (554) "Is not Aristotle taking an imaginary case: the elements of society (such as γεωργὸς) which are necessary πρὸς τὸ ζῆν μόνον i. living apart but exchanging products (μεταδόσεις) ii. living together and connected by a defensive league, § 11?" (Wyse).

20 οἷον δὲ κτλ] That is, supposing they belonged to these different crafts without which the state could not exist at all: see IV(VII), c. 8. SUSEM. (555)

21 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν μύριοι] i.e. not at all too many even for a 'city' according to Greek ideas, as distinguished from a race or tribe: cp. IV(VII), c. 4, also n. (11); and II. 6 §§ 4—6, 9 §§ 15—17, nn. 198—201, 306, 307, 309, 311. SUSEM. (556)

§ 11 24 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας] because they did not live near enough to each other.

25 ἕκαστος μέντοι κτλ] Each making his own house his 'castle.'

29 συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς] after their union and when they lived apart.

§ 12 φανερὸν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (434 b). SUSEM. (557)

32 οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὑπαρχόντων κτλ] "yet not even if all these conditions are present is it then actually (ἡδη) a city, but (a city is) the union of families and clans

τούτων ἀπάντων ἡδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ (V)
 34 ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γέρεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-
 § 13 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούν- 14
 των τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαι τὸ ἐγέ-
 νοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ δια-
 γωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ
 39 συζῆν προαιρέσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὐ ζῆν,
 § 14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὴ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν
 1281 a κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν,
 ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πρά- (p. 74)
 ἔσθιεν [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ
 § 15 τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύ- 15
 5 τὴν κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείστον ἡ τοῖς
 κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος. Ισοις ἡ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν
 πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἡ τοῖς κατὰ πλούτον ὑπερέχουσι
 κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ ὑπερεχομένοις.

10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν-

34 τελείας II^o Bk. || 35 καὶ] η fr. || 38 τῷ συζῆν Koraeς || 40 δὴ ἡ οὐ δὴ
 Susem., δὲ ἡ Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Bk.

1281 a 1 <χάριν> Scaliger, ἐκεκεν Koraeς, see next note || 3 χάριν omitted by
 II^o (added in P¹ by corr.¹), [χάριν] Scaliger. This justifies the insertion of χάριν in
 line 1, rather than ἐκεκεν || 5 τούτους omitted by Q^b T^b and P¹ (1st hand)

in noble living, to the end that they may attain a perfect and independent life. This however will not be secured unless they dwell in the same place and have the right of intermarriage."

§ 13 36 κηδεῖαι=ties of affinity.

37 φρατρίαι] See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17, VII(VI). 4 § 19 nn. (141, 169, 1427 b). Amongst the Greeks these "brotherhoods" were [or appeared to be] the next subdivision of the old tribal stocks (*φυλαῖ*) having a number of clans (*γένη*) included under them. SUSEM. (558)

θυσίαι] Clubs which met to sacrifice.

διαγωγαὶ] Cp. IV(VII). 15. 2. n. (921). SUSEM. (568 b) 'The recreations of a life in common which depend on φιλία' would include much, e.g. the commerce of disciple and friend as well as the pleasures of social reunions (Wyse).

38 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον κτλ.] Comp. Nic. Eth. VIII. 3 § 5 1150 b 4, οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτες ἔτιν φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν 5 § 3, 1157 b 19, 6 § 4, 1158 a 23, IX. 9 § 10 1170 b 10, 10 § 4 1171 a 2, 12 § 1 1179 b 20 (Eaton). SUSEM. (569)

40 ταῦτα] all these minor associations, κηδεῖαι, φρατρίαι, &c., are necessary means

to the end, and that is why they came into existence (36 διό). "This certainly looks as if to Aristotle the φρατρίαι were something posterior to the origin of a πόλις by συνοικίσις of κώμαι" (Wyse).

§ 14 πόλις δὴ κτλ.] "Therefore a city is the union of clans and villages (to attain) a perfect and independent life." Ridgeway defends the double genitive: "the fellowship of clans and villages in a perfect and independent life."

1281 a 1 τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους] Cp. I. 2 § 8 nn. (20 b, 21); further nn. (459, 460) on III. 3 § 3; also III. 1 § 12 n. (447); IV(VII). 4 § 11 n. (579), 5 § 1 n. (764), 8 § 8 n. (804) and n. (136). SUSEM. (560)

2 τῶν καλῶν...πράξεων] With regard to this conclusion, see n. (708) on IV(VII). 1 § 11. SUSEM. (560 b)

§ 15 The citizens have a stake in the city in proportion to their contributions towards civic fellowship, in the sense just given to the term. Superior contributions to other objects (wealth, birth) are of no avail to confer a greater share of civic rights.

c. 10 Where ought sovereignty to reside?

ιο τες μέρος τι τοῦ δίκαιου λέγουσι, φανερὸν ἐκ των εἰρημέ- (V)
 νων. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τι δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. VI
 ἡ γάρ τοι τὸ πλήθος, ἡ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἡ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἡ
 τὸν βέλτιστον ἔνα πάντων, ἡ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα
 ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἀν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ
 15 πλέοντας εἶναι διανέμονται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδι-
 κίαν τί δεῖ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων,
 οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἀν διανέμονται, φανερὸν ὅτι
 φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἡ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ
 20 ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν ὥστε δῆλον
 § 2 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἰόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ
 τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἐπράξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας
 δίκαιας· βιάζεται γάρ ὁν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλή-
 θος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ' ἀρά τοὺς ἐλάττους ἀρχεῖν δίκαιον
 25 καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἀν οὖν κάκεινοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρ-
 πάζωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλήθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
 § 4 δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἀρά. ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ὅτι φαῦλα πάντα
 καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δεῖ

13 [ἡ τύραννον] or change to ἡ τὸν νόμον Spengel (not bad) || 16 ὁ omitted by P¹ Π² fr. Ar. Bk. || 17 δεῖ] χρῆ Π² fr. Bk. || πάλιν.....ληφθέντων corrupt according to Oncken: see Comm. n. (561) || 19 φθερεῖ Γ || 24 ἀρά Π² and M^a (1st hand) || δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν Π² fr. Bk. || 25 ταῦτα Vettori and Lambin in their translations, ταῦτα Γ Π Ar. || 27 πάντα φαῦλα Π² fr. Bk. || 28 δίκαια σπουδαῖα Π¹

In particular, (c. 11) *Should it rest with the Many or the Few?*

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin *Jurisprudence Lect. VI.* pp. 226—235, ed. 3.

§ 1 12 ἡ γάρ τοι κτλ] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminent good man, or (5) a despot.

16 ἔδοξε γάρ κτλ] Ironical. "It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?"

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. SUSEM. (561) The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὐχ ἡ γ' ἀρετῇ] Cp. II. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which

qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: *Nit. Eth.* II. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve); whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, ἐστι γάρ ἡ κακία φθαρτική ἀρχῆς *N. E.* VI. 5. 6, 1110 b 19 (Eaton). SUSEM. (561 b) Cp. Pl. *Keph.* X. 608 E: if moral evil, which is the evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον...φθαρτικόν] Comp. I. 2. 16 n. (28 c), II. 2. 4 n. (133), III. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590). SUSEM. (562)

§ 3 24 ἀλλ' ἀρά κτλ] Passing to (2), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ θάτερον ἀρά] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (ἐπιεικεῖς) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διά τὸ τοὺς ἀριστούς ἀρχεῖν.

καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους (VI) 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ' § 5 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ' ἔνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλι- (p. 75) γαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀτιμοὶ πλείους. ἀλλ' ἵστω φαίη τις ἀν 35 τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἀνθρωπον εἶναι ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῦλον. ἀν οὖν ἡ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίστε περὶ τῶν ἡπορημένων; συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.

11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἔτερος λόγος· ὅτι 40 δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειν ἀν λίεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, 8 2 τάχα δὲ κανὸν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὡν ἔκαστος ἔστιν 1281 b οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους ἑκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἔκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἔκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο- 35 ἔχοντα.....36 ψυχὴν after 36 φαῦλον P¹ II² fr. Bk. || 37 διοίση P⁴ Q^b T^b || 41 λίεσθαι.....41 ἀλήθειαν. That the text is unsound was seen by Camerarius, λίεσθαι <δέει>? Schneider, [λίεσθαι] Göttingen, [λίεσθαι καὶ] Susem.¹ (λίεσθαι a variant on ἀλήθειαν), τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶ λίεσθαι καὶ ἀλήθειαν Thurot, <οὐχ ἱκανῶς> λίεσθαι Shute || τιν'] τινος Γ M^a || ἔχει M^c (1st hand) || εὐπο-ρίαν Koraes, accepted by Bernays and by Susem.² as less violent than the other proposals, cp. *De cælo* II. 12 § 1, 291 b 27, εἰ τις διὰ τὸ φιλοσοφίας διψῆ καὶ μικρὰς εὐπορίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὃν τὰς μεγίστας ἔχουμεν ἀπορίαν.

1281 b 1 οὐ III¹ P⁴ Ar., ὁ P^{2,3} Q^b T^b

31 ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ.] This is the reason why the same feature in Plato's government is called dangerous (*ἐπισφαλές*), though unavoidable, II. 5 § 25 n. (181).

§ 5 Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best state') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 δὲ λίεστος κτλ.] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 n. (641). SUSEM. (562 b)

35 φαῦλον] sc. εἶναι predicate, 'that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme *instead of the law*, is a mistake.'

Ἀν οὖν κτλ.] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 1 39 λίεστος τις ἔτερος λόγος] cc. 12—17 and B. vi(iv.), B. VII(vi); :

comp. *Introduct.* p. 43. SUSEM. (563)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κτλ.] This is a defence of the claims of (1) as against (3). In c. 15 the claims of πλῆθος and βασιλεὺς are compared.

§ 2 41 τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς κτλ.] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (646); also c. 11 § 9 below, Thuc. VI. 18. 6 δύον δὲ (τριπλασιεῖ) τὸ τε φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνω ἀριθμὸς ἀν ἐνγκραθὲν μάλιστ' ἀν λίεσθαι, with Herod. III. 80 s. fin. ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἔνι τὰ πάντα (Eaton). SUSEM. (564)

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 2 οὐχ ὡς ἔκαστον δὲλλ' ὡς σύμπαντας] See II. 3 § 2 and *notes*.

3 συμφορητά δεῖπνα] 'public dinners' to which many contribute.

4 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κτλ.] Cp. c. 4

5 νήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἔνα ἀνθρωπον (VI)
 τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ⁹
 § 3 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ηθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ
 καὶ κρίνουσιν ἀμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα
 9 καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἄλλοι γάρ ἀλλοὶ τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ

5 καὶ <ὡ> οἱ καὶ <ὥσπερ>? Susem., following Thurot hesitatingly || συνελ-
 θόντας P⁴ Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. Bk. and corr.¹ of P^{2.3} || [ὥσπερ] ἔνα Thurot || 7 τὴν
 περὶ τὴν M^a Susem.^{1.2} and perhaps Γ || 8 κρίης Γ M^a (et kries melius William)

§ 7 n. (474): also IV(vii), 1 §§ 10, 11 n.
 (703). SUSEM. (565)

Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an *artificial* body.

5 καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων... 7 διδ-
 γούσι] Trendelenburg in his "Law of
 Nature" (Naturrecht p. 463) rightly objects
 that 'in works of art man is essentially
 a free, unprejudiced spectator: in politics
 he is a partisan fellow-actor. There is a
 fallacy in an argument from analogy which
 draws an inference from the
 universal common to all the cases com-
 pared, when in fact it is the *difference*
 between them which is decisive.' But he
 proceeds to argue, that the comparison
 leaves out of account the desires and pas-
 sions which in the case of the multitude
 dull the intelligence and pervert the will;
 that the truth brought together by their
 collective wisdom is materially preju-
 diced and hampered by the falsehood
 collected along with it; that the supple-
 menting of the truth from various sides
 is hindered or frustrated by the resist-
 ance of errors and self-seeking. In reply
 to this we must inquire, whether when
 the public at large judges and enjoys
 works of art, only healthy popular incli-
 nations and instincts are brought to-
 gether: whether they are not blended
 with others which are unhealthy and mis-
 leading. Aristotle at least is of this latter
 opinion v(viii). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n.
 (1097), and certainly he is right. Fur-
 ther is there no fallacy in the criticism
 which overlooks the true analogy in the
 difference?

On the other side it is not to be forgotten,
 that where our own interest is concerned,
 although passion no doubt is inflamed
 and the critic is converted into a judge in
 his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9),
 yet at the same time the intellect is
 sharpened: thus in accordance with the
 analogies applied in § 14, (whose cor-
 rectness even Trendelenburg has not
 questioned,) in practical questions, where
 his own weal and woe are at stake, the

uneducated man approximates to an
 expert still more closely than in art
 criticism. If it were not so, art critics
 might be appointed by the popular vote,
 but not even the most indirect choice of
 its representatives should be left to the
 people, although our procedure is now
 universally the reverse and we believe
 it to be justified. Trendelenburg's ob-
 jections (p. 147) to too numerous exec-
 utive or decreeing assemblies are quite in
 point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9
 Aristotle, if we take him literally, only
 allows the popular assembly to elect the
 officials: and that in any case (see Exc.
 IV. to B. II. n. 388) he restricts the
 decision of the people to a few definite
 questions. Had he been acquainted with
 the representative system, he would have
 judged more correctly: he would then
 most likely have referred to the council
 all matters which call for a full delibera-
 tion and responsible decision rather than
 a vote. That not merely capacity but
 prejudice also and ignorance are col-
 lected in the popular assembly is more-
 over expressly laid down by Aristotle in
 §§ 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has al-
 together overlooked this); but he holds
 that the danger arising from the passions
 of individual sovereigns is the greater of the
 two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable
 nation he maintains that the force of
 truth will finally triumph over falsehood.
 This is the thought upon which, as we
 know, his conception of rhetoric is based:
 see Zeller II. ii. 755. It may be that this
 is not capable of strict demonstration, but
 to a large extent remains merely a matter
 of belief. Yet this much is certain, that
 whoever does not cherish this belief has
 lost faith in humanity generally. See
 also n. (577) on II § 19. SUSEM.
 (565 b)

§ 3 8 κρίνουσιν ἀμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ]
 Both music and poetry are well able to
 illustrate this maxim. The present cen-
 tury is rich in good work which has won
 its way in spite of the critics.

§ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ὅ
ἔκαστοι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς
φασι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνή-
χθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε
14 κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὄφθαλμὸν ἐτέ-
ρον δέ τινος ἑτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον
καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφο-
ρὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον,
ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίσιν ἀδύνατον (οὐ γάρ αὐτὸς
κανέπι τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσει λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
20 ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν;)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος
§ 5 οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀλληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότε-
ρον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἀν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν
ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους (p. 76)
24 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιῦτοι δὲ εἰσὶν ὅσοι μῆτε
§ 6 πλούσιοι μῆτε ἀξιώματα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν. τὸ μὲν γάρ
μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά
τε γάρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀν<ἀγκη> τὰ δ'

11 ἔκαστοι Thurot, ἔκαστοι Γ II Ar. Bk. || ὥσπερ] φέρε Vettori in the margin of his Munich copy || [καὶ τῶν μὴ.....12 φασι] Oncken || 13 κεχωρισμένων Γ Susem.^{1,2}, καὶ χωρισμένων Μ^a || γε<οὐδὲν κωλύει>? Spengel || 14 ἔχει P^a and perhaps Ar. <ἐστιν ἔχειν>? Susem., but no change is needed || 18 περὶ] ἐπὶ Sylburg, perhaps rightly || ἐποιον Spengel, which would also do, ἐποιος Schneider (bad) || 24 μῆτε πλούσιοι omitted by Γ M^a || 25 μηδὲ ἐν? Susem., μηδὲ ἐν P¹, μὴ δὲ ἐν Μ^a, μηδέν P²⁻³, μηδὲ ἐν P¹, μηδέν Ald. || 27 ἀνάγκη Rassow, ἀν Γ II Bk. Schneider first saw the text to be unsound and violently changed ἀδικεῖν into ἀδικοῦειν and ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς into ἀμαρτάνοειν

§ 4 12 τὰ γεγραμμένα κτλ] Comp. what Socrates says, Xen. Memor. III. 10.
2 καὶ μῆτε τὰ γε καλὰ εἰδῆ ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπειδὴ οὐ βάσιον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἀμειψτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐν πολλῶν συνά-
γοντες, τὰ ἐξ ἔκαστον κάλλιστα, οὕτω διὰ τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖτε φάνεσθαι. Zeuxis adopted this procedure, when he painted his Helen. To make it a masterpiece of female beauty, he took as models the five most beautiful maidens in the city in order that he might unite in the picture the special excellences of each: see Brunn's History of the Greek artists II. pp. 80, 88 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in Susemihl's edition of the Poetics, c. 6 § 11. SUSEM. (566)

13 κεχωρισμένων γε] With the brief gen. abs. comp. Ν. E. VIII. 13 § 2 ἀμαλλω-
μένων, 15 § 4 ὑπερβάλλοντος.

§ 5 16 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν π. πρὸς

τοὺς δὲ] the difference between the many and the few. So δάστασις, Nic. Eth. IX. 3. 4.

18 ὁ γάρ αὐτὸς...ἀρμόσει λόγος] For the same argument would apply to the animals.

19 τὸ διαφέρουσιν] Comp. I. 5 § 8 n. (43), and n. (54) on I. 6 § 8. SUSEM. (567)

20 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος] in a certain (given) population.

§ 6 21 τὴν πρότερον εἰρημ. δπ.] Namely: who is to possess the sovereign power? Comp. also § 19 n. (578). SUSEM. (568)

23 τίνων δεῖ κυρίους κτλ] This next problem (§§ 6—14) is: how far does the sovereignty of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, extend? This was provisionally decided c. I § 8.

§ 7 27 δικεῖν ἀνάγκη] There should be an independent causal sentence here,

ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς). τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν (VI) φοβερόν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, § 8 πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττονται σὺν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔωσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ § 9 ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἵκανὴν αἰσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίστῃ τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ η̄ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης γη̄ς χωρὶς δὲ ἔκαστος περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἀτελῆς ἔστιν. ἔχει

28 μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν Böcker, μηδὲ μετέχειν Γ ΙΙ Bk. || 38 ἀτελῆς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ΙΙ² Bk.

something standing to τὸ μὲν μετέχειν ... οὐκ ἀσφαλές as the clause δταν γὰρ ...ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ... ταύτην below stands to τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι...φοβερόν. With Rassow's conjecture, ἀνάγκη (ἐστι), there is such a verb; without it there is no verb on which the infinitives ἀδικεῖν ἄν and ἀμαρτάνειν can depend.

29 ὅταν γὰρ κτλ] Cp. VII(VI). 5 § 4 n. (1434). SUSEM. (568 b)

This is presumably the sequel of the objections raised in c. 10 §§ 4, 5. The further development would be in the form of Plato's well-known simile of the drones in his criticism of oligarchy *Rep.* VIII. 551 D, 552 A—E, 555 D.

§ 8 It remains for them to take part in deliberation and in trials.

32 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων ... 34 λόσιν] Comp. II. 12 § 3 (Exc. v. p. 350 f.), § 5 n. (412, 413); VI(IV) II § 19 n. (1303), VII (VI). 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitutional restriction is not admissible, certainly, for the citizens of the ideal state who have the best nature and education and are in the possession of a fixed amount of land. There suitable elections of officials must be assumed without such a restriction; there all the citizens have equal rights (cp. nn. 440, 885). But nevertheless, as was inferred in the *Introd.* p. 54 from II. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there can be hardly any doubt that even in the ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict the activity of the whole body of full citizens to the election of the officials, together with the final decision upon legislation as well as upon questions of war and peace and treaties with foreign states. Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSEM. (569)

33 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to them' the election of the magistrates and the scrutiny of their conduct (when they retire from office).

ἔπι after τάττονται. Other constructions are εἰς, κατὰ and ἐπὶ with dat.

§ 9 35 [ἴκανὴν αἰσθησιν] 'sufficiently clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.' The terms *αἰσθησις* and *αἰσθάνεσθαι* in Aristotle often go beyond the notion of mere sensation and sense perception to which Plato in the *Theaetetus* restricts them. Thus *αἰσθάνεσθαι*=to understand another's command in I 5 § 9 (cp. n. 45 b). Like Plato himself at an earlier time, *Phaedr.* 271 E, even where the terms express that notion, Aristotle always has in view the discrimination of the sensible individual by sense, the *judgment* of perception, so that he calls it a discriminating and judging faculty (*δίναυσις κριτική*, cp. n. 497); *Anal. Post.* II. 15 § 5, 99 b 35, *De Anima* III. 9. 1, 431 a 15. Thence by a very natural transition he applies these terms to denote the discrimination of the individual and particular generally, and the decision as to what is right and wrong in relation thereto in practical life:—an instinctive process, so to speak, or at all events one which rests merely upon observation and experience, *Nic. Eth.* II. 9. 8, 1109 b 20, IV. 5, 13, 1126 b 3 ff. SUSEM. (570)

36 καθάπερ η̄ μὴ κ.] "as inimutritious food when mixed with the nutritious makes the whole a better diet than the scanty supply" (of nourishment alone), § 2 n. (564). SUSEM. (571)

38 χωρὶς] alone, by himself.

ἀτελῆς] Properly 'immature' or 'un-developed' or 'incomplete': thence 'un-

δ' ή τάξις αὐτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν δτι (VI)
 40 δόξειεν ἀν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὄρθως ἱάτρευκεν,
 οὐπερ καὶ τὸ ἱάτρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιὰ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς
 νόσου τῆς παρούσης οὐτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἱάτρος. ὁμοίως δὲ
 1282 a τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἱάτρον δὲ διδόναι τὰς εἰθύνας ἐν ἱάτροις, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 § 11 λοις ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἱάτρος δὲ ὁ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχι-
 τεκτονικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην εἰσὶ
 § 12 γάρ τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι περὶ πάσας ὡς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀπο-
 δίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἡττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς
 εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀν δό-
 42 ξειν ἔχειν τρόπον. καὶ γάρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὄρθως τῶν εἰδό-
 των ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ
 10 κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων
 καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὐ τι τῶν
 § 13 εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ

42 ὁ omitted by II² Bk. || καὶ added after ὁμοίως δὲ by Γ Μ²

1282 a 5 τοιοῦτοι καὶ II² Bk., καὶ untranslated by William, Ar. || 7 καὶ omitted by II¹, hence [καὶ] Susem.¹⁻² || 9 τε omitted by P¹⁻⁴ || το [περὶ] or [περὶ ἐνίων] Spengel (the former perhaps right) || 11 καὶ before τῶν ἴδιωτῶν omitted by P⁴ Q^b T^b || οὐ τοι Koraes Bk.²

qualified to judge.' The word was used in I. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue' (Congreve). Cf. also n. (875) on IV(VII).

13. 5. SUSEM. (572)

§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician can properly judge a course of treatment and pronounce with authority that it has been successful.

39 ἀπορίαν πρώτην] 'Certainly this mode of ordering the constitution involves a difficulty—in the first place that &c.' followed § 15 by ἀλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἔχομένη ταῦτα: cf. *Analysis* p. 111. SUSEM. (573)

1282 a 1 ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ] Compare Plato's illustration of the physician tried by boys at the accusation of the cook, *Gorg.* 521 E.

§ 11 3 ἱάτρος δὲ κτλ] 'Physician' may mean (1) the practitioner in ordinary cases, (2) the scientific student who has mastered the whole field of medicine, (3) the educated layman who has acquired his knowledge of medicine only out of scientific interests generally.

5 τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι κτλ] "For there are even some such" viz. amateurs "in nearly all the arts, and we assign the

right to judge to the educated layman as much as to the profession." With the order of II², τοιοῦτοι καὶ, Bernays and others must translate "in almost all other arts as well," which is a misplaced emphasis. Camerarius compares the first words of the treatise *De partibus animalium*, περὶ τῶν θεωριῶν τε καὶ μέθοδον...διό φανούσται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὃν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον ταῖσθαν τυῖα. πεπαιδευμένους γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν δέ λέγων. SUSEM. (573 b)

§ 12 7 ἔπειτα=further, not answering πρώτην; but rather completing so much of the problem as is expressed in §§ 10, 11 viz. περὶ τὴν κρίσιν.

περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν] in the election of magistrates, § 13 ἀρχαιρεσίῶν.

8 τῶν εἰδότων] experts in statecraft, answering to the geometers and pilots, Plato *Politicus* 301 A, B, ὁ ἐπιστήμων.

11 If περὶ is retained, μετέχουσι=μετέχουσι τῆς αἵρεσεως virtually; 'have a voice in the election.'

§ 13 12 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Cf. II. 3 § 1 n.

ἀν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον κύριον οὐτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὐτε (φ. 77)
 § 14 τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλά ἵσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 10
 15 διά τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἀν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδρα-
 ποδῶδες (ἔσται γάρ ἔκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτής τῶν εἰδότων,
 ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἡ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι
 περὶ ἐνίων οὗτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὐτ' ἄριστ' ἀν κρίνειεν,
 ὅσων τάργα γνώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον
 τοιούτων οὐ μόνον ἔστι γνῶναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ-
 τιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῷ κρινεῖ (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ
 πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαιτυμῶν ἀλλ'
 § 15 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέν
 τις ἀν οὗτῳ λύειν ἰκανῶς ἀλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἔχομένη ταύτης.
 25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀποπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύ-
 λους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν, αἱ δὲ εὐθυναι καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέ-
 σεις εἰσὶ μέγιστα ἡς ἐν ἐνταῖς πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἰρηται,
 τοὺς δήμους ἀποδιδόστιν ἡ γὰρ ἔκκλησία κυρία πάντων
 § 16 τῶν τοιούτων ἔστιν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἔκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ
 30 βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς
 τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμείουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγοῦσι καὶ τὰς
 μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχουσιν ἀπὸ μειζόνων. ὅμοιως δή τις ἀν 12

17 ἡ before βελτίους omitted by Π¹, [ἡ] Susem.^{1,2} || 18 μέντος Susem.^{1,2} (solus William, Ar.) || 21 αὐτῷ³ αὐτῷ³ P^{2,3} Ald. || κρίνει Π¹ Ar. || 26 εὐθύναι M⁴ Ald. || 27 μέγιστα Γ, μέγισται Π^{1,4}, μέγιστοι M⁴, μέγιστον P^{2,3} Q⁴ T⁴ Ar. Ald. Bk. || ἐρ omitted by M⁴ Π¹ || 30 διδάσκουσι P⁴ (1st hand), γρ. δικάζουσι in the margin of P⁴ || 32 ἀρχωσιν M⁴, ἔχουσι Π² || μεγάλων Π² Ar. Bk. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ Γ Π Bk.

13 κύριον οὗτε...οὔτε] The two *minima* without which it is reduced to virtual dependence on its rulers (*δουλος* ἀν εἴη καὶ πολέμος II. 12. 5).

§ 14 The reply to the objection of § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free people may be even superior to that of the experts: (b) the users of the laws may be better practical judges of them than their makers: the expert's knowledge is not always an advantage.

15 Σιδ τὸν πάλαι λόγον] for the reason stated above, §§ 2—4. πάλαι as in § 20; so II. 4 § 10.

μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες] answering to περὶ ἐνταῖς ἀδύνατον of § 5.

17 καὶ ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων κτλ] The user may be in a higher position than the maker: c. 4 § 18 ὁ αὐλητής ὁ χρώμενος) (ὁ αὐλοπούσ. n. (499). SUSEM. (574)

19 δσων τάργα κτλ] viz. all those subjects in which the products (?) are

understood, even by such as are unacquainted with the art.

§ 15 Second objection (see § 10). The least capable citizens have the most authority: sovereignty resides with them.

27 ὥσπερ εἰρηται] § 8. 'Solon and some other legislators.' SUSEM. (575)

§ 16 31 ταμείουσι...32 μειζόνων] "But for the treasurership and the ministry of war and the highest offices men of higher property qualification are required." Even at Athens the "Treasurers of the Goddess" as they were called, and the treasurers of the other temples, though appointed by lot, were always taken from the highest class only: Schömann p. 418 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (576)

The reply. Strictly speaking no single ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he is only a fraction or element of the composite magistrate or public official, the assembly and the law court.

λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. οἵσως γάρ ἔχει καὶ ταῦτ' (VI)
 § 17 ὁρθῶς. οὐ γάρ ὁ δικαστῆς οὐδὲ ὁ βουλευτής οὐδὲ ὁ ἐκκλη-
 35 σιαστῆς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ
 δῆμος τῶν δὲ ὥρθέντων ἔκαστος μόριόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω
 40 δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικα-
 § 18 στήν). ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολ-
 λῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
 45 δὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάντων ἡ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ'
 § 19 ὀλίγους μεγάλας ἄρχας ἄρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω¹³
 1282b τούτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανε-
 ρὸν οὐδὲν οὔτως ἔτερον ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-
 ρίους κειμένους ὁρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἀν τε εἰς ἄν τε
 πλείους ὡσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἔξαδυνα-^(p. 78)
 5 τούσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθό-
 § 20 λου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὅποιονς μέντοι τινὰς δεῖ εἶναι
 τοὺς ὁρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει
 τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γάρ καν δμοίως ταῖς πολιτείαις

40 τὸ before τούτων omitted by II¹, hence [τὸ] Susem.¹⁻² || πάντων τούτων II²
 Bk. || 41 ἔχοντων II²

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τούτον Μ^a P¹ || 6 διορίσαι] δηλῶσαι II² Bk. || εἴραι δεῖ P² Bk.
 || 8 ἀλλὰ γάρ.....10 ἀδίκους transposed to follow 11 νόμους by Congreve; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολι-
 τείας, § 10.

§ 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κτλ] More-
 over the amount of property at which all
 these are rated is far greater collectively than
 the property of individuals in high
 offices and of the members of small
 boards.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κτλ] Tren-
 delenburg thinks that we do not quite
 clearly see whether Aristotle is only
 setting up his analogies dialectically or de-
 fending them as his own opinion. There
 can be no doubt, however, especially after
 such an explicit explanation as is here
 given, that the latter is the case: nor
 can any reason be discovered, even on
 other grounds, for a doubt of this kind.
 SUSEM. (577)

1282 b 1 ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία] This is the question treated in c. 10, and
 then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz.
 who is to possess supreme authority?
 (Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was
 “the whole of the burgess body in every
 state which has any degree of excellence”:
 and on the basis of this decision, the
 point which came up at c. 10 § 5 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying
 clause “but in accordance with the laws,”
 and in such a way that the greater or less
 degree of excellence and correctness of
 the laws is determined by that of the
 constitution to which they correspond.
 This raises the question of the relative
 merit of the normal constitutions which
 we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13: see
 however *Introd.* p. 41 f. SUSEM. (578)
 3 κειμένους ὁρθῶς] if they are good
 laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κτλ] “and the ruler,
 be he one or many, must only be sove-
 reign in such cases as the laws are quite
 unable to lay down precisely, because
 of the inherent difficulty of framing
 general rules applicable to all cases.”
 Comp. c. 15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with
 nn. (637, 652, 653); *Nic. Eth.* v. 10. 4,
 11. 47 b 13. Here again Aristotle is
 following Plato, *Politicus* 294 A—303;
 see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. SUSEM. (579)

To these references *Lawus* IX 875 c
 may be added (Jackson *ad loc. Nic. Eth.*)
 also *Pol.* II. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 πάλαι] At c. 10 § 5: comp. n.
 (578). SUSEM. (580)

9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαίλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI)
 § 21 καίσις ἢ ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτο γε φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. <ἀλλὰ γάρ κανὸν ὄμοιός ταῖς
 9 <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαίλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι
 <καὶ δίκαιους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι
 12 τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὅρθας πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δίκαιους.
 τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκίας οὐ δίκαιους.

12 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VII
 15 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριω-
 τάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δὲ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἔστι δὲ
 πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι τὸ κοινῆ συμ-

13 δίκαιον by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who then emends <τι> γάρ ἀν δλο <ἢ> ὄμοιος.....ἀδίκους); while Thurot omits ἀλλὰ γάρ and transposes 8 καὶ δμοιος.....το ἀδίκους to follow 11 δῆλον ὅτι. A double re-
 cension, 8 δλλὰ γάρ.....το ἀδίκους= 10 τπλὴν τοῦτο.....το τοῦτο, wrongly assumed by
 Susem.¹⁻² || καὶ before δμοιος II² Bk. Schneider Rassow Thurot Bernays, <ει>
 καὶ Koraes, ἢ Susem.¹⁻² (si similiter William) || On cc. 12, 13 see *Introd.* 41 ff. ||
 15 δὲ II² Bk. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel || 16 έστι δὴ Scaliger || 17 <τὸ> Susem.

ἀλλὰ γάρ κανὸν ὄμοιος] ‘for relatively
 to the constitutions the laws, too, must
 necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust.’
 Comp. vi(iv). 1 § 9 n. (1128), Isocr. VII.

14. SUSEM. (581)

In cc. 12, 13 true constitutional principles take a more definite shape. In a note to his Translation, p. 172, Bernays remarks that these two chapters “contain a separate sketch for the discussion of the same questions which are partly treated in cc. 9—11, partly in cc. 16, 17. As the sketch presents some peculiarities, e.g. the mention of ostracism, c. 13 § 15 ff., those who arranged Aristotle's papers thought it ought to be preserved; and the place they assigned to it seemed recommended by the close connexion of its contents with the neighbouring chapters. Where the tautologies thus arising appeared too obvious, the attempt was made to lessen them by formulae like εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον 13 § 1, § 2. According to Aristotle's intention, the beginning of c. 14 should join on directly to the close of c. 11”; the reason assigned being that the words φανέν γάρ τῶν ὅρθων πολιτεῶν μάλα εἶναι ταῦτη, 14 § 1, find no connexion at the close of c. 13, but refer back to the words κατὰ τὰς ὅρθας πολιτεῖας of 11 § 22. This view has been already examined, *Introd.* pp. 42,
 43.

c. 12 § 1 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν πάσαις] Comp. I.

§ 1 n. (1), *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 4, 1094 a 26.
 SUSEM. (582)

The structure of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἐπεὶ to 22 λανθάνειν. But this requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ is the reading of II¹.

16 δύναμις] Joined with αἱ τέχναι, II.
 8 § 18; so *Rhet.* I. 2 § 1, ἔστω δὴ ἥπτο-
 ρικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἔκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ
 ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γάρ οὐδεμιᾶς
 ἔτέρας ἔστι τέχνης ἐργον.

ἔστι δὲ...17 δίκαιον] ‘The good for
 the state, i.e. the interest of the common-
 wealth, can only be justice.’ πολιτικὸν
 ἀγαθὸν is the subject and τοῦτο refers to
 this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next
 sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 2 and
 the references given in n. (562). SUSEM.
 (583)

It is convenient at this place to repro-
 duce, from *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, the fuller
 account of πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, the embodiment
 of ‘right’ or ‘justice’ in civil so-
 ciety: τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι κοινῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ
 εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τοιων ἢ
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμόν, the justice
 of free and (proportionately or actually)
 equal citizens living together with a view
 to the satisfaction of wants. When this
 is not the case there is only an analogical
 sort of justice, τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὄμοιό-
 τητα. ἔστι γάρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς

φέρον. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII)
 γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς
 20 διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν (τὶ γάρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ
 § 2 δεῖν τοῖς ἵσοις εἶναι φασίν). ποίων δ' ἵστης ἔστι καὶ
 ποίων ἀνιστής, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. ἔχει γάρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν
 καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν. ἵσως γάρ ἀν φαῖη τις κατὰ 25
 παντὸς ὑπεροχῆν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρ-
 25 χάσ, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέροιεν ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι
 τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες· τοῖς γάρ διαφέρουσιν ἔτερον εἶναι τὸ δί-
 30 καιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται
 καὶ κατὰ χρώμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν
 35 ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέ-
 40 χουσιν. ἡ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων τῶν γάρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν

19 [ἐν οἷς.....ἡθικῶν] Stahr || 21 δ'] omitted by P⁴ C^o, [δ'] or else τ¹ Spengel, δὴ Bonitz || 23 ίσως.....1283 b 32 δίκαιον noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καὶ] Schneider, [τῷ] Ramus || 30 δ'] γάρ Spengel

αὐτούς· ρόμος δ' ἐν οἷς δίκαια· ἡ γάρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου...τούτῳ δ' ἔστι τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλά τοῦτο δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. See further Jackson's admirable comments, pp. 101—103 of his edition.

18 [τὸν τι] 'All hold that justice is a species of equality.' So also in Nic. Eth., see n. on 9 § 1.

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις] Strictly scientific or philosophical discussions as contrasted with such as are merely dialectical, *Topic*. I. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and with the exoteric discussions carried on from the standpoint of the ordinary or 'envisaging' consciousness, *Eud. Eth.* I. 8 § 4, 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ...καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτεροις λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. Comp. c. 6 § 2; IV(VII). I §§ 2, 3 and Excursus to B. IV(VII). τῶν ἡθικῶν] Nic. Eth. V. c. 3 which is similarly cited c. 9 § 3; see n. (545). Cp. VIII(V). I § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584)

20 τὶ γάρ καὶ τι] 'For justice is held to be something assigned to certain persons, and must be equal for equals.' One's rights, one's just share, is the nearest English for the concrete δίκαιον. Or, as Mr A. C. Bradley puts it, here is the nearest approach to our modern notion of a 'right.'

§ 2 21 ποίων δ' ἵστης] Comp. c. 9 § 4, κατὰ τὶς οἷς χρήματις, οἷς ἐλευ-

θερία, π. (546 b); VIII(v). I § 2 n. (1493). SUSEM. (584 b)

22 ἔχει...23 φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν] Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus to research in political science. SUSEM.

23 κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχῆν ἀγαθοῦ] on the ground of superiority in *any* advantage. This is one of the phrases used in I. 6 § 3. Here certainly *external* goods: see line 28.

26 τοῖς γάρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (he would say) people who differ have different rights and their relative merits are different.' The correction of Ramus, καὶ καὶ ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their different rights go according to merit.' See n. (1493). SUSEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour (white and dark races?) or size (cp. IV [VII]. I § 3) or in any other external good would confer a larger share of political rights. The falsity of this is seen from the other arts.

Eaton compares Nic. Damasc. (s. voc.) 'Αλετέριοι Λίθινες τοὺς ταχυτάτους αὐτῶν αἱροῦνται βασιλεῖς.'

§ 4 31 αὐλητῶν] A partitive genitive with εὐγενεστέρους. The comparison between αὐλητική and πολιτική ἀρετή is best known from the discourse of Protagoras in Plato's dialogue 327 A (cp. 323 B). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c. 4 § 18.

τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέ- (VII)
 ροις· οὐδὲν γάρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔρ-
 γον ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. (p. 79)
 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸν προαγα-
 § 5 γοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γάρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ
 τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολὺ δ' ἐλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν ἡ κάλ-
 λος, εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἀκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθόν ἔστι τῆς αὐλη-
 τικῆς (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ
 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ ἐκείνος
 κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν ὅμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας
 1283 a τῶν αὐλῶν. δεῖ γάρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπερ-
 οχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται δ'
 § 6 οὐδέν. ἔτι κατὰ γε τούτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν
 ἀν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γάρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὸ μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως

33 οὐδὲ ΓΜ¹ || 35 εἰ δὲ.....1283 a 3 οὐδέν is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of αὐλητική to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated

1283 a 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνδιμάλλον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbial accus. after ὄμοιων, as after *ἴστοι* II. 2 § 6, *ἔξ ίστοι* I. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπά in line 25.

33 δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον κτλ] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν= the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν=advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προαγαγοῦσιν] "if we advance a little further." Intrans. as in *Phys.* I. 1 § 2, 184 a 19, προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, *Poet.* 4 § 7, 1448 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες. It appears then that αὐτὸν is a nom., as 5 § 4: 'of itself.'

§ 5 38 εἰ καὶ...41 αὐλητικήν] "even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes." I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Bernays, we understand ἐκείνα from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχουσι. Riese treats the

entire passage 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον...1283 a 3 οὐδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assertion that the remark 'although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty' has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* II. p. 71 (159) f. SUSEM.

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle's constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. II § 17 λέγω δὲ...δικαστήν, *Rhet.* I. II § 26, 1371 b 20, id. III. 2 § 6, 1404 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γάρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει in c. I § 4 of the present book of the *Politics*.

1283 a 1 δεῖ γάρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν=commensurable. See *De gen. et corr.* II. 6 §§ 1, 2 εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητό), ἀνάγκη ταῦτα τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἄπαν τοῖς συμβλητοῖς φυτεροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἰεν δέρος δέκα.

§ 6 εἰ γάρ μᾶλλον τὸ τὸ μέγεθος] "For if a given bodily stature (confers political privileges) more than' i.e. in preference to—here we must supply 'a certain amount of wealth or good birth.'

5 ἀν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς (VII) ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὅδι διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἡ ὅδι κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλεῖον ἀρετῆς μέγεθος ὅλως ὑπερέχειν * *, εἴη ἀν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ § 7 κρείττον τοσόνδε, τοσόνδε δῆλον ὡς ἵσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οὐ μὲν βραδεῖς οὐδὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον τοὺς δὲ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ τούτους των διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμήν). ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ πλούσιοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἀν εἴη πόλις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ

6 ἡ.....ὑπερέχειν omitted by Q^b R^b || 7 <ει> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει θλως ἀρετὴ μεγέθους Bernays || ὑπερέχειν θλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος P^{2,3,4} T^b Ald. Plutarch Bk. || ὑπερέχειν <ἐνδέχεται>? Susem., ὑπερέχει Ar. Plutarch Bk. Susem.¹ P¹ (corrector) and perhaps Γ || 8 [πάντα] Bernays || [μέγεθος] Susem. || 10 καὶ omitted by Π¹ Ar., [καὶ] Susem.^{1,2} || 11 ἀνισότητα P⁴ p¹ and Plutarch, λεῖτητ³ Γ M^a, λεῖτητα P¹ (1st hand) || 16 περὶ τῆς P^{4,6} Q^b T^b || ἐπιεικεῖς Susem., εὐγενεῖς Π¹ P^{2,3,4} Ar. Ald. Plutarch Susem.¹ (in the text), συγγενεῖς Q^b T^b. Cp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 393 || καὶ πλούσιοι after 17 καὶ ἐλεύθεροι Π² Ar. Plutarch Bk. || 17 τ' omitted by M^a P¹, hence [τ'] Susem.^{1,2}

5 ἐνάμιλλον εἴη= would enter the lists with, be comparable to.

6 ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον κτλ] 'Hence if A's superiority in stature exceeds B's superiority in merit, and (if) in general stature can exceed merit, evidently everything is comparable with everything else' —can represents the ἐνδέχεται conjectured to stand after ὑπερέχειν. Bernays takes <ει> καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει θλως ἀρετὴ μεγέθους, εἴη ἀν συμβλητά as all belonging to the apodosis: "then, although virtue in itself is more excellent than bodily size, yet a common measure can be found."

8 τοσόνδε γὰρ εἰ κρείττον κτλ] If a cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic inch of silver, then clearly a certain amount of gold is equal to a cubic inch of silver. But this being impossible in the case where wealth, or bodily strength, competes with virtue, it follows that "in politics as well as (καὶ) the other sciences or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of inequality on which men ground their claims to public office, and this for good reason." μέγεθος, except in line 8, = stature, not 'amount.'

§ 8 14 ἀλλ ἐξ ὧν πόλις συνέστηκεν] But it is on the ground of the elements of which a city is composed that they necessarily contend for state offices, ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντας § 4. Of these 'elements' of the city, the various factors or sections of society whose preponderance fixes the constitution and the nature of the qualification for political power, he enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free birth. Comp. nn. on 7 § 2, 9 § 1; also VI(iv). 8 §§ 7—9.

17 τίμημα is the rated valuation of taxable property, upon which taxes were levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly below the true, or selling, value. Thus τίμημα φέρειν or ἔχειν = to have property so estimated, to be a taxpayer, because returning a rateable value of property. So in VI(iv). 13 § 2, τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα and τοῖς ἀπόροις are found opposed, and ib. 6 § 2, κτᾶσθαι τὸ τίμημα τὸ δωματιον. But in itself τίμημα does not mean taxes.

18 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπόρων...19 δούλων] A body of needy paupers would not have the necessary leisure, II. 9 § 2. A body

§ 9 οὐδὲ ἐκ δούλων· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ⁶
τὸ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς. οὐδὲ γάρ ἄνευ τού-
των οἰκεῖσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προ-
τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι κα-
13 λῶς. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἀνὴρ πάντα ἡ
ἔνια γε τούτων ὄρθως ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγα-
25 θήνη ἡ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαίως ἀνὴρ ἀμφισβητεῖν.^(p. 20)

τοίησαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπειδὸν δὲ οὔτε τι
πάντων ισον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ισους ἐν τι μόνον ὅντας οὔτε
ἄνισον τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἓν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς

§ 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό-
τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες,
ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐ πάντες δικαίως. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον
μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χώρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ
συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον· οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι

20 πολιτικῆς P⁴ and Plutarch || 25 δικαίως Διαγκαλω P⁴⁻⁶ Q^b T^b || 27 Ισων
P² (apparently), P³ T^b Ald. P⁴ (rst hand) Q^b (rst hand, corrected by a later hand)
and p¹, Ισων Ισων Ar. and corrector of P¹⁻⁴ in the margin:—in P¹ another Ισων is added
in the margin after the Ισων altered by p¹ into Ισων || 32 τὰ omitted by M¹ P¹,
hence [τὰ] Susem.^{1,2}

of slaves would be without natural rulers, 1. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian *θῆρας* constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians.

§ 9 21 ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων] These indispensable factors or elements, ὡς ἄνευ οὐκ ἀνὴρ πόλις, c. 5 § 2, IV(VII). 8 § 1. But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly.

c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power (ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state.

23 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι] 'In view of the bare existence of a city,' as contrasted with εἰδῶν, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πόλιν εἶναι = τὸ συζῆν of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν κτλ.] Comp. 1. 2 § 8 π. (21). Susem. (585)

25 τὴν παιδείαν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴν] καὶ explicative. Education (culture) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, καὶ δέσμων = καὶ ἀρετῶν, 5 § 5 (Bradley). See also *Rhet.* 1. 8 § 4 with

Cope's note p. 156 f.

26 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 9. Compare *Introd.* p. 42. Susem. (586)

27 πατρῶν Ισων Ξειν κτλ.] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 καὶ τὸ Ισων) should have an equal share of everything.'

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve).

§ 2 καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 1. It was said, *Introd.* p. 42, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Bernays' suggestion (*n.* on c. 12 § 1) requires. Susem. (587)

31 ὅτι πλειόν...32 κοινόν] 'that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern.' A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Bonitz s.v. See also Cope on κοινότερον, *Rhet.* 1. 1 § 10. But Bernays renders 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 οἵτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια κτλ.] 'Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life,' as they have not the temptations of the poor.

33 'The claims of the free born and

καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγῆς ἀλλήλων (πολῖται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ (VII) 35 γενναιότεροι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δὲ εὐγένεια παρ’ ἑκάστοις § 3 οἴκοι τίμιοι· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιόνων, εὐγένεια γάρ ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους· ὅμοιώς δὲ φήσομεν δι- 39 καίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβῆτεν * *, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ 39 ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἡ πάσας ἀναγκαῖον § 4 ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας ἀλλὰ μῆν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους εἰσίν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους. 1283 b ἀρ’ οὖν εἰ πάντες εἰεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δὲ οἷον οἵ τ’ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἐσται τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ, ἡ

35 δέ] τ' Zwinger, τ' or γὰρ Susem. || 37 δὲ Plutarch Susem.¹⁻² and apparently Γ (autem William)—perhaps right. But see Vahlen Poetic p. 191 ed. 3 (p. 161 ed. 2) || 38 ἀμφισβητεῖν <καὶ μάλιστα τὴν δικαιοσύνην> or something similar Susem. || 42 συνλαμβανομένων? Stahr, συνβαλλομένων Koraes

1283 b 2 τι omitted by II¹ (ἄλλ' θτι P²), hence [τι] Susem.¹⁻²

of the nobles are closely related." Supply διαμφισβητοῦσιν. ἐγγῆς is nearly equivalent to an adjective, see n. on II. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἐγγῆς ἀλλήλων] From time immemorial, as noble birth stands to merely free birth so free birth and descent from citizens have been opposed to the status of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 §§ 7, 8, a passage which should be compared with the following words also. SUSEM. (588)

34 ff. This is confirmed on two grounds: (1) the nobles are the truest citizens, and (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly speaking, it is only in a republic that a real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Freeman, *Comparative Politics*, Lect. VI. pp. 246—270.

35 The use of γενναιότερος and ἀγεννῶν does not bear out the distinction made in *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3, εὐγενεῖς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναιόν δὲ κατὰ τὸ μῆξιστοθεῖ τὴν φύσεως.

36 οἴκοι τίμιοι] Cr. I. 6 § 7, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους νομίζουσιν οἴκοι μόνον εὐγενεῖς, n. (52). SUSEM. (588 b)

βελτίους εἰκός] Ambition to win fresh honour is a trait of good birth, τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον, *Rhet.* II. 15 § 2.

§ 3 37 ἀρετὴ γένους] Comp. nn. (54, 55) on I. 6 § 7, VI (IV). 8 § 9 n. (1248), VIII (V). 1 § 7 προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος, n. (1496). SUSEM. (589)

ὅμοιως δὴ... δικαῖος... ἀμφισβητεῖν] As the claim of (a) the wealthy line 31, (b) the free born and the nobles, so now that

of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a partial justification.

With δῆ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on *Poet.* 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, compares II. 3 § 2, VIII (V). 3 § 16, 4 § 10: often strengthened at the close of a list, as καὶ δῶς δῆ, καὶ καθόλον δῆ.

38 κοινωνικὴν] justice especially; for justice is, as we affirm, a virtue essential to civil society (*κοινωνία*), on which all the others must necessarily attend: i.e. justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as is more fully explained in *Nic. Eth.* v. 1. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see Jackson's notes]. Compare too *N. E.* VIII. 1 § 4, 1155 a 22, 9 § 1 ff. 1159 b 25 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2 and the references cited in n. (562). SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for the claim of ἀρετὴ, after all we have been told (Wyse).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μῆν καὶ οἱ πλείους] sc. δικαῖος ἀμφισβητοῦσι. The justice of this claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γὰρ κρείττους κτλ.] Comp. Plato *Gorgias* 488 οὐ οὐκοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶ κατὰ φύσιν; (Eaton). SUSEM. (591)

42 ὡς λαμβανομένων] Comp. c. 10 § 2, πάντων ληφθέντων: "if the many are taken in a body and compared with the few in a body" (Congreve).

1283 b 1 λέγω δὲ οἷον] I mean, namely. 3 πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις κτλ.] The question raised in c. 10.

(VII)

§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων⁹
 5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις
 διαφέρονσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ
 διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἑκάστη
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον). ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, δταν περὶ τὸν
 § 6 αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. * * εἰ δὴ τὸν 10
 10 ἀριθμὸν εἰνεν δῆλοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα
 δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἡ τὸ δῆλοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκο-
 πεῖν, εἰ δινατολ διουκεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος
 ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαν-
 § 7 τας τοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

8 σκοπούσι μὲν Ald., σκοπήσομεν? Sylburg, σκοπῶμεν Bas.³ in the margin, con-
 siderandum est Ar. || 9 ὑπάρχει^X M*, ὑπάρχει Pl || εἰ δὴ.....13 αὐτῶν; trans-
 posed by Thurot to precede 1284 a 4 εἰ δέ τις; see Introd. p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν κτλ]
 "Under each one of the constitutions mentioned there will be no dispute as to the proper holders of office: for (these constitutions) differ in their sovereigns, e.g. the one by being in the hands of the wealthy, another by being in the hands of the good, and similarly with each of the others." τὸ κύρια is the plural of τὸ κύριον the 'sovereign,' a supreme authority: also found in *Rhet.* I. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ κύρια διώργηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, δοταί γάρ αἱ πολιτείαι, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔστιν, and *Demosth. Falsa Leg.* § 259 p. 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λαοὶ καὶ τὰ κύρια ἄτα ποτ' ἔστιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων. Cope compares *N. E.* III. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τὰ πολιτικά = the citizen levies, as a similar plural.

5 τοῖς κυρίοις] Comp. c. 6 § 1 n. (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537); also n. (466). SUSEM. (592)

8 περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον] So § 4, ἐπιφέρει.

On the following sentence, 9 εἰ δὴ... 13 ἐξ αὐτῶν, see Introd. p. 43. Thurot *Etudes* p. 49 gives a brief analysis of §§ 6—14. Aristotle proposed to investigate what class ought to have power in a state where all sorts of superiority (riches, nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented: and this is his answer: (1) *If the virtuous are few, we must inquire whether they are numerous enough to govern the state or to make a state by themselves, § 6.* (2) *No superiority gives an exclusive right to the exercise of power, §§ 7—10.* (3) *The best laws are relative to the interest*

of the whole state and to the great body of the citizens. The citizen is not the same under all governments; under the best government he is the good man, §§ 11, 12. (4) *If a single individual, or a handful of men not numerous enough to form a state by themselves, be preeminent for virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level of equality, §§ 13, 14.* On this answer Thurot remarks; "the first proposition (1) has nothing to do with the question Aristotle has just raised: it is clear before he discusses what is to be done with the virtuous few he should prove the right of the virtuous to command. The second, (2), has a direct bearing on the question, of which it is the negative solution. The germ of a positive solution is found in (3), but this solution is not given directly; for Aristotle is handling a difficulty as to the end of the best legislation. In (4) he discusses a particular case analogous to that which is the subject of (1). This analogy and the impossibility of understanding (1) in its present place lead me to suppose that the words εἰ δὴ... ἐξ αὐτῶν should be transposed to come after κατ' ἀρετὴν and before εἰ δέ τις (1284 a 3). Then there will be a good sequence of ideas."

§ 6 13 ἔστι δὲ ἀποτλα] So 10 § 1 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχειν φανεραὶ δινοκόλαται.

§§ 7, 8 The refutation of the several claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is a species of *reductio ad absurdum* by the enforcement on the same ground of the right of the one richest, or noblest, or most virtuous man, or of the strongest group.

15 ξειαν γάρ <ἀν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες (VII) ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δῆλον γάρ ὡς εἰ (p. 81) τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἔστι, [δῆλον] ὅτι κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸν δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἔνα ἀπάντων δεήσει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων δίκαιον δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτο δὲ τούτοις συμβήσεται καὶ η 21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γάρ τις εἰς ἀμεί- νων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτα δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν εἴ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν 25 ὀλιγών, κανὸν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν πόλλων κρείττους ὡσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἀν δέοι κυρίους § 9 εἶναι μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτα ἔοικε ποιεῖν φανε- 12

15 δόξεις M¹, δόξειν P⁴ (corrector), δόξαις Ald., δόξαιν P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Plutarch Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand) || γάρ <ἀν> Koraes Bk.², <ἀν> γάρ Götting || 17 [δῆλον ὅτι] Camerarius Bk.³, Vahlen (*Beiträge zu Ar. Poetik* IV. 432) tries to save δῆλον at least. Comp. also Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* I. p. 58 n. (1) || 20 τούτους] τοῦτο ίσως P²⁻³⁻⁴ Plutarch Ar., τοῦτ' ίσως Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. || 27 φανερὸν ποιεῖν II² Plutarch Bk.

16 δῆλον γάρ ὡς κτλ] Comp. VII(VI). 3 § 3 n. (1407 b) ἐάν εἰς ἔχη πλεῖστα τῶν ἀλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος. SUSEM. (592 b)

17 παλιν=αὐτος, in this case as in the former.

18 τὸν ἑνα ἀπάντων] This is called *τυπωνίς* in VII(VI). 3 § 3.

§ 8 21 περὶ τὰς δρ. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp. c. 5 § 5 n. (508), c. 7 §§ 3, 4 with nn. (536, 8). SUSEM. (593)

There provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, cc. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τις ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων. All the governing class are good, but he is pre-eminent in goodness.

24 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος κτλ] Comp. Pl. *Gorg.* 489 E ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (594)

§§ 9, 10 πάντα δῆταῦτα κτλ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. L. Stein (*Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissenschaft* IX. p. 157) and Hildenbrand (p. 422) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-

tion of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, "since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, true constitutional monarchy," cp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. Hildenbrand rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildenbrand however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected,—whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is *superior* or *inferior* to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle's own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 nn. (680, 681), VIII (v). 1 § 6 n. (1493): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two forms of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate context §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle desires

ρὸν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὄφθος ἔστι, καθ' ὃν ἀξι- (VII)
οῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι
§ 10 πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιοῦντας
31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ
πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἀν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινὰ δίκαιον·
οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν διάγων
καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἔκαστον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀθρόους.
§ 11 διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσι
36 τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν (ἀποροῦσι γάρ 13
τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλομένῳ τίθε-
σθαι τοὺς ὄρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτίων συμ-
39 φέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων), ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθέν.
§ 12 τὸ γάρ ὄρθὸν ληπτέον ἵσως· τὸ δ' ἵσως ὄρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς

28 ὄρθως Q^b Ald. and P³ (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀποροῦσι...

39 πλειόνων) Bernays: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντᾶν and no parenthesis
|| 37 βουλομένῳ <γε> Schneider || 40 γάρ Susem., δ' ΓΠ Plutarch Bk. Suscm.¹

distinctly to express this here. See *nn.*
(597, 599). SUSEM. (595)

28 τῶν δραυν οὐδεὶς κτλ] Cp. 9 § 1 n.
None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining
principles upon which they claim to
govern.

§ 10 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύ-
ματος] to control the governing body.

33 τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν
διάγων] This is the thesis which Grote
is striving to prove throughout his history,
taking the Athenian Demos as his great
example. He dwells upon the sacrifices
of which it was capable at Salamis and
Argennusae, upon its financial honesty,
as attested by an undebased coinage, and
its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,
when after the unparalleled provocations
of the Thirty it consented to a general
amnesty. B.C. 403. The appeals made
to the humanity and enthusiasm of the
multitude had most chance of success, as
the cases of Paches and Diagoras prove.
Against all this must be set the panic
and terror at the time of the mutilation of
the Hermae and the hasty condemnation
of the generals at Athens, the troubles of
Corecyra and Samos, and other occasional
outbursts of popular fury like the Scytal-
ism at Argos.

34 οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἔκαστον] See the
parallel expression in c. 11 § 2 and the
note on II. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 ζητοῦσι...τινες] Was this
also in writing? SUSEM. (596)

προβάλλουσι] "bring forward as a

problem"; whence πρόβλημα.

36 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν...39
ὅταν συμβαίνῃ κτλ] May be met as
follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 τίθεσθαι] Properly, to enact.
But Herod. I. 29, II. 177 of Solon.

39 τὸ λεχθέν] That is, the case
when the aggregate merit of the great
majority surpasses that of prominently
able individual men. SUSEM. (597)

§ 12 40 τὸ γάρ ὄρθὸν ληπτέον ἵσως]
The problem is to find the standard to
which the most upright laws (*τοῦς ὄρθοτάτους νόμους*) must conform. Here
the right must be taken to mean the
equally right, and the equally right
regards the interest of the whole city
and the welfare of the citizens. For
ἵσως = *aequaliter* Shilleto quotes Plato
Laws VII. 805 Λ Σαυρουάτιδαί αἰς τόξων
καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅπλων κοινωνία καὶ τοῖς
ἀνδράσιν ἵση προστεταγμένη *ἵσως* ἀσκεῖται:
Epin. 991 Λ *ἵσως* δὲ τοῦ Ἐλάττονος τέλεον
Ἐλαττὸν τε τοῦ μείζονος: Dem. *De Pace*
59, 18 ὑμεῖς οὐτε συμφέρωτο οὔτ' *ἵσως* οὐτε
καλῶς τροπεῖσθε Φωκέας; Isocr. *Panegyr.*
77 συνθήκαι...αἵτινες ἀν *ἵσως* καὶ κοινῶς
ἀμφοτέρους ἔχοντι, and probably Soph.
Philoc. 758. Though restored in *Pol.*
II. 6 § 20, it is not elsewhere certain in
Aristotle. It is however a v. I. VI(IV).
14 § 12, Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 6. Also found
in *Khet. ad Alex.* 9 § 10, 1430 a 1, ἀν
ἵσως καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσφερόμεθα
(? a citation).

41 πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν· (VII)
 πολίτης δὲ κοινῆ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
^{1283 a} ἐστί, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἔτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρί-
 στην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν
^{a 3} πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

^{§ 6}
^{1283 b 9}

10 <ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα
 11 <δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἡ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν,
 12 <εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος
 13 <ώστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; >

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly || 3 τὸν after βίον omitted by
 Q^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand)

1283 b 9 * * Conring Thurot (by Susem,¹ placed after 13 αὐτῶν), see Comm. n.
 (599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be
 transposed to follow either (1) 1283 a 40 τὰς ἄλλας or (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπον || δὲ
 Susem,² δὴ Γ II Plutarch Bk. Susem. ^{1,2} in the text || 11 διελεῖν τὸν Q^b T^b Plutarch
 Bk. || 12 [?] Schneider, probably right

42 πολίτης δὲ κοινῆ μὲν κτλ] A neat formula summing up the results of
 cc. 1–9.

1284 a 1 καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν
 ἔτερος] See c. 1 § 10 n. (440). SUSEM.
 (598)

1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ...3 ἀρετὴν] In
 the best constitution, the better class
 (*βελτίονες*) coincides not merely with
 the majority but even with the whole
 mass of citizens: cp IV(VII). 9 § 3; 13
 §§ 9, 10; VI(IV). 7 §§ 2–4. Thurot
 rightly remarks that after the negative
 answer §§ 5–10 n. (595) to the question
 first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11,
 12 also contains the germs of a positive
 answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed
 to follow directly upon it, the answer
 is continued in the context without
 interruption of the connexion. Thurot is
 no less right when he observes that this
 solution is no *direct* answer to the former
 questions, but as regards its form is only
 an answer to the subordinate question of
 § 11 itself. There is therefore a con-
 siderable hiatus after § 12. But Thurot
 is scarcely correct and clear when he
 assumes that it can be supplied from §§
 11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that "in
 a state where there are virtuous men, rich
 men, nobles, and a mass of citizens,
 power belongs to all those who have true
 civic virtue, this being something different
 from moral virtue not only under an ideal
 government but everywhere else." In
 my opinion, we should rather expect the

conclusion that in the best constitution,
 all citizens ought to have equal rights,
 and that the true aristocracy is one
 in which all citizens are provided with
 sufficient property. But where the excel-
 lence (*ἀρετὴ*) of the few is equal to that
 of the many, especially if neither exceed a
 certain amount, in default of other means
 of satisfying the claims of both parties,
 either the exercise of full citizenship, or
 else the merely passive right of being elect-
 ed to office (11 § 8 n. 569), must depend
 on a moderate property qualification, and
 wealth be introduced as a supplementary
 consideration. Thus, although inferior to
 aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity,
 would still be included among the normal
 forms, and would in such a case be better
 than democratical equality. SUSEM. (599)

2 ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος] Comp. *Tep.* IV. 5 § 11, 12 b 9; οὐτε γάρ
 ὁ προαιρούμενος ἀδικατῶ δέ, οὐθ' ὁ δυνά-
 μενος μη προαιρούμενος δὲ διάβολος η φέναξ.

§ 6 1283 b 9 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...13
 πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] "But if the possessors
 of virtue are altogether few in number,
 how should we decide (Bernays: set the
 limits)? Or must their fewness be con-
 sidered relatively to the task; are they
 competent to administer the city or, in
 other words, numerous enough to form
 a city themselves?" Schneider rightly
 saw that the last sentence contained a
 single supposition: able to manage the
 city, because strong enough to form a
 city by themselves.

§ 13 εἰ δέ τις ἔστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερ- VIII
 1284 a 4 βολήν, ἡ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατὸν πλήρωμα πα-
 ρέχεσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς (p. 82)
 τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δὲ εἰς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θε-
 τέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἵσων,
 10 ἄνισοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν.
 § 14 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους 2
 καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος.
 αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἀν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις

1284 a 4 εἰς] εἰς Γ Μ¹ P⁴ and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || 5 δυνατὸν Γ Μ² || παρα-
 σχέσθαι Π² Bk.

§ 13 1284 a 4 τοσοῦτον διαφέρων...
 6 ὥστε μὴ...] So preeminent...that the
 merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν] 'in excess
 of merit'=by reason of his exalted
 merit. So *N. Eth.* ix. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 η
 ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλασ=friendship in the
 extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one
 such prince of men, (2) a number of them
 too small to form the 'complement' of a
 city. Comp. for πλήρωμα νι[ν]V. 4 § 12
 and *Pl. Rep.* II. 371 E (where the sense
 is slightly different).

5 η πλείους...6 πόλεως] The second
 case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to
 this place, since it requires that one kind
 of collective virtue be added to another;
 and in this kind of calculation it is
 impossible to decide where to stop
 adding particular men to the virtuous
 minority, while the result of the calcula-
 tion varies according to our decision.
 Therefore Aristotle in what follows
 neglects this case entirely and does not
 construct from it a 'truest' form of
 aristocracy beyond and above the true
 one. Comp. c. 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with *nn.*
 (678, 682). SUSEM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικὴν] In other words,
 τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἕργον δύναμιν (Congreve).

9 μέρος] The phrase μέρος εἶναι = με-
 τέχειν οἱ κοινωνεῖ τὴν πόλεως: see IV(VII).
 4 § 6; 8 § 1, § 6; 9 § 4. It is opposed
 to the indispensable adjuncts (ὧν ἀνεν
 ούσιν ἀν εἰη πόλις) which are excluded from
 the franchise. 'The conditions of com-
 mon political life cease to be applicable;
 the great man is not an equal amongst
 equals to be bound by equal rules.'

(Bradley). Trans.: "these men must cease
 to be accounted members of the city.
 For they will be wronged if they are
 deemed worthy of mere equality when
 they are so far superior (*διωσοι*) in merit
 and civil capacity." See π. 7 § 18 n.,
 VIII(v), 1 § 3.

11 ὥσπερ γάρ θεὸν] Comp. § 25 and
 n. (615). Aristotle could hardly express
 more strongly how improbable he himself
 considers this case. His reasons for
 considering it notwithstanding are no
 doubt those mentioned in § 8 1 for
 the consideration of other no less im-
 probable cases. Cp. n. (542) and *Introd.*
 p. 70 f. See also n. (678) on III. 17. 5.
 Bradley *Hellenica* p. 239 rightly traces
 this thought to its origin in Plato's
Politicus. SUSEM. (601)

Plato's words are πασῶν γράφειντο γε,
 sc. τὴν δρόην πολιτειαν, ἐκκριτέον, οἷον
 θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἀλλων πολιτειῶν,
 303 B.

§ 14 13 κατὰ=anent, applicable to,
 binding upon; and not necessarily
 'against'. Even the rule of law does
 not bind such men.

"This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ
 ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St
 Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, c. 5 v. 23,
 suggesting, at all events, a direct adapta-
 tion from Aristotle." (T. L. Heath.)

14 αὐτὸν γάρ εἰσι νόμοι] Comp. 17
 § 2 n. (675). SUSEM. (601 b)

"Comp. the identical sentiment in St
 Paul *Romans* c. 2 v. 14, where ἔαυτοί
 εἰσι νόμοι is applied to θεη τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα
 νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men
 who do by nature (φύσει) the same things
 as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have

15 πειράμενος κατ' αὐτῶν. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἀν ίσως ἄπερ Ἀντισθέ- (VIII)
νης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ
§ 15 ίσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρακι-

16 δημηγορούντων P⁴ and M^a (1st hand), δημουργούντων Γ || 17 διὸ καὶ.....
1284 b 34 πολέσιν Krohn regards as a spurious addition: against this view see Comm.
n. (602 b)

moral virtue" (T. L. Heath). Comp. *Nic. Eth.* IV. 8 § 10, 1128 a 32, *olov νόμος*
ὧν ἔστη.

15 **Ἀντισθένης** The celebrated pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic school. The quotation is probably from his work *Πολιτικός*, 'The Statesman': cp. A. Müller *De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis* p. 64 (Marburg 1860); Zeller *Socrates and Socratics* p. 323 n. (41) and c. 13 generally, p. 284 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (602)

Treatment of disproportionate eminence in the imperfect constitutions: §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead democracies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15, 16. This has a counterpart in the execution by violence of eminent citizens which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in the policy pursued by sovereign states (Persia, Athens) in humbling their subjects, § 19.

Compare Grote's masterly defence of Ostracism: c. 31, IV. pp. 200—212.

§ 15 17 διὸ ... ὀστρακισμὸν] It is improbable that this conception of Ostracism is the correct one. It was resorted to rather when two party leaders had each about the same number of followers and thus the machinery of the state was likely to be brought to a dead lock. In such cases, the removal of one converted the other into the leading statesman. This at any rate was the significance of this institution at the best period of the Athenian democracy, although according to Philochorus, *Fr.* 79 b, it was at Athens originally directed against the followers of the Peisistratidae (*αἱρετοὶ δὲ Τερέβιος ἐκ τῶν ἀδέξιων ... ἐξοστρακισθῆναι διὰ μοχθηρίαν τρόπων, οὐ δι' ὑποψίαν τυραννίδος* μετὰ τούτον δὲ κατελύθη τὸ θέος, ἀρέσμενον νομοθετήσαντος Κλεισθένους, ὅτε τοὺς τυράννους κατελύσεν, δύος συνεκβάλῃ καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῦ... Müller *Frag. hist. gr.* I. p. 397, 3 ff.); and elsewhere too it may have had a similar origin. Thus it is possible that here Aristotle really adheres to the original intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXV. 1877 742, n. 8) though on the other hand in his remarks

further on, § 23, there can be no doubt that he refers to its later degeneracy (n. 613). This institution prevailed at Athens from the time of Cleisthenes until the latter half of the Peloponnesian War or even later (n. 613), at Argos, VIII(v), 3 § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, and Ephesus. At Athens the question whether there should be an Ostracism in any particular year was regularly debated and voted on in the popular assembly. If the result was affirmative, a day was fixed for another meeting of the Assembly, at which at least 6000 citizens had to be present: so Fränkel and before him Lugebil *On the nature and historical significance of Ostracism at Athens* in the Suppl. to the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* N. S. IV. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd the name of the person whom he wished to banish, and the man who was thus designated by the majority had to leave Athens within 10 days for a term of ten years, subsequently diminished to five; he might however be recalled before that time by a vote of the Assembly. See Schömann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with Fränkel's corrections *op. cit.* p. 92 f. n. 1: ep. pp. 14 ff. 52, 80ff. SUSEM. (603) One part of the Berlin papyrus, on which hardly decipherable fragments of Aristotle's *Ἄθηναις πολιτείᾳ* have been discovered, relates to the establishment of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes two phases in the development of this institution. At first the dread of a restoration of the Peisistratidae prevailed, and (a) relatives or friends of Hippias and Hipparchus were banished. Later on, as a settled institution, it fell upon (b) any who by preponderant influence threatened to become dangerous to democratic equality, such as Aristeides and Xanthippus,' Diels restores ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν Ἐξηκτοῖσιν τοὺς τὸν τυράννῳ φίλους ὠστρακίζοντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγνοπολεμένων (?) διατάσσεται τις δὴ σχῆμα μετίζω [δύναμις]. The name of Aristeides is recovered from a brief excerpt in pseudo-Heracleides Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* II. p. 209, 7 of the very passage which is but half recovered

σμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· (VIII)
 αὐται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἵστητα μάλιστα πάντων,
 20 ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλούτου ἢ πολυ-
 § 16 φιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἴσχυν ὀστράκιζον καὶ με-
 θίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὡρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 3
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ
 τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὸ-
 25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων.
 διὸ καὶ τοὺς φέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου
 Θρασυβούλῳ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὅρθως ἐπιτιμᾶν
 § 17 (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον εἴπειν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-
 φθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ὀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς
 30 ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῦναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν
 ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γινομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγ-

19 τάυτας γὰρ δεῖ P¹ || δοκοῦσι omitted by P¹ || διώκειν] persecuntur William ||
 20 πολυφύλαι P¹ (1st hand), γρ. πολυφίλαι corr.¹ in the margin of P¹

to us: Κλεισθένης τὸν περὶ δοτρακισμοῦ
 σώμαν εἰσηγήσατο, ὃς ἔτεθη διὰ τοὺς τυρα-
 νώρας (a)· καὶ ἄλλοι τε ὀστρακισθησαν
 καὶ Ξάνθιππος καὶ Ἀριστέλης (b). Dicls
 Über die Berliner Fragmente p. 30.

18 διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν] For this
 reason, that laws are only destined for
 those who are more or less on an equality,
 while an individual grows disinclined to
 be bound by law in proportion as he rises
 above this general equality. If this very
 simple connexion be borne in mind, there
 is no reason to suspect an interpolation.
 SUSEM. (602 b)

21 ὀστράκιζον] Note the imperfect;
 here certainly because Ostracism was
 obsolete in Aristotle's time. See n. on
 II. 9 § 19.

§ 18 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ] "Even in
 the story there is a naive hint that
 Herakles was out of place in the Argo.
 When he went on board the ship, it
 threatened to sink, and when he took
 hold of an oar, it broke at once in his
 grasp." (Preller Gk. Mythol. II. p. 324.)
 Pherekydes of Leros (Fr. 67), Antimachos,
 and Poseidippus also state that Herakles
 was set on shore because the Argo com-
 plained that his weight was too great for
 her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. I. 1290), but
 this was not the only form of the legend.
 See Apollod. Bibl. I. 19. 9, Herod. VII.
 193. SUSEM. (604)

24 οὐ γὰρ ιθέλων] "For the Argo
 refused to carry (ἀγειν) him with the rest

as far outweighing her crew": φθεγξα-
 μένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῖντον βάρος.
 Apollod. I. 9. 19.

27 οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὅρθως ἐπιτιμᾶν]
 'must not be thought to blame it with
 absolute justice.'

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον] In the account given by Herodotus v. 92,
 the parts of Periander and Thrasylbulos are reversed (Vettori). Aristotle refers to
 the story again VIII(v). 10 § 13, n. (1669).
 For the tyrant Thrasylbulos of Miletus see
 E. Curtius II. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for
 the tyrants of Miletus in general VIII(v).
 5. 8, n. 1557. Periander, ruler of Corinth
 probably from 626 to 585, one of the
 most brilliant and at the same time most
 tragical figures among the earlier Greek
 tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded
 as one of the first to introduce all those
 measures which appeared, not without
 reason, to the Greeks who were contemporaries
 of Plato and Aristotle, as inseparable
 from the tyranny. See VIII(v). 11.
 4 n. (1711); also VIII(v). 12. 3 nn.
 (1751, 1754), VIII(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 16 nn.
 (1525, 1672); E. Curtius I. p. 250 ff.
 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (605)

Livy (I. 54) borrows the story for
 Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii.

32 σύννοησαν] Comp. σύννοου γενέ-
 μενον, II. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ] Oncken
 (II. 173) says that Aristotle approves of
 Ostracism. It would be as correct (or

γείλαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι (VIII)
 § 18 δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἄνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 4
 συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν,
 35 ἀλλ᾽ ὅμοιώς ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημο-
 κρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τρό-
 πον τινὰ τῷ κολούειν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. (p. 83)
 § 19 τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ
 κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ
 40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θάττον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν
 ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτὸν παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-
 1284 b σῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τοὺς
 πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέ-
 § 20 κοπτεῖ πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας ἐστὶ 5

- 37 τῷ] τὸ Γ M^a P⁴ Q^b T^b || κωλέειν Γ M^a P⁴ Q^b T^b Ald. and P^{2,3} (1st hand), γρ.
 κολούειν P² (corr. in the margin), reviser of P³ in the margin, afterwards erased || [καὶ
 φυγαδεύειν] Valckenaer (on Her. v. 6), perhaps rightly || 41 παρὰ] περὶ P^{2,3} Q^b T^b Ald.

1284 b 2 ἐπέσκοπε T^b, ἐπέσκοπε P²

rather incorrect) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both, but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyrannis respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however n. (614). SUSEM. (606)

35 ὅμοιος ἔχει] i.e. συμφέρει, it is the interest of oligarchies and democracies and accordingly they take such measures. § 19 38 περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη] 'in the case of cities and nations' (und. subject to them). See n. (11) and the references there given. SUSEM. (607)

39 Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους] Aristotle is thinking of the famous Samian revolt, 441—440 B.C., see E. Curtius II. p. 471 ff. Eng. tr.; Von Wilamowitz *Aus Kydathen* p. 11 f. SUSEM. (608)

40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους] Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were the only independent states amongst the allies of Athens. In the year 424 however, the Chians were compelled by the Athenians, who had suspicions of their intentions, to pull down their new walls: Thuc. IV. 51. The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost all the other cities of Lesbos, and their punishment (427) are noticed VIII(v). 4. 6 n. (1548); see E. Curtius III. pp. 100 ff. 118 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (609)

ἐπεὶ γάρ...41 παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compacts made with them.' It is clear from n. (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians: even in regard to the Chians and the Samians it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSEM. (610)

For ἐπεὶ θάττον=as soon as, Shilleto compares Demosth. *Pantaeen.* § 41 p. 978, 18, *Conon* § 5 p. 1257, 28; Plato *Protag.* 315 C ἐπειδὴν θάττον συνῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, *Alc.* I. 103 Λ ἐδὲ θάττον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναῖον δῆμον παρέλθει.

1284 b 1 τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους κτλ.] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of ἐπι, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to ἐπ' ἀρχοντείαι, or ἐπ' εὐθείας κινεῖσθαι. Compare perhaps Dem. *Philipp.* I § 7 p. 42, 4 ἀντὶ τῆς τοιωτῆς ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γράμμης νῦν.

2 ἐπέσκοπε πολλάκις] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod. I. 156: externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusually mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Herod. III. 159 (Eaton). Comp. Duncker's History of Antiquity (ed. 4) IV. pp. 334 ff., 464 ff., 477 ff. (vol. VI. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSEM. (611)

τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὄρθας· αἱ μὲν γάρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι (VIII)
§ 21 σπρὸς τὸ ἕδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει
τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλων τεχνῶν καὶ
ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γάρ γραφεῖς ἔάσειεν ἀν τὸν ὑπερβάλ-
λοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῷον, οὐδὲ εἰ δια-
φέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε πρύμναν ναυπηγὸς η τῶν ἀλλων
τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν με-
ζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἔάσει συγ-
χορεύειν. ὥστε διδ τοῦτο μὲν οὖδεν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχας § 22

5 ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koraes || 8 ἔάσει ἔάν M¹, ἔάσει ἀν P⁴ || 10 ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν
Π² Bk. || 11 τι omitted by Π¹, hence [τι] Susem.^{1,2}, perhaps rightly || 13 ὥστε
.....15 δρῶσιν transposed to follow 20 διορθῶν Thurot (see *Introd.* 83), by Bernays
to precede 7 δῆλον. See Comm. n. (612). Or is the sentence an interpolation, and
no change required?

The problem (what to do with men of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the normal state, § 20. Principles of symmetry require that, as in the arts, there should be no disproportionate influence or merit, § 21. This is a frequent cause of revolutions (δέ τοποχήν), as is explained VIII(v). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 καὶ = even the normal forms.
§ 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας¹: a foot that violates symmetry in its size² (the gen. as in § 16, πλούτης, πορείας, 'even if it were of surpassing beauty.' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp. λοιπά c. 12 § 2. For the order of the words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen's *Arist. Aufsätze* II, pp. 41—44. On symmetry, see *Metaph.* M. 3 § 11, 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγεστα εἴδῃ τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὠρισμένον: this is illustrated in *Pol.* IV(VII). 4 § 7, *Poet.* 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these words was proposed by Thurot and Bernays (see *Introd.* p. 83). Bernays renders "Hence this point need not stand in the way of a good understanding between single rulers and the city communities; so far, that is, as their personal rule is useful (also) for the cities and they adopt this procedure." Thus he understands τὰς πόλεις to be those which are ruled by μονάρχας. So Postgate (*Notes* p. 7):—"τὰς πόλεις in both sentences are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,' but the states governed by the μονάρχας (notice *not* τίτανοι)." See note (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς δύμολογομένας ὑπεροχάς]
Hence in regard to admitted instances of superiority the case for Ostracism possesses a certain political justification, a ground of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the constitution so as not to require anything of the sort; failing that, the next best course is to adopt it as a corrective measure. Unfortunately it was used in the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κτλ] Comp. VIII(v). 3 § 3 n. (1510) where the same recommendation is given, κατοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅρας ὅπις μὴ ἐνέσονται τοσοῖτον ὑπερέχοντες, η ἔάσαται γενέσθαι λασθανότερον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). SUSEM. (611 b)

13 ὥστε διδ τοῦτο κτλ] It is only with the gravest misgivings that I have followed Thurot in the transposition of § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his other by no means simple changes. But I see no other means of obtaining any really consistent connexion, corresponding to the one idea prevalent throughout the whole chapter, namely that the measures taken by Monarchs and Republics rest in this respect on the same principle, and that the same problem must be considered by the true forms of Monarchy and Republic, and not merely by the degenerate ones. Thus in these matters a republic has no advantage over a monarchy; on the contrary the corresponding measures of violence are generally calculated with a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,

14 συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφελίμου (VIII)
 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου-
 μένας ὑπεροχάς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ¹
 § 23 τὸν ὀστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 οὐτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης
 20 ιατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλούς, ἀν συμβῆ, πειρᾶσθαι τοιούτῳ
 20 τιν διορθώματι διορθοῦν. <ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς
 14 <μονάρχας συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφε-
 15 <λίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.> ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο περὶ²
 21 τὰς πόλεις οὐ γάρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας

14 μονάρχους II² Bk. || τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ Thurot, τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ <ώ>? Susem.
 <Ἐνεκεν> ἀρχῆς Schneider, <χάρω> ἀρχῆς Schmidt || ὠφελίμου [ταῖς πόλεσιν
 οὕσης] Thurot (the best suggestion as yet), ὠφελίμου.....οὕσης transposed to follow 19
 λαρπαῖς Schmidt || 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν] τοῖς πόλλοῖς Lindau

while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Bernays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects; of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as *ἀλογεύης* that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected *ἀλογεύης* by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. He at length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition; viz. that, as Bernays proposed, § 22, *ὥστε...δρῶσιν*, be inserted between *τρόπον* and *δῆλον* at the end of § 20: these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (*ὥστε...δέ*) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here

shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as *πόλεις*; we should rather expect *τοῖς ἀρχούμενοις* or at any rate *τοῖς πολίταις* in both places instead of *ταῖς πόλεσιν*: and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate *ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πόλεσιν*. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of *εἰς* "also" before *ταῖς πόλεσιν* would be indispensable for the sense, as Bernays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. SUSEM. (612)

20 ὅπερ οὐκ ἔγινε[ν]. If Thurot's transposition be approved, this means: "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Bernays and others make it refer to the words *τοιούτῳ τιν διορθώματι διορθοῦν*:—it was not used as a corrective.

21 οὐ γάρ [βλέπετον κτλ.] It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolos, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-

§ 24 συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἔχρωντο τοῖς ὁστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (VIII)

μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκύαις πολιτείαις ὅτι μὲν ἴδιᾳ συμ-

φέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἔστι, φανερόν, ἵστως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς

25 δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας

ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν

ὑπεροχήν, οἷον ισχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ (p. 84)

§ 25 ἀν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετήν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ

γάρ δὴ φαῖεν ἀν δεῖν ἐκβάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦ-

30 τον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (παραπλήσιον

γάρ καν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦν), μερίζοντες τὰς ἄρχας.

λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ

πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀιδίους

ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Bernays || 25 ἐπει P^{a,b} || 31 ἀξιοῦν Γ Susem.^{1,2}, ἀξιοῖ μὲν M^a. The parentheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal clause: μερίζονται Susem. || 31 ὅπερ<καὶ> Susem.^{1,2} and possibly Γ (quod et videtur William); perhaps rightly || 33 δομένως P^{a,b} Q^b T^b || βασι-

λείας P^{a,b} T^b

casion how easily a combination of two parties could defeat the true aim of this institution, and turn it against the most zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no evidence that it was ever actually resorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schömann pp. 182, 395 Eng. tr. When the healthy life of parties ceased there, and especially when its surplus strength began to fail the state, and every man of talent was needed at his post, Ostracism proved to be superfluous. When it had been more than once employed in order to remove some person displeasing to the dominant party (Damon Plut. Per. 4, Aristid. 7, Callias Pseudo-Andoc. IV. 32) it disappeared from the frame-work of the Constitution (Seeliger). SUSEM. (613)

Summary of results: *the removal of eminent men is (a) expedient and just in the interests of perverted constitutions, but (b) not absolutely just. The best state can neither expel such a man of prominent merit, nor treat him as an ordinary subject. It only remains to make him sovereign.* §§ 24, 25.

§ 24. 23 [ἴση] expedient and just *in the private interest* of the government. Not 'in particular cases.' This is a restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 οὐχ ἀπλῶς sc. τοι δίκαιον. The mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας] Aristotle does not say what should be done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy, which are also to be reckoned among right forms of government. Is it possible that he regarded Ostracism as still admissible? Further comp. *nn.* on II. 9 § 30 (339); III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); 17 §§ 4, 5 (677–8); VI(IV). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133–6–7), 10 § 3 (1280) and *Introd.* p. 43 ff. SUSEM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἀλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν] κατὰ governs ὑπεροχήν. Note that the cases chiefly alleged for Ostracism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Διὸς] Used proverbially, as in Herod. v. 49 ἥδη τῷ Διῷ πλούτῳ πέρι ἐρίσετε, 'ye vie with Zeus in wealth.' Comp. Nic. Eth. vi. 13 § 8, 1145 a 10 ἐτι δροιον καν εἰ τις τὴν πολιτεύκην φαῖ ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν (Eaton).

μερίζοντες τὰς ἄρχας] 'Nor to rule such an one, in a distribution of offices': i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better taken with ἄρχειν γε than, as Bernays and others, with ἀξιοῖς, in which case it must be strained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχειν as in c. 17 § 7, οὐτ’ ἀξιοῖς ἄρχειν κατὰ μέρος.

33 βασιλέας ἀιδίος] Kings for life. The form of the phrase, and the words ἐτι τὰς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the reference to Alexander which it was once

14 ἵσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μετα-^{IX}
 36 βῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄρθων
 πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει
 τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασι-
 λεύεσθαι, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ’ ἀλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν
 § 2 συμφέρει τισὶ δ’ οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον διελέσθαι
 41 πότερον ἐν τι γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς.

1285 a ῥάδιον δὴ τοῦτο γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένη περι-²
 § 3 ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς πατῶν. ἡ γὰρ ἐν
 τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν
 κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἔξελθῃ

35 ἀφισμένους Γ Μ^a || 37 εἶναι <καὶ> Koraes || δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. ||
 40 δὴ Γ Μ^a P^{1,2,3} || 41 ἐν τι] ἐν τῷ Π² Bk. || αὐτῶν Π² Ar.

1285 a 1 ῥάδιον Μ^a P¹ || δὲ Susem.^a (perhaps rightly) || 4 δὲ] δ’ η P⁴ Q^b T^b U^b
 L^a, γὰρ Ar.

the fashion to discover in the treatise. From VIII(v), 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14 Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is **Monarchy**. *There are five actual and historical types of single rule:* (α) the Spartan king, (β) the oriental sovereign, (γ) the αἰσχρῷτης or dictator, (δ) the king in the heroic age: §§ 2—14. *To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (ε) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.*

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown 14 § 25, 17 §§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See *Introd.* pp. 44—47, *Analys.* p. 112 f., and VI(iv). c. 10.

§ 1 36 φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄρθων πολι-
 τεῶν] Bernays, *Trans.* p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these words with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore prefers to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, ‘the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just.’ To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the ‘normal forms’ in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more im-

portant to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, indecisive, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25: which, be it observed, answers the question of § 13 and § 6. Indeed Bernays’ view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1—12, and had allowed the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. Comp. *Introd.* p. 42 n. (3).

38 οἰκήσεσθαι] middle, II. 1 § 3.
 πόλεις καὶ χώρᾳ] Comp. IV(VII). 6 § 5 χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν. This admits the case of the θῆρος or nation, and helps us to see that Aristotle would not have allowed Persia or Macedon to rank as a πόλις, although he would have admitted their claim to possess a πολιτεία, and although he calls the subjects πολίτας, § 7. Cp. n. on 12 § 8.

§ 2 1285 a 1 γένη] Used indifferently with εἶδος (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for ‘species’ or ‘variety’: so I. 11 § 5 n., VI(iv). 4 § 8.

§ 3 ‘The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,’ i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies)(tyrannies.

4 ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἔξελθῃ κτλ.] ‘He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country.’ See Schömann p. 228 Eng. tr. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their

5 τὴν χώραν, ἡγεμόνων ἔστι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ (IX)
 § 4 πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδοται τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν. αὗτη μὲν οὖν ἡ
 βασιλεία οἷον στρατηγία τις αὐτοκρέτωρ καὶ ἀδιος ἔστιν' κτεῖ-
 ναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινὶ [βασιλείᾳ], καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀρχαλῶν, ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νομῷ. δῆλοι
 10 δὲ 'Ομηρος' Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κακῶς μὲν ἀκούων ἡνείχετο ἐν
 § 5 ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτεῖναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γὰρ
 ὃν δέ καὶ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης...

οὐδὲν οἶ...

ἄρκιον ἐσσέται φυγέειν κύνας ἢδε οἰωνούς·
 πᾶρ γὰρ ἐμοὶ θάνατος.

15 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βίου, τούτων

6 τοὺς omitted by M^a P¹, [τοὺς] Susem.¹ || 7 αὐτοκρατόρων Π Bk.¹ || 8 [βασι-
 λεῖα] Susem. and Bernays independently, [ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ] Giph. (untranslated by
 Ar.) Jackson {who would transpose 9 ἐν ταῖς.....έξόδοις before καθάπερ}. Other
 suggestions in my critical edition: add ἑνεκα δειλας Bywater || 9 νομῷ Fäsi (see
 Passow's lexicon) νόμῳ all MSS. edd. || 10 δὲ γὰρ ἀγαμέμνων Π² Bk. || 11 γὰρ Π¹
 Susem.¹⁻², γοῦν Π²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. Susem.³, οὐν P⁴ || 12 μάχης] νοήσων Π¹ (1st
 hand, μάχης is added in the margin by corr.¹); φεύγοντα νοήσω added by Γ (video
 fugientem e prolio William) Susem.¹⁻² (comp. Römer *Sitzungsber. der Münch. Ak.*
 phil. Cl. 1884. II. pp. 270—276, Busse *op. c. p. 34*), φεύγοντα κιχελῶν by Camot, φεύγοντα
 κυρέων an unknown hand on the margin of the Munich Aldine; ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσ-
 σοντα νοήσω Nic. Eth. III. 8. 4. See Comm. n. (619) || 13 λεῖται M^a P¹, ἐσται P⁴

presidency in the Senate and the Popular Assembly, especially as in treating afterwards of monarchy in the heroic age (§ 12 n. 628) he rightly emphasizes the former.

SUSEM. (616)

§ 4 8 εἰ μὴ ἐν τινὶ] "except in a specified case." To the other remedies suggested for this passage Jackson adds the omission of the words 8 ἐν τινὶ βασιλεῖα and the transposition of 9 ἐν ταῖς πο-

λεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις to take their place.

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαλῶν] In general we can observe in the office of the Spartan kings many traces of its descent from the old Greek monarchy of the heroic age. See Schömann p. 227 Eng. tr., Trieber p. 114. SUSEM. (617) So as representing the state in relation to the gods, Her. vi. 57, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 13 § 2, 8, 15 § 1. The Spartan state was the early Greek state of the heroic age, barbarically, not scientifically, martial, and from its simple martial organization free. Elsewhere such a state did historically pass into an oligarchy, as the nobles profited by the decline in the power both of the king and of the assembly of warriors. But the peculiar circumstances of Sparta crystallized

(or shall we say fossilized?) this early form, with just so much of modification (Ephors, Helots &c) as sufficed to secure its maintenance.

9 ἐν χειρὶς νομῷ] in hand to hand encounters.

10 Ἀγαμέμνων γὰρ κτλ] 'For Agamemnon was content to listen to chiding in their debates': e.g. *Iliad* I. 225. SUSEM. (618)

The Homeric 'ecclesia,' or ἀγορά, is not the *βασιλεῖα* of chiefs (as Congreve supposed) but a counterpart of the assembly of citizens in time of peace. See Gladstone *Homeric Studies* II. p. 114 ff., Freeman *Comp. Politics*, pp. 201—207. Grote has unduly depreciated it.

§ 5 11 λέγει γὰρ] *Iliad* II. 391 ff. But in our texts the wording is slightly different, and the last words πᾶρ γὰρ ἐποι θάνατος are wanting. The same lines are also quoted, with a slightly different reading ὅτι δέ καὶ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσοντα νοήσω | οὐδὲν ἄρκιον ἐσσέται φυγέειν κύνας, in Nic. Eth. III. 8. 4 from Il. xv. 349 ff., where the variation from our present reading is still greater. SUSEM. (619)

§ 6 δ' αὶ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αὶ δ' αἱρεταὶ παρὰ ταῦτην δ' (IX) ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' ἐνίοις εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὐται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαὶ διὰ γάρ (p. 25) 20 τὸ δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἥθη εἶναι φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην, ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες. § 7 τυραννικὰ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιούτον εἰσὶν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ πάτριον καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασι- 25 λικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴτιαν. οἱ γάρ πολι- ται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἔνεικον· οἱ μὲν γάρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δὲ ἀκόν- των ἀρχουσιν. ὡσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ 28 τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακήν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα 30 μοναρχίας, ἔτερον δὲ ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλησιν,

18 παραπλαισίαν P³ (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπλησίας P⁴⁻⁶ C⁴ Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^b and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || 19 τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Susem., τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ Γ M^a, τυραννίσι κατὰ P¹ and P² (corr.²), τυραννί κατὰ P³ T^b V^b and P² (1st hand), τυραννική κατὰ C⁴, τυραννικαὶ κατὰ Q^b R^b S^b, τυραννικὴ εἰσὶ δὲ ὅμως κατὰ P⁴⁻⁶ Q M^b U^b L^b, τυραννίσι εἰσὶ δὲ ὅμως κατὰ Ar., τυραννικὴ εἰσὶ δὲ ὅμως κατὰ W^b Ald. Bk. || πατρικάς Γ M^a, πατρικά R^b, πάτριοι? Spengel || 20 τὸ δουλικώτερα P⁴ Q U^b Ar. Ald. δουλικώτερα M^b || εἶναι τὰ ἥθη Bk., εἶναι τὰ θνητὰ Ar. || 24 πάτριαι P² Bk., πατρικά Schneider || 25 αὐτὴν] τοιαύτην? Γ (talem) William Susem.¹⁻², perhaps right || 27 <τὸ> ἔρικόν? Sylburg (wrongly)

16 αὶ 8' αἱρεταὶ] Possibly the ταγδί of Thessaly, called βασιλεῖδες Her. v. 63, Thuc. I. 111; compared with the Roman dictator by Dion. Hal. Greece retained few traces of that older institution common to many Aryan races, an *elective* monarchy or chieftainship but with presumption greatly in favour of a few noble families (βασιλεῖδες = duke, while ἀράξ = noble). See Gladstone *Hom. Stud.* III. 51, Freeman *Comp. Politics*, Lect. IV pp. 114—159.

§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule over unfree subjects (δεσποτική) with their consent and in virtue of traditional forms.

18 παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν] In Eur. *Heracl.* 423, οὐ γάρ τυραννίδ' ὥστε βαρβάρων ἔχω, the rule of non-Greek kings is called a tyranny (Eaton). SUSEM. (670)

19 διὰ γάρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι κτλ.] Comp. I. 2 §§ 2—4 n. (11), IV (VII). 2 § 15, 14 § 21; and notes (54, 780, 781). SUSEM. (621)

20 τὰ ἥθη] This accus. 'of respect' depends on δουλικώτεροι. Comp. 9 § 10 πλῆθος εἰεν μάριοι, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς] firmly established, not to be overthrown (like tyranny). "Yet in 16 § 9, 1287 b 7, as in II § 7, 1281 b 26, and in II. 8 § 16 'safe,' 'trust-worthy' is the meaning." (T. L. Heath.)

24 ἡ φυλακή] From meaning 'self-defence'—see VIII(v). II § 27—the word came to be used in the concrete sense of a protecting force, or body-guard. So also δῆται μῆτε φυλακὴ τρέφηται, VIII(v). II § 8.

26 ἔνεικον] Foreigners, a force of mercenaries. Comp. c. 15 § 10 n. (656), § 14 (666), and especially VIII(v). 10 § 10, φυλακὴ τυραννικὴ διὰ ξένων, n. (666), *Rhet.* I. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 ff., Herod. I. 59 (Eaton). SUSEM. (622)

§ 8 State officers called αἰρεμένηται were appointed anciently in troublous times, some for life, others with a commission to accomplish a definite political task (πράξεων). Hence their analogy to the Roman dictators.

30 ἔτερον δὲ αἱρετὴ τυραννίς] Comp. 15 § 14 n. 667, VII (IV). 10 § 2 nn. (1277—9). In the *Polity of Cyrene* (Fr. 481, 1557 a

οὺς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν (IX)
αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέροντα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ
§ 9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἥρχον δ' οὐ μὲν
διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οὐ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὥρισμένων
35 χρόνων ἡ πράξεων, οἷον εὖλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα-
κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὡν προειστήκεσσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ
§ 10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δῆλοι δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εὖλοντο ε-
τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν ἐπιτιμᾶ γὰρ ὅτι

τὸν κακοπάτριδα

40 Πιττακὸν πόλιος τὰς διχόλων καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
1285 b ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαινέοντες ἀλλέες.

35 οἷαν Μ⁴, οἷαν Ρ¹, οἷαν Ρ⁴ || φιττακόν Π¹ and so subsequently || 38 σκολιῶν
Götting || 40 πόλιος Schneidewin, πόλεως all MSS. edd. || διχόλω Schmidt
Bergk, ἀχόλω or ἀχόλω Μ⁴, ἀχόλω ΓΠ²Ρ¹ Ar. Bk. Susem. 1.2.3., δαχόλω Camerarius
1285 b 1 μέγ'] μέν Γ Μ⁴ and apparently Ρ¹ (1st hand) || παινεντες? II.
L. Ahrens

5 ff. = 476 Rose *Ar. pseuddep.* = 192 Müller) Aristotle stated that in olden times the tyrants were called *aisymnētai* (ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔτι Κυμαῖοι πολιτεῖστος τοὺς τυράννους φησι τὸ πρότερον *aisymnētai* προσαγορεῖσθαι. ἐφημερότερον γὰρ ἐκένο τοῦντα). SUSEM. (623)

31 οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον] For he was constitutionally appointed, although to powers beyond the constitution.

§ 9 35 οἷον ἐλογοτο κτλ] The similar fragment of Theophrastos in Dionys. R. A. v. 73, already mentioned in the Introduction p. 18, n. 7, runs as follows: οἱ γὰρ αἰσυμνῆται καλούμενοι παρ' Ἑλλησι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περι βασιλειᾶς ἴστορει Θεοφραστος, αἱρετοὶ τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι· ἥρθεντο δὲ αἱρετοὶ αἱρετοὶ πάλιν τὰς βασιλικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς ἔχουσας εἰς μέσον, ὅνδμασι περικαλύπτοντες αὐτὰς εὑπερπεπτέρας, θετταλοὶ μὲν ἀρχόντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀρμοστάς καλούμενοις φοβούμενοι τυράννουν ἢ βασιλεῖς αὐτοῖς καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophrastos Πολιτικός πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς π. 1 (in Harpocr. s. v. ἐπίσκοπος) πολλῷ γὰρ καλλιοπεῖ κατὰ γέ τὴν τοῦ ὄνδματος θέσιν, ὡς οἱ Λάκωντες ἀρμοστάς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις πέλκειν, οὐκ ἐπισκόπους οὐδὲ φίλακας, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to Theophrastos." (Henkel *Zur Arist. Pol.* p. 3, n. 1.) SUSEM. (624)

historical position in political development. Originally, he says, there prevailed everywhere in Greece a law-abiding monarchy based on law; but gradually this degenerated into arbitrary rule, and the next step was to a republic. But neither did this prove strong enough to uphold law and right, and thus, through the pressure of circumstances, (*καιροὶ πολλὰ νεοχωνίστες*) they reverted in reality, though not in name, to the establishment of monarchical powers. Compare the words, v. c. 74, ἥταγκεδοντο παράγοντας τάν τὰς βασιλικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς ἔχουσας εἰς μέσον, ὅνδμασι περικαλύπτοντες αὐτὰς εὑπερπεπτέρας, θετταλοὶ μὲν ἀρχόντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀρμοστάς καλούμενοις φοβούμενοι τυράννουν ἢ βασιλεῖς αὐτοῖς καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophrastos Πολιτικός πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς π. 1 (in Harpocr. s. v. ἐπίσκοπος) πολλῷ γὰρ καλλιοπεῖ κατὰ γέ τὴν τοῦ ὄνδματος θέσιν, ὡς οἱ Λάκωντες ἀρμοστάς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις πέλκειν, οὐκ ἐπισκόπους οὐδὲ φίλακας, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to Theophrastos." (Henkel *Zur Arist. Pol.* p. 3, n. 1.) SUSEM. (624)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolian was a particular kind of drinking song, sung by the guests at a party singly in a certain order. Fragments of them may be found in Bergk *Poet. lyr.* III⁴, p. 643 ff. SUSEM. (625)

39 κακοπάτριδα] Does this mean base-born (ἢ εὐταρίδαι)? 'They set up the base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the

§ 11 αὐται μὲν οὖν εἰσί τε καὶ ἡσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ (IX)
εἶναι τυραννικαὶ, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικαὶ·
τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωες
καὶ κούς χρόνους ἐκούσιοι τε καὶ πάτριοι γινόμεναι κατὰ νόμου.
§ 12 διὰ γάρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας
κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγέν ἢ πορίσαι
χώραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνοντοι
πάτριοι. κύριοι δὲ ἡσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας
ιο καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαὶ, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς
δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐποίουν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὀμηνύοντες
οἱ δὲ ὀμηνύοντες· ὁ δὲ ὄρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις. (p. 86)

² δεσποτικαὶ.....3 τυραννικαὶ Sepulveda, 3 τυραννικαὶ.....3 δεσποτικαὶ Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 5 ἐκόντων M^a, ἐκόνται.....πάτριαι Π² Bk. || 8 βασιλεῖαι Casaubon, perhaps right || 10 οὐσιῶν Π¹, γρ. οὐσιῶν P⁴ in the margin || 12 ἐπανάτασις M^a Π¹⁻⁴ and P² (1st hand, emended by the same hand), ἀνάστασις Q^b T^b, γρ. ἀνάστασις corr.¹ in the margin of P² and under the text of P³

wrathful ill-fated town with loud cries assenting in full assembly' (Wyse). Or is it 'bane to his country'?

40 **Πίττακὸν**] See Exc. II. on this book, p. 451 ff. SUSEM. (626)

§ 11 1285 b 2 διὰ τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαὶ κτλ] These two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves: hence they come under coercive or arbitrary rule (*δεσποτεῖλα*, c. 6 § 6 f. with notes). Xerxes is οὐχ ἐπενθυμος πόλει, Aesch. *Persae* 213; Pittacus is *ἀλερδὸς τύραννος*. So far they are akin to the rule of an usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As Aristotle says they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).

4 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωικοὺς χρόνους] The monarchies of the heroic age are described by Grote, Part I c. 20; Gladstone *Studies on Homer* II. pp. 1—69. See also Freeman *Comp. Politics* Lect. IV. and Lect. II. p. 64 ff.

§ 12 6 διὰ γάρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους...εὐεργέτας] Comp. c. 15 § 11 (ἀπ' εὐεργεταῖς) n. (659) and VIII(v), 10 § 3 καθ' ἐπεροχὴν ἀρέτης ἡ πρόξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρέτης, n. (1649). SUSEM. (627)

7 κατὰ τέχνας] In the arts (of peace).

He is probably thinking of the mythical inventors.

8 τοῖς παραλαμβάνοντι πάτριοι] 'heeditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elected. Comp. Ridge-way *The Land Tenure in Homer* in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* VI. 1885, p. 337: the *τέμενος* of Odysseus is by no means secure to Telemachos, *Odys.* XI. 184 f.

10 καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν κτλ] "Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites," e.g. like the Eumolpids (Jebb). So Saul, the Israelitish king, is described as offering sacrifice.

11 τοῦτο = the judicial functions. It is not the 'coronation oath' that is in question, as Mr Lang assumed, *Essays* p. 23.

12 τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις] 'The form of oath consisted in the act of uplifting the sceptre.' Comp. *Iliad* I. 233 f. ἐπὶ μέγαν ὄρκον δμοῦμαι· ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, VII. 412 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνάσχει πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, X. 321 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνάσχει καὶ μαὶ δμοσσον; also n. (616) generally. SUSEM. (628)

The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while Homer calls the thing sworn by (*σκῆπτρον*, *Ζεὺς* VII. 411 &c.) ὄρκος, Aristotle gives the name to the solemn accompanying act.

§ 13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαῖων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλιν
καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχώς ἥρχον· ὅστερον
15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν
σχλῶν παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριοι
θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον
εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλέαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.

§ 14 βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμόν, χ
21 μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικὸς χρόνους (αὗτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων
μέν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις στρατηγός τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικα-
στῆς ὁ βασιλεύς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα
δὲ ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτικὴ
25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσυμνητεῖαν προσαγορεύουσιν
(αὕτη δέ ἐστιν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Λακωνικὴ
τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλᾶς εἰπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ
30 γένος ἀδίος) αὕται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δὲ εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἡ πάντων
35 κύριος εἴς ὧν ὕσπερ ἔκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη τῶν

13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αἱ πάτραι M^a, omitted by II² Ar. Bk. || οὐδεὶς II¹ ||
|| 18 εἶναι] καὶ Koraes || 22 ὠρισμένων M^a II² Ar. (?) || τε omitted by II² Bk.
|| 27 εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς II² Bk. || 30 εἰς omitted by Γ M^a Q^b T^b || ὕσπερ Bücheler,
probably right, [ὕσπερ.....ἔκαστη] Conring

§ 13. 14 τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] *op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441*, whence these
domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κτλ.] As the kings
themselves resigned some of their func-
tions, while others were taken from them
by the populace.' παραιρουμένων=shred-
ding or paring off, as in c. 5 § 8.

16 ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀλλαις κτλ.] Thus at
Athens the second of the nine Archons
especially superintended religious worship
and bore the title of King Archon, as the
successor in this respect of the ancient
kings. Comp. further Herod. III. 142, IV.
161 (kings at Cyrene), VII. 149 (kings at
Argos), 153; also VII(VI). 8 § 10 n.
(1482) below and n. (1653) on VIII(V). 10
§ 6. SUSEM. (629) For the
functions of the King Archon (whose wife
was βασιλισσα, as the wife of the Roman
'rex sacrorum' was called 'regina') see
also Lysias c. *Andocidem.* Or. 6 §§ 4, 5:
on the Argive kings Pausanias II. 19 § 1
and Plutarch *De fort. Alex.* II § 8, p.
340 D: and in general on these shadowy
survivals of a former real kingship, in-
cluding the interrex and rex sacrorum or
sacrificulus. Dion. Hal. IV. 74, Plutarch
Quaest. Rom. 63, p. 279 C, and Freeman

op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these
references are taken.

17 ὅπου δὲ ἄξιον sc. ἦν; where it de-
served to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον] This is de-
cidedly too strong an assertion, see n.
(616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings
are mentioned, it is more correctly limited
by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἰπεῖν, for the
most part. SUSEM. (630) The
Argive kings belonged to this class of
commanders in war: Herod. VII. 149.

§ 14. 22 ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὠρισμένοις] On
certain fixed conditions: ἐπὶ ὥραις γέρασι
πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, Thuc. I. 13.

24 ἐκ γένους = κατὰ γένος, hereditary.

27 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] See n. (630)
and II. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι οὐδεὶς
στρατηγοῖς διδοῖς, n. (343). SUSEM.
(631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all
the foregoing, so far as they are limited
or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a
monarchy answering to the art of house-
hold management, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν
οἰκονομίην: cf. I. 1 § 2.

30 ὕσπερ ἔκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις
ἔκαστη] Like each separate barbarian

κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ (X) οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ^{<παμ>}βασιλεία πόλεως [καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἡ πλειόνων] οἰκονομία.

15 σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἴδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκε-
35 πτέον, αὐτῇ τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μετα-
ξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν. ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασι-

31 τεταγμένων Montecatino: Bücheler rightly thinks no change needed; if any, he prefers τεταγμένης || 32 παμβασιλεία Susem., βασιλεία Γ Ar. Bk. See vi(iv). 10 § 3, 1295 a 19 || 33 [καὶ.....πλειόνων] Susem.², see Comm. n. (633) || καὶ] ἡ Ms. || πλειόνων Ms. II³ and P^{2,3} (1st hand, altered by corr.¹). Postgate explains this as the gen. of πλειόνων used as a subst. || οἰκονομίας P² II³ and P² (1st hand, altered by corr.¹ or corr.²) || 36 βασιλείας II³

tribe or Hellenic city. Comp. nn. (11. 633). SUSEM. (632)

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομίᾳ] It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as M¹ gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see 1. 2. 4 n. 11) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpolator has been misled by the preceding words ἔκστον ἔθνους καὶ πόλεως, and has made the mistake into which since his time many modern critics have fallen (see *Introd.* p. 26 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also vi(iv). 10 § 3 and n. (1280). SUSEM. (633)

Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be δεσποτική, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

*Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question: §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, *Esprit des Lois* B. xi cc. 8, 9.*

§ 1 35 αἱ πολλαὶ] The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the παμβασιλεῖς; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as δεσποτική ἀρχή from οἰκονομική in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy: but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (δουλεύεται τὰ ἡθη) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) heredity, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 ἐλαττόνων μὲν...παμβασιλείας] Of the 'despotic' kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarz rightly charges him, in *Die Staatsformenlehre des Aris.* p. 32 f. (Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. [To the former is opposed any *arbitrary* or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (*δρᾷται πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν*): to the latter is opposed only the *usurped* rule of the *τύραννος*.]

To what extent may this also be assert-

§ 2 λείας, πλειόνων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν (X) περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἀλδιον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ αὐρεσιν,
1286 a ἡ οὐ συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερόν ποτε ἔνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἡ οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῦν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), (p. 87)
§ 3 ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἶδος ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσιας.

ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὐτῇ, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον

39 αἱρεσιν P⁴⁻⁶ L⁸ Ar., μέρος Π¹ P²⁻⁸ Q^b T^b W^b Ald. Bk., ἀρετὴν Bas.^b in the margin

1286 a 1 ποτε omitted by Π² Ar. Bk., perhaps rightly || 3 ἔχει] ἔχεται omitting εἶδος? Bernays

ed of the *αἰσχυνητεῖα*? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the *αἰσχυνήτης* too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the *αἰσχυνήτης* himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUSEM. (634)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος=presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. ἔχειν as in ἔχειν λόγων 1. 6 § 9, or ἀποτελεῖν, III. 10 § 1, II. § 1, § 10, 12 § 1: and so ἔχει δ' ἔκάτερα χάριν, *De Part. anim.* 1. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with εἶδος is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν δργάσον εἶσει, I. 4 § 2. A better example is *Rhet.* II. 22 § 1, 1395 b 21, δῆλο γὰρ εἶδος ἔκάτερον (*Bekker* ἔκατερον) τούτων ἐστίν. Trans. 'a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4 ἐν ἀπόστασι] Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669).
SUSEM. (635)

5 ἀφείσθω] 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his *Politics*. See *Introd.* p. 33 n. 1. SUSEM. (636)

τὴν πρώτην=at the first, as in *Meta. Z* (vii). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τοσαῦτα

εἰρήσθω τὴν πρώτην. In Herod. I. 153 τὴν πρώτην ἔιναι: cf. III. 134. In *Probl.* II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης=ἔξι ἀρχῆς.

§ 3 5 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ.] "But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution; hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed." Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. παμβασίεια. See *nn.* on c. 17 § 1. For ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like ἐπεκθεῖν, comp. *Rhet.* I. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16; a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from *Introd.* pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from *Philologus* XXV. 1867, pp. 386—392. Its *rationale* is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (*εἰδι δὲ*)...§ 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See *Anal.* p. 112 f.

First ἀποτελεῖ: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth ἀποτελεῖ stated in 16 §§ 2—4.

(X)

§ 4 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχεσθαι ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. δο-⁴
 10 καὶ δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον ὁ
 νόμος λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν. ὥστε
 ἐν δοιασοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἄρχειν ἡλίθιον· καὶ πως
 ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἱατροῖς,
 ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὡς
 15 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία
 § 5 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεινον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν
 τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν· κρείττον δὲ φίλον
 πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν δλως ἡ φίλον συμφυέσ. τῷ μὲν οὖν
 νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τοῦτο
 20 ἔχειν πᾶσαν.

9 δοκοῦντι Bas.³ Bk. || 10 οὐ νόμος Götting, οἱ νόμοι ΓΠ Ar. Bk. || 12 <ἄστερ>
 καὶ Conring, <καθά> καὶ Koraes || πῶς M³, omitted by P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. Bk. and
 P⁴ (1st hand), <ἄστερ> πῶς <καὶ> ? Susem. || 13 τριήμερον Γ M² Ar., τετρήμερον
 Γ¹ Π² Bk. || 14 αὐτὸῦ Π¹ Π² Bk., αὐτῶν M³, αὐτῶν perhaps Ar., αὐτῶν an unknown
 scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel's edition, also Schneider following
 Vettori's translation || 17 δέ] γάρ Koraes, wrongly || 19 τούτῳ Ald., τούτῳ P³
 and P² (1st hand)

§ 4 Argument in favour of monarchy.

9 δοκεῖ δὴ κτλ] Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

"This side is defended in Plato's *Politicus* 294—303. Cp. c. 11 § 19 n. (579), c. 16 § 11 nn. (652—3), II. 8 §§ 18—22 n. (275), VI (IV). 4 § 31 (1210)." SUSEM. (637)

12 ἐν δοιασοῦν τέχνῃ...ἡλίθιον] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, *Polit.* 298—9.

καὶ πῶς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 295 C. See II. 8 § 18 n. (270), III. 16 § 6 (726), IV (VII). 2 § 13 (870). SUSEM. (638)

13 μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον...κινδύνῳ] "After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk." Herodotus (II. 84) does not mention this, but Diodoros I. 82 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription, they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not

easy to determine which of the readings, τριήμερον or τετρήμερον, is correct. That μελέτην must be understood with τὴν τριήμερον or τὴν τετρήμερον, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 F τεσταρακονθήμερον τὴν μελέτην καὶ τὴν ἐπίδεσιν χρή τισθεῖσαι. Herodotus II. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the corn country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Diodoros § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all. SUSEM. (639)

14 φανερὸν τοίνυν κτλ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5 Reply to this argument.

15 ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκεινον κτλ] "But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned: yet that which has no emotional nature" viz. the law "is in general superior to that in which it is innate."

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ κτλ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); *Nū. Eth.* v. 6 § 5, 1134 a 35; x. 9 § 12, 1180 a 21 (Eaton). SUSEM. (640)

19 τοῦτο ξεν] sc. τὸ παθητικόν, οτ (10 § 5) τὰ συμβαλνούτα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.

c. 16 § 5
1287 a 28

<κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θέδν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μό-
30 <νους, ὁ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἢ τε γὰρ
<ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τὸν ἀριστον

20 ἀλλα..... 1287 b 34 ὅμοιος. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See *Introd.* 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson's resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10 = 16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel's proposals.

1287 a 28—b 8. a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν..... 32 ἐστίν cited by Julian ad *Themistium* p. 261 B || νόμον] II Ar. and the Codex Vossianus of Julian, νοῦν Γ Julian and Bk.¹ || 29 δοκεῖ..... ἄρχειν omitted by the Cod. Voss. of Julian || θέδν] γρ. νοῦν corr.¹ of P¹ and corr.² of P² (both in the margin) ἀλλως νοῦν corr. of P⁴ in the margin || τὸν νοῦν μόνον Cod. Voss. of Julian, νοῦν νόμον Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Julian and Bk.¹ || 30 θηρία Cod. Voss. of Julian perhaps rightly || ἢ τε] ὁ τε Μ^a, ὅτε Γ || 31 τοῦτον Cod. Voss. of Julian || ἄρχοντας omitted by Julian, ἄρχον τέλος Γ? (*et furor principatum habuerit, tandem et optimos viros interimet* William), ἄρχων τέλος or ἄρχων <κατὰ> στάς τέλος? Schmidt

Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1)
Law is passionless and therefore its rule is the better; § 5.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] Whether οὖν marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there too οὖν would have no force.

νόμον... νοῦν μόνον] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words *ad Themist. 261 c D* δόξις, ὁ φιλόσοφος... τέλος ἐπιθετικὸν κολοφωνικὰ τοῖς ἐμπροσθετοῖς λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἰσαὶ φροτὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὀρέξεως) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θέδν καὶ τὸν νόμον, ὁ δ' ἀνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρία· ἢ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τὸν ἀπλούτον ἀνθρακας. ὅπερ ἀνεὶ ὀρέξεως δὲ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τὸν νοῦν μόνον, the corruption of which into τὸν νόμον is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See *Julian and Aristotle* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol. CXVII.* 1878 p. 389f. SUSEM.

Trans. 'he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers, it would seem; he who

appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutes, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unfettered by passion.'

30 προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον] Best explained by the Platonic simile in *Rep. IX.* 588 B C: the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (*τὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν*).

ἢ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller *Plato* p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (i. 5 § 6 n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Häcker seems to assume in his treatise *On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics* (Berlin 1863, 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, βούλησις. At any rate Häcker's careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμὸς on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμὸς then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unin-

16 § 6 <ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἀνευ ὄρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν. τὸ⁵
 <δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ
 <γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἴρετώτερον χρῆ-
 16 § 7 <σθαι τοὺς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οὐ μὲν γάρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν
 36 <παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
 <κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
 <πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 <τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοὺς ἔχθροῖς δια-
 40 <φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν

32 ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδρας Π² fr. Julian Bk. and P¹ (in the margin), φθείρει P¹ (1st hand, marked by dots for erasure), interimet William || ὁ νοῦς νόμος M² fr. Julian and P¹ (1st hand): no doubt Γ also. The full text of this older recension was ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων.....τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νόμον, ὁ δὲδιαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους.....διόπερ ἀνευ ὄρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἔστιν, which gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other || νόμος] μόνος Cod. Voss. of Julian || 34 γράμμα M² P¹ fr. || καὶ omitted by fr. [καὶ] Susem.³⁻⁴, ἀλλὰ untranslated by Ar., [ἀλλὰ] Schneider || 35 φιλίαν <ἢ ἔχθραν> Spengel (hardly needless) || 36 ἀρνοῦνται M² Ar. and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || 39 πιστευθέντας] πισθέντας Schneider Bk.², probably right

peded activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit *θυμός* to external reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in *Nic. Eth.* vii. 6. 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master's opinion from the pupil's, and assume that in *θυμός* the idea of displeasure at oneself was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, IV(vii). 7. 2 n. (781), are the principal manifestations of *θυμός*, indeed *θυμός* is sometimes actually used for "Anger," sometimes for "Courage." As regards Häcker's second statement, the conception of *θυμός* in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere warding off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks IV(vii). 7. 5, n. (786), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call "the affections." On this analogy however, Fear should belong to it as well as Courage (*Top.* IV. 5. 4 126 a 8 f.) but scarcely, as Eaton supposes, all the passions in contrast to Desire. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Häcker and Brandis (*Gr.*

Röm. Phil. III i p. 140) suppose, that Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled *ὁ θυμός apud Aristotalem Platонemque* P. Meyer has not been more fortunate than Häcker in his account of the Aristotelian distinction between *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* and Aristotle's conception of both; and the matter is no clearer than before. Compare Susemihl in *Bursian's Jahresher.* 1876, v. p. 264 ff.; also III. 10. 5 with n. (562 b) and notes 182, 790, 839, 935, 1704, 1741. SUSEM. (641)

(2) *The analogy of the 'arts' is misleading; for there (e.g. in medicine) personal motives do not come in:* §§ 6, 7. In *Nic. Eth.* II. 4 §§ 2, 3 he points out that the [Socratic] analogy of the arts and moral conduct is seriously defective.

§ 7 35 οὐ μὲν κτλ] 'the physicians do not act unreasonably out of personal liking; on the contrary they earn their fee by healing patients,' so that their interest lies in effecting cures and this coincides with their 'art.'

38 πρὸς ἐπίρειαν καὶ χάριν] "to spite (men) and to win favour; since when people once suspect their doctors are pledged to their enemies for gain" i.e. have been bribed "to make away with them, they will in that case more urgently require to be treated according to written rules."

(XII)

c. 16 § 8 <ζητήσαιεν ἀν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἁ
 1287 b <οἱ ἱατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἱατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-
 <μναξόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς
 <διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον
 4 <ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὃ δὲ νόμος τὸ
 <μέσον.

c. 16 § 9 <ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 5 <νόμῳν οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσὶν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 <ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ
 8 <τὸ ἔθος. >

1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἵσως ἀν φαῖη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-
 1286 a 21 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον.

1287 b 2 τὸ ἀληθὲς..... 3 κρίνειν omitted by P⁴-Q^b T^b || 4 δὲ Thurot, γὰρ Γ
 II (including fr.) Ar. Bk. || 6 ὥστ' (ὥστε M^a) εἰ Π¹ Αρ., ὥστε Π² Bekk., ὥστ' εἰ
 <καὶ> Schneider

§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainers in their practice (call in) other trainers, which implies that they cannot here judge aright, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling."

1287 b 3 Βαῦ τὸ κρίνων κτλ] Comp.
 c. 9 § 2 n. (542). SUSEM. (642)

ὥστε δῆλον κτλ] "Hence it is clear that whoso seeks what is just and right seeks an impartial middleman: now the law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middleman' stands between the two contending sides and is therefore of neither side, i.e. is impartial. Comp. VI(IV), 12 § 5; πανταχοῦ δέ πιστότατος ὁ διαιργῆς, διαιργῆς δ' ὁ μέσος, n. (1314), and Nic. Eth. v. 4 § 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ἴησον δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλούσιν Ἰησού μεσόδον. SUSEM. (643) Add Thuc. IV. 63, ἐποίεις ὦ Βρασίδη μέσω δικαστῆς ἐπιτρέπειν.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυριώτεροι] more authoritative. Comp. n. (48), on I. 6 § 1, and VII(vi), 5 § 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph. Antig. 580 ff. SUSEM. (644)

See Cope *Introd. to the Rhetoric* pp. 239—244. He shows that τὸ ἐπιεκτές, Equity, is a special application of κοινὸς νόμος, which as universal law, or the law of nature, is opposed to positive, conventional and written laws; that both κοινὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπιεκτές are designated *unwritten law*, ἀγράφα νόμοι, *Rhet.* I. 13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond

to the ἔθη and ἐπιτρέπειν of Plato *Laws* 793 D. Comp. *Politic.* 295 A, *Laws* 680 A; Demosth. *De Cor.* p. 317, 20 ff.: Thuc. II. 37 s. fin.

6 εἰ... 7 ἀλλὰ] Even granting a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law, still he is not so safe as the law of social custom.

c. 15 § 5 1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἵσως ἀν φαῖη τις...καλλιον] "But perhaps some one will say that to compensate for this [a human ruler] will be better able to advise on particular cases." This sentence evidently belongs to the first *ἀπορία*, advocating like c. 15 § 4 the claims of the human ruler, though in a modified manner. But the words following in the mss., c. 15 § 6, are in no definite logical connexion; so that translators are at a loss to make any intelligible sequence, Jowett for instance inserting [to whom we in turn make reply:] after this sentence, though he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ τρὸς τοῦτο ἀπορεῖσθαι before the διη or to omit the τρὸν after it: while Bernays translates "to this objection one might perhaps reply &c.", and separates off the next sentence by a break.

c. 16 §§ 4, 5 1287 a 23—28 This is at any rate a valid objection to the modified view just proposed, and is clearly still concerned with the first *ἀπορία*. "But yet in any cases where the law seems unable to decide, a man would equally be unable. Whereas the law gives a suitable training and then sets the magistrates to decide and manage all other matters 'to the best of their judgment.'"

1. 16 § 4
1287 a 23

<ἀλλὰ μὴν (XI)

24 <*ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος*6 § 5 25 <*ἄν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος*26 <*ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν*27 <*τὸν ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπανορθῶσθαι δίδωσιν, ὃ τι ἄν δόξῃ*28 <*πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.*>1. 15 § 6
1286 a 21

ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν (X)

22 ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κεῖσθαι νόμους,

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνοντας, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἀλλων

εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ

25 ὅλως ἢ εὐ, πότερον ἔνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας;

§ 7 ||*καὶ γάρ τον συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βούλευονται καὶ κρί-
νουσιν, αὗται δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκα-
στον. καθ' ἔνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἵσως χείρων.*

1287 a 23—28 24 οὐδὲ] δὲ δ' Ar. (accepted by Vettori and Schneider) || 25 <*τὸ
καθόλον > ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας* Susem.^{1,2} wrongly (and similarly Schneider and Koraes),
universale William (from a gloss in Γ on ἐπίτηδες): *παιδεύσας* omitted by II¹ || 27
Ἐτι δὲ <*πάντας*> Susem,^{1,2} wrongly, following William's version (*adhuc autem omnia
dirigere dant*)

1286 a 21—25 25 δεῖ ἄρχειν] δεῖ διαιρεῖν οὐ διαιρεῖν ? Koraes || πάντας] πάντα
P²-S⁵-Q^b T^b Ald., γρ. πάντα p¹ in the margin, πολλοὺς Ar.

1286 a 26—b 3=1287 b 15—35. See *Introd.* p. 84 f., the parallel columns.1286 a 27 al κρίσεις εἰσι II² Bk.

1287 a 26 τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρί-
νειν] The standing expression apparently
used of the judge: the heliastae took
this oath, says Demosthenes, XXIII, c.
Aristocr. § 96 p. 652 s. fin. γνώμῃ τῇ δι-
καιοτάτῃ δικάστων διωρόκαστρ, cpr. *adv.*
Lept. § 180, p. 493, ι καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐν νόμοι
μὴ δῷσι γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ κρίνειν [διωρό-
καστρότε], *Pollux VIII.* 10 § 122, δὲ δ'
ὅρκος ἢ τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι
εἰσι, ψηφίσθωσι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ
ῶν μὴ εἰσι, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ. (Eaton).
SUSEM. 646

Aristotle remarks in *Rhet.* I. 15 § 5,
1375 a 29 f. that the oath may be ex-
plained to mean τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.

27 ἐπανορθῶσθαι] “and allows them
to adopt any correction which appears
upon trial to be an improvement upon the
established laws.” The play upon words
ἐπανορθῶσθαι...κειμένων is quite accidental.

On behalf of the place here assigned
to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28 it may be
urged (1) that the plurals (*τοὺς ἄρχοντας,
πειρωμένοις*) are not appropriate to the
transition from the first to the second
ἀπορία, and (2) that only in this way do

the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβα-
νούσι become intelligible.

c. 15 § 6 Transition to the second
ἀπορία. If it be allowed that there is
a province (viz. that of particular cases)
in which the decision of the laws is insuffi-
cient, should it be supplemented by
the one best citizen as ruler, or by the
entire community?

1286 a 22 αὐτὸν] that he (viz. the
ruler). Otherwise Eaton, “that there be
some one to make laws.”

23 οὐ παρεκβαίνοντας] “but should
not be unalterably binding where they are
wrong.” This refers to the gradual cor-
rection of the established laws just men-
tioned, c. 16 § 5.

§ 7 With §§ 7—9 compare the parallel
version c. 16 §§ 10—13, printed in parallel
columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνιόντες] The subject is πάντες
sc. οἱ πολῖται, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἄκαστον] Cpr. *Rhet.*
I. 1 § 8 περὶ τῶν γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,
ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,
§ 7 περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων.

28 καθ' ἄκα] Taken individually
χείρων inferior [to the one best citizen].

ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἔστιασις συμφορητὸς (X)
 30 καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τούτο καὶ κρίνει ἀμεινον
 § 8 ὅχλος πολλὰ ἡ εἰς ὄστισον. ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ ε
 πολύ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν
 ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γάρ ἐνὸς ὑπ’ ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος
 ἡ τινος ἔτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρί-
 35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἔργον ἄμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.
 § 9 ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλήθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον (p. 88)
 πράττοντες, ἀλλ’ ἡ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν.
 εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ’ εἰ πλείους εἰεν
 ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖς καὶ πολῦται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώ-
 40 τερος ἄρχων, ἡ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ

29 [ὥσπερ.....30 ἀπλῆς] Oncken || 30 κρίνει M^o II^o || 32 καθάπερ <γάρ>
 Bk.^o, rashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristote-
 lian. Cp. Vahlen Zeitschr. f. d. öst. Gymn. XVIII. p. 721 ff. || 33 γάρ Susem., δ Γ
 Π Ar. Bk. || 37 ὃν P²³⁴, ὃν Q^o T^o || 38 τοῦτο μὴ II^o Bk.

29 ἔστιασις συμφορητὸς] “a feast to which many contribute.” Cp. 11 § 2, n.
 (564). SUSEM. (646)

§ 8 31 ἔτι μᾶλλον...33 ἀδιαφθορώ-
 τερον] Vahlen has illustrated this con-
 struction, viz. a simile breaking the prin-
 cipal sentence (often worked out into
 elaborate detail) and a resumption of the
 main thought with *οὗτον* asyndeton, from
 VI(IV). 3 § 6, 1290 a 11—15; Nic. Eth.
 VII. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31, *ἴσοις γάρ θύμοις*
ἄκοντεν μέν τι τῷ λόγῳ, παρακούειν
δέ, καθάπερ...θλακτοῖσιν οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς
κτλ.; De Soph. El. 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30,
*συμβαλνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς δια-
 γράμμασιν· καὶ γάρ ἐκεῖ δυαλύσαντες ἐντοτε*
συνθένται πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν
*τοῖς ἀλέγοντος εἰδότες παρ’ δὲ λόγος συμ-
 βαλνει συνέραι διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦ-
 μεν; Poet. 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13, ἐπει δὲ*
μίμησις ἔστω ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιώνων, ἥπας
δὲ μιρέσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν εἰκονογράφους·
καὶ γάρ ἐκεῖνα· γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν
ποιητὴν κτλ.; De Anima II. 8 § 10, 420 b
*17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (*οὗτος οὖν* the*
*text, οὕτω καὶ the other recension or para-
 phrase of E), III. 7 § 7, 431 b 12 ff.*
*Comp. I. 3 § 9, 406 b 15—20 (*ὅμοιως δέ**
κατ...), Rhel. III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 22—25, τὰ
δέ μικρά ἀπολεῖσθαι ποιεῖ ὠσπερ...ὅμοιως
*δέ καὶ al περιβοι κτλ., where the resump-
 tion is not asyndeton. “Add Pol. 1. 4 § 3,
 1253 b 33—39, II. 6 § 14, 1265 b 20 f.,*
III. 7 § 6, 1277 a 5 ff., v(VIII). 7 § 7,
1342 a 22 ff.” SUSEM.

ἀδιαφθορον] “incorruptible,” not merely
 by bribes, but by any passion.

32 τὸ πλήθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθ.] Yet when, Rhet. I. 1 § 7, he is com-
 paring the functions of the dicast and
 of the laws he expresses an opinion which
 it is difficult to reconcile with this, ὅτι
 ἔνα λαζαίν καὶ δλ[γον]ς ῥάον ἡ πολλούς
 εν φρονήτας καὶ διναμένος χρηματεῖν
 καὶ δικάζειν.

33 ἐκεῖ δὲ ἔργον] “But in the other
 case it is improbable” lit. difficult, see
 II. 7 § 3 n., “that all should err at
 once.”

34 ἐκεῖ δὲ ἔργον...ἀμαρτεῖν] This is hard-
 ly correct. A large assembly is more
 likely to be led into over-hasty con-
 clusions than a single capable man and
 ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a
 large assembly, the passion does not
 generally last so long; and they more
 easily regain composure; while a single
 ruler, if once misled by inclination or
 hatred, may easily confound obstinacy
 and stubbornness with energy, so that
 there is greater danger that he will mis-
 use his unlimited power. SUSEM. (647)

35 36 μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κτλ.] “not acting against the law except,” i.e.
 only acting against the law in cases where
 it [i.e. the law] must necessarily be de-
 fective.

38 ἐν πολλοῖς = ἐν τῷ πλήθει line 36.
 δλ[γον]ς al πλείους] “at least suppose a
 majority to be good men and good citizens.” A majority, though not the whole
 body of citizens.

40 οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] Num-
 erous enough, indeed, in the best state, to

^{1286 b} § 10 δὲ πάντες; ἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν στασιάσουσιν (X)
οὐ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἵσως ὅτι
σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κάκεινος ὁ εἰς ||.

c. 16 § 9 ^{1287 b 8} <ἀλλὰ μήν οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἔνα· δεήσει^(XI)
9 <ἄρα πλείους εἶναι τὸν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἀρχοντας,
10 <ῶστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἔνα
11 <καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἴπερ, ὁ καὶ πρότερον
12 <εἰρημένον ἔστιν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἀρχειν
13 <δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ
14 <σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένω
καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

15 <τοιοῦτοι δίκαιοι συμφράδμονες. >

1286 b 1 δὲ πάντες] δ' ἄρδες Γ M^a || στασιάζουσιν Ar. Morel Bk.

1287 b 8–15 8 πολλὰ omitted by P^a Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. and P^a.⁴ (1st hand, added in
the margin of P^a, and by a later hand in P^b, but afterwards erased) || 9 υφ' αὐτοῦ fr.
11 δ.....12 ἔστιν before εἰ περ Γ II Ar. Bk.; transposed by Susem.³ See Comm. n.
(649) || 13 ὅτι Camerarius, γε Böcker; but see Bonitz *Ind. Arist.* 167 a 19 ff. ||
14 ἐρχομένων Γ M^a fr. || 15 δέκα] δὲ M^a, untranslated by William || ὡς οὐχ ίνα·
λοιπόν (iam William) ἀρχειν δίκαιον added by Γ M^a after συμφράδμονες; a gloss which
has found its way into the text, given by p^a, and in red ink on the margin of P¹, in
the more correct and fuller form ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τὸ ως οὐχ ίνα λοιπόν ἀρχειν δίκαιον

form the popular assembly and to appoint
the council, the magistrates and the courts
of justice from themselves alone—or,
more precisely, from the older members
amongst them, provided they are not too
old: see IV(vii). 14 § 5, n.(817). SUSEM.
(648)

§ 10 1286 b 1 ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν κτλ] Ob-
jection. “A larger body will split up
into parties; with the one ruler this is
impossible. To which we must, I take
it, reply that they are (*ex hypothesi*) as
virtuous in soul as that one ruler.”

c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1287 b 8–15. The place
of this fragment is vindicated by the
congruence between its subject-matter and
the foregoing. The contrast is still be-
tween ὁ εἰς and πλεῖοι.

*The one ruler cannot overlook all things
himself: he must appoint a number of
officials; so that the state of things is
virtually the same as if there were a
number [i.e. a large body of the citizens]
ruling.*

1287 b 10 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν]
‘Whether this was the original state of
things’ as it would be if the great body of
citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 δ καὶ πρότερον κτλ] In c.

13 § 8, §§ 13–25. See also c. 15 § 3
s. fin. If we followed the manuscript
order we should have to translate: “Last-
ly, as was remarked before, if the vir-
tuous man deserves to rule because he
is superior”: but then it would follow
that the apodosis (*τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς...βελτίους*)
also occurred in the preceding chapters.
But in the two passages which alone are
conceivable and to which Bernays refers us
c. 11 §§ 1–3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not
find this, but something really quite dif-
ferent and only comparatively similar. Or
could it have occurred in the lacuna which
we assume after 13 § 5? This is hardly
likely. We must therefore transpose
thus; “if, as was previously remarked,
the virtuous man &c.” SUSEM. (649)

13. τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis
after εἰ cp. *Phys.* IV. 8 § 11, 215 b 15, εἰ
γάρ τὰ τέτταρα τῶν τριῶν ὑπερέχει ἐνι,
πλεονὶ δὲ τοῦ δυοῖν...τοῦ δὲ μηδενὸς οὐ-
σέτι ἔχει λόγον φ' ὑπερέχει. With ἀλλὰ
this is frequent: see e.g. c. 5 § 3 of this
book.

14 σύν τε δύ' ἐρχομένων] Homer *Iliad*
x. 224. SUSEM. (650)
ἡ εὐχὴ] Agamemnon says this of
Nestor, *Iliad* ii. 372 f. SUSEM. (651)

1286 b 3

εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τ

4 τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχῆν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἀν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὕστης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀν δὲ λαβεῖν πλείους ὄμοίους.

§ 11 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἵσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε τοι μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὄμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐξήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.

§ 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γενόμενοι ἔχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κουιῶν, §

1286 b 3—1287 a 23 1286 b 7 ὄμοιος Γ ΙΙ³ Ar. || 9 πολὺ plures Ar., πολλοὺς Sylburg || 10 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἐπει δ' Susem.^{1,2,3} with all earlier authorities || ἐπι δ'.....11 ἀνδρῶν Krohn rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐπειδὴ disposes of his doubts. See Comm. n. (659) || 13 καὶ <ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ> πολιτείαν? Susem. || 14 γιγνόμενοι Π² Bk.¹, γνόμενοι Bk.²

c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν...
5 θετέον] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.

SUSEM. (655)

6 καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως] "whether the king has an armed force granted to him or not." Cp. § 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (656)

7 ἀν δὲ λαβεῖν κτλ] "provided always a majority can be found of uniform excellence." In fact an 'assembly of kings' as Kineas said of the Roman senate. ὄμοιος as in 4 § 5, and as in 15 § 11 ὄμοιος πρὸς ἀρετήν.

In §§ 11—13 (ἴηματα), we have a sort of historical appendix to the first two ἀπορίαι.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτλ] The immediate reason is rather to be sought—as Aristotle himself explains I. 2 § 6, n. (19 b)—in the development of the state from the family through the intermediate link of the village-community. It would have been better therefore to repeat that fact and then to add that on account of the further reason which is here adduced kingly rule was maintained for some time longer. Cp. n. (659). SUSEM. (657)

9 τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις] "considering too the small size of the cities in which they lived then." Comp. § 13 n. (663), and the passages there collected. SUSEM. (658)

10 ἐπειδὴ διπ' εὐεργεσίας κτλ] It

would have been highly desirable to adjust this second reason to the first. For if monarchy is traced back on the one hand to the government of a community by its elders, and on the other to personal merit, the two causes cannot simply be at once combined, though a partial combination is not only conceivable, but even right. Aristotle however has neglected to make it, and has thus left a difficulty unsolved. For when Henkel writes *Stud.* p. 95, 'but even in places where the original connexion between the state and the organization of the family no longer exercised a determining influence, it was only monarchy that grew up in the beginnings of civilization,' adducing the second reason to explain this, he is quite right, but unfortunately there is nothing of the kind in Aristotle. See also VIII(v). 10. 3 n. (1649). SUSEM. (659)

12 συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς κτλ] Comp. VIII(v). 10 § 37 n. (1708). "They would no longer submit to the rule of a king, but strove after a commonwealth (*κοινὴ τι*) and tried to set up a free government" (*πολιτεία*): i.e. a republican constitution, or more accurately, first an aristocracy or a 'polity' of horse soldiers, next a 'polity' properly so called, of heavy-armed foot: VI(IV). 13 § 10, cp. n. (1273). SUSEM. (660)

§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δέ χείρους... 15 δλιγαρχίας] And yet Aristotle (?) VIII(v).

15 ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς διλυγαρχίας· ἔντιμον (X)
 γάρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλούτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν·
 αἱεὶ γάρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι’ αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἴσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ’ ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεῖζους εἶναι συμβέθηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἵσως οὐδὲ ράδιον ἔτι γίνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.
 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἀριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι
 23 ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γυνομένων ὅποιοι τινες

17 μετέβαλλον M^o P² fr. Bk. || 18 ἄγοντες <*τοὺς διλγούς*> or ἄγοντες <*τοὺς πλουσίους*> or something similar Henkel (*Studien*, p. 96 n. 24): see Comm. n. (662)
 || 22 εἰ.....27 φύσιν cited by Julian ad Themist. p. 260 D L. || 23 περὶ παρὰ the mss. of Julian except the Cod. Voss. || 24 ὄποιοι (όποιαι M^o) II¹ fr. Julian and P² (corr.), ὄποιοι P³ W^b Ald. and P² (1st hand), ὄποιων P⁴ Q^b T^b L^b C^c

12 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Timocracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Schlosser). See *nn.* (1767, 1777). SUSEM. (661)

18 εἰς θλάττους ἄγοντες] Here τὰς διλυγαρχίας or τὴν διλυγαρχίαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοὺς διλγούς or τοὺς πλουσίους in the text and translate: "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchies were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (II. 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δῆμος in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated," VIII(v). 5 § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and

afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a democracy arose. SUSEM. (662)

§ 13 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεῖζους κτλ] Comp. § 11, VI(iv). 6 § 5 n. (1225), 13 § 10 (1272), § 11; VII(vi). 5 § 5 (1435), 6 § 5 (1448—9), also VI(iv). 12. 3 n. (1310). Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, VIII(v). 5 §§ 8, 9, comp. *nn.* (1558—9), and VIII(v), 10 § 5 n. (1650): the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, VII(vi). 7. 2, and the development of the navy, *ib. nn.* (1453—5) (Henkel). SUSEM. (663)

21 ἵσως οὐδὲ ράδιον κτλ] "Nowadays hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise." Kingly rule in particular is not to be expected; if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of τυραννίς, VIII(v). 10 § 37; cp. VIII(v). 5 §§ 6—8 (Henkel) with *n.* (1708). SUSEM. (664)

22 εἰ δὴ τις... 23 πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων;) This is the third *ἀρρώδια*: a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heredity has been modified at different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. *n.* on 1285 a 16; (2) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γυνομένων ὄποιοι τινες κρυχού] "But that will be mischievous if

§ 14 ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὁν τοῖς (X)
26 τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔτι ράδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι χαλεπὸν γάρ,
καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἡ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.

ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ¹⁰
τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἵσχυν τίνα περὶ αὐτόν, ἡ δυνήσεται (p. 89)
30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἡ πῶς ἐνδέχεται

§ 15 τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη-
δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἡ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.

§ 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν
35 διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἵσχυν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην

τὴν ἵσχυν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω
τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, καθάπερ οἵ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς
ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταίεν τίνα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνή-
την ἡ τίραννον, καὶ Διονυσίφ τις, ὅτ' ἦτει τοὺς φύλακας, συν-

40 εβούλευε τοὺς Συρακουσίους διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας).
16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα XI

^{1287 a}

25 ἀλλ'.....26 τέκνοις omitted by Q^b T^b, given in P^{a-b} L^a Q M^b U^b C^c in the form
ἀλλ' οὐ καταλείψει τοὺς οὐεῖς διαδόχους ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' ἔξουσις ἔχων τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ||
τοῖς] τοιούτοις Ar. Susem.¹⁻² (perhaps rightly), omitted by Julian || 26 οὐκ ἔτι ράδιον
τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι Julian, οὐ ράδιον ἔτι τοῦτο Γ (?), οὐκέτι (οὐκ ἔτι Μ^a, οὐκ ἔτι Π^b) τοῦτο
ράδιον Π (including fr.) Bk., perhaps rightly || 29 αὐτὸν Bas.^a, αὐτὸν Γ Π || ἡ Μ^a
P^{a-b} Q^b T^b Ald. || δυνήσεσθαι Μ^a, possit William || 31 καὶ omitted by Π^b fr., un-
translated by Ar. || 32 αὐτὸν Γ, αὐτὸν Π || 33 φυλάξει P^a Ald., φυλάξαι P^{a-b} Q^b
T^b fr., φυλάξεται Μ^a Π^b || 36 ἐκάστων Susem.¹⁻² (singulorum William) || 39 [ἢ
τίραννον] ? Susem., <αἱρέσθε> ἡ τίραννον? Schmidt || 40 συρακοσίους fr.

the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random" or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior." So Pl. *Gorg.* 514 ε πρὸς πολλὰ μὲν δυνάμεις ἐπύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι: Eur. *Hipp.* 929 τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δὲ δυνάμην ἐτίγχανε.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important" (Congreve).
SUSEM. (665)

28 ἀπορίαν] The fourth difficulty started is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (656), 14 § 7 n. (622).
SUSEM. (666)

§ 15 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύ-

ποιος] "For even if he be lawfully sovereign...still he must have a force to guard the laws."

§ 16 38 αἰσυμνήτην] Cp. c. 14 § 8 n. (623). SUSEM. (667)

39 ὅτε πέτε τοὺς φύλακας] This is what Dionysios the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (*στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* Diod. XIII. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodoros XIII. 85—94 (cp. nn. 1562, 1576) v. c. 406 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm *Geschichte Siciens* II. pp. 94—96, p. 128. Cp. VIII(y). 5 § 10. n. (1562), 6 § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723); also I. 11. 12 n. (106), Rhet. I. 2. 19, 1357 b 30. Plato *Rep.* VIII 566 B, Polyaen. V. 2. 2. SUSEM. (668)

c. 16 § 1 1287 a 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ.] This clause with δὲ answers

πράττοντος ὁ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε ιῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ- (XI)
ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν
εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-
χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν αἰδίουν, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως·
τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπιδαμνον, καὶ περὶ
Ὀπούντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα- 2
§ 2 σιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δὲ ἔστι καθ' ἥν ἀρχεῖ πάντων κατὰ
ιο τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς, * *.

δοκεῖ δέ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ
II φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἓνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλις· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν

1287 a 4 πολιτείας Camerarius and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), βασιλεῖς Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Susem.¹ in the text || 8 ἔλαττων Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel (probably right) || 8 περὶ...13 ἀναγκαῖον quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 631 A f.
|| 9 δὲ ἔστι Codex Vossianus of Julian || δρχεὶ...10 βούλησι perhaps transposed by I to follow 10 βασιλεύς || πάντων Julian, πάντα II (including fr.), τῶν Codex Vossianus || 10 αὐτῷ Cod. Voss. (accent by a second hand), αὐτῷ Hertlein || λεκτέον inserted after βασιλεύς by Γ; a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by p¹: κατὰ κοινοῦ τὸ λεκτέον. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δέ, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Sylburg and Scaliger, to δὴ. || τὸ κατὰ Julian || 11 εἶναι πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ήταν Γ M^o Susem.^{1,2} || ὅπου.....12 πόλις and 13 καὶ.....φύσιν omitted by Julian

to the preceding one beginning τάχα μὲν οὖν 15 § 16; and it is an objection to Mr. J. Cook Wilson's analysis of cc. 15, 16 that it ignores this correspondence.

2 ἐφέστηκε] the question is now at hand, impends.

4 καθάπερ εἴπομεν] c. 15 § 2, n. (635). SUSEM. (669)

5 ἀίδιον=held for life.

6 τῆς διοικήσεως 'of the administration.' Not in the technical sense in which ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως meant the Minister of Finance at Athens.

7 περὶ Ἐπιδαμνον] Comp. VIII(v). I § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1550); also II. 7 § 23 n. (249). SUSEM. (670)

8 At Opus the holder of this office bore the title of Cosmopolis Polyb. XII. 16. Comp. Schömann p. 142 Eng. tr.

§ 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 ὁ βασιλεὺς; the omission of δὲ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δὴ is another.

For instead of extending to παμβασιλεῖα the fourth ἀτοπία (which in 15 §§ 15, 16, 1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy) the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, ἀτοπία (5); viz. *Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly when all are peers (ἴσματοι)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law?* Thus by the mention of law the fifth difficulty brings us round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unexceptionable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments §§ 4—13 which bear more or less closely upon the first and second ἀτοπίαι.

10 δοκεῖ δέ τισιν] Comp. II. 2 § 4 n. (133), § 6 (134 b); IV(VII). 3 § 6 n. (740); further I. 7 § 1 n. (58 b); IV(VII). 8 § 2 (797), VI(IV). II § 8 (1293). SUSEM. (672)

είναι, ὡστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἵσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἡ (XII)
 ἐσθῆτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
 § 3 τὰς τιμάς, ὅμοιως [τοίνυν] καὶ τὸ ἀνιστον τοὺς ἵσους· διόπερ οὐδένας
 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἡ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοί-
 νυν ὀσταύτως. τοῦτο δὲ ἡδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν (p. 90)
 19 ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔνα
 § 4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, καν εἰ τινας ἄρχειν
 βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
 νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινας ἄρχας, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔνα τοῦ-
 23 τον εἶναι φασι δίκαιον ὅμοιων γε ὅντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μήνι
 δσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δίνασθαι διορίζειν δ νόμος, οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπος
 § 5 ἀν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλὰ ἐπιτηδες παιδεύσας δ νόμος
 26 ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, δ τι ἀν δόξῃ
 28 πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. δ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον

14 εἴπερ] ὕστερ an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine || ὡστ'
 εἴπερ καὶ ὕσπερ γὰρ? Schneider || 15 <καὶ> Götting || ἔχει] ἔχει Schneider
 || τὸ P⁴ Q^b T^b L^a Bk. || 16 τοίνυν omitted by Π¹ || οὐδένα Bernays, οὐδὲν Γ Π (in-
 cluding fr.) Ar. Bk. || 23 ὅμοιως Π²

1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μήν δσα..... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a

21 κάλλιον: see p. 433

1287 a 28 δ μὲν οὖν..... b 8 τὸ ἔθος transposed to follow 1286 a

20 πᾶσαν: see pp. 430—432

14 τὸ ἵσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp.
 Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 7, 1106 a 36 ff. (Brough-
 ton). SUSEM. (673)

§ 3 16 ὅμοιως καὶ τὸ ἀνιστον κτλ.]
 "So too it is quite as harmful if unequal
 shares are assigned to those who are
 equal. Hence it is right that in ruling
 and being ruled all should be alike, and
 consequently should interchange with one
 another in both. But here we come to
 law, for the system" on which they inter-
 change "is a law."

17 τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος rotation in ruling
 and being ruled.

18 ὀσταύτως sc. δίκαιων ἔστι.

§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας = guardians of the
 laws: the expression used by Plato Laws
 IV 715 c (Eaton). SUSEM. (673 b)

23 ἀλλὰ μήν κτλ.] "In order to bring
 this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands,
 into logical connexion with the preceding
 fifth ἀτοπία, it will be necessary to regard
 it not as an objection to the view therein
 expressed, but as introducing a new objec-
 tion to a ruler who goes beyond the letter
 of the law: ἀλλὰ μήν=but again, as in 1262

b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25
 —27, allows that within certain limits the
 one ruler is really in a position to make
 such decisions, and speaks of rulers in
 the plural. Hence there can be no ques-
 tion here of attacking or defending monar-
 chy, and besides all the ἀτοπίας are alike
 in treating absolute monarchy unfavourably.
 It would still be open to us to read δ δ with Arethius instead of οὐδὲ,
 a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the
 next line would not be in place: Ar. omits
 it and we should rather expect δδ or
 ώστε or something of that sort." SUSEM.

28 δ μὲν οὖν] "It is not to be denied
 that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28
 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—b 8
 might quite well follow the fifth ἀτοπία,
 so far as the connexion of thought goes.
 But the form renders this impossible. The
 fact that law is passionless is not an infer-
 ence that can be drawn from the natural
 injustice of a permanent ruling body: so
 that οὖν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor
 will it suit as a transitional particle, with-
 out something else, καὶ or ἔτι δε." SUSEM.

κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν (XI)
 § 30 μόνους, ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρὸν· ἥ τε γὰρ
 ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 § 31 ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. Βιόπερ ἀνευ δρέσεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἔστιν. τὸ 3
 δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ
 34 γράμματα λατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρῆ-
 § 35 σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλαν-
 παρ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρνοῦνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
 κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
 πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπειὶ καὶ
 τοὺς λατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθίντας τοῖς ἔχθροῖς δια-
 40 φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν
 § 36 ζητήσαιεν· ἀν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μήτην εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ε
 1287 b οἱ λατροὶ κάμνοντες ἀλλούς λατρούς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-
 μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐδὲν δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ
 τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὅντες. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
 § 37 δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ μέσον.
 5 ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-
 ματα ἀνθρώπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ (p. 91)
 8 θεος. ἀλλὰ μήτην οὐδὲν ῥάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεῖστε 7
 ἀρά πλείονας εἶγαν τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
 10 ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἥ τὸν ἔνα
 § 10 καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, ἐπει., δ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον
 12 ἔστιν, ὁ ἀντίρρος ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δί-
 13 καῖος, τοῦ δὲ ἔνος οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ
 14 σύν τε δύ' ἔρχομένων
 καὶ ἥ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος
 15 τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.

|| εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ

16 ἄρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος
 ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-

1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μήτην οὐδὲν..... 15 συμφράδμονες transposed to follow
 1286 b 3 ὁ εἰσι: see p. 435

1287 b 15 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ.....35 δεῖν ὁμολως is another recension of 1286 a 26
 —b 3. See *Introd.* p. 84 f. || δὲ] γάρ? Susem. || 17 γε omitted by Π² Bk.

c. 16 §§ 10—13 1287 b 15—35. In
Introd. pp. 84—5, the reader will find this
 passage printed in parallel columns side by
 side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3,

an arrangement which cannot be adopted
 here, simply because it is then no longer
 possible to preserve the lines of Bekker's
 quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.

τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἀν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξει καὶ κρίνειεν. (XII)
 § 11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοὺς νόμοις τὰς
 20 δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἂ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον
 τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄρι-
 στον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοτεθῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων
 ἐστίν. οὐ τούννα τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀν-
 24 θρωπὸν εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 § 12 οὐχ ἔνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἔκαστος ἄρχων πεπα-
 δευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀπόπον τ' ἵστις ἀν εἶναι δό-
 ξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὅμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοῖς
 κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσὶν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-
 λοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ μὲν ὀφθαλμούς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦσιν
 30 αὐτῶν καὶ ὡτα καὶ χειρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἄρχῃ
 § 13 καὶ αἵτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες
 οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαιρεσιν εἰ δὲ φίλοι
 κάκενον καὶ τῆς ἄρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἵστις καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ
 τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἵστους καὶ ὅμοιους ἄρχειν οἴεται
 35 δεῖν ὅμοίως.||

17 ἀ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγου-

18 ὡς.....κρίνειεν transposed to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by II², untranslated by Ar. || 19
 καὶ omitted by Γ and P¹ (1st hand, added by p¹) || ἐπειδὴ II² fr. Bk. || 22 νερομο-
 θετῆσθαι Susem.^{1,2} *lege statuta esse* William || 23 κρινέι Spengel, κρίνει Γ II Ar. Bk.
 || 26 ἀπόπον...31 συνάρχονς cited in Scholla on Aristoph. Birds 92 || τ' II² fr.,
 δ' II² Ar. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ἔχοι Susem., ισοὶ Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Schol.
 on Aristoph. Bk. || δυοῖν] δυοὶ Sylburg || 28 πράττοι Conring wrongly, but recog-
 nizing that the text was unsound || 29 μέντραχος II² fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Bk. || 30
 αὐτῶν Morel, αὐτῶν II Schol. Aristoph., αὐτοῖς Susem.^{1,2} (*sibi* William), possibly right
 || τῇ ἄρχῃ Casaubon || 31 αὐτοῦ Susem.³, αὐτοῦ Γ II Susem.² Bk.¹, αὐτοῖς Schol.
 Aristoph. Susem.¹, perhaps right, αὐτοῖς Bk.², but see Bonitz Ind. Ar. 125 a 18 f. || 32
 δὲ omitted by fr. || 33 ἦ τε Γ, ὅτε P⁴ T^b Ald., οὐτε Q^b, δὲ Ar. || φίλους ἵστως Γ M²

c. 16 § 11-19 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν κτλ] It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decrees. See Nic. Eth. v. 8. Cf. also Rhet. I. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comments and his *Introd.* pp. 190—193], Plato Polit. 294 B ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 579, 637 and VI(iv). 4, 31 n. (1212). SUSEM. (652)

20 περὶδόν γὰρ βουλεύονται] This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of Nic. Eth. III. c. 3. SUSEM. (653)

τῶν διδυνάτων λοτίν] Here, it may be remarked, Mr J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, ἀλλὰ μὴν δοσα...τῷ κειμένῳ.

§ 12 29 δόφθαλμος] An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king: Herod. I. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. Persae 973, Aristoph. Ach. 94 with scholiast, Xenoph. Cyropaed. VIII. 2 §§ 10—12. Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. De Mondo c. 6, 398 a 21 ff., Poll. II. 4 (Eaton) and n. (1715) upon VIII(v). 11 § 7. SUSEM. (654)

c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3

(XII)

36 σι, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἵσως ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει¹⁰
 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει
 δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ
 δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, (p. 92)
 40 οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶν ταῦτα
 § 2 γάρ γίνεται [τὰ] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φα-
 1288 a νερὸν ως ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὅμοιοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον
 ἔστιν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ δυτῶν νό-
 μων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ως ὄντα νόμου, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγα-
 θὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ ἀν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 § 3 ἀμείνων ἡ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τις δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον
 εἴρηται δέ πως ἥδη καὶ πρότερον. [πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸν]

38 δεσποτικὸν] δεσποτὸν P^{2,3} Q^b T^b fr. Ald., probably also P⁴ (1st hand), δεσπο-
 στὸν Sylburg Bk., δριστοκρατικὸν in place of either δεσποτικὸν or βασιλικὸν Schlosser.
 See Comm. || καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν omitted by Π³ (in Π¹ added in the margin) ||
 βασιλευτὸν P^{2,3} Q^b T^b fr. Ald. Bk., probably also P⁴ (1st hand), βασιλευτικὸν P⁴ (corr.)
 || 41 τὰ rightly omitted by Π² Ar. Bk., retained by fr.

1288 a 2 νόμων ὄντων M^a Π² fr. Bk. || 3 ἀλλ'.....νόμου omitted by Π³ || 5 εἰ
 omitted by fr. || 6 ἥδη omitted by Π³, [ἥδη] Susem.¹ || [πρῶτον.....] 15 ἀρχάς]
 Susem. See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 398 f.

will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the *λουπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας*, or absolute monarchy. Comp. Susemihl *Quaest. coll. crit.* p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to *that commonwealth of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise*. Comp. c. 15 § 9.

§ 1 36 ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν] i.e. in certain circumstances: *not*, as Bernays and others translate, “in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies).” See n. (677) and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 397 ff. SUSEM. (674)

38 δεσποτικὸν...βασιλικὸν] “Bekker writes δεσποτὸν after Sylburg and βασι-
 λευτὸν as in Π². But we find τυραννικὸν standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like ἀριστοκρατι-
 κὸν and πολιτικὸν, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read δεσπο-
 τικὸν with Göttling, as in Π¹, and adopt βασιλικὸν from the corr. of Π¹. Further,
 how else are we to construe καὶ δίκαιον
 καὶ συμφέρον and τῶν ἄλλων...παρεκβάσεις,
 to which Lambin raised an objection? But with the text before us *ἴση φύσει* is
 the predicate of the first clause, *ἴση κατὰ φύσιν* the predicate of the second clause:
 all the rest is subject.” SUSEM.

40 ταῦτα γάρ ..παρὰ φύσιν] Com-

pare the apparently inconsistent passage
 VIII(iv). 12 § 3 n. (1310). SUSEM.
 (674 b)

§ 2 1288 a 3 ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ως ὄντα νό-
 μου] Cp. 13 § 14 n. δοτ b. SUSEM. (675)

This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato.

§ 3 6 καὶ πρότερον] viz. c. 13 §§ 13
 —25. SUSEM. (676)

6 πρῶτον δὲ...15 ἀρχάς] Krohn is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle's conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it faithfully. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for

βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. (XI)
 § 4 βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν
 γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀρι-
 στοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν [[πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι
 δυνάμενον]] τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν
 φῷ πέφυκε ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρ-
 χειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
 § 5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.] ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἡ καὶ τῶν 12

10 [πλῆθος...φέρειν] Vettori Bk. || [πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον] Susem. following Ar. and Schneider. Perhaps another recension of the preceding || 11 ἀρχὴν omitted by M^a P³ || 12 πλῆθος ἐν φῷ.....13 ἐγγίνεσθαι Spengel Bk.², [ἐν φῷ.....13 πολεμικόν] Hercher (*Hermes* VII, 467) || 13 πέφυκε καὶ ἐν Π² (only P⁴ has ἐν for ἐν, written over an erasure), [καὶ ἐν] Bk.¹, omitted by Π¹ fr. Ar. || ἡθος Hayduck (probably right) || πολιτικὸν fr. Π¹ (emended by corr. of Π²) || καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι M^a, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν Π² fr. Bk. || 15 ἀπόροις Π³ Π⁵ fr. Ar. γρ. ἀπόροις Π¹ in the margin. Π¹ (1st hand) also had ἀπόροις : εὐπόροις was written over by corr.³ and γρ. καὶ ἀπόροις inserted in the margin ; <εὐπόροις καὶ> ἀπόροις? Stahr (not bad). See Comm. n. (677) : πολιταις Koraes || ἡ Π¹ Π² Ar. Bk. Bernays Susem.¹ || [τῶν ἀλλων] Susem.¹, aliorum id est aliquorum Albert ; if ἡ is right either τῶν ἀλλων is a dittographia from 17, or must be transposed to follow 16 ἔντα τινὰ, or, as Schmidt proposes, to follow 19 βασιλέα

aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz. that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see *Introd.* p. 44). For this very reason, we would not translate above at 17 § 1 "for some people monarchical government is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather: "under some circumstances the one, and under others the other." But the interpolator, like many modern critics, misunderstanding the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is closely connected with καὶ πρότερον... (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading εὐπόροις or ἀπόροις ; the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a compromise between oligarchy and demo-

cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad even for this interpolator, and we ought perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τοῖς εὐπόροις <καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις> which would remove the difficulty. SUSEM. (677)

§ 4 12 πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος κτλ.] If we adopt the very probable change of the second πλῆθος into ἡθος, the sense is : "And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a warlike character (ἡθος), qualified to be rulers as well as subjects in accordance with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits to the rich (and the poor)." If this change be not made, the sentence will be differently rendered according as the second πλῆθος is regarded (1) as mere redundancy (*Postgate Notes* p. 25), or (2) as used in a different sense from the first: i. e. as meaning 'body,' 'class' within the entire civic population. Bernays, while adopting this latter view, makes δυνάμενον...ἀρχάς refer to the first πολιτικὸν πλῆθος: which seems inconsistent. If 'the population suited to Polity' were 'one in which a warlike class naturally arises,' it should merely be *this class* and not the population generally 'in which an interchange of ruling and being ruled can be carried into effect.' SUSEM.

16 ἄλλων ἔνα τινὰ συμβῆ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν (XII)
 τοσοῦτον ὡσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων,
 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάν-
 § 6 τῶν καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἔνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρό-
 το τερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώ-
 θασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς
 καὶ οἱ τὰς δλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς
 (πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιούσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν
 § 7 αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἡ 13
 25 φυγαδεύειν οὐδὲ ὀστρακίζειν δῆ που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν,
 οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος
 ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι
 § 8 τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ
 τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τοῦτον] ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. (p. 93)

30 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλέας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον XII

16 τινὰ omitted by II¹, [τινά] Susem.¹ || 20 [οὐ μόνον] Bojesen || 21 ἀριστο-
 κρατικὰς and 22 δλιγαρχικὰς Γ M^a Susem.¹ || 22 δημοκρατικὰς Γ Susem.¹ and M^a (1st
 hand) || 23 παντη̄ fr. πάντες II² Ar. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps right; yet altered to
 πάντη by the corr. of P⁴ || ἀξιούσιν...ὑπεροχὴν omitted by T^b and P⁴ Q^b (1st hand,
 ἀξιούσιν added in the margin of P⁴, and ἀξιούσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν by a later hand in the
 margin of Q^b) || 24 <καὶ> Schneider, which supersedes Bojesen's violent change
 (line 20) and Spengel's suspicion of 20 οὐ μόνον οὕτως || 27 τὴν omitted by M^a P⁴
 Q^b T^b Bk. || 29 τοῦτον omitted by II¹ || κατὰ μερος εἴναι τοιούτον ἀλλὰ απλῶς fr.

§ 5 18 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ] Aristotle speaks with far more correctness here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing with a whole stock of individuals or even a single man. But this gives a fresh proof (cp. *Introd.* p. 46) that in describing his ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of Macedonia; for not even Oncken would attribute to him the absurdity of regarding the whole royal family of Macedon as gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615). SUSEM. (678)

§ 6 19 εἴρηται πρότερον] viz. c. 13 §§ 23—25 and §§ 1—12. SUSEM. (679)

21 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of aristocracy, we should at first sight rather expect polity: for aristocracy is founded on the right of fitness or merit, the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 536). But Aristotle is here pointing to the explanations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is aristocracy and not polity that is discussed; and even this is hypothetically designated as faulty, in cases, that is, where the excellence of the community is not weighed against that of individuals

to see which excels the other. SUSEM. (680)

24 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] sc. δίκαιον 'but also according to the right previously expounded': viz. the right of merit, when the estimate just mentioned (in n. 680) has been correctly made. Accordingly we are referred back to c. 9 as well as to c. 13. Further comp. n. (595) and VIII(v). I § 6 n. (1495). SUSEM. (681)

§ 7 26 οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε...28 συμβέβη-
 κεν] 'For it is not natural that the part should outweigh the whole, and the pos-
 sessor of such extraordinary eminence has happened to be in this case' viz. that all
 the others together stand to him as part to whole. The ordinary interpretation is,
 'For it is not the course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas
 this happens when a man is very superior to the rest.' But see c. 13 § 13. SUSEM. (681 b)

§ 8 29 μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς] 'not merely in rotation' with others,
 'but absolutely sovereign.'

31 οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ συμφέρει, καὶ τίστι, καὶ πῶς, (XII)
18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμεν εἶναι τὰς
 ὄρθας πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ²
 τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἔστιν ἐν ᾧ συμβέβη-
 35 κεν ἡ ἔνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἡ γένος ὅλον ἡ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον
 εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ'
 ἄρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωτάτην ζωὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδει-
 χθῇ λόγοις ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ
 πολίτου τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως· φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
 40 καὶ διὰ τὸν αὐτῶν ἀνήρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συ-
 στήσειεν ἄν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἡ βασιλευομένην, ὥστε ἔσται ε-
 1288 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον
 42 ἄνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν [καὶ βασιλικόν]. διωρισμέ-
 νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδη πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς
 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἄρχεσθαι <καὶ ἄρχειν> Spengel Bk.² || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης II² fr. Bk.
 || 41 <ἀριστ' ἡ> ἀριστοκρατουμένην Bücheler, probably right. Schmidt
 thinks ἀριστοκρατουμένην a gloss which has taken the place of the
 true reading ἀριστα πολιτευομένην or εὖ τεταγμένην; [ἡ βασιλευομένη] Spengel who
 first saw the text to be unsound.

1288 b 2 τοπικὸν] πολιτηρίῳ γάγαθον (οτι σπουδαῖον)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικόν]
 Spengel, καὶ βασιλικός <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικόν> Conring wrongly: καὶ βασιλευτὸν
 Nickes, accepted by Bernays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good
 sense || 4 καθιστᾶσθαι πῶς M^a, καθιστᾶσθαι πῶς P² T^b W^b Ald. and P² (1st hand,
 the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 *Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense*, i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy.

This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV (VII), V (VIII), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal) state in its normal form is or is not identical with the ὄρθη πολιτεία Aristocracy: a point which Forchhammer (*Philol.* XV. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (*Philol. XIV.* p. 293 ff. *Der alte Staat des Aris.* p. 66 ff.), defending the traditional order of the books, denied. Their objections are examined by Spengel *Arist. Studien* II. p. 60 (652) f.

§ 1 34 οἰκονομουμένην] administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see VIII (V). 8 § 15 τῷ ἀλλῷ οἰκονομίᾳ.

35 ἡ ἔνα τινά...ἢ γένος ὅλον ἡ πλῆθος] The first two cases give the ideal kingdom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678); the third

gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n. (600). SUSEM. (682)

37 πρὸς τὴν...ζωὴν] Comp. II. I § 1 n. (128); also n. (21) on I. 2 § 8, n. (284) on II. 9 § 5 and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] c. 5 § 10; see n. (471). SUSEM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀράγη δή τὸν μελλούντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προστηκουσαν σκέψην. It was Spengel's great merit, *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* p. 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognise in this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back from the time when that discussion immediately followed the present chapter, and consequently evidence of an older order of the books than that adopted by the compilers of our present text (?Andronicus). See *Introd.* p. 17, p. 47 f.

EXCURSUS I.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. 1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel *Studien* p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotus III. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Periclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotus nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that 'during the Peloponnesian war,' as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names' (Thuc. III. 82); afterwards the Socratics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, *rήρ εἰώνυμον δημοτοκρατίαν*, Plato *Politic.* 302 D.¹ Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannis, are found in Herodotus as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding¹ as at Sparta (Xen. *Mem.* III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. *De Rep. Lac.* 10. 7, Plato *Crito* 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. *Mem.* IV. 6. 12, cp. I. 2. 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

¹ And not, as Oncken II. 152 misinforms us only 'after performance of definite statutory injunctions.'

the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind¹. In democracy he made no such distinction at all : he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all ; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (*Xen. Mem.* III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his *Politicus*, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard² which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyrannis, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not ; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the *Republic* so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the *Politicus* arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the *Republic* on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the *Politicus* to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy : cp. Zeller *Plato* p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the *Republic* and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

¹ Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account,

and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which bases a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

² That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude : Plato *Polit.* 219 D f., 302 C.

the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6. 17 with n. 219, cp. also *Introd.* p. 20): for Plato in the *Republic* does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad: IX 544 f., 547 D ff.

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II. 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shews himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the *Laws*, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also n. 191 on II. 6. 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited; the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the *Politicus*, except that it is not stated in the *Laws* whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyrannis, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the *Politicus*, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy: nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the *Republic*. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order: at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the *Laws*, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a 'government by the best,' although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 C D it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI(IV). 7. 1, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—cp. n. 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name *Πολιτεία*, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (a) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution *par excellence*; or else (b) because as in their opinion the best constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (c) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the *Ethics* I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-

tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 *n.* (537), VI(IV). 9. 3 *n.* (1254), VI(IV). 13. 7 *n.* (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(IV). 2. 3 (cp. *nn.* 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the *Politicus*, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the 'old fashioned' and the 'modern' Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(IV). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4, VIII(V). §§ 10 and *n.* (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using¹. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(IV). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. *n.* 1126, also VI[IV]. 2 § 4 *n.* 1140 b, VII[VII]. 1 § 7 *n.* 1383 b, VIII[VIII]. 12 § 18 *n.* 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbridled and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(IV). c. 4 f., VII(VI). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato's procedure in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Polities, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9, cp. 2 § 1 *n.* (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(VII). 11. 5 (849), also *n.* (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 *nn.* (595, 597, 601), c. 17 *nn.* (677, 678); VI(IV). 2 § 1 f *nn.* (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 *n.* comparing *nn.* (521) on III. 6. 1, (614) on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—3:² indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that when Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotus³, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

¹ Comp. e.g. Isoer. VII. 15 ff.

² The divergences which Oncken, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.

³ But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.

in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (*Panath.* §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the *Ethics*, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published¹; nor is there anything said in the *Ethics* about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f., criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Socrates and Plato, says not without some reason : la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intrinsiques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference ; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained ? And is there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely ? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it.
SUSEM. (533)

EXCURSUS II.

PITTACUS: III. 14. 10.

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Töpffer more particularly has recently shown in his *Quaestiones Pisistrateae* pp. 81—107

¹ Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Müller's History of Greek Literature, *Geschichte der griech. Litt.* II ii p. 281 f. (cp. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that the *Nicomachean Ethics* owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato's lifetime in the Academy : but see, as against this, Susemihl in *Philologischer Jahressbericht* XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken II p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded : —if, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teichmüller and Bergk that the polemic of Isocrates in the *Panathenaicus* §§ 16—34 is directed against

Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato's death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 344 to 342 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Susemihl *Jahresber.* XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of these ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the *Panathenaicus*). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I take it, to abstain from it.

(Dorpat, 1886). He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthilidae, VIII(v). 10. 19 n. (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duris *Frag.* 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenaeans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenaeon colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenaeans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippes (*Fr.* 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strab. XIII. 600, Plut. *De Herod. malign.* c. 15, Diog. Laert. I.c., Suidas) is very suspicious, as Töpffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo II. cc., Apollodoros *Fr.* 78 in Diog. Laert. I.c., Töpffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," *στρατιωτικά*, as they are called (Strab. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, *Frag.* 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. I. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 n. 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. I. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record

in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger: hence the *floruit* (*ἀκμή*) of the latter, i.e. his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2=611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2=651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, i.e. as Eusebius in the Armenian translation attests, Ol. 43, 3=606¹. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, viz. the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus' appointment to be Aesymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the Parian Marble, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne 'Researches into the life of Sappho' in *Symb. phil. Bonn.* p. 755 ff.), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus' tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3=570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (Laert. Diog. 1. 79, where ἐβδομήκοντα must obviously be altered to ὑδομήκοντα). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, e.g. to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Müller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, 'A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,' in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Müller's only reason on the other side, viz. that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Duncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *op. cit.* vi. p. 281; "Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar's Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

¹ The text of Suidas (*s. v. Πίττακος*) καὶ τῇ μεθ' ὀλυμπιαδὶ Μέλαγχρον τὸν τύραννον Μιτιλήνης ἀνεῖλε. καὶ Φρίσωνα στρατηγὸν Ἀθηναίων πολεμοῦντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ Σιγείου μονομάχῳ ἀπέκτεινε δικτύῳ περιβαλῶν αὐτὸν should be thus punctuated,

with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἀνεῖλε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Töpffer p. 55 f.

Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem." Moreover, as Alcaeus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (*Fr.* 106 in Strabo I. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. SUSEM. (626) Cp. now *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887, p. 140 ff

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Ol. 32, 2	Pittacus born	B.C. 651
Ol. 36	Phrynon aetat. 25 victor	636
Ol. 42	Downfall of the tyrant Melanchros	
Ol. 42, 2	Pittacus floruit, aetat. 40	
	Phrynon aetat. 50 conquers Sigeion }	611
Ol. 43, 3	Phrynon slain in single combat by Pittacus	606
Ol. 47	Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles	592
Ol. 47, 2	Pittacus aetat. 60	591
Ol. 47, 3	Pittacus made Aesymnetes	590
Ol. 50	Pittacus resigns his office	580
Ol. 52, 3	Pittacus dies, aetat. 81	570

EXCURSUS III.

FRAGMENTA VATICANA RESCRIPTA.

The printing of B. III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887, vol. XLII p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the *Politics*: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age¹ the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes². The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius' conjecture *ἀστῶν*, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of *καὶ*, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks P², the principal codex of the family II², although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent³. For the definite separation between the two recensions II¹ and

¹ Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accents are very rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

² It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the

partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of *ν ἐφελκυστικόν*; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of dittography, 11 of omission through homoeoteleuton and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

³ Namely, of XIV century, four centuries later than fr.

Π^2 was brought about, as I have shown¹, in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's MS apparently more nearly resembled Π^1 than Π^2 , while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of Π^1 and of Π^2 . Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in Π^1 or Π^2 . On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that Π^1 has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases² than Π^2 , and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with Π^1 , or with Π^2 : sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 διο "with Π^2 , 1281 a 35 f οχοντα...ψυχην placed after φαντον with Π^2 , 1287 a 11 "ενα παντων ειναι with Π^2 , a 32 o νους νομος as Julian reads, 1288 a 2 νομων οντων as Π^1 ": whereas in the fourth of these passages Π^1 also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not Π^1 , but only ΓM^* (or in the last passage ΓP^1), from which fr. diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from ΓM^* equivalent to divergence from Π^1), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of Π^1 the readings in which the fragments agree with ΓM^* only; namely, 1278 b 22 πολιτειας, 1280 b 5 διακονουσιν, 1287 b 13 ερχομενων. The second of these three erroneous readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as P^1 has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, διακοπούσιν for διασκοπούσιν, the fragment as well as ΓM^* had already converted this into διακονουσιν³. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where M^* has the true reading with Π^2 , while the frightfully corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in Γ , and originally also in P^1 . At 1287 a 33 $\Gamma \Pi^2$ rightly have γράμματα, fr. has γράμμα with $M^* P^1$. The statement "1286 b 17 μετέβαλλον with Π^2 " is quite misleading: for here it is only P^1 that has μετέβαλον at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of Γ . At 1278 a 36 the order of the words in fr. is the same as in P^1 and corr. P^1 , i.e. a branch of Π^1 .

¹ In my critical edition p. xiv. Cp. above, p. 2, n. 1.

² A reference to a single passage may suffice. II. 2 § 6, 1261 a 39 ff., where Π^2 affords an especially deterrent example: cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a

series of similar passages.

³ See above p. 76 n. (1). We know that P^1 was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century: for on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrios Chalcondylas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.

Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have *βούλευόμενον* with Π² and *κριτοῦν* with Π¹. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with Π¹ or Π², as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with Π²" in the following cases; 1276 b 33¹, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (*επαμέν*); and "with Π¹" in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (*το πολιτευμα*), 1280 b 4 (*εξει*), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write *οὐθεὶς* and *γίγνεσθαι* with Π², on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with Π² against Π¹ 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with Π¹ 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided². The correctness of the calculation that Π¹ has retained the true text oftener than Π² cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *αν φαη* is undoubtedly derived from Π¹. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π¹, even this makes but very little change in favour of Π².

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. *φύσει μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικὸν*: on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π² fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 *διάτε πολιτικὸν ζῶν ὁ ἀνθρωπος*, Eth. Nic. 1097 b 11 *φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἀνθρωπος*³, 1169 b 18 *πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος*. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἀνθρωπος, as Stöhr suggests.⁴]

On the other hand in the above calculation *kai el* or *kai ei*, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote *kai ei*. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in *τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀριστερᾶς*: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

¹ It is a mere accident that M^a here agrees with Π². With the copyist of M^a no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homocotelenon: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

² Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Π² fr. agree against Π¹ there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated fr., viz. Susem.³, agrees with Π² against Π¹, viz. 1275 a 28 f., 1277 a 12, a 10, a 24, 1279 a 2 f., 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases Π¹ omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292

b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which fr. may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Susem.³, i. e. with Π¹ as against Π²: adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π¹ fr. are agreed as against Π².

³ See Rassow *Forschungen über die Nikom. Ethik.* (Weimar, 1874) p. 54.

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feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension II¹ (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280 a 15 f.² and 1288 a 13 f.³ Those which he adduces in favour of *μία ἀρετή* 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight⁴. However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms *μόναρχος* and *μονάρχης*: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words *οὐκ ἔλαττον*, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by II¹ than added by II² without justification. But now it appears that fr. agree with II¹ in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable⁵. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the γε inserted after *ἀρετής* by P^{2,3} fr. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace *τοὺς* in the text with P^{2,3} fr. Ald. Bk., as here the sense favours the article. SUSEM.

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1275 b 4 (*ναι...εκαστην*) *πολιτει(αν διο)* *περ(ολεχθεις)* | 5 *εστιν* | 7 *εν* omitted | 8 *δικαιουσιν* | 10 *αλλοις αλλας* | 11 *της επερας* | 12 *κριουσιν* | 13 (*τον*) | 15 *εστιν* | *αλλα* | 16 *βουλευθαι* with II² | 19 *βουλευτικης* *η κριτικης* | 20 (*προς*)...21 (*ορι-*

¹ In favour of *φαῦλοι κριται*, the order of II² fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, *Tör.* VIII. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 ἐπει δέ φαῦλοι κουμωνὸς δέ ἐμποδίζων κτλ., *Nic. Eth.* 1. 3 § 5, 1094 b 28 ἀγαθὸς κριτῆς.

² For the less usual order of II² fr., *ἀρχεσθαι και ἀρχειν*, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with *Crit. note*.

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⁴ Heylbut points out that *ἔλαττον* denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. *πλειον-*

ἔλαττους VII(VI). 3 § 3, 1318 a 26: *ἴξ* *ἔλαττον* *εις ἔξακολους* *ἡλθεν*, VIII(V). 6 § 3, 1303 b 12: *οι μὲν γάρ ἔξαμινους*, *οι δὲ δι' ἔλαττον* (sc. *χρόνου*) *ποιούσαι τὰς ἀρχάς* VII(IV). 15 § 1, 1299 a 6: *οὐ γάρ* *ἔλαττον* *διέστηκεν* IV(VII). 3 § 2, 1325 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by *οὐχ ἥπτον*, *οὐδέν ἥπτον*, the opposite of which is *πολὺ ἥπτον*=much less easily, e.g. VI(IV). 11 § 11, 1296 a 5. At VIII(V), 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, *ἥπτον* is parallel to *οὐ γάρ ὅμοιος βάδιον*.

Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case fr. have *βούλευμα* with II² and *κρούνη* with II¹. Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which fr. agree with II² or II¹, as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with II²" in the following cases; 1276 b 33, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (*ειραπετ*); and "with II¹" in the following; 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (*το τολιτρυγα*), 1280 b 4 (*εγα*), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that fr. usually write *οὐθεῖς* and *πρώτην* with II², on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: fr. agree with II² against II¹ 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas fr. agree with II¹ 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided¹. The correctness of the calculation that II² has retained the true text oftener than II¹ cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in fr. at 1275 a 27 *αρ* *φων* is undoubtedly derived from II¹. And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where fr. have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family II¹, even this makes but very little change in favour of II².

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 f. *φίστην σε εττο* & *ἀρθρόν* (*φίστην* & *ἀρθρόν*): on the contrary there can be no doubt that II² fr. are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case: 1253 a 7 *δέοντα μολιτρά* (*φίστην* & *ἀρθρόν*, Eth. Nic. 1007 b 11; *φίστην μολιτρά* & *ἀρθρόν*², 1169 b 18 *μολιτρών γὰρ* & *ἀρθρών*). [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ may be for *ἀρθρόν*, as Stöhr suggests.⁴]

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1275 b 4 (*ναι...εκαστην*) πολιτει(αν διο) περ(οδεχθει) | 5 εστιν | 7 εν omitted | 8 δικαζοντων | 10 αλλοις αλλας | 11 της επερα | 12 κρινουσιν | 13 (του) | 15 εστιν | αλλα | 16 βιντεοθα with Π² | 19 βιντευτικης η κριτικης | 20 (προς)...21 (ορι-

¹ In favour of φαῦλοι κριται, the order of Π² fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, *Tor. VIII. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 ἐπει δὲ φαῦλος κουκουδός ὁ ἐμποδίζων κτλ.*, Nic. Eth. 1. 3 § 5, 1094 b 28 ἀγαθός κριτής.

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⁴ Heylbut points out that *ἐλάττον* denotes a less sum, or something less in number, time or space: e.g. πλεον—

ἐλάττον *VII(VI)*. 3 § 3, 1318 a 26: ἐξ ἐλάττονων εἰς ἔξακοινος ὑλίθεν, *VIII(V)*. 6 § 3, 1305 b 12: οἱ μὲν γάρ ἐξαρήνους, οἱ δὲ δι' ἐλάττονος (sc. χρόνου) ποιοῖσι τὰς ἀρχάς *VII(VI)*. 15 § 1, 1299 a 6: οὐ γάρ ἐλάττον διέστηκεν *IV(VII)*. 3 § 2, 1325 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by οὐδὲ ηττον, οὐδὲν ηττον, the opposite of which is πολὺ ηττον=much less easily, e.g. *VI(IV)*. 11 § 11, 1296 a 5. At *VIII(V)*, 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, ηττον is parallel to οὐ γάρ δροιος βάδιον.

ζονται) δη | 23 επι...οιον twice over | 24 παμππον | 25 απορουσιν | 27 ειρωνευ-
μονος | 29 υπο των twice over | λαρισσοποιους, but just before λαρισταις | 30
εστιν | 31 διωρισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη corrected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τινεχωντην τοιαντην |
24 δη(λον) | 25 (αρετη)s | 26 (εργον εστ)ω | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία
δ' εστιν is omitted | 30 διο with Π¹ Π² | πολι(του προς) | 31 εστιν | 32 α(ρετην) |
33 τὸν δ'...τελείαν is omitted with Μ¹ Π² | 34 ενθέχετ(αι) | πολι(την) | 35 (καθηρ) |
36 ἀλλὰ is omitted with Π¹ | εστιν | 39 αυτον | π(οιει)ν | 40 επειδε ας Π²
(παν)τας

1277 a 1 ει(η)μ(ια)αρετη as Π² | (κα)i | 2 (σπουδαιον πο)λιτ(ουδ)ει | 3 (αναγ-
κισιν ειναι τη)ν(ν) | πόδιν τηρ] πολιτην | αγαθ(ον αδυνατον ει μη) | 5 (τησπον)δαια |
6 (πολις ασπερ ζων) | ψυχ(η εκ) | 8 κτησεις | 9 ανοποιων | 15 αγαθονειναι
as Π² | 16 φρονημαν | 17 λεγουσιν | 18 ευρηπιδης φησιν | 19 κομψ as Π² | 20 ειδε-
αντη as Π² | 21 εστιν | 22 απλως αν ειη as Π² | 24 πινην | 29 αμφω επαισιν
ποτε | 32 τουτευθεν as Π² | 33 εστιν | 39 τουνομαντονι as Π²

1278 a 29 τουνοθους | οις in πολλοις over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολιγ(αν..)
θρωπιαν, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοχλ(ον κα)τα | 34 αστων |
36 ασπερ...38 μετεχων comes after 40 συνοικουντων εστιν as in Π¹ corr. Ρ⁴

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρημεγων with Π² | 3 κακεινον ου with Π² | 8 κανει with
Π² | after τινε an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριος | 11 δεστιν |
12 δοιον | 14 δεκαι | 16 συνεστηκεν | 19 δη with Π² | 21 ο is omitted with
Π² | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειας ορεγονται* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 πασω | 26 και...
κοινωνιαν between αυτον and ισως as Π¹ | 28 υπερβαλη | 29 κακοπαθιαν | 31 γε
after αρχης | 40 ή <ει> omitted | 41 ασπερ with Π²

1279 a 2 παιδοτρεβην | 13 το κεινον | 15 αρχ(ουσινοσακ)αιροις | 16 αρχας :
χ above the line | 19 σφετερον] σ above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεψασθαι) |
23 εισιν | 25 διωρισθεισων | το πολιτευμα with Π¹ | 26 σημαινε...πολιτευμα is
omitted | (δ)εστιν | 28 (ο)ταν | (π)ολλοι | 31 (η)τον | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο-
βλεπουσαν...την) δε των οιτων μεν | 35 δ(ε ενος αρισ)τοκρατιαν | 37 οτανδετο |
38 (κ)αλει(ται το) | (πασων...δειλο)γωας | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθ(ει) γιγνεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν | (μη δε τι) |
15 καταληπειν | 16 εστιν | 20 ειε(νοι) | 23 συμβαντη | 26 καντει | 28 προσ-
αγορευει | 34 the line ends with πο, the next begins τεια: either λι is omitted,
or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 δια is omitted | 39 γιγ-
νεσθαι | 40 δημοκρατεια

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 παν το: παγα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φαιδοι κριται with
Π² | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεχθεν omitting το | κρινουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν
ομιζουσι over an erasure | 24 ελευθεριοι: the first i above the line | 26 μετε-
χουσιν | 29 εκατον μυων | εισενεγκαντα with Π² | 31 μονον ενεκει with Π²
33 εστιν | 36 τυρηνοι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 τον is omitted with Π¹ | αδικος: κ above the line | 4 εξει with
Π¹ | αδικησωσιν | 5 δαρετης | διακονουσιν with ΓΜ² | 8 γιγνεται | 9 απωθε
10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφρον | 17 πολεσιν | δουδει | 23 που | 26 οικειαι | σφι(σι)ν
28 δοξειει | 30 η πολις ουκ εστιν with Π² | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και] η | 40 δει

1281 a 1 χάριν is omitted | 3 χαριν with Π² | 5 μετεστιν | τ(οι)s | 6 μειζοσιν |

* περι with Μ¹ Π², πολιτειας with ΓΜ², οὐκ Ελαττον omitted with Π¹.

7 (πολιτευμένης) επί ταπερχόντων | 10 λεγούσιον | 16 ἀν is omitted with Ρ¹Π²
 17 χρη with Η² ταῦται | λεφθότων | 21 τούτων | 23 κριτήσαντο | 24 δικαιομένης
 with Η²; π in αρχειν above the line | 26 εστιν | 27 πατεράνδε with Η²
 28 δικαιον with Η²; 35 εχούσια..36 φυχήν after φαντος with Ρ¹Η²

1286 b 17 πετεβάλλειν with Μ¹Η² | 18 αισχροκερδῶν | 21 γυγνοῖσιν | 24 γυγνοῖσιν
 | 26 τούτῳ μάρτιον | 31 καὶ is omitted with Η¹ | 33 φιλαξιν | 34 θεωρία
 τὸν τούτον is omitted with Η¹ | 40 σπαρακοῖσιν

1287 a 2 εφεστηκεν | 4 βασιλείους | 5 οὐτοι | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | πατέα | 11 επι
 πατέα επι with Ρ¹Η² | 16 αρχαῖος τούτοις καὶ 25 Η² οὐδεν | 25 πατέντων with
 Η² | 26 εφεστηκεν | 29 τὸν ποῖον μάρτιον] τοὺς καρούς | 31 αρχαῖος διαστρέψει as
 Η² | 32 διαφέρειν is omitted as in Η²; ο νοῦς καρούς with Η¹ Julian | 33 γνωρία
 with Μ¹Ρ² | 34 καὶ is omitted | 37 παριστάτας is corrected from σταμαντάς
 38 επιπρόν | 40 δεράτην

1287 b 4 ο γηρ τορος | 5 τῷ κατὰ | 6 (κατὰ) | τῷ κατὰ | 8 οὐδαίνον | 10 κατα-
 τρόπει | 11 ποτερον; (αὐτὸ)ηρ | 13 εστιν | ερχομένων with Γ Μ¹ | 16 εστιν | 17 αργεῖν
 | 19 επιδη with Η² περιλειφθῆναι | 24 α(λλο)τι | 26 τούτων with Η¹ | 27 (ζε)λτιον
 ιδοι τε (δυοι) ορμασι (καὶ δυοι); | 28 τούτων | 29 μοναρχον with Η² | 32 παριστά-
 σιν | δε is omitted | 37 εστιν | δεσποτον with Η² | βασιλεύον with Η¹ | 41 γε-
 γετας τε πάρα φεσιν with Η¹

1288 a 2 τορον εστιν with Μ¹Η² | 5 ει is omitted | 6 ποτερον | 8 εστιν
 πεφύκει | 13 πεφύκει εγγυησθειν as Η¹, omitting καὶ ἐν | πολιτικον with Η¹
 14 αρχεσθαι καὶ αρχειν with Η² | after καταξιαν dittography; διαφεραντον
 καταξιαν, then διαφεραντα | 15 αποροις with Η² | 17 (τοτον)τον ω(σ)θ | 18 βασι-
 λείους | 21 εστε οὐτε οὐτε | 23 πατέα with Η¹ | 24 καὶ is omitted | 26 πεφύκει
 | 29 κατὰ μερον επι τούτοις αλλα απλων with Η² | 30 προτερον | 31 after η συμ-
 φερεις dittography; ταῖς πολεσιν η συμφερεις | τισιν | 33 διατυκανον | 34 αρ-
 parently αικιουμενης | 35 τισυμιτανον | 39 τῆς πολεως τῆς αριστης with
 Η² | 41 ποτεστα

1288 b 1 παδεια | 3 δητοιτων | πο(λι)τειας | τι(ν)α πεφυ(κε γεγν)εσ(θετ)
 ροτον | 5 δη | 9 αριστοτελον πολιτικων: γ: in the margin by the same hand
 .Δ. [fol. 302^v begins with this heading] 11 γυγνομενα: the second γ scratched
 out

out | 14 καλιστα | κεχορημενω | 16 εργον with Η¹ | δεαν | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν
 with Η² | 23 εστιν | 24 αρμοτουσα with Η² | 26 τε απλων καὶ την is omitted |
 31 συμβιβηκεν | 35 ως | 36 λεγουσιν

1290 a 36 ομοιοις: the second i above the line | ουθεις

1290 b 2 δοταν | πολλοιν with Η² | 5 φασιν | 8 ετι instead of επει | πλειονα
 μορια with Η¹ | 11 δημοσι | 12 τοιτων | τημαις | 15 δημοσ | ουραν as Η²
 17 εστιν | 19 δοταν | 21 πολιτειαν ορ πολιτειαν | πλείους...αὐτιαν is omitted |
 24 πασαν εχειν with Η² | 25 μεν is omitted as Η² | 29 δη | ειδημονον | 33 πλει,
 πο trace of ω | ταιτον | 35 ληφθωσιν | 37 δε | 39 συγκρητε | μερων with Η²
 40 εστιν | καλλουμενοι

1291 a 4 διαγοραιον | 5 καὶ τὰς ὠνᾶς is omitted | 6 καπηδιας | 7 ουθεν | εστιν
 αναγκαιον as Η² | 11 φησιν | 13 τοιτου τους | 18 μαλον | 20 αποδιδωσιν | 21
 απογμενον as Η² | 22 τετταροσιν | 27 δικαιοτης corrected from δικαιο-
 τηκης | 29 ουθεν | γαρ before διαφερει with Η¹ | 33 αναγκαιον μοριον της πολεως

with Π² | 34 σ with Π¹, not ὅπερ | οὐδον | 39 βουλευομένον with Π^{1*} | 41 πολεσιν | γινεσθαι | δίκαιος

1291 b 3 αὐτούς : ε above the line | 4 και τεχνίτας twice | 12 καθιστασιν | και δοκούσιν twice | 14 εισιν | 15 εστιν | δημοκρατειας | 17 λεγωμενων | 21 χρηματιστικον | 22 αλιευτικον; the first ε above the line | εκαστα : τα above the line | 27 αμφοτερον | ετερον | 30 δημοκρατεια | εστιν | 32 υπαρχειν | 34 μαλιστεστιν

1292 a 3 τὸ πάσι μετεῖναι] ταλλαμεν ειναι with ΓΡ¹ | 17 τοιουτος | δημος as Π² | 22 παρ² is omitted | 23 δεμαγωγη | 24 εισιν | 29 προσκλησιν with Π¹ | 30 αρχε | 32 εστιν | 33 εκαστοι οι εκαστον | 34 εστιν | 36 ουθεν

1292 b 1 μακρων with Π¹ | 3 ποιωσιν | 5 οταν παις | 9 τελευτεας | ειπαμεν with Π² | δημοκρατιας εν ταις is omitted | 10 καλουσιν | 13 between κατα and τους room for 3 letters | δε after δια is omitted | 14 πολιτευεσθαι δε δημοτικως | 15 κατα τους νομους | 17 τουτο δε | 19 αλλα αγαπωσιν‡

* Apparently κρινον with Π¹; this at least is the inference to be drawn from Heylbut's silence.

† Apparently Εθος with Π¹; Heylbut is silent.

‡ [It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 εισεγεγκατα is given as the reading at any rate of Π² and presumably of fr. (εισεγεγκατα Heylbut).]

NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

In Mr Newman's edition I. p. VIII. f. II. p. LIV. there recurs, although in a much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. p. 801 ff., and in Excursus III. above, that I seek to base the text of Aristotle's *Politics* primarily on Π¹, and especially on Γ. Mr Newman writes:

"Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too often followed Π¹, I have nevertheless already said at p. XXXII. :

"quoniam ex eo, quod dixi, satis appetet ita nobis traditum esse hoc Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtam ex utraque codicum familia recensionem perficere hodie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura artis criticae regulas diligentius, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas periti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba... cum libris affinibus Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinde quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubicunque autem aequo bonam sententiam utraeque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est posthabenda."

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished *a priori* to make the recension Π¹ the basis of the text would proceed just as perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with Π²; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its merits: *quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent*; and

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family Π^1 . The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest; but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from Π^1 . In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of Π^2 , as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the *Politics* has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly deterrent example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in Π^1 , however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the *Politics* has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown *a priori* by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in Π^1 are corrected by means of Π^2 and those in Π^2 by means of Π^1 ; whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "Vetus translatio," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of P^1 and Ar., for the rest is certainly true only of the "deteriores" of the family Π^2 ($= \Pi^3$). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from Γ or from P^1 and P^4 (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-

strated, unless it be one so preeminently excellent as e.g. A^c of the *Rhetic* and *Poetic*, or Σ in Demosthenes, or Γ in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K^b alone presents right readings in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π¹, or of the better class of Π², present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π¹, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π¹, in Π² they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. XII. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. notes] on this matter:

"soli Γ libro debemus praeter 1260 a 4 ἀρχότων καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαροπίδη, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἥδη, 1271 a 20 κάν (μὴν Π; partem veri vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ίν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστα, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἔντα δὲ, 1336 a 34 σπουδαστορένων (aut σπουδασθησομένων, quod praebet P^b), 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πλήθει, 1320 b 9 τὴν Ταραντίνου ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ἀπλιτικήν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγὺς ὅν (an ἐγγίζον?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),

solis Γ P^b has: 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσενθύνεις (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:

solis Γ et pr. P^a 1259 b 28 δὲ:

solis Γ p¹ 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτὸ :

solis Γ et corr. P^a 1278 b 22 παρ' :

solis Γ Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμους :

solis Γ P^b Ar. 1336 a 5 δὲ :

solis Γ R^b 1303 b 31 τὰ :

solis Γ Ald. corr.¹ P^a 1332 a 33 τῷ :

solis Γ Ar. corr.² P^a 1335 a 26 σώματος :

solis Γ p² 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς δὲ M^a P¹, δὲν cert.).

Neque fas esse censeo in tali rerum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum servatorum lectionibus οἱ κοινῶνοι et μηδὲν multo illas exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppeditat translatio, οἰκονόμοι et ταλάντων...

E solo P¹ has...depromere licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπιβαλόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἐλαιουργείων, 1278 a 36 sqq. rectum ordinem (corr.¹), b 4 κάκείνης corr.¹ (nisi potius retinendum est κάκείνος), 1286 b 17 μετίβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικόν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγχεια, 1335 b 20 γενομένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr.¹, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ἑτέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):

e solis P¹ et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τὸ, 1280 b 19 εἴησαν:

e solis Ar. et corr. P¹ has: 1255 a 37 ἔκγονον, 1299 a 14 πολυτεῖαις :

e solis P¹ mg. P^a rc. P^a 1284 a 37 κολαύειν, quarum nonnullae...ita sunt comparatae, ut currente calamo a Demetrio Chalcondyla demum et Leonardo Aretino e suis ingenii facile potuerint restituiri, velut ἐλαιουργείων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιεῖν, εἴησαν, ἔκγονον...Solo autem M^a codice paene nusquam

nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo P², solo P² 1253 a 25 (*kai post φύσει om.*), 1270 b 38 (*εἴποι*), 1325 a 29 (*αὐτὸν τὸ corr.¹*), 1339 a 14 (*εἴπειεν*), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 *ἀπαιδαγωγήτους*.²

This is exclusive of the cases, in which ΓΜ^{*} alone or Μ[•]Π¹ alone or ΓΠ¹ alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (*I.c. p. xi.*)

1253 b 33 ὁ om. M[•], erased by P⁴ (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 *συμβαίνει* Π¹⁴:

1336 a 17 *Ψυχρὸν* Π¹Π⁴ (corr.):

1342 b 33 ἡ added by Π¹ and corr.¹ of P² (here conjecture is really out of the question):

1290 a 1 δὴ Π¹ and P¹⁴ (corr.):

1290 a 2 διειλόμεν Π² (corr.), διειλόμεθα Π¹, διειλόμην ceteri:

1291 b 32 *ὑπερέχειν* Π¹⁴ Ar.:

1295 a 39 δὲ erased by corr. of P⁴, γρ. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δὲ corr.³ in the margin of P² (this may be a conjecture):

1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ Π¹⁵ and γρ. in the margin of P⁴:

1309 a 40 *πάρεστιν* Π⁴ (corrector):

1316 a 38 *ἀναξιλάον* Π¹⁴.

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the *Vetusta translatio* is "instar optimi codicis." That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Π¹ only at

1252 b 28 (*ἡδη ΓΠ¹*),

1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3,

1258 b 40 (*Χαρητίδη Γ*),

1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),

1259 b 28 (*δὲ Γ 1st hand of Π¹*),

1260 a 37 (*δρα*):

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: *ὑποδύεσθαι ΓΜ^{*}* possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 ὁ is only added before *ἀνθρώπος* in Μ[•]Π¹, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the *Ethics* (as I have remarked on p. 456) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from Μ[•]Π¹; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in B. II. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of *δὰ τύχην* against Μ[•]Π¹; but at 1323 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have *δὰ τὴν τύχην*. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the *kai* between *εὐγενές* and *εἰεύθερον* with Π²; and at 1260 a 26 ἡ before *τὸ* with Π²Σ³Τ³. In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations (after *οἱον*, *ἄσπετος* especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15

unless καὶ be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before κατατοκιζόμενοι) the explanation must be quite different, viz. δσωτευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι must mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy." At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting εἴναι or leaving it out : as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π². And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (*Qu. crit. coll.* p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π¹ is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π², yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 f he wrote ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ without συνήλθοντος. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted ὁμοκάποντος, but it still remains doubtful whether ὁμοκάπτοντος be not right after all (see Addenda *ad loc.*). At 1253 b 27 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν (Π²) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 δὲ is omitted by Π¹ O¹ U¹ L¹ Ald., but one which is justified by the facts ; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write δὴ) : that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π¹ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that δλως was explained by ἀπλῶς or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable : still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, λόγῳ (Π¹) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than λόγου (Π²), I have laid down *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 ὀφοποιητική and 1256 a 6 κερκαδοποιητική are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakeably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present διδομένη to the perfect δεδομένη and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect ἴφηγγατο to the present ἴφηγεται, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 <ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, see Addenda *ad loc.*

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 (ὁμοκάποντος or ὁμοκάπτοντος), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 κοριζόνται and 1258 b 1 μεταβολικής (Π¹) may be corruptions of πορίζονται and μεταβλητικής ; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π¹ is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 (ταῦτα), 1257 b 24. Π¹ is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 (ἢ δη ΓΡ¹), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 (Χαρητίδη Γ), 1259 a 37, b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand Π²), 1260 a 4 twice (ἀρχόντων καὶ Γ and

νόφηγεῖται), 1260 a 37 (*ἀρα*), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M¹ as well as ΓP¹. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π¹, either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π¹ in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple *errata*, as e.g. φάλιτα, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susem.¹ p. XIV.), and the repeated φαλλίας. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading ἀνθρέια (*ἀντρέια*). Apart from the order of the words 1265 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14: one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π² at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π¹ at 1263 a 23 (*καὶ* omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of Π¹. In the remaining 109 cases Π¹ has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (*εἰς ὁ τῆς Γ*), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (*ἐλκύστει ΓP¹*), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's crit. n.), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (*ἴθεστε*), b 7 (see Qu. crit. coll. p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (*ἄλλαις ΓM¹*), 30, 1266 b 2 (*Γ*), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (*αὐτῆς ΓP¹*), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (*αὐτὴ* affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (*κἀν Γ*), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π¹ has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times: 1261 a 18 (*ἢ* omitted by M¹P¹, probably wrongly, whether by Γ also, cannot be known), 35 (at least M¹P¹), b 7 (*οὐ*, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least M¹P¹), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (*φαλλίας*), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least M¹P¹), 25, 27 (at least M¹P¹), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (*φιλίτια*, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least M¹P¹), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless θατέρων is here nearer to the true reading than θάτερον, θάτερα being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Περαῖθοις is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but μῆν gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὸ δικαστήριον into the more natural and simple τὰ δικαστήρια?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his

doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π² presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way *ἐν τοῖσις* has arisen from *τοῖσι*, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then *τὸ* before *ἐν μέρει* need not be changed into *τῷ*; but there is no need of this with the reading *τοῖσι*: see Susem.⁴ *crit. n.* and *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 361.

1262 b 32. The omission of *τοὺς φύλακας* in M¹P¹ is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263 a 23. For *ἴθεσι* Mr Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda *ad loc.* If *ἐκδίστῳ προσιδρεύοντες* (ΓΜ¹) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of Π¹.

1265 a 33f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π¹ has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koraes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as Mr Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits *πλεισταῖς*, not *δῆλαις* into the text.

1265 b 30. In case the reading *πολυτείαν* were right, *τὴν* could scarcely be omitted before this word or before *κοινοτάγη*.

1267 b 25f. With the reading *κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ* arises the absurdity, that *ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς* would depend not simply on *πλήθει*, but on *κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ*. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is *καταδικάζειν τὴν δίκην* in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula *ἐρήμην καταδικάζειν?*

1268 b 21. Mr Newman's statement in the critical note, that *ἡδη* is left out by Π¹ here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Γ and P¹ (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken *τούτῳ* (Π¹) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, *τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δημοτῶν* is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman's intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose

$\tauῶν δυνατῶν$, with Π^1 , to follow $\deltaοῦνται$ (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture—an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Koraes, of $\alphaν$ (line 8) for $\deltaαν$. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π^2 , as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that $\deltaυναστῶν$ (Π^1) instead of $\deltaυνατῶν$ (Π^2) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be $\deltaυναστεία μᾶλλον ή πολιτεία$. Not so. Once for all, Π^2 is made out to be the better recension!

1272 b 39. Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that $καθ' αὐτῷ$ is not found in any manuscript: it is in the margin of P^1 , quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in Γ . He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading $καθ' αὐτό$, a second $κατ' αὐτῷ$ (P^1 and somewhat corrupted M^1), and a third $κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ$ (Π^2), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π^2 is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6. Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text $εἰποπλαν$ from Π^2 and O^1 , in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π^1 and Π^2 when in my third edition p. v, I wrote: “haud raro hanc, saepius illam meliorem.” Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heylbut’s account, which I have not correctly reported in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π^2 , but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π^1 . If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π^2 any more than in favour of Π^1 : on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, $ἀστῶν$ 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 $καὶ$ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the care bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π^1 . However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the *Vetusta translatio* is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-

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ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to I. c. II I agree with him : I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so-called second book of the *Economics*, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. SUSEM.

H.

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-
1323 a 14 κουσαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσα- I
§ 1

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη...6 σκέψιν joined by all previous authorities to B. III, omitted by Bk.² See Comm. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ Π¹ P^{2,3} Q⁶ T^b fr. Ald. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, γάρ (with the omission of the following τὸν μέλλοντα) P^{4,6} L^a Ar.

1323 a 14 [περὶ...15 ἀνάγκη] Spengel || δὲ added after περὶ by P² and corrector of P⁹; perhaps rightly, yet see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || τῆς inserted before ἀρίστης in P¹ and in the margin of P⁴; cp. p. 456 f.

B. IV(VII), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, commences a sketch of the best polity which is continued through the next book, B. V(VIII), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1—3, the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4—12; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the means at the legislator's command for realizing it; the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. IV(VII) and not at all in B. V(VIII).

1288 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ...6 σκέψιν] That this conclusion of B. III, breaking off in the middle of a sentence, is only a parallel version of the beginning of the (old) seventh book, is acknowledged by all who recognize that the proper place for the (old) seventh book is immediately after the third. Beyond all doubt, of the two parallel versions, that at the end of B. III is the original one, as Spengel rightly decides, and it ought not to have been omitted from the text of Bekker's

octavo edition *. When the rest of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed; hence the clause περὶ πολιτείας...ζῆταισιν διάγ-κη was added by the redactor. SUSEM.

The grounds for making the transposition of the books have been already noticed: *Introd.* p. 16 n. (4), p. 17, p. 47 f. The main point to decide is, where in the treatise ought the description of the best polity (in the form of pure aristocracy) to come, whether before the description of the existing faulty polities or after them. The indications of B. III are unmistakeable, especially cc. 13 and 18: and upon them Spengel has rightly insisted (*Über die Politik* p. 16 f., *Arist. Studien* II, pp. 46 ff., 60 ff., 71). Not less convincing is the assertion in VI(IV), c. 2 that aristocracy, as well as monarchy, has been already discussed. But when the question has been decided upon these grounds, the unfinished sentence at the end of B. III certainly affords striking corroborative evidence.

c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2). *The connexion of the best constitution with the highest life.*

Few chapters in the work have been subjected to more minute examination than this. See Bernays *Dialogue des Arist.* pp. 69—84 and Vahlen *Aristote-*

* Not that of Oxford, 1837, but *Iterum edidit I. Bekker, Berolini 1855; nunc iteratum 1878.*

1323 a 15 σθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι πρότερον τὶς (I) αἱρετώτατος βίος. ὅδηλου γάρ ὄντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀριστην ἀναγκαῖον ἄδηλον εἶναι πολιτείαν· ἀριστα γάρ πράττειν προσήκει τοὺς ἀριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων § 2 αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ τι γίνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρώτου τῷ ὁμολογεῖσθαι τὶς ὁ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἥ ἔτερος. (p. 94)

νομίσαντας οὖν ἴκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔξω-ε τερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀριστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. § 3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαιρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητή-

15 πρότερον] πρώτον Ρ¹ Π³ Bk., perhaps rightly || 19 παρὰ λόγον Γ Ar. || 20 ὁμολογῆσθαι Susem.^{1,2}, confessum esse William || 22 [καὶ τῶν] Oncken wrongly

lische Aufsätze II 'On a chapter of the Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp.).

§ 1 1323 a 16 αἱρετώτατος βίος] See n. (683) with the passages there quoted. SUSEM. (686)

τὴν ἀριστην πολιτείαν] i.e. the absolutely best constitution: see VI(IV). 1 § 3 πολλοῖς γάρ τὴν ἀριστης τυχεῖν λας ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστηρι τε ἀπλῶν καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀριστην οὐ δεῖ λεληθεῖν τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικὸν, and n. (1116). SUSEM. (686)

18 προσῆκα] 'We should expect the citizens who live under the best constitution possible to them (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς to be taken closely with ἀριστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most desirable life.

§ 2 21 κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι, χωρὶς ἔκστρω. 22 τοῖς ἔξωτεροις λόγοις] See Ex-cursus I. to this book. SUSEM. (687)

23 καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς] 'It is clear from passages such as *De Caelo* II. 13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. ἐπει δὲ περὶ τοῖτων δύωρσται πρότερον δια κατὰ τὴν παρόντας δύναμιν εἴχομεν, χρηστέον ὡς ὑπάρχοντων and *Meteor.* III. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 f. Εἰσω δέ περὶ τοῖτων ἡμῖν τε θεωρημένον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διεκυμένονις διὸ τὸ μὲν λέγωμεν, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ὑπάρχονται χρηστέα αὐτῶν, that this expression does not imply that an exposition given elsewhere is to be borrowed or reproduced, but that the results of some other discussion will be employed and utilized. Those who remember the tolerably frequent use of the verb χρῆσθαι by Herodotus e.g. in II. 120 εἰ χρῆ τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν, corresponding to Thucydides I. 10 § 3 τῇ Ὀμήρου αὐ τοῖσι εἰ τι χρ-

κάντανθα πιστεῖν, will hardly raise any objection to our taking the word, used here and in *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27 in connexion with the ἔξωτεροι λόγοι, but not as confined to them, in the sense of the phrase in *Nic. Eth.* VI. 4 § 2, 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἔξωτεροις λόγοις. It is plain that this expression does not in any way show whether the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own or belongs to some one else, nor to what degree or extent it is utilized" (Vahlen). SUSEM. (688)

§ 3 24 πρὸς γε μίαν διαιρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀν] The appeal to the ἔξωτεροι λόγοι in this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus amounts (in effect at any rate) to an appeal to public opinion, to what was at the time conceded by all, or at least by all cultivated and intelligent men. We should also notice how, as III. 12 § 1, the strictly scientific (philosophical) distinctions and discussions are opposed (1) to opinion universally current, and on the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle himself at least by his pupil Eudemos (see n. 584), to the ἔξωτεροι λόγοι; and it is hardly possible to regard the latter as anything else but the expression of that universal opinion. Bernays sees in these words an ironical excuse on Aristotle's part in reply to the charge which was no doubt often levelled at him, of useless logical hair-splitting, when he thus expresses the hope that he may be allowed to make *one* division at least without opposition. But Vahlen rightly urges against this view that, in spite of the announcement of at least this *one* division, the emphasis is not

25 στειν ἀν ώς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν (I)
 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν
 § 4 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γάρ ἀν φαίνει μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν
 μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης
 μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας
 30 μνίας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἀν ἐπιθυμήση τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ
 πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἔνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείροντα τοὺς
 φιλτάτους φίλους, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν

25 [οὗ] Oncken wrongly || 26 τῷ omitted by P⁵ S^b V^b Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand) ||
 27 χρή omitted by P⁶ II² (added in the margin of P⁴): δέ Vettori Bk. || 29 [μηδὲ
 φρονήσεως] Susem.¹; see on a 32 || 30 τοῦ Koraes, [τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πιεῖν] Bernays,
 perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen *Arist. Aufsätze* II. p. 11 (9) ff. || τοῦ before πιεῖν
 omitted by P³ P⁶ Bk. || 31 ποιεῖν P¹ and M^a (1st hand) || 32 [φίλους] Koraes Bk.² ||
 τὴν διάνοιαν is omitted by M^a (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by
 Γ; *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant* William, doubtless from
 a gloss. Hence ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ γάρ μακαρίζοντιν Su-
 sem.¹⁻² wrongly

laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; that just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the form of 'argumentum ad hominem' here chosen, proceeding from premisses universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that 'he might be allowed just this one division' would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term "external goods," it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 2, 1098 b 12 ff., *Rhet.* I. 5 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. SUSEM. (689)

25 μερίδων] Even though it is plain to everybody that the subject is "goods," yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. SUSEM. (690)

§ 4 28 σωφροσύνης] Comp. n. (206 b).
 SUSEM. (691)

These are the four Platonic virtues,

which Aristotle substantially retained as the basis of his more extended list.

29 δεδιότα...30 μνίας] This hyperbolical description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transferred from some dialogue. But an extravagant and drastic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 16, 1098 a 18 μία γάρ χλειδὼν ἔκα οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα οὖτος δέ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εἰδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα, αὐτὸς δέ λέγει χρόνος: 10 § 14, 1101 a 8 ἀν Πρασικάς τύχαις περιπέσῃ: VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 δεδιότα πάντα καὶ φοβήσῃ μήτ: x. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 πράξεις δέ πολας ἀποτείμαι χρέων αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς θεοῖς) καὶ...b 19 οὐ γάρ δή κακεῖδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυράτων: 8 § 10, 1179 a 4 διωτάρον δέ καὶ μῆ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράτευν τὰ καλά: *Poet.* 7 § 4, 1451 a 2 εἰ μηρίων σταδίων εἴη ἵππος, a 7 ἔκαρδον τραγῳδίας δύωντεσθαι: *Rhet.* II. 12 § 8, 1389 a 23 f. τοῖς δέ νεοις τὸ μὲν μελλον πολὺ τὸ δέ παρεληλυθός βραχύ. τῇ γάρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μετωνόθει μὲν οὐδὲν οἶον τε, ἐλπίζειν δέ πάντα (Vahlen). SUSEM. (692)

30 For τοῦ with the infinitive after ἐπιθυμεῖν see Xenophon *Memor.* I. 7 § 3, III. 6 § 16; *Oecon.* 14 § 9. For τὸ πιεῖν as a substantive Plato *Rep.* IV. 439 B τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ διγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίον ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν, and Xenoph. *Hiero* I § 30 (Vahlen).

32 τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν] Here too φρόνησις, the virtue of the practical intellect, stands in contrast to the moral vir-

οὔτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένου ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἡ μαινό- (1)
 § 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἀν συγ- 3
 35 χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δὲ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.
 τῆς μὲν γάρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ικανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅποσονοῦν,
 πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-
 40 τῷ τῶν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἀπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμεῖς
 δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ράδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν
 45 ἔργων [δια]λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ
 φυλάττονται οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταῦται,
 1323 b καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ

34 ὥσπερ] οὕτω before λεγόμενα P^b, [ὥσπερ] Scaliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπλῶς Bernays, <ἀπλῶς>; ὥσπερ? Susem., a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen's defence of the text p. 14 (16). Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὥσπερ λέγομεν ἀπαντεῖ would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὥσπερ * * Schneider, ὡς εἰπεῖν Koraes || 36 εἶναι omitted by P^b S^b V^b Ald. and P^a (1st hand) || 37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Bernays, wrongly || 40 λαμβάνειν Lambin, διαλαμβάνειν II^a p¹ P^a Ar. Bk. 1, διαβαίνειν II¹

tues; cp. 1. 13 § 8, III. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, 11 § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with nn. (40, 45, 112, 115, 474—476, 498, 565, 703). SUSEM. (693)

§ 5 34 ὥσπερ πάντες] "Almost all would allow, when stated." Comp. n. (689). SUSEM. (694) ὥσπερ πάντες: ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντες = ὥσπερ οὐδέν: ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδέν. Vahlen compares *Rhet.* 1. 6 § 24, 1363 a 11, ὥσπερ γάρ πάντες ηὖθις ὁμολογοῦσσιν = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope); and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato *Sympos.* 109 B τἀληθῆ λεγόμενα ἀκοίειν, *Protag.* 311 E. τι δύναται ἀλλα γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκοίομεν; and the Herodotean ταῦθ' ὡς ἀπενειχθέντα ηκουσαν.

35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three the superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that ever so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.

37 Cp. 1. 9, 10, 1257 b 7 πλούτου καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).

38 εἰς ἀπέρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν] Cp. 1. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with nn. (76 b, 90). SUSEM. (695)

§ 6 ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν] Here again Bernays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 n. (733), VI(IV). 2. 3, 1289 b 9 [add 11. 9, 12, 1270 a 10], *De Anima* 1. 3

§ 10, 40b b 22 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐρωτήσομεν; *Meta.* III. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 f. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), *Post. Anal.* 1. 3 § 2 s. f., 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμεν (Vahlen). SUSEM. (696)

39 διὰ τῶν ἔργων] To convince oneself by means of the facts. Like γνῶμενα, φαντόμερα, συμβεβηκότα we find ἔργα and πράγματα used for 'facts' as distinguished from λόγοι, 'theories.' See c. 4 § 7, 1326a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12; B. II. c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1263 a 17 (λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεις).

40 ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται κτλ.] Cp. II. 9 § 35 with n. (346 b) and c. 15 § 6 n. (928) below. SUSEM. (697)

1323 b 1 εἴτ' ἐν τῷ...2 εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν] Bernays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle's own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. "Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the *Ethics* is Aristotelian]; cp. 13

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἴτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (I) ηθοῖς μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολὴν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἡ τοῖς § ἐκείνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρήσιμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐλλείπουσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις § 7 ἐνδύνοπτον ἔστιν. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι (πᾶν γάρ τὸ χρήσιμόν ἔστιν, δν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἡ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς 10 ἔχουσιν): τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἔκαστον ἀγαθῶν, δσφ περ ἀν ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [εἰναι], εἰ δεῖ καὶ τού- (p. 95) τοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.

§ 8 ὅλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρ-

1323 b 6 ἀλλὰ omitted by M^r, by P¹ (1st hand), and possibly by Γ || 8 γάρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text and Bernays, who alters πᾶν into πέρας, wrongly || χρήσιμον εἰς τι Vahlen, perhaps rightly; <χρήσιμον τοῦτ' ἔχει πέρας εἰς ὅ> χρήσιμόν ἔστιν (or something similar) Susem. Both probable corrections, the one is no easier than the other || ὁν] ὥστε Bernays, and so (or perhaps ὥστε αὐτοῦ) Ar., eorum William, αὐτῶν perhaps Γ; ὥστε αὐτῶν Susem.¹ but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) || 9 αὐτῶν omitted by II¹ Ar., [αὐτῶν] Susem.¹ with Koraes, αὐτῆς Oncken, quite needlessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly | 11 χρήσιμον μᾶλλον P⁵ S⁶ || [εἰναι] Schneider Bk.², ἔστιν ?Spengel, <χρή> χρήσιμον Bernays. I am not convinced by Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)

§ 2, 1153 b 15 ff., and 1. 8 § 6 ff. 1098 b 25 ff., and also cp. Rhēt. I. 5 § 3 ff." (Vahlen). Cp. also below V(VIII). 5 § 10 (Eaton) with n. (103). SUSEM. (698)

2 ὅτι μᾶλλον...6 ὀλλείποντον] Cp. Nic. Eth. IX. 8 § 9 f. 1179 a 3 ff. οὐ γάρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκεῖς οὐδὲ ἡ πράξις...καὶ γάρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναται' ἀν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (Eaton). SUSEM. (699)

§ 7 7 τὰ μὲν γάρ...ὅργανόν τι] Cp. I. 8 § 15, 9 § 13 with nn. (76 b, 90), also De Anima I. 3 § 15, 407 a 23 ff. τῶν μὲν γάρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεως ἐστὶ πέρατα, πάσαι γάρ ἐτέρου χάριν, Metaph. II (a). 2 § 12, 994 b 13 ff. [yet this is a spurious book], Nic. Eth. VII. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς μὲν γάρ εὐδαιμονίας δόρος αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς εὐτυχίας] (Vahlen). SUSEM. (700)

8 παν γάρ κτλ] The sense required is 'whatever is useful is useful up to a certain point [or, has a limit to its utility], to exceed which must necessarily either do harm or confer no benefit upon its possessor.' Vahlen supposes a participial clause to have been replaced by the words ὡν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. The simplest draft of the sentence would be τὰ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρας

...ἀν ὑπερβάλλοντα (i.e. ἀν ὑπερβάλλῃ) ἡ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἡ μηδὲν ὄφελεῖν τοὺς ἔχοντας. Then by a familiar idiom the second alternative is replaced by ἡ μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτὸς). The sentence thus becomes somewhat unsymmetrical in form, because τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, though it goes well enough with βλάπτειν, is less suitable as the subject of μηδὲν ὄφελεῖν.

11 καὶ τοῖτος ἐπιλέγειν] 'to predicate of these also,' viz. of mental goods. So Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 9, 1106 b 10 δθεν εἰώθασθαι ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εἰς ἔχουσιν ἔργοις διτι οὐδὲ ἀφελεῖν ἔστι οὐδὲ προσθέναι. With the use of the prep. cp. the phrase ἐπὶ τολλῶν.

§ 8 13 ὅλως τε δῆλον...15 διαθέσεις] "Further, as a general rule it is clear that the relative superiority of the best condition of one thing [as compared with that of another] will be said to be measured by the difference existing between the things of which these are said to be in themselves the best conditions." Comp. Rhēt. I. 7 § 4, 1363 b 21 ff. (Congreve), § 18, 1364 a 37 ff. καὶ ὡν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἰρετωτέρα ἡ καλλιων...καὶ ἀν-

στην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἀλλῆλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, (I) 15 ἥνπερ εἰληχε διάστασιν ὡν φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας διαθέσεις. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τιμιώτερον καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διά-

15 εἰληφε II² Bk.¹ (emended by corr.² of P³) || διάστασις Ar. (apparently) and Γ, but before ὥπερ: [διάστασις] Bojesen, ὥπερ διάστασιν ὡν Bernays, wrongly, ὥπερ...διαστάσει? Vahlen needlessly: see Comm. || αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας II² P³ Bk. avoiding hiatus || ταύτας] ταύτας Bernays, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see Comm. || 16 τιμιώτερον transposed to come after 17 σώματος in II² P³ Bk., τιμιώτερον M⁴, pretiosior William

τικεμένων δὲ τῶν βελτίων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίων καὶ καλλίστων καλλίων. Σοὶ τ. c. § 4, καὶ δὲ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχει, καὶ αὐτὰ αἵτινας καὶ θεαὶ [ὅταν] αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου: Τορ. 111. 3 § 4, 118 b 4 ff. ἐτοῦ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἰρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸν αἰρετώτερον (Vahlen): 2 § 9, 117 b 33 ff. εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῖτον βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἔτερῷ βέλτιστον (Bernays). Even in this unmistakable and express 'development of the logical formula' Bernays discovers a proof of quotation from a dialogue. See n. (702). SUSEM. (701)

14 A parallel to πρὸς ἀλλῆλα after ἐκδοτον is Ρωτ. 23 § 2, ἡν ἕκαστον ὡν ἔργων ἔχει πρὸς ἀλλῆλα. Comp. ἀλλῆλων after ἐκάτερον Pl. Πhaedo 97A, Aeschines I. 137, after μηδένα Ar. Lysistr. 49. Take κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν with what immediately precedes: the best condition of two things 'compared in point of superiority,' i.e. as judged by the superiority of the one relatively to the other. All this forms the subject of ἀκολούθειν. What is the object? Either τῇ διάστάσει, or κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν (for which cf. e. 14 § 1, 1332 b 15), ἥνπερ κτλ. Normally one would expect this to be changed by attraction of the relative into ἥνπερ εἰληχε διάστάσει (or καὶ ἥνπερ εἰλ. διάστασιν). Instead of this, the antecedent is absorbed into the relative sentence and assimilated to its construction ἥνπερ εἰληχε διάστασιν. Such absorption and assimilation may be seen in VI(IV). 4, 8, 1290 b 28, 5, 2, 1292 b 8, 12, 2, 1296 b 20, possibly (see n. ad loc.) 1, 8, 13, 1256 b 29. A good example is Pl. Rep. 400 D εὐηθεῖς ἀκολούθει, οὐχ ἦν ἀνοικαίσθαντες ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐηθεῖς, ἀλλα τὴν αἱ ἀληθῶς...διάστασιν: where the construction of the relative sentence invades the resumed principal sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The periphrasis of ἔχειν c. accus. for a verb is

sometimes varied. Here εἰληχέναι διάστασιν = διεστάναι as Pl. Tim. 38 D, Pol. 288 E δύναμιν εἰληχέναι = δύνασθαι, Phil. 49 C γελοῖσιν εἰληχε τάξιν = γελοῖσι τάξιν. In its simplest form the proposition states that the ὑπεροχὴ of the best condition of two things compared corresponds to the διάστασις between the things. The best state of A : the best state of B :: A : B. Allow the soul's superiority, and you must allow the superiority of ἀρετὴ and φρόνησις its best states. (Vahlen.)

15 διάστασιν] The order of the words in Γ (*distantia quam quidem sortita est quarum dictimus esse ipsas has Will.*) may suggest that διάστασιν was originally a variant of ὑπεροχὴ, and to be bracketed (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Madvig who also proposed < καὶ > διάστασιν). But Vahlen pp. 28—34 (30—36) has shown that διάστασιν is all but indispensable for the sense, and himself admits that it is not necessary to alter to ὥπερ...διάστάσει. Schneider, who first felt a difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ πράγματος κατὰ τὴν διάστασιν ἥνπερ εἰληχε πρὸς ἀλλῆλα τῇ ὑπεροχῇ ὡν φαμεν κτλ. SUSEM.

αὐτὰς ταύτας] Vahlen shows that this is an instance of the idiomatic attraction of a pronominal subject (here a demonstrative, often a relative) into the number and gender of the predicate. In Plato Phil. 57 Ε ταύτας οὖν λέγοντες ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστ' εἴναι = this is what we especially mean by the exact sciences. So here: 'the things whereof we say that just this and that are the attributes' becomes, not ὡν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὡν αὐτὰς ταύτας φαμέν εἶναι διαθέσεις.

17 καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν] Both absolutely and relatively to us. See N. Eth. I. 4, 5, 1059 b 2: Bonitz Ind. Ar. 77 a 21 ff. where τινι, ἐκάτερι, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι are cited as similarly contrasted with ἀπλῶς. So III. 9, 3, 1280 a 21, μέχρι τινός.

- § 9 θεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἔκαστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ (1)
τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν αἱρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἱρεῖ-
ναι σθαι τοὺς εὐ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκεινων ἔνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν.
- § 10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔκαστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὁ
ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταῦ-
τας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμέ-

18 καὶ omitted by Π^{1.5} Π² Bk. || 19 ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ Π² Ρ⁵ Bk. || 20 καὶ
added before τοὺς εὐ φρονοῦντας by ΓΜ*

18 Take τούτων after ἔκαστον. For the use of ἀνάλογον ἔχειν absolutely cp. II. 10 § 4, 1271 b 41, 11 § 3, 1272 b 37.
§ 9 18 Ἐτ. 81..20 τὴν ψυχήν] Cp. Top. III. 1 § 4, 116a 19 f. τὸ δι’ αὐτὸν αἱρετὸν τοῦ δι’ ἔτερον αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερον. "What is desirable on its own account is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else" (Bernays). Although this point of view (*tόπος*) is closely related to the one adopted here, yet it is not identical with it. A more important point is that as the precise argument of the *Topics* is employed e.g. in the *Ethics* also, I. 7 § 4, 1097a 30, we have no right to follow Bernays in ascribing to this chapter of the *Politics* a scientific character materially distinct from the method of the *Ethics* and only suited for popular writings (Vahlen). Moreover there is no development of the 'logical formula' for this proof, as in the former case (see n. 701); while in the passage of the *Ethics* this is done. SUSEM. (702)

The last remark because Bernays argues (p. 80) that in the dialogues the treatment must necessarily have been somewhat abstract and dialectical; and this side of the dialogue he thinks is reflected in the present chapter. The author wrote, he says, for the public at large, who, if impatient of technical terms, are nevertheless especially qualified to appreciate the tact which adapts to each branch of science its appropriate logic.

§ 10 22 ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως] Cp. III. 4 § 7, 11 § 2, with nn. (474, 565). SUSEM. (703)

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταῦτα] Why Aristotle was obliged to add 'activity in accordance with the virtues' we learn from N. Eth. I. 8 § 9, 1098b 31 ff. διαφέρει δ' ίσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐξει ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐξι ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν πάρχουσαν, οὐν τῷ καθεύδοντι..., τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἶον τε πρᾶξι γάρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὐ πράξει. We must agree

with Bernays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of description here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term ἐνέργεια used in that passage. Cf. also § 13 with n. (710), and n. (736). SUSEM. (704)

23 μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις] Bernays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than 'taking the happiness of God as evidence' or 'appealing to the happiness of God,' cp. Thuc. I. 73. 2, just as in a similar phrase the Cyrenaics and Epicureans are reproached with appealing to the lower animals, Plat. *Phileb.* 67 b τοῖς θηρίαις ἐπωρασ οἰονται κυπλοῖς εἶναι μάρτυρας, Cic. *De Fin.* II. 33 § 109 bestiis ..quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis. It is nothing unusual for Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between c. 3 § 10 (cp. n. 746) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in Nic. Eth. X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 7 ff., and similar references to the deity occur e.g. Nic. Eth. VIII. 7 § 4, 1158 b 35, cp. VII. 14. § 8, 1154 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists, see Zeller *op. c.* II. ii. p. 365 ff. Aristotle's aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not unsuitable for his purpose: the inference from this is that happiness in general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities;

νοις, ὃς εὐδαιμων μέν ἔστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (I) 25 ἔξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον ταύτοματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δὲ οὐδεὶς § 11 οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἔστιν) || ἔχόμενον 30 δὲ ἔστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονα

25 αὐτὸν M² P³ || τῷ τὸ M¹ P¹ (perhaps rightly) || 27 [ἀγαθῶν] Bernays, [τῆς ψυχῆς] Spengel Susem.¹, but see Vahlen p. 40 (42) ff. || 29 ἔχόμενον...36 σώφρων a duplicate of 1324 a 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαιοτέραν first recognized by Susemihl. Spengel (following Schlosser) having previously remarked that the two passages do not go well together. See p. 86 f. where they are printed in parallel columns

and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see n. 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen).
SUSEM. (705)

For this *N. E.* x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, *εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀνεύ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι*: cp. I. 10. 16, 1101 a 19.

26 καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἔτέραν εἶναι] Many see no difference between the two: *Nic. Eth.* 1. 8 § 17, 1099 b 7 f. ὅτεν εἰς ταῦτα τάχτουσαν ἔνοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Cp. Socrates apud Xen. *Memor.* III. 9 § 14 (Eaton).
SUSEM. (706)

Add *Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 3 σημεῖον δ' οὗ δοκεῖ ἡτοι ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἡ ἐγγύη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τε εὐπράξια γάρ.

29 ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην] *Cp. Phys.* II. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς Ἑρεκί του γνωμένοις, διαν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἔρεκα γένηται οὐ ἔξω τὸ αἰτίον, τότε ἀπὸ ταῖτουάτον λέγομεν διὰ τύχης δὲ τούτων δοια ἀπὸ ταύτομάτον γίνεται τῶν προαιρέτων τοῖς ἔχοντι προαιρέσιν: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to beings possessed of

purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton).
SUSEM. (707)

Comp. the lucid comments of D. D. Heath *Misconceptions of Aristotle* in *Journal of Philology* VII. p. 111 ff.

§ 11 ἔχόμενον δὲ τοῖς κατὰ] Next there follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαιμονα and 31 πράττοντας καλῶς are predicates of which τὴν ἀριστηρὴν πόλιν is the subject.

30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πράττειν has (1) the transitive meaning 'to do = to perform certain acts,' line 32 τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας, (2) the intransitive meaning 'to do = to be (in a certain state),' as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πράττειν = to be doing (or faring) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Bernays' conclusion that Aristotle would

τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γάρ καλῶς (I) πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον § 12 οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ὑρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἀνδρίᾳ δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύ- 35 ναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ἀν μετασχὼν ἔκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων.]

§ 13 ἀλλὰ γάρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφροιμιασμένα τῷ 6 λόγῳ (οὔτε γάρ μὴ θιγγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνατόν, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἐτέρας γάρ ἔστιν ἔργον σχο-

³¹ γάρ Bernays, δὲ ΓΠΑρ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen p. 45 [47] ff.) || ³² τὴν Spengel, τοῖς ΓΠΑρ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || πράττουσαν M*, πράττουσιν with all other authorities Ar. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || ³³ [καὶ φρονήσεως] Schneider || ³⁴ Körner and Bk.² insert καὶ σωφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and l. 36 ἀνδρεῖος καὶ before δίκαιος; but see Vahlen p. 48 (50) ff.

not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, *Gorg.* 507 C [*Rep.* 353 E], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. *nn.* 732, 744) and III. 9 § 14 (cp. *n.* 560 b), and similarly in *Nic.* *Eth.* I. 8 § 4, 109^b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildenbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 73 (565) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildenbrand's view is that in III. 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by III. c. 5, 6 (cp. *nn.* 471, 684), whereas in IV(VII). 1 § 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore III. c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle's pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Böcker observes) in the words

'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the *virtue* of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness [or wellbeing]. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. 1. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the *virtue* of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cc. III. 5, 6) and the reference to it in III. c. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the 'virtue or excellence' manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. 13 §§ 9, 10 and VIII(v). 9 § 12 with *n.* (1642). SUSEM. (708)

§ 12 33 Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the *Republic*, made implicitly II. 368 E and reasserted expressly IV. 435 B, 442 D ff. Ον δίκαιον καὶ μορφὴν, terms cognate to εῖδος, λόγος, φύσις, cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 206 b 12, and *n.* on I. 4. 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of *ων*, if expressed, would be τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει: see on 1323 b 15.

§ 13 39 ἐτέρας...σχολῆς] For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,

40 λῆσ ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄριστος, καὶ (I)
χωρὶς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῆ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχο- (p. 96)
1324 α ρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά-
§ 14 ξεων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἔσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν
μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὑστερον, εἰ τις τοῖς εἰρημένοις τυγχά-
2 νει μὴ πειθόμενος· || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II
5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων
καὶ πόλεως ἡ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, λοιπόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. φα-
νερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γάρ ἀν δόμολογήσειαν εἰ-
§ 2 ναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὐ τίθεν-
ται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὐτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ἡ πλουσία,
10 μακαρίζουσιν ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τι-
μώσιν, οὐτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλειστων ἀρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστά-
την εἶναι φαῖεν ἀν εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἔνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,
§ 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. || [ἀλλὰ 2

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου omitted by P⁴ V^b Ald. and the first hand of P³ S^b (added in
the margin of S^b by the same hand, in the margin of P³ by a later hand and again
expunged) || 41 ἐκάστω P² Ar. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of
P³ || κεχορηγημένος P⁴-⁶ L^a Ald.

1324 α 4 πότερον...13 σπουδαιοτέραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86
10 μακαρίσουσιν οτ μακαριώσουν Ar. Spengel || 12 ἀν before εἶναι II^a Bk. and P⁶ (in
the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἀλλὰ...1325 b 34 πρότερον] Susem.²³

Lat. *disciplina*, course of study or instruction: in all other passages of Aristotle *σχολὴ*=leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφείσται, πολιτικὴ τις οὐτα, Nic. Eth. I. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see *Introd.* pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastos called *ἡθικαὶ σχολαὶ* (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Krohn *op. c.* p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle's. But his view requires some stronger proofs. SUSEM. (709) "That *σχολὴ* was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου *σχολὴν* ἐλεγε χολὴ, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβὴν, κατατριβὴν, Diog. Laert. VI. 42: cf. also Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* I. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere auderemus..., itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros contuli" (Ridgeway). But the witticisms attributed to Diogenes need very careful sifting be-

fore they can pass as historical (Susemihl).

41 ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς...1324 α 1 πράξεων Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in n. (704) is applicable. Cp. also n. (736). SUSEM. (710)

1324 α 3 διασκεπτέον ὑστερον] Spengel rightly observes, *Über die Pol.* p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cp. *Excursus I.* SUSEM. (711)

c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cp. Plato *Theatet.* 157 A επὶ ἐνός νοῆσαι.

c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τεθεώρηται πρότερον).

A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophic retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceable rule over freemen and of internal activity?

§ 3 13 ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἥδη δύο] The close

ταῦτ' ἡδη δύο ἔστιν ἀ δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἱρε- (II)
 15 τώτερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-
 λεως ἡ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-
 λελυμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέον καὶ πολαν διάθεσιν
 πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πάσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως
 § 4 εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς
 20 διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἔκαστον
 αἱρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προηρήμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνο
 μὲν [[γὰρ]] πάρεργον ἀν εἶη τοῦτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.
 § 5 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταύτην 3

See Comm. nn. 712—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—9 || 14 πότερον

Γ Μ^a (?) P^b S^b Ar. (M^a has τό) || 18 αἱρετοῦ <τοῦ> Koraes || 19 ἐτελ Βδ] ἐτελ διὰ
 M^a, τὸ δὲ περισσόν is a gloss of p^b in the margin; γὰρ Spengel, quite wrongly ||
 21 νῦν after προηρήμεθα Π^c P^b Bk. || 22 γὰρ omitted by Γ P^b L^a Bk., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see n. 708). Even setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present themselves in this section, see nn. (713—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might raise doubts as to the genuineness of that portion (see nn. 690, 709, 711) should be more closely compared. Read Ed. Müller's exhaustive examination in his *History of the theory of art among the ancients* II. pp. 366—373, Breslau, 1837, a work universally neglected, which ought to have led subsequent inquirers to a renewed consideration of these chapters. What a deal of pains he takes to remove the difficulties in them, and all in vain. Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is most intimately connected with his exposition. This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see n. (743). Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1: viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. 13 § 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in cc. 2,

3, though in a slightly altered form, is commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to refer by anticipation to this later section, c. 3 § 1 (cp. n. 731). SUSEM. (712)

14 ἐν μὲν—22 μεθόδου ταύτης] The transition to the best constitution took place as far back as III. c. 18, and in IV (VII). 1 it was stated that we must first examine the best life; now after having concluded this examination and after having stated that the result holds good for the state as well as for the individual, it seems very awkward to say that there are two questions requiring to be investigated, (1) whether the best life for the individual is one of scientific leisure or of political activity, and (2) which is the best constitution. The first question is violently thrust in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be allowed to take even a secondary rank as a question of politics, which the author at once declares is all that he himself claims for it; it has nothing whatever to do with the science of politics, as Schlosser long since observed. It would be a different thing if it were preceded by, and then taken up and treated as co-ordinate to, the inquiry whether the end of the state is peaceful activity or war, which in § 5 is treated as a co-ordinate question. SUSEM. (713)

§ 5 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ..φανερὸν ἔστιν] It is plain then that the [absolutely] best polity is that system under which any one of the citizens whatever would fare

καθ' ἥν τάξιν κάν νόστισον ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζώη μα- (11)
 25 καρίως, φανερὸν ἐστίν· ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τὰν
 δομολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον αἴρετώτατον, πότε-
 ροιν ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἴρετὸς ἡ μᾶλλον ὁ
 πάντων τῶν ἔκτος ἀπολελυμένος, οἷον θεωρητικός τις, ὃν
 § 6 μόνον τινές φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς
 30 διό βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν φαί-
 νονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν λέγω
 δὲ δύο τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ¹
 μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὐ (p. 97)
 34 φρονοῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν
 § 7 ἀνθρώπων ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ
 μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ'
 ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον

24 ἦτορ Ar. apparently, [τάξιν] Spengel. The former probably right: yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) || ἤτοι M^a, ἤτοι P¹ (1st hand, emended by corr.¹) || 28 τις <ῶ> ? Koraes, [τις] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 φιλόσοφοι [sc. αἰρετόν] Jackson || 30 τούτους after τοὺς δύο M^a P¹ || φιλοτιμώτατοι M^a P⁴⁻⁸ Ald. || 31 πρότερον Koraes (needlessly) and P² (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33 γε Spengel, τε M^a P¹ II² Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, omitted by P⁶, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve || 35 ἑκαστον II² P⁵ Ar. Bk. Spengel, γρ. ἑκαστον P¹ (corr. in the margin), perhaps rightly || τῇ τοι M^a, τῇ πολιτείᾳ (πολιτείᾳ 1st hand of P⁵) II² Ar. Bk. (γρ. τῇ πολιτείᾳ corr. in the margin of P⁵), perhaps rightly; τῇ πόλιν Spengel, needlessly || 37 τινὸς omitted by II¹

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness' Cp. c. i § 1 and n. (685). SUSEM. (714)

29 τινες] 'Some' only? We should expect 'all.' But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). SUSEM. (715)

§ 6 σχεδὸν γάρ ... 32 φιλόσοφον] The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. SUSEM. (716)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, *N.E.* i. v. 4, 1095 b 23. Whereas in *N.E.* x. 7, 1177 b 19 ff. *ai karà tás πράξεις ἀρεταί* are sharply distinguished from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (*θεωρητική*), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as *αὐτοελή* (Newman).

34 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ] But granting that the speculative (i.e. studious) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no

way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration: for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (cp. n. 736²) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which arises with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cp. nn. (743, 745). SUSEM. (717)

§ 7 35 οὐ μὲν] The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotic rule over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy prosperity. The conjunction of τὸ ἄρχειν and γινόμενον = ἡ ἄρχῃ γινομένη is harsh, but can be paralleled. On δεσποτικῶς (properly as slaves) see 1277 a 33 n.

³⁸ *αὐτὸν* Γ, perhaps rightly, *αὐτῶν* Vettori², *αὐτοῦς* Schneider.

1324 b 1 ** of Susem. and Böcker, <δροις δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολεῖς ἀμφισβητεῖται. οἱ μὲν γάρ ** οἱ or something similar? Susem. || 4 δέ...δροις] δέ οὗτος καὶ τῆς πολιτείας δρος τῶν νόμων Pl, δέ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος τῶν νόμων Pl⁴⁻⁶, δέ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος δρος (καὶ added by Congreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editors except Susem. || 8 πολεμίους Pl¹ || 14 τῶν] τοσούτων? Koraes, but see Vahlen p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

⁴¹ οὐ μᾶλλον] not so much.

§ 8 Secuta est uberior expositio sententiae eorum qui vitam optimam esse contendunt civitatibus quae καθ' αἰτίας λογουθέα sint, cf. 1325 b 23—27. SUSEM.

complete the connexion we require words to the following effect:—"and there is the same difference of opinion with regard to states. For some think that those states lead the best and happiest existence which devote themselves purely to domestic politics and have nothing to do with any policy of war. For, they say, etc." "This then is one view, but others (of δὲ) etc." SUSEN. (718)

§ 9 7 ὁ σπέρ τὸν Δακεβαῖμοντι πλῆγ-
θος] Cp. II. 9 § 34, IV(vii), 14 § 15 II.,
v(viii). 4 §§ 1-6, with *nn.* (344, 910,
1005). SUSEM. (719)

§ 10 9 *λν τοῖς θύεσι]* cp. 1. 2 § 6,
and *n.* (10 b). SUSEM. (720)

11 καὶ Πέρσαις] cp. Hdt. VII. 2, IX.
123 (Eaton). SUSEM. (731)

12 *καὶ Κελτός*] cp. II. 9 § 7, and n.
(287) p. 334 f. and below c. 17 § 3 and
n. (953). SUSEM. (722).

^{19.53} [τὸν κρίκων κόστρον] Does this throw any light on the real significance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the rings of the Roman equites, as told by Livy XXIII, 12? (Ridgeway).

LIV. XXXI. 12. (KINGLEY)
§ 11. 15 καὶ τρίπο Μακεδονῶν] Here we see the Macedonians expressly reckoned among barbarian peoples. And even if this is pronounced the interpolation of a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier Peripatetics were attached to the Macedonian cause, the more probable it becomes that the pupil is here reproducing

μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεκώσθαι τὴν φορ- (11)
βειάν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔξην πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινι σκύφον
περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
“Ιβηρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους
καταπηγγύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἀν διαφθείρῃ τῶν
πολεμίων· καὶ ἔτερα δὴ παρ’ ἔτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλά,
τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν.

καίτοι δόξειεν ἀν ἄγαν ἄτοπον ἵστως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπισκοπέν, εἰ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι (p. 92)
θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ
§ 13 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἀν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἡ νομοθετικόν,
ἢ γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἔστιν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως
ἄλλα καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δὲ ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκτούστα P^{1,5}, ἀπεκτακότα P³ (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκτακότα P^{4,6} Ald., ἐπτακότα M⁹ || 17 σκύφον περιφερόμενον? Schneider || 18 ἀπεκτακότι M⁹ P^{1-4,6}, ἀπεκτακότι P³ (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκτούστι P⁵ || 19 ἀριθμοῦντες or ἀριθμοῦντας, apparently, Γ (numerantes William) || οὐ βελίσκους M⁹ || 21 δὲ? Koracis wrongly || 24 δύνασθαι transposed by Lindau to follow 28 ἄρχειν, wrongly || 27 μόνον after δικαίως P³ Susem.^{1,2} and apparently Γ

unaltered his master's view. SUSEM. (723). Cp. *Introd.* p. 46 n. (3)

17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις] Comp. Herod. IV. 66. SUSEM. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ιβηρσιν] The only mention of the Iberians, or Spaniards, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious *De Mirabilibus* 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8, 24 ff. SUSEM. (725)

19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcileable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia rows of stones are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the *Academy* of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

"οβελίσκους means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally 'spits.' Originally the spits carried the heads of the slain: when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the

spits, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted ὅσους ἀν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων; i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with 'militancy', of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spencer's *Ceremonial Institutions* ch. ii, p. 48 with p. 186."

§ 12 22 κατειλημμένα] established, confirmed, secured: Cope *Rhet.* II. 2 § 20 compares Thuc. V. 21 στονδᾶς εὐρον κατειλημμένας; Plato *Laws* VII. 823 Α τὰ ταῖς ξυμβασίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα; Nic. Eth. X. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ήθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μετασήσαι: also the active use in Thuc. VIII. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιώτερον κατειλαθον.

25 τῶν πλησίον] but § 8, a 5 τῶν πλαστῶν.

§ 13 Hampke compares with this the discussion upon slavery I. 6 §§ 1—5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβῆτησι, is certainly echoed by the protest 27 f. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κτλ. "to rule at all hazards, whether justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."

(II)

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις τοῦτο ὄρῳμεν· οὔτε⁸
 30 γάρ τον ἰατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ [[ἥ]] πεῖσαι ἢ
 τὸ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆ-
 § 14 ρας. ἀλλ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἰεσθαι
 εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκαστοι οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ
 συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες.
 35 αὐτὸν μὲν γάρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς
 § 15 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ
 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστόν ἐστι τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστόν, ὥστε εἴπερ
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν,
 ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστῶν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοληνῆν ἢ θυ-
 40 σίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν· ἐστι δὲ θηρευ-
 § 16 τὸν ὃ ἀν ἄγριον ἢ ἐδεσπότην ζῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἀν καὶ
 1325 a καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαιμων, ἢ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι
 καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νό-

29 ἀλλὰ...ὄρῳμεν omitted by P¹ (supplied in the margin of P¹) || 30 ἢ before πεῖσαι inserted by P² P⁵ Bk. || 31 τὸ omitted by P² P⁵ Bk. || λάσασθαι P¹ (but βιάσασθαι a correction in P¹) || 33 διπερ <παρ'> or ὁ παρ' ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || 36 μὴ φύσει κτλ can hardly be right: [μὴ] Thurot, perhaps rightly. Schneider suspected a lacuna: if so, it may conceivably be filled up thus; μὴ <φύσει πειθόμεθα, καὶ> φύσει || 37 δεσποστόν—δεσποστόν—δεσποστόν Giphanius, δεσπόζων—δεσπόζων ΓΠΑρ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 39 δεσποστῶν a later hand in P⁵ and Lambin, δεσποτῶν ΓΜ¹ P¹⁻²⁻³ S^b V^b Ald. and P² (1st hand), δεσποτι-κῶν P⁴⁻⁶ L^a || 40 έστι δὲ <πρὸς τοῦτο> θηρευτὸν Oncken rightly, though perhaps this need only be understood

29 The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is by no means superfluous. See Xen. *Mem.* III. 9 § 11, Pl. *Rep.* 488 D δε ἀν ἔνδιαμβάνεις δεινὸς ἡ, ὅπως δρξουσιν ἢ πειθούστες ἢ βιαζούστες τὸν ναυ-κληρον, *Politicus* 296 B ἀν τις ἀρα μὴ πειθῶν τὸν ἰατρεύμενον, ήχων δὲ ὄρθιος τὴν τέχνην, παρέ τὰ γεγραμμένα βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν τινα, τι τονομα τῆς βίας ἐσται ταῦτη; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 30 ἰατροῦ οὐτε, κυβερνήτου ἔργον, πεῖσαι ἢ, 32 οἰεσθαι εἶναι, 33 ἐκασ-τοι οὐ, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not removable by transposition.

οὔτε γάρ τον ἰατροῦ οὔτε κτλ] Comp. Plat. *Gorg.* 456 B (Eaton): also c. 13 § 2 n. (870), and above III. 6 § 7 n. (531), 15 § 4 n. (638), 16 §§ 6—8: 11. 8 § 18 n. (270). SUSEM. (726)

§ 14 35 αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς] at home, in their own political affairs.

§ 15 37 φύσια τὸ μὲν δεσποστόν] See B. I. c. 4 § 6, cc. 5, 6. SUSEM. (727)

39 θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοληνῆν ἢ θυσίαν] Plutarch *Alexand.* 72 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσταλίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡγηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. τοῦτο δέ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐρα-γυμός ἐκάλετο. This was B.C. 324—3 quite at the close of Alexander's career.

40 τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτόν] Implying that wild animals which are not fit for food may be hunted for other purposes, and to supply other necessities of life. It is not quite clear whether the writer thinks that for such other purposes it is also under certain circumstances permissible to hunt men, and whether therefore he would allow of war for the capture of slaves, which Aristotle disallows (1. 8 § 12 n.n. 65, 75) as a branch of θηρευτικῆ. SUSEM. (728)

μοις χρωμένην σπουδαίοις, ἡς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ (II) πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων· εἰ μηδὲν γάρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον.

§ 17 δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς 10 μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὡς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔστι τὸ θεάσασθαι 9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλλην κουνωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγα-

§ 18 θῆς πάσι μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εἰδαιμονίας. δι-
οίσει μέντοι τῶν ταττομένων ἔνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-
θετικῆς ἔστιν ἴδειν, ἐάν τινες ὑπάρχωσι γειτνιῶντες, ποιὰ πρὸς (p. 99)
ποίους ἀσκητέον ἡ πώς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κάν νόστερον τίχοι τῆς προσηκούσῃς
15 σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν·
3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον III
ἀριετώτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-
κτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς (οἱ μὲν γάρ ἀποδοκιμά-
ζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

1325 a 6 ἄρα after δι: M^o P^{1.2.3} S^b V^b || 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίου omitted by M^o P¹

|| 18 of...23 ταῦτά] This whole parenthesis is transposed in P^{2.4} to follow 24 δρθῶ,
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line || 19 [τε] Spengel

§ 16 1325 a 3 ἡς τῆς πολιτείας] We may well believe that such conceptions, though foreign to Pericles, and new even to Isocrates, had become familiar enough in the Athens of Phocion, especially amongst those who lived to compare the brilliant peace administration of Demetrios of Phaleron with the disastrous results of the active policy which had led to Chneroonae and Crannon. Comp. Bernays *Phokion* pp. 31 ff., 55 ff. and Newman I. p. 311.

5 μηδὲν γάρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον] But this is only true with the proviso that such a state is not attacked by offensive wars, for which it must by its constitution be prepared, as indeed the writer himself explains, § 18. SUSEM. (729)

§ 17 6 δῆλον ἄρα...10 εὐδαιμονίας] Precisely the same statement as in these two sentences is made by Plato *Laws* I. 618 D: ὡσάντως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλεων εὐδαιμονίας ἥ καὶ ίδιωτου διανοούμενος οὗτα τις οὐτ' ἀντοπετούσης γένοιτο δρόσος, πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὕτ' ἀν νομοθέτης ἀκριβής, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ τοδέουν νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἥ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔρεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (730)

§ 18 12 ἰάν τινες...γειτνιῶντες] So already II. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-defence.

14 κάν νόστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See *nn.* (712)—this reference may of course be interpolated—and (906). SUSEM. (731)

c. 3 *The best life for the individual is practical activity in the service of a free city. Yet intellectual activity is also practical and this is a higher life still.*

§ 1 17 περὶ τῆς χρήσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.

λεκτόν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp. n. (696) on c. 1 § 6. SUSEM. (733)

19 τε interdum ei vocabulo additur, quod utriusque membro commune est: φόσει τε <γάρ> ἀρχικὸν πατήρ οὐλῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων (i.e. φόσει γάρ ἀρχικὸν πατήρ τε οὐλῶν καὶ...) N. E. VIII. 13 [c. xi. § 2], 1161 a 18^o Bonitz Ind. Ar. 749 b 44 ff. τοῦ ἀλευθέρου] τοῦ ἀποδελυμένου, untrammeled by office and by civic obligations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were metooes, as Anaxagoras had been before them.

20 βίον ἔτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετώτατον, (III)
οὐ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον ἀδύνατον γάρ τὸν μηδὲν πράττοντα
πράττειν εὐ, τὴν δὲ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι
ταῦτον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὄρθως τὰ δὲ οὐκ
24 ὄρθως, οὐ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείων.
§ 3 τοῦτο γάρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γάρ τὸ γε δούλῳ, οὐ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι
σεμνόν· οὐ γάρ ἐπίταξις η̄ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς με-
τέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δε-²
σποτεῖαν οὐκ ὄρθον· οὐ γάρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν η̄ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων η̄ αὐτὸν τὸ φύσει ἐλευθερον τοῦ φύσει δού-
30 λου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἵκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.
§ 3 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν οὐκ ἀλη-
θές· η̄ γάρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ κα-

22 εἶναι before καὶ M^a P¹ || 25 τὸ] τῷ M^a P¹⁻²⁻⁴, τῷ Ald. || 27 δεσποτεῖαν P³
{1st hand, corrected by a later hand}, δεσποτεῖην P¹ and perhaps Γ, so that this may
be right || 29 αὐτὸν τὸ P² (corr.¹), αὐτὸν Γ P¹⁻⁴⁻⁵, αὐτὸν M^a Ald., αὐτὸν P³ S^b V^b and P²
(1st hand)

21 ὀδύνατον γάρ...23 ταῦτόν] Comp. n. (708). SUSEM. (732)

§ 2 25 οὐδὲν γάρ...σεμνόν] Comp. I. 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 n. (913). SUSEM. (734)

26 ἐπίταξις] See note (124) on ἐπι-
τάξει χρῆσθαι I. 13 § 14.

27 νομίζειν πάσαν ἀρχὴν δεσποτεῖαν] See n. (58). Yet Plato was free from this error when he classified the forms of rule, *Lawos* III. 690 A ff. On the other hand he makes πολιτική=βασιλική, *Euthyd.* 292 c, a passage which should be added to *Polit.* 258 e, as quoted on I. 1 § 2.

29 η̄ αὐτὸν...δούλου] How great that difference may be, we learn from I. 5 § 8 n. (47).

30 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] B. I. cc. 4-7. SUSEM. (735)

§ 3 31 οὐκ ἀληθές] is not right, haud verum est.

32 η̄ γάρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις] This is certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine. See c. 1 §§ 10-13, nn. (704, 710); *Nic. Eth.* I. cc. 7-9; VI. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, VI. 5 § 4, 1140 b 7, X. 6 § 2, 1176 a 33; *Phys.* II. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; *Poet.* 6 § 12, 1450 a 17; *Rhet.* I. 5 § 3, 1360 b 14; comp. Zeller II. ii p. 612. But still it is so provided only that under πρᾶξις is included not merely practical, but also theoretical or mental activity, and that consequently the term is understood in the wider sense: for otherwise this doctrine would not be

true of the highest felicity of pure thought, as it pertains to God alone (n. 705), to which however the author himself appeals § 10, n. (746). And of human well-being, too, scientific perfection in active operation is the higher element, moral perfection only the lower element, according to the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. "It must be granted, that then it would be hard to say how the happiness of the individual and of the whole state can be one and the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser endeavours to explain the mistake pointed out in nn. (717, 745) by assuming that "Aristotle subordinated the idea of internal activity to that of contemplation." This thought is quite just; but does this unhappy attempt to mend matters by such a confusion look more like the master or a pupil? Granted that this subordination is intended here (and from § 8 this cannot be doubtful—see n. 743), still of those who prefer the *scientific* life to the practical life it cannot possibly be maintained with truth that they prefer inactivity to activity, nor can Aristotle himself have written anything so inconsistent. SUSEM. (736)

33 η̄ δὲ πολλῶν κτλ] "The actions done by the just and temperate contain a realization of many noble ends." This is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle himself. Further comp. for σωφρόνων n. (206 b), II. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)

λῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. (III)
 καίτοι τάχ' ἀν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων
 35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἄριστον· οὔτω γὰρ ὃν πλεί-
 § 4 στων καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πρόξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖ τὸν
 δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παριέναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 ἀφαιρέσθαι, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παιδῶν μήτε παιδας πα-
 τρὸς μήθ' ὄλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς
 40 τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δὲ πρά-
 τειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἵσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ-
 1325 b ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώ-
 § 5 τατον· ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐχ οἶδον τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτίθενται (p. 109)
 τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
 τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσούτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς ἢ πατήρ
 5 τέκνων ἢ δεσπότης δούλων· ὥστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐδὲν ἀν τη-
 λικούτον κατορθώσειν ὑστερον ὅσον ἡδη παρεκβέθηκε τῆς
 ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὅμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ
 56 <ἐν> μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἵσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσον τοῖς ἵσοις

36 δεῦ Susem., δεῦ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 39 ὑπολογίζειν Bas.², ὑπολογεῖν
 3^b Bk., ὑπολογεῖν M^a Pl¹-2-3-4-5 V^b Ald. Susem.¹ in the text, ὑπόλογος <ον ἔχ> ειν οτ ὑπό-
 λογον ποιεῖσθαι Madvig || Koraes proposed either (1) to bracket μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο
 φροντίζειν, or to alter to (2) μηδὲν, or (3) μηδὲν πρὸς τοῦτον φροντίζειν ||

1325 b 3 ψεῦδος untranslated by William, [ψεῦδος] Susem.¹, ψεῦδος ? Casaubon ||
 8 <ἐν> Thurot

34 τάχ' ἀν ὑπολάβοι τις] 'Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.' This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. SUSEM. (738)

§ 4 Development of this extreme view, that, as the practical life implies the possession of power, the more power the better.

37 παριέναι = to surrender, sc. τὸ ἀρχεῖν, III. 14 § 13. ἀφαιρέσθαι = to deprive another (state or ruler) of empire, Dem. VIII. *De Chers.* § 42, p. 100, 7, ἔχοντι ἀφελέσθαι.

38 πατέρα παῖδων κτλ] Plutarch, *Demetrios* c. 3, p. 890 n, complains that the Diadochi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire.

39 ὑπολογίζειν] This verb, if indeed it be right, is ἀπαξ εἰρμένον in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Demosthenes.

41 ἵσως] 'perhaps,' conforming to Aristotle's own dictum *Rhet.* II. 13 § 2, 1389, b 18 ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέσσιν δε τὸ ἵσως καὶ τάχα. But in b 2 it con-

ceals a very positive opinion under a cautious formula.

§ 5 1325 b 3 τὰς πράξεις] The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἀποστερῶν καὶ βιαζομένος).

4 ὅσον ἀνὴρ... δούλων] These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See I. 12 § 1 f. and *Nic. Eth.* VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSEM. (739)

5 ὁ παραβαίνων] An Archelaos or a Napoleon.

6 κατορθώσειν] would perform a right action: rectum faciat. This use of the verb, as opposed to παρεκβάνειν, may be easily understood from *Nic. Eth.* II. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαυρίται καὶ κατορθῶται, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of κατόρθωσα as a technical term.

§ 6 8 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσον... παρὰ φόσιν] Cr. III. 16 §§ 2-4 n. (672), II. 2 § 6 n. (134 b). SUSEM. (740)

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοῖοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (III)
 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ κανὸς ἀλλος τις ἡ κρείττων κατ'
 ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ
 § 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δὲ οὐ μό-
 νον ἀρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρα-
 κτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
 15 εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινὴ πάσης πόλεως ἀν εἶη καὶ καθ'
 §§ 8 ἔκαστον ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἔτέρους, καθάπερ οἰονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβα-
 νόντων χάριν γινομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶ-
 20 λον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἔνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι after μάρας Pl, after ταῦτα Γ || 20 αὐτῶν Vettori, αὐτῷ Γ II || διανοή-
 σεις... 21 μάλιστα] Should this be διανοήσεις ἢ...πρᾶξις τις. μάλιστα?

10 διὸ κανὸς ἄλλος τις] To the genuine Aristotle this proposition holds provided only that the one great citizen is superior in virtue to all combined, not (as is here expressed) to each individual: see III. 13 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUSEM. (741)

§ 7 12 δεῖ δὲ μόνον κτλ] "He must have not only the virtue but the force to develope his activity fully" (without transgressing virtue). This is only possible in the best state: see III. 13 §§ 24, 25; also n. (677) and *Introd.* p. 44. SUSEM. (742)

14 ταῦτα] That while the life of freedom is preferable to that of rule over unwilling subjects, *βίος δευτερούχος*, § 1, yet the life of action is preferable to that of inaction § 3 (which however does not imply that conquest or grasping at sovereignty is unconditionally desirable §§ 4—6).

16 ὁ πρακτικός] So far as the individual is concerned, comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 § 8, 1178 b 32, εἴη δὲ ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις, 7 § 9, 1178 a 7, οὗτος δρᾶ (sc. ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος δευτέρως δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. But the qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not mean a life in relation to others, as some suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone be practical which are done for the sake of certain external results of the action: on the contrary the self-contained speculations and processes of the intellect are far more truly practical." By *rives* we should naturally understand Plato: but the cap better fits Aristotle himself, *Nic.*

Eth. x. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὐδὲν δικαιοραγῆσαι καὶ μεθ' ὧν, § 7, αἴτια, sc. αἱ πολιτικαὶ πρᾶξεις, ἀσχολοὶ καὶ τέλοις τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐδὲν αἴτια αἴρεται εἰσων. Eaton compares *Rep.* IV 443 D where justice is expounded to be harmonious activity of all the parts of man, and therefore internal, περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθὸς τερπλὸς ταῦταν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ [πρᾶξεν].

20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς...διανοήσεις] This can only mean theoretical or purely scientific thinking; Ed. Müller's uncertainty on this point is the chief defect in his whole exposition, which hinders him from arriving at any really tenable result and is the cause of many errors. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 7 § 5, 1177 b 1 οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, sc. τῆς θεωρητικῆς, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν η πλέον η θαττον περιπο-ούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Upon Aristotle's view two things must be distinguished in every activity, the end and the means; theoretical activity differs from practical and creative activity (see n. 34) in this respect, that in the former internal activity is a self-contained end, while in practical activity the end lies in the act produced by it, which affects some external person, and in the creative activity of art the end is the work or result produced. See *De Caelo* II. 12 § 9, 292 b 6, η πρᾶξις ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἐν δυστι, δρᾶς καὶ οὐ διεκα γίνεται, καὶ τὸ τοῦτο διεκα, *Nic. Eth.* vi. cc. 2—5, *De Anima* III. c. 9^o (Eaton): Zeller *op. c.* II. ii. p. 177 f. If αἱ αὐτοτελεῖς θεωρίαι καὶ διανοήσεις are the most truly practical, the supporters of the view that the intellectual life is to be

νοήσεις. ἡ γάρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξις τις^{*} μά- (III)
λιστα δὲ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἔξωτερικῶν
§ 9 πράξεων τοὺς τὰς διανοίας ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ
25 ζῆν οὕτω προηρημένας· ἐνδέχεται γάρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο ε
συμβαίνειν· πολλαὶ γάρ κουνωνίαι πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρεσι
§ 10 τῆς πόλεως εἰσίν. ὅμοιώς δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἐνὸς
ὅτουν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῆ γάρ ἀν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς
καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἔξωτερικαὶ πράξεις παρὰ
30 τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

21 μάλιστα...23 ἀρχιτέκτονας cited by Julian ep. ad Themist. p. 263 D || 22 καὶ
inserted after δὲ by II² P⁶ Bk. || τῶν] τὸ Julian || 23 τῆς διανοίας Julian

preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, i. 2 §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an assured scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their real satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See e. 14 §§ 7—11, n. (906), also nn. (717, 1024) and *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (743)

21 ἡ γάρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. I. § 11 n. (708). SUSEM. (744)
§ 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν...28 ὅτουν τῶν ἀνθρώπων] ‘However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man.’ What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly

practical, partly creative (see *nn.* 34, 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (Zeller *Plato* p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual's moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see *nn.* 41, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. SUSEM. (745)

28 ὁ Θεὸς] See *n.* (705) on c. I § 10, n. (736). SUSEM. (746)

29 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. ‘God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours: or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See Zeller II. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (*n.* 745). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον (III)
 32 ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
 4 ποις, φανερὸν ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρομίασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ IV
 αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ὄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρό- (p. 101)

32 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Koraes followed by Spengel Bk.² Susem.¹, but see Comm.
 n. (739) || 33 [περὶ αὐτῶν] Schneider,
 34 [καὶ...πρότερον] Spengel Bk.² Susem.¹

activity: hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (*ἴχειν καλῶς*) is exactly identical with its happiness (*εὐδαιμονεῖν*). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. SUSEM. (747)

32 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. SUSEM. (748)

c. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ὄλλας πολι-
 τείας] By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," *τῆς μελλούσης καὶ εὐχῆς συνεστῶν πόλεων* (cp. Diebitsch's excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only as such that it has any meaning and connexion, as Spengel, *Über die Politik* p. 26 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: "After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its external and then

of its internal requirements." Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τὰς ὄλλας...πρότερον to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Susemihl.* But when Hildenbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (*Philologus* XVI. p. 164 ff.) pronounced "the other forms of government" to refer rather to the other model polities or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposed connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if cc. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of c. 4 § 1 as far as πρότερον. We need then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpretation, that the words do refer to B. II., since the interpolator has tacked his composition on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III., so that, as we have already stated, *Introd.* p. 48, he either found or made a redaction, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the

* In *Jahrb. f. Philol.* ct. 1870, p. 350.

35 τερον,] ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑπο- (IV)
θέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ’ εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως.

§ 2 οὐ γάρ οἶον τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμμέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποτεθεῖσθαι καθάπερ
39 εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ
§ 3 οἶον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὡσπερ γάρ καὶ
1326 α τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγῷ, δεῖ τὴν
ὑλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείαν οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν ἔργασίαν (ὅσῳ γάρ ἀν
αὔτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-
νον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ
5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὑλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν.

“§ 4 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικής χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαντως, πόσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαν τινὰ ταύτην.

οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν 8
ιο εὐδαιμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἀληθές, ἀγυοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἀλλὰ γάρ ταῦτα μὲν...1324 a 4 πειθόμενος, we should expect *ἀρχὴ* <δὲ> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 περὶ omitted by M*, [*περὶ*] Susem.¹⁻², perhaps rightly || 37 γενήσεσθαι Susem.¹⁻², *fore* William, γίνεσθαι? Susem. || 38 προϋποτίθεσθαι Sylburg Susem.¹⁻², *praesupponi* William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχομένοις, as Sylburg suggested

1326 α 3 αὐτῇ Π³ P⁵ Bk. || 4 κάλλιον] βέλτιον M* || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ>
κατὰ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσην Sylburg, δῆην ΙΙ Bk.¹
Susem.¹ in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention (see nn. 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, *ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν κτλ*, a place immediately after the end of Book III, without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last unfinished sentence of B. III. to B. IV(VII). —as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. IV(VII). and at the same time treat the words τῶν λοιπῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here: “Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c.” SUSEM. (749) Cp. II. 1 § 2, 1260 b 36, ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἢ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴν ταῦτης τῆς σκέψεως.

c. 4 §§ 2—14, cc. 5—7: περὶ τε πλῆθος πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. With this compare generally Plato *Laws* IV.

§ 2 38 χορηγίας] See n. on 1. 6 § 3, 1255 a 14.

διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ κτλ] Cp. II. 6 § 7 n. (202): also II. 1 § 1, n. (128) and the references there collected. SUSEM. (750)

§ 3 40 ὡσπερ γάρ κτλ] The analogy was used I. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the population: how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So likewise in regard to the territory: how large and of what nature ought this to be?

The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14: their race and mental characteristics in c. 7.

The size of the ideal city: c. 4 §§ 4—14.

1326 α 10 ποία μεγάλη] With §§ 4—6 compare Pl. Ceph. IV. 423 B: ἔως ἀν ιπόλιτος οὐοι οἰκῦ σωφρόνως ὡς ἄρτι ἐτάχθη,

§ 5 ποία μικρὰ πόλις. κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γάρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρί- (IV)
 νουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύνα-
 μιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυνα-
 μένην τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην,
 15 οὐλον Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φήσει-
 § 6 εν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ 4
 μὴν ἀλλὰ κάνει εἴ δει κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντας,
 οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος τοῦτο οἰητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἵσως
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν
 20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως καὶ
 ἔξιν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μερῶν· ή γάρ τούτων ὑπε-
 ροχῇ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημείουν, ἔξι ής δὲ βάναυ-
 σοι μὲν ἔξερχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄπλεται δὲ ὀλίγοι, (p. 102)
 ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γάρ ταῦτὸν μεγάλη τε
 § 7 πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο γε ἐκ τῶν 8
 26 ἔργων φανερὸν ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἵσως δ' ἀδύνατον εύνομεσθαι

11 ποία added by Γ Μ² Ar., omitted by all other authorities and Bk. || 12 εἰς δὲ] ἀλλ' εἰς preferred by Thurot, but such variations should be noted without correction. The passage supports R. Schöll's conjecture at 1353 a 22, <οὐκ> ἔσται || 14 οἰητέον omitted by Π¹, [οἰητέον] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 18 ποιητέον Camerarius Bk², ὄριστέον? Schmidt || ἵσως after 19 πόλεσιν Π² P⁶ Bk. || 20 εἰσὶ μέρος πόλεως apparently Γ, πόλεως εἰσὶ μέρος Π² P⁶ Bk. || 21 μερῶν Π² P⁶ Bk. || 25 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γε καὶ ? Koraes

μεγάλη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εἰδοκιμεῖν λέγω, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐάν μόνον ἡ χιλιῶν τῶν ποιολεμούντων (Eaton). Plato also criticizes the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy Laws 742 D ff., cp. 738 D, E. 11—13 Comp. Isocr. VII. 13. SUSEM. (751). Add vi. 81, xv. 171 f. (Newman).

§ 5 12 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν] We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency: explained, in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In § 10, a 38 it is rather "essence," cp. c. 1 § 12, 1323 b 33.) For the use of δὲ instead of the more usual ἀλλὰ, as in a 15 οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλ' ἰατρὸν, cp. Thuc. IV. 86. 1 οὐκ ἔπι κακῷ ἐπ' ἀενθερώσει δὲ.

15 Ἰπποκράτην] We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which

constitute the first and third books of the 'Epidemics,' the no less excellent little work 'On the influence of air, water and locality,' and perhaps 'On the origin and cure of diseases,' and the fragment 'On wounds in the head.' Still these are enough to prove the ability of the man, who is rightly called the Father of Medicine. SUSEM. (752)

§ 6 18 κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος] 'We must not estimate it by the mass of any and every sort of people.' Comp. c. 8 § 8 n. (804) and VIII(v). 3 § 11 ὥσπερ γάρ οὖδε ἐν τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθεις πόλις γίνεται οὐτως οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ n. (1531 b). SUSEM. (753)

20 ὅσοι μέρος...21 μερῶν] 'but only count those who form an integral part of a city or the parts of which it properly consists': see cc. 8, 9. SUSEM. (754)

21 τούτων depends on πλῆθος.

23 ὄπλεται] Of course the soldiers are here mentioned only to exemplify the organic members of the city generally. SUSEM. (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπόν, ἵσως δ' ἀδύνατον]

τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι (IV) καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὄρῳμεν οὖσαν ἀνεμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. § 8 τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὁ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἔστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν εἶναι, ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξιες· θεῖας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν. ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει § 9 ἔωθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἡς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεῖς 35 ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταῦτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον, <ἐπεὶ τὸ γε <καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι.> ὀλλ' ἔστι ἡ 36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὃσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῷων φυτῶν ὄργανων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ὀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὅτε

§ 9 τε omitted by M^o Pl, very likely by Γ, perhaps rightly, [τε] Susem.¹ || 33 ἐπεὶ ... 34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Boecker to follow 35 ἀναγκαῖον. See p. 87. Schneider, who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ἐν πλήθει καὶ || τὸ γε] δὲ τὸ and 34 [δὸς] Koraes || 34 πόλιν] πόλις Pl II² and P³ (1st hand) || ὃ Koraes, most likely right || 36 πόλεσι II² P³ Bk., civitati Ar. || 38 αὐτοῦ Γ Pl³, αὐτοῦ M^o II²

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of *εἴρωπα*: Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government 11. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 800,000, the numbers given for Acragas Diog. Laerti. VIII. 63, Holm *Gesch. des Siciliens* II. 402 (Diod. XIII. 84 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 100,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybaris, Croton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξις τις] And πολιτεῖα = τάξις τις ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. *Gorg.* 503 ε. ff. esp. 504 δ. ταῖς δὲ τῇ φυχῇ τάξεσι καὶ κοσμήσεσι (*ὄντομα*) νόμους τε καὶ νόμος.

32 θεῖας γὰρ...33 τὸ πᾶν] "for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together." And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, *νοήσεως νόησις*, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate

formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause: see esp. *Mēta.* XII. (Δ) 7 § 6, 1072 b 13 ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρά φύσεως ἤρηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις; 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 ταραδότα παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων διτ...περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν. SUSEM. (756)

§ 9 34 ἡς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ] 'which has the definition here given,' i.e. *εύταξια*, 'combined with a certain size,' ἐπεὶ τὸ γε καλὸν κτλ 'since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude.'

Comp. *Poet.* 7 §§ 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ καλὸν καὶ δύον καὶ ἄπαν πράγμα διανέστηκε ἐκ των οὐ μόνον ταῖτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξεις ἐστίν, διὸ οὔτε πάρμακρον διὸ τὸ γένοιτο καλὸν ἔσται...οὐτε πανιέγεθες: *Mēta.* XIII. (Μ) 3 § 11, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἰδῆ τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὄψιμον: *Probl.* XIX. 38; XVII. 1; *Nic.* Eth. IV. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τὸ καλὸν ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δὲ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δὲ οἱ: Ed. Müller op. c. II. pp. 84—107: Zeller II. ii. p. 765 f. SUSEM. (757)

Plato *Phileb.* 64 D, μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δηποτε.

§ 10 39 ἐστερημένον κτλ] 'robbed of its true nature,' i.e. depraved, like the

40 δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοίον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται (IV)
 πλοίον ὅλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν, εἰς δὲ τὶ μέγεθος ἐλθὸν ὅτε
^{1326 b} μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσει τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ
^{§ 11} διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἡ μὲν ἔξ ὀλίγων ⁷
 λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκει), ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν
 ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ’
 5 οὐ πόλις πολιτείαν γάρ οὐ ράδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γάρ στρατη-
 γὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθους, ἡ τίς κῆρυξ μὴ
 Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρώτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ
 τοσούτου πλῆθους ὃ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ζῆν
 εὐ ἔστι κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν
 10 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλονταν κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι [μείζω] πόλιν,
^{§ 12} ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, δόριστον. τίς δὲ ἔστιν ὁ
 τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὄρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἵδειν ράδιον. εἰσὶ γάρ αἱ
 πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δὲ ἀρχομένων,
^{§ 13} ἀρχοντος δὲ ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν (p. 103)
 15 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ’

1326 b 3 ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκεις omitted by P¹⁻⁵ P³ Ar. || 4 μὲν after τοῖς P^{2-3,4} S^b V^b
 Bk. || αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὥσπερ θνος or αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ <δὲ> θνος Jack-
⁷ son, perhaps rightly || 5 πολιτείαν] πολιτηριαν P²⁻³, πολιτηριαν S^b V^b || 8 ζῆν after 9 εὐ
 Π² P⁶ Bk. || 10 [μείζω] Schneider Bk.² Schmidt would transpose thus: μείζω ταύτης
 <καὶ>. Presumably μείζω is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλονταν κατὰ πλῆθος

διεφθαρμένα of 1. 5 § 5 (cp. I. 2 § 13 n. 28),
 ‘or stunted,’ in poor condition.

40 πλοίον σπιθαμιαῖον] A boat a span long.

41 οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίοιν] nor yet a boat two furlongs long: comp. Puel. 7 § 9,
 1451 a 2, οὐλεὶ μηρίων σταδίων εἰν ἕπον.

§ 11 1326 b 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις] Comp. Nic. Eth. IX. 10 § 3. 1170 b 31: ἡ ἐστιν τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους,
 ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὐτε γάρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώ-
 πων γένοται ἀν πόλις, οὐτε ἐκ δέκα μηρά-
 δων ἐτι πόλις ἐστιν (Eaton). SUSEM.
 (758)

3 αὐτάρκεις] See I. 2 § 12 n. (21),
 also n. (136), III. 1 § 12 (447), 9 § 14
 (560), IV(VII). 5 § 1 (764), 8 § 8 (804).
 SUSEM. (759)

4 αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ θνος, ἀλλ’ οὐ
 πόλις] See n. (11) and II. 2 § 3 n. (132).
 SUSEM. (760)

5 οὐ ράδιον] The larger the city or
 canton state becomes, the more difficult
 is the working of the constitution. Baby-
 lon, like all Peloponnesus (II. 6 § 6, III.

3 § 5), has passed the limits within which
 civic unity is possible. Such an over-
 grown city or canton-state must be treated
 as an *θνος*; or possibly that is what he
 contemplates in III. 14 § 1 (πόλει καὶ
 χώρᾳ). The problem which to Aristotle
 seemed almost insoluble was solved by
 events, as the federal system became
 developed; the Achaean league, an *θνος*,
 included for a while all Peloponnesus in
 political unity, Polyb. II. 37. 11.

7 πράτην] primitive, earliest as b 8
 πρῶτον. The term is applied to οὐλα,
 κάμη I. 2 § 5. So in the definition *De
 Anima* II. 1 § 6, 412 b 5, πράτην ἐντελ-
 χεια σώματος φυσικοῦ ὅργανοι.

§ 12 14 ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις] Cp.
 VI(IV). 15 § 4, μάλιστα δὲ ἀρχὰς λεκτέων
 ταῦτα ὅσαι ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαι τε
 περι τινῶν καὶ κρίναις καὶ ἐπιτάξαις καὶ
 μάλιστα τοῦτο τὸ γάρ ἐπιτάξτει ἀρχικό-
 ταρον ἐστιν, n. (1349 b). SUSEM. (761)
 Similarly Pl. Politicus 260 π., συμπάσης
 τῆς γνωστικῆς τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ
 δὲ κριτικόν.

ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποῖοι τινές εἰσι, τοὺς (IV) πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαύλως ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις.

19 περὶ ἀμφότερα γάρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν § 14 τῇ πολυνανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερώς. ἔτι δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκοις ῥάδιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας οὐ γάρ χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὐτός ἔστι πόλεως ὄρος ἄριστος, ἢ μεγίστη τοῦ πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος.

5 περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦ 26 τοῦ παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει περὶ ν μὲν γάρ τοῦ ποιαν τινά, δῆλον δὲ τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς τις ἀν ἐπαινέσειν (τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παντοφόρον τὸ γάρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς 30 αὐταρκεῖς) πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἄμα καὶ σω-

20 πολυνανθρωπίᾳ τῇ] πολυνανθρώπῳ Susem.¹, quae valde multorum hominum William || 23 [πόλεως] Spengel, δρός <τῆς μεγίστης> Schneider, both unnecessarily || 24 ἦτοι εὐβοήθητος P² (corr. ¹) and P³ (a later hand), a gloss from 1327 a 3 || 26 τὰ omitted by P⁴ & S^b V^b || 27 τινά <δεῖ> Spengel, τινά <δεῖ εἶναι τὴν χώραν> Scaliger, but τὰς τις ἀν ἐπαινέσειν should be understood from what follows || πᾶς] πᾶν Bk.² by a misprint

§ 13 17 ὡς ὅπου...18 κρίσεις] τοῦτο = τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους. A genuine Athenian sentiment; not only does Plato's judgment agree with this (*Laws* v. 738 E, ὅπως ἀν φιλοφρονῶνται ἀλλήλους μετα θυσίων καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὐ μείζον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀργαθέν, ἢ γνωρίσμους αἴτοις εἶναι. ὅπου γάρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὐτ' ἀν τιμῆς τῇ δέξιας οὐτ' ἀρχῶν οὗτε δίκαιη ποτέ τις ἀν τῆς προστικούσης ὄρθως τυγχάνω), but Thucydides also remarks, VIII. 66 § 3, that during the reign of terror under the Four Hundred people were afraid to communicate their suspicions to one another διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγρωστιαν (Eaton). SUSEM. (762)

19 οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is not fair to pronounce off-hand." Knowing the ground of his objection to overpopulous cities, we can argue (as in a similar case previously, see on III. 5 § 5) that his own principles require him to withdraw it where increased facilities of communication have enabled men to surmount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη...24 εὐσύνοπτος]

'the largest excess of population which will promote independence of life and yet can be taken in at one view.' This closely corresponds with the decision pronounced by Aristotle as to the proper length of a poem, and the size of a work of art generally, *Poet.* c. 7 § 10, 1451 a 3 ff. 23 § 5, 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1459 b 18. *Comp. Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b 17 ff. (Eaton). Also c. 5 § 3 below with n. (768). SUSEM. (763)

c. 5 deals with the territory. *It should be sufficient for the support of the inhabitants without external supplies, §§ 1, 2; compact and easily defensible, § 3; and with direct access to the sea, § 4.*

§ 1 30 αὐταρκεῖς] 'Independence' implies that the soil produces all the necessities of life. See I. 2 § 12 n. (21), and the references in n. (759). SUSEM. (764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει] 'in extent and magnitude'; muchness and greatness are here nearly synonymous.

31 ζῆν σχολάζοντας] Cp. χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσούτοις ἐξ ἣς ἀργοὶ θρέψονται, II. 6 § 6 n. (201): δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ

§ 2 φρόνως. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὄρον εἰ καλῶς οὐ μὴ καλῶς λέγο-

μεν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτή-
σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνη ποιεῖσθαι
35 μνεῖαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτήν· πολλαὶ γάρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφι-
σβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκουτας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-
βολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλισχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.

§ 3 τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δὲ ἔντα ε-
40 πείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρὴ
μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δὲ εὐέξοδον.
1327 a ἔτι δὲ ὡσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔφαμεν εὐσύνο-
πτον εἶναι δεῦν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δὲ εὐσύνοπτον
τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἔστιν.

τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρὴ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν, πρὸς τε
5 τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. (p. 104)

§ 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος (δεῖ γάρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοι-
νῆν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἀπάντων) ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν

32 τοῦτο L³ Ar. Ald. || τὸν δρον omitted by P² Ar. (supplied by corr.³ in P²) ||

38 τὴν before γλισχρότητα omitted by P¹, P³ || 41 μὲν τοῖς] τοῦτο μὲν ? Susem. (cp. v. I. 1326 b 4)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον P² P⁶ Bk. || 6 μὲν <οδν> Schneider

σχολῆς εἴναι: ἀσχολούμεθα γάρ ίνα σχολά-
ζωμεν, Nic. Eth. x. 7. 6.

Δευτέρως ἀμα καὶ σωφρόνος] “at once with liberality and temperance”: c. II. 6 § 8 n. (206), § 9 n.n. (206 b, 207); also II. 7 § 7 n. (237 b), and VI (IV). 11 §§ 3, 4 n. (1290 b). SUSEM. (765)

§ 2 33 ὕστερον] An unfulfilled promise; there is no such treatment o political economy. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), 53 n. (6). SUSEM. (766)

36 ἀμφισβητήσεις] ‘For there are many controversies on this subject; because of those who urge us to one or the other extreme in life, to parsimony on the one hand and to luxury on the other.’ Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολὴν] excess, extreme, as in c. I § 5, 1323 a 38, VI (IV). 11 § 10 τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβάλλει. Cp. c. I § 7, 1323 b 11, 11. 9 § 24 (ἡ διαιτα ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρὸν) and N.E. IV. 1 § 39, 1121 b 27 (ἀνόμασται δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀν δύναι).

§ 3 41 τοῖς πολεμίοις...εὔξοδον] ‘a difficult country for the enemy to invade, but easy for the citizens to quit.’ Comp. c. II § 3 n. (848). SUSEM. (767)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον εἴναι]
See c. 4 § 14 n. (763). SUSEM. (768)

“We say of the territory, as we said of the population, that it should be such as can be taken in at one view; meaning thereby that reinforcements can easily be marched for the defence of every part of it.”

4 κατ' εὐχήν] ‘If we are to fix upon an ideal site’: comp. n. (128): ‘a position favourable for access to the sea and for communications by land is imperative.’ SUSEM. (769)

§ 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὄρος] “One defining principle,” see n. on III. 9 § 1 “is that just mentioned”: τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἴναι: “the city must be equally in communication with all parts of the country for defensive purposes.” This is expanded c. 6 § 3, a 21—23. κοινὴν εἴναι = facilem aditum habere ad omnes locos Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

7 δὲ διὰ λοιπὸς] “And the other is that it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐπαρα-
κόμιστον εἴναι τὴν χώραν) for the convey-
ance of the produce of the soil as well as of material like timber, or any other similar material in which the country may

γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα (V) ὅλης, καν εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἡ χώρα τυγχάνοι 6 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην εὐπαρακόμιστον. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ὀφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἡ Βλαβερά, πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενοῦσθαι τινας ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένους νήμοις ἀσύμφορον φασιν εἶναι πρὸς 15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυνανθρωπίαν γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος, ἵπεναντίαν δὲ εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι § 2 καλῶς. διτὶ μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν 20 τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον. § 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥάσον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφότερα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν

8 The punctuation (a comma after *παραπομπάς* instead of a period, and no comma after 10 *τοιαύτην*) Jackson followed by Welldon || 9 τυγχάνη *P¹*, τυγχάνει *P⁶ S^b* || 10 *τοιαύτην* before *κεκτημένη* *M^a P¹*, before ἡ χώρα *Γ* || [περὶ...1327 b 18 τοῦτον] Broughton: see Comm. || 12 πολλοὶ Camerarius and possibly *M^a P¹* (1st hand): for

M^a has *πολλά*, i.e. πολλά or πολλοί, and *P¹* has *πολλά* (with a written very small and apparently an erasure after it), πολλά *Γ Π² Ρ³ Bk.¹ P¹* (corr.) and perhaps *M^a* || 14 *εἴσαντας* *Π² Ρ³ Bk.* || 17 *επ' ἑναντίαν* *M^a*, *ὑπεραντίαν* *Ρ² C^c* || 20 *τὴν πόλιν* omitted by *Γ M^a* || *τῆς χώρας <καὶ>* Bojesen (see c. 5 § 3, c. 11 § 1), *τὴν χώραν* *Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.*¹ in the text || 21 πολέμους *Sylburg*, *πολεμίους* *Γ Π Ar. Susem.*¹ in the text

trade" (Welldon). *κεκτημέναι* ἐργασίαν τυνός = to have acquired a trade in any staple commodity.

c. 6 *The advantage and disadvantage of proximity to the sea.*

Comp. A. Lang *Introductory Essays* p. 71. Broughton maintains that c. 6 is not by Aristotle, but is wholly the work of some Peripatetic, which Apellikon or Andronikos first inserted in this place. Comp. n. (790), and on the other side *nn.* (881, 932). SUSEM.

§ 1 12 πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες] See Plato *Laws* IV. 705 A, 706 ff.; ep. XII. 950. But in Aristotle's account of the opinions held by representatives of this view there are some things not to be found in Plato: accordingly it would seem that he has other writers also in view. At a later time Cicero 'is wholly in agreement' with such opinions, *De Repub.* II. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at the question more impartially' (Oncken)

and really goes as far as it was possible for him to go with his narrow theories upon Political Economy. But of course even he was greatly hampered by them. See *nn.* (772, 774). SUSEM. (770)

13–18. Objections: (1) the continued residence of aliens brought up under alien laws, and (2) the populousness of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good government. See *Laws* IV. 704 D.

15 καὶ τὴν πολυνανθρωπίαν sc. ἀσύμφορον εἶναι. γίνεσθαι] sc. τὴν πολυνανθρωπίαν. A large population is the result of their traffic by sea. The participles are accus. as subjects of *χρῆσθαι*.

§ 2 18 εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart from these results.

20 "that the city should communicate both with the land and the sea." This sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφότερων μετέχουσιν.

§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, bear the brunt of an attack.

καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τους ἐπιτιθεμέ· (V)
 24 νοῦς, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀμφῷ δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρ-
 25 ξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντιν. ὅσα τ' ἀν μὴ τυγχάνῃ
 παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα
 τῶν γνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστιν. αὐτῇ
 γάρ ἐμπορικήν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν
 οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσέδουν
 30 χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν ἦν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης
 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδὲ ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιούτον.
 35 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὄρῳμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντας καὶ χώραις καὶ
 πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν
 πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸν νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν,
 35 ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,
 φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς
 κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ (p. 105)

24 ἀλλ' εἰ Π³, ἀλλὰ γε Schneider || 30 ἦν P^{2.3.4} Vb Ald. and apparently Ar. ||
 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Π² Ar., ἐπεὶ δὴ Götting || ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, ὑπάρχοντα
 Congreve Susem.²⁻², ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ Π Bk.¹, ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schneider Bk.² || 34 νέμειν
 αὐτὸν τὸ Γ Ar. Susem.¹⁻², αὐτὸν τὸ after a lacuna P⁵ (1st hand), τὸ αὐτὸν (αὐτὸν Π⁴)
 νέμειν other authorities and P⁵ (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busse
 p. 38.

23 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι] Cp. c. 11
 § 11 n. (855). SUSEM. (771) Also II. 6
 § 8.

24 κατὰ θάτερον] 'in one of the two ways, if both are at their command.'

(μετέχοντιν dative plur. of the participle.)
 § 4 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἔστιν] Partitive genitive: 'is one amongst necessary conditions': so II. 11 § 10, 1273 a 33. This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαῖον.

25 γάρ ἐμπορικήν κτλ] 'For it ought to carry on trade in its own interests exclusively and not for the advantage of others.' This dictum strikes at the root of free-trade legislation (Eaton). SUSEM. (772)

Thirty years ago our other English commentator Congreve uncompromisingly denounced this dictum: "Any theory like this of Aristotle's—such as the mercantile and protective system of later times,—which aims at exclusiveness, is to be condemned as a direct attack on the real interests of mankind." Even now how large a part of civilized mankind is in Aristotle's position and fails to discern its real interests in this matter.

29 πᾶσιν ἀγοράν] 'a universal mart.' This exactly describes the situation of Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from the Black Sea. Cp. Xen. *De Vect.* 3.

31 οὐδὲ ἐμπόρου] The ideal city is not itself to be such a place of trade, nor is it to have a commercial seaport of this kind.

32 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ...33 ἐπίνεια] "This was the situation of Peiraeus, Cenchreæ, Lechaion, Notion [cp. VIII(v). 3 § 15 n. 1541], Nisaea, Pegae, Patrae, Argos" (Eaton). SUSEM. (773)

33 τείχεσι] As the long walls connecting Peiraeus with Athens, Lechaion with Corinth, and Nisaea with Megara.

37 εἰ δὲ τὶ βλαβερόν] "while any harm they may cause it is easy to guard against by prescribing and defining in the laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy mutual intercourse." Here then even Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's policy in regard to the treatment of foreigners, *Laws* XII 950 ff., esp. 952 D-953 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (774) Plato would exercise a strict surveillance on all who enter or leave the country: comp. n. (373) on the Spartan *ξενηλασίαι*.

τι βλαβερόν, φυλάξασθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας (V) 39 καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς § 6 ἀλλήλους.

βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ 1327 b μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίον τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν, ὡσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ § 7 θάλατταν) περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἥδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ § 5 ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ξήσται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυναυθρωπίαν τὴν γυνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν 8 8 ὅχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν κὸν ἔλευθερον καὶ τῶν πεζεύοντων ἔστιν, ὃ κύριον ἔστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκων καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ναυτῶν. ὄρθμεν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισὶν, οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι 15 τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἔτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

1327 b i αὐτοῖς M^a P^{2,3-4} Ald. || πλησίων P^{2,4} || καὶ φοβερός εἶναι transposed to follow 2 βοηθεῖν by Camerarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly || 5 πολεμικὸν Schneider (in the translation) Bk. 2, <μὴ μόνον> πολιτικὸν ? Schneider, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket καὶ πολιτικὸν is not commendable || 8 ἄρχειν ? Schlosser (wrongly) || οὐθὲν Π² Bk., οὐδὲ Γ M^a || 9 μέρος omitted by L^a C^c Ald. W^b || 13 καὶ added after δὲ by Π² Bk. || 14 ἡρακλεωτῶν P^{4,5} S^b V^b || 15 ἐρδεοεστέραν Sepulveda, and Γ apparently had κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἔτέρων ἐνδεεστέρας (*aedificata civitate magnitudine aliis contractiore*)

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits. Epaninondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.

§ 7 1327 b 4 εἰ μὲν γὰρ...βίον] "For if the city is to have a career of supremacy." One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21. Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a warlike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however n. (917) and *Introd.* p. 55. SUSEM. (775)

5 πολιτικὸν] Schneider well remarks:

quasi reliquae civitates πολιτικὸν βίον non colant. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to II. 6 § 7, IV(VII). 2 § 3.

§ 8 9 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν κτλ.] "For only the marines are free men and form part of the land army; and it is they who are supreme (on board ship) and control the crew."

10 καὶ τῶν πεζεύοντων] At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. n. 1519). Thuc. III. 98 § 4, VIII. 24 § 2; but generally (n. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. VI. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh *Staatsh.* I². 583 f., 1² 649 f. p. 500 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (776)

14 τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν] Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the

§ 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων καὶ (V)
 θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα
 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους, τίνα μὲν VI
 7 ὥρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δέ τινας τὴν
 τοφύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, μὲν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειν ἄν
 τις τοῦτο γε, βλέψας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμούσας
 τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διείλη-

16 καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων Susem., καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων Γ Π Αγ. Bk.¹
 Susem.¹⁻² in the text, καὶ πόλεως λιμένων Welldon wrongly, καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων
 Congreve. In place of πόλεων Koraes conjectured ἐπωειῶν, Schmidt ἐμποριῶν,
 Broughton περιπολίων, Jowett πλοίων. Conring followed by Bk.² bracketed καὶ πόλεων

|| 17 διωρισμένον L^a P^{b-c} Ald. Bk.² and P^d (corr.), διωρισμένον P^e, διωρισμένον S^b V^b ||
 21 τὰς πόλεις omitted by P^{b-c} L^a Ald. W^b

Herakleioiots, *Anab.* v. 6 § 10 (Giphanianus). He also calls Herakleia in Pontus a colony from Megara, settled in the land of the Mariandynians (*Anab.* v. 10 § 1). We know from other sources that there were also Boeotians (from Tanagra) along with the Megarian colonists, and that the colony was founded about 550. Strabo xii. 549 is wrong in designating it a Milesian settlement. The colonists had converted the Mariandynians whom they had conquered into subjects or vassals, in virtue of a compact similar to that made by the Thessalians with the Penestae (cp. n. 280) and by the Spartans with the Helots, containing a special proviso that they should not be sold out of the country. Indeed the Herakleioiots did not call them their property or their slaves, but their spear-bearers (*δόρυφόροι*). See Posidonius *Frag.* 16 in Ath. vi. 263 c, Strab. xii. 542, Plato *Laws* vi 776 D (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also Pseudo-Arist. *Oecon.* II. 9 § 1, 1347 b 3 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (777)

15 τῷ μεγέθει ... ἴμμελεστέραν] "A city of but moderate size, as compared with others." We do not anywhere else find an accurate statement as to the probable size of Herakleia; but extracts from the work of its native historian Memnon in Photius give us information as to its power and history (J. G. Schneider). See Müller's edition, *Fragm. hist. Gr.* III. p. 525 ff. There are notices of the early internal history of Herakleia VIII(v). 5 § 3 n. (1555); 6 § 3 (1569), § 7 (1575), § 15 (1582). SUSEM. (778)

Comp. also Grote, c. 98, vol. xii. p. 622 ff.

18 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους...

19 πρότερον] "As to the strength of the citizen body, and what limit should be set to it, we spoke above (c. 4 §§ 4—14)."

c. 7 *The natural characteristics of the citizens: they should be of Greek race, uniting intelligence with a spirited temper,* §§ 1—4. *Criticism of Plato:* §§ 5—8.

§ 1 22 διαληπταὶ τοῖς θνετοῖς] divided amongst different races. So διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας VI(IV). 11 § 13, 1296 a 11; εἰς διαφορὰς *De Part. Animal.* I. 3 § 3, 642 b 30; διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη *Rhet.* I. 4 § 4, 1359 b 3.

§§ 2, 3 Compare the remark made by Plato *Rep.* IV. 435 e, that among the Thracians, Scythians and other northern nations courage predominates; among the Phoenicians and Egyptians love of gain; among the Greeks reason. Hippocrates in his work *de aere, aquis, locis* alluded to above in n. (752), p. 547 ff. Kühn, compares in detail the natural differences between Europeans and Asiatics, and describes the happy mean of the Greeks. Herod. IX. 122 makes Cyrus say that fertile countries make effeminate people, since the same soil is not capable of producing rare fruits and warlike men; and in III. 106, he says that Hellas enjoys by far the best climate. Plato *Tim.* 24 C commends in particular the happy blending of the seasons in Attica, and the combination of warlike excellence and love of knowledge resulting from this influence. In the Aristotelian *Problems* XIV. 8, 16, there is a discussion of the question why the inhabitants of warm countries are as a rule cowardly, and those of cold countries brave (Eaton). Cp. also n. (641). SUSEM. (781)

§ 2 ππαι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη (VI)
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μέν ἔστι πλήρη, διανοίας
25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ
μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-
μενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ
τὴν ψυχήν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἄρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα ^{D. 10}
§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ
30 τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γάρ ἔνθυμον καὶ
διανοητικὸν ἔστιν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερὸν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-
τιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μᾶς
§ 4 τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ ²

²⁴ [καὶ] τὰ Spengel Susem.² Or better καὶ [τὰ] with explicative sense? Cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 357 b 13 ff., Vahlen *Beit. zu Poet.* II. p. 88. || 28 μὲν inserted after ἄρχόμενα by III || 31 μάλιστα Γ (apparently) Susem.¹⁻²

§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γάρ κτλ] "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe." J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thrace (*Hom. Hymn to Apollo* 251). Not only is this interpretation in itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be epexegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." SUSEM. (779)

26 ἀπολίτευτα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φύσει ἄρχων Aristotle considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φύσει ἄρχοντος.

28 διόπερ ἄρχόμενα ... 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSEM. (780)

§ 3 30 ἔνθυμον] spirited, courageous.

31 διόπερ ἐλεύθερὸν ... 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government." Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonios that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the

whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γάρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἑλλῆνας ὁμοφρο-
νέστατας, οὔτε καὶ τάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον,
χαλεπά εἶναι περγυνεσθαι καὶ ἄπαισι ἀνθρώ-
ποισι (Eaton). See further *Introd.* p. 46. SUSEM. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken I. 18 ff. II. p. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish ὅμονοια (*Panegyric, De Pace, Philippus*, cp. *Eph.* 3). According to Oncken the μά πολιτελα was already realized *de facto* in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλεξανδρον συνθήκων. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (*συμ-
μαχία βοηθειας χάραν*) and not a πολιτελα (II. 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedon having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms συνθῆκαι and κοινῇ εἰρήνῃ themselves (cp. *Rhet.* II. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 διτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν [ἔστιν], καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖ τὸ προσταττόμενον). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotos, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotle had in mind,

τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καὶ] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἔχει (VI)
 35 τὴν φύσιν μονόκαλον, τὰ δὲ εὐ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφο-
 τέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ δια-
 νοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας
 § 5 εὐαγγάγους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν. ὅπερ γάρ
 φασί τινες δεῦν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν
 40 εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμός
 ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γάρ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

34 καὶ inserted by M² II² Bk. || 35 τε omitted by I¹ Bk.² Spengel approves the omission unless καὶ be inserted after τε || 38 τῶν νομοθέτην I⁴, τῶν νομοθετῶν I¹ apparently

under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by 'constitution' Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchical and 'despotically' governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of βασιλεῖα they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see n. on III. 12 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is because Asiatics are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke, III. 14 §§ 6, 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (III. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 § 1, § 15; 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes: see VI(VI). 11 § 18 f., and *Frag.* 81, 1489 b 26, Plutarch *De Alexandri virtute* 1 c. 6 ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενος. To us Chaeronea, or Crannon, may mark the

end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion.

§ 4 34 The Dorian, Ionian, Thessalian, Arcadian, Acaeanian, Aetolian φύη, occur as examples of Greek tribal populations.

35 μονόκαλον] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy peoples of the north: the Asiatic Ionians to the softer Asiatics.

35 38 δόπερ γάρ φασί τινες] Plato in *Repub.* II. 375 ε ff. Comp. n. (1006) on V(VIII). 4 § 2. SUSEM. (783)

39 τοῖς φύλαξι] See n. (140) on II. 3 § 5. SUSEM. (784)

φιλητικούς] The word itself is not used by Plato, but in substance his meaning is not essentially different (*δεῖ γε πρὸς μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις πράσου αὐτοῖς εἶναι*), so that it is difficult to see why Schneider should believe that Aristotle does him injustice. See however n. (789). SUSEM. (785)

40 ὁ θυμός ἔστιν . φιλούμεν] 'It is passion or temper which makes us friendly; for that is the faculty of soul with which we love.' The logic reads faulty in the translation because we can scarcely render by the same word θυμός = courage, θυμός = affection, although we too speak of the heart as the seat of both. See n. (641) on III. 16 § 5. Comp. *Topics* II. 7 § 6, 113 a 35 ff., *οὐον εἰ τὸ μέσον ἐπεσθαί δρυγὴ ἐφησεν, εἴη διὸ τὸ μέσον ἐν τῷ θυμο-εἰδεῖ· ἔκει γάρ ἡ δρυγή, and Trop. IV. 5 §§ 5, 6, 126 a 8 ff.: ἡ μὲν γάρ αἰσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος, ἐν τῷ θυμο-εἰδεῖ, καὶ ἡ μὲν λέπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, ἡ δὲ δρυγὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεῖ, where fear and anger are hypothetically assigned to 'spirit, but love (φιλία) to the ἐπιθυμητικόν or impulsive principle of the soul (J. G.*

1328 α δύναμις ἡ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸν συνήθειαν
καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἀγνῶτα,
§ 6 ὃ λιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσηκόντως τοῖς
φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν.

5 σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχει.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης
§ 7 ὑπάρχει πάσιν ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀγτητον ὁ θυμός. οὐ
καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τὸν ἀγνῶτας·
πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρὴ τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι

1328 α 5 σὸν Bergk, following Schneider, οὐ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || δεῖ
Μ*, untranslated by William || παρὰ Γ P² Ar. Bergk, περὶ with all other authorities
Bk. || ἀπάγχει P¹, ἀπέγχει M* and apparently Γ (*a lanceis perforationes* William),
ἀπάγχειο P^{2,3,6} L⁴ Ald. Bk. Bergk, ἀπάγχετο P⁴, ἀπήγχειο P⁵, ἀπέγχειο S^b V^b and
perhaps Ar. (*lanceis transfixus es*)

Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109, ff., ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or *θυμός*" (Camerarius). Further comp. *pp.* (790, 181, 839, 935). SUSEM. (786)

41 αὗτη] Not τοῦτο, see c. 1 § 8 n.

1328 α 1 πρὸς γὰρ τὸν συνήθειαν] Eaton compares Rhét. II. 2 § 15, 1379
b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις [οργιζόνται] μᾶλλον ἡ
τοῖς μῇ φίλοις οὖνται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον
πάσχειν εἴ τοι' αὐτὸν ἡ μῆ. SUSEM.
(787)

2 αἵρεται] rises viz. in indignation.

§ 6 3 Ἀρχίλοχος] Frag. 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the *νόμος* belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the *Poetics*). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choruses; there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the *τῶι Βάκχει* attributed to him (Frag. 120), but none as to the hymn to Herakles (Frag. 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paeanies cannot be certainly inferred from Frag. 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre into poetry and into vocal music con-

structed according to the rules of art, and he supplied it with a series of strophes composed of short dactylic iambic and trochaic verses, and of verses in which dactyls or anapaests and trochees or iambics were combined. See Westphal *Greek Metres* II. p. 350 ff., 443, 450, 457, 479 f., 498, 563 ff. The fragment of verse here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter without the opening dipody, and it belonged to a poem composed throughout of such tetrameters, as we see from another longer fragment (*Frag. 66*). On Archilochus, see Bernhardy *History of Greek literature* II. p. 486. SUSEM. (788)

§ 7 7 οὐ καλῶς κτλ.] Here clearly Aristotle is taking Plato's statements much too literally, and in a much cruder and stricter sense than they are meant. SUSEM. (789)

9 οὐδὲ εἰστιν οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι κτλ.] Plato also Rep. IV. 440 C designates indignation at injuries received as a main element of *θυμός*, and indeed, as already noticed in n. (641), he refers ambition to *θυμός*. But Aristotle also mentions Post. Anal. II. 12 § 22, 97 b 15 ff. as one of the chief characteristics of the *μεγαλόψυχοι*, that they will not brook insult. On the other hand Nic. Eth. IV. 3 § 30, 1125 a 31 ff. that they are not revengeful, but know how to forgive and forget (Eaton). It is not easy however to reconcile what is here stated with the description given there § 24, 1124 b 9 ff., according to which the high-minded man is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed of receiving them, and always requites services done

ιο τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας. τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλ- (VI)
 λον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,
 § 8 ἀν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' ὁ
 οἰς γὰρ ὄφειλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς
 τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν. ὅθεν εἴρηται
 15 χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν
 καὶ
 16 οἵ τοι πέραν στέρξαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ πέραν
 μισοῦσιν.
 § 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν
 18 δεῖ καὶ ποίους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην
 τέ τινα καὶ πολὰν τινά, διώρισται σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν (p. 107)
 20 αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διά τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γνο-
 8 μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως). ἐπεὶ δὲ ὥσπερ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν VII

13 δεῦ] δεῖ M^a, δὲ apparently P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹), δὴ ? Koraes, William leaves it untranslated, [δεῦ] Schneider Susem.¹, perhaps right ly || τιν; ? Koraes || ὑπολαμβάνουσι] νομίζουσι M^a P¹ and very likely Γ || 14 τῇ βλάβει P⁴, τι βλάβει I^a, τῇ βλάβῃ P^b || 15 πόλεμοι (πολέμοι Γ) γὰρ Π¹ Plutarch de frat. am. p. 480 b, γὰρ πόλεμοι Π² P^b Bk. || 16 πέρα—πέρα Π² P^b Bk. Susem.¹ || 18 ὄποσην M^a P¹ || 21 τῶν ἀλλων omitted by I^a L^a Ald. W^b and P⁴ (1st hand, supplied in the margin)

him by greater services in return, so that he may not be under obligation to others, but rather others to him (Broughton). Cp. also n. (878). SUSEM. (790)

§ 8 'And this is a result to be expected; for they imagine themselves to be robbed as well as slighted by those from whom they believe a kindness ought to be due to them.' ἀποστερεῖσθαι (ὑπ' ἐκείνων) παρ' οἷς—by those in whose case there ought to be an obligation to a service to themselves.

"Cp. *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2 ff. (Eaton, Congreve)." SUSEM. (791)

14 οἵτε εἴρηται] This is a line of Euripides, from what play is not known, *Frag. 965* (Nauck). SUSEM. (792)

16 οἱ τοι πέραν κτλ.] We know neither the author nor the play from which this is quoted (*Frag. ad esp.* 53 Nauck) SUSEM. (793)

§ 9 19 οὐ γὰρ... 21 αἰσθήσεως] Comp. c. 12 § 9 n. (868). SUSEM. (794)
 Also *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 §§ 18, 19, 1098 a 26 ff. and *De Anima* I. 1 ad init. 422 a 2, with Wallace's note on ἀκρίβεια. Also I. 5 § 1, 1254 a 20, IV(VII). 1 § 6, 1323 a 39 with nn.

cc. 8—12 contain the social conditions of the best city, which differ but slightly from those laid down by Plato (more

especially in the *Laws* B. v., VI.) and would command the assent of most reflecting Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

c. 8. *Distinction of the citizens proper, who are an essential part of the city, from the rest of the population, which is but an indispensable adjunct.*

This idea is already familiar to the reader of B. III. c. 5, c. 13 § 13: see n. on 1284 a 9.

§ 1 21 ὥσπερ τῶν Ὀλλων] Thus for instance the things without which happiness cannot exist are not all parts of happiness, *Endem. Eth.* I. 2 §§ 2—5, 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of these (ὧν ἀνενοθέντων) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (*Ast. Lex. Plat.* s. v. *συναίτιος*), or necessary conditions (Camerarius). Cp. *Metaph.* v. (Δ) § 8 1, 1015 a 20: "necessary (or indispensable) is that without which as secondary cause life is impossible" (Eaton). See Zeller II. ii. p. 331 n. (1). Cp. n. (907) and n. (504) on III. § 8 2. SUSEM. (795)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστάτων] Natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29, with which πόλεις was ranked III. 1. 2, 1274 b 39 n. (434). They are frequently mentioned in the zoological treatises.

κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συ-
 στάσεως ὡν ἄνευ τὸ ὄλον οὐκ ἀν εἰη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-
 24 λεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν
 —<οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτο ἔστιν εἴτε χώρας πλήθος
 <εἴτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἔστιν> — οὐδὲ
 § 2 ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἣς ἐν τι τὸ γένος. ἐν γάρ

22 ταῦτα M^a P¹, ταῦτα Bk.¹, ταῦτα P⁴, πάντα? Wyse || 25 ἐξῆι P² V^b and perhaps P⁴ (1st hand), since in that ms. ἐξ ἣς is over an erasure, [ἐξ] ἣς and τέλος for γένος? Postgate || [τό] γένος? Koraes

22 μόρια] Also μέρη (μάλιστα δύνα 1329 a 4 f., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical terms for 'full members,' constituent parts and not mere adjuncts of the organic whole. See the good instances c. 4 § 6, 1326 a 20 f.; VI(IV). 4, 14, 1291 a 24. In contrast to them the adjuncts are (1) necessary appendages, *ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν*, (2) *sine quibus non*, ὡν ἄνευ πόλης οὐ συισταται, (3) requirements, ὡν δέ, or even (4) τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα e.g. τροφὴ, χώρα. Note that both μέρος and μόριον are also used as non-technical terms, for the adjuncts. So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as here) of full membership, 1329 a 35: sometimes again of the entire population, 1279 a 32. The relation between constituent parts and necessary conditions is explained III. 12. 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and IV(VII). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the ναυτικὸς ὄχλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There can be no city of brutes or of slaves.

συντάσσω] A term with various meanings: (1) the putting together=construction, (2) the thing so constructed ή συνισταται, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστ., cp. 1329 a 35. It is largely used in the biological works for 'structure' or 'organism': so also VI(IV). 11. 8, 1295 b 28. On the latent analogy between organism and state, implied in this term and in ἐργα=functions, but drawn out at length VI(IV). c. 4 §§ 8, 9, see A. C. Bradley *op. e. p.* 203 ff.

The view of *De Partibus Animalium*. I. 5 §§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every part (μόριον) of the body, like an instrument (ὄργανον), is for an end: this end is a function (τράξις τοι). The parts are nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, more or less specific, γένεσις, αὔξησις, θνάτος, πτοεια, κτλ.

The transposition of the clause 27 ολον εἴτε τροφὴ... 28 ἔστιν appears inevitable, because 'food' and a 'quantum of territory' would otherwise be adduced as

instances of ἐν τι κοινῷ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, for which purpose they are clearly inappropriate. The common object of the society, which gives the city its unity, is its ethical end, the conviction of the members that they must endeavour to realize a noble life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. III. c. 9). On the other hand a supply of food and so much territory are indispensable requisites, and would seem to be included under κτῆσις a 33.

24 οὐδὲ ἄλλης κοινωνίας.. ἐξ ἣς ἐν τι τὸ γένος] "Nor is this true of any other association which is to form a unity of kind" (and not merely of mass, γένος is adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a true organic unity, not merely the collective unity of an aggregate or heap. After 25 ἐν τι there is no need to insert ἔσται, for γενήσεται (or ἔσται) can easily be understood. SUSEM. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the society must have some one identical common interest, though they need not all share in it equally. Haec mihi visetur esse sententia: unum aliquid idemque sociis commune necesse est (Susemih).

25 A generic unity, or natural composite whole, I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 n., but not a κράτος, μῆτη, or σύμβουλος in which the mingled elements vanish and give birth to a new product: for the citizens continue to exist as parts of the whole I. 2. 14, 1253 a 26. The difference between the mere heap and the organic whole is explained *Meta. Z.* 17. 8. 1041 b 18 ff. (examples: a syllable, flesh; each something apart from its constituents). See also *Meta. H.* 6. 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλειστα μέρη ἔχει καὶ μη ἔστιν ολον σωρός τὸ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ δλον παρὰ τὰ μόρια. For a parallel to the language see *Phys. v. 3.* 7, 227 a 14, ἐν τούτοις ἔστι τὸ συνεχές, εἰς ὡν ἐν τι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν.

The notion of Unity is analysed *Meta. Δ. 6*, I. 1: τὰ πρώτως λεγόμενα ἐν τι are ὡν ἡ σύστα μία ἡ συνεχεία (sometimes τὸ δλον is

τι [καὶ] κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταῦτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἀν τε ἵστον (VII)
 ἀν τε ἄνιστον μεταλαμβάνωσιν (οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν
 § 3 εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτε ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν). ὅταν ε
 δὲ ἦ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δὲ οὖ ἔνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἔν γε τούτοις
 30 κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ μὲν παιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν λέγω δ' οἷον ὄρ
 γάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γηρόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς·
 οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ'
 § 4 ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως
 μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδέν δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς
 35 πόλεως. πολλὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἔστιν. ἡ δὲ

26 τι] τοι M^a P²⁻³, [τι] Koraes || [καὶ] Susem. || δεῖ Π¹ P⁴ Ar., δὴ P²⁻³ S^b V^b
 Ald. || γενέθλιος τοῦτο Π¹ || 27 οἷον...28 ἔστιν transposed by Bojesen to follow 24
 ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Introd.* p. 87 || 27 ἔστιν erased by a later hand in Π³, perhaps
 rightly || 28 διαν...35 ἔστιν transposed to follow 1328 b 1 πολιτεία Susem. See
 Comm. and cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401 f. || 29 δὲ ἦ] δὴ Π², δὲ Ar. || οὐδὲν] οὐδὲ
 ΓΜ^a || δὲ Μ^a and apparently Π¹ || 30 λαβεῖν] παθεῖν Postgate, perhaps rightly
 || 32 [δὲ γίνεται] Schneider || 33 δεῖ μὲν κτήσεως Susem.¹⁻², δεῖ κτήσεως (without
 μὲν) ΓΜ^a || 34 οὐδὲν δὲ ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως ἔστι (ἔστι Π¹) Μ^a Π¹, ἡ δὲ κτήσις
 οὐδὲν μέρος ἔστι τῆς πόλεως Γ apparently || 35 κτίσεως Π² V^b

added to τὸ συνέχειν) ἡ εἶδει ἡ λόγῳ, 1016
 b 8. The last two together = ὥν ἀν ὁ λόγος
 εἰς ἦ, 1052 a 29.

§ 3 There is no such ‘common interest’ in the case of the means to an end and the end itself, the tools and the craftsman, architecture (the builder’s art) and the house. § 4 Hence property may be necessary to cities, but nevertheless does not form part of a city.

28 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο...35 ἔστιν] This passage is closely connected with § 6 b 2 ἐπικεκτέον δὲ κτλ. No one would suspect any loss if the intervening passage §§ 4, 5, 1328 a 35—b 2 were removed. In fact this intervening passage must be regarded as a parenthesis, suggested by a 26 ἀν τε ἵστον ἀν τε ἄνιστον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, apparently inserted in the wrong place: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 401. In confirmation of this view may be cited Dr Postgate’s remark (*Notes* p. 9): “the same sense can be got out of the text by making ἐν γάρ τι...μεταλαμβάνωσι, § 2, parenthetical, and ἡ δὲ πόλις κτλ, § 4, a resumption of it: thus οἷον...ἔστιν will refer to δοσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.” That is, though his own remedies are different (see *Crit. n.*), he agrees as to the end in view; viz. the reference of 27 οἷον κτλ to 24 δοσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and the resumption of 15 ἐν γάρ τι...27 μεταλαμβά-

νωσιν at 35 ἡ δὲ πόλις κτλ.

28 διαν δὲ] ‘When one thing is the means and another the end, in this case at least there is nothing in common, except that the latter receives the activity of the former.’ A very doubtful use of λαβεῖν instead of λαβεῖν τι, said of the thing acted upon: by no means established, as Prof. Ridgeway thinks, by Pl. *Apol.* 25 E, where τινὰ μαχθηρὸν ποιῆσω τῶν ξυνόντων is followed by κακὸν τι λαβεῖν διπ’ αὐτοῦ. Dr Postgate’s παθεῖν brings out the exact shade of meaning: “the one acts and the other is acted upon; the builder makes and the house is made.”

30 οἷον ὄργανῳ] *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 11. 6, 1161 a 32 ff. The same incompatibility exists between the tyrant and his subjects as between soul and body, workman and tool, master and slave. Cp. *E. E.* VIII. 9. 2, 1241 b 17—19. (Could λαβεῖν = be the recipient of services, ποιῆσαι = to render them?)

§ 4 33 That property is no ‘part’ of the state, but merely an indispensable condition, must weigh with us in deciding whether κτητικὴ is a branch of οἰκονομῆ, 1. 4. 1, n. (32), from the constant parallel of household and state 1. 8 § 13, § 15, 1256 b 30, 37 f.; 11 § 13, 1259 a 33 ff.

35 πολλὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα κτλ] Under

πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἔστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδε- (VII)
 § 5 χομένης ἀριστης. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστιν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἡ
 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως
 ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἡ μηδέν,
 40 δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἰδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ
 πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γάρ τρόπον καὶ δὲ ἄλλων ἔκαστοι τοῦτο
 1328 b θηρεύοντες τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.

§ 6 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτὶ ἔστιν ὡν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ
 ἀν εἰη· καὶ γάρ ἡ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις
 4 ἀν εἰη. διὸ * * ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν
 § 7 ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γάρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον

39 αὐτῆς <πάντως> ? Spengel, needlessly || 40 τῷ] τοῦ Π² P⁸ Bk.

1328 b 2 ταῦτ' Schneider Bk.², ταῦτα Bas.³ || 4 διὸ omitted by Π² Π⁶ Ar. Bk.
 and Vettori, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to
 punctuate 3 εἰη (καὶ γάρ...4 εἰη) διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν

the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see 1 c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp. also n. (37). SUSEM. (801)

η δὲ πόλις κτλ] "Now the city is a society of like members"; comp. 1. 7 § 1, ἀνεύθερων καὶ ισων, vi(iv), 11 § 8 ισων καὶ δρων, with notes (58 b, 1393). See also n. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand ἀδένατος δρων εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, III. 1 § 5, see n. (47). SUSEM. (797)

36 ἐνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς κτλ] It is therefore this 'best life realizable' which is the 'one identical common interest' in question, ἐν τι κοινώ (Congreve). Compare further n. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὐτῇ δὲ κτλ] No reference is made to a previous discussion or to the Ethics. Comp. the Excursus I. SUSEM. (799)

38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος] A fair paraphrase of the definition of *Nic. Eth.*, as may be seen from E. E. II. 1, 1219 a 16, τῶν δὲ ἡ χρῆσις ἔργου, 1219 b 2, ὡν ἔκαστον χρῆσις ἔστι καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ ἔνθη καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις.

39 ὥστε] Apparently redundant, as in II. 2 § 5 n.

40 τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἰδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους] This supplements the statement of III. 1 §§ 8, 9. An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man's true develop-

ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all' (A. C. Bradley). Cp. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 31.

41 ἄλλον γάρ τρόπον κτλ] Cp. n. (466) on III. 3. 9. SUSEM. (800)

1328 b 1 Cp. 1. 8. 4 ff.

§ 6 2 The recognition of the 'parts' or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (*ἔργα*), i.e. 'occupations' (b 20 *ἔργαστα*) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to classify the inhabitants working at these occupations: food implies farmers, handicrafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(VI). 7, 1, 1321 a 4 ff. (*βάραντικόν, ἀγοράν*) and VI(IV). 4. 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (*βάραντος, ἀγοραίον, δικαστικόν, δημοτρικόν, βουλευοδημενόν*): but here *τεχνήται* must include *βάραντος*, while *τὸ εὐπόρος* or 'capital' probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (*ἀγοραῖος*), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive *κρεταί τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφέροντων* corresponds in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VI(IV). c. 4. "Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society" (Newman).

3 All the real members, or parts (*μέρη*), of a city will be indispensable, though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ * *) There are so many conceivable possibilities for filling up this lacuna that any definite attempt of this kind becomes idle. SUSEM. (802)

μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ (VII) ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ξῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδι- (p. 108)
ιο κεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὔπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς <τὰς> πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρώτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θέον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαῖοτατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τε τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

§ 8 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὡν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἔστιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὐταρκεῖ, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι
§ 9 ταύτην ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἱ παρασκευάζουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων).

9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοι-

8 [καὶ] Koraes, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly || αὐτοῖς P³ (?), αὐτοῖς Γ and the rest of our authorities || 11 <τὰς> Schneider Bk.² || 12 [καὶ πρώτον] Spengel || 16 ὡν] ἀ M⁹ P¹ || 18 τούτων after τυγχάνῃ (τυγχάνει P²) II² P³ Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 20 συνεστάναι M⁹ P¹ || 21 παρασκευάσουσι P²⁻³⁻⁵ Bk. || 23 δικαίων Lambin, διαγκαλων Γ II Ar. Bk.¹ Susem,¹ in the text

§ 7 An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato *Rep.* II. 381, cp. *Phaedr.* 248 D, E.

§ 7 8 πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν κτλ.] To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third c. 14 § 21, 1334 a 2 n. (918).

12 πρώτον] First in importance.

14 κρίσιν] Under κρίσις τῶν συμφερόντων is here included everything besides the administration of justice which belongs to the government of a state. Thus it includes the making of laws and the common action of the consultative and executive councils as well as of the officers of state. SUSEM. (803)

§ 8 18 ὡς φαμέν] III. 1 § 12, cp. n. (447); IV(VII). 4 § 11 n. (759); also n. (21) with the passages there quoted. The present φαμέν is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but c. 10 § 9, n. (831), c. 13 § 4 n. (877), 14 § 8 n. (902). Any multitude of men taken at

random does not constitute a state; a remark which was made c. 4 § 6 n. (753) and repeated VII(v). 3. 11 n. (1531 b). SUSEM. (804)

§ 9 20 κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.

21 Cp. II. 8. 10, 1268 a 32 f.

23 κρήτες] So above, § 7, b 14, κρίσιν. c. 9 *Exclusion from the franchise of the producing classes: artisans, traders, husbandmen. Those who remain will have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial duties. This close body of citizens will own the land: when superannuated, to become priests.*

This exclusion of the 'necessary appendages' from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the criticism of Plato's Republic, II. c. 5 §§ 18—28, and of Hippodamus, c. 8 §§ 8—12: it was laid down distinctly III. c. 5; see n. (504).

25 νωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ένδέχεται γάρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄπαν- (VIII)
 τας είναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους
 καὶ δικάζοντας), ἡ καθ' ἔκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους
 ὑποθετέον, ἡ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 § 2 ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταῦτῳ πολιτείᾳ καθάπερ γάρ εἴπομεν,
 30 ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας
 πάντων ἄλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γάρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολι-
 τειας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γάρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι
 § 3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τούναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ε-
 τυγχάνομεν σκοπούντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη
 35 δὲ ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἀν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαιμόνων, τὴν δὲ
 εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἰρηται
 πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευο-
 μένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἄλλα
 μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὗτε βάναυσον βίου οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον
 40 δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγενής γάρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς (p. 105)
 § 4 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργοὺς είναι τοὺς μέλ-

29 ταῦτα Susem., τοῦτο Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 32 μὲν omitted by
 III, [μέν] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 37 κακίστα P⁴, καλλίστη II¹ || 40 ξῆν] ξῆ-
 τειν Γ P⁵ || 41 τὴν omitted by II² P⁵ Ar. Bk. || δεῖ δῆτα P⁵ Ar. Bk.

§ 1 25 τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄπαντας] This would be the case in democracies.

§ 2 29 καθάπερ γάρ εἴπομεν] Just before, § 1, b 25 ἐνδέχεται γάρ κτλ. SUSEM. (806)

33 πάντων sc. ἔργων.

§ 3 34 αὐτη... 35 εἰδαίμων] Comp. c. 1 8 3 n. (686), c. 13 § 4 n. (872); also 11. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). SUSEM. (806)

36 ἔργη τον πρότερον] It was observed in *Excursus I.*, n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that c. 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more: had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδέκται, 'proved,' rather than εἶργαι 'stated.' Comp. further n. (872). SUSEM. (807)

38 ἀπλῶς] In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy; III. 9.

39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν] Relatively to the constitution of the time being: under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (*δόσις*) for the standard. See III. 4. 3, 1326 b 30, VI(IV). 7. 2, 1293 b 3 ff.

τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινὰ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, with π. (1233). Comp. also II. 9. 1 n. SUSEM. (808). Add VI(IV). c. 11 s. fin. 1296 b 9 ἀν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρινῆ τις, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and *Meta.* XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1082 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὄρθως λέγουσιν, ἀπλῶς δὲ οὐκ ὄρθως. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from *τέλος* or *δρός*. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑπόθε-*σις* or II. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γάρ ταῦτην ὑπόθεσιν.

40 ἀγενής] See III. c. 5, esp. notes (506, 509, 511). Cp. also n. (103). SUSEM. (809)

On the construction *ὑπεραντίος πρὸς* cp. II. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. *Olynth.* III § 32, p. 37, 10: ἐστι δὲ οὐδέποτε, οἷα, μέγα καὶ νεανικόν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράγματα· οὐοί· ἄττα γάρ ἀν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων γίνεται, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρίσμα ἔχειν. Cf. Burke: Great empires and little minds go ill together.

§ 4 1329 a 1 δεῖ γάρ σχολῆς] 'Lei-

λογιστας ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς (VIII) ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ ⁵ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὅντα, πότερον ἔτερα <έτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θε-
§ 5 τέον ἡ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἔτέροις.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἔτέροις. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδυ-
10 νάτων ἔστι τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύει, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεί, ταύτη δὲ τοὺς αὐτούς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἡ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν.
§ 6 λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν ⁴

1329 a 1 πολίτας added after ἔσεσθαι by P⁴ L¹ Ar. Ald. W^b, [πολίτας] Susem.¹ || 5 <έτέροις> Koraes Bk.²; previously Schneider wrote ἔτέρους for ἔτεροις || 6 δέ] δῆ Π^r || 11 δὲ untranslated by William, δεῖ? Göttling || τοῖς αὐτοῖς Camerarius Bk.² perhaps even Ar., τοὺς αὐτοὺς Γ II Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text || 12 ἥ] καὶ Γ Ald. W^b || 13 ἀμφότερα? Susem. followed by Welldon, who nevertheless retains 14 ταῦτη

sure is needed if virtue is to be forthcoming, as well as for the conduct of state affairs. Contempt for labour goes side by side with exaltation of leisure: n. (93). The artisan, the farmer even, is too busy to cultivate virtue. Cp. Aelian *V. H.* x. 16, ἡ ἀργαλεία δεῖται τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἡστι. From the Greeks this estimate passed to the Jews: see Ecclesiasticus c. 38, 24—34 (Newman).

3 βουλευόμενον...καὶ κρίνον] From ἄμφω, a 6, it is clear that a single class is meant: a body which deliberates on questions of policy and decides questions of justice. Cp. § 9, a 31, τὸ τε ὅπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν.

4 ἐνυπάρχει] 'are contained in the city as members in the fullest sense' not merely indispensable adjuncts.

6 ἄμφω=the functions (1) of the military class, (2) of the deliberative and judicial class.

§ 5 7 διότι=that (after φανερὸν): as 1253 a 7 and often.

8 ἔτέρας ἀκμῆς] sc. ἡστι: belongs to a different time of life.

9 φρονήσεως] Cp. III. 4. 17 n. (497): also nn. (45, 112, 115, 474—476). SUSEM. (810)

ἡ δέ κτλ.] This is said to be στάσεως αἰτιον, II. 5. 25, 1264 b 8. With the partitive genitive τῷ δινάτων ep. c. 6 § 4, 1327 a 27: in full ἐν τῷ δινάτων c. 14

§ 4. 1332 b 32.

11 ταῦτη δέ] Resumptive of the δέ in a 9: 'in as far as it is impossible...in so far they must be the same.' When δέ has preceded with the relative, it may for emphasis be repeated with the demonstrative. The idiom is found in Herod. (e.g. II. 50), Thuc. (II. 46), Xenophon, Isocrates (*Panegyr.* § 98, § 176), Plato (*Lach.* 194 ο ταῦτα ἀγαθός ἔστω ἔκαστος ἡμῶν, δέπερ σοφός, δέ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δέ κακός) and Demosthenes (c. *Mid.* § 100, see Buttmann's *Exc. XII.*). Bonitz, *Ind. Ar.* 166 b 58—167 a 12, and *Studien* II. III. pp. 124—129, has disposed of the view formerly held (by Zell, Göttling, etc.) that Aristotle in some cases used δέ where other Greek prose writers introduce the apodosis without any particle. The only valid instances are (1) after a conditional particle (1287 b 12 n.), (2) as ἀλλὰ occasionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κτλ.] Hence one of the favourite measures of tyrants was to forbid the use of arms VIII(V). 10 § 11, and 11 § 22 nn. (1667, 1742 b). See moreover Xen. *Cyr.* VII. 5. 79, Thuc. III. 27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained arms: ἐπειδὴ Μιλύβος ὅπλα οὔτε ἡρωῶντο ξει τῶν ἀρχόντων (Eaton). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13 τὴν πολιτείαν ταῦτη] 'hanc partem rei publicae administrandae' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. "It only remains to

πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἄμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν (VIII)
τις δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις
ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον
§ 7 [εἰναι]. ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαιρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ <εἰναι> περὶ τούτους. ἀναγκαῖον
γάρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ
20 γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν μέρος
δι μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς
ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ
τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαν-
§ 8 τας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φα-
25 νερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγ-
καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἡ βαρβάρους [ἥ] περιοίκους.
λοιπὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ιερέων γένος.
§ 9 φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε
βάναυσον ιερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει

14 [ταύτην] Thurot (unless the word be transposed to follow 16 ἀμφοῖν), τὴν αὐτὴν Ueberweg, ταῦτα Susem. Cp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 402 f. || μὲν <γάρ> Vettori in his translation || 16 ἑστίν] εἶναι (from l. 17) Lambin || 17 εἶναι was transposed to follow 18 τούτων by Camerarius, to follow 18 δεῖ by Susem,²⁻³; εἶναι δοκεῖ Γ P⁵ Ar., εἶναι [δοκεῖ] Susem,¹ in the text, ἑστίν Lambin followed by Welldon || 18 <εἶναι> added by P⁵ Bk., and so William Ar. translate || 20 μέρος] γέρος Π² P⁵ Ar. Bk. which is just as good || 25 δι—εἰπερ} εἰπερ—δι Hayduck || 26 [ἥ] Susem., cp. 1330 a 29 and Quaest. crit. coll. p. 403 || 27 λεπών Γ P⁵ L⁵ Ar. Ald., λεπών the other authorities || 29 λεπτὰ omitted by P¹ (1st hand), τολμητῆι supplied by P¹ in the margin

entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons" (a lame conclusion); as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc. 8, 9. If however we adopt *ἀμφότερα* and *ταῦτα* (see *Crit. notes*), then *τὴν πολιτείαν* becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb *ἀποδίδονται*. SUSEM.

17. Ἐχα...ἄξιαν] "This division recognizes 'desert.'" See c. 14 § 4. 1332 b 25, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (812)

§ 7 18 <εἶναι> περὶ τούτων] Cp. § 8, a 25, εἶναι τούτων, § 9, a 33, τὴν ἀνάπτασσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῶν. 'περὶ c. acc. rem significat ad quam aliqua actio referatur' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*, who cites *Topics* II. 7. 5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως = the sensation of sight. "The landed property must be in their hands."

19. Civic rights are not for the artizans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the 'manufacture' of virtue.

21. ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813)

23. εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν] 'When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class.' Cp. II. 5. 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (814)

§ 8 φανερὸν δὲ κτλ.] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions: (1) Aristotle's decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as serfs or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of serfs of Greek descent, Penestae, Helots, etc. nn. (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (839) and Exc. 'On the Cretan περιοίκοι' p. 336 SUSEM. (815)

§ 9 33 περιαύτος must be περὶ τοῦτο

30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διῆρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο (VIII) μέρη, τοῦτ' ἔστι τό τε ὄπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει (p. 110) δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἀν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

§ 10 ὡν μὲν τοίνυν ἀνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη 36 πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργὸι μὲν γἀρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὄπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἔκαστον, τὸ μὲν δὲ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).
39 10 [ἔσικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ IX

33 αὐτὸς ? Susem. || τούτους Γ P⁶ (1st hand, for οις is written over an erasure) and Bk. || 34 τὰς ἱερωσύνας Ar. and Bas.³, τὰς ἱερωσύνας Γ II Bk. || 36 γεωργὸι—τεχνῖται ? Scaliger || 37 [ὑπάρχειν] Spengel: the text can hardly be sound || 39 δὲ Schneider, δὴ Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 40 [ἔσικε... 1329 b 39 χώραν] Susem., [b 3 τὰ τε... 25 Σεσώστριον] Chandler, [b 5 ἀρχαῖα... 25 Σεσώστριον] Bojesen: see Comm. and *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404 ff.

θεούς; in their service (Welldon). But see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404.

τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας] Those who are superannuated: upon the principle stated II. 9. 25, see n. (330). This is the solution of an apparent inconsistency; that in this, the only genuine aristocracy, n. (530), all citizens have equal rights, see n. (930), and yet aristocracy is the rule of a minority: III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15 §§ 8—10 n. (648), cf. III. 18. 1. For if the citizens of the ideal state must complete military service before admission, at the age of 35, into the popular assembly (c. 16 § 9 1335 a 30 ff., Exc. II.), and are not eligible to the Council or the offices of state (military commands excepted) till they are about fifty, while later on they are again released from all civic duties and lose all civic rights by becoming priests, it follows that it is only from his fiftieth to about his seventieth year that each citizen can have a share in the entire government and administration, as indeed was remarked *Introd.* p. 51, p. 54. For these twenty years only is he actually a full citizen, in the active exercise of his rights. This being so, the ruling body of full citizens will always remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of the civic body in the wider sense, including the soldiers and superannuated old men, even if the boys and youths are excluded. Comp. c. 13 § 9, 1332 a 34 n. (885), c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position

which the priests hold in relation to the magistrates proper see VI(IV). 15. 2 n. (1344), VII(VI). 8. 21 n. (1478). SUSEM. (816, 817)

35 ff. 'Thus we have given (1) the indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral parts of a city: i.e. cultivators, artisans, and the whole class of labourers are adjuncts indispensable to cities, while the integral parts are the defensive force and the deliberative body. These elements are severally distinct, the distinction between integral parts and adjuncts being permanent, that between the army and the deliberative body only temporary.' A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [*Historical digression*: §§ 1—9.] *Particulars respecting the division and cultivation of the land*: §§ 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently an interpolation by a well-informed Peripatetic. At all events the suspicion under which it labours (see *Crit. notes*) has not been dispelled by Spengel's fond admiration of this "beautiful passage" (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 3 n.), or by Newman's dispassionate survey, Vol. I. p. 573 f.

§ 1 40 οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ] Possibly this is directed against Plato, and intended to prove that he was by no means the inventor of the particular classification wherein Aristotle here follows him. E. Curtius *History of Greece* I.⁶ p. 162 (I. p. 181 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to suppose that all the three 'orders' of the

πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη (IX)
 1329^b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωρ-
 γοῦν. ἐν Αἴγυπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔτι
 καὶ νῦν, τά τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτου
 4 Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ

1329^b 2 τε omitted by P²⁻⁵ S^b V^b, perhaps by Γ || τοῦτον after τὸν τρόπον Π² P⁶
 Bk. and γρ. P¹ (corr. in the margin) || δὲ added after Εἰτι by Π¹ (but corr. in the
 margin of Π¹ marks it for omission γρ.) || 4 μένω Γ Μ^a

Platonic state had actually existed in Crete—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16-*n.* (167). SUSEM. (818) Hippodamas (see II. 8. 2) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17, 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state: Holm *Griech. Gesch.* III. p. 185.

41 γένη] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164: λεπέis (ib. cc. 37, 143), μάχιμοι (c. 165), βουκάλοι (c. 65), σιβωταὶ (c. 47), κάστηλοι, κυβερνῆται, ἐργάρεις (c. 154). See however E. Meyer *Gesch. des Alterthums* I. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 565.

1329 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause: "μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur" Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. The stock instance is *Poet.* c. 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: ἀλλὰ ἀν τις ἀπαρτα τοιάντα ποιήσῃ, οὐτεγύα ξεται η βαρ-βαρισμός, ἀν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἰνγάνα, ἀν δ' ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. Vahlen *Beträge* III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμός. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἀν μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιάντα by ἐκ μεταφορῶν and ἐκ γλωττῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative: a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τὰ μὲν... τὰ δέ...). Vahlen classifies the present passage and *Soph. El.* 6. 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits *Catog.* 2 § 1, 1 a 17, *Top.* 105 b 21, 108 b 9, b 38 to be not very different; while *Pol.* I. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see *Crit. note*), IV(VII). 17. 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (δλως μὲν οὖν... μάλιστα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(v). 12. 8, 1316 a 8 are

somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps *De Rep. Athen.* c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K., but Haxpocrate omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώστριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker *History of Antiquity*, I.⁵ 134—158, Eng. tr. 1877, pp. 142—159) two real kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—circa 1350), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lycurgus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker I.⁵ 191 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. SUSEM. (819)

"The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste": A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, *Herodots zweites Buch* p. 573, who quotes Plato *Tim.* 23, 24, Isocr. *Busiris* 6—8, Diod. I. 73 f., I. 28, Strabo XVII. p. 787. Cp. *Les castes en Egypte* in *Le Muséon*, 1886. Also E. Meyer *Gesch. des alten Aegyptens* (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (ib. p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesostris, any more than User-tesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (*Agyptische Geschichte* p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke *Weltgesch.* I. p. 26, Maspero *Genre ép.* p. 83: "Setsû, var. Setsû-râ, le nom populaire de Rhamsès II."

Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (*Gesch.* p. 117): "the three notices dealing with

§ 2 περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. φασὶ γάρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλὸν τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὐ τό τε ὄνομα ιο μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὐσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὅδὸν ἡμισείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους τε αὐτοῖς ἀλλούς θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστῆσαι πρῶτον· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρῶνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις § 5 καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ὥκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-

8 λόγιοι Γ S^b, λογικοὶ P¹ || 13 Ναπετίνου ? Sylburg (from Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I. 35) || δέ] γάρ Π² P⁹ Bk. || 15 τε αὐτοῖς ἄλλοις M^a, τ' ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς P⁵, ἄλλοις τε αὐτοῖς P¹ Π² Bk. || 18 τυρηπλας M^a P^{8.3-4.5} S^b V^b and perhaps Γ

the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into castes originated with Sesostris does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην] The division of the Cretan population is mentioned II. 5. 19, 1264 a 21. n. (171), c. 10 §§ 1—8 with Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (820)

§ 2 5 τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις] The system of public meals, as ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, II. 11. 2, 1272 b 30: cp. also II. 5. 5, 1263 a 23.

6 περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν] Compare again II. 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. SUSEM. (821)

§ 3 8 οἱ λόγιοι] II. 8. 1, 1267 b 28. Comp. Antiochus *Frag.* 3. 4, 6, Müller F. H. G. I. p. 181 f. SUSEM. (822)

'Ιταλὸν τινα...15 γεωργούς] Antiochus (*Fr.* 6 apud Strab. vi. 284 f.) however calls the Lametic gulf the Napetine: the name common in later times is ὁ Ἰταπηνιατικός. This gulf is in the south-west of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia: just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Scyllitic Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 160 stadia [i.e. 18 miles 660 yds] apart, rather more than half a day's journey. The name Italy was then

originally confined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulfs on the other. Oenotria means Wine-land, Italus the Ox, or calf: Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be meant, a symbol of the transition of the Graeco-Italians from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, shrewdly connects the original Italian legislation with the transition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as reapers (Siculi perhaps also Sicani) or field-labourers (Opsci). See Mommsen, *History of Rome* I. p. 21 f. Eng. tr. Thucydides VI. 2. 4 calls this king Italos not an Oenotrian but a Sicel. For the name Europe, see c. 7 § 2, n. (779). SUSEM. (823)

§ 4 16 καὶ τὰ συσσίτια] There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. SUSEM. (824)

διὸ καὶ νῦν...17 χρῶνται] The language is undoubtedly the echo of II. 10. 3, 1271 b 30 διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περιοικοὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρῶνται αὐτοῖς. But we hesitate to draw the inference that here, as there, an extract from Ephorus follows (Newman: I. p. 575 n. 2).

§ 5 18 ὥκουν δὲ κτλ.] Here the in-


19 νίαν Ὀπικοὶ καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπωνυ- (IX)
 20 μίαν Λύσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον
 Χῶνες, τὴν καλούμενην Σιρῖτιν· ἡσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες
 21 Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν
 γέγονε πρῶτον, ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ
 22 πλήθους ἐξ Αἰγύπτου· πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτέλειν τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν

20 αὐσωνες M^a P⁴⁻⁵ V^b || 21 χάδωνες (χάδωνες S^b V^b) II² P⁵ Ar. || Σιρῖτιν Göttingen Bk.², Syrlin William, σύρτην P⁵ and P² (1st hand), σύρτιν the other authorities Ar. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text and P⁵ (later hand), Σιρῖν Heyne (*Opusc.* II. 211, 232) from Arist. *Frag.* 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (Σιρῖν is the correct accentuation.) || χάδωνες II² P⁵ Ar.

interpolator has taken the opportunity to air his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotrians or Itali on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opsci or Oscans, explained in n. (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausionians we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotrians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (*Frag.* 6, n. 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrhenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. *Frag.* 567 [558] *Arist. pseudop.* = 609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rem.* I. 72 where Latium is described as region in Κρίπη, τὸν τόπον τούτον τῆς Ὀπικῆς, ὃς καλεῖται Λάτιον (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania; so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great

Oenotrian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy is washed by the Terinaic Gulf, of which the Hippo-natic in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (VII. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (VI. 44 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (VI. 4 § 5). Herodotos (I. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Terinaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpolation, and as such would have to be removed from the rest, if that really belonged to Aristotle. But it will be shown in notes (829, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1-9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Peripatetics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them. SUSEM. (825)

§ 6 24 πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτέλειν κτλ.
 As shown in n. (819). SUSEM. (826)
 τοῖς χρόνοις] The plural as in VI(IV).
 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected chapter II. 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually as in VI(IV). 3 § 3, VIII(V). 4 § 1. Another instance is Nic. Eth. VIII. 12 § 2, 1161 b 25, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.



Walter & Boustall sc.

§ 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (IX)
 26 ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,
 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν
 εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιου-
 σίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἥδη τούτων εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὕξη-
 30 σιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἰεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν
 § 8 ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ
 Αἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
 νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασιν <ἀεὶ> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς
 μὲν εἰρημένοις ἵκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα
 35 πειρᾶσθαι ξητεῖν.

§ 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτη-
 μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότε-
 ρον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργούντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ
 πόσην τινὰ χρὴ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·] περὶ δὲ τῆς
 40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργούντων, τίνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρῆ,
 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε κοινήν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὴν

28 εἰκὸς after διδάσκειν ΙΙ² Ρ⁵ Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and Π¹ (1st hand, sup-
 plied by corr.¹⁾ || 31 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἀεὶ> Bernays and Susem. inde-
 pendenly, <πρῶτοι> ? Schneider || 34 εὐρημένοις Lambin Bk.², apparently right
 || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δεῖν after εἶναι ΙΙ² Ρ⁵ Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well known passage *Meteorol.* I. 3 § 8, 339 a 29, οὐδὲ γάρ δὴ φθίσουμεν ἀπαξ οὐδὲ δις οὐδὲ διπλάκις τὰς δέξας ἀνακιλεῖν γνωμένας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις.

§ 7 27 τὰ μὲν γάρ ἀναγκαῖα] Comp. n. (793) on c. 8 § 1. SUSEM. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ τὰς εὐσχημοσύνην κτλ.] All these ideas are certainly genuinely Aristotelian: see II. 5 § 16, 1264 a 3 with n. (167) and *Meta.* I. I. § 15, 981 b 17 ff.: esp. b 20 διενεργεῖ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μερὶς πρὸς τάπαγκατα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἰρέθησαν. But see n. (829). SUSEM. (828)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παραλελειμμένα πα-
 ράσθαι ξητεῖν] How can that be done, if everything has been already discovered? It is hardly possible to attribute this paradox to Aristotle. The intermediate link is wanting, which explains that what has been already discovered may be lost in oblivion and therefore require to be rediscovered. SUSEM. (829) Cp. Plato *Laws* 630 ε of legislators: οὐ γάρ ἀν ἱκαστος ἐν χρειᾳ γίγνεται, τοῦτο ξητεῖ τὸν παραθέμενος. But Waitz compares the end of the *Topics*, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν...39 χώραν] If we compare this new recapitulation with the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is clear that it passes over everything intermediate, as not containing anything peculiar or important for the course of the inquiry, but as seeking historic confirmation partly for what is affirmed in c. 9 and partly, with an eye to what is coming, for the *sysitia*, which do not come up for discussion until 10 § 10; like the former recapitulation, it summarizes everything discussed before c. 10. But while the former is rightly confined to the contents of the two preceding chapters, with which alone what follows (6—9) is connected, the latter wrongly passes over the passage c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it were there at all, and goes back to the subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although this has no immediate connexion with what follows. We can clearly detect the interpolator, who has framed this second recapitulation, so entirely out of place here, with the sole object of fastening his own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on Aristotle's treatise. SUSEM. (830)

41 φαμεν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 nn. (156, 156 b,

1330 a κτῆσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς (IX) γινομένη κουνήν, οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολειτῶν τροφῆς.
 § 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς εὖ κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν συνδοκεῖ καὶ ήμῖν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. δει δὲ τούτων κουιωνεῖν πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ ράδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἴδιων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ τὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν. ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν εἰς δύο μέρη διηρήσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κουνήν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἐκατέραν διηρήσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κουνῆς τὸ μὲν ἔτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἔτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, (p. 112) τῆς δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν τὸ ἔτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατιάς, ἔτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἐκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵστον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς

1330 a 2 γινομένη Congreve, γινομένη <γινεσθαι> Susem.², γινομένην Γ II Ατ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 4 δοκεῖ? Susem. || 14 τὸ μὲν ἔτερον Stob. p. 332 and Paris. 2042 || τὸ after μέρος omitted by Stob. || ταῖς ἐσχατιάς Stob., proprias necessitates William Ar. Suid. and Phot. notice this passage s. v. ἐσχατιάν || 15 ἔτερον δὲ τὸ τὸ δὲ ἔτερον Stob. || τῇ πόλει Stob. || ἐκάστων P⁴, ἐκάστον L² Ald. W^b

(58), 9 §§ 2—4 n. (279), 11 § 10 n. (393). Compare also II. 6 §§ 10—14 n. (211); IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 7, 8. The same use of the present, φαίνεται, as in c. 8 § 8 n. (804), and below c. 13 § 5 n. (872), c. 14 § 8 n. (902). SUSEM. (831)

1330 a 1 τινὲς] Plato alone is meant by this. SUSEM. (832) See n. on 1261 a 6.

2 οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα] A condition upon which special stress is laid in the criticism of Carthage cited n. (831): ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅρᾳ ἔστι τῶν ἀναγκαιότατων, διότι οἱ βέλτιστοι δίωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδὲ διωτεοντες, 1273 a 32 ff.

§ 10 3 συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι] As e.g. Plato *Laws* 780 n., έδοξε μέγα διφέρειν εἰς σωτηρίαν τὸ νόμιμον, Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 5.

5 ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν] An unfulfilled promise: *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4) and p. 53. SUSEM. (833)

6ει δὲ τούτων...8 οἰκίαν] "Now all the citizens must take part in these (syssitia), but it is not easy to arrange that poor men should contribute their quota from their own means and at the

same time pay all that is needed for their own housekeeping as well." See II. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 § 8 n. (365). Compare also n. (153) on II. 5. 2. SUSEM. (834) For τὸ τεταγμένον cp. II. 10 § 7, 1272 a 15.

8 κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The *Politics* takes for granted the maintenance, even in the best state, of the popular faith and the traditional worship" (Newman). Comp. n. (859).

§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην] This is precisely the solution which the criticism in Book II. indicated: see nn. on 8 § 3 (154), 9 § 31 (341), 10 § 8 (365).

14 τῇς δὲ τῶν ἴδιωτῶν...16 μετέχωσιν] See II. 6 § 15 n. (215). SUSEM. (835) The lands nearer to the city would possess many advantages over those more remote.

16 τὸ τε γὰρ ἵστον...20 καλόν] Comp. Thuc. I. 120 § 2 (the various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy), II. 21 § 3 (the Acharnians): the Book of Numbers c. 32 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as

- § 13 ἀστυγείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γάρ μὴ τοῦτον (IX)
ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐ μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους
το ἔχθρας, οὐ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ
παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-
μετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον
οὐκ ἀν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς.
- § 18 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μέν,⁹
εἴ δει κατ' εὐχήν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε
θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γάρ ἀν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἰεν χρήσιμοι
καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ
βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύ-
- § 14 σιν, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [*ἱδίους*] ἐν τοῖς ἴδιοις εἶναι ἴδιως
τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς.
τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς
δούλοις ἀθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν.

11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε ^Χ
35 καὶ τῆς θαλάττης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν
ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι

19 τῆς] τὴν Π³ Ι⁵ || 20 ἔχθραν Π³ Ρ⁵ || διὸ παρ'] διόπερ Π¹, perhaps rightly ||
22 βουλῆς] τιμῆς Γ Μ¹ || 26 εἰ δεῖ] εἴτε Sylburg, δεῖ Schneider, εἰ <εἴται> δεῖ
Spengel, possibly rightly || δομοφύλους πάντας—27 θυμοειδεῖς Schneider, hardly
right || 29 <ἢ> περιοίκους Schneider, cp. 1329 a 26 | 30 ἴδιοις before ἐν
omitted by Π⁴ Λ¹ Ar., the second *ἴδιοις* omitted by Γ Ρ⁵ Bk. | 34 τὲ Ald., τὰς Ρ³
Τ⁶ Β⁶ || 35 θαλάττης Μ¹, θαλάσσης the other authorities Bk. Susem.^{1,2} || 36 αὐτὴν]
αὐτὴν Μ¹ Ρ² Ald. and Ρ⁴ (1st hand) | εἴται...37 δῆ] εἰ κατ' εὐχήν δεῖ κατατιγχάνειν,
τὴν θέσω πρὸς τέτταρα * * δῆ (δεῖ Schneider Susem.²) Susem.^{1,2}, wrongly, si ad rotum

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12 generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (211). SUSEM. (836)

§ 13 26 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχήν] Compare the passages collected in *n.* (128) on II. 1 § 1. SUSEM. (837)

μήτε ὁμοφύλων] So Plato *Laws* VI. 777D cp. μήτε πατρώτας ἀλλήλων εἴναι τοῖς μέλοντας ἥπον δουλεύσειν ἀσυμφώνους τε εἰς δύναμιν διτι μάλιστα. Comp. Ps.-Αρ. *Oecon.* I. 5 §§ 5, 1344 b 14 ff. χρῆ δε καὶ τέλος ὠρίσθαι πᾶσιν δίκαιον γάρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἀθλον. SUSEM. (841)

μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression II. 5 § 25, 1264 b 9, see *n.* (182); there “men of spirit,” here “passionate.” Compare what is said of θυμός in notes on III. 16 § 1 (64), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790). SUSEM. (839)

28 διόπερον δῆ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n.

(815), also *notes* on II. 9. 4 (282) and EXC. III. on the Cretan περίοικοι p. 338. SUSEM. (840)

32 διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι...ἐλευθερίᾳ] A new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the best state actual slaves or serfs can only be, must logically remain slaves for ever. However comp. Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.* I. 5 § 5 f., 1344 b 14 ff. χρῆ δε καὶ τέλος ὠρίσθαι πᾶσιν δίκαιον γάρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἀθλον. SUSEM. (841)

33 ὕστερον] an unfulfilled promise: *Introd.* pp. 49, 53. SUSEM. (842)

cc. 11, 12. *The city: regulations in detail for the site, the water-supply, the plan of the streets, the fortifications, and the two Agorai.* Cp. *Analysis* p. 115.

§ 1 36 εἴρηται πρότερον] In c. 5 §§ 3, 4. SUSEM. (843)

37 τὴν θέσιν εὑχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέ- (X)
 § 2 ποντας. πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἴ τε
 γὰρ πρὸς ἔω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα
 40 τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι, δεύτερον δὲ
 κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχείμεροι γὰρ αὗται μᾶλλον). τῶν δὲ λοι- 2

oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique resipientes William, who doubtless translates a gloss || *εἶναι* omitted by P^b, [*εἶναι*] Bk.^a (perhaps rightly), *et δεῖ* Welldon, who transposes 37 εὐχεσθαι δεῖ to follow *κατατυγχάνειν* (wrongly). Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. suspects that *κατατυγχάνειν* is corrupt || 37 εὐχεσθαι δεῖ M^a || πρὸς omitted by II^b (supplied by p¹) || δὴ omitted by II^b Bk., δεῖ? Schneider, * * δεῖ Susem.¹⁻² || 38 αἱ τε] ἄτε P^b,³ S^b, αἱ II^b, αἱ [τε] Susem.¹, αἱ μὲν Koraes (needlessly) || 40 δὲ <αἱ> Koraes, certainly necessary; perhaps δ' αἱ is better || 41 καταβρέιοι Lindau; but Schneider shows that κατὰ βορέαν has the same sense || εὐχείμεροι νεαροὶ Susem.¹ in the text, *recentiores* William, *εὐδειροὶ* Muretus, *εὐδειροὶ* Böcker, approved by Susem.¹ —all resting upon misapprehension of κατὰ βορέαν

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτήν εἶναι...κατατυγχάνειν...37 βλέποντας] The construction of the infinitives *εἶναι*, *κατατυγχάνειν* is disputed, and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. suspects the latter word. Busse (*op. c. p. 17*) compares (as Göttling had done) phrases like ἐκὼν *εἶναι* and the like: he thinks an object of the verb *κατατυγχάνειν* can be supplied without trouble from what follows. On the contrary, if *κατατυγχάνειν* is sound, it is on this verb that the accus. with infinitive *τὴν θέσιν εἶναι* must depend: this construction already given in Passow's lexicon has lately been proposed anew by Dr Jowett (= *τὸν θέσιν εἶναι*). To this Susemihl objects: "at non hoc optandum est ut *τὴν θέσιν* accipiat urbs, sed *τὴν ἐπιτρέπανταν θέσιν* vel *τὴν θέσιν* ὡς δεῖ, quod ut subaudiri posset e verbis πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας, scriendum potius erat sere sic: αἱτὴ δὲ καδ' αἱτὴ τῆς θέσεως κατατυγχάνειν. Aut igitur lacuna deformatus esse videtur locus aut, quae est Bonitz's suspicio, *κατατυγχάνειν* corruptum. Omnia bene se haberent, si <*τὸν ἐπιτρέπανταν*> vel <*τὸν οἰλαν δεῖ εἶναι*> legeretur, sed in re tam incerta praestat a conjecturis abstinere." Mr Welldon's proposal is met by the inquiry, Can *κατατυγχάνειν* govern an accusative? and if it can, would it not be easier to omit *εἶναι* with P^b? (See *Quæst. crit. coll.* p. 407, of which the foregoing is an abstract.) SUSEM.

37 εὐχεσθαι] Another of the passages collected in *n.* (128) on II. 1. 1. SUSEM. (844)

§ 2 38 αἱ τε γάρ...40 ὑγιεινότεραι] Similarly Hippocrates *De aere* I. p. 525 ff.

Kühn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air: cp. *Meteor.* II. 6. 20, 364 b 19 f., *Problem.* xxvi. 56, *Oecon.* I. 6. 9, 1345 a 31 ff., *Thuc.* III. 23, 5. Aristophanes *Wasps* 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus *De ventis* § 4: like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Socrates in Xen. *Memor.* III. 9. 9 and Xenophon himself *Oecon.* c. 9 § 4 (a passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. *Oecon.* I. c. as Schlosser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (Eaton). SUSEM. (845)

Add Plutarch *De curiositate* c. 1, 515 C: ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ἕφυρον ἀνεμον κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥδιον ἐρεῖσθαι δεῖλης ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρασοῦ δεχομένην, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπήναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαλώνων. The east wind is spoken of as warm *Probl.* xxvi. 31, 943 b 24 (Newman).

41 κατὰ βορέαν] Under the north wind, and so protected from it: i.e. with south aspect. Cp. *Oecon.* I. 6. 8, 1345 a 33, *κατάβορρον οὖσα*, Plato *Critias* 118 A, B: πρὸς νήσον ἐπέραπτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτῶν κατάβορρος (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. SUSEM. (846)

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν] What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are accounted for by the words πρὸς τὰς πολεικάς πρᾶξες καὶ πολεικάς καλῶς ἔχειν; the one which still remains is, in all probability, beauty

1330 b πῶν * * πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς (X) § 3 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων δὲ καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος (p. 113) 5 οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, τούτο γε εὑρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν ὑποδοχὰς ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον. § 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγιείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικούντων, τοῦτο 3 δ' ἔστιν ἐν τῷ κεῖσθαι τὸν τόπουν ἐν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς 10 τοιούτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι, καὶ τούτου τὴν ἐμπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οὶς γάρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγιείαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ 15 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν ταῖς εὐ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ'

1330 b 1 <πρὸς μὲν τὸν κόσμον * *, τὸ δὲ μεγατόν ἔστι τῇ θέσιν τῆς πόλεως> πρὸς, or something similar, ? Susem. || 2 μὲν after αὐτοῖς is omitted by Π¹ and not translated by Ar.; hence [μὲν] Susem.¹ || 4 δὲ Γ P⁵ Ar., τε Μ⁴ Ρ¹ Π³ Bk. || 5 εὑρηται] εὑρῆσθαι Lambin Bk.², but Schneider thought another verb required: τηρήσαι for γε εὑρηται? Susem.³, needlessly; cp. Quaest. crit. coll. p. 408 || 6 ὀμβρίοις ὕδασιν Μ⁴ Ρ¹⁻²⁻⁴ Β⁵ Ald., ὀμβρίοις θάρος P², aquarum imbrium William, ὀμβρίοις θάρος or ὀμβρίων ὑδάτων ? Susem.⁴ || 7 ἐπιλείπειν Koraes Bk.⁵, needlessly || εἰργομένους Madvig || 8 ἐπει] εἰπερ Böcker, transposing εἰπερ... 17 χρεῖαν to precede τῶν δὲ λαοτῶν 1330 a 41 || 9 δεῖ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 10 καὶ τούτου <δεῖ> Schneider, <δεῖ> καὶ τούτου Welldon, 11 ἔχειν <δεῖ> Susem.¹⁻². But if a verb is required (instead of understanding δεῖ in the apodosis from b 9 the protasis) χρῆσθαι, <χρή> καὶ is more obvious || 11 τούτου] τούτων Welldon, wrongly || πλείστους P³⁻⁴ || 14 τοιαύτην Π² P⁵ Ar. Bk.

of situation. See ήδιων 1330 b 22, κόσμον b 31, εὐχαρίς 1331 a 36, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον a 38. If the mention of this has been lost after λαοτῶν we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the *Critical notes*, and render the whole: "of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes." See Quaest. crit. coll. p. 408. SUSEM. (847)

§ 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Again from the same point of view as c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see π. (767). SUSEM. (848)

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy): that of Antioch was wonderfully good: Liban. I. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 235),

commends the Romans for their attention to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl. *Laws* 779 C.

5 τοῦτο γε εὑρηται] See *Oceon.* II. 2. 22, 1350 a 17, εὑρεῖν=assequiri; though τοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must be "thus what is required has been attained." Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29. SUSEM.

7 'Recte Ridgewayus θάρα subiectum esse monet et εἰργομένους obiectum verbi ὑπολείπειν' Qu. crit. coll. p. 408 SUSEM. That this is Aristotle's regular use of the verb is plain from *Rhet.* I. 13. 20, 1374 a 33, ὑπολείπει γάρ ἀν διαρθουόντα, and III. 17. 21, 1418 a 35, οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν διάλογος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are eminently sound and practical.

όμοια μήτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων η ναμάτων, χωρὶς τά τε εἰς (X) τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ 4 τόπων [τῶν] ἐρυμανῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἶον ἀκρόπολις ὀλυγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχι- 20 κόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὄμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον, § 6 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἴσχυροι τόποι πλείους. η δὲ τῶν ἴδιων οἰκή- σεων διάθεσις ὑδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἀν εὔτομος η κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς 25 ἀσφαλείας τούναντίον ως εἰχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσέξοδος γάρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς § 7 ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχε- 5 ται γάρ, ἀν τις οὕτως κατασκευάῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωρ- γίοις ἡς καλοῦσι τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν 30 ὄλην πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν εὔτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους·

16 μῆτ'] μηδὲ Koraes, rightly || τοιούτων Π¹ P⁴⁻⁶ L¹ and P⁵ (corr.), τούτων the other authorities Ar. Bk.¹ || 18 τῶν omitted by M⁹ P¹, <τῶν> τόπων τῶν P⁵ V^b, τόπων τῶν Bk. with the other authorities || 21 ἴδιων] οἰκετῶν M⁹ and P¹ (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 22 μὲν omitted by Π³, untranslated by Ar., hence [μὲν] Susem.¹ || 23 καὶ inserted before κατὰ by Π³ P⁵ Bk. || 24 [καὶ] Schneider Susem.¹⁻², possibly right || Ἰπποδάμειον Π⁹ (in P⁹ ἡ written faintly) P⁵ || 25 χρόνον] τρόπον Γ M⁹ || 26 δυσέξοδος—δυσεξερεύνητος—δυσέξοδος Jackson || 27 ἀμφοτέρων after τούτων Π² P⁵ Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 28 γεωρ- γίοις Scaliger, γεωργίοις Γ ΙΙ Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, γεωργικοῖς Camerarius || 30 δηλητ'] θλητ Ar. and P⁵ (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || πόλιν after μὴ ποιεῖν Π² P⁵ Bk., omitted by P¹

§ 5 20 ἀριστοκρατικὸν] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy; VI(IV). 7. 2 n. (1232), cp. c. 2 § 1 (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 n. (118); III. 7. 3 n. (536) and Exc. I. on B. III. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes: and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections; for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short usurpers may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. SUSEM. (849)

§ 6 23 κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον...τρόπον] See Exc. II. to Book II.: p. 331. SUSEM. (850)

24 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς...τούναν- τίον] Eaton remarks that the surprise of Plataea (Thuc. II. c. 4) in ancient, and the second siege of Saragossa in modern, times, will illustrate the author's meaning. But "Aristotle probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes across which the besieged carried walls; Diod. XVI. 76" (Newman). SUSEM. (851)

§ 7 29 τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας] Unquestionably, vines planted in the fashion of a quincunx. SUSEM. (852)

30 εὔτομον] Cut up, i.e. laid out, in straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-

οὗτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς. (X)

§ 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῦν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀντιτοιουμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαῖως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,

34 καὶ ταῦθ' ὄρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνως καλλω-

§ 9 πισαμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ πλήθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειράσθαι σφίζεσθαι διὰ (p. 114)

τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλειά τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων [καὶ]

τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δὲ σφίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-

1331 α μικωτάτην, ἀλλως τε καὶ νῦν εύρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας.

§ 10 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν τ

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by Π² P⁶ Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before συμβαίνει omitted by M¹, [καὶ] Koraes; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδέχεται Stahr || 38 καὶ untranslated by William, [καὶ] Spengel || 39 [καὶ] Spengel, wrongly || [καὶ τῆς] ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης <τε> καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς δλίγοις Schmidt

1331 α 3 τὸ] τῷ S^b V^b and perhaps P⁶ (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἀπασα μὲν οὖν ὅδοις κατατέμηται.

§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῦν κτλ.] Plato *Laws* VI. 778 D ff.: περὶ δὲ τειχῶν ἔγοι ἀν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἐμφερομένην τὸ καθεύδειν τὸν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὸ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπανιστάμαι. SUSEM. (853)

34 ἐλεγχομένας [ἴργῳ]. Here no doubt he is thinking more especially of Sparta: see n. (554) on III. 9. 10. SUSEM. (854)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had walls like those of Babylon, they could have procured for her any greater protection than her strong position afforded in the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas, though he did not succeed in surprising it unawares, actually penetrated into the city, Xen. *Hellen.* VII. 5. 11, Polyb. IX. 8. 5. Very obstinate resistance had been offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perinthus (340), although Thebes, in spite of its walls, was carried by assault (335).

§ 9 36 οὐ καλὸν] To skulk behind fortifications has been in all ages contrasted with courage in the open field. So of the remark of Archidamus, which Camerarius quotes from Plutarch, that at the sight of a catapult he exclaimed: ἀπώλετο ἀδρὸς ἀρετά.

37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An

inversion which Mr. Newman compares with II. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μὴ τῶν πλειστῶν ἢ μὴ πάττων. Translate: “but as it not only may but does happen that the superiority of the enemy is too much for the brave but not superhuman resistance of the smaller number, in such cases, if the defenders are to preserve themselves and be free from indignity and injury, we must hold that walls of impregnable strength are a soldierly precaution, especially when we consider the precision that has been attained in the manufacture of missiles and siege-engines.”

1331 α 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two main divisions of Greek artillery ὀξυβελεῖς sc. καταπάλαι for discharging arrows chiefly, with a range of 400 yards, and the heavier engines πετροβόλοι; see A. Bauer *Griech. Kriegsalterthümer* in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch d. Kl. Alt.* IV. 1, p. 310 ff. H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer* p. 190—204.

§ 10 3 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ...ἀξιοῦν καὶ] “To insist on not building walls round cities is the same thing as to seek for a country easily invaded;” for καὶ ‘as’ after ὅμοιον see II. 8. 21, 1269 a 6. With ἀξιοῦν cp. II. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν.

καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς (X)
 5 ὄρεων τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς ιδίαις οἰκήσεσι μὴ
 περιβάλλειν τούχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούν-
 § 11 των, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτο γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν
 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως
 χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἔχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ
 10 ἔχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον 8
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχῃ τῇ
 πόλει πρεπόντας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρέias, τάς τε
 § 12 ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπι-
 15 τιθεμένοις ἐπιμελές ἔστι δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν,
 οὗτω τὰ μὲν εὑρηται τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ
 12 τοὺς φυλαττομένους ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρούσιν ἐπιτίθε-
 σθαι τοῖς εὐ παρεσκευασμένοις. ἐπει δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆ-
 θος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις κατανευμῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ
 20 τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους
 ἐπικαίρους, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευ-

5 φρονὸς II² P⁵ || ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ίδιαις II² P⁵ Bk. || 10 τοῖς—κεκτημένοις Ar.,
 ταῖς—κεκτημέναις Γ² Bk.¹ || 11 [μόνον] ? Koraes, wrongly (cp. Pl. *Symp.* 179 B
 with Hug's note) || 12 τούτων] τῶν διητῶν? Koraes || 13 χρέias <ἀνταρκούντως>
 ? Schneider, not badly || 16 δεῖ before ζητεῖν II² P⁵ Bk., omitted by P¹ (1st hand,
 supplied by corr.¹) || καὶ after φιλοσοφεῖς untranslated by William and Ar. (perhaps
 rightly) || 17 ἐπιχειρήσουσιν? Schmidt || 21 δῆλον...22 φυλακτηρίοις omitted by II²
 (supplied in the margin by p¹) || αὐτὸν Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 125 a 35 f.), certainly right

5 The construction must be δομοίς δὲ <δομούν ἔστι> ... μὴ περιβάλλειν, this in-
 finitive being parallel to ζητεῖν.

§ 11 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτᾶ] We had a similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 3 n. (771) with respect to maritime site for the city. SUSEM. (855)

11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον] μόνον is pleonastic.

14 τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας] Dionysius the Elder invented machines of this kind; Diod. XIV. 42, 1, 50, 4 (Camerarius). Cp. Rüstow and Köchly *Gesch. des griech. Kriegswesens* p. 207 f. Afterwards the campaigns of Philip and Alexander of Macedon led to many fresh improvements in the siege-engines and heavy artillery: see Rüstow and Köchly p. 264, 307 ff. "It is possible" (see n. 1589 on VIII(v), 6, 13) "that Aristotle was acquainted with the work of Aeneas Tacticus. (See c. 32.)" (Eaton.) SUSEM. (856)

See also H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer*

c. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention of καταπάται at Athens *circa* Ol. 105 or 106, 356—348: they were of course used by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, 340, 339; and by Alexander against Halicarnassus 334.

§ 12 17 ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρούσιν] This is equivalent to the Latin maxim: si bellum vitare vis, bellum para (Congreve). SUSEM. (857)

c. 12 § 1 19 τὰ δὲ τείχη...21 ἐπι-
 καλύπους] So Xenoph. *Cyrop.* VII. 5 § 12, towers for guard-rooms ἀντηγε δὲ πολλοὶς
 πύργοις, ὅπως ὅτι πλείστα φυλακτήρια εἴη and Polyb. VIII. 17. 5 of Cretan mercenaries at Sardis συνέβαινε δὲ τοῖς Κρήτας πεπιστεύσασι τι τῶν φυλακτηρίων τῶν κατὰ τοὺς διποσθεν τόπους τῆς ἀκρας (J. G. Schneider), SUSEM. (858)

20 διειλῆφθαι] c. 7 § 1, 1327 b 22,

διειληπται τοις θύεσι.

21 αὐτὰ] Vahlen on *Poet.* c. 15 § 12,

1454 b 17 out of several instances has

άξειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρί- (X)
 § 2 οις. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἄν τις διακοσμήσειε
 τὸν τρόπον τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδεδομένας οἰκήσεις XI
 25 καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχέων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει τό-
 πον ἐπιτήδειόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν
 ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθό- (p. 115)
 § 3 χρηστον. εἴη δὲ ἀν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ίκανώς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιῶντα
 30 μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμνοτέρως. πρέπει δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οὖαν καὶ περὶ²
 § 4 Θετταλίαν νομίζουσιν, ἦν ἐλευθέραν καλούσιν, αὕτη δὲ
 ἐστὶν ἦν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὡνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε
 βάναυσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν τοιούτων παρα-

24 θεοῖς P⁴ Ar., θεοῖς the other authorities and Bk.¹ || 25 τὰ τῶν κυριώτατων ?Susem., τὰ κυριώτατα <τὰ> τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 1331 b ff.) || ἀρχέων P⁴, ἀρχῶν P⁴·⁶ L¹ Ar. Ald., ἀρχαῖων the other authorities || [συσσίτια] Spengel || 28 ἐπιφάνειάν—θέσιν—ἐπιφάνειαν Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἔχει πρὸς || 29 ἀρετῆς] ἵερατελα ?Jackson || ἀρετῆς θέσιν] θέσεως ἀρετῆν Lambin || θέσιν] ξέν Götting, ἔφεσιν Eaton, θεάν Schneider. If this latter be accepted, either with Susem.¹ read [πειφάνειάν τε] as a gloss, or with Bücheler transpose ἐπιφάνειάν τε to follow θεάν || 32 νομίζουσιν Lambin, δνομάζουσιν ΓΠ Ar. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text || 34 τῶν τοιούτων] τοιοῦτον M¹ II² P⁸ Bk., also P¹ (corr.) and apparently Ar. (perhaps rightly)

one similar: *De anima* II. 4 § 12, 416 a το αὐτὸν φαίνεται μόνον τρεφομένον. Add *Pol.* III. 5. 4, 1278 a 14.

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly: "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the several divisions of the citizens shall be held at the immediate sphere of their employment: those of the φύλακες in the φυλακτηρίαι and πύργοι where they are on duty. Similarly the common meal of the ἀρχοντες is in the town hall." Hence he proposes to read τὰ κυριώτατα τὰ τῶν ἀρχέων, which is open to the objection: non omnium magistratum sed superiorum tantum praetoria circa forum superius iacent. SUSEM.

§ 2 27 μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον] Thus Aristotle places all the regulations for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state under the Delphic oracle precisely as Plato does *Rcp.* IV. 427 b (Congreve). SUSEM. (859).

§ 3 28 ἐπιφάνειάν τε κτλ.] (p. Vitruv. I. 7: aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in excelsissimo loco, unde moenium maxima

pars conspicatur, areae distribuantur (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly *Plato Lysis* VI. 778 c, the temples to be built all round the Agora and the city around them πρὸς τοὺς ὑψηλοὺς τῶν τόπων εὑπερλας τε καὶ καθαρότης χάρην: VIII. 848 D (similarly in the twelve κώμαι). SUSEM. (860)

Add Pausan. IX. 22 εὗ δέ μοι Ταναγραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γάρ αἱ οἰκαὶ σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν καθαρῷ τε ἐστι καὶ ἐπτὸς ἀνθρώπων. Xenophon gives as Socrates' opinion: ναοῖς γε μήν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἐφη εἶναι πρεπωδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη, *Merc.* III. 8. 10.

§ 3 29 περὶ Θετταλίαν] Also, according to Xenophon's romance, amongst the Persians also: *Cyrop.* I. 2. 3, ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά καλούμενη, ἐνθα τὰ τε βασιλεία καὶ τάλλα ἀρχεῖα πεποιηται. SUSEM. (861)

See Blümner *Privatall.*³ § 18 p. 134 n. (2). ἀγορά was also used as a term for 'harbour' in Thessaly (Hesychius).

35 βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δὲ ἀν (XI) εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
 § 5 ἔχοι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρῆσθαι κατὰ τὰς
 ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέ-
 39 ροις ἀρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
 § 6 τοῖς ἀρχοντιν· ή γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρου-
 στα μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-
 1331 b θέρων φόβον) τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀγορᾶν ἐτέραν τε δεῖ ταύ-
 της εἶναι καὶ χωρίς, ἔχονταν τόπον εὔσυνάγαγον τοῖς τε
 ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
 πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλήθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς Ἱερέis
 5 εἰς ἀρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν Ἱερέων συσσίτια περὶ τὴν
 § 7 τῶν Ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δὲ ἀρχείων

39 τὰς—πρεσβυτέρας Γ, τὰ—πρεσβύτερα apparently M*

1331 b 4 τῆς πόλεως after διαιρεῖται Π³ E⁸ Bk., thus avoiding hiatus, “there must be some mistake” Congreve, ?πολετεύματος Susem. || 5 <καὶ> εἰς Lambin Bk.², [εἰς] <καὶ> ?Susem. But if 4 τῆς πόλεως is right, ὅπλιτας or στρατιώτας must have been dropped and εἰς may be a trace of this, [εἰς] <καὶ> ἀρχοντας <καὶ ὅπλιτας> Welldon, combining these suggestions || τὴν omitted by Π¹ (supplied in P¹ by corr.), untranslated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after οἰκοδο-
 μημάτων || τὴν—6 οἰκοδομημάτων] τὰ—οἰκοδομημάτα Ridgeway || 6 χώραν inserted after οἰκοδομημάτων by Bas.³ It should be ἀγοράν which may just as well be understood; οἰκοδομημάτων <χώραν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν τοῖς ἀρχείοις τὴν αὐτὴν> Spengel

§ 4 34 παραβάλλειν] Intrude upon, approach: *N.E.* VIII. 13 § 6, 1153 b 34 παραβάλλειν εἰς ηδονάς καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν: *Hist. anīm.* VIII. 12 § 11, 597 b 15: διαν ἐκεῖθεν παραβάλλωσιν sc. δρυγες. *De gen. anīm.* III. II § 31, 763 a 31, περὶ Ρόδου παραβαλόντος γαυτικῶν στρατοῦ.

§ 5 39 ἀρχοντάς τινας] Either special magistrates: cp. VII(vi). 8 § 22 γυμνασταρία, πρὸς δὲ τούτους περὶ ἀγύρας ἐπιψέλαια γυμνικοῦς καὶ Διογυντιακοῦς with n. (1484)—or the παιδονόμαι, for whom see c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 17 § 5 (958), § 7 (960), § 10 (963), § 12 (969); VII(iv). 15 § 3 (1345), § 9 (1355), § 13; VII(vi). 8 § 22 n. (1483) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (862)

τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: *Introd.* p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 f. n. (962). SUSEM. (863)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ] See c. 9 above. SUSEM. (864)

5 The repetition of εἰς before ἀρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the

soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double εἰς conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολετεύματος, the governing body. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1264 b 32, εἰς δύο μέρη, τὸ μὲν εἰς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ πρωτοδεικοῦν μέρος, and *infra* c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 30 ff. διηρηγη... τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μέν εἰς τὰ αἴγα-
 καλα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά, how much harsher the text is than would be the following e.g. τὸ μὲν εἰς λεπῆς τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀρχείας.

With τὴν τῶν Ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων understand, from b 1, ἀγοράν as in b. 11. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 410. This removes one of Prof. Ridgeway's objections (*Transactions* II. p. 143), but it is still strange that λεπῶν should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8.

6 ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν = τετάχθαι, as § 4, 1331 a 37. So ἔχειν τιμῆν = τιμάσθαι,

δσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περί τε γρα- (XII)
φὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην
διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην
ιο ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾶ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κα-
τεσκενάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δὲ ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι
τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γάρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ
πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.

§ 8 νενεμῆσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν 4
15 χώραν· καὶ γάρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλωροὺς
οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἵερά κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμη-
μένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν.

§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λέγον- (p. 116)
20 τὰς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἐστίν. οὐ γάρ χαλεπόν ἐστι
τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γάρ
λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ

8 τὴν after ἀλλην omitted by M^a P¹, perhaps rightly, [τὴν] Susem.¹ || 10 καὶ
κάν ? Susem. || κατεσκενάσθαι P¹, κατασκενδούσθαι S^b V^b, κατασκενάσθαι M^a ||
14 μεμμῆσθαι P^a-S^a S^b V^b Ar. Ald. Bk.² and P².⁴ (1st hand, νενε in P² is written over
an erasure), νενεμῆσθαι P⁴ (corr.) || 16 ἀγορανόμους P^b S^b and P⁸ (1st hand, cor-
rected by a later hand)

1333 b 35; ἔχ. τὴν φύσιν=πεφυκέναι,
1330 b 14; ἐπιμέλειαν = ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
1330 b 11; αἰσθήσιαι = αἰσθάνεσθαι, 1340 a
3 (cp. 1253 a 17); not to mention various
phrases ἔχειν δυσχέρεαν, μοχθηραν, δυσμέ-
νειαν, διαφοραν, δυσκολαν, which are equi-
valent to εἶναι δυσχέρες, μοχθέρων, δυσ-
μενές, διάφορον, δύσκολον. Comp. Vahlen
Arist. Anfs. II. p. 30 f.

§ 7 9 ἀγορανομίαν... 10 δοτυνομίαν] Comp. II. 5. 21 n. (176 b), VI(IV). 15. 9
n. (1354), § 22 n. (1373); VII(VI). 8 §§ 3—5
nn. (1461, 1463, 1468). SUSEM. (865)

10 συνόδῳ] As in II. 9. 31, 1271 a 28
n. meeting, gathering. Cp. 1319 a 32.

11 περὶ has almost the meaning of a
possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 18.

§ 8 14 τάξιν is the so-called cognate
accus. after νενεμῆσθαι.

15 οὓς καλοῦσιν, κτλ.] Comp. VII(VI).
8. 6 n. (1465) for these wood-rangers or
foresters. Plato has the term ἀγρονόμοι
Laws VI. 760 ff. SUSEM. (866)

16 φυλακτήρια κτλ.] Comp. Plato
Laws VIII. 848 D: for the twelve κώμαι,
exactly as VI. 778 C for the Agora (Eaton).
See the citation n. (860). SUSEM. (867)

§ 9 19 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν κτλ.] Cp. I.

11. 5, 1258 b 34, f. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος
ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ
ἐνδιατρίβειν.

20 οὐ γάρ χαλεπόν] Comp. c. 7 § 9,
1328 a 19 ff., n. (794). SUSEM. (868).

22 εὐχῆς ἔργον] Another of the pas-
sages cited in n. (128) on II. 1. 1. SUSEM.
(869)

This next chapter, c. 13, is preliminary
to that detailed account of Education in
the best state which forms the subject of
the treatise from c. 14 to the (incomplete)
termination of B. v(viii). We have here
a string of remarks on the end of the
state, and the best means to secure it by
a given character in the citizens: remarks
not very dissimilar to parts of cc. 1—3,
or again to c. 14. For this reason the
chapter has been bracketed by Congreve
and Broughton, either wholly or in part.
See *Anal.* p. 115 f., *Introd.* p. 88 f.
Prof. J. Cook Wilson's view, as there
stated, is that c. 13 seems like a shorter
duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "The chief
difference is that c. 13, 1332 a 7—9,
takes the definition of the Good in the
general form given in *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 7
(or *Eud. Eth.* II. 1), while cc. 14—15,

μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλείον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,
 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ποίων δεῖ XII
 25 συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ
 § 2 πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἔστιν ἐκ οὓς γί-
 νεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοις δ' ἔστιν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκο-
 πὸν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὄρθως, ἐν δὲ τὰς
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
 30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίστε γὰρ
 ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-
 χεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον,
 ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἱατρικὴν οὕτε [γὰρ]
 35 ποιὸν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίστε καλῶς,
 οὕτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιη-
 τικῶν δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμ-
 φότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις).
 § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ξῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίενται 2
 40 πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἔξουσίᾳ τυγχάνειν,
 τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διά τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-

23 ἐπιπλεῖν P².³⁻⁴ Ald., ἐπὶ πλεῖν P¹ (perhaps rightly) || 24 ἐκ inserted before ποίων by II² P⁵ Ar. Bk.¹, [έτε] Bk.² || 25 συνεστάναι M¹ P¹ || 26 πολιτεύεσθαι Koraes Bk.³, πολιτεύεσθαι II Bk.¹ || [έπει δὲ δύο...1332 a 27 τέχνης] Congreve, who calls it an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning, [έπει...1332 b 11 ἀκούοντες] Broughton and Wilson, the latter considering c. 13 a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15; see *Intrad.* p. 88 f. and *Comm. nn.* (876, 879, 881, 948, 949) || 28 τῶν <ὄρθων> P^{4-5,6} S^b V^b L^a || 31 καλὸς Γ P¹ || 32 δὲ P⁴, ἐντορ P² Bk. || 34 γὰρ omitted by II¹, inserted by II² P⁹ Bk. || 41 τύχην ἢ φύσιν P² P⁶ Ar. Bk. and perhaps M¹

like *Nic. Eth.* x., distinguish between the life of moral virtue and the higher life of philosophic contemplation. In c. 13 there is no consciousness of what seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue does not belong so completely to the καλὸν as θεωρία. In the version of c. 13 the language which follows the words φαμὲν δέ καὶ ἐν τοῖς θύσαις, 1332 a 7, has more affinity for the Eudemian than the Nicomachean Ethics⁷ (*Journal of Phil. x.* 84 ff.).

§ 1 26—38 Eudemus reproduces this *E. E.* II. 11. 3, 1227 b 19—22. The whole period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently discussed by Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* II. III. p. 94 sq. SUSEM.

§ 2 29 εὑρίσκειν = assecuri. See 1330 b 5 n. Σο λαβεῖν = ascertain. Yet below b 38 κρατεῖσθαι = to be won, secured.

30 ταῦτα are (1) τὸ τέλος and (2) αἱ πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέρουσαι πράξεις. See b 38.

34 οἷον περὶ ἱατρικῆν] References to Medicine have occurred II. 8. 18 n. (770), III. c. 6 § 7 n. (531), c. 11 §§ 10, 11, c. 15 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 § 6 ff. Also IV(VII). c. 2 § 13 n. (726). SUSEM. (870)

35 τὸ ὑγιαῖνον εἶναι σῶμα] Note that εἶναι is transposed. The order is ποιὸν τι τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα δεῖ εἶναι, in what condition the patient should be left, in order to be well.

§ 3 41 χορηγίας τινὸς] Certain resources, means, prerequisites, auxiliaries. For this meaning cp. *N. Eth.* I. 8. 15, 1099 a 31—33, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδοσμένη ἀδίνατον γάρ ἡ οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀρχορήγητον ὄντα, I. 10. 15, 1101 a 14 f. τὸν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς λκανὸς κεχορηγημένον, X. 8. 4, 1178 a 23 ff., § 9,

^{1332 a} ρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττονος μὲν τοῦ (XII)
 § 4 ἄμεινον διακειμένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῦ χείρον), οἱ δὲ εὐθὺς
 οὐκ ὅρθως ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἔξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ιδεῖν, αὕτη δὲ
 5 ἐστὶ καθ' ἓν ἀριστ' ἀν πολιτεύοντο πόλις, ἀριστα δὲ ἀν πολι-
 τεύοντο καθ' ἓν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν·
 δῆλον δτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λανθάνειν.
 § 5 φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, εἰ τι τῶν λόγων

<sup>1332 a i τοῖστον] ταῦτη Schneider needlessly || 2 εὐθὺς] αὐθὶς Madvig, wrongly
 (αὐθὶς is not found in Arist.) || 4 ἐστιν ἀρίστην M^o P¹ omitting τὴν, hence [τὴν]
 Susem.¹ || 6 ἐνδέχοτο M^o and perhaps Γ || 8 διωρίσμεθα omitted by Π² Ρ⁵ Ar. Bk.
 || τι] τε M^o, τι γε P¹ (corr.¹): the word is untranslated by William</sup>

1178 b 33 (Eaton). These are the auxiliary causes or indispensable conditions (see n. 795) of Wellbeing. SUSEM. (871)
 § 4 1332 a 2 of § εὐθὺς] The δὲ answers μὲν of 1331 b 40: ‘whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.’ For this sense of εὐθὺς comp. I. 5, 2, 1254 a 23 εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. Bonitz *Ind. s. v.* distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16, 9, 1287 b 10, I. 8, 9, 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς; so VI(IV). II. 6, 1295 b 16, εὐθὺς οἰκοθεν, and VIII(V). c. 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. 5 § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29: (2) a quasi-causal sense, suapte natura, = φύσει εὐθὺς (ὑπάρχει), as in V(VIII). 5. 23, 1340 a 40: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as I. 13, 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4, 6, 1277 a b, IV(VII). 14, 2, 1332 b 18, V(VIII). 2. 2, 1337 b 2.

3 ἀπέ... 7 λανθάνειν] It is pointed out in Exc. I. (p. 559) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (i) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and, (ii) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1329 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (as ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τέλεος 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the *Ethics*. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we inferred that the first chapter of our present book was

not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the *Ethics* there (i. e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 1, φαμὲν δὲ καὶ διωρίσμεθα, where the present φαμὲν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804), 1329 b 41 n. (831), 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of ξφαμεν, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp. also n. (807) and I. 2. 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (872)

§ 5 8 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] Nic. Eth. I. 7. 9 ff., esp. § 15, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8. SUSEM. (873)

εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἔκεινων δῆθεος] It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [*Dialogue*, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. SUSEM. (874)

With far less probability Grote in an essay on the *Ethics* (in *Fragments* p. 133 f.) connects this passage with Nic. Eth. I. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and II. 2. 3—5, 1104 a 1—11 (*τειρατὸν βοηθεῖν*) as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): “that Aristotle regarded

9 ἐκείνων ὅφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ (XII)
 § 6 ταύτην οὐκ ἔξι ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δὲ ἔξι ὑποθέσεως (p. 117)
 τάναγκαῖα, τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-
 12 καίας πράξεις αἱ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-
 τῆς μὲν εἰσιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖας
 15 ἔχουσιν (ἀίρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων
 μῆτε τὸν ἄνδρα μῆτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμᾶς καὶ
 17 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἔτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις
 τούναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις.

10 ταῦτης ?Stahr, not badly || 12 αἱ <γάρ> Reiz || διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας Jackson,
 δίκαιαι (δίκαιαι al ΓΜ^α and apparently Αι.) τιμωρίαι ΓΠΑρ. Bk. Susem.¹⁻² || καὶ
 (before κολάσεις) omitted by ΓΑρ. || 13 καὶ before ἀναγκαῖα omitted by Π¹⁻⁵ Π²
 Αρ. Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 14 [μὲν] Koraes, perhaps rightly || 15 δὲ ἐπὶ] δὲ
 περὶ ?Schneider || 16 εὑδόξια ?Spengel, προεδρία ?Jackson || κάλλισται] καλαί
 ?Spengel || 17 ἀναίρεσις Schneider, αἴρεσις ΓΠΑρ. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text. Cp.
 1332 b 36.

the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as all but desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of *εἶναι* is *εὐδαιμονίαν*. The definition in full is *ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεῖα*, οὐκ ἔξι ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks I. p. 575 f., II. 385—401.

τελεῖαν] We may paraphrase: "matured and relatively permanent." See Rassow *Forschungen* p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is no true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Well-being, because its virtue is not yet developed: *Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. *Pol.* I. 13. 11, n. (120). The corresponding negative term, too, *ἀρελήσις*, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development: I. 13. 7 f. (cp. § 11), III. 11. 9 n. (572), V(VIII). 5. 10 n. (1033). SUSEM. (876)

10—21] Resperxit haec Eudemus VII. 2. 43 (56), 1238 b 5 sqq. SUSEM.

10 ταύτην οὐκ ἔξι ὑποθέσεως] This is not to be found in *Nic. Ethics*, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. SUSEM. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 τάναγκαῖα] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, *Journal of Phil.* x. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word τάναγκαῖα for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato *Keph.* VI. 493 C: ἀλλὰ τάναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοὶ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαῖου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, διστιφέρει τῷ θντι, μήτε ἐμπρακτὸς εἴη κτλ." Cp. c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 32: πρακτά = (1) ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρῆσιμα, (2) καλά; and *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 5, 1116 b 2 f. δεῖ δὲ οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνθρεπος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.

τὸ καλῶς] sc. πραχθέν. But below, a 13, τὸ καλῶς, sc. ἔχειν = nobleness or beauty as a quality of actions.

13 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν] They are of the character of a necessary evil (Congreve). SUSEM. (877)

14 τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τιμωρῶν καὶ κολάσεων.

15 ἐπὶ] to secure; the final sense of ἐπὶ c. acc. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 268 b 59 ff., Eucken II. p. 58.

§ 7 17 ἀναίρεσις] Postgate defends the vulgate αἴρεσις = choice, in the sense that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSEM. (877 b)

αἱ τοιαῦται] sc. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμάς.

χρήσαιτο δ' ἀν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενία καὶ νόσφ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς ἀλλὰ τὸ μακά-
ριον ἐν τοῖς ἑναντίοις ἔστιν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώρισται κατὰ
τοὺς ἡθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἔστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, φ διὰ τὴν
§ 8 ἀρέτην [τὰ] ἀγαθά ἔστι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι καὶ
τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαῖος καὶ καλὸς εἶναι ταύτας
25 ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἀνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἴτια
τὰ ἔκτος εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-
πρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἴτιωτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δι' ἀρέτην, omitting τὴν, M^o Pl: hence [τὴν] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ]
before ἀγαθό Reiz Bk.² || δῇ Sepulveda, δ Γ Π^o Ar. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text || δὲ
καὶ δῆι apparently Γ (palam autem et quod William) || 27 αἰτιῷ <τις> P^o Bk.² ||
ἢ λύρᾳ Γ, perhaps rightly

19 χρήσαιτο δ' ἀν] Comp. Nic. Eth. I. 10. II f., 1100 b 18 ff., where this is presented as a special feature of Magnanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790). Again in Post. Analytics II. 13. 18, 97 b 15 ff., this, τὸ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι εὐτυχῶντες καὶ ἀτυχῶν-
τες, is mentioned as a second mark of the high-souled character (μεγαλοψύχος) along with that adduced in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-
χεσθαι ὑβριζόμενον (Eaton). SUSEM. (878)
Cp. χρήσις in N. E. I. 10. 12, 1100 b 27,
χρήσθαι § 13, 1101 a 4.

20 τὸ μακάριον] The decision in N. E. I. 10. 14, ιτοι α 6, is ἀδίλοις μὲν οὐδέποτε γένονται ἀν ἐνδαιμών, οὐ μὴν μακάριος γε, διὰ Πρωταρκίας τύχαις περιτέτηρ. Cp. ib. I. 10. 3, 1100 a 16 f., and the absurd derivation from χαλεποί, VII. 11. 2, 1152 b 7.

21 κατὰ τοὺς ἡθικοὺς λόγους] Nic. Eth. III. c. 4 [c. 6, Bk.], esp. § 4, 1113 a 25, τῷ μὲν σπουδαῖῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθεαν (sc. Βουλητήν) εἶναι sc. φατὸν Βουλητήν, a 32 διαφέρει πλείστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθῆς ἐν ἔκστοτοις δρᾶν. It is quite true the statement is not made there in so many words: this is much more nearly the case in the two spurious treatises, Eud. Eth. VII. 15. 5, 1248 b 26 ff., Magna Moralia II. 9. 14, 1207 b 31 ff. SUSEM. (879) Comp. also Rhet. I. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

§ 8 24 τὰς χρήσεις] The plural as ἐνέργεια. In fact χρῆσις and ἐνέργεια are both opposed to ἔξι. The use which from time to time he makes of these goods (not of their opposites) attests his absolute virtuousness and goodness. Hence to consider external goods the cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as to attribute to the instrument what is really the result of the player's skill.

25 διδ...26 ἀγαθῶν] Because external

goods are just those which while absolutely good (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθό) are not good for every one, but only good at all times to the good man: Nic. Eth. V. 1. 9, 1129 b 1 ff., ἐπειδὴ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἀδίλος, περὶ τάγαθα ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ σὸν εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, ἀ ἔστι μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ ἀγαθά, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ, Meta. Z (VII). 4. 2, 1029 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἔστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεις τὸ ποίησαι ἐν τῶν ἔκαστων ἀγα-
θῶν τὰ δῆλας ἀγαθὸν ἔκαστων ἀγαθά. SUSEM. (880) The distinction is drawn N. E. VII. 12. 1, 1152 b 26 f. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τινὶ. See N. E. I. 3. 3, 1094 b 17 ff.: wealth and strength are instances, since they have proved in some cases fatal (τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀγαθά).

c. 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see Crit. note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26 ἐτελ. δὲ...to 1332 a 27 τῇ τέλην, as an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning. "What was said" (a 28, τῶν εἰρημένων) would then mean what was said cc. 4—12; and that would undoubtedly serve to explain what according to §§ 1, 10 requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. But then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον κτλ. lacks all proper connexion unless it has been directly preceded by the statement that Wellbeing consists in the practice of virtue assisted by the requisite external conditions. This alone makes all follow in regular order: these conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend on Fortune, but if the external conditions are present it is the governing intelligence that produces virtue. Hence the fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispensable for the context, and the athetesis of that passage is not the right way to re-

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, ⁵
 § 9 τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχό-
 30 μεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὡν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρίαν
 γάρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν). τὸ δὲ σπουδαίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν
 οὐκέτι τῆς τύχης ἔργον ἀλλ’ ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας
 34 τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους. ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται
 § 10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τοῦτ’ ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γή-

29 κατατυχεῖν Koraes, καὶ εὐχὴν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, καὶ τυχεῖν Madvig, κατέχειν Schmidt, καὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν? Jackson || 31 αὐτὴν inserted after γάρ by P⁴ L⁴ Ar. Ald. W^b Bk., perhaps also by S^b || 32 τῆς omitted by II² P⁵ Bk. || 33 γε omitted by II² P⁵ Bk. || τῷ Γ Ald. W^b and P² (corr.²), τὸ M² P¹⁻³⁻⁴⁻⁵ S^b V^b Ar. and P² (1st hand)

move the objection noticed in *nn.* (687, 872), although we do not deny, and in *n.* (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inserted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton's objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in *nn.* (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive; while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f.; cp. *n.* (931). SUSEM. (881)

28 ἄκ] It follows from what has been said: *c. n.* on 1254 a 31.

τὸ μὲν = ἐκ τίνων καὶ πολων δὲ συνεργάται τὴν μελλουσαν λεσθαν πόλιν μακαρίαν = χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ τάγαθα ἀπλῶς. To this is opposed the work of the legislator as in I. 10. 1, 1258 a 21 f., II. 5. 8, 1263 a 39, II § 15, 1273 b 21. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, χορηγία, is due to Fortune; the other, ἀρετή, is the legislator's task (*σκεπτέον*). Cp. 1333 a 14 πραγματεύεται, viz. by education. Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.'

§ 9 29 εὐχόμεθα] Another of the passages cited *n.* (128). SUSEM. (883)

30 τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν] The

structure of the state—the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune's disposal. The relative clause is the object of κατατυχεῖν.

κυρίαν γάρ] For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. 1 § 10. 1323 b 27 f., *nn.* (707, 795, 871); Zeller³ *op. c.* II. ii. p. 333. SUSEM. (882)

32 ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως] 'The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the εἰδὼν and προαιρούμενος of *N. Eth.* II. 4. 3, 1105 a 30 f. (Congreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 1—5, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also *n.* (121) on 1. 13. 12. SUSEM. (884)

34 ημῖν δὲ πόλιτες] Here still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 19, it is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal rights. Cp. *nn.* (816, 817); III. c. 1 §§ 9, 10, c. 13 § 12, *nn.* (440, 599). SUSEM. (885)

§ 10 35 πώς δύνης γίνεται σπουδαῖος] By this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 3. 3. *n.* (470), and *n.* (112) on I. 13. 6; further *Nic. Eth.* VI. 1. 7, 1139 a 15, 2 § 6, 1139 b 12 f. Comp. Walter *op. c.* p. 283 ff. In what sense the words εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπ. εἶναι μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν are to be taken is clear from III. c. 11 §§ 2—4, 1281 a 43 ff., esp. b 4 f. πολλῶν γάρ δύτων ἕκαστον μέριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἔνα διθρασκού, *n.* (565 b); c. 13 §§ 3, 4, 1283 a 37 ff. See further IV(VII). c. 1

36 νεται σπουδαιος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαιόυς (XII) είναι, μὴ καθ' ἔκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὐτως αἱρετώτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἔκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

§ 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαιοὶ γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ 40 τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἔστι φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φύναι δεῖ πρῶτον οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀλλων τι ξφων, εἴτα καὶ (p. 113) ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὅφελος 1332 b φύναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γάρ ἔστι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἔθων ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον § 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλα τῶν ξφων μάλιστα μὲν 7 τῇ φύσει ξῆ, μικρὰ δ' ένια καὶ τοῖς θεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ 5 καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γάρ ξχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφω-

41 εἴτα P⁵ (later hand) and Lambin, οὐτως Π² Ar. Susem.¹ in the text and P⁵ (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Γ, τε ΙΙ Ar. Bk.

1332 b 1 μεταβαλεῖν Π² Bk. || ένια...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γάρ] δέ ? Schneider || ἔστι διὰ] έστιν ίδια Koraes || [διὰ] Götting, βιρ Lindau, against the sense || 2 φύσεως <καὶ> in the margin || <ἢ διάγεται> διὰ ? Susem., <ἢ> διὰ and <μέτει> ἐπὶ Schmidt, ἔθων <δὲ μεταβαλλόμενα> ? Conring, ἔθων * * or else [διὰ τῶν ἔθων] Thurot || δέ is added after διὰ by Alb. and Thomas || 3 βέλτιον <ἄγονται> Schneider (who also brackets b 1 έστι), βέλτιον <ἀγόμενα> Welldon who also reads 2 διὰ <δέ> τῶν ἔθων || 5 ὥστε...6 ἀλλῆλοις transposed by Böcker to precede 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν: see *Introd.* p. 89. Susem. had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλὰ γάρ...7 βέλτιον || 5 μόνος Spengel (*solutus Ar.*), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(v). 9, 12, 1310 a 18 f. n. (1642). SUSEM. (886) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (II. 5. 27) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες] (ὡς ἔκαστος, see II. 3. 2, 1261 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(v). 8. 3, 1307 b 35 ff.

39 ἀλλά μήν...40 λόγος] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f., n. (931). Comp. N. Eth. X. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 f., γνεσθαι δὲ γαθοὺς οἰνοῦς οἱ μὲν φύσει οἱ δὲ έθει οἱ δὲ διδαχῆ. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by διδαχῆ, instruction, so in B. II. 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II. 8. 24, 1269 a 20: the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. SUSEM. (887)

41 εἴτα καὶ...42 ψυχήν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence I. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., I. 13. 2 f., 1259 b 22—28. In Nīc. Eth. VI. 13, 1144 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats

of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (αἱ φυσικαὶ ξεῖς), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (ξεῖς), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. Exc. III. on B. v(viii). SUSEM. (888)

42 ένια is subject to φύναι, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11 1332 b 1 ένια γάρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Aretinus translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam aliqua per naturam ad utrumque apta per mores ad peius vel melius convertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. SUSEM.

§ 12 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλα κτλ.] In form this sentence recalls *Meta.* I. 1. 3, 980 b 25—28, N. E. VIII. 12. 7, 1162 a 19—22.

4 μικρὰ is accus., ένια nominative. The gender of μόνος is a parallel to τελεωθέν and χωρισθέν, I. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν] Habit should cooperate with natural endowment. This

νεῖν ἀλλήλοις. <τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει> (XII)

4 <ξῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον>

<γάρ ἔχει λόγον·> πολλὰ γάρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν

7 πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

§ 13 *τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἶους εἴναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον-*

τας εὐχειρώτους ἔστεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον.

10 *τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἡδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἔθιζόμενοι*

μαντάνουσι, τὰ δὲ ἀκούοντες.

14 *ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόν-* XIII

των καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο ἡδη σκεπτέον, εἰ ἑτέρους εἴναι

δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ

15 βίου· δῆλον γάρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

⁸ *τοὺς* omitted and *δῆ* inserted after *φύσιν* by M¹ and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹ in the margin): presumably *τοὺς* and *δῆ* (*before φύσιν*) were variants. In Bk.² *φύσιν* is omitted by mistake || 10 ἔθιζόμενα II² || 13 [ἡδη] εἴναι P¹ (1st hand), *δῆ* II² I² Bk. and P¹ (corr.), possibly right || ἑτέρους—14 *τοὺς αὐτοὺς* Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.² in the text, *τοὺς αὐτοὺς*—14 ἑτέρους Susem.^{2,3} Madvig first suspected corruption, but proposed ἀρχομένους, [ἡ] || 15 *τὴν* omitted by P⁴ S^b V^b

is a satisfactory sense; see however p. 89 for Prof. Wilson's view (*ταῦτα* = reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 *οἱ πρότερον*] In c. 7. SUSEM. (889)

10 *τὰ μὲν γάρ]* By habitation (*ἔθιζμενοι*) arises moral virtue, by instruction (*ἀκούοντες*) intellectual virtue, *Nic. Eth.* II. 1, 1103 a 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education: *N. E.* II. 1, 8, 1103 b 22 ff., x. 9, 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (890)

11 *ἀκούοντες*] Cp. *N. E.* x. 9, 7, 1179 b 27 οὐ γάρ ἀν ἀκούοντες λέγουν. Apparently ἔθιζμενοι...ἀκούοντες corresponds to *τῷ λόγῳ...τοῖς ἔθεσιν* c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 18.

c. 14 *The distinction between rulers and ruled; whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary: §§ 1—5.*

§ 1 (12—16) Comp. III. 4. 8 n. (477) for the distinction in education. SUSEM. (891)

13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see *Crit. n.*) Dr Jackson argues in the following note: 'Aristotle here contrasts (a) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (b) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἴναι* might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might

be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled"; or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, "the same persons rule and are ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses. Susemihl however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἴναι* bears the *latter* of the two meanings above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the *former* of those meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in *both* places in the *former* of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.'

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Susemihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: "vitium inde ortum esse videtur, quod deinde pro *τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχηγένους ἑτέρους εἴναι* διὰ βίου potius dicitur alēi *τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχεῖν τοὺς δὲ ἀρχεῖσθαι καθάπτας* (v. 22 sq.) et pro *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἴναι* accuratius *τάντας ὥριως κοινωνεῖν τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι* (v. 26 sq.)" Qu. crit. coll. p. 412. Where the reasons on each side are so equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates no more than *non liquet*.

§ 2 κατὰ τὴν διαιρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἶησαν τοσοῦτον (XIII)
διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἀλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς
ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολὴν, εἴτα κατὰ
τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν
ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι
βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχεῖν τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι
§ 3 καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν 2
Ίνδοις φησι Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέ-
25 ροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας
ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὄμοιός κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν
καὶ ἀρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἵστον * * ταύτον τοῖς ὄμοιοις, καὶ
χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ
§ 4 δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν
30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν τοσοῦτον τε εἶναι

23 ὥσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἀρχεσθαι
? Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] or 27 [καὶ ἀρχεσθαι], or else ἀρχεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος
ἀρχεῖν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἵστον <τῷ δίκαιῳ> Thurot, ἵστον
<καὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ> Susem. from Dübner's translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι
transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thurot || 30 βουλόμενων Vettori (in
his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ ?Spengel

16 κατὰ= in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι *Meta.* I. 6. 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz *ad loc.* Eucken p. 43. This construction with δικλούσθειν is less frequent than the dative. But cp. *N. E.* II. I. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ γάρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς δικλούσθοσιν αἱ ἔξεις, VII. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καθ' ὀμοιότητα ἡκολοθηκεν, *Hist. Animal.* VIII. 2. 13, 590 a 16, ἀδικούσθοισιν οἱ βίοι κατὰ ταῦτα τὰς διαφορές, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13 (*Ind. Ar.* 36 a 36 has, what is rare, a double misprint, l. 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. I. 5. 10, 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). SUSEM. (892) Strikingly similar to Pl. *Politicus* 301 D, εἰ: ρῦ δέ γε ὅπότε οὐκ ἴστοι γιγνόμενος, ὃς δὴ φαμεν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν συγ-
νεσιν ἐψήσεται, τό τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρων εἰς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας ξυγγράμ-
ματα γράφειν.

22 βέλτιον δὲ κτλ] This has been affirmed II. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the basis of the argument for Absolute Monarchy III. 13. 13. See nn. (601, 678).

§ 3 Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the mouth of the Indus, Herod. IV. 44. We may conclude with certainty from this passage that he published an account of his

expedition in a book of travels. But the geographical work, which has come down to us bearing the name of Scylax, Περιπλοὺς τῶν ἐρτότων τῶν Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν, is of much later date. SUSEM. (893)

Comp. Niebuhr in *Phil. Museum* I. 245.

24 τοὺς βασιλέας κτλ] Cp. VI(IV). 4. 4, n. (1165). In Ethiopia the kings were chosen for their stature. SUSEM. (894)

27 τό τε γὰρ ἵστον <καὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ> ταύτον] Where all the citizens are peers, equality is the same thing as justice. See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (895)

Equality=τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From VIII(V). I. 11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἵστον which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἵστον which is ταῦτο.

28 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν.....

32 ἶστιν] This passage condenses the results of the inquiry into the stability and instability of governments in B. VIII(V) and VI(IV), especially recognising the criterion of VIII(V). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff., and VI(IV). 12. 1, 1326 b 14 ff. ὅπως κρέπτον ἴσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν. See n. (1307).

(XIII)

τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ' εἶναι κρείττους τού·^(p. 119)
 τῶν πάντων, ἐν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι 3
 γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβή-
 34 τητον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δεῖ σκέψα-
 35 σθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ
 φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαιρέσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τῷ γένει
 37 ταῦτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὃν τοὺς μὲν ἄρ-
 χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν. ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδεὶς καθ'
 38 ἥλικιαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἀλλως τε
 40 καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχῃ
 39 τῆς ἴκνουμένης ἥλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν
 41 καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. ὁστε καὶ τὴν
 1333 a παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέραν
 42 εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασι
 δεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἄρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρη-
 43 ται λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.
 44 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν

31 τούτων after 32 πάντων P¹⁻⁵ II² Bk. || 36 διαιρεσιν Ar., αἱρεσιν Γ II Bk., cp.
 1333 a 33 || αὐτῷ inserted by Ald. W^b Bk., αὐτῷ M^a and Γ after τῷ, αὐτῷ P²⁻³⁻⁴⁻⁵
 S^b V^b L^a, τῶν αὐτῶν Bas.³, τῷ Spengel, omitted by P¹ Ar. || τῶν Ald. W^b ||
 37 ταῦτὸ Bk., ταῦτῷ M^a and P¹ (1st hand, emended by corr.¹), cosdem Ar., un-
 translated by William, omitted by Bas.³ || τὸ—τῷ] τοτὲ—τοτὲ M^a P¹ || 39 οὐδ'
 εἰ νομίζει Sepulveda, οὐδ' εἰ νομίζει Koraes, not badly || 40 τὸν τοιοῦτον] τοῦτον
 τῷ P² P^b Bk., perhaps right, eundem Ar.

1333 a 1 ἔστω] ἔστι μὲν Bk.³

§ 5 35 εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον] c. 9 §§ 4—6: see n. (812). SUSEM. (896)

41 ἴκνουμένης=προσγκούσῃ Bon. Ind. Ar. s. v. Found with ὡρα Probl. XX. 14, 924 b 14; with έξει, ἐπιστήμη Pol. VI(IV). 1. 2, 1280 b 16.

Education to be in one sense the same for all; in another sense a different education for rulers and ruled: §§ 6—8.

§ 6 1333 a 1 ἔστιν ὡς κτλ.] The education is the same and yet different in so far as it has two different sides; it trains the governed to obey well, but only in so far as this would seem to teach them how to govern well in the future: thus so far it really teaches the future governors. Comp. Bonitz in *Zettsch. f. d. östr. Gymn.* XVIII. 1867, p. 680 f. SUSEM. (897)

2 τὸν τε γὰρ] With this whole passage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1277 a 25 n.

(490). This is one of the few instances in which *τε γὰρ*=*etenim*, as is allowed by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian usage of *τε γὰρ* generally in the paper just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 680. SUSEM. (898)

English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Dem. *De Falsa Leg.* § 176. He cites Herod. IV. 167, Aristoph. *Pax* 402, Ar. *Rhet.* III. 7. 11, 1408 b 17, and III. 11. 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates the similar usage of *οὐτε γάρ*.

3 ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται λόγοις] I.e. III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1278 b 30 ff. It is noteworthy that reference is only made to this passage, and not to the much more similar one quoted in n. (898). However, some such reference may have been lost, where the following context is defective. See n. (900); also n. (902). SUSEM. (899)

έλευθέρων. * * διαφέρει δ' ἔντα τῶν ἐπιταπομένων οὐ τοῖς ἕρ-⁵
γοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἔνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἰναι δοκούντων δια-
κονικῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακο-
νεῖν· πρὸς γάρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτως δια-
ιοφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ
§ 8 τίνος ἔνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν
ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν
ἀρχόμενον τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἀρχοντα ὑστερον,
τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα-
15 θοι γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ
τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς.

§ 9 διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' ε-
αὐτό, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δὲ ὑπακούειν δυνά-

6 * διαφέρει Conring, cp. B. III. c. 4 1277 a 29—b 30, and see Comm. n. (900) ||
11 πολιτικοῦ Rassow, πολιτεία M^a, πολίτον Γ P¹⁻⁵ II² Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text,
πολίτου <ἀρίστου> Spengel || αὐτὴν omitted by P⁴⁻⁶ C^a (?) || 13 δεῖ over an
erasure P⁴, δεῖ P⁵ S^b V^b || 14 πῶς Schneider, πῶς <ἄν>? Koraes || 15 γίγνωνται
P⁴⁻⁵ S^b V^b Ald. Bk.¹, γίγνονται P², γίγνονται? Koraes

§ 7 6 Θεούτερων^{**}] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. SUSEM. (900)

6 διαφέρει δ'.....11 τίνος ἔνεκεν] See v(VIII), 2, 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). SUSEM. (901) The end redeems and ennobles apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse.

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1332 a 36. But the last clause τι τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς carries us back further, to 1332 a 7 or the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-

tion; next criticise Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5. πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

12 φαμεν] The present may well stand here also (see nn. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense; if so there is certainly a reference to III. 4 § 5. Comp. n. (471). SUSEM. (902)

14 τοῦτ' ἀνέη....16 [ζωῆς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φρόνησις has been clearly proved in III. 4-17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also v(VIII), 2, 1 n. (977), also n. (1024) and Exc. 1. to B. v(VIII). Also Introd. p. 48, p. 50 ff. SUSEM. (903)

Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the properly rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence: §§ 9—14. Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which make success in war the goal of education: §§ 15—22.

§ 9 17 διήρηται δὲ κτλ] See n. (40) on l. 3, 6. SUSEM. (904)

μενον. ὡν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἄσ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς λέγε- (XIII)
το ταὶ πώς. τούτων δὲ ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτως
§ 10 διαιροῦσιν ως ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἀδηλον πῶς λεκτέον. ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ
χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίους ἔστιν ἔνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερὸν ὄμοιως ἐν (p. 120)
τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον
ἔχον. [διήρηται τε διχῇ, καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι-
25 ρειν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικός ἔστι λόγος ὃ δὲ θεωρητικός.
§ 11 ὥστατως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διηρήσθαι δηλον-
ότι.] καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς
τοῦ φύσει βελτίους αἱρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-
29 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἱρε-
§ 12 τώτατον οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ
31 βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρή-
νην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρή-
§ 13 σιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλά. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν
αἱρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-

20 πότερα M^a, qua William || 24 [διήρηται...27 δηλονότι] Susem. || τε] δὲ Γ ||
διχῇ <ἢ λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation || 26 οὐρ] δ' Ρ¹ || καὶ τοῦτο
τὸ μέρος after διηρήσθαι Ρ¹⁻⁵ ΙΙ² Bk. || δῆλον διτι Bk., omitted by Ald. W^b, while Ar.
translates it after πράξεις: δῆλον <δέ> διτι Sylburg, <καὶ> δῆλον διτι Spengel. Both
Sylburg and Spengel omit 27 δέ, which neither William nor Ar. translates || 29 ἢ
πασῶν ἢ <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Ed. Müller (*Gesch. der Kunsththeorie* II. p. 370), ἢ πασῶν ἢ
τῶν δυοῖν Lindau, [ἢ] πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν Ridgeway, [ἢ] πασῶν [ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν] or else
[ἢ πασῶν ἢ] <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Susem.: Schmidt however conjectures that ων ἢ
βούλησται has been dropped after δυοῖν || 31 [καὶ] πόλεμον Reiz || 32 [εἰς τὰ] and
33 [εἰς τὰ] Bonitz Ind. Ar. 42 b 26 ff., 632 a 29 f.: see however Vahlen *Ztschr. f. d.*
östr. Gym. 1872 p. 540 || 33 [περὶ] and 34 διαιρεσιν Schneider, wrongly

§ 10 24 διήρηται] Sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχον.
The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλον-
ότι is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see
n. (40); and it would be quite appropriate
to raise here the further questions: In regard
to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or
the practical side that occupies the higher
place? Is it the intellectual develop-
ment of the former, or rather the cultiva-
tion of practical and political insight,
which is the chief and final aim of
Education? Yet these questions are not raised
anywhere in the context and so the
passage serves no useful purpose. What is
worse, it interrupts the connexion in the
most confusing manner: it must therefore
be pronounced an interpolation by an
alien hand. SUSEM. (906)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις] Cp. nn.
(712, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c. 2 § 1, § 6,
c. 3 § 1, § 3, § 8. SUSEM. (906)

29 τοῖν δυοῖν] The relation is ex-
pressed 1331 b 29, τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φε-
ρόστας πράξεις.

30 οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου] The
highest within his reach, how determined
is not explained. Cp. i. 1. 1.

§ 12 30 διήρηται δέ] As e.g. i. 5.
10, 1254 b 31. There is an echo of this
division in Plut. *De lib. educand.* c. 13,
96 C πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς διεστιν καὶ σπουδὴν
διήρηται (Newman).

32 τῶν πρακτῶν] Cp. 1332 a 10.
With χρήσιμα comp. the utilitarian con-
ception of a civic virtue as in Plato's
Phaedo, *Protag.*, *Republic* and Mr Archer
Hind's *Phaedo*, Appendix I.

§ 13 34 αἱρεσιν] The correlation of
αἱρετάτατον a 28; so a 41, τὰς τῶν πραγ-
μάτων αἱρέσεις = the choice of one action
in preference to another. The estimate
of value is the ground of preference. At

35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχο- (XIII)
λῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκεν.
πρὸς πάντα μὲν τούνυν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετητέον, ^ο
καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
§ 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν
40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-
των αἱρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γάρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-
1333 b λεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τά-
ναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ
μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τούτους τοὺς σκοπούς καὶ παιδας ἔτι
4 ὅντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παι-
§ 15 δεῖς. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἐλ- 10
6 λήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὕτε πρὸς τὸ βελτιστὸν τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-
τες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν
10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.
§ 16 παραπλησίώς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῷν ὑστερόν τινες γραψάντων

40 πρακτῶν? Susem. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense || 41 αἱ-
ρέσεις Korae (cp. a 34), διαιρέσεις (δὲ αἱρέσεις P⁴) Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text ||
μὲν omitted by Γ P⁵, hence [μὲν] Susem.¹

1333 b 2 δὲ before πράττειν added by Π² Bk., before καὶ P⁵, δὲ? Stahr || 7 βελ-
τιον Π² P⁵ Bk., possibly right, βελτιον <καὶ τὸ>? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted
by Π¹

a later time αἱρέσθαι, φεύγειν are technical Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. VII. 105.

35 πόλεμον] sc. αἱρετὸν εἶναι or αἱ-
ρέσθαι δὲ.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς] Comp. N. E. X. 7. 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato *Laws* I. 628 D (Eaton), and with the former passage n. (921) below. SUSEM. (907)

37 βλέποντι] Goes with πρὸς πάντα: an instance of hyperbaton.

39 τῷδη] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοπούς.

8 14 1333 b 1 μᾶλλον δὲ εἰρήνην δγειν] Cp. again Plato *Laws* I. 618 D, ὥσταίτως τις οὗτ' ἄγ ποτε πολιτικὸν γένοντι δρόβιον πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μάνων ἡ πρώτων, οὗτ' ἀν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSEM. (908)

4 τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας] What these are, is plain from 1260 b 15 f., 1277 a 16 — 20. See further n. (1024) on V(VIII).

5. 4, 1339 a 29 f.

§ 15 5 οἱ δὲ νῦν] Cp. II. I. 4, n.

(128 b). SUSEM. (909) The plural notwithstanding, it would seem as if Sparta and Lycurgus alone were meant.

7 οὕτε πρὸς τὸ βελτιστὸν] A familiar criticism. Cp. II. 9. 34 n. (344 ff.), IV (VII). 2. 9 n. (719), V(VIII). 4 §§ 1—7, n. (1005). SUSEM. (910) Add Isocr. IV. (*Panegyric*) 187, 188, 228 (Newman). With συντάξαντες comp. 1324 b 8, and 1271 b 2 (σύνταξις).

9 φορτικῶς] In a purely utilitarian, almost mercenary spirit.

§ 16 II καὶ τῷν ὑστερόν τινες γρ.] Comp. VI(IV). 1 § 3 with n. (1123) and *Introd.* p. 20 n. 1. Here we again clearly perceive how slight is our knowledge of such political literature before Aristotle. It is highly probable that among the writers here alluded to were those too who were the first to set up the theory of a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, nn. (219—221) and B. III. Exc. I. p. 449, since it was in the Spartan and Cretan constitutions that they found the realiza-

ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γάρ τὴν Λακε- (XIII)
δαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἀγανται τὸν νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι (p. 121)
πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἀν
§ 15 καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἔστιν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἔξε-
§ 17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γάρ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζη-
λοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὴ χορηγία γίνεται

14 ἐνόμοθέτησαν ΓΜ^a || 16 νῦν omitted by Π¹, [νῦν] Susem.¹ || ξητοῦσι
Samot Bk.², certainly right || 17 τὸ] τῶν Π³ Ρ⁹ Bk. || πολλῇ ΓΜ^a || γίνεται
ΓΜ^a, γίνεται Π² Ρ⁸ Bk.¹

tion of their ideal, 1265 b 33 with *n.* (219). Thimbron, or Thibron, according to another reading, is quite unknown to us. There can scarcely be a doubt that Aristotle was also thinking of the work on the Lacedaemonian constitution which bears the name of Xenophon. At any rate its author, i. e. f., makes the happiness which the Lacedaemonian citizens attained by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of their small number, they had proved themselves the most powerful and celebrated state in Greece; and Aristotle's next remarks sound exactly like a polemic against the opening words of this little work: ἀλλ' ἔγώ ἐννοήσας ποτὲ ὡς ή Σπάρτη τῶν ὀλεγανθρωποτάτων πλειστά σύστατη τε καὶ δυναστοτάτη ἐν τῷ Ἑλλάδι ἑφάντη, ἐθάμαστα διφερόντες τὸν ἑγένετο ἐπειδὴ μέντοι κατενόησα τὰ ἐπιτρέψατα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐκέτι ἐθάμασον. The suggestion would therefore be natural enough that Thimbron, and not Xenophon, was the real author; but the true authorship of Xenophon has been lately demonstrated with such certainty by Naumann *De Xenophontis libro qui Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία inscribitur* (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible to adduce any tenable argument against it. Oncken's suggestion, too, *op. c. II. p. 179*, that Xenophon wrote it under the assumed name of Thimbron, is just as unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (*Philologus* XXXIII. p. 97) that he wrote the first part of the *Hellenica* under the name of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses themselves depend on an hypothesis, the falsity of which has been demonstrated by Nitsche (after Morus) in a dissertation *Über die Abfassung von X. Hellenika* (Berlin 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypothesis, unquestionably dating from ancient times, that, according to his own statement, *Hell.* III. 1, 2, Xenophon published his *Anabasis* under the name of Themisto-

genes of Syracuse. But the right interpretation of the passage in question is that Themistogenes also wrote an *Anabasis*, to which Xenophon refers because his own was not written at the time. Moreover there is no ground for the supposition that Xenophon ever published any of his works under an assumed name. Thimbron or Thibron is a well-known Laconian name, and the one alluded to here by Aristotle was doubtless a Laconian by birth, and this may have been the reason why Aristotle cites him by name, without mentioning Xenophon. SUSEM. (911)

v. Wilamowitz identifies the author Thimbron with the Spartan who commanded in Asia Minor 399 B.C. (*Xen. Anab.* VII. 6. 1, 8. 24, *Hell.* III. 1. 4, IV. 8. 17). His words are; "Next there appeared on the scene a champion of Oligarchy, Thibron, an ambiguous character and incompetent official, but one of the ruling caste: he wrote in glorification of Lycurgus. Well might Agesilaos request his literary agent, Xenophon, to draw up a new version of the story" of Sparta, "just as he had entrusted him with the task of justifying before public opinion the period from 404 to 388.... The foundation for the common traditional view of Sparta was laid in the half century 403—350: its author was probably Dieuchidas of Megara" (*Homerische Untersuchungen* p. 273 f.). He conjectures in a note that possibly Plato's strange authority for Sparta in the *Laws* [B. III. esp. 683—693] was Thibron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν] Conquest, 'to win victory,' as § 19, b 30, 1271 b 3. We find ourselves in the midst of a discussion similar to that of c. 2 § 8 ff.

15 καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἔξεληλεγκται νῦν] Comp. II. 9 § 16 n. (308), § 34 n. (345); and *n.* (919). SUSEM. (912)

§ 17 17 πολλὴ χορηγία] As in II. 9 § 35, γίνεσθαι τάχα τὰ περιμάχητα δε' ἀρετῆς.

τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίμβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται (XIII)
τὸν τῶν Λακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστος τῶν
γραφόντων περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι
§ 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἥρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ τε
ιῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐδαί-
μονες, οὐδὲ ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ
μένουστες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος
πρὸς τὸ χρήσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-
§ 19 λῶς. οὐκ ὄρθως δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦν
δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γάρ δεσποτικῶς
ἀρχειν ἡ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'
ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμόνα νομί-
§ 20 ζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἥσκησεν ἐπὶ
τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν. ταῦτα γάρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
§ 20 δῆλον γάρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πει-
ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν.
ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Παυσανίᾳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, καὶ
§ 25 περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμὴν. οὔτε δὴ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-
των νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὀφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθῆς ἔστιν.

18 Θίμβρων ΙΙ³ Ρ⁵ Αρ. Bk. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Bk.² || γεγυμνάσθαι M^o P¹ ||
21 ἐπειδὴ γε νῦν M^o P¹ || 23 ἔστι δὲ Congreve, ἔστι γάρ Susem. || 26 δὲ M^o,
omitted by P⁴ S^b V^b L^c || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reiz, καρτερεῖν? Congreve, perhaps rightly
|| ἵσχεται Γ^{P²}, ἵσχεται M^o || 31 τῷ] τῷ Scaliger Bk.² || 36 λόγων (omitted by
P⁴) καὶ νόμων ΙΙ² Ρ⁶ Αρ. (?) and Bk.

18 Θίμβρων] See n. (911).

19 τῶν ἀλλῶν] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephorus n. (219); and perhaps Critias.

20 γεγυμνάσθαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen: see Schömann *op. c.* E. tr. p. 255 ff.

§ 18 21 δῆλον] That is, on their own premisses such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of *post hoc propter hoc*.

23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 14, [Plut.] *Inst. Lac.* c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch's authority for the 'Life of Agis' adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the

credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle's criticism in B. II. and in the *Politics*. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epitadeus and degenerate Spartans: (b) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Crypteia, or the treatment of the Helots: and (c) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τοῦ γάρ δεσποτικῶς κτλ.] Comp. I. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); IV(VII). c. 3 § 2 n. (734). SUSEM. (913)

§ 20 32 δῆλον γάρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. SUSEM. (914)

34 On Pausanias see VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 n.n. (1498, 1596). SUSEM. (915)

35 πολιτικός] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθετικός stands to νομοθέτης.

§ 21 ταῦτὰ γάρ ἀριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, τόν <τε> νομοθέτην (XIII) ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν ¹⁴ πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-⁴⁰ δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρώτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ δουλεύσωσιν ἑτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ^{1334 a} ὀφελείας ἔνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-¹⁵ τείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ ¹⁵

§ 22 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν (p. 122) ⁵ ἔνεκεν τάξη καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. αἱ γάρ πλεῖσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σφόδρα, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται. τὴν γάρ βαφὴν ἀνιᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σιδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγον-¹⁰ τες. αἴτιος δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχο-¹⁰ λάξειν.

15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ¹⁶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπερέχειν· τέλος γάρ,

37 ταῦτα P^{2,3,5} L³ V^b Ar., ταῦτα the other authorities, τὰ Spengel || ἕδια P⁹ Ald. || τὸν <τε> Thurot Susem.^{2,3}, <καὶ> τὸν Congreve || 38 ταῦτα omitted by P^{4,6} L³, [ταῦτα] Bk.² || ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν twice over in Π¹ || 39 πολεμίων ΓΜ² || 41 δουλεύσων P^{4,5} S^b V^b || ἤηλάσι Γ

1334 a 1 πάτωτα? Oncken || 2 τρίτον] τοῦτο Joh. Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* xi. p. 596), not rightly || τῷ τῷ Vettori, τὸν Koraes || 3 ὅπως...4 σχολάζειν omitted by ΓΜ² || 5 τάξει Π¹ (1st hand) and probably Γ (ordinis William), τέκη M² || 8 ἀφίσισιν Π² P⁶ Bk., perhaps rightly || 11 δῆ? Susem., yet δὲ is also tenable || 14 ὑπερέχειν Susem., ὑπάρχειν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹

§ 21 37 τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην] Cp. n. (296) on II. 9. 12. SUSEM. (916)

40 ἵνα followed by δῆτος. See P. Weber *Absichtssätze* p. 20, who quotes 1267 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1320 b 11.

41 ἔπειτα δῆτος ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγ.] This is a curious admission, which proves that Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his ideal state without external dominion, but rather as at the head of a group of allies, whom it has conquered in war, and protects, but also to some extent rules; like Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this dominion ought to be generously exercised, so that it may be of even greater service to the governed than to the governing states. Cp. also *Introd.* p. 55. SUSEM. (917)

1334 a 1 τρίτον δὲ κτλ] Comp. 1. 8.

12, 1286 b 23, with notes; also nn. (54, 75, 728) and 1. 7. 5, 1255 b 37, n. (65). SUSEM. (918)

§ 22 5 τὰ γινόμενα] So 1. 5. 1, 1254 a 21 ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν.

A fuller phrase 1328 a 20, see n.

6 Ephorus apud Strabonem IX. p. 614: καθάπερ Ἐπαμεινῶντας ἔδειξε τελευτήσαντος γάρ ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τὸν Θηβαῖον, γενσαρέ-¹¹ νος αὐτῆς μόνον αἴτιος δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγον καὶ ὅμιλος διεγωρῆσαι, μόνης δὲ ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῇ, F. H. G. I. 125 (Newman).

9 αἴτιος δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης] Cp. again II. 9. 34, with n. (345). SUSEM. (919)

c. 15 Preminence of the virtues of peace, though all virtues are alike indispensable: §§ 1—6.

15 ὥσπερ είρηται πολλάκις, είρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολὴ δ' (XIII)
 § 2 ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσὶ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 17
 καὶ διαγωγῆν, ὃν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὃν ἐν τῇ
 ἀσχολίᾳ δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως
 ἐξη σχολάζειν· διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἴναι προσήκει
 20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικήν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ
 σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως
 § 3 δούλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσὶν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 25
 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν,
 σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-
 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον είρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· οὐ μὲν

19 ἐξη ΓΜ¹, perhaps Γ had σχολάζης || [σώφρονα] Susem.

§ 1 15 είρηται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. SUSEM. (920)

§ 2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν καὶ δια-
 γωγῆν] Besides its general meaning
 'mode, or condition, of life' and the
 more special sense, extending beyond the
 necessities of existence, 'refinement of
 life' (*Meta.* I. 1. 15. 981 b 18, I. 2. 11,
 982 b 23), the word διαγωγὴ in Aristotle,
 with or without the attribute θεούθερος
 (cp. v[VIII] 5. 8 with n. 1027) or some
 similar expression, or ἐν τῇ σχολῇ "in a
 condition of leisure" (v[VIII] 3 § 3, § 8,
 cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure
 worthy of a really free man, such as he
 attains when his political duties have
 been performed, or such as he always
 possesses, provided he is peculiarly inde-
 pendent, and leads a life of true study or
 contemplation. The occupation of such
 leisure, i.e. in other words (see *Nic.* *Eth.*
 x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. nn. 907, 548, and
 922) the highest degree of human happi-
 ness and satisfaction, is however activity:
 according to Aristotle, the highest ac-
 tivity there is. It consists in the study
 of all branches of knowledge and the
 contemplation of all works of art: it
 confers the highest intellectual enjoyment
 and most nearly approaches to the divine
 blessedness, *Metaph.* XII (A). 7 § 7,
 1071 b 14 f. and above nn. (702, 728).
 From this meaning of 'the highest intel-
 lectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes
 descends to the more commonplace one
 of mere occupation and especially 'social
 occupation or intercourse': *N.E.* IX. 11.
 5, 1171 b 13, *Fragm.* 90, 1492 a 28; cp.
 also e.g. *Pol.* v[VIII]. 2 § 9 with n. (995).
 Then it is used in the plural for societies
 whose object is such intercourse, especi-

ally refined intellectual culture (III. 9.
 13, 1280 b 37, where it might be trans-
 lated "social clubs," cp. n. 558 and
 v[VIII]. 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even
 for regular feasts, gambling and drinking
 parties: *Nic.* *Eth.* x. 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b
 12 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word
 becomes identified with the amusement,
 sport, or pastime, undertaken for re-
 creation (cp. *Nic.* *Eth.* IV. 8 § 1, 1127 b
 33 f.); though in the former and stricter
 interpretation, the two are sharply dis-
 tinguished: v[VIII]. c. 3 §§ 3–8, c. 5 § 1
 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. nn. (993,
 995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036,
 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially Exc.
 v. on B. v[VIII]. See also Schwegler
 ad Arist. *Meta.* Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz,
 Arist. *Meta.* II. p. 45, *Ind. Ar.* 178 a
 26 ff., and especially Zeller² II. ii. p.
 734 f. n. (5). SUSEM. (921) In short,
 a term which may stand for any employ-
 ment of leisure, even on vulgar amuse-
 ments, receives a special application to
 (1) elevated intellectual enjoyments (1339
 a 25); in particular (2) those of philo-
 sophy and art, including music.

20 οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις] Comp. n.
 (548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly
 need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle's
 sense of the word, as explained n. (921),
 is something quite different from recrea-
 tion. SUSEM. (922)

§ 3 23 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*
 s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investi-
 gatio,' as in III. 12. 2, 1282 b 23, or
Phys. I. 2. 5, 183 a 20: and hence ex-
 plains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

25 ὁ μὲν γάρ κτλ.] Comp. Thuc. III.
 82. 2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ἤφεδων τὴν εἰπο-
 πλαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ

γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαιούς εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ή δὲ (XIII)
 τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης
 § 4 οὐβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ¹⁹
 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ
 30 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινες
 εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μᾶλιστα
 γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δι-
 καιοσύνης, ὅσφι μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιού-
 35 τῶν ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν
 καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέ-
 χειν, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ οὗτος μὴ δύνασθαι ^(p. 123)
 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἕτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆ-
 38 σθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθούς,
 § 6 εἰρήνην δ' ἀγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις. διὸ δεῖ ²⁰

28 δεῖ] δέονται (δέ over an erasure), 29 δοκοῦντες P^o, *indigent qui videntur—frui* William || 29 σωφροσύνης <μετέχειν> Koraes, more satisfactory, if any change is needed || 37 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς omitted by P^o (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), τοῖς...χρῆσθαι omitted by M^o, ἔτι...χρῆσθαι omitted by II^o Ar. || τὸ] τῷ P^o (1st hand), omitted by P^o Bk., <αἰσχρὸν> τῷ Koraes, perhaps rightly

πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὄργας τῶν πολλῶν
 ὄμοιοι (Eaton). SUSEM. (923)

26 ή δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας] Comp. Thuc. III. 29. 4, VIII. 24. 4, Plato *Laws* VII 814 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (924)

§ 4 29 δοκοῦντας] Porson discusses this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on *Orestes* 659. It is not confined to Euripides amongst Attic writers (Valckenenaer on *Hippol.* 23); see Aesch. *P. V.* 86, and the comic fragment apud Herodianum Pierson, p. 450, *εὐρυχωρίας σε δεῖ*, as cited by Porson.

31 οἱ ποιηταί] First in the *Odyssey* IV. 561 ff., next the author of the episode on the ages of the world in Hesiod's *Works and Days* 167 ff., then Pindar *Olymp.* II. 60 ff. and others. The Isles of the Blest, or Elysium, are placed at the remotest ends of the earth: it is the land of privileged heroes who do not die but are taken alive from the earth: here, 'where falls not hail or rain or any snow,' where gentle breezes are ever blowing, they spend a most blessed life in undisturbed enjoyment of all good under the sway of Kronos or Rhadamanthus. See Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 635 ff.; cp. pp. 53, 69. SUSEM. (925)

μᾶλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι κτλ.] This is the moral of Plato's fine myth respecting the

children of Kronos, *Politicus* 272 A—D. Though it is not there stated that the advantages of the golden age failed to confer greater happiness, there can be little doubt that this is Plato's meaning. Several expressions of the *Politicus*, παρόσσῃς αὐτοῖς οὕτω πολλῆς σχολῆς...κατεχρῶντο τούτοις ἔνμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν...ἔμπιμπλάμενοι στιῶν ἄδην καὶ ποτῶν 272 B, C, seem to find an echo here.

32 φιλοσοφίας] Culture, cp. II. 5. 15, 1264 a 40. Intellectual aptitude, a habit of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation in leisure and save the citizens from rusting. Liberal and refined pursuits such as music, literature, philosophy in the restricted sense, must in leisure hours replace the active business of life, τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα.

33 σχολάζουσιν] This conception of a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from work and recreation, as the ideal life (cp. 1337 b 30), which only 'philosophy' can train us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1267 a 11), is of primary importance for the discussions in Book V(VIII). See esp. V(VIII). c. 3 §§ 4—8 with notes.

34 39 ἀνδραποδώδεις] This term 'slavish' means to Aristotle 'sunk like beasts in low sensual enjoyments.' Plato traces out exactly the same line of thought,

40 μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖ—(XIII)

νοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτη διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν

^{1334 b} ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι
ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπεὶ δὲ μεῖζω τε ἀγαθὰ
ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόδλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν * * .

<ὅτι μὲν οὖν * * τὴν ἀρετήν,> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν, φανε-
σὶ ρὸν ἐκ τούτων πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.

§ 7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους εἰ-
καὶ λόγου δεῖ τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τίνας εἶναι χρὴ τὴν

^{1334 b 1} γίνεσθαι Schneider Bk.², γένεσθαι P⁴, γενέσθαι the other authorities Bk.¹
Susem.¹ in the text || 2 ἐπει] ἐπει Welldon, who punctuates with a full stop at 3 ἀρε-
τῶν, ignoring the lacuna || τε] τὰ P¹⁻⁵ || 3 ἡ (omitted by M¹) || τὰ τοῦ (τοῦ
omitted by M¹) πολέμου added by Γ M¹ P⁵ before ταῦτα contrary to the sense, τὰ πολε-
μικά, a similar addition, is presented as a gloss by p² || τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι] Camera-
rius first saw that the text was defective. Thurot placed the lacuna after, and Spen-
gel before, the words τῶν ἀρετῶν, supplying it conjecturally as follows: τῶν ἀρετῶν
<ὑπολαμβάνοντιν, ἐπέβαντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλαντο δὲ ἀρέαντες. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν κτλ Thurot (cp. II. 9 § 34,
1271 b 3 ff.): τῶν <πολεμικῶν μείζω εἴναι ἀδύκη. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην
χρή ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολὴν> ἀρετῶν καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτῶν, κτλ Spengel; mistak-
ing the sense. Thurot's supplement requires a slight alteration to account for the
loss: hence 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι
κτλ Susem. Welldon supplies <ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετὴν δεῖ ἀσκεῖν> ||
αὐτήν? Congreve || 6 [τυγχάνομεν...12 ἥχθαι] Broughton, thinking it to be
an interpolation by the author of the present redaction || δῆ? Susem.

though in a different manner, in the first two books of the *Laws*. See n. (43) on I. 5. 8. SUSEM. (926)

§ 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέ-
γιστα] Namely the external goods. Compare for the Spartan convictions II. 9. § 24,
1270 b 34, ὅπει μὴ δύνασθαι καρπεῖν ἀλλὰ
λάθρα...ἀπολαβεῖν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,
n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff., νομίζουσι
μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τάγαθα τὰ περιμάχητα δι'
ἀρετῆς κτλ with nn. (346, 346 b, 347).
SUSEM. (927)

2 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς] That is, by means of valour or courage, which is a particular virtue: see II. 9 §§ 34, 35 nn. (344, 347),
esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γάρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ
τάσσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστι, τὴν πολε-
μικήν· αὕτη γάρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κράτεῖν.
Comp. also IV(VII). 1 § 6, κτῶνται καὶ
φιλάπτονται οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἑκτὸς ἄλλ
ἔκεινα ταῦταις, n. (697). SUSEM. (928)

Mr Newman well observes that this correction of the one-sidedness of Lacedae-
monian training tells just as much

against all systems which, like Stoicism
and Puritanism, tend to develop something less than the whole man.

ἐπει δὲ μεῖζω...3 ἀρετῶν] The passage
is defective: we may supplement it from
II. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus: ‘But as they
esteemed these goods higher than the
virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher
than that of the virtues, <they maintained
their state only while at war, and fell
after they had acquired empire.>’ (Thurot.)
SUSEM. (929)

4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Thurot further
suggests as the sense of this opening para-
graph: ‘That virtue must be practised
in leisure also,’ and for its own sake, is
clear from this. SUSEM. (930)

§ 7 6 διηρημένοις πρότερον] The re-
sult of our previous analysis: 13 § 10,
1332 a 39 f. see n. (887) and n. (881) on
c. 13 § 8. SUSEM. (931)

7 τούτων] The citizens of the best
state (Susemīhl): cp. b 8 παιδευτέοι, § 5,
a 34, § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.

φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πότερον παὶ (XIII)
 δευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἡ τοῦς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ
 10 πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχε-
 ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
 8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως ἤχθαι φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτο 22
 γε πρῶτον μέν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ'
 ἀρχῆς ἐστι καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ
 15 δὲ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς
 τούτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔθων δεῖ παρασκευάζειν
 8 μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύ' ἐστίν, οὕτω 23
 καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄρῳμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ
 λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἔξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν,
 20 ὅν τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὅρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα

8 παιδευταῖς Μ^a, παιδευτοῖς Ρ^a || 9 πρότερον omitted by Π³ Ρ³ || 10 ἀρίστην.
 <ἢ τοῖς θέσεις; > ? Jackson || 11 καὶ omitted by Ρ², [καὶ] Koraes Bk.⁹; Koraes also
 suggested its transposition to follow τὸν λόγον || 12 ἔθων omitted by Π¹ (supplied
 in the margin of Π¹ with γρ. prefixed), ὁμοίως Ρ³ Β^b and in the margin of Π¹
 with γρ. prefixed, ὁμοίως Ατ., ὁμοίως Π¹⁻² || διὰ...ἤχθαι] τὴν διὰ τῶν ἔθων ὁμοίως
 ἀγωγὴν? Schneider || 14 ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῆ> François Thurot, perhaps rightly, but (as
 Postgate observes) even this slight change is hardly needed || [τέλος] and ἀλλ' οὐ
 C. Thurot, ἄλλο τελούσ <ης> Spengel

8 Βιώρισται πρότερον] In c. 7. SUSEM. (932)

9 τῷ λόγῳ κτλ.] Parallel to c. 13 §§ 12, 13, and to the more general dis-
 cussion of *Nic. Eth. x. 9 §§ 1—12* (c. 10 Bk., 1179 a 33 ff.).

11 διημαρτηκέναι τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
 θέσεως] To miss the truest (highest) con-
 ception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13
 § 2. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may
 be led astray by habit as well as by rea-
 son. With ἤχθαι = drawn cp. *N. E. 1. 4.*
6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὁμοίως is vir-
 tually, ‘amiss.’ Göttling is quite wrong
 in rendering ‘eodem perduci moribus
 quo perduxisset ἡ βελτίστη ὑπόθεσις.’

8 8 12—15] Mr Newman thinks much
 light is thrown on this difficult passage by
De Part. Animal. II. 1, 6, 646 a 30 ff.
 πᾶν γὰρ τὸ γνόμενον ἐκ τίνος καὶ εἰς τι
 ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπ'
 ἀρχῆς, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινούσης καὶ ἔχο-
 σης ἡδὸν τινὰ φύους ἐπὶ τινὰ μορφὴν ἢ τοι-
 ούτοις ἄλλο τέλος.

13 ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] The sense
 of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n.
 (937): ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὄραν δεῖ
 ὅπως κτλ. “Obviously birth is the first
 or earliest thing which demands our care,”

i.e. we begin with birth. The next words
 mean ‘the nearest or proximate end from
 any starting-point’—understanding ἐστὶ¹
 with the gen. ἀλλού τέλους, ‘belongs to
 [is referred to] another, or new, end.’
 The proximate end is but a means, sub-
 ordinated to a higher end: *Nic. Eth. 1.*
1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature
 this higher end is intellect and reason.
 SUSEM. (933)

16 τὴν τῶν θῶν μελέτην] Somewhat
 stronger than ἐπιμέλεια, for which cp.
N. E. x. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 (e.g. 1180
 b 23 δὲ ἐπιμελεῖται βελτίστους ποιεῖν).

8 9 18 δύο μέρη κτλ.] See c. 14
 § 9, 1333 a 17, n. (904), and esp. n. (40)
 on l. 5. 6. SUSEM. (934)

20 τὸ μέν ἐστιν ὅρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς] In
 English, as in German, it is not easy to
 find two terms, mutually related as ὅρεξις
 and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in ge-
 neral, is the meaning of ὅρεξις [Hamilton's
 connotation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes sense-desire,
 or appetite, in particular. This explains
 why ὅρεξις alone denotes ‘the motive force
 of the irrational soul’ (as I should trans-
 late ἕξις; characteristic possession, or at-
 tribute, is not strong enough), while
 within the soul θυμός, passion—see nn.

πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐτως καὶ τὸ ἀλογον τοῦ (XIII)
 § 10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βού-
 λησις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϊούσιν πέφυκεν ἐγ-
 25 γίνεσθαι. διὸ πρώτου μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἡ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπειτα τὴν
 τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἐνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ (p. 22)
 τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

16 εἰπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὄρâν δεῖ ὅπως XIV
 30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρώτου μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by Π³ Ρ⁶ Bk. || 24 πέφυκεν after ἐγγίνεσθαι (ἐγγίγρε-
 σθαι Ρ^{2,3,4}) Π^{1,5} Η² Bk. || 26 τὴν after ἡ omitted by Ρ^{4,5} Σ⁵ Β⁵ L⁵ || 27 τὴν δὲ τοῦ] τοῦ
 δὲ Π¹ || 28 τοῦ σώματος] τοῦ τρίτου Μ⁶ (huius autem eorum quae animae William) ||
 30 τὰ σώματα after βέλτιστα Π² Ρ⁶ Bk. || γίνηται Π² Ρ⁶ Bk.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished : and further, why in I. 5. 6 the term ὀρέξις is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθητικὸν μέρον 'the emotional part,' see note (40). The same trichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in *De Anima* II. 3. 1, 414 b 1, III. 10. 3, 433a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with *De Anima* III. 9. 3, 432 b 4 ff. and *Topica* IV. 5. 6, 126 a 12 f., if the statement τὸ λογιστικῷ ηβούλησις be rightly interpreted, is shown by Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise *De Motu Animal.* c. 6 § 4, 700 b 22, ἀλλὰ μήν ἡ ὀρέξις εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησις καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and *Eud. Eth.* II. 7. 2, 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὀρέξις... ὥστε κινέτη πρώτον τὸ δρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητόν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from *Eud. Eth.* more particularly proves, as ὀρέξις = impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see *N. Eth.* II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and Anger (θυμός) at revenge. See Walter *Die praktische Vernunft* pp. 194—212. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from *De Anima* is that here θυμὸς and βούλησις are again drawn closer together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (*op. c. II. ii.*, p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to θυμός than to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEM. (935)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; next the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρώτον μὲν....27 ὀρέξις] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, *Laws* II. 652 E—653 C. SUSEM. (936)

Add *Republic* 410 B, 563 A, 591 C ff.

c. 16 Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.

§ 1 29 εἰτε οὖν δι' ἀρχῆς κτλ.] The expression is chosen with reference to the words at the beginning of c. 13 § 8, 1334 b 13, and as regards the facts also Aristotle takes up the same thread. Cp. n. (933). But in the further and decisive step, of making education begin not merely before birth but even before conception, Aristotle quite follows Plato's procedure *Laws* IV 721, VI 774—776, 783 D ff., 788 ff. (comp. *Rep.* V 458 E, *Politicus* 310). It is in imitation of the Spartan model: see Xen. *De Rep. Lacædaem.* I. 3 ff., Plut. *Lyc.* 14 (Eaton), SUSEM. (937) Add *Critias*, Fr. 1, F. H. G. II. 68 (Newman).

δεῖ ὅπως] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1320 a 33, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἀληθεῖας δημοτικὸν ὄρâν δτως κτλ.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ πολὸν τινὰς ὄντας (XIV)
χρή ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὄμιλίαν.

§ 2 δεῖ γάρ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταῦτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς
αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς
35 ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-
μεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἡ ταῦτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γάρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-
σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς) ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ²
§ 3 τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γάρ οὕτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι τὰ
40 τέκνα ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γάρ τοῖς μὲν
πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν
1335 a πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς είναι
(πολλὴν γάρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἡ τε γάρ αἰδὼς ἡττον ὑπάρ-
χει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώτας, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν
§ 4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς) ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο
5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχῃ
πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ³
§ 5 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπειδὴ γάρ ὥρισται τέλος
τῆς γενήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν δὲ
τῶν ἀβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς Ισχατος, πεντήκοντα ⁸
10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζέυξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν

32 πρὸς ἀλλήλους omitted by ΓΜ^a, hence [πρὸς ἀλλήλους] Susem.¹ || 33 γάρ
Susem., δ' ΓΠ Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ || <περὶ> ταῦτην Vettori, perhaps rightly || 34
συζῆν P⁴ (corr.) || 37 γάρ omitted by S^b V^b Ar. || 39 τῶν omitted by P^{2,3} ||
λίαν omitted by Π¹ || τὰ τέκνα after 40 ταῖς ἡλικίαις ΗΠ⁵ Bk.

1335 a 2 γάρ after τε omitted by Π¹ || 5 ὑπάρχει Μ^a P⁵ || 6 σχεδὸν...ιι τεῦ-
τος transposed to follow a 27 ἐτι. <ἢ μαρύν> Susem.^{2,3}. See *Introd.* p. 89

32 γαμικὴν] 'Nuptial,' not 'conjugal'; cp. 1. 3. 1, 1253 b 9 n. Or, as Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wedding, not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Eur. *Bacchae* 1277 ἐγένετο | Πένθεις ἐμῇ τε καὶ πατέρων κοινωνίᾳ.

34 συγκαταβαίνωσι] For the vb. κατα-
βαίνειν, § 5, 1335 a 11, see Schw. *Lex.*
Herod. It is used, like ἵκεσθαι (cp. 1332
b 41), for 'to suit': properly 'to meet in.' The compound with σύν=to come simultaneously to an end, so producing a convergence or correspondence.

§ 3 Johnson *Rasselas* c. 29 affords a parallel. "From these early marriages proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents and children: the son is eager to enjoy the world before the father is willing to

forsake it, and there is hardly room at once for two generations.... Those who marry at an advanced age will probably escape the encroachments of their children; but, in diminution of this advantage, they will be likely to leave them, ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's mercy. From their children if they have less to fear they have less also to hope."

41 ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων] The gratitudo due from their children. Cp. Plato *Laws* IV. 717 B, C.

1335 a 1 βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις] Plato *Laws* 717 C εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνων with Stallbaum's note: βοήθεια τῷ λόγῳ *Parm.* 128 C, *Afc.* I. 116 A, τοῖς φίλοις.

4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς] Nearness, i.e. equality in age, produces bickerings, misunderstandings (II. 5. 4).

§ 6 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν-⁴
 12 δυασμὸς φᾶλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῷοις
 ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ
 μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν
 πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέον συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-
 § 7 λεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις
 αἱ νέαι πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους· διὸ (p. 125)
 καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν γενέσθαι τινές φασι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν
 20 τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμί-
 σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-
 25 μιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό-⁵
 σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ δοκοῦσι
 νέαι χρησάμεναι τὰς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων
 25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ

11 ἔστι] *Eti* Susem.¹ in the notes, wrongly || 12 τὴν omitted by II² P⁶ Bk. ||
 13 ἔγγονα II² P⁶ Bk. || θηλυτόκα Camerarius (wrongly), θηλύτερα Koraeis || 14 ταῦτὸ
 τοῦτο II² P⁶ Ar. Bk., *hoc ipsum* William || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει M⁴ and (after a lacuna)
 Pl., ἐπιχωριάζεται II² P⁶ Bk. p¹ (in the margin) and apparently Γ || τὸ τοῦτο M⁴ P⁶ ||
 18 αἱ νέαι] *Eti* Pl., ἀλλως αἱ νέαι p¹ in the margin || πονοῦσι after τε M⁴ P² || 23
 νέαι inserted after γὰρ by II² P⁶ Bk. Susem.² || 25 δὲ omitted by II¹, untranslated
 by Ar., [δὲ] Susem.¹, wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα] This point is not mentioned *Hist. Animal.* v. 12. 1 (v. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. SUSEM. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, *De Gen. Animal.* IV. 2. 1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀκραζόντων, καὶ γηράσκοντα μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οἴσπω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δὲ ἀπολεῖται. Falstaff, *Henry IV.* Part II, Act 5 sc. 3, humorously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμήριον δέ...γὰρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and Bonitz *ib.* 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances, including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. v(viii). 6. 12, 1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. *Phaedo* 57 A. The supposed passive of the Lexx. (see *Crit. n.*) receives its *coup de grâce* from Kaibel, the last editor of Athenaeus, who at XIV. 619 f. reads κατά τινα ἐπιχωριάζουσαν τῷ πάρ' αὐτοῖς....ἔδοντες, with the critical note

"πάρ' αὐτοῖς < ἔστηται > Wilamowitz,
 recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζεσθαι verbum
 medium."

συζευγνύναι] To pair, join in marriage:
 § 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 πονοῦσί τε μᾶλλον] This statement reappears in the spurious B. VII. of *Hist. An.* c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τὸν χρησμὸν] A gloss cites the oracle in the form μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἀλοκα, 'till not the fresh furrow.' Götting proposed to alter νέαν to νέας, thinking there was a play upon νέας which he took to be gen. of a supposed νέα=novale, fallow land [for which νέας, Attic νέος, is the received form]. SUSEM. (939) Comp. Eur. *Phoen.* 18 σπέρειν τέκνων ἀλοκα, Soph. *Oed.* T. 1210 (Ridgeway); also Antig. 569 ἀράσιμοι γὰρ χάτερων εἰσὶν γάρ.

20 διαφθειρομένων] Comp. *Frag.* Λύγου γαμικοῦ of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1022 P., III. 501 Dind. παρθένων φθορὰ λέγεται οὐ μόνον παρεῖλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸ καιροῦ ἐκβοστις, ὅταν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἀπρός ἐκδοσῆ τῷ ἀνδρὶ.

§ 8 24 Comp. Aristoxenus Tarent. Fr. 20, F. H. G. II. 278.

σώματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου (XIV)
 27 τις χρόνος ὡρισμένος, δὲ οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύον ἔτι <ἢ μικρόν.> § 4 a b <σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα, ταῦτα, ταῦτα κατὰ μίαν
 <ἐπιμέλειαν. § 5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὥρισται τέλος 8 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 <πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ 9 τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς
 <ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεῦ τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς συζεύ-
 <ξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τὸν χρόνον καταβαίνειν τούτους. >
 28 § 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν δικτυακίδεκα ἐτῶν ε
 ἡλικίαν συζευγνῦναι, τοὺς δὲ τέπτατε καὶ τριάκοντα[, ἢ μικρόν].
 30 ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται,
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται
 § 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς
 33 μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λό-

26 σώματος Γ Ar. and P² (corr.²), δὲλλως σώματος P¹ (in the margin), σπέρματος
 the other authorities || 27 χρόνος after ὡρισμένος P¹⁻³ P² Bk. || πληθύον Bk.², πληθύον
 M², multum William Ar.

6 δὲ Susem., δῆ Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ || ταῦτα before πάρτα M², untranslated by
 William

29 συζευγνῦναι P¹, συζευχθῆναι M² || ἔξ Ar., ἔπειτα all other authorities: πέντε? Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. n. (940) || [ἢ μικρόν] Sepulveda, transposed by Göttling Susem.^{2,3} to follow 27 ἔτι || 30 τοσούτῳ τούτων P³ P⁵ Ar. and P¹ (corr.¹ in the margin) || ἀκμάζουσι M², ἀκμάζουσά P^{4,5} S⁵ V⁵ || 31 <συγ> καταβήσονται Susem.^{1,2} wrongly following William (*convenient*) || 32 ταῦτα μὲν ἀρχομέναιas Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. II. p. 567 || 33 ἀρχομένης Γ apparently (*inchoante akmes* William) Bk. Susem.^{1,2} and P⁵ (corr.), perhaps rightly || γίγνηται P² Bk.¹, γίγνηται P¹

26 καὶ γὰρ τούτου κτλ] Sc. τοῦ σώματος: bodily growth has fixed limits of time which it does not exceed (or only to a small extent). Comp. note on V(VIII). I. 1, 1337 a 13.

§ 9 28 διὸ τὰς μὲν κτλ] In Rep. v. 460 E. Plato fixes the period for procreation amongst his guardians from twenty to forty in the woman, and from twenty-five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case in the man. His regulations in the *Laws* are not consistent. The marriage of the sons is at one time enjoined when they are between thirty and fifty-five (IV. 721 A, VI. 785 B), at another time when they are between twenty-five and thirty-five at latest (VI. 772 D). Similarly the daughters are to marry before the age of twenty, but while the earlier limit is once fixed at sixteen (VI. 785 B), it is elsewhere raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 D).

In the spurious B. VII. of Aristotle's *Historia Animalium*. cc. 5, 6 there are statements about the limits of age for getting offspring in tolerable agreement with the present passage. The limit is said to be, as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in the woman, with occasional prolongation to seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon (*Oecon.* 7 § 5, cp. 3 § 13) fixes the earlier limit in the wife's case at fifteen. SUSEM. (940)

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgeway, *Transactions* p. 145 f., Dr Jackson *ib.* pp. 116—118.

* Vide quae disserui in Herm. xix. p. 592 sqq.; ubi etiam exposui, cur prorsus recte olim Spengelium v. 29 πέντε pro ἔπειτα postulasse nunc censeam' Quæst. crit. coll. p. 414. The substance of the paper in *Hermes* is given in Exc. II. p. 566. SUSEM.

γον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἥδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλι- (XIV)
 35 κίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτον ὄριθμόν. περὶ μὲν ἡ
 οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται· τοῖς δὲ
 περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶνται καλῶς
 καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην.
 § 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἥδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίαν τά τε
 40 παρὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν
 οἵ τε γὰρ ἰατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσιν ἵκανῶς,
 1335^b καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-
 § 12 τίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δέ τινων τῶν σωμάτων 8
 ὑπαρχόντων μᾶλιστ' <ἀν> ὅφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστή-
 σασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,
 5 τύπῳ δὲ ἵκανὸν <δεῖ> εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν
 χρήσιμος ἔξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν

34 γένησις Reiz Susem.² || [τῆς ἡλικίας] Spengel || 37 δεῖ χρῆσθαι omitted by II² P⁸ Ar. Bk. thus avoiding hiatus || χρᾶσθαι M¹ P¹ || οὗτος ως II² P⁸ Ar. Bk. || ὁτ—καὶ νῦν καλῶ Schmidt || [τέλος χρῆσθαι ωτι] Madvig || 38 ποιεῖσθαι after τὴν συναυλίαν II² P⁸ Bk. || συναυλία Zwinger Bk.² || 39 δὲ Π¹ P⁸ Ar., δι' P³ (1st hand), δῇ other authorities Bk. and P⁸ (later hand) || 41 λέγονται after ἵκανῷ II² P⁸ Bk.

1335 b 3 μᾶλιστ' <ἀν> Koraes Bk.², μᾶλιστα ἀν M¹ (?), μᾶλιστα the other authorities and Bk. || 4 μᾶλλον...τοῦ omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || παιδεῖας Π¹ (corrected by p¹ in the margin) || 5 <δεῖ> Susem., possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτέον || οὔτε γὰρ ἡ omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 6 έξις omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || οὔτε πρὸς εὐεξίαν inserted after εὐεξίαν by Γ M¹ || οὐδὲ Koraes, οὔτε Π || πρὸς omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied

§ 10 34 καταλελυμέντης] On the analogy of καταλύειν πόλεμον, εἰρήνην, βίστον, κατάλυειν συμποσίου, στρατίας, τριήρος (a crew), δῆμον, πολιτεῖα, where 'breaking up,' 'dissolution' are the main ideas, we must render 'in the decline of their powers, or vigour.' So *fracta aetate Vict., aetate iam decrepta* Lambin.

38 χειμῶνος] more exactly, in the month Gamelion (January and February), which derived its name of wedding-month from the custom: Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* vii. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippoc. περὶ ἀφέρων (III. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains "that the spring is the most suitable time." SUSEM. (941)

§ 11 41 καιροὺς] Favourable conditions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεα] That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offspring is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his *Historia Animalium* and *De generatione*

Animalium: e. g. *H. A.* vi. 19 § 4, 574 a 1 καὶ βόρεος μὲν διενόμενα ἀρρενοτοκεῖ μᾶλλον, νοτίου δὲ θηλυτοκεῖ. SUSEM. (942)

3 ἐπιστήσασι] Intransitive, as if τὴν γράμμην had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. *Ant.* 227.

§ 12 4 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας] Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), 12 § 5 n. (962); vi(iv). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13. viii(vi). 8 § 22 n. (1483). Also *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (943)

5 οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν κτλ.] Comp. Plato *Rep.* iii. 404 A (Eaton) and below v(viii). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7—9 n. (1015). SUSEM. (944)

καὶ τεκνοποιίαν, οὕτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοποιητικὴ λίαν, (XIV)
 § 13 ἀλλ’ ἡ μέση τούτων, πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν (p. 126)
 ἔξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βιαίους, μηδὲ πρὸς ἕνα
 10 μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν
 ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὅμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῦτὸν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀν-
 § 14 δράστι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ε-
 τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥάθυμούσας μηδὲ ἀραιὰ τροφὴ χρωμέ-
 νας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ’
 15 ἡμέραν τινὰ ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπείαν
 τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν. τὴν μέντοι διά-
 νοιαν τούναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥάθυμοτέρως ἀρμόττει διά-
 γειν· ἀπολαύοντα γάρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἔχούσης
 § 15 ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 10
 20 τροφῆς τῶν γενομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον
 τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν
 κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γενομένων· ὠρίσθαι γάρ

by p¹) || ὄγελαν M^a P¹⁻⁶ || 7 θεραποντικὴ M^a and apparently P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹), *curis indigens* William || κακοποιητικὴ M^a and P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹), *male habens* William || 8 ἔχειν omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 9 ἔνα * * Susem.¹⁻³, ἐν as a gloss by corr.³ in the margin of P² and Schneider Bk.²; but πένον should be understood || 11 ἐλευ-θέρων Γ P¹, ἐλευθέρων the other authorities Bk. Susem.¹⁻³ || ταῦτα Π² P⁶ Ar. Bk. || καὶ omitted by Π² P⁶ Bk. || 12 ἐγγύοντις P¹ Ald. || 16 ταῦς εἰληχούσις Γ Ar. Susem.¹⁻³, perhaps rightly || 18 ἀπολάβοντα M^a, ἀπολαβόντα Γ and perhaps Ar. || γεννόμενα Γ P¹ || 19 καὶ added before τὰ by Π² Bk. || 20 γενομένων P¹, γεννω-μένων P⁵, γυνομένων M^a Bk.², γυγνωμένων Π² Bk.¹ || 21 ἐν added after τέκνων by Π² P⁶ Ar. Bk. and P¹ (margin), ἐν μὴ ?Scaliger. Schömann *Gr. Alt.* II. p. 517 n. (1) restores the passage thus: τέκνων (ἐὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γυγνωμένων) ὠρίσθαι γε δεῖ || ἐθνῶν Γ P⁴⁻⁶ S^b L^c C^d Ar. || 22 κωλύη Π²⁻⁴⁻⁵ S^b V^b Ar. Ald. Bk. and P⁸ (corr.¹), κωλύοι apparently P⁸ (1st hand), perhaps rightly, κωλύσσει Susem., καλὴ γ (with preceding ἐν) Schlosser || γενομένων Koraes (who does not reject γεννωμένων), γεννωμένων Scaliger, γυνομένων M^a P¹ Bk.² Susem.¹ in the text, γυγνωμένων Π² P⁶ Bk.¹ || ὠρίσθαι Γ Ar. P¹ (margin) and P² (corr.¹), ὠρίσθαι M^a, ὠρισθῆναι P¹ (1st hand), ὠρίσται P⁸⁻⁵ Π² Bk. P¹ (corr. in the margin) and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.¹), ὠρίσθω Spengel || γάρ] γοῦν Koraes, γε Schömann

§ 13 10 “If any word is needed, read πένον, but ἔνα refers to πόνοις with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly

V(VIII). 4. 2, 1338 b 15” (Ridgeway).

Comp. however *Quæst. crit. coll.* p. 415.

§ 14 14 προστάξαντι καθ’ ἡμέραν τινὰ....16 τυμῆν] Plato, too, *Laws* VII 789 E, prescribes in spite of ridicule, ἀμα γέλωτι φράζωμεν, that when enceinte the wife should take walks assiduously (Eaton). SUSEM. (945)

15 ἀποθεραπείαν] The force of the prefix is similar in ἀφοσιώσθαι, to discharge one's conscience. Here, ‘to discharge her service.’

18 ἀπολαύοντα] Prof. Ridgeway takes this to mean that the foetus is a drain on the woman's strength, just as plants draw the good out of the ground; τῆτι sc. ἐργαστρὶ ἔχοντη.

§ 15 22 ὠρίσθαι.... 23 πλῆθος] How this is to be brought about was stated II.

δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δέ τισι γίνηται παρὰ (XIV)
ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωήν,
25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν· τὸ γάρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μῆ
§ 16 διωρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μὲν η
ἀρχὴ τῆς ήλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, πότε ἀρχε-
σθαι δεῖ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρ-
μόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν ὠρίσθω. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
30 ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῆ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς
σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἀσθενῆ.

23 δεῖ Π¹ Ar. and P³ (1st hand), δη P^{2,5} P³ Bk. and P¹ (corr. in the margin) P⁸
(a later hand): so Spengel || 24 συνδυασθεῖσιν Spengel Susem.^{1,2} from a misuse
of William's translation *aliquibus...combinatis*, <τῶν> συνδυασθέντων? Koraes ||
25 μὴ omitted by Π² P³ || 28 δεῖ] χρὴ Π² P³ Bk. || βεβήσεις M⁴ and P¹ (1st
hand, emended by corr.¹⁾ || 30 καὶ inserted after καθάπερ by Γ, if *sicut et iuniorum*
(William) is an accurate translation || τὰ omitted by M⁴, possibly by Γ || τῶν
omitted by P¹ || 31 γηρασκόντων M⁴ and P¹ (1st hand, corrected in the margin
with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12 : see *nn.* (209, 211), also II. 7 § 5
n. (236). Plato, too, *Rep.* V 460 D, 461 C,
orders exposure in the case of weakly or
deformed infants of the guardian class (as
was remarked *n.* 140), and in the case of
conception occurring where the law or
the magistrates' orders have been in-
fringed, abortion, or (presumably if this
has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he
goes further than this by condemning the
offspring of inferior guardians: τὰ δὲ
τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀρ-
τηρος γέγνηται, ἐν ἀπορήσει τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ
κατακρύψουσι, 460 c. But even in the
Timaeus 19 A his words convey the im-
pression that he had not given any in-
structions for exposing the children of
less qualified parents, but meant simply
a secret transference of them to the third
class of the population. Under the guise,
that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies
his former regulation in this sense (see
Zeller *Griech. Phil.* ed. 4 II. i. 909 *n.* 2,
ed. 3 pp. 771 *n.* 3, Eng. tr. p. 478 *n.*
55, Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. p. 171). In
the *Laws* (see *nn.* 192, 208) he drops
the preventive means of abortion alto-
gether, nor does he say anything about
exposing illegitimate and deformed in-
fants. Thus in the course of his own life-
time Plato gradually attained to a more
humane view. In this respect Aristotle's
ideal state goes far beyond that of the
Laws in the stringency and callousness,
or rather, to give it its true name, the

abominable cruelty of its regulations. As
to exposure, the example of Sparta has
again had a determining influence on both
thinkers. In all other Greek states it was
left to the father's decision whether he
would expose his child or not: but at
Sparta a committee of the eldest members
of the Phyle decided, and in accordance
with their decision the deformed or weakly
infant had to be despatched to the place
of exposure (*Ἄποθέται*) on Taygetos.
See Schömann p. 270 f. (Eng. tr. 256).
Comp. also *Introd.* p. 52 f. SUSEM.
(946)

Note that ὥρισθαι...πλῆθος is a virtual
repetition of II. 6, 12, 1765 b 6 ff., just as
c. 4 § 2, 1325 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17,
in both cases without the conventional ὡς
εἰρηται πρότερον (Newman).

23—25] Here the indignation of some
honest reader found vent in the remarkable
gloss on the margin of P³, τι λέγει ὁ
δαιμόνιος τούτους; Doubtless the same
hand which scribbled φλυαρεῖ, φλυαρία,
against 1269 b 16, 1272 a 23. Whether
from this "thin end of the wedge" came
the gradual depopulation of Greece, which
Polybius (xxxvii. 9) deplores, is another
matter. Cp. Thirlwall *Hist.* VIII.
463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.³ p. 28 ff.
shows that λητουργεῖν is the true Attic
form. The usurping λειτουργεῖν does not
appear before the third century B.C. When
this ει was pronounced as ι, λι-

§ 17 διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν. αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς (XIV) πλείστοις ἥνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἔβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντάκοντα ἑτῶν. ὅστε τέτταρσιν ἡ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα 12 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφείσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγείας χάριν ἡ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης 18 τῆς αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὄμιλίαν. περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἐστω μὲν ἀπλᾶς μὴ καλὸν 40 ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσ- (p. 127) αγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποίας 1336 a ἔαν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτον τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθῳ πρεπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

17 γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οὔσεσθαι <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἶναι δια- XV φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὁποία 5 τις ἀν ἢ. φαίνεται δὲ διά τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστιν εἰσάγειν τὴν

35 ὡς Π¹, but ὥστε Π¹ (corr.¹) || 36 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταῦτην omitted and a lacuna left by Π¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 37 ὑγείας Μ⁹ Ρ⁹, ὑγείας χάρω omitted and a lacuna left by Π¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 38 τὴν omitted and a lacuna left by Π¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 39 καὶ] ἢ Π² Ρ⁸ Bk., perhaps rightly

1336 a 3 <δεῖ> Susem. Should it come before διαφορὰν? || 5 δὲ Γ Ρ⁸ Ar., τὲ Μ⁹, τε Π¹ Π² || 6 εἰσάγειν Γ Ρ⁹, ἀγειν Μ⁹ Ρ¹, δει Π² Ar., δσκεῖν Koraes, ἐπάγειν? Susem.

toupyla was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινες] Solon *Frag.* 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 15 (cp. n. 971), and similarly in *Hist. Animal.* v. 12 § 2 (v. 14 § 3, 544 b 25 ff.), 17 § 16 (v. 20 § 3, 553 a 2 ff.), vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 f.); comp. vii. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., viii. 13 {viii. 12 § 2, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the *Scholia* to Aristoph. *Birds* 494). Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo *περὶ κοσμοκοδίου* p. 71 Pfeif. and Censorin. *De die natali* 14 (J. G. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in *Rhet.* II. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 f. the forty-ninth year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. SUSEM. (947)

36 τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως] This means that if any license is taken, there must be recourse to abortion, so that no child is born. The key is furnished by *Rēp.* v. 461 c, μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κόντρα μηδέν, 'to prevent any embryo which may come into being from

seeing the light' (J. G. Schneider). Comp. n. (946) and *Introd.* p. 63. SUSEM. (948)

§ 18 40 προσαγορευθῇ πόσις] "In the sense of *call* προσαγορεύω sometimes employed προστηθεντα and προσηγορεθην, though in the sense of ἀστάθουαι it had προσερῶ, προσείπων, and προσερῆθω" (Rutherford). See *New Phrynius* p. 333 ff. with citation of [Dem.] *Adv. Boeotum de doce* XL. § 1, ὅταν τις ἀδελφὸς προσαγορευθῇ. Comp. I. 12. 3, 1259 b 13 (προστηθεντε), and for the use of πόσις, Soph. *Trach.* 550 f. μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἡρακλῆς ἔμδε καλῆται τῆς νεωτέρας δ' ἀνὴρ (paramour).

c. 17 *Treatment and food of children during infancy.*

§ 1 1336 a 3 οὔσεσθαι... 5 ἀν ἢ] "Our next care must be for the proper quality of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are bound to believe, for the thriving of the body." Comp. Plato *Rēp.* III. 404 a ff., Xenophon *De Rep. Lac.* 2 § 5 (Eaton). SUSEM. (949)

πολεμικὴν ἔξιν, ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφὴ μάλιστ[·] (XV)
 § 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀσινοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι δε
 δὲ καὶ κινῆσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-
 πόφερει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό-
 τητα χρῶνται καὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὄργανοις τισὶ μη-
 χανικοῖς, ἢ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμ-
 πόφερει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
 14 παιδῶν· τοῦτο γάρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγείαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
 § 3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-
 βόρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-
 μενα [ψυχρόν], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρὸν ἀμπισχεῖν, οἷον
 Κελτοῖς. πάντα γάρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχο-
 μένων βελτιον μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν·
 20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἡ τῶν παίδων ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν

7 πληθύσοντα Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P^{4.6} L⁵ ||
 9 τηλικούτων Susem.¹⁻², tantillor William, τηλικούτων? Susem., τηλικούτων P^{4.8} L⁵ ||
 10 διαφέρεσθαι M⁴ and P¹ (corr.¹), διαφέρθαι P¹ (1st hand), defltere William, δια-
 στρέφεσθαι other authorities and P¹ (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπαλό-
 τητα M⁴, ἀπλότητα Π³ || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικὰς omitted by M⁴ P¹ || 16 τοῖς]
 τῶν M⁴ P¹ || γενόμενα Susem., γεννόμενα Scaliger, γενόμενα M⁴ P¹ Bk.³ Susem.¹
 in the text, γεννόμενα Π³ P⁶ Bk.¹ || 17 [ψυχρὸν] Susem. || ψυχρὸν after σκέπασμα
 P¹ and P⁴ (corr.¹), μικρὸν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπισχεῖν Bk. Susem.¹
 and P^{2.3}(?), ἀπισχεῖν P⁶ (1st hand), ἀμπισχεῖν P⁶ || 18 εὐθὺς...19 ἐθίζειν omitted by
 P^{4.6} S^b V^b L⁵ || ἀρχομένων Π^{2.3} Ald. Bk., ἀρχομένους? Sylburg, ἀρχόμενον? Spengel ||
 19 ἐκ...ἐθίζειν omitted by Ar. || 20 διὰ <τὴν> Jackson

8 δονοτέρα] Plato *Laws* II. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the eighteenth year (Götting). Comp. *Hist. Anim.* VII. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton); *De Somno* c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff. SUSEM. (950) Comp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 25 (Ridgeway).

§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικούτων] "All the exercise possible at that early age." So also Plato *Laws* VII. 789 ε. ss. SUSEM. (951)

10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says St Hilaire, is the first germ of orthopedics. Camerarius understood it of cradles and swaddling clothes (cp. Plato *I. c.*): Vettori of irons to straighten the crooked knees of children, *serperastræ* as Varro calls them *L. L.* IX. 5. 11. SUSEM. (952)

§ 3 15 διὸ...18 Κελτοῖς] The same thing is said in an epigram first published by Brunck *Anal. vet. poet.* III. p. 150 XXXII, θαρσαλέοι Κελτοὶ ποταμῷ ξηλήμονι Ρίψῳ | τέκνα ταλαντεύονται, καὶ οὐ πάρος εἰσὶ

τοκῆσει πρὸς πάντας ἀθρίστως λελουμένον ὕδατι σεμιφ..., οὐπω γάρ γενέταο φέροντον, πρὸς γ' ἱσθρῆσθαι | κεκρυμένον λοντροῖσιν ἀλεγχί-γδαν ποταμοῖοι: and by Nonnos *Dionys.* XXIII. 95, XXXVI. 5 (Götting). Further compare Strabo III. 165, Galen περὶ ὑγεί-ειν I. T. vi. p. 51 Kühn, and Kapp Aristot. *Staatspädag.* p. 123 (Eaton). Galen however calls the people, of whom this is told, not Kelts but Germans. See on this point II. 9 § 7 with Note, p. 334 and IV(vii). 1 § 10 n. Comp. further Verg. *Aen.* IX. 603 f. There is a similar habit amongst the Beloochees (Ridgeway). SUSEM. (953)

§ 5 20 διὰ θερμότητα] Aristotle thus assumes that the vital heat, which by its gradual but serious decline causes old age, and by its extinction death, gradually becomes weaker and weaker from the moment of birth, so that it is most largely found in the embryo and the new-born infant, and in animals generally so long as they are growing, because growth is

ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν. § 6 a 34 <τὰς δὲ διατάσεις 35 τῶν παιδῶν κατὰ τοὺς (XV)
 <κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς
 <νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν. 37 γίνεται γὰρ τρόπου
 <τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ 38 τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις
 <ποιεῖ τὴν ἴσχυν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δὲ 39 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παι-
 <δίοις διατεινομένοις.> § 4 περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρώτην συμφέρει ποιεῖ-
 21 σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτην παραπλη-
 σίαν· τὴν δὲ ἔχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἑτῶν, ἣ
 ἦν οὕτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν
 25 οὕτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδί-
 ξωσιν, δεῖ [δὲ] τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν
 τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, ἢν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι’
 28 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδιᾶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς
 παιδιᾶς εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνει-
 30 μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσται (p. 128)
 παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσοδοποιεῖν πρὸς
 33 τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιᾶς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-
 36 λὰς μιμῆσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδασομένων. τὰς δὲ διατά-

1336 a 34—39 34 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...39 διατεινομέρους transposed by Susem. to follow 21 ἄσκησιν, see *Introd.* p. 89 || 35 κατὰ Γ, καὶ II Ar. Bk. || τοὺς omitted by P² P⁵ Bk. || 38 πονοῦσιν] πνεύμοσι; Ridgeway

21 πρώτην <ἡλικίαν> ? Spengel, Schmidt would transpose 23 ἡλικίαν to this place; but it can just as well be understood || 22 τὴν ταύτην] τοὺς ταύτην V^b and P⁴ (corr.), ταύτην P⁵, L⁵ and P⁴ (1st hand) || 23 ἔχομένων P⁶ S^b V^b and P⁴ (corr.) || 24 ἦν] in qua William || 26 δὲ omitted by P¹ P⁴, Bk., but it should perhaps be retained || 29 δέγαν inserted before ἀνελευθέρους by P¹ || 31 τοὺς omitted by P⁴, V^b and perhaps by S^b || 33 διὸ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 34 σπουδασομέρων Koraes,

conditioned by vital heat. Comp. *Probl.* III. 7, XI. 14, *De Inventione etc.* cc. 3, 4 (Eaton), SUSEM. (954)

§ 6 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] Plato *Laws* VII. 791 E ff. (Camerarius). SUSEM. (955)

38 Dr Jackson defends τοὺς πονοῦσι by an appeal to Darwin *On the Expression of the Emotions* pp. 148, 236, 284.

§ 4 23 μέχρι πάντες ἔτον] Plato however in the *Laws* VII. 793 E ff. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, §§ 7—15. SUSEM. (956)

28 καὶ διὸ τῆς παιδιᾶς] Plato I. c. proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-

garten under the inspection of the nurses (*al τροφοί*) who for the most part leave the children to invent their own games (*παιδιᾶι αὐτοφεύτεις*), but prevent them from growing too angry over them, the nurses themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. SUSEM. (957)

§ 5 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων] Comp. n. (970), and §§ 7—12 in regard to the παιδονόμοι: above c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 12 § 5 n. (862) with notes (960, 963, 969), and *Introd.* p. 52 f. also VI(IV). 15 § 9 n. (1355), § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483). SUSEM. (958)

33 διὸ τὰς παιδιᾶς.. 34 σπουδασομένων] Comp. Plato *Laws* I. 643 B ff. SUSEM. (959)

35 στεις τῶν παιδῶν κατὰ τοὺς κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὅρθως ἀπαγορεύου· (XV)
στιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις συμφέρουσι γάρ πρὸς αἴξη-
σιν· γίνεται γάρ τρόπον τινὶ γυμνασίᾳ τοῖς σώμασιν· ή γάρ
τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν Ισχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ
§ 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατενομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὴ
40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τήν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ
ὅπως ὅτι ἡκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γάρ τὴν ἡλι-
1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἑτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἶκοι τὴν τρο-
φὴν ἔχειν. εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκούσμάτων τ
§ 8 καὶ τῶν ὄραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως
μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεῖ
5 τὸν νομοθέτην ἔξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γάρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτιοῦν
τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μάλιστα
μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μη-
§ 9 δὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δέ τις φαίηται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων
ἀπηγορευμένον, τὸν μὲν ἀλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως

σπουδασμένων οτ σπουδασθησομένων Γ apparently (*studendorum William*) and perhaps
ΑΓ. (*quae postea serio sunt facienda*), σπουδασθησομένων Ρ⁶, σπουδαζομένων Μ¹ Ρ¹ Π²
Βκ., σπουδασμάτων Ridgeway

39 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Βκ. Susem.¹ in the text

1336 b <τὴν> μέχρι ?Susem., but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπο-
λαβεῖν Γ (*absumere William*) Susem.¹⁻², ἀπελαύνειν Π² Ρ⁵ Βκ. || 3 ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν
ἀνελευθέρων Ρ⁶ Λ⁹ Ar. Ald. Bk.² and Ρ⁴ (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθερῶν Ρ⁴ (corr.) || 4
ὥσπερ] εἶπερ Lambin Bk.², wrongly || τι after ἄλλο (so avoiding hiatus) Π² Ρ⁵ Βκ. ||
7 μὲν οὖν] δὲ Susem., approved by Schmidt || 8 δὲ] δὴ Susem., μὲν οὖν Schmidt
(with colon after τι χάρω) 9 ἀπηγορευμένον] τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων Π² Ρ⁵ ΑΓ. Βκ. ||
ἀλεύθερον <μὲν> Koraes

§ 7 41 δὴ ἡκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται]
Comp. § 9 n. (962). Here then Aristotle
refuses to adopt the idea of common
games for children, in which the children
of aliens and slaves of this age also take
part, as was proposed by Plato, here
again the more humane of the two, and
briefly mentioned in n. (957). His refusal
is on the ground that by means of these
infant schools Plato begins the public
education as soon as the third year has been
reached, while he follows the Spartans in
postponing it to the seventh year: see
Schömann p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 206).
Further see § 5, n. (958). SUSEM. (960)

1336 b 2 εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν κτλ.]
This and the two following sentences with
the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to
many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz
Ind. Ar. 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen *Poetics*² p.

190 f., Busse *op. c.* p. 28, Susemühl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπο-
λαύειν, which William of Moerbeke mis-
took, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and
1303 b 31, for ἀπολαβεῖν (in pronunciation $v=f$, $\beta=v$), is correct and means to
derive influence of any kind, good or
bad: Busse cites δέδουκα μὴ ἀπολαβω τι
φλαδῶν Isocr. 8. 81.

§ 8 4 ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the
utmost vigilance. A variation upon the
more usual εἶπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs
VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order,
ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, which Π² gives here.

7 ἀκούσωτι] Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* c. 2, 38 B, δὸς καὶ Ξενοκράτης τοῖς
παισι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περι-
πτειν ἀμφωτίδας ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὄτα
ταις πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἥθη
διαστρεφομένων.

10 ήξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [άτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πλη- (XV)
 γαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις
 ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδώδιας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι³
 τῶν τοιούτων ἔξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ
 § 10 γραφὰς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς
 15 ἄρχοντι μηδὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων
 πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ
 τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀφίη-

10 [άτιμίαις] Bücheler Susem.²⁻³, rightly if ἀτιμίαις is not corrupt: ἐπιτιμίαις
 or ἐπιτιμήσει? Susem. formerly, *aktales*? Schmidt who further approves [καὶ
 πληγαῖς] Schneider || 14 ἔστω P¹⁻⁵ Ar., ἔστι ΓΜ⁶ Η² || 17 πρὸς...νόμος omitted in P⁴⁻⁶ S^b V^b || τούτους Reiz Bk.² || παρίστην P⁶ over an erasure, ἐφίησιν
 Koraes

§ 9 11 ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις] Meier,
De bonis damn. p. 103, understands by
 this their exclusion from sacrificial festi-
 vals in which slaves could not take part,
 that is, from the state sacrifices (*ἱερὰ*
δημοτεῖς) proper: for which cp. Böckh
Staatsh. I³. p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 298). SUSEM.
 (961)

12 ἀνδραποδώδιας χάριν] "To punish
 him for his degrading conduct." Comp.
 c. 15 § 5 n. (926) and especially n. (43)
 on l. 5 § 8; and in regard to this whole
 section c. 12 § 5 n. (863), and more parti-
 cularly *Introd.* p. 52 n. (3). SUSEM.
 (962)

§ 10 14 ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν...16 μέμη-
 των] See V(VIII). 15 § 21 n. (1053), V(VIII).
 7 § 3 n. (1084). The magistrates here
 mentioned are of course the Παιδονόμοι,
 as before; see n. (1958). SUSEM. (963)

16 πράξεων=scenes, n. (1084).

εἰ μὴ παρά τισι θεοῖς...17 ὁ νόμος]
 As, for instance, Dionysos, Aphrodite,
 Priapos, Eileithyia (Kapp.). Aristotle
 himself, it is well known, traces the
 origin of Comedy to the worship of Dio-
 nysos, namely, to the improvised speeches
 added to the choral ode by the chief
 singer or leader of the chorus in the
 phallic songs; such phallic songs, he
 says, were still customary in many places
 (*γενομένη ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ἔξαρχωτων*),
Poet. 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These im-
 provised speeches certainly contained
 improprieties of the sort here mentioned.
 But that even in the phallic songs pro-
 perly so called there was often much that
 was positively indecent might hardly be
 doubted, even apart from the specimen
 we have in Aristoph. *Ach.* 263 ff., where

Dikaiopolis sings a burlesque of one, as
 he himself says (261). Other facts rela-
 tive to this matter are mentioned by
 Athenaeus XIV. 621 d—622 d, on the
 authority of Sosibios and Semos. Both
 writers mentioned certain reciters, called
ἀντοκάβδαλοι, who delivered monologues
 or even dialogues (*βήσεις*) from the stage
 crowned with ivy according to Semos, and
 were at a later date called *λαυρῖοι*, like their
 poems. It is beyond all doubt that Archilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic
 lampoons in current use at the merry festi-
 vities of harvest and vintage, and therefore
 in the worship of Dionysos and Demeter,
 which was especially cultivated in his
 home of Paros and her colony Thasos,
 where Archilochos settled. Comp. Homer
Hymn to Demeter 496, Paus. X. 28. 1,
 Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v.
Κάδαρποι; Welcker *K7. Schrift.* 1. p.
 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular
 poetry that he fashioned his own artistic
 iambic poetry. Aristotle himself men-
 tions directly afterwards (§ 11) the re-
 cital of such artistic compositions (*λαυρῖοι*),
 which certainly took place at such reli-
 gious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at
 the proper season, probably in contests
 between rhapsodes. For it would appear
 from the pseudo-Platonic *Ion* 531 A that
 a contemporary rhapsode might include
 Archilochos in his repertoire; in any case
 his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the
 present passage: whether also his elegies,
 is doubtful. About that time also the
 burlesque epos and its recitation by rha-
 psodes were brought into vogue by Hege-
 mon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of
 this kind. SUSEM. (964)

σιν ὁ νόμος τὸν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἰκνουμένην καὶ (XV)
19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεούς.

§ 11 τὸν δὲ νεωτέρους οὕτ' ιάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς θετέον, ε
πρὶν ἡ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἡ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρ- (πατε
ξει κοινωνεῖν ἥδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων
γυνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

§ 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον.
25 ὑστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ
πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατὰ δὲ τὸν

§ 13 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἵσως γάρ οὐδὲ
κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιούτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑπο-

18 τὸν...ἰκνουμένην M⁴ P¹, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προκουσαν Γ P³ Bk. (πλέον
P⁶ over an erasure), iam homines factos Ar., τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους Bas.³ in the margin,
omitted by B² Bas.^{1,2} and the text of Bas.³ || ἔτι] ἥδη ?Susem., iam Ar., [ετι] Welldon || 19 αὐτῶν P^{1,5}, αὐτῶν Γ M⁴ P² || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by P³ (sup-
plied by corr.¹ in the margin of P¹), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.¹ || τιμαλφᾶν
M⁴ P¹ || [τοὺς θεούς] ?Susem. || 20 θετέον] θετητέον M⁴, νομοθετητέον P² P⁶ Bk.,
<εἶναι> ἐατέον Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπαθῆς M⁴ and apparently P¹ (1st
hand) || πάντας suspected by Jackson, πάντως ?Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν...27
ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Susem. to follow 35 δυσμένειαν || 27 [τοις
...37 αὐτοῖς] Böcker || 28 κακῶς] καλῶς Γ M³ || ἔλεγε suspected by Camerarius,
ἴψεγε οἱ ἔλεγχε ?Schmidt

18 ἔτι] The word cannot have arisen from ἥδη, nor is it likely to have crept into the text. However dissimilar, this must apparently be added to the passages in which ἔτι means *iam*. SUSEM.

§ 11 20 οὕτ' ιάμβων] See *n.* (964) and *n.* (788) IV(VII). 7 § 6. SUSEM. (965)

21 κατακλίσεως ὑπάρχει κτλ.] The term μέθη which recurs VI(VIII). 5 § 2, *n.* (1019) denotes the advanced stage of the banquet, at which men's spirits were more elevated and they began to drink wine undiluted (*ἄκρατος*); cp. Plato *Larus* II. 271 E, Ath. II. 40 a (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also V(VIII). 5 § 8, *n.* (1028), 7 § 13 f. *n.* (1067), also *n.* (113). But, as was remarked in *Antrōd.* p. 55, κατάκλισις, or admission into συσσίτια, in all probability commenced with initiation into military service from the seventeenth year onwards; see V(VIII). 4 § 9 Exc. 1. to B. v(viii); but when recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed for them (Exc. to B. v[viii]) they certainly have συσσίτια of their own, and only when their education has been completed, from their twenty-first year onwards, are they admitted to the συσσίτια proper, at first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. SUSEM. (966)

22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κτλ.] Plato on the contrary even in the *Larus* VII. 816 D, ε. XI. 935 ε wholly banishes comedy and Iambos, and only permits comic dances by foreigners or slaves. SUSEM. (967)

§ 12 25 ὑστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας] Another point the discussion of which is missing: see *Introd.* p. 49 *n.* (4), p. 53 *n.* (1). SUSEM. (969)

§ 13 28 Θεόδωρος] It is beyond all doubt that Theodoros is here treated as one deceased: but I fail to see that he is spoken of *Rhet.* III. 2 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff. as if he were still living and on the stage, as Zeller II. ii. p. 131 *n.* (1) maintains. From the latter passage it is very clear that he was the greatest tragic actor of recent times. Aelian, V. H. XIV. 40, relates a story of the powerful impression which his acting made on the tyrant Alexander of Phraeia. Plutarch mentions him along with Polos as a famous protagonist actor in leading parts in *De regim.* 21, 816 F, and with Nikostratos, Kallipides, Myrmiskos, Polos in *De Gloria*

κριτής· οὐδενὶ γάρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ (XV)
 30 τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ως οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς
 πρώταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτο τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄμιλας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων.
 § 14 πάντα γάρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς
 νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μᾶλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν
 35 ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν.

§ 12 b 14 <νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον·
 <25 ὑστερον δ’ ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ
 <26 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν
 <27 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ως ἀναγκαῖον.> 35 διελθόντων δὲ τῶν
 36 πέντε ἔτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ δεῖ θεωροῦντες ἡδη γίνεσθαι
 37 τῶν μαθήσεων ἀς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτούς.
 § 15 δύο δ’ εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἀς ἀναγκαῖον διηρήσθαι τὴν παι- 11
 39 δείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρις ἡβῆς καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσάγειν P⁴-⁶ L⁹ Ald. W^b and probably P⁵ (1st hand) || <οὐδεν>, οὐδὲ
 Bothe (on Terent. p. 619) || 30 θεατῶν Π² P⁶ Ar. Bk. and (with γρ. prefixed) corr.¹
 of P¹ in the margin || 34 ὅσα after αὐτῶν P¹-⁵ Π² Bk. || 35 δυσμένειαν Π Bk.
 Susem.² in the text, *in haesitionem* William, *improbabilitatem* Ar., *δυσγένειαν* Schmidt,
 Susem.³ δυσχέρειαν Koraes.

1336 b 24-27 24 τοῦτον P¹ and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) P⁴ Ald.,
 τοῦτων Γ M⁸ Ar. and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) all other authorities Bk. ||
 25 διωρίσαι P⁴-⁶ L⁹ Ald. W^b || 26 πρῶτον] πρότερον? Koraes, needlessly

36 ἡδη omitted by Η¹ wrongly; [ἡδη] Susem.¹ Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 || 38 τὴν
 omitted by M⁸ and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by corr.¹ in P¹), [τὴν] Susem.¹ || 39 μέχρι¹
 Π² Bk. Susem.¹

Athen. vi. 835 F (cp. also *De Audiendis Poetis* 18 c). Demosthenes *De Falsa Leg.* § 246 f, p. 418, 4, mentions him along with another great protagonist of the time, Aristodemos, with the remark that both shone in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but did not appear in the *Phoenix* of Euripides; that Aeschines acted under them as tritagonist and had represented Creon in the *Antigone*. In his private life Theodorus appears to have been very wild, to judge by the nickname given him no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych. s.v. πελεθόβαξ or πελεθοβάψ). An idea of his habits may also be gathered from Hesych. s. v. Θεοδώρους ἔλεγον οἱ κωμικοὶ τοὺς πρωκτούς, ἀπὸ Θεοδώρου τιδὶς οὐκ εὖ τῆς ἁντοῦ ὥρας χρησταένουν. See also Hesych. s. v. Ἀριστόδημον οἱ κωμικοὶ τὸν πρωκτόν, καὶ Θεοδώρου καὶ Τιμοτιάνακτα ἔλεγον. Diog. Laert. II. 104 calls him a tragic poet: but this must rest either on a

false reading or an error—more probably the latter, as Aelian also calls him ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας πονητής. Comp. also Athen. xi. 482 D and Meineke *Fragm. Com. Gr.* I. p. 523 f. SUSEM. (968)

§ 15 39 μέτα τὴν ἀφ' ἡβῆς... 40 ἔτῶν] The first period is to be wholly taken up with gymnastic, three years of the second with the remaining subjects of youthful training, the following years again with severer bodily exercises; see v(viii). 3 § 13, n. (1003), 4 § 9 n. (1015) Exc. Here Aristotle only partially follows Plato [see nn. (1015, 1016)]. In the *Republic* the latter divides the educational course into three parts. The first begins with gymnastic, preceded by the narration of mythes, legends and tales, much as Aristotle also prescribes (see § 20, n. 958): gymnastic is followed by music and poetry together with reading, writing and arithmetic, and certain elements of

40 ἀφ' ἥβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἰκοσιν ἔτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι (XV)
 διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς,
^{1337 a} δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη
 καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν.

40 Εν P^{4.5.6} S^b V^b L^a || 41 κακῶς Muret, καλῶς Γ ΙΙ Ar. Bk.¹ Susem.² in the text
^{1337 a 2} τῆς φύσεως after βούλεται ΙΙ² P^b Bk.

mathematics generally: this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in *n.* (182) on *II. 5 § 25*. See *Rep.* *II.* 376 E f., *III.* 403 C, *VII.* 534 C—535 A, 536—537 D, 539 D ff. In the *Laws* (see *VII.* 794 C—795 D, 809 E—813 C, 817 C—822 D, cp. 813 C ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. *n.* 956); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in *n.* (193) on *II. 6. 5* that even in the *Laws* the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the *Republic* by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. SUSEM. (970)

40 οἱ γὰρ... 41 οὐ κακῶς] Cp. c. 16
 § 8 *n.* (947). SUSEM. (971)

^{1337 a 1} πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη... 2 ἀνα-

πληροῦν] Eaton compares *Phys.* *II.* 8 § 8, 199 a 15 f. δλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἢ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μαρτίται: "and in general it is art which either brings to completion what nature is unable to effect or else imitates nature": on which passage see Döring *op. c.* p. 81 ff. Further comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 15 (i.e. I. c. 4 Bk., 1097 a 5) where we are told of all arts and sciences that each seeks to meet a definite want, τὸ ἔνδεις ἐπιζητοῦσαι. SUSEM. (972)

"The context here, in its reference to education, limits the scope of *τέχνη* to useful art. Useful art supplements nature and at the same time follows her guidance. He who would be a master in any art must first discern the true end by a study of nature's principles, and then employ the method which she suggests for the attainment of that end" (S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects*, p. 241). He adds: "in the passage from the *Physics* also it is probable that the distinction is not, as would at first sight seem, between useful and fine art, but between two aspects of useful art. The sentence is not quite logical in form, but the meaning is that useful art on the one hand satisfies those needs of man for which nature has not fully provided, on the other hand its processes are those of nature."

EXCURSUS I.

ΟΙ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ.

NOTE ON IV(vii). 1. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages¹. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (*οι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, III. 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see *n.* 584). But whether they are (1) *discussions by others*, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's dialogues and popular works, or to (3) *dialectical discussions*, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems², in his scientific writings, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work³: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) *oral controversies and expressions of opinion* are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all⁴.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, *n.* (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see *n.* 689) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

¹ *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 9, 1102 a 26, VI. 4. 2, 1140 a 3; *Metaphysics* XIII(M). 1. 4, 1076 a 28; *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31; *Eud. Eth.* I. 8. 4, 1217 b 22, II. 1. 1, 1218 b 34.

² See Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii p. 242 ff., Thurot *Études* p. 118 ff., Tegge *De vi ac notione dialecticae Aristoteleae* (Treptow 1877).

³ See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 105 b 16 ff.

⁴ This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But how is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of

goods which follows has furthermore been laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions and does not require 'to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. *n.* (688).

has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles¹. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, *Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69 ff., 158 ff., finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen², *Aristotelische Aufsätze II. (Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susemihl *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873, p. 673 ff.). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel³ that for a question discussed in the *Ethics* Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the *Ethics* the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, "What is the best life, or human happiness?" and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the *Politics* Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II. I. 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(iv). 9 § 2, cp. IV(vii). 12 §§ 3, 4: see *nn.* 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the *Ethics*. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether nonexistent, as is actually the case.

¹ For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller *op. cit.* II ii p. 119 *n.* (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says:—"as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life

to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods, and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (*ἐξωρευτὸς λόγοις*) goes no farther: for the ordinary view regards mental goods, i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing."

² And more recently Diels: see below.

³ See Krohn *op. cit.* p. 37.

Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. n. (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. n. 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as "according to our previous inquiry," and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the *Ethics*. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see nn. (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. n. 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the *Ethics*—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see nn. 876, 879, 881¹), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it², and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the *Introd.* pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on *Politics* Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer's notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also n. (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression *Aristotle* I. pp. 63–75, not content to understand by it 'discourses outside the subject,' thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to *Phys.* IV. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, *Études* p. 213, he can cite Alexander in *Topica* διδεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ (the *Topics*) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥγορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς, 260 a 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἐξωτερικά = τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδόξων περαινόμενα.

¹ On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded: see n. (881).

thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.

² For the inconsistencies which Krohn

Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in *ἐξωτερικός* more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to *σκέψις Pol.* I. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase *οἱ ἐξωθεν λόγοι*, II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own *διατρίπαλα...δλλάν οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys.* I. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by *ἀπαρίαν ἐξωτερικήν Simpl. in Physica* 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit *Phys.* c. iv. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with *Nic. Eth.* I. 8, 1098 b 10 *καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς*, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the *Politics*, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 104 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled *Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles* reported in *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.* 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' *τὰ ἐξωθεν λεγόμενα*, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thurot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit *a priori* than to *ἔνδοξα* generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to *λόγοι διαλεκτικοί?* (cp. *λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί*, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι* all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such *ἔνδοξα* we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 8, where a similar in-

tention is announced, 1098 b 9 *σκεπτέον* δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς τῷ μὲν γαρ ἀληθεῖ πάρτα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ Φευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τάληθες. The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our *Politics* passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (*Laws* III. 697 A, B), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ff. ὥστε καλώς ἀν λέγοντο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὄμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the *γε*: 'at least this *διαιρέον* is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in *Pol.* IV(VII). I. 3, 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5, 1323 a 34, ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάρτες ἀν συγχωρήσεων. That he had the *Ethics* in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 ἑτέρας σχολῆς, and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on *ἰκανός*:—believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in Outside Discourses, we must now also make use of it: *καὶ νῦν*, here in the *Politics* as before in the *Ethics*¹."

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι* and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (? Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in *N. E.* I. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato *Charmides* 163 A for *N. E.* VI. 4, 1140 a 3; Hesiod, Homer, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the *ἀντοπία* concerning Time in *Phys.* IV. c. 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connexions: not only is it *external* and *referring to what is external*, but in contradistinction to *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, it would naturally be used for *non-philosophical discussions*²." What all men say may be a part of the *ἔξωτεροι λόγοι* though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in *Eud. Eth.* II. 1 it is just='what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both *Politics* passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to *Meta.* 1076 a 22—28, *Eud. Eth.* 1217 b 22, and *Physics* IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not so much to *λεγόμενα* as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method³.

¹ *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 480 f.

² Susemihl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* 1884, p. 267.

³ Tostrik's rendering of another dis-

puted phrase *οἱ ἐν κοινῷ γιγνόμενοι λόγοι* *De Anima* I. 4, 1, 407 b 29, is *eae disputationes quales homines eleganter instituere solent*. This at least does justice to the present participle.]

NOTE ON IV(VII). 11. 6, 1330 b 26.

δυσέξιδος γὰρ ἔκεινη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.
 Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρῆ, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερλήπτον 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II. 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect δυσέσοδος? and if so, would it not seem that δυσεξερεύνητος should correlate with ξενικοῖς, δυσείσοδος with ἐπιτιθεμένοις, rather than δυσέσοδος with ξενικοῖς, δυσεξερεύνητος with ἐπιτιθεμένοις? I conjecture therefore δυσεξερεύνητος γὰρ ἔκεινη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσείσοδος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. H. JACKSON.

EXCURSUS II.

THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.

*ἔτι δὲ η̄ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐν γίνεται
 κατὰ λόγου εὐθὺς η̄ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ηδη καταλευμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν
 ἀβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸν.* IV(VII). 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man's age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father's civic rights (so I take διαδοχῆ) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the

father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, $70\frac{1}{2}$ years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years: if a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, II. 6. 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. II. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in *Introd.* p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified: even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, n. (817).

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (*Transactions of Cambridge Philological Society* II. p. 146) would read *ταῖς μὲν ἀρχομέναις*, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 49). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (*ib.* p. 118), who in his turn retains *ἀρχομένης* (Γ and corr. P²), but, while rightly referring *ἀρχομένης τῆς ἀκμῆς* as well as *καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας* to the father, takes *τοῖς μὲν* to be the older, *τοῖς δὲ* the younger children by the same marriage, and explains *ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων* as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected *τῶν μὲν..τῶν δὲ* instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of *τῶν πατέρων* after *τῆς ἀκμῆς* and of *ἐκείνων* after *ἡλικίας* would then have conduced to clearness. This however is a small

matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to $\eta \deltaιαδοχη \tauων τέκνων$; as if it meant that the children succeed (*not their father but*) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary. SUSEM.

Θ.

§ 16 πρώτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινα περὶ τοὺς παιδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῆ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιουν τρόπον (ἢ γίνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.

1 11 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον 1 περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἀν ἀμφισβητήσειεν, καὶ γάρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γνόμενον τούτῳ βλάπτει τὰς πο- (p. 130)
§ 2 λιτείας (δεῖ γάρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γάρ ηθος

1337 a 3 πρώτον... 7 ταύτη first separated from B. IV(vii) and rightly prefixed to B. V(viii) by Spengel || 7 δεῖται M^o, δεῖ εἶναι Susem.¹⁻² following William's translation (*oportet esse*) || 14 παιδεύεσθαι Ar., πολιτεύεσθαι Γ II Bk., πολιτ-<είαν παιδεύεσθαι Jackson, yet at c. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1 T M^o have πολιτευομένοις for παιδευομένοις (cp. 1260 b 15, 1310 a 14)

B. v(viii). The same subject continued: the true system of state education.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's proposal to begin at *πρώτον* μὲν is in full accordance with the usage of Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before starting a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this: see e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 22, 1338 b 39, and at 1341 b 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at II. c. 12, p. 314, III. c. 2, p. 359.

c. 1. *Three points to decide:* (1) *Should there be a systematic education?* (2) *Should it be a public system?* (3) *What subjects should it include?* While (1) and (2) are soon settled in the affirmative, B. v(viii)

leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cp. *Anal.* p. 118.

§ 1 12 καὶ γάρ] Si nam et significat, pro altero καὶ a 18 post longam parenthesim adhibitum est ἐτι δὲ, sed facilius fortasse καὶ γάρ etenim esse sumemus: certe altera earum inducta est his, altera ἐτι δὲ particulis, et μὲν οὐρ a 11 excipiuntur δ' conjunctione quae legitur a 21. SUSEM.

13 οὐ γνόμενον τούτῳ] The neglect of this: in Latin, *hoc non servatum.* Cp. 1324 a 36 n., VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 33 f.

§ 2 14 δεῖ γάρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι] What this means is explained VIII(V). 9 §§ 11, 12, 1310 a 12 ff. Cp. n. (1641). *Rhet.* I. 8. 6, 1366 a 12 f. (Eaton): δέοι ἄν τὰ ηθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν γῆμας· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐκάστης ηθος πιθανώτατον πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. SUSEM. (973)

τὸ ηθος τῆς πολιτείας] As Plato in *Keph.* VIII. 544 D explains, any constitution (e.g. a timocracy) is due to the prevalence of a certain (e.g. timocratic) temper amongst the citizens: *ib.* 549 A, η οὐει ἐκ

15 τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν (1) πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρατικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δὲ διληγαρχικὸν διληγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον ἡθος βελτίους αἴτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἀ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι το καὶ προεβίζεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν τὸ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μὲν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἴδιαν, διν τρόπον ἐκα- 25 στος νῦν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἴδιᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν ἴδιαν, ἢν ἀν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν § 4 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἔκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δὲ ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον M⁴ P⁶ Ar., βέλτιστον the other authorities (viz. ΓΡ¹ Π³) and Bk.¹ || 24 [κατ'] Spengel, needless || ἔκαστος after 25 νῦν ΙΙ² Ι³ Bk. || 26 γὰρ Susem.,

καὶ M⁴, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 28 αὐτῶν Γ, ἀν M⁴ || αὐτοῦ P⁶, αὐτῷ or αὐτῷ P², αὐτοῦ P² ΙΙ³, αὐτῷ Γ¹, αὐτῷ M⁴ || 29 μόριον...πόλεως omitted by II²

δρῦς ποθεν ἡ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτειας γιγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ιθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀ ἀσπερ ἀφεντα, τάλλα ἐφελκυσθαι; Comp. also Rep. 541 A, *Laws* IV. 711 B. It is not the 'spirit of the constitution,' but the temper or character which originates and keeps up the constitution. Comp. the application of the term ἡθος to ἄρμοις and ῥύθμοις c. 5 §§ 22, 23, 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 τὸ βέλτιον ἡθος] The nobler temper. In other words, where the constitution is such as to permit the excellence of the individual considered as a citizen to coincide with his excellence considered as a man: cp. III. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8: IV(VII). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10: VII(IV). 7 § 2 with notes (468, 471, 684, 808, 1233). Also Plato *Laws* I. 641 B, εἰ δὲ δῆλος ἐρωτᾶς ταῦθεν τῶν παιδευθέντων, τι μέγα τὴν πόλιν δύνησον, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν, διτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εἰ γιγνουντ' ἀν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοι. SUSEM. (974)

As to the argument, it is much the same as in I. 5. 2 f. 1254a 25. It is perplexing to determine whether it merely guarantees consistency in the use of the term βέλτιον, or is intended for a material inference.

ἔπι δι] answers a 12 καὶ γὰρ, alleging another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristotelian periphrasis for the special sciences which has already occurred II. 8, 18, 1268 b 36. Comp. III. 12 § 1, 1282 b 16, where ἡ πολετικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναι, b 14, which phrase is replaced in § 3, 1283 b 31, by ἐπιστήμαις καὶ δυνάμεις; also VI(IV). 1 §§ 1, 2, with notes.

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. δ. π.] Therefore there should be τάξις τις περὶ τοὺς ταῦθας: the first of the three questions is settled.

§ 3 21 ἐπεὶ δι] This corresponds to ὅτι μὲν οὖν of a 11.

22 τε καὶ] join ἴδιᾳ to διδάσκων.

26 δεῖ γὰρ] This sentence gives one reason why the education is to be public. The second point is quickly dismissed, but the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἀμα δὲ κτλ] The sacrifice of the individual to the state was carried out most completely at Sparta, but Periclean Athens did not fall far short in this respect. Aristotle accepts the principle along with the other fundamental postulates of the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly in I. 13. 15 as here. Comp. I. 1 § 12 ff., 4 § 5, and Eucken *Methode* p. 80 f. Also the conception of rearing a family as λητουργία, IV(VII). 16. 16.

30 πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου ἐπιμέλειαν. (I)
 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ οἱ
 πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῆ ταύτην.
 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην
 κοινῆ ποιητέον, φανερόν τις δ' ἔστιν παιδεία καὶ πῶς
 35 χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. οὐ γὰρ ἀμφισβη-
 τεῖται διὰ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταύτα πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι
 δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν
 βίον τὸν ἀριστον. οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
 § 2 πρέπει μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος· ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμ-
 40 ποδὸν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ δῆλον οὐδενὶ πό-
 τερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ τὰ τείνοντα
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἡ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-

31 κατὰ Sylburg, καὶ Γ Π Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 32 κοινῆ οἱ κοινῶς Γ Ar.
 (communites), κοινῶς M^a, κοινῆς Π^a Bk., perhaps rightly || 36 διὰ] περὶ Π^a Bk.
 and p¹ in the margin || 40 οὐδενὶ Π^a Bk. οὐδὲν the other authorities and Bk. (this
 may of course be right) || 42 εἰληφε Reiz, needlessly

30 The order πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὄλου βλέπειν
 ἐπιμέλειαν would avoid the hiatus and
 conform to I. 13. 15. 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν
 τοῦ ὄλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Cp. Plato
 Laws 903 B, C.

31 ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἄν τις] Comp. *N. Eth.*
 X. 9. 13. 1180 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM.
 (975)

32 καὶ κοινῆ ταύτην] On the ἀγωγὴ
 or public training of Spartan citizens see
 Schömann Eng. tr. I p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all VI(IV). 9. 7,
 1294 b 22 ff. (except the king's eldest sons
 or next heirs, Ps.-Pl. *Ale.* I. 122 B, Plut. *V.*
Agesilai c. 1), and without it mere birth
 from Spartan parents did not constitute
 any one a citizen: cp. the wellknown
 story of the hostages; 'Ἐτεοκλῆς ἐφορέων
 εἶπε 'πάῖδες μὲν οἱ δώσειν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπαίδεν-
 τοι γένωνται, τῆς πατρὸς ἀγωγῆς ἀνεκτή-
 σατες' οὐδὲ πολίται γάρ δι εἰσαγ. Plu-
 tarach *Apophth.* *Lac.* 54, 235 B. Cp. *Inst.*
Lac. 21.

C. 2. *Conflict of views as to what
 should be taught: divergent theories of
 the end of education:* § 1, 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life
 must be imparted, but only within certain
 limits. Even in scientific studies there is
 much which a gentleman would not pursue,
 or only as means to a given end: §§ 3—6.

37 οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀριστον] But
 Aristotle would not recognise any such
 dilemma as 'virtue or happiness,' unless

we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue
 only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2,
 a 42, see n. (978). SUSEM. (976)

38 οὐδὲ φανερὸν—ἥθος] Cp. IV(VII). 14
 § 8 ff with n. (903) and *Introd.* p. 45 ff., 47 ff.
 As here τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος, 'character of
 the soul' is a fuller form of expression for
 ἥθος, so also in c. 5 § 16 we have τοῦ περὶ²
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους cp. n. (1043). SUSEM.
 (977)

§ 2 39 τῆς ἐμποδὸν παιδείας] From
 the standpoint of the ordinary, current
 education.

40 ταραχώδης = perplexing: ταραχή
 for ἀποτλ in II. 8. 12, 1268 b 4. The
 three theories of the end of education
 are that it should be (1) directly utilitarian
 i.e. subservient to a livelihood, or should
 cultivate (2) the moral, or (3) the intellectual
 faculties. They still find supporters
 in the modern controversies on the subject.

42 πρὸς ἀρετὴν] Here and in the fol-
 lowing clause (b 1) ἀρετὴ is evidently re-
 stricted to 'moral virtue' combined with
 φρόντιση, practical wisdom. SUSEM. (978)

ἡ τὰ περιττά] The fragment which has
 come down to us does not include a dis-
 cussion of the question whether and to
 what extent these higher sciences should
 also be taken into account in the educa-
 tion of the young, cp. c. 3 §§ 10, 11, with
 n. (999) and n. (1015), Exc. 1; also *In-
 trod.* 50 ff. SUSEM. (979)

εἰληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας] Have found

(1)

1337 b τάς τινας) περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδέν εστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς).

§ 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, II 5 οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ § 4 βάναυσον. βάναυσον δὲ ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ 10 τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ § 5 σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιούτας τέχνας ὅσαι παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χείρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρν-

1337 b 4 δεῖ omitted by Γ M^a || 5 ἐλευθερίων? Schneider (perhaps the reading of Γ Ar.) and 6 ἀνελευθερίων P¹ and perhaps Ar.; both possibly right || 11 [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] Susem. || 12 τε omitted by M^a P¹ and perhaps Γ, hence [τε] Susem.¹ || παρασκευάζουσι after τὸ σῶμα II² P⁶ Bk.

partizans, supporters; literally 'umpires to decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests; cp. *Mētrik.* I. 8. 5, 989 a 6 ff.

1337 b 2 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντας] See 1332 a 2 n. and for the thought cp. *N. E.* I. 3. 2, 1094 b 14 ff.

3 πρὸς] not περὶ, after διαφέρονται, as after ἀφαιρεῖτε in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is ἀσκῆσαι ἀρετῆς? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκ., 1333 b 30, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν... μελετᾶν.

§ 3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of *βαναύσια*.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Ks. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(VII). 14. 14, 1333 b 1—4. There is no need to limit the expression to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἔργων as in I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5, III. 4. 11.

5 ὅτι δὲ] There is nothing strange in the repetition of ὅτι after φανερόν. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 f., where ὃς is picked up by ὅτι, as also in *Phys.* I. 7. 9, 190 b 17, 19: other instances from *Phys.* VI. 2. 9, 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render: "as to all not being required, in view of the distinc-

tion made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student." τῶν τοιούτων limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργον, because τῶντο is predicate.

11 [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἡδος for ψυχὴν [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἡδος συντελεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. Plat. *Theat.* 173 E, τὸ σῶμα μένον ἐν τῷ πόλει κεῖται ἀντοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια... παραταχθέρεται), then ψυχὴ must be regarded as a gloss upon διάνοια, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 622 ff. SUSEM.

§ 5 13 βαναύσους] What is meant by παρασκευάζουσι χείρον διακεῖσθαι comes out in I. 11. 6, 1258 b 37 τὰ σώματα λαβῶνται. See n. (103). SUSEM. (980) This is the best description of "sordid occupations": see Newman I. p. 111 f.

τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἔργαστας] "Trades plied for hire" including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See notes (102, 103). But in I. 11. 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρνία is used in a different sense, = 'working for wage,' to denote merely the manual labour of artizans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐμπορία and τοκισμός, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUSEM. (981)

καὶ ἐργασίας. ἀσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα- (II)
 15 πεινήν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν ²
 τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν
 § 6 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ
 πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἡ μαν-
 θάνειν τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἡ φίλων ἡ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ
 20 ἀνελεύθερον, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους
 θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἀν δόξει πράττειν.

15 <μὴ> ἐλευθερίων οτι ἀνελεύθερων? Götting (wrongly), ἀνελεύθερων Ridgeway: but see Comm. n. (982) || 16 ἀνελεύθερον perhaps Γ Ar. || 16 τὸ... 20 ἀνελεύθερον omitted by Π³ (supplied in the margin of P⁴) || τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν omitted and a lacuna left by P⁵ (1st hand), προσεδρεύειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in P⁵) Bk. || 17 ἀκρίβειαν] τὸ τέλειον P⁵, perfectionem William, extreum Ar., τὸ ἐντελὲς Vettori Bk. || εἰρημέναις] φημέναις P⁵ || δέ] γὰρ? Susem. (a very doubtful suggestion) || 18 ἔνεκεν] χάριν P⁵ Bk. || 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P⁵ Bk. with hintus in pause || αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ P⁴ in the margin, ἀν M² || τῶν inserted before φίλων by P⁵ || 20 ἀνελεύθερον perhaps Γ Ar. || πράσσων Η² P⁵ cp. 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16 || πολλάκις (πολάκις P⁴) after δι' ἄλλους Η² P⁵ Bk. || 21 διν (in P³ a correction by a later hand) after δόξειν Η² P⁵ Bk.

15 [τοι δέ... 17 βλάβαις] The sense, which Götting and Ridgeway have mistaken, is: "And even as to studies not in themselves illiberal, while (μὲν) there are some which it is liberal to pursue [ὧν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα 1255 b 28] within certain limits, too close application to them with the aim of scientific mastery is subject to the drawbacks above mentioned." Aristotle is thinking more particularly of Gymnastics and Music, but also of Drawing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), c. 5 § 8, n. (1029), c. 6 §§ 3—8, §§ 15, 16, nn. (1065, 1080). But on the other hand consult Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (982) Of the two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ Bonitz' dictum holds: "prius sc. membrum, grammaticae coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro."

16 προσεδρεύειν] to work closely at: II. 5, 6, 1263 a 29; infra c. 4 § 4, 1338 b 25. Comp. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι I. 11. 5, 1258 b 34.

§ 6 17 ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν = πολὺ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference; cp. II. 8, 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below.

19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν κτλ] Cf. III. 4. 13, n. (488), IV(VII). 4. 7 nn. (900, 901). SUSEM. (983)

20 δὲ... πράττειν] Comp. n. (103) and Metaph. XII (A). 10. 3, 1075 a 19 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (984)

πολλάκις] This word goes with ἀν δόξει while δι' ἄλλους (=in obedience to others) goes with πράττειν as contrasted with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἡ φίλων, and accordingly Π³ have transposed it. But the hyperbaton is not stranger than in many other passages. Cp. 1255 b 3.

21 θητικὸν] Cp. 1341 b 14. The strait conjunction between βάραντος and δόλως is laid down I. 13. 13, n. (122). The day labourer, θῆς, was mentioned III. 5. 4, 1278 a 13, 18, 22: see nn. (507, 486). The word is used in *De Rep. Ath.* of the lowest property classes, as reconstituted by Solon: τοῦ δὲ δόλους θητικόν, οὐδεμάτις μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς. διό καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὸν ἔργα τὸν μέλλοντα κληρούσθαι τῷ ἀρχῆ, πῶν τέλος τελεῖ, οὐδὲ δὲ εἴτε ποτε θητικόν: c. 7, s. f.: a very close parallel to II. 12. 6, 1274 a 21.

c. 3. *Of the ordinary subjects of instruction Grammar (Letters), Gymnastic, Drawing have a practical value:* § 1. *A consideration of Music leads us to determine the higher end of all Education, which is the right employment of leisure:* §§ 2—7, as Homer attests: §§ 8, 9. *Recapitulation:* §§ 10, 11.

The proper treatment of subjects of practical utility: §§ 11, 12. *Gymnastic should precede:* § 13. Cp. Anal. p. 118.

3 αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι τὸν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἴρη- (II)
 ται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἀ παι-
 δεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ
 τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν
 ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὖσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ
 γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν
 § 2 ἥδη διαπορήσειν ἀν τις. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἥδονῆς χάριν οἱ
 πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παι-
 δοῖς δείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρη-
 ται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὄρθως ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-
 νασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν
 § 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δὲ ἀμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ
 αἱρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον (p. 17)

22 εἰρηται] Διέλθη Π² Ρ⁶ Bk. || 25 τὴν μὲν...γραφικὴν omitted by ΙΙ (supplied by p¹ in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν] περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς Ρ⁶ and perhaps Γ (de musica autem dubitabit utique aliquis William) || 28 ἥδη omitted by Ρ⁶, untranslated by William and Ar., [ἥδη] Susem.¹, εἰ δεῖ Koraes, needlessly || 33 δὲ Susem., γὰρ Γ Η Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 34 τῆς...35 σχολάζειν omitted by Π² (supplied in the margin of Ρ⁴), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure Ρ⁶, καὶ...σχολάζειν omitted by Ar. || [τέλος] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly, τελευτῶν Ρ⁶, διλοι Vettori Bk.

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημέναι] Here and 1338 a 36 used for ordinary, current i.q. τὰ ἐγκέκλια, οἱ ἐγκέκλιοι παιδεῖα. Apparently from καταβάλλεσθαι = 'lay down a foundation' mid. So Pl. *Law* 803 A. Late writers use the passive in the sense of 'to be published,' committed to writing, so already *N.E.* I. 5. 8, 1096 a 10: cf. Antigonus Caryst. *De Mirabilibus* c. 60 ἐβδομήκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν καταβεβληται βιβλία.

23 πρότερον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39—
 b 2. SUSEM. (985)

Ἴστι δὲ...35 γραφικὴν] Comp. Plin. N. H. XXXV. 10. 77 (Vettori): huius (Pamphili) auctoritate effectum est Sicyone primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut pueri ingenui omnia ante graphicen, hoc est picturam in buxo, docerentur, recipere returque ars eis in primum gradum libera-
 lum: Plato *Protag.* 315 D, *Crito* 50 D, *Rep.* II. 376 E, *Law* VII. 795 D, Xen. *De Lac. Rep.* 2. 1, Pseudo-Plat. *Theages* 122 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (986) Under γράμ-
 ματα came reading, writing, counting (*λογιστικὴ*), and the elements of arithmetic. Most of the authorities given above recognize the threefold division e.g. Pl. *Prof.* I. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) κιθαρίσεως, both in the διδασκαλεῖον (*ib.* εἰς διδασκά-
 λων πέμποντες) and (3) physical training

(εἰς ταῦταρπίθου πέμποντα) at first in the palaestra. So *Theages* l.c. οἷον (1) γράμματα τε καὶ (2) κιθαρίσεως καὶ (3) παλαίσιαν τὴν ἀλληλήγωσιν.

§ 2 30 Ἰητέν] Nature, personified, is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as she is said to define, to make a division, to place at man's disposal: I. 8. 5, 1256 a 26 f., IV(VII). 14. 5, 1332 b 35 f., I. 10. 1, 1258 a 23.

πολλάκις] E.g. II. 9. 34, IV(VII). c. 14 § 9, c. 15 § 6. SUSEM. (987)

32 αὗτη] "This is the principle which determines all." The pronoun is attracted into the gender of the predicate. See IV(VII). I. 8. 1323 b 15, n., Vahlen *Anf.* II. p. 34. Another instance IV(VII). 7. 5, 1327 b 41.

παῖδες] That is, after 1333 b 1.

§ 3 33 δὲ] Qu. crit. coll. p. 418. Hoc loco γὰρ (Γ Η Ar. Bk.) plane absurdum est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisse set haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae et consecutionis coniungere, certe multo magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio. Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius peccatum est γὰρ et δὲ coniunctionibus propter compendiiorum similitudinem inter se permutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituendum est. SUSEM.

35 ὅ τι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γάρ δὴ παιζοντας· τέλος (II)
 § 4 γάρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιὰν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς
 παιδιᾶς (ό γάρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, η δὲ παι-
 διὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἔστιν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει
 40 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδιὰς εἰσάγε-
 σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντα φαρ-
 μακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γάρ η τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς,
 1338 a καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν
 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ξῆν
 § 5 μακαρίως. τοῦτο γάρ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 σχολάζοντιν· οὐ μὲν γάρ ἀσχολῶν ἔνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ
 5 τέλους ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, η δὲ εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἔστιν, ην
 οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι.

35 δ τι Susem., τι P⁶ Bas.³ Bk., δτι the other authorities || δεῖ after ποιοῦντας
 Γ (if William has translated closely *quod facientes oportet vacare*) P⁶ Bk. Susem.¹ in
 the text || 36 <ἄν> ἀναγκαῖον Schneider, ἀναγκαῖον <ἢ> Spengel; one or other
 seems needed || 38 η τε ? Susem. || 41 καιροφυλακοῦντας II², which may also be
 right, καιροφυλακοῦντας P⁶ Bk. || προσάγοντας II² P⁶ Bk., which may also be right

1338 a 3 γάρ Susem., δ' Γ Π Bk. Susem.¹ in the text

33—36] With the punctuation now adopted (comma after τέλος): “If both are necessary but leisure more desirable and more truly the end than occupation, we must next inquire what should employ our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or else amusement would be made the end of life.” With ἀναγκαῖον there is the less need to express ἄν.

35 οὐ γάρ δη κτλ] Comp. *N. E.* Eth. x. 6, 1176 b 27 ff.: οὐκ ἐν παιδί ἀρά η εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γάρ ἀποτον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιὰν καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κατοπθανεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαντε τῷ παιζεν χάριν (Eaton). Also *infra* c. 5 § 10, n. (1033), § 13 n. (1038). SUSEM. (988)

§ 4 41 φαρμακείας χάριν] Cp. *N. E.* VII. 14 § 4, 1154 a 26 ff.: δὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λέπης, ὡς οὐσης λαρπεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι; §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff. ἔξελαινει δὲ ἡδονὴ λόπην...κατὰ συμβεβήκος ἡδεῖ τὰ λαρπεύοντα (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10, n. (1031). SUSEM. (989)

42 ἄνεσις γάρ...τῆς ψυχῆς] This is seen most plainly in the case of sleep, which is sweet because it affords pleasure of this kind: c. 5 § 3 (cp. n. 1021). Further comp. *N. E.* VII. 7. 7, 1150 b 17 f. η γάρ παιδιὰ ἄνεσις ἔστιν εἰπερ ἀνάπαυσις: ‘amusement is recreation, and

consequently of the nature of relaxation.’
 SUSEM. (990)

1338 a 2 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here καὶ is explicative; translate, ‘and indeed,’ ‘and what is more.’ For the pleasure here mentioned is not something apart from Happiness (i.e. Wellbeing), but is contained in it. It is incredible that Döring *op. c.* p. 155 (cp. p. 109 f.) should have been satisfied with the absurdity “happiness,” or as he says, the life of happiness (which is much the same), “consists of happiness accompanied by pleasure.” To complete the logical absurdity he should have added “together with the sense of existence.” SUSEM. (991)

§ 5 3 The violent hiatus—*ὑπάρχει* ἀλλά—can be removed by emendation, or we may relegate the whole clause *τοῦτο...σχολάζοντας* to the margin.

6 μεθ' ἡδονῆς] Pleasurable. The use of *μετά* and a genitive as an equivalent for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the lexicons s.v. *Ast* II p. 310 f., Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 458 a 2 ff. Döring’s difficulty (see n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the fact that Happiness is a misleading term for *εὐδαιμονία*. The English reader need not be reminded that Welfare, Wellbeing (of which ‘well-doing’ is the primary

ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ (II)
καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἔκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος
§ 6 τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι
10 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μανθάνειν ἄττα
καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύ-
τας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν
§ 7 ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαῖας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν
μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
15 (οὐδὲν γάρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδὲ ὡς χρήσιμον, ὅσπερ τὰ γράμ-
ματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν [καὶ πρὸς
μάθησιν] καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς, δοκεῖ δὲ
καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τε-

8 αὐτῷ P⁴ Ald. and corr.¹ of P¹, αὐτῷ M^a and P² (1st hand) || 10 ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
διαγωγὴν Koraes, cf. § 8, a 22, [ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ] σχολὴν Spengel, ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ [σχο-
λὴν] Jackson: but Postgate has satisfactorily defended the text || 16 [καὶ πρὸς
μάθησιν] Susem.^{2,3}, but more probably μάθησιν is corrupt, μαθηματικὴ? Flach, hardly
right || 18 χρησίμη P^{4,5,6} S^b T^b L^b

constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man's ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick *Methods of Ethics* p. 76 n. 1, *History of Ethics*² p. 48 n., p. 56 n. 2.

7 ταῦτην μέντοι... 9 καλλίστων] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* 1. 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff. (Congreve). I cannot understand how Döring p. 109 f. is able to prove from these words, that the pleasure which belongs as a necessary condition to the life of happiness is not the pleasure which arises from virtuous action and theoretical knowledge, but something which taken by itself is an integral factor of happiness. (To this view Döring's reviewer Walter, *Jen. Lit.* 1877 p. 19, rightly took exception.) From what other source can it arise? Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly maintains (see Zeller *op. c.* II ii p. 617 ff.), can only be conceived as a consequence of some bodily or mental activity—even the pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation of falling asleep: for eating and drinking are bodily activities, and the very act of falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation of a movement is itself a movement) is also an activity. Döring is no less mistaken when he goes on to state that the pleasure which is introduced as an integral factor into the end of life itself contributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-

ment (διαγωγή), whereas the latter is really due to the cognitive faculties and the pleasure inseparably associated with their strenuous exercise. The thought of Aristotle is a very simple one: that those activities alone can belong to happiness, which naturally produce the purest possible joy with the smallest admixture of pain. Comp. further c. 5 § 10, n. (1032). SUSEM. (992)

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the face of τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν § 8, a 21, I cannot reconcile myself to this phrase. Is it possible that σχολὴ is the interpolation of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ, did not see that with these words ἡδονὴ should be understood from the preceding sentence?" Dr Postgate *Notes* p. 15 defended both phrases, explaining this as 'our training must include certain studies available for leisure to be spent in rational amusement,' and a 21 as 'rational amusement to be pursued in leisure time.'

§ 7 14 εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν] Ranked under, with: so 1339 b 14 and θετέον εἰς, 1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτῃ τάπτοντας.

17 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ] "While drawing too has its use in making us better judges of works of art," so that we are less liable to be taken in when purchasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1. SUSEM. (994)

χνιτῶν ἔργα καλλιον, οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς (II) τῷ ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὄρῳμεν γινόμενον § 8 ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς). λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν. ἦν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάτουσιν, διόπερ "Ομηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν

(p. 133)

25 ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,

§ 9 καὶ οὕτω προειπὼν ἐτέρους τινάς, οἱ καλέουσιν
ἀοιδόν,

27 φῆσιν,

ὅ κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντας.

28 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φῆσιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι δια-
γωγὴν, ὅταν εὐφραινομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων

30 δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκονάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ
ἡμενοι ἔξεινε.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἡν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδεύ-

32 τέον τοὺς νιεῖς οὐδὲ ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν,
φανερὸν ἔστιν πότερον δὲ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἥ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὖ-

25 οἶον Schneider || μέν is corrupt, μή? Schneider, μέν γ' ? Göttling, μέν τ'
? Spengel, γε μέν Welldon, μὲν ἔτικε? Schmidt || καλεῖν (καλεῖσθαι ? Γ) after ἔτι
δαῖτα II¹ || θαλῆην P¹, θαλεῖων M², congiundere William || 26 οἵς καλοῦσιν
οἱ καλοῦσιν Spengel, rightly || 27 φῆσιν φῶσιν Γ || δ] ὡς Π¹, δς P⁴ || 31
χρήσιμον P¹ || 32 ἀναγκαῖαν P⁶, ἀναγκαῖον Π² Bk. || 33 μίαν Π¹ || τὸν ἀριθμὸν
Π² Bk., avoiding hiatus, and this may be right

§ 8 21 λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν] See n. (921). Aristotle seems mistaken in asserting that the only remaining end, which music can subserve, is to educate men for rational enjoyment in leisure. There is still the end of moral training, and below c. 5 §§ 1—8 he goes so far as to demonstrate that this is the only object to be considered in the education of the young. He has then expressed himself hastily and inaccurately. Comp. nn. (1000, 1024). SUSEM. (993)

23 διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων] Intellectual enjoyment worthy of free men. So at 28, ἀρίστην διαγ. the noblest enjoyment. References to both passages will be found in n. (921) on IV(VII). 15. 2, 1334 a 17. SUSEM. (995)

25 Though not found in our texts, nor cited in Plato *Ref.* 389 D, in Aristotle's *Odyssey* this line must have followed XVII. 383 (Spengel). SUSEM. (996)

§ 9 27 φῆσιν] This is *Od.* XVII. 385.

Our present texts give δεῖδων instead of ἀπαντας. SUSEM. (997)

We may conjecturally restore Aristotle's text as follows:

tis γὰρ θῆ ξένον καλεῖ ἀλλοθερ αὐ-
τὸς ἐπελθὼν |

383 ἀλλον γ', εἰ μή τῶν οἱ δημιοεργοι
ἴσσοι; |

<ἀλλ' οἶον μέν τ' ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ

384 μάντιν ἥ ιητῆρα κακῶν ἥ τέκτονα
δούρων |

· ἥ καὶ θέστιν ἀοιδόν, δ κεν τέρπησιν
ἀπαντας.

The discrepancies in the Homeric citations (indicated by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v.) are numerous enough to exclude the hypothesis that slips of memory would sufficiently account for all of them. See Wachsmuth *De Arist. Studiis Homericis* p. 12 ff.

28 Ὀδυσσεὺς] *Odyss.* IX. 7 f. With all this comp. n. (1021). SUSEM. (998)

§ 11 ται καὶ πῶς, ὑστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν (III)
 35 εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχομέν
 τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ
 μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι:
 δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,
 39 οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολ-
 § 12 λὰς δι' αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, δύοις
 41 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἴδιοις ὥντοις μὴ δια-
 μαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ' ὥσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
 1338 b ὥντήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἡ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ
 περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-
 σιμον ἡκιστα ἀρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

36 * * ἐκ Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneider thought, the passage needs any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. <ὅτι τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἔξειργον> ἐκ ?Susem. || 37 τῶν χρησίμων after ὅτι δέ Γ (if William has translated accurately quod aportet utilium) P⁸ || 40 δι' αὐτῶν after γίγνεσθαι (γίγνεσθαι Bk.?) II³ I⁸ Bk. (in P¹ ἐνδέχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 ἀλλ'] ἡ Reiz || [ἀλλα...b i ἡ] Koraes

1338 b 1 ἡ transposed by Postgate for follow μᾶλλον || ἡ] ἀλλὰ Ar. (?) Reiz Thurot || πρᾶσιν. ἡ μᾶλλον...2 καλλους; Jackson formerly || θεωρητικὴ (θεωρητικὴν S^b) II⁸, θεωρητικὸς P⁸ || 3 ἀρμόττει II³ P⁸ Bk. || ἐλευθέροις ?Susem.

§ 10 34 ὑστερον] Another of the unfulfilled promises. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4). SUSEM. (999)

§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον...37 δῆλον] The sequence of thought here is liable to be misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has proved, or tried to prove, that the ancients had regarded poetry and music as being preeminently a means to intellectual training, which in his eyes is more important than moral training, and to the highest intellectual enjoyment associated with it. It is true the evidence he has produced suffices for no more than the inference that the ancients considered music and poetry in the light of higher rational amusements for men of riper age, but not that they adopted music in the education of the young with the view of training them for this rational enjoyment in the future: cp. *nn.* (993, 1024). He does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the question, see *n.* (993), whether this art may not be utilized for the development of character: this he discusses later on, c. 5 § 1, where he expressly states that he will resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11, which had been left incomplete: see *nn.* (1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrasting the intellectual and theoretical aim of education not with its moral aim, the

development of character, but only with the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of what is absolutely necessary and practically useful. All three aspects are more intimately concerned with the mental side of education. The third is disposed of in §§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the difference between intellectual and moral training, without however pursuing the inquiry more precisely into particulars, his attention being at present especially directed to the proper development of the body. SUSEM. (1000)

35 εἴναι] Lobeck in his ed. of Phrynicus p. 275 treats this as a case of the absolute inf. See *n.* on 1330 a 37.

§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in 1261 a 13, 1262 b 3, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31, 1338 b 2.

1338 b 2 πρὸς τὰ σώματα] The prepositional phrase an equivalent for the adjective 'corporeal.' So Plat. *Timaeus* 35 A, *Phaedr.* 246 D. See Ast *Lax.* s. v. of whose exx. *Soph.* 251 C πεντας τῆς πρὸς φρόντιον εὐήσεως = 'poverty in mental endowment' is perhaps the best.

τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν κτλ.] See 8. 1, 1279 b 13 f., Eucken *Methode* p. 35.

3 τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις] Editors comp. N. E. IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. SUSEM. (1001)

§ 13 ἐπεὶ δὲ φαινερὸν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν παιδευτέον ἡ τῷ (III)
5 λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἡ τὴν διάνοιαν,
δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῇ
καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν
ἔξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.

4 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε-
10 λεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λω-

4 πρότερον Π¹ (corr.¹), πρότερον Ar. with all the other authorities || παιδευτέον
after 5 λόγῳ Π² P² Bk., avoiding hiatus || 5 εἶναι omitted by Π¹ || 6 <πρότερον>
παραδοτέον ? Susem.

§ 13 4 πρότερον] IV(VII). 15 §§ 6—10.
SUSEM. (1002)

7 τούτων γὰρ κτλ.] From what follows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared with IV(VII). c. 14 § 9 ff., c. 15 § 8 ff., it is plain that instruction in gymnastics does not conduce merely to physical development, but also to the moral education of the mind in courage. For the difference between παιδοτριβικῇ and γυμναστικῇ see also Galen *De valet. tuenda* II. 9, T. VI. p. 143 Kühn, where the relation between trainer (παιδοτριβη) and teacher (διδάσκαλος) is compared to that between a cook and a physician. See VI(iv). 1. 2 n. (1015), and for this passage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e. Exc. 1, p. 619. SUSEM. (1003)

ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ] The phrase recurs c. 5 § 3, 1339 a 13 f., § 24, 1340 b 11, c. 6 § 16, 1341 b 18. Like τοιόντος (see n. 1. 8. 7. 1256 a 37) the precise import of ποιός τις = “of a definite character” is determined by the context: in 1339 a 24 = διναμένην χαλψειν ὄρθως (cp. 1339 b 24); in 1341 b 18 = βάναυσος simply; while in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as δρυματικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ 1340 b 3. In our present passage it is substantially βελτίω ποιεῖν, πρὸς ἀρετήν (τὸ δῆθος) συντελεῖν; in short, παιδεύειν, “develop,” “influence.” A correlative phrase, ποιοι τινες γυνεῖσθαι, occurs c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 7 f., where see note. Comp. N. E. I. 9. 8, 1099 b 31, Rhet. I. 1. 9, 1354 b 20.

c. 4 Athletic training. Two errors to avoid: we do not desire to make professional athletes, or to realize the Spartan type; §§ 1—7. Bodily exercises to be relaxed in favour of other studies for three years after puberty: §§ 7—9.

The censure of an athletic training was passed IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13, 1335 b 2—12. The criticism of the exercises of the Spartans widens into a condemnation

of their political system in general on the lines of B. II. c. 9, IV(VII). c. 14 §§ 15—22, c. 15 § 6.

10 αἱ μὲν...ἐμποιοῦσι] Some endeavour to make their sons professional athletes. Aristotle evidently considers that such a career is βάναυσος: cp. § 6, b 33, n. (1012), § 9, n. (1015), i.e. Exc. 1, and IV(VII). 16. 12, 1335 b 3 ff., n. (944). SUSEM. (1004)

In his condemnation of the mania for sports, Aristotle had predecessors in Xenophanes *Frag.* 2, Euripides *Autolyce*. Fr. 1, as well as Plato *Rep.* III. 404 A, 407 B, 410 B—D, VII. 535 D, IX. 591 C. The judgment of poets and philosophers was confirmed by practical soldiers like Epaminondas and Alexander, and later Philopoemen (Plut. *Vita Phil.* c. 3, p. 357 C), by medical authorities like Galen (Προτρ. Λόγος cc. 9—14, I. p. 20 ff. K.; cp. Plut. *De sanit. tuenda* c. 16, p. 130 A ff.), and by the Romans. On the degradation of the athletic sports, see P. Gardner *New Chapters* pp. 300—303, Mommsen *The Provinces* I. p. 269, 287—289 Eng. tr. The chief causes for the prominence of the professional element were (1) the increasing popularity of the heavier sports, boxing and the pancratium; (2) the change of diet, see n. (1015); (3) the progress made in the science and art of training. “But it was Herodius of Selymbria who ruined athletics, by introducing elaborate rules for eating and drinking and exercise. He first discovered that the human body can by scientific tending be made, not healthy and beautiful, but muscular and adapted to this or that special service: he improved the speed of the races and the skill of the wrestlings, but spoiled athletics as a means of education for life and happiness” (Gardner). The evil increased until in Roman times no pro-

βώμεναι τά τε εῖδη καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ (III)
 12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θη-
 ριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ώς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν
 § 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. κατοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε (p. 134)
 15 πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον
 τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔξενρί-
 σκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἔθνῶν
 ὄρῳμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ
 § 3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἥθεσιν. πολλὰ
 20 δὲ ἔστι τῶν ἔθνῶν ἀ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω-
 ποφαγίαν εὐχερώς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον
 'Αχαιοί τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνῶν ἔτερα,
 τὰ μὲν ὄμοιώς τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἀ ληστρικὰ μέν ἔστιν,
 § 4 ἀνδρίας δὲ οὐ μετειλήφασιν. ἔτι δὲ αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας

15 μίαν <ἀρετὴν> Susem. (after Alb. and Ar.), μίαν <ξιν> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταῦτην || 20 δὲ τ' or γὰρ Susem., γνε Ar. || 23 ληστρικὰ M¹ L¹ Ald., ληστρικά Bk. with all the other authorities || 24 τοὺς omitted by P⁴ L¹ Ald.

vince of the empire possessed so many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the pancratium is found in Plutarch *V. Lycurg.* 19, *Apophthegm. Lycurg.* 4, 189 E, Seneca *De Benef.* v. 3. 1, Philostr. *De Gymnast.* 9, 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύονται διὰ τὴν ἐρυθρὸν ἀν συμβάλλωσι. *Rep. Lac.* 4 § 6. Epaminondas saw the difference between the corpulent athletic habit and that of a spare, wiry soldier: Plut. *Apophth. Ep.* 3, 192 C.

13 τοῖς πόνοις] Cp. II. 9. 24, 1270 b 33, ὑπερβάλλει (ἢ διαιτα) ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν.
 § 2 14 πολλάκις] II. 6. 34 n. (344), IV(VII). 14. 15 ff., n. (910). c. 15 § 55; cp. IV(VII). 2. 9, n. (719). SUSEM. (1006)

15 With μίαν understand ταῦτην: 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἀρετὰς to be found I. 13. 9, 1260 a 24.

19 λεοντάδεσιν] The character of the lion is given *Hist. Animal.* IX. 44. 2-6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῷ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατος ἐστι, μῆτ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρακών πρόστατος, ἐστι δὲ τὸ ἥπατος οὐχ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, πρὸς τε τὰ σύντροφα καὶ συνήθη σφόδρα φιλοσαγγων καὶ στερεκτικός. ἐν δὲ ταῖς θήραις ὄρῳμεν μὲν οὐδέποτε φεύγει οὐδὲ πτήσσει, ἀλλ' ἔν

καὶ διὰ πλήθος ἀναγκασθῆ τῶν θηρευτῶν ὑπαγαγέν βάθην ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ κατὰ σκέλος, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐπιστρέψθενος. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treatment and criticism of γυμναστική (see *Rep.* III. 404-412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in *Rep.* II. 375 C ff.; comp. also III. 410 E, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(VII). 7. 5. n. (783, ff.). SUSEM. (1006)

§ 3 21 εὐχερῶς ξινα] "are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannibalism." These wild races lead the 'natural' ληστρικός βίος of I. 8. 7 f., 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν... 24 μετειλήφασιν] Comp. Nic. *Eth.* VII. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff. (λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις) .. οἵοις χαρέων φασὶν ἔνιοις τῶν ἀπτηρωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοῖς μὲν ὅμοις τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέσσιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν ἀλλήλους εἰς εἰω-χίαν: Herod. IV. 18, 106, 'Ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι οἵσεα, οὗτοι δικηρούντες οὐτε νόμιμον οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι, νομάδες δὲ εἰσι: Scylax *Peripl.* 75 f. p. 60 (Müller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416 A (colonists of the Orchomenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), XI. 495 f. φασι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἱάσονος στρατιᾶς τοῖς μὲν Φθιώτας 'Αχαοῖς τὴν ἐνθάδε Αχαῖαν οἰκέσσαι (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue

25 ἵσμεν, ἔως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερ- (III)
 ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ
 τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἐτέρων οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους
 28 γυμνάζειν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον πρὸς
 μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν. 36 <δεῖ δὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων 37 ἔργων
 <κρίνειν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 38 παιδείας νῦν
 35 <ἔχουσι, πρότερον δὲ οὐκ εἰχον.> 39 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ θηρι-
 30 ὁδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θη-
 ρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἀν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
 36 ἀνήρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παιδας

25 αὐτοὶ <μόνοι> Eucken; but why should not αὐτοὶ alone have the sense of μόνοι, as often? || 26 γυμναστοῖς Π² P⁵ Bk. || ἀγῶσι after 27 πολεμικοῖς Π³ P⁵ Bk. || 27 λειπομένοις M¹ P⁵ || οὐ γάρ οὐδὲ δρά? Susem. doubtfully || 28 μόνον τῷ Reit. || 36 δεῖ δὴ...38 εἰχον transposed by Susem. and Böcker to precede 29 ὥστε ...36 ἐτέρων. See *Introd.* p. 89 f. || 36 δὴ Susem., δὲ ΓΠΑ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || προτέρων] πρότερον Spengel, needlessly

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ Π¹, οὐ γὰρ Π² P⁵ Bk. || τι inserted after θηρίων by Vettori Bk.; Camot inserted οὐδέτει, Koraes οὐδέτει || 31 οὐδένα] οὐδέν Götting, <οὐδέν> οὐδένα? Susem., but perhaps no change is needed

(see *Nic. Eth.* IV. 2. 7, 1112 b 6, and often), the motive must be purely the noble, the beautiful, the good: the virtue must be exercised τῷ καλῷ ἔνεκα, cf. § 5, n. (1009). See *N. E.* III. c. 7 § 6, 1113 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17 (Congreve). SUSEM. (1007)

§ 4 Cp. Pl. *Protag.* 342 b, c. where Wroschel says: haec Platonis verba tangit, opinor. Aristoteles Pol. VIII. 4.

25 αὐτοὶ] By themselves, alone: αὐτὸς = μόνος. Very near to this is the sense αὐτή (but is it right?) would bear. II. 9. 19, 1270 b 8 "iam per se" and I. 1. 2, 1252 a 14, I. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSEM. Add 1335 a 39.

27 λειπομένος ἐτέρων] This criticism repeated from II. 9 § 16, § 34, IV (VII). 14 §§ 16—18; see *nn.* (308, 345, 912). SUSEM. (1008) The simple verb here in the sense of ὑπολειτεσθαι, IV (VII). 16. 3, 1334 b 39.

28 πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας] So Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, τοῦτο μέρη ἀλλοις αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λικεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους τῷ δρτὶ τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν.

29 τὸ καλόν] With this and b 30 καλὸν κίνδυνον, cp. n. (1007). SUSEM. (1009)

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κτλ.] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (1010)

τῶν ἀλλων θηρίων] With this genitive should be compared I. 13 § 2, 1259 a 25, § 13, 1260 b 2, 111. 5 § 7, 1278 a 27, 13 § 21, 1284 b 11 (if Π¹ gives the true reading); 'genitivus partitivus non addito e quo pendeat vel ἔκαστος vel pronomine indefinitivo.' SUSEM.

§ 6 32 οἱ δὲ λίαν κτλ.] In Sparta, reading and writing were not included among the subjects taught by the state. But this did not prevent individuals from learning them on their own account, if it seemed expedient to do so (Plut. *Lys.* 16), and it is therefore a rhetorical exaggeration for Isocrates to make the sweeping assertion (*Panath.* § 209) that in the most ordinary education they were so backward as not even to know their letters (Schömann Eng. tr. p. 259). Yet the author of the *Hippias Major* (258 c) says very few Spartans understood figures (Eaton). Plato *Rep.* VIII. 548 b f. conclusively proves that they attached far greater importance to gymnastics than to music. Chamaeleon in Athen. IV. 184 D asserts that all the Lacedaemonians learnt flute-playing, but this cannot be accepted in the face of Aristotle's statement, c. 5 § 7 n. (1026), that they were not taught music. This disposes of Schömann's assertion to the contrary. And yet strictly speaking this would include singing as well; but the expression should probably

καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους (III) κατεργάζονται κατά γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἐν τε μόνον ἔρ-
35 γον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χει-
§ 7 ρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. θεὶ δὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέ-
ρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσιν, πρότερον δὲ οὐκ εἰχον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὅμο- IV
40 λογούμενον ἔστιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβῆς κονφότερα γυμνάσια
προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους
§ 8 ἀπειργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ὑπὸ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, σημεῖον
1339^a γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
δύσμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἀνὴ τρεῖς εὗροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας
ἀνδρας τε καὶ παιδας, διὰ τὸ νέοντας ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι (p. n)
§ 9 τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων ὅταν δὲ ἀφ' ε
5 ἡβῆς ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε
ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις κατα-

33 ἀπαιδαγώγητος P² Bk. Susem.¹⁻², perhaps rightly || 34 ἀπεργάζονται P¹ ||
40 μὲν omitted by ΓΜ¹, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.¹ || κονφότερα ΓΜ¹ Αγ., κον-
φοτέρα P¹⁻²⁻⁴ T^b V^b L^a, κονφότερα Ald. W^b || γυμνασία P², γυμνασία M¹ T^b V^b Ald.
W^b, γυμνασί L^a

1339 α γ δύνανται Π¹ L^a Ald. W^b, δύνανται P²⁻³⁻⁴⁻⁵ S^b T^b Bk. || ταῖς Π² P^b || 3
δύναμικαῖς P² and P³ (later hand) || ἀνὴ π¹ (corrected by p¹) || 3 ἀσκοῦ-
ντας] δύνανται Γ || 5 γίνωνται Π¹ || 6 ἀναγκοφαγίαις] ξηροφαγίαις Γ, from a gloss
which is retained as such in the margin of P² from corr.³

not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choregus of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement. SUSEM. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαιδαγώγητος appears N. E. IV. 1. 36, 1121 b 11.

βαναύσους] Comp. nn. (103, 1004). SUSEM. (1012)

35 χέρον ἐτέρων] Comp. again the passages quoted in n. (1005). SUSEM. (1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἡβῆς] Comp. Plato Laws VIII. 833 C: τριτά δὴ ταῦτα ἀθλή-
ματα διανορθῶμεν, ἐν μὲν παιδείᾳ, ἐν δὲ

ἀγενείᾳ, ἐν δὲ ἀνδρῶν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν
ἀγενείων τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ
δρόμου θήσομεν, τοῖς δὲ παισι τὰ τοῦτα
ἥμεσα (Eaton). SUSEM. (1014)

To the "lighter" course are opposed the "heavy" or "violent" (βαία) contests: ἔστι τοινυ πάγωις ἐμπάσης τὰ
μὲν κοῦφα ταῦτα στάδιον, δόλιχος, ὀπτά-
ται, διαιλος, ἀλματα τὰ βαρύτερα δέ, παγ-
κράτον, πάλη, πάνται. πέντασθος δὲ δι-
φόνιον συνηρμόθη Philostr. De Gymnastic.
3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, 'heavy-weights,' 'light-weights,' Galen vi. 487 K.

§ 8 1339 α 2 δύο τις ἀνὴ τρεῖς εὗροι]
The order is artistic; four short syllables.

§ 9 6 ἀρμόττει] But 1338 b 3 ἀρμόττει
Π¹, ἀρμόττει Π².

ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις] The compulsory diet of the athletes consisted principally of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge, cheese. Only in later times was meat allowed: Dromeus of Stymphalus in Arcadia is credited with the change, Pausan. VI. 7. 10 (according to Pliny

λαμβάνειν τὴν ἔχομένην ἡλικίαν, ἀμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ^(IV)
καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τούναντίον γὰρ ἐκάτε-
ρος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν
τοῦ σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα.
5 περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔντα μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
πρότερον, καλῶς δὲ ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ
προαγαγέν, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὓς
§ 2 ἄν τις εἴπειν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα
15 δύναμιν ἔχει φάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χά-
ριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύ-
σεως, καθάπερ ὑπονού καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ
μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἄμα μέριμναν

1: διηπορήσαμεν Π² P⁵ Bk. || 13 ἦ] ἴνα Μ¹ Π² Bk. || γίγνηται? Susem., and so perhaps ΓΑΓ. || 14 εἴπειν P², εἴπουεν the other authorities || 15 δύναμιν after ἔχει Π² P⁵ Bk., allowing a slight hiatus (cp. 1341 b 2) || 16 ἐρεκε P¹, χάριν P⁵ || 18 οὐδὲ οὐ οὔτε <τῶν καλῶν οὔτε> Reiz, rightly || ἄμα...19 αὐτὴν first sus-

N. H. XXIII. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laert. VIII. 13 a trainer named Pythagoras, ἀλεπτῆρ τυνά, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. VIII. 12, ισχάσι ξηραῖς καὶ τυροῖς ὑγροῖς καὶ τυροῖς σωματούσιν. Plato Rep. III. 404 a says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any departure, however slight, from the prescribed régimen made them liable to long and serious illness. Aristotle himself states *De Gen. Animal.* IV. 3. 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In *Problems* XXXVII. 5, 967 a 11 ff., VIII. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἀχροι, δύσπρι-γοι); and *Probl.* I. 28, 862 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bonitz). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13 n. (944) and Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (1015)

7 ἄμα γὰρ...10 σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle: Rep. VII. 537 b. ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τοῦτοι τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις διὰ ἐντρέχεστατος ἀεὶ φαίνεται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα ἐγκριτέον ...ἥνικα τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθί-ενται. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, έάν τε δύο ἔδν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατος τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. κέπτοι γὰρ καὶ ὑπονού μαθήμασι πολέμωσι. He differs slightly in his mode

of carrying it out; see IV(VII). 17. 15, n. (990) and Exc. I. SUSEM. (1016)

cc. 5—7 discuss the place of Music in education. See Anal. p. 119.

The corresponding passages in Plato are Rep. III. 398 B—403 B, 404 E, 410 B—412 A, IV. 424 B, C, VII. 522 A; Laws II. esp. 653—660 C, 664 B—671 A, VII. esp. 796 E—804 B, 809 B—813 A.

§ 1 11 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 3 §§ 1—11. SUSEM. (1017)

12 καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας κτλ] The discussion breaks off, c. 3 § 11, 1338 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning νῦν δὲ τοσούτοις ἥπαι εἶναι πρὸ δόδοῦ γέγονεν δτι κτλ. See n. (1000). SUSEM. (1018)

13 ίντι] The variant ίνα M¹P² is valuable for the treatment of elision and crasis in the manuscripts.

14 ἀποφαινόμενος] For the absolute use Bonitz Ind. Ar. s. v. quotes I. 13. 16, 1260 b 23, VI(iv). I. 5, 1288 b 35. With οὕτω 1289 b 5; with the direct object (τὴν αὐτὴν δέξαν), IV(VII). 14. 16, 1333 b 12. In II. 12. I, 1273 b 27, there is a variant.

§ 2 15 διελεῖν] As in III. 13. 6, 1283 b 11, "decide." Ex distinguendi significacione abit in notionem disputandi, explorandi, explicandi: Bonitz s. v. who quotes 1299 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also V(VIII). 7. 2, 1341 b 31; but see note.

16 The first use: for amusement and recreation merely.

17 μέθης] See IV(VII). 17. 11, n. (966). SUSEM. (1019)

§ 3 παύει, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ (IV)
 20 χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὑπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ·
 τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἡ μᾶλλον οἰητέον +
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ
 ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν
 24 μουσικήν τὸ ἥθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἔθιζονταν δύνασθαι χαί-

pected by Vettori, ἀμα ταῦται μέρμαν Π² P⁵ Bk.¹, avoiding hiatus, ἀπαταῖ μέρμαν Götting Bk.², not badly; ἀμα transposed by Schmidt to follow 19 διὸ καὶ: [ἀμα] here, but 19 f. καὶ <ἀμα τούτοις> τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσι [τούτοις] ὁμοίως Flach, not badly || 19 τάττουσιν <εἰς τάχιν ταῦτα τὴν> αὐτὴν Lambin, τάττουσιν αὐτὴν <ἐν παιδιῷ> Reiz, τάττουσιν <ἐν> αὐτῇ Koraes: cp. Comm. n. (1020 b) || 20 ὑπνῳ Ar. and a marginal note in a codex of William's translation, οἷνῳ Γ II Bk. || 21 οἰητέον (οἰητεον P¹) after 22 μουσικὴν M² P¹, after 22 τείνειν τι Γ || 22 τι after τείνειν Γ, omitted by M² P¹ || 23 παρασκευάζειν Γ M², perhaps rightly || [καὶ τὴν μουσικήν] Flach, needlessly || 24 δύνασθαι omitted by Γ M², hence [δύνασθαι] Susem.^{1,2}

19. The quotation is from the *Bacchae* 381, ἀποταῦσαι τε μέρμαν. The preceding line is μερά τ' αὐτῷ γελάσαι, and the choral ode continues ὅπόταν βόρυνος θλῆγι | γάρος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, | κισσοφόρος δ' ἐν θαλαιᾳ | ἀνδράσι κρατήριον οὐρανὸν ἀμφιβάλλη. SUSEM. (1020)

§ 3 διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κτλ.] The sense of this corrupt passage is quite plain. Lambinus has perhaps made the best attempt at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάττουσιν = prescribe, recommend as in vi(iv). 2. 18: "and so it (music) is also appointed for the purpose of recreation alone, and all these things are employed in like manner." But then the words in italics have to be supplied. With Flach's transposition ἀμα τούτοις τάττουσιν = 'and so they rank music with all these, and employ them all alike.' SUSEM. (1020 b)

21 τὴν ὄρχησιν] Reiz correctly quotes Ath. 1. 9 F ff. in illustration of the passage, but he should not have adduced Od. I. 151 f., for in Homer's description of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the feast" (τὰ γδέ τ' ἀναθῆματα δαιτός) Aristotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995–998), a higher estimate of these arts as a means of refined amusement and the best intellectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato *Alcib.* I. 108 c the term μουσικὴ is used in the widest sense to embrace the whole of the rhythmic arts, music, poetry, and dancing: but Plato himself only uses the word to include music and poetry. He makes dancing a part of gymnastics, *Laws* II. 673 A, VII. 795 E, 813 A ff.; and distin-

guishes between imitative dancing and non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing in the narrower sense of the term, 795 Ε τῆς ὄρχησεως ἀλλὰ μὲν Μούσης λέξιν μιμουμένων, τὸ τε μεγαλωπεῖς φυλάττουσα ἀμα καὶ ἀλεύθερον, ἀλλῃ δὲ εἰνεξιας ἀλαφρότητος τε ἔνεκα καὶ καλλιών τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν (Eaton). Aristotle *Poet.* I. 5. 6, 1447 a 27 f. finds it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that either this first kind of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing properly so called—or else (as I have assumed) all dancing belongs to the group of imitative arts of the rhythmical or musical class (the defective text of the *Poetics* admits of more than one explanation, and one explanation can be extorted from the words as they stand, see Vahlen *Beiträge zu Arist. Poet.* I p. 3 [267]). As to sleep, see n. (990). SUSEM. (1021)

ἡ μᾶλλον] The second use: for moral training and formation of character, as gymnastic trains the body.

24 θέλουσας δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὄρθως] According to Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, moral virtue is only found where love of the good is present, and where the moral activities are really exercised with pleasure and delight. The main thing in the formation of character, as Plato teaches, *Laws* II. 653 B, C, is to awaken and render habitual this right feeling of pleasure: see *Nic. Eth.* II. 3. 1, 1104 b 3 ff., X. 1. 1, 1172 a 19ff., X. 9. 6ff., 1179 b 23 ff., and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with n. (1044). Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff., III. cc. 11 and 12, IV 1 § 13, 1120 a 26,

§ 2 ρειν ὄρθως, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἔνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἀδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει 30 καὶ ταῖς ἥλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐδὲ γὰρ § 5 ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἵστως ἀν δόξειν ἡ τῶν παι-

25 ᾧ] ἡ P² Ald. and P³ (later hand), ἢ <καὶ> Koraes wrongly || καὶ πρὸς εὐφροσύνην Spengel, [καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν] Döring *Philologus* XXVII p. 704 f. So Heidenhain (*De doctrinae artium Aristotelicae principiis* p. 49) who considers the words as a gloss upon 22 πρὸς ἀπειρῆν. See Comm. n. (1033) || 29 τε παισὶν II² P⁶ (παι over an erasure) Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text, γε παισὶν P¹ Newman *Class. Rev.* VII. 305 n. 1, παισὶν M¹, pueris William, [τε] παισὶν Bk.², παισὶ τε Flach, τοῖς παισὶν Reiz, τε <καὶ φρόνησιν> παισὶν? Götting, ἀτέλεστον Schmidt Susem.² || 30 οὐδὲν] οὐδὲν M¹ P¹, οὐδὲν I² P⁶ Ar. Bk. Either may be right

§ 24, b 30, c. 2 § 8, 1122 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see *Nic. Eth.* III. 4. 4 f., 1113 a 29 ff., VI. 5. 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 ff., n. (1039). Cp. Döring *op. c.* p. 106 f., 110 f. SUSEM. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 831 b 4: φρόνησις latiore sensu, syn. γνῶσις, ἐπιστήμη. The passages cited, amongst them 1288 b 22, 1289 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while c. 5 § 8 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting εὐημέρια καὶ before διαγωγὴν θευθέρων: see n. (1027). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion εὐφροσύνη, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is εὐφροσύνη and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as εὐημέρια. SUSEM. (1023)

27 παιδιᾶς ἴνεκα] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 6 §§ 3—8, 1176 b 6 ff.

28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μετ' ἡδονῆς, c. 3 § 5, 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. *Rep.* 345 B, 518 C; and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities *De Soph. El.* 33 § 17, 18, n. 2—8 (Butcher). On the pleasures of learning see *Ehet.* 1. 11. 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, *Poet.* c. 4 § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See IV(VII). 3. 1, 1325 a 19, n.

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος] Döring p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying art either as an amusement (παιδιᾶς) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification: although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. 6 § 2, n. (1062). In IV(VIII), 1. 4 § 9 ff., 15 § f., cp. n. (903), Aristotle says intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while V(VIII), 3. 6 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adducing (c. 3 § 2 f.) the fact that the ancients considered Music in this sense a part of education: cp. n. (993), n. (1000). This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from IV(VII),—παιδευτέον 1333 b 4, τὴν τῶν ἔθων μελέτην 1334 b 16, τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν b 25—he does

δων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ (IV) τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἀν ἔνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ (v.) 35 Μήδων βασιλεῖς, δι' ἀλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν § 6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν 40 ὄψιν πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἀν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ' § 7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη ε βελτίω ποιεῖν ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' 1339 b οὐχ ἔτέρων ἀκούοντας ὄρθως τε χαρεῖν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὡσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὄρθως, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ 45 § 8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κάνει πρὸς εὐημε-

33 δέοι] δεῖ II¹ (emended by corr.² of PI) || 35 δι' omitted by P² Bk. || 36 καὶ <ἀνευ> Susem., [καὶ] Spengel, καὶ Madvig || 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα after δεῖ II² P⁶ Bk. || 40 ἀν omitted by II¹

1339 b 1 καὶ transposed to follow δύνασθαι Spengel, perhaps rightly if § 3, a 24 δύνασθαι is to stand || 4 εἰ II¹ P⁴, εἴη P²⁻³⁻⁵ S^b T^b Ar. Ald.

not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (β) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, n. (1025), § 8, n. (1027), § 11, n. (1036), cp. nn. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (*ἥθος*) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also § 7 n. (1026), Excursus 1, and n. (875) on IV(VII). 13. 5. SUSEM. (1024)

§ 5 32 παιδιᾶς χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις³ In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. 5 § 11, n. (1036). SUSEM. (1026)

35 βασιλεῖς So Philip of Macedon: Plut. *Vita Periclis* c. 1, p. 152 s. l. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν οὖν ἐπιτερψῶν ἐν τῷ πότῳ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶν εἶπεν: "Οὐδὲ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλων;" ἀρκεῖ γάρ, οὐ βασιλεῖς ἀκροᾶσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζειν, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῦτα Μούσαις ἔτέρων

ἀγανιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατὴς γιγνόμενος.

§ 6 37 ἀπεργάζεσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πεποιημένος is perfect of the middle ποιεῖσθαι (ἔργον).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ὄψιν] We find ὄψοποιητικὴ an example I. 7. 3, 1255 b 26, and condemned as δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11. 14, 1282 a 17—23, III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle v (VIII). 3 §§ 3—6.

§ 7 41 δύναται] The subject is ἡ μουσικὴ, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—24, though it is obscurely indicated a 37 by αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i.e. the execution.

1339 b 2 ἵκενοι γὰρ κτλ] See notes (1011, 1024); also c. 5 § 17 nn. (1022, 1044, 1045); comp. c. 6 § 1 ff. with nn. (1061, 1066). SUSEM. (1026)

§ 8 4 ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος κτλ] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, n. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see n. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly

σ πλαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῷ τί δεῖ μανθά- (IV)
νειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἔτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκο-
πεῖν δὲ ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν οὐ
γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀείδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ
καὶ βαναύσους καλούμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ
ιο ἀνδρὸς μῆ μεθύνοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

§ 9 ἀλλ’ ἵσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὑστερού ἐπισκεπτέον ἡ δὲ πρώτη ν
ζήτησίς ἔστι πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θε-
τέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παι-
δείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δὲ εἰς πάντα τάττεται

§ 10 καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως
ἔστι, τὴν δὲ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἥδειαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ
διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἱατρεία τις ἔστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν
όμολογον μέρος δεῖ μῆ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
19 ὥδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὑδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἔστιν).

§ 11 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ὥδιστων, καὶ ψι-

6 χρωμένων] χειρογράφων Flach || 8 δέδει P⁶, ἄδει Bk. || 13 παιδιὰν ἢ παι-
δεῖαν Vettori¹, perhaps rightly || 14 παιδιάν] ἀρετὴν ? Jackson

serve as preparation for the elevated enjoyment of music in riper years. Cp. also
nn. (921, 1023). SUSEM. (1027)

7 ὑπόληψιν] See Bonitz ad *Meta.* 1.
1, 2, 981 a 7, b 6, p. 41, p. 47 f.; Waitz
ad 60 b 19, *Org.* 1, p. 523. Such “un-
proved assumptions,” like other *ἔρδοξα*,
contain a germ of truth.

8 ὁ Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here
Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the
contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest
divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As
to representations of Apollo and other
gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. *n.*
1071), see particularly L. van Jan *De
fidibus Graecorum* (Berlin 1859), pp.
17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the
number. SUSEM. (1028)

ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ.] See *n.* (982), Exc. 1.
to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 §§ 13, 14
with *n.* (1067). SUSEM. (1029)

10 Plato *Laws* II. 665 D f. τὰς πον
γγράμενος πρεσβύτερος δίκουν πρὸς τὰς
ψᾶδες μεστός, καὶ χαίρει τε ἡ τῶν πράττων
τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκης γιγρομένης αἰσχύνουτ’ ἀν-
μᾶλλον.

§ 9 11 ὑστερον] I.e. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b
20 ff. where this point is again taken up.
See *n.* (1060). SUSEM. (1030)

13 παιδεῖαν] The end to which
Plato confined all poetry and all art:
see Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 317 ff.

“Aristotle allows that for childhood the
use of poetry and music is to convey
moral instruction”...but “for the grown
man the poet’s function is not that of a
teacher, he is only so by accident” p.
322 f.

§ 10 17 ἱατρεία τις] This has been
set forth c. 3 § 4, φαρμακεῖας χάριν: cp.
n. (989). SUSEM. (1031)

18 μῆ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κτλ.] The highest intellectual (or aesthetic)
enjoyment implies the highest nobleness
(τὸ καλὸν), because it is the highest ac-
tivity of soul: it implies the highest plea-
sure, because from this highest human
activity flows the pleasure appropriate to it:
see *n.* (992) on c. 3 § 5. SUSEM.
(1032)

19 ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων] Cp. c. 3
§§ 3, 4 (μεθ’ ὥδοντος), with *nn.* (988, 991,
992); also IV (VII). 1. 6, 1323 b 1 f. τὸ
ζῆν εὐδαιμόνων εἰτ’ ἐν τῷ χαίρει εἰτ’ ἐν
ἀρετῇ εἰτ’ ἐν ἀμφοῖ, *n.* (698). SUSEM.
(1033)

§ 11 20 ψιλῆν] Instrumental music,
unaccompanied by the voice: § 17, 1340
a 12 ff. ἀκροάμενοι...χωρὶς τῶν ρυθμῶν καὶ
τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.

Comp. *Nic. Eth.* 1. 9. 1, 1098 b 25,
IX. 8. 9, 1169 a 20—25: also VII. 11. 2,
1152 b 6, c. 13. 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).

λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας (φησὶ γάρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι ^(V)
βροτοῖς ἡδιστον δεῖδειν.

διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνου-
24 σιν αὐτὴν ώς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπολάβοι (p. 137)
§ 12 ἀν τις παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γάρ ἀβλαβῆ
τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς
τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ὀλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἀναπαύονται
καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιάς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἀλλὰ καὶ
30 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἀν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ

21 γάρ Π¹, γοῦν Π³ Bk., δὲ Ρ³ || 24 ὑπολάβοι after 25 ἀν τις Π² Ρ² Bk., avoiding hiatus || 28 γενέσθαι? Susem. || 29 καὶ διὰ δὲ αὐτὴν Spengel, but the text can give the same sense

21 **Μουσαῖος**] Not an historical character, but a mythical personage. Under this name went a variety of ancient poems, the real authors of which were unknown, including (α) hymns—Pausanias, IV. 1, 4, maintains that a hymn to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the only genuine fragment of his which has been preserved—(β) oracular responses (*χρησμοι*); collected by Onomacritus of Athens under the direction of Hipparchus and esteemed of such importance that Onomacritus was banished from Athens for the interpolation of a single line, which was discovered by Lasus of Hermione: Herod. VII. 6, VIII. 96, IX. 43; also (γ) a gnomic poem addressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to by Plato *Repub.* II. 363 C, called 'Eumolpia' by Pausanias, X. 5. 3, but 'Τροφῆκα', 'Precepts' or 'Advice,' by Suidas. SUSEM. (1034)

23 **διαγωγάς**] The plural has a concrete meaning 'social gatherings,' 'the more playful forms of social intercourse,' approximating to *παιδιάς*, from which *διαγωγή* is in general carefully discriminated. Comp. n. (921), and III. 9, 13, Nic. Eth. x. 6 § 3, § 8 there cited. SUSEM. (1035)

24 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν] In order that in mature life they may find in music a recreation: cp. c. 5 § 5 with nn. (1024, 1025). The difficulty there raised, as to why in that case boys should learn to sing and play themselves, has been postponed for future discussion: § 9, n. (1030). SUSEM. (1036)

The order of the words in Π¹ must be modified. There is authority for *ὑπο-*

λάβοι τις ἀν, 1265 b 6: or we might comp. 1277 a 32, κάρτεῦθεν ἀν κατίδαι τις. Yet as at § 14, b 39, all MSS. give ἀν τις ὑπολάβοι, we should probably adopt the same order from Π² here.

§ 12 25 **ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων**] A Platonic conception: Phil. 51 A—52 B, 66 C, Rep. II. 357 B al ἡδοναί ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς, Laws II. 667 D, E. The harmless pleasures, especially those of imitative art, "conduce both to our great end, Happiness, and to rest by the way. Few men have the fortune to find themselves at the goal. All, however, take frequent rest and pastime" (Jebb).

27 ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι] An unusual phrase, which must mean τοῦ τέλους τυχεῖν, to achieve that highest end of life.

Possibly the following is a burlesque of some encomium on music: εἰδὼς ἀπολαύει τῆς τέχνης ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μανθάνειν, καὶ ἄμα τε ἀρχεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐστίν, Luc. De Parasito 14.

29 οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον] "Not merely for the sake of a good beyond it, but also for the sake of the pleasure." Even the man who spends his leisure in contemplative activity requires a change; the most cultivated would then seek repose not in difficult but in easy music, though not perhaps such music as is described c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff., cp. nn. (1097—1099). But Congreve is right in calling attention to the fact that in Nic. Eth. x. 6, 3, 1176 b 6 ff., virtuous activities and pleasant pastimes (al ἡδεῖαι τῶν παιδιῶν) are declared to be the only two things which men pursue purely for their own sakes and with no other end in view. SUSEM. (1037)

§ 13 ταύτης ἡδονᾶς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι³ τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος· ἔχει γάρ ίσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ξητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων 35 ἔχειν ὅμοιόν τι. τὸ τε γάρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἱρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενός εἰσι τῶν

33 δὲ omitted in II¹ (supplied by corr.² of P¹) || 34 τῷ omitted by P⁴⁻⁶ S^b L^a Ald. || 35 ὅμοιόν (μα over an erasure) P⁶, δμοιώματα II^b

31 ταῦτης τῆς μουσικῆς.

§ 13 συμβέβηκε δὲ κτλ] “It is incident to men to regard their pastimes as an end.” The expression might have been altered slightly for clearness: ‘but perhaps it is not right to do what is so often done, that is, to make amusements the end of life.’ SUSEM. (1037 b) The verb *συμβάλλειν* has before been used of awkward consequences which overtake an argument or an opponent: II. 3, 5, 1262 b 4, II. 5, 10, 1263 b 7.

32 Εἴτα γάρ... 37 λόπης] “The true end, no doubt, is fraught with pleasure too,—though not of the commonplace sort. Pursuing the commonplace pleasure, men mistake it for the true pleasure, because it is a faint image of that to which all their actions tend. The true end is desirable independently of things to come after it. So it is with pleasures of this sort; they are desirable independently of what may come after them, and solely on account of what has gone before them, such as toil or pain” (Jebb).

With οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν cp. IV(vii), 9, 8, 1328 b 17 (where πλῆθος οὐ τὸ τυχόν does not mean an extraordinary number, but a number definitely defined) and Poet. c. 26 § 15, 1462 b 13, δεῖ γάρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονήν ποιεῖν αὐτάς (*τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν ἑτοιοῖς*) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Take τῶν πράξεων with τέλει: often in N. E. τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος. Pleasures are πόνων ἔνεκεν, because § 10, b 16 f., they heal the pain which comes of toils: in Pindar's words ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων λαρψ Nem. IV. 1; ἔκπρονει τὴν λόπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λόπης, ὡς οὐσῆς λαρπεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι N. E. VII. 14. 4, 1154 a 27 f.

34 Βιά τὸ τῷ τέλει...ἔχειν ὅμοιόν τι] One consequence of the similarity here explained is that men forget the essential difference, viz. that the higher intellectual pleasure contains its end in itself, whilst ordinary sensuous pleasure, so far as it is

harmless and necessary, has its end in recreation, becoming (when used at the right time and in moderation) something positively useful and not merely harmless. Cp. c. 3 §§ 1—4 with n. (988). Döring op. c. p. 107 f. points out the apparent inconsistency with the parallel passage Nēc. Eth. x. 6, 1176 b 27 ff., quoted in that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the Ethics Aristotle says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is closely connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unbroken exertion. Consequently recreation is not an end but a means to activity. οὐκ ἐταιρίᾳ δρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ γὰρ ἀποτον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἀπαγγει τοῦ πατέρων χάριν. ἀπαγγει γάρ ὡς εἰτεί εἴρετο ἔνεκα αἰρομένα πλήρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. τέλος γάρ αἴτη σπουδάζειν δέ καὶ ποτέν παιδίας χάρων ἥλιθιον φαλεται καὶ λαν παιδικόν. πατέρων δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ κατ' Ἀνάχαρον, ὅποις ἔχειν δοκεῖ ἀναπαύσει γάρ τοικεν ἡ παιδιά ἀδηνατούντες δὲ συνεχῶς ποτεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δῆ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις γίνεται γάρ ἔνεκα τῆς ἐνέργειας. Here the end of recreation is said to consist in the work to be done, not the work already done, and rightly enough: recreation is naturally to lead from the labour of the past to new labours. But although a man may know this very well, nevertheless, in the midst of recreation (if it is to be a real and enjoyable rest) he will forget the fact, and without any thought of future labour give himself up entirely to a feeling of satisfaction at having happily ended the past toils, for which the present holiday is a recompense and restorative. This appears to me to be the idea which Aristotle wishes to express in the *Politics* in contradistinction to the idea in the *Ethics*. Cp. also n. (1143). SUSEM. (1038)

έσομένων ἔνεκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύ-^(V)
 § 14 πης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίνε-
 σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἀν τις ὑπο-
 40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ
 διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς
 § 15 τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἔσικεν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μὴ ποτε
 1340 a τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δὲ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ
 κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς
 ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἡς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει
 γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις
 5 καὶ πᾶσιν ἡθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ᾽
 ὄραν εἰ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.
 § 16 τοῦτο δὲ ἀν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἥθη γινόμεθα δι'

37 οἷον omitted by Η¹ (supplied by corr.¹ in Π¹), [οἷον] Susem.¹ perhaps rightly
 || 39 εἰκότως after ἀν τις ΙΙ³ Ρ³ Bk. || 40 τὴν αἰτίαν transposed by Flach to follow
 41 μόνην || 41 διὰ...42 ἔουσεν supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Sylburg
 conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Koraes one after 42 ἔουσεν, Schmidt the loss
 of <φαίεν ἀν δεῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Susemihl of <φαίονται αὐτὴν> after 41 μόνην.
 Yet it may be sufficient to understand ἤγρονται (αὐτὴν) from the preceding || <πάν-
 των μάλιστα> χρήσιμον or χρησιμώτατον Flach, perhaps rightly

1340 a i ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστιν Π¹, ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς ΓΜ¹ Susem.^{1,2} || 6 πῇ τι Π¹ and
 Ρ⁴ (corrector) || The second πρὸς is omitted by Μ¹ Π¹, [πρὸς] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 81' ἦν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κτλ] See
 § 3, 1339 a 24 l. n. (1022). SUSEM. (1039)
 Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the
 omission of a verb with τερψθεῖν τοῦ κοι-
 νωνεῖν. It is best with Flach to repeat
 εἰκότως ἀν τις ἀπολάβοι, understanding
 ἤγρονθαι or γίνεσθαι. See Quaest. crit.
 coll. p. 419.

§ 15 42 μὴ ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβί-
 βηκε, τιμιωτέρα δὲ κτλ] For the use of
 μὲν=while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337
 b 15. "Let it be granted that such ser-
 vice is incidental to Music. Still we must
 ask,—Does not the nature of Music range
 above this sphere of service?" (Jebb).
 The real complement to ζητητέον is the
 clause introduced by δε.

1340 a 3 ἔχουσι...αἰσθησιν]=αἰσθά-
 νονται I. 2. 12, 1253 a 17.

4 διὸ πάσαις...προσφιλής] Cp. c. 6
 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n.
 (1069). SUSEM. (1040) The pleasure is
 natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense
 used of self-love II. 5. 8, 1263 b 1; and
 III. 6. 5, 1278 b 30.

5 εἰ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥθος συντείνειν]
 "Whether Music has not somehow a
 bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7,

1341 a 10.

καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη] Evidently an
 emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,'
 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere
 pastime of recreation music also affects
 the soul: it is the soul and not the body
 which feels pleasure [cp. Ν. Ε. x. 6. 3,
 1173 b 10, ἐν φῇ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτο δὲ
 καὶ ἥδοντο τὸ σώμα ἀρά· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ]. Cp.
 n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt.
 After the preceding comparison between
 this sensuous pleasure and the highest contemplative enjoyment of elevated mental
 satisfaction, it is strange to find that
 nothing is said about the latter as an
 effect of music, but the question is raised,
 whether Music is capable of producing a
 higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγή;
 and whether it is thus qualified to promote
 the moral education of the young:
 for it is this with which Aristotle in the
 context is chiefly concerned. SUSEM.
 (1041)

§ 16 7 ποιοί τινες τὰ ἥθη] So c. 6
 § 16, 1341 b 18, ποιούσι τινας τὰ σώματα.
 Cp. also II. 5. 23, 1264 a 39, where τὸ
 ποιούσι τινας εἶναι τοῖτος=whether they
 are to be communists or not. The idiom

(V)

αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ⁵
πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἔτέρων, οὐχ ἡκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμ-
πο που μελῶν ταῦτα γάρ διμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς
ἐνθουσιαστικάς, δ' ὁ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους
§ 17 πάθος ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροωμένοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται
πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν
αὐτῶν ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε τὴν μουσικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἥδεων, (p. 138)
15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὄρθως καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν,
<καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὔτως ὡς

8 πιοι...9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P⁶ S^b T^b Ar. Ald. and P^{8.4} (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P⁴ and by a later hand in the margin of P⁸, afterwards erased) || φανερὸν] δῆλον P⁵ || 9 ἔτέρων] δλλων P⁸ || 12 ἔτι δέ] ἐπειδὴ Susem. who transposes 12 ἐπειδὴ...14 αἰτῶν to follow 23 τοιωτῶν, a transposition approved by Spengel: see *Introd.* p. 90 || 14 ἐπει δέ], ἔτι δὲ with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long protasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἔτι δέ <ἐπει> ?Susem. || τὴν μουσικὴν after εἶναι Π² P³ Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον δτι δεῖ Γ P⁶, δεῖ δῆλον δτι Bk., δεῖ δῆλονότι Μ⁹ Π³ Ar. and P¹ (corr.¹), δηλονότι P¹ (1st hand)

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. πήτερον πράσον η̄ ὅργιλον, αὐθερίον η̄ δειλον (Newman).

9 διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν] On this exciting ecstatic music, see *Excursus II.* p. 621 and c. 7 § 4, 1342 n. SUSEM. (1042)

10 ταῦτα γάρ κτλ] "It is undeniable that they rouse the soul to ecstasy, but ecstasy is an emotional state of the moral nature." On ecstasy and ungovernable excitement generally as wrought by Greek music, see *Excursus III.* p. 622 ff. SUSEM. (1043)

§ 17 The clause ἔτι δέ...αἰτῶν is not a further reason for inferring πιοις τινας διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι: it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstasy, that is because they express ecstasy: quod rhythmis et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? 'Quia eosdem omnino semper in auditoribus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimuntur, rhythmī atque modulations': *Quæst. crit. coll.* p. 420. Hence ἔτι requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking χωρὶς as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (*ψιλῇ*). SUSEM. There is possibly a tacit correction of Plato who in *Laus II.* 669 ε̄ condemns instrumental music

without words: ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον δεῦται λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμὸν τε καὶ ἀρμόνια ταργανάκειν, δ τι τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτῳ οὐκε τῷδε ἀξιολόγων μαμηδάτων.

14 ἐπει δέ...b 13 νέον] This is all one portentous period (*nonstrum periodi*, perhaps the most extended in Aristotle), employed to formulate the second reason for the inference πιοις τινας διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι.

The first clause ἐπει ..τῶν ἥδεων finds an echo § 25, 1340 b 15—17. The succeeding clauses are continually interrupted by parenthetical remarks: still the logical connexion, if harder to detect in a 14—18, is plain for the remaining links of the chain. *Music can give most realistic imitations (ὅμοιώσαται) of certain feelings, love, hatred, courage, temperance, § 18; habituation to feel pleasure in the imitations tends to create sympathy with the realities, § 19: it is peculiar to the sense of hearing that it can thus be the channel of a moral imitation (forms and colours are not expressions but only symbols, σημεῖα), §§ 20, 21: melodies are imitative expressions of character, § 22: hence, there is a definite affection of the soul produced by Music, and if the music be rightly chosen it can be used to educate the moral nature, § 24.*

15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν...μισεῖν] With this and what follows comp. n. (1022). Observe that moral, not intellectual, virtue is here intended. SUSEM. (1044)

16 δεῖ μανθάνειν κτλ] "and clearly

τὸ κρίνειν ὄρθως καὶ τὸ χαρέιν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἥθεσι καὶ (V)

§ 18 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ ⁶
τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὄργῆς
το καὶ πραότητος ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων
τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἥθικῶν (δῆλον δὲ ἐκ
22 τῶν ἔργων μεταβάλλομεν γάρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροάμενοι
τοιούτων, 12 <ἐπειδὴ ἀκροάμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται
13 <πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν
§ 19 <αὐτῶν>), 23 δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ

12 ἐπειδὴ Susem., Επι. 38 Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text. See *Comm. crit. coll.*
p. 419 f. || ἀκροάμενοι untranslated by William, ροώμενοι omitted by the 1st hand of
M², leaving a lacuna, supplied by a later hand || 13 τῶν before ῥυθμῶν omitted by
Γ and M² (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), <τῶν λόγων διὰ> τῶν ? Susem.^{1,2},
perhaps rightly

no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing aright in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term *μανθάνειν* is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of *ἥθος*, character, still no *ἥθη ἀρέτη*, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from *φρόνησις*, practical wisdom or insight: and the converse is true, *Nic. Eth.* vi. c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 a 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, n. (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, nn. (1061, 1066), and *Excursus i.* SUSEM. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὄρθως] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 9, 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὡσπερ οὐδὲ... τὸ κρίνειν ὄρθως μέγιστον, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἔκαστα κρίνουσιν ὄρθως τὰ ἔργα (results: in music, the performances).

χαρέιν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν κτλ] Comp. n. (1101); i.e. *Excursus v.* SUSEM. (1046)

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1256 b 14, γάλακτος φύσιν (see n.), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἥθικῶν] Music can

give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (Liepert). Cp. *Excursus iii.* and n. (1089). SUSEM. (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics respecting Music. He appears to be controverting in his *De Musica* the arguments of Theophrastos and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is *μημονία* and musical strains *ὅμοιώματα τῶν ἥθων*. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fr. 55 Kemke τὰς δὲ μεμήσεις... αὐτῷ πως ἄγειν καὶ κινεῖν τὸ πάθος. οὐτοί εἰναι καὶ τὸ μημεῖσθαι τὰ λελεγμένα τῆς [ηὗ] μουσικῆν καὶ τὸ μημονία[ν]α ὅπερ... αὐτῆς πρὸς ἀρέτην [επι]μορφεῖν τι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ [με]τὰ τῶν μηρίων μημητικα[τέ]ρων, διεγενέρων ἐδείκνυμεν, also B. IV. col. III. 23 ff. οὐδὲ γάρ μημητικὸν ἡ μουσικὴ, καθάπερ τινὲς ὑπερώττουσιν, οὐδὲ... οὐτος [Diogenes, the Stoic] ὅμοιειτας ἥθων οὐ μημητικά μὲν ἔχει, πάντως δέ πάσας τῶν ἥθων ποιεῖτας ἐπιφανεῖται τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἔστι μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὸν καὶ αὐδρόδες καὶ ἀνανδρον καὶ κέσμον καὶ θρασύ, μᾶλλον ἡπερ ἡ μαγειρικὴ (Kemke's restoration *De Musica* p. 65). Though we too have the saying, 'Let me make the songs of a country, and I care not who makes its laws,' the belief in a peculiar ethical influence of music is quite

χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἔστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν (ν)
 25 τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ
 δι’ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον
 τούτῳ καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,
 § 20 ἡδεῖαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς 7
 ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὅμοιώματα τοῖς ἥθεσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς
 30 ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γενστοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὄρατοῖς ἡρέμα
 (σχήματα γάρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθή-
 σεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα
 ὅμοιώματα [τῶν ἥθων], ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γυνόμενα

27 καὶ] καὶ^τ Μ[¶] P¹, καθ^τ Γ || αὐτὴν Γ, αὐτοῦ Ar. Lambin Scaliger Bk.², perhaps rightly || ἑκένου Lambin Scaliger Bk.³, perhaps rightly || οὐ after τὴν εἰκόνα Μ[¶] P¹ (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ αὐτὴν... 28 εἶναι in this order: *illam visionem, cuius videt imaginem secundum se esse delectabilem* || 32 ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν after 31 τοιαῦτα Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦσιν by Spengel, Susem.²⁻³. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the error, but conjectured <οὐ> πάντες without any transposition. Welldon transposes 31 καὶ πάντες... 32 κοινωνοῦσιν to precede 28 συμβέβηκε, wrongly || ἐπι δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹, ἐπειδὴ Heidenhain *op. cit.*, ἐπειδὴ Susem.², see Comm. n. (1050) || 33 [τῶν ἥθων] Flach Susem.³

foreign to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὴν θεωρίαν (*ἑκένου*) οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the *Problems*: XIX. 29, 920 a 3, διὰ τὶ οἱ ρύθμοι καὶ τὰ μέλη φωνῆς οὐσα ἥδεσιν ἔουσι; ἢ διὰ κινήσεως εἰσὼν ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ πράξεις; ἥδη δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἥδικὸν καὶ ποιεῖ ἥθος: so XIX. 27, 919 b 26 ff., esp. b 35 αἱ κινήσεις αὐταὶ πρακτικαὶ εἰσῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἥθους σημαῖα ἔστιν. This points to an exaggeration of the rhythmical element: see Butcher *op. c.* p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἥθεσιν] For the meaning see Exc. III. p. 622 ff. Comp. also generally n. (1084). SUSEM. (1048)

30 ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὄρατοῖς] We may translate “The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present an image of moral affections]—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not *images* [of moral character]: forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters on

which they usually attend.” It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32] The words ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν are a poor qualification of τοιαῦτα, which they follow in the MSS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to οὐ πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα] There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχήματα, viz. forms, gestures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματίζειν). Statuary, it should be remembered, imitates by forms only: painting by forms and colours, *Poet. c. 1 § 4, 1447 a 18 ff.* with *n. (4)* of my edition. Cp. also *Athen. XIV. 629 b*, ἐστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων δημιουργῶν ἀγάλματα τῆς παλαιᾶς ὀρχήσεως λειψανα. SUSEM. (1049)

32 ἐπι δὲ] To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐπειδὴ makes it the explanation of the preceding unlikeness. SUSEM. (1050)

οὐκ οὐτι.. ὄμοιώματα.. ἀλλὰ σημεῖα] “Painting and sculpture working in an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their frozen

§ 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ (V)
35 σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ
περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παιδικῶν θεωρεῖν τοὺς
νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγυνώτου καν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-

34 σχήματα omitted by S^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand, added in the margin) || ταῦτ^{*}
Π² P⁵ Ar. Bk., ταῦτ^{*} Döring (*Kunstlehre des Aristot.* p. 151) wrongly || ἀπὸ] ἐπὶ Π²
P⁶ Bk. and P¹ in the margin || 36 παιδικῶν Π^{2.3.5.8} S^b T^b L^a Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand)

and arrested movement they fix eternally the feeling they pourtray... Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance; and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, *Some Aspects* p. 174 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, *Phaedrus* 250 A ff. makes the most lustrous copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson *ad loc.*, "by *εργα τέμπα φυχῆς* he seems to mean *moral* ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."

34. *Χρώματα*] Blushing and paleness would serve for examples, *Nic. Eth.* IV. 9. 2, 1128 b 11 ff. (E. Müller). SUSEM. (1051)

καὶ τοῦτ...35 πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrectly explained by Döring *op. c.* p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (*Poet. c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1*), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (*γέλοιον*, *Poet. c. 5 § 1*). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds:—"and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;" he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Döring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However,

both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Döring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naïveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. SUSEM. (1052)

36 οὐ μὴ τὰ Παιδικῶν...ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγυνώτου] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the 'art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period so full of the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pauson was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Ach.* 854. *Thesm.* 949, *Plut.* 606. See *Poet. c. 2* § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολύγυνωτος μὲν γάρ κρέτας, Παΐσων δὲ χειρός, Διονύσιος δὲ δρυόντων εἰκάσειν: the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In *Poet. c. 6* § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οὐδὲ καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦς πρὸς Πολυγυνώτος πέπονθεν' οὐ μὲν γάρ ΙΙ, ἀγαθὸς θύσιογράφος, η δὲ Ζεῦς δόξα γραφή οὐδὲν ἔχει ηθος, Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of character and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ηθικὸς must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. III.

φέων ἡ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἡθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-⁸
 § 22 λεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανε-
 40 ρόν εὐθὺς γάρ ἡ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούον-
 τας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον

41 έχειν after τρόπον P¹ and perhaps Γ, έχει P⁴

n. (1043) p. 624. As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Pheidias among sculptors. Pauson however was not precisely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, or satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Brunn *Gesch. der griech. Künstler* II^a pp. 14—46, 49—51; Vahlen *Aristoteles Lehre der Rangfolge der Theile Tragödie in Symb. Philol.* Bonn. p. 159 ff. Comp. also iv (VII). 17. 10 with n. (963) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUSEM. (1053)

38 *ἴν οὖτις μέσοις αὔτοῖς κτλ.* [Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character.] Prof. Butcher has written an able commentary on this *op. c.* p. 267 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as *μηχανή* "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'initiative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character.... Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion

as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 *ἡ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν φύσις*] Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 25 below; the soul assumed to be a 'harmony') *ἀρμονία* has a special musical signification: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations: as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is *συμφωνία*. The best rendering for the technical term *ἀρμονία* is not 'key' or 'scale', but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp. the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, *Paradise Lost* I. 550 ff. 'to the Dorian mood | Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised | To highth of noblest temper heroes old | Arming to battle, and instead of rage | Deliberate valour breathed, firm and unmoved | With dread of death to flight or foul retreat; | Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage, | With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase | Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain.' See further *Excursus IV* on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUSEM. (1064)

Trans. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the mixo-Lydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate frame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode: while the Phrygian excites to ecstasy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.

πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὁδυρτικωτέρως (V) 1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς 4 ἔτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθου- (p. 139)
 § 23 σιαστικὸς δ' ἡ φρυγιστὶ—ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 9 τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων—, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἡθος στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως P^a (1st hand), συνετηκότως Madvig, συνενοφότως Schmidt II μιξολυδιστὴ M^a and perhaps Γ. Similarly b 4 δωριστὴ M^a P^b S^b T^b and perhaps Γ ॥ 5 φρυγιστὴ S^b T^b M^a (1st hand) and perhaps Γ ॥ 6 παιδείαν Ar., παιδίαν Γ Π ॥ 7 δὲ Π¹ Paris. 2042, γὰρ Π² P^b Bk., untranslated by Ar. ॥ 8 τὰ omitted by Π² P^b and Π¹ (1st hand, supplied by corr.¹), untranslated by Ar., [τὰ] Bk.² ॥ ἔχουσι after 9 ἡθος ΙΙ² P^b Bk.

1340 b 1 συνεστηκότως] Affect the spirit with restraint, ‘oppressively’. For this effect of the mixo-Lydian mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, *Rep.* 398 D f. τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίαι; Μιξολυδιστὶ, ἐφη, καὶ συνενοφότωντο καὶ τοιαῦτα τίνες. Οὐκοῦν οὐται, ην δ' ἄγω, ἀφαρετέαν ἀχρηστοῖς γάρ καὶ γνωστοῖς, ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράτων.

2 τὴν διάνοιαν] Not the subject of the infinitive (*ἔχειν* or *διατίθεσθαι*) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 τὰς ἀνειμένας] The modes called here “relaxed” are obviously those which Plato calls χαλαραὶ, *Rep.* 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμπτοικαὶ τῶν ἀρμονῶν; Ιαστὶ, ἣν δ' οἵ, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἰτίας χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται. The terms refer to pitch: ἀνειμένη (χαλαρά)=low, low-pitched, σύντονος =high, high-strung. See Pratinas *Frag.* 5: μῆτε σύντονος διώκε, μῆτε τὰν ἀνειμέναν Ιαστὶ μοῖσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν... νεών ἀρρωγαν αἰδίσθε τῷ μέλει... πρέπει τοι πάσσων δοῦσα λαβήσαταις Αἰολίς ἀρμονία (Athen. XIV. 624 F). Plainly the Aeolian mode or ‘key’ is described as intermediate to ‘high-pitched Ionian,’ and ‘low Ionian.’

§ 23 5 οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην π.] Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotle refers to Damon mentioned in *n.* (1054), i.e. *Exc.* IV p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (*ἡθος* and *πάθος*) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato *Rep.* III.

400 B (cp. IV. 424 C). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3, (?) Aristoxenus, see *n.* (1083); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heracleides of Heracleia in the Pontus Athen. XIV. 624 C, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Pericles: most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (*μισθὸς δικαιοτικός, μ. βουλευτικός*), as Wilamowitz *Hermes* XIII. 1880. p. 318 ff. has shown. Cp. II. 12, 4, *n.* (408). See 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: πρὸς δὴ ταῦτη τὴν χορηγίαν (sc. τὴν Κλιμάνων) ἀπολεπόμενος τῇ οὐαλῃ, συμβούλευοντος αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδον τοῦ Οἴηθεν (οὗ ἔδεκτε τῶν πολεικῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἴναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὸ καὶ ωτράκισαν αὐτὸν βοτερον), ἐπει τοῖς ίδίοις ἡπτάτῳ διδόνει τοῖς πολλάκις τὰ αὐτῶν, κατοκενταῖς μισθοφόρων τοῖς δικαιοτάταις: also *Frag.* 364, 365 Rose in Plut. *Per.* c. 4, c. 9 and Plut. I.c. c. 4, Steph. Byz. s.v. "Οα. SUSEM. (1055)

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κτλ.] “As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some measures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined.” On Rhythms in Greek Music, see *Exc.* IV. p. 632. SUSEM. (1056)

ιο φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας), (V)
 17 <καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ
 18 <τοῖς ρύθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοί φασι τῶν σοφῶν, οἱ
 § 24 19 <μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, οἱ δὲ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν>· ἐκ
 11 μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
 12 ἥθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν,
 δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῷ τοὺς νέους.
 § 25 ἔστι γάρ ἀρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡ δι-
 15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς οἱ μὲν γάρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν
 ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν

ιο ἐλευθεριωτέρας apparently Γ Ar. || 17 καὶ τις...19 ἀρμονίαν transposed by Böcker to follow ιο ἐλευθεριωτέρας. See *Introd.* p. 90 || 17 *cognatio ad animam* one codex of William's translation, as if Γ had <πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν> ταῖς ἀρμονίαις || 18 <ἥμιν> εἶναι Ar., <μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς> εἶναι Conring, <πρὸς ἥμᾶς> εἶναι ? Reiz, <πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν> εἶναι Bk.², adopting another conjecture of Reiz, perhaps the best || 14 ἔστι Γ P⁶, ἔστι P¹, ἔχει all other authorities || γάρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || ἀρμοζόντων P⁴ L⁴ Ald. || 16 ἀν ἔηδυντον P⁴, ἀν ἡ δύνατον P¹ L⁴

17 καὶ τις ἔοικε...19 ἀρμονίαν] The transposition is recommended by Böcker for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be ample justification: see Böcker's own remarks p. 32 (cited above *Introd.* p. 95 n. 5).

17 συγγένεια] Butcher compares Pl. *Tim.* 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία ξυγγενεῖς ἔχοντα φορὰς ταῖς ἦμιν τῆς ψυχῆς περιβόαι. 'Musical tones and measures have a certain affinity' — the context plainly shows the meaning to be 'with the soul': but the extraordinary brevity and allusiveness of Aristotle's style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text-books, οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι, were composed, it should be remembered, for the members of the school; in their peculiar terminology, Diels observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils possess the key: and he compares Galen *De sophism.* XIV. 585 K. σινηθεῖς δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο τάχος τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῷ σημειών ἔκφερεν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκηκοτας ἡσάγραφεσθαι.

18 πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, Aristoxenus, who had

previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and Dicaearchus held this same view without any essential difference: see Zeller *Phil. d. Griechen* I.⁶ p. 444 (ed. 4 p. 413), II. ii.³ p. 888 ff. Eng. tr. *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 476. SUSEM. (1057) The earliest evidence is Plato *Phaedo* 85 ε, on which see the note of Mr Archer Hind who thinks Simmias must be the exponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in *De Anima* I c. 4 assumes that ἀρμονία = κράτος, a blending of diverse or opposite elements (λόγος τις τῶν μιχθέντων ἡ σύνθετος); and so Simmias in one place of the *Phaedo* 86 B, though again he compares the soul to the music or tune i.e. something immaterial played upon the material lyre, which answers to the body. The present passage certainly favours the latter interpretation of the ambiguous term ἀρμονία.

19 οἱ δὲ ἔχει ἀρμονίαν] Pl. *Phaedo* 93; the soul has in it virtue, which is a harmony. Cp. Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* I. p. 440 L, 443. SUSEM. (1058)

§ 24 11 φανερὸν ὅτι κτλ] The problem of § 15, 1340 a b, is thus solved. And in b 16 we have an echo of 1340 a 14.

§ 25 14 ἔστι γάρ] Quae secunduntur causam afferunt, cur ad iuvenilem potissimum aetatem aptissima sit musicae exercitatio. Quare hoc quoque loco γάρ pro δὲ scribendum esse crediderim. SUSEM.

16 ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσεις κτλ] "Music

ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καὶ τις οὐκε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις (V)
καὶ τοῖς βιθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ
μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν φυχήν, οἱ δὲ ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν).

6 πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουρ- VI
21 γοῦντας ἡ μῆ, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.
οὐκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίνε-
σθαι ποιούς τινας, έάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῆ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν
24 γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἡ χαλεπών ἐστι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας
§ 2 τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἀμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς
παιδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτα πλαταγῆν

17 ἡδυσμάτων? Bywater || 20 τοῦς inserted before αὐτοὺς by Π¹ || χειραγω-
γοῦντας S^b T^b L^s P^g Ald., χρημαγωγοῦντας P⁴ || 22 δὴ Π¹⁻⁴⁻⁵ perhaps rightly ||
24 τοῦς inserted before μὴ by Susem.¹, and perhaps by Γ || 26 ἀρχότου Π² P^g Bk.
and Π¹ (corr.¹)

has this sweet seasoning in its nature.” Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1059)

c. 6 Practical instruction in music is indispensable: §§ 1, 2. Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or degrading: §§ 3–8, provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course: §§ 9–16. Cp. Anal. p. 119.

§ 1 20 χειρουργοῦντας] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of ‘playing on a musical instrument,’ ‘becoming performers,’ and so 23 κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, where ἔργα=musical performances, as below b 36 f. and in Nic. Eth. x. 9. 20, 1181 a 20.

21 πρότερον] C. 5 §§ 4–8. Comp. 5 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1030). SUSEM. (1060)

22 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφοράν] See c. 2 § 6. Here ‘it makes a great difference’ = it is a great advantage: multum prae-stat.

23 ἐν γάρ τι κτλ.] This is directly opposed to the Spartans’ boast, c. 5 § 7, 1339 b 2 ff. cp. nn. (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)

25 κριτᾶς] Amplified below, § 4, 1340 b 38 f. Cp. c. 5 § 17.

§ 2 26 διατριβήν] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults: though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, n. (1024): cp. Döring p. 137. SUSEM. (1062)

‘Ἀρχύτα] A famous Pythagorean phi-

losopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see VIII (v). 7. 2 n. (1592), for its fortunes ib. 3 § 7 n. (1517), for its constitution VII(vi). 5. 10 n. (1441): also n. (141).—Archytas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times στρατηγός, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Strab. vi. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, III. 22). Archytas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodor. in Athen. XII. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodor. l. c.), cp. Aelian Var. Hist. XII. 18, Suidas s. v. ‘Ἀρχύτας’, Poll. IX. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-

οἵεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἢν διδόαστι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως (VI) χρώμενοι ταῦτη μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν οὐ γάρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἀρ-
30 μόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγή τοῖς μείζοις τῶν νέων.

§ 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὔτως ὥστε καὶ κοι-
νωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φαινερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ ²

34 μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τὸν

§ 4 φάσκοντας βάναυστον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, (p. 140)
ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους
μὲν δύναται ποιεῖν τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους
τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ

27 γίνεσθαι Γ P¹, λέγεσθαι Koraes, wrongly || 29 ἀρμόττοντα after 30 τοῖς νη-
πίοις II² P³ Bk. || 30 παιδίων P¹, παιδικῶν L¹ Ald., παιδῶν with all other authorities
Ar. Bk.¹ || 32 καὶ omitted by II¹, [καὶ] Susem.¹ || 37 γενομένους Reiz Bk.², per-
haps M¹, γενομένους P⁴, γενομένους with the other authorities Bk.¹ and perhaps Γ
(*factor William*)

tainly not genuine, see Westphal *Metr.*
2. ed. I. p. 71. But at any rate the
science of Geometry was substantially ad-
vanced by him (Procl. on Eucl. p. 19).
In particular we know his interesting at-
tempt at solving the problem of squaring
the cube (Eudem. *Fr.* 110. Speng.
Eratosth. quoted by Eutok. in Archim.
De Sph. p. 135, 143, Ox. and Diog. Laert.
VIII. 83). He was also the first to treat
Mechanics methodically according to
geometrical principles (Diog. Laert. I. c.,
cp. Favor. in Gell. x. 12. 9 f., Vitruv. VII.
Praef.). See Hartenstein *De Archytac Tar-
rentini fragmentis philosophicis* (Leipzig
1833), Gruppe 'On the Fragments of
Archytas' (Berlin 1840), Zeller *op. c.* I.
p. 267. III. II. p. 88 f., 91 f., 112 f.
SUSEM. (1063)

The Doric form 'Αρχύτα, which was
altered to 'Αρχύτρον by corr.¹ in P¹ as well
as by II²P³, makes another instance for
Prof. Ridgeway: see n. on I. 2. 5 (p. 144).

29 οὐ γάρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν]
This remark is made by Plato *Laws* II.
653 D: φησι δέ [ὁ λόγος] τὸ νέον ἄπαν, ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς
ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι. SUSEM.
(1064)

30 Learning to play an instrument
will keep them out of mischief.

§ 3 33 τὸ δὲ πρέπον]
The fortifications of the city are to serve as an
ornament, IV (VII). 11. 11, 1331 a 13.
The Lydian Mode suits youthful singers

διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον ἔχειν ἀμά καὶ παι-
δεῖαν, c. 7 § 15, 1342 b 30 f. Aristotle's
own account of Propriety *Topics* v. 5. 8,
135 a 13, is vague: ταῦτα ἔστι τὸ καλὸν
καὶ πρέπον. The above usages in this
treatise seem to justify the writer of *Eth.*
Eud. (III. 6. 1, 1233 a 34, τὸ μὲν γάρ
πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἔστιν, cp. 1233 b 7 καὶ
ἄξιαν ἔστιν) in making grace or charm
the leading feature.

34 **Βιοπλασία καὶ λύσις**] Define and
refute the objections of those who maintain
that to take up music practically is de-
grading. The absolute use of λύειν in-
stead of λύειν λόγος, ἀπόπλασις recurs b 41;
cp. *Meta.* N. 2. 5, 1089 a 3, λύσει καὶ
δύσεις βαδίσεται τῷ λόγῳ, *Rhet.* II. 25. 1,
1402 a 31, 26. 3, 1403 a 26. Aristotle's
own explanation of this metaphor is
explicit enough: η γάρ υπερον εὐπορία
λύεις τῶν πρότερον ἀποραμένων ἔστι.
Λύει δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοούντας τὸ δεσμόν
Meta. B. 1. 2, 995 a 28.

35 **Βάναυσον**] Repeated § 5, b 41,
§ 6, 1341 a 7. Comp. notes (103, 982,
1080). SUSEM. (1065)

§ 4 Some degree of skill in execution
is needed to make a connoisseur.

36 **τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν**] Comp. nn.
(1026, 1045, 1061). SUSEM. (1066)

37 **πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους**] Ex-
cept at a drinking party, or in jest c. §
§ 8 n. (1027). See also c. 7 §§ 13, 14 with
n. (1113); IV (VII). 17. 11 n. (966). Comp.
Introd. p. 56. SUSEM. (1067)

39 χαιρειν ὄρθως διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι^(VI)
 § 5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἡν τινες ἐπιτιμώσιν ὡς ποιούσης
 τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λύσαι σκεψαμένους
 μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν
 1341 a παιδευομένοις πολιτικήν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυ-
 θμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὅργανοις τὴν μάθησιν
 § 6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ
 λύσις ἔστι τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς
 5 τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδί-
 ζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον
 καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν
 § 7 τὰς μαθήσεις ἡδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὑστερον. συμβαίνοι δ'
 10 ἀν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνι-
 κοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῦεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ
 τῶν ἔργων, ἀ νῦν ἀλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν
 § 8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ
 ἀν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ
 15 μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὕσπερ καὶ τῷν ἄλλων
 ἔντα ζώων ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

39 γενομένην Μ^o P¹

1341 a 1 παιδευομένοις] πολιτευομένοις Γ M^o || 9 μαθήσεις—χρήσεις Bojesen, χρή-
 σεις—μαθήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text. But Spengel transposed ἡδη and
 ὑστερον, which is also possible. Schneider, who discovered the error, proposed to
 transpose 8 πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις and 9 χρήσεις; [χρήσεις] and [μαθήσεις]
 Göttling || 13 παιδάν M^o P¹ || καὶ inserted after ἀλλὰ by II^o P^o Bk., “probably
 right, though hard to interpret” Newman, ἀλλὰ <κατὰ> Madvig || 15 κοινῶν M^o
 P^o II^o (corrected by p^o)

§ 5 The censure passed on music implies that the pursuit of excellence as a performer degrades the youthful citizen into a professional. It is remarked in Exc. 1. p. 620, that the feeling of the Greeks in the fourth century towards artistic specialists seems to have varied with the eminence of the artist much more than it does amongst us. While the artists of genius were recognised as great men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic, who had left the true political life for a bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising upon instruments which unfit the citizen for taking his part in war and in athletic exercises. Musical training must not be such as to fit the learner for contests of artists.

1341 a 11 τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ] “Brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty.” Even in the present day it would be sound advice to leave these out of the musical education designed for the young. SUSEM. (1068)

12 ἀ νῦν ἀλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας κτλ.] Comp. Athen. XIV. 619 b, καὶ τὰ σχήματα μετέφερον ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐκ τῆς χειρουργικῆς) εἰς τοὺς χορούς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν χορῶν εἰς τὰ παλαίστρα.

§ 8 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] I.e. the practice of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited μέχρι περ=only until.

14 Comp. with this stock phrase e. g. §§ 17—19. This tends to form character.

15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. e. g. § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1040) on τῇ

δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίους ὄργάνοις χρηστέουν.⁵
 § 9 οὔτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν
 ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν καν κεῖ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
 το ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-

18 τι omitted by Π² P⁵ Ατ. Bk. || 19 οὐλός ἐστιν Π¹, ὀλλός ἐπέρον ἐστιν Ρ⁴ (corr.),
 ἐπέρον ἐστιν with all other authorities Bk. || 20 παιδιᾶς ΓΜ⁸

ήδονὴν φυσικήν. Aristotle means that sensuous charm, that tickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: *Poet.* c. 4 § 7, 1448 b 20 f. *Comp.* Döring p. 114 f. SUSEM. (1069). See *Probl.* xix. 38, 920 b 29—36. It will be seen, c. 7 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure. Plato indeed, *Larus* II 655 D, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: κατοι λέγοντι γε οἱ πλειστοὶ μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἴναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσας δύναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐτε ἀνεκτὸν οὐτε δύσιον τὸ παράπαν φθεγγεσθαι.

τῶν ὀλλῶν ἔντα [ψών] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are strictly defined *Eud.* *Eth.* III. 2. 8, 1231 a 2 ff.: οὐθὲν γάρ, δι καὶ δέξιον λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα [sc. τάλλα θηρά] αὐτῷ τῇ ἀκροάστι τῶν εναρμοστῶν, εἰ μή τι ποιον συμβέβηκε τεράθως.


§ 9 18 αὐλοὺς] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (*βενγοί*), with a vibrating reed (*γλωσσά*) fitted in it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The σύργει μοροκάλαμος may have represented the modern flute. Hom. *Ili.* x. 13 mentions both, αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ' ἐνοτήν. The αὐλὸς was always played in pairs (Latin *tibiae*, cp. § 13, 1341 b 4, αὐλούς), the two instruments being connected by a leather strap, φορβεῖα, worn round the mouth. SUSEM. (1070). Consult further L. v. Jan Art. 'Flöten' in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* and A. A. Howard in *Harvard Studies* IV. 1893, p. 1 ff.

οὔτ' οὐλός τι τεχνικὸν κτλ.] By these words Aristotle excludes every instrument except the κιθάρη, or lyre, also called φόρμηξ in Homer (as L. van Jan conjectured to be the case before Westphal); though on insufficient grounds, as appears to me, he afterwards withdrew the conjecture, and pronounced κιθάρη and φόρμηξ to be the same as κιθάρα but distinct

from λόρα). The lyre was the most ancient and the most easily handled of Greek stringed instruments: beside those here represented Jan gives (p. 45) other shapes of the lyre and κιθάρα.



Kepion a pupil of Terpander, Plut. *De musica* c. 6, 1233 c, invented the κιθάρα about 700 B.C. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonance, being of the shape here shown.



See Westphal *Gesch. der alten Musik* p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan *De fidibus Graecorum* p. 5 ff. Plato *Rep.* IV. 399 D permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching: on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. *Comp.* *Larus* VII. 812 c ff., and *infra* c. 7 § 9, n. (1105). SUSEM. (1071)

20 αὐτῶν = ὄργάνων. The gen. παι-

δείας ἡ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἄλλα (V)
μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιρούς
χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἡ μά-
§ 10 θησιν. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ ἐναντίον πρὸς
25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐλησιν.
διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ
τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρώ-
§ 11 τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γάρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας
καὶ μεγαλοψυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔτι τε πρότερον

21 ἡ καὶ Pl. || ἐπὶ δὲ Γ II Ar. Susem.¹ in the text, ἐπὶ δὲ Bk., ἐπειδὴ Susem.² ||
ὁ αὐτὸς M³, id ipsum William || 23 δύναται before κάθαρσιν Γ, after μᾶλλον Π⁴ Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π² P⁵ Bk., avoiding hiatus ||
28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γνόμενοι M⁶ Pl., γεγόμενοι Π² P⁵ Bk.¹ || 29 τὴν omitted by
P⁶ S⁶ T⁶ Ald. Bk.

δεῖς must depend on ἀγαθούς: 'such only as will improve the hearers of them in respect of their musical or general education.'

21 The change of *ἐπὶ* δὲ to *ἐπειδὴ* is thus defended *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421: Aristoteles dixit quidem v. 17 sqq. δῆλον δὲ τὸ τούτων καὶ πολὺς ὄργανος κτλ., sed nondum docuit cur hoc sit δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. Secuntur denum hae causae. Ergo hoc quoque loco non ἐπὶ δὲ scripsit, sed ἐπειδὴ. SUSEM.

22 [ὄργιαστικόν] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8, 9. Cp. also c. 5 §§ 22, 23, Excursus IV, p. 628 nn. (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ἡθικὸν = expressing character, ὄργιαστικὸν should mean expressing orgies or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music interprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 5 § 17.

[ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κτλ.] "Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instruct."

23 [κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or curing emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1339 a 16 ff., b 13 πότερον παιδείαν ἡ παιδίαν ἡ διαγωγὴ sc. δύναται)? For the present we are only told that it differs from παιδεία, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no informa-

tion as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (*ταιδεία, δράπανος*), or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγὴ, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus V, n. (1101). SUSEM. (1073)

Besides its literal meaning *cleaning* (*καθαίρειν*) which is necessarily vague, κάθαρσις has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, *purifying*=*lustratio, expiatio*; (2) medical (or rather pathological) *purging*. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle: but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, *emotional relief* followed by *refinement* of the emotions. See the passages cited in the 'Note on κάθαρσις' p. 641 ff.

24 αὐτῷ is αἰδῷ. "Besides, it happens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here λόγος approximates to the meaning of φωνή, cp. n. (26).

26 Probably ἐκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withdrew it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1321 a 25.

§ 11 28 [σχολαστικώτεροι] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligently: cp. VIII(v). 11. 5 συλλαθόγονοι σχολαστικούς. 'Better fitted by their increased resources for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they begin to lay hold on every form of learning without distinction, pushing their research onward.' 'To this stirring generation, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus' (Newman).

30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, (VI)
πάσης ἥπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιξη-
τοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἡγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.
§ 12 καὶ γάρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ηὔλησε τῷ
χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθῆνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχεδὸν οἱ
35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων μετεῖχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
πίνακος διν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδη χορηγήσας.
ὑστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον ἡ

31 ἥπτοντο M^a and apparently Γ, ἥπτοντο S^b || 33 αὐτὸς omitted by II¹ (supplied in the margin by p¹), [αὐτὸς] Susem.¹ || 35 ἑλευθέρων Schneider, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐκφαντίδη P^{2,5}, ἐκφαντίδη L²

§ 12 33 The **χορηγὸς** was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 **χορηγῆσας**. SUSEM. (1074)

τῷ χορῷ] This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For dramas proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. SUSEM. (1075)

34 ἐπεχωρίασεν] As in 1335 a 16 n. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre.

35 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος] There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Diphilus.

36 πίνακος διν ἀνέθηκε κτλ.] The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chiōnides and Magnes, Poet. 3 § 5, 1448 a 34 (ep. 5, 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantides and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book iv of the *Nic. Eth.* (iv. 2. 20, 1123 a 23 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast; but we know the title of one of his works 'the Satyrs' (Athen. 1. 96 c). See Meineke *Fragm. com. Gr.* 1. p. 35 ff., 11. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasippus was his choregus, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word *πίνακ* refers to the custom which compelled the victorious choregus to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a brazen tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the

temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (*τρίποδες*) the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Paus. I. 20. 1 f., cp. Plut. *Them.* 5, Demosth. xxi. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actor are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the choregus belonged and the species of drama represented. SUSEM. (1076)

See however Haigh *Attic Theatre* p. 52 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choregi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (*πίνακες*). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the mean man in Theophrastus, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden scroll (*Char. 21 ταῦτα ἔνδινη*) in commemoration of his victory."

37 ὑστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη] Plutarch, *Vita Alcib.* c. 2, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words αὐλεῖσθαν οὖν Θηβαῖον πᾶδες· οὐ γάρ ίσσοι διαλέγεσθαι. He adds that both by jest and earnest Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of learning the flute: δόεν ἐξέπεσε κοριδὺ τῶν ἑλευθέρων διατριβῶν καὶ προεπηλακισθη παντάπασιν διάλος. The connexion of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous αὐληταί who were applauded at Athens were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Antigenidas and Timotheus, were Boeotians.

δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ^(VI)
 § 13 συντεῖνον ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὄργανων τῶν ἀρχαίων,
 40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἥδουντην συντείνοντα
 τοὺς ἀκούοντας τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωντα καὶ τρίγωντα καὶ
 1341 b σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
 εὐλόγως δὲ ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων
 μεμυθολογημένον. φασὶ γάρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εύρουσαν ἀπό-
 § 14 βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλούς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ δὰ
 5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασσαν
 τὴν θεόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν omitted by M^o and P² (1st hand) || 40 πηκτίδες Π^o,
 πηκτίδες Π², πουητίδες Ρ^b, πηκτίδες Thomas Ar.

1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Göttling, λαμβοὶ Π¹, σαμβύκαι Π² Ρ⁵ Ar. and p¹ in the margin,
 λαμβύκαι Susem.¹ || 2 αὐλῶν Γ Μ^o || 3 δὴ omitted by Π¹, [δὴ] Susem.¹ ||
 4 μὲν οὖν enim William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in M^o (1st hand, supplied
 by a later hand) || 6 θέάν Ρ Σ^o Τ^b

§ 13 39 πολλὰ...ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπεδο-
 κιμάσθη.

40 οἷον πηκτίδες κτλ] All foreign
 stringed instruments, on which consult
 EXCURSUS IV. p. 632 ff. SUSEM. (1077)

1341 b 3 μεμυθολογημένον] Comp. the
 similar reference to legend II. 9. 8, 1269
 b 28, n. (288).

εύρονταν ἀποβαλεῖν] The Satyr Marsyas is said to have picked up the flute which Athene threw away, and to have played upon it: and for this the goddess punished him. The earliest extant allusion to this legend is in a dithyramb 'Marsyas' by Melanippides FRAG. 2. ἀ
 μὲν Ἀθάνα | τῷργαν' ἔρρηφέν θ' ἵερας ἀπὸ²
 χειρὸς | εἰτὲ τ' ἔρρετ' αἰσχεα, σώματι λόμα: to which the contemporary poet Telestes replied in his 'Argo' FRAG. 1. διὰ σοφὸν
 σοφὸν λαβόντας οὐκ ἐπέλπουμεν νέῳ δρυμοῖς
 δρελος δρυανον | διὰν Ἀθάναν δισθόβαλμον
 αἰσχος ἐκφοβηθεῖσαν αἴδεις ἐκ χειρὸν βα-
 λεῖσ, | συμφαγεῖνει χειροκτύψῳ φρει Μαρόν
 κλέος. | τὶ γάρ οὐν εὐηράτοιο κάλλεος ὅξε
 ἔρως ἔτετρε, | ἢ παρθενεῖαν ἀγανον καὶ
 ἀπαιδ ἀπένειει Κλωθώ; see ATHON. XIV.
 616 e. f. (J. G. Schneider). In other
 legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself
 the inventor of the flute; an enthusiastic
 singer and flute-player in the service of
 Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in
 Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers
 and fountains in the train of the Phrygian
 Dionysus. In this character he encounters
 Apollo, the representative of the music

of the κιθάρα, by whom he is defeated
 and punished. In Lydian legend Pan re-
 places Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and
 the teacher of Olympus. See Preller
Griech. Mythol. I. p. 176 f., 508, 510.
 576 ff., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian,
 or Mysian, the supposed father of Marsyas,
 was sometimes called the inventor
 of the flute: and Olympus himself, who
 was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas,
 is at one time called a Phrygian and at
 another a Mysian, pointing to the origin
 of this kind of music in Asia Minor,
 whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see
 EXC. II and IV). The authorities to con-
 sult for the above are Plut. *De musica* 14,
 1135 E, Alex. Polyhist. Fr. 52 apud Plut.
 ib. 5, 1132 F, Heracleid. ib. 7, 1133 E,
 Strabo X. 324, Schol. in Aesch. *Persas*
 933, Suidas s. v. "Ολυμπος. Comp. PL.
Latus III. 677 D, *Symp.* 215 E, Ps-PL.
Mino 318 B: and for the whole section
 nn. (288, 297). SUSEM. (1078)

§ 14 6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κτλ] "Not but
 what a more likely reason is the fact, that
 instruction in the flute contributes nothing
 to the culture of the intelligence. For
 to Athene we ascribe science and art."
 SUSEM. (1079)

For διάνοια cp. n. (1023) on φρένησις;
 it has been opposed to ἦθος c. 2 § 1, and
 in III. II. 2, 1281 b 7. With περιθεῖσι
 in this sense Bonitz joins Rhet. I. 9. 40.
 1368 a 29, μέγεθος περιθεῖσις (ταῦτα πράξεις)
 * to invest exploits with importance."

οὐδέν ἔστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ἐπι- (VI)
στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην.

§ 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὄργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζο- VII
10 μεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται
χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορ-
τικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,
§ 16 ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν, καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι
15 παινήρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ (p. 142)
θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὡν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε
καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς
7 τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις·
σκεπτέον [δέ] ἔτι περὶ τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ρυθμούς,²
20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον τὰς ἀρμονίας πάσαις χρηστέον

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ' II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, *cum Ar.* || 10 παιδείᾳ Π¹ (emended with γρ. prefixed by ρ¹ in the margin) || 11 τῇσι] τὴν P⁴⁻⁶ L⁸ Ald. || αὐτοῦ Γ,
αὐτοῦ Π || 13 ἐλευθερίων ? Susem. || 14 βάναυσον Koraes, omitting the comma
before καὶ || 18 ποιούσι] πτολούς Lindau (a very rare word), *illius modi Ar.* as if he
had read τοιούτους for ποιούς τινας, τοιούτους? or φορτικός ? Susem. || αἰτούς τε
ποιούς τινας] ἑαυτῷ ἑικότα Flach || 19 δ' omitted by P⁶, [δέ] Schneider Susem.¹⁻²,
δέ M¹ Reiz, δέ P³, δὴ ? Susem. But it is a repetition of δέ in the protasis || ἔτι τι
P³, τὰ Reiz || 20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] Bonitz, παιδείᾳ ? Orelli *Aristot. Pädagog.* pp.
110—116 || τὰς ἀρμονίας after χρηστέον Π² P⁶ Bk.

§§ 15, 16 With these two sections cp. nn. (103, 982, 1065): also c. 7 §§ 6, 7 n. (1097), and *supra* III. 112 f., 1281 b 5 n. (565 b). SUSEM. (1080)

12 [φορτικῆς] Because the spectator is φορτικός, b 16. Comp. *Poet.* c. 26 § 1, 1461 b 27 ff. εἰ γὰρ ἡ πτον φορτικὴ (sc. μίμησις) βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίων θεατάς: also *Laws* II. 655 D (quoted in n. on 1341 a 15).

14 [θητικωτέραν] *Supra* 1337 b 21 n.
§ 16 14 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι] Cp. οὐδέν γάρ κωλεῖει κτλ. c. 6 § 6, 1341 a 4 f.

17 αὐτούς τε] This is rightly opposed to τὰ σώματα. But whether ποιούς τινας 'of a certain character' should be emended to τοιούτους τινας = φορτικός is altogether uncertain. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421. SUSEM.

c. 7 Which musical modes and measures are to be accepted, (1) in general §§ 2—7, (2) for education, §§ 8—15. Which is more important for educational purposes, melody or rhythm (time). The latter question is not considered. Cp. *Anal.*

p. 120. The subject is discussed by Plato at *Keph.* III. 397—399.

§ 1 19 With σκεπτέον commences the apodosis corresponding to a protasis ἐπειδή...κωντέοι, b 9—18: so that unless δέ is changed to δῆ, it had better (with Schneider and Bonitz) be omitted: *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 421. The difficulties of this long period are discussed by Bonitz *Arist. Stud.* III. pp. 95—99 (61—65). SUSEM.

Bonitz suggests b 20 the excision of καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, (1) because no satisfactory sense can be given to καὶ, (2) because two questions are distinguished, and it is the second one, beginning at ἔτειτα, which has to do with Education. Further he is inclined to extend the period as far as b 32 περὶ αἰτῶν, reading ἐπειδή δῆ at 23, and making νομίσαντες μὲν οὖν begin the apodosis to this (secondary) protasis b 23 ἐπειδή...26 εὑρίσκων, on the ground that it is impossible for ἐπειδή to introduce a second protasis referring to the preceding apodosis σκεπτέον...ἔτερον.

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἡ διαιρετέον, ἐπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παι-
δείαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ
τίνα ἔτερον, τρίτον δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὄρῳμεν διὰ
μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δὲ ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λε-
25 ληθέναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον
προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὑρυθμον.
§ 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν
μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τιγχάνουσιν
ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
30 καθ' ἕκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς Βουλο-
μένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς omitted by P⁴-S^b T^b L^a || 23 τρίτον δεῖ (δὲ P^b L^b) before τῶν ἔτερον Γ Π Bk., τρίτον δὲ with the transposition Susem. δεῖ untranslated by Ar., [δεῖ] Koraes; Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be corrupt || 25 δύναμιν after ἔχει P⁴-S^b T^b Bk., cp. 1339 a 15 || [καὶ] ? Susem. || 31 νομικῶς *in genere* Ar., γενικῶς Bas.³ in the margin, λογικῶς Koraes, σωτρόμενος Flach || διέλομεν P⁴ S^b T^b and M^a (1st hand), διέλομεν or διέλομεν apparently Γ

21 τοῖς... διαπονοῦσι] The *dativus commodi*, not the dative after τῶν αὐτῶν. "Whether for those whose work is educational we shall make the same division." After this ἡ τρίτον δεῖ τῶν ἔτερον Γ Π seems hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be understood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the harshness, if not impossibility, of supplying an infinitive for δεῖ from θέμοις.

22 ἡ τῶν ἔτερον, τρίτον δὲ] Veram mihi emendandi rationem inventam esse spero, cum en coniecerim. Si haec spes me non sefelliit, v. 25 καὶ significat "etiam," et sic quidem ferri forsitan, sed vel sic dicere malim: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421. SUSEM.

25 καὶ πότερον κτλ.] In the *Introd.* p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the discussion of this question is no longer extant in our present treatise. SUSEM. (1081)

The whole passage may be rendered: We have still to consider the question of musical modes and rhythms: whether all the modes and all the rhythms should be employed or a distinction made between them: secondly, whether the same distinction will serve for those whose work is teaching, or whether we shall make a new one: thirdly, as we find Music to consist of melody and rhythm, and the influence which each of them has upon education ought not to be overlooked, [also] whether the preference must be given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.

§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention

to the close similarity of phrase between this passage and IV(VII). I. 2, 1323 a 22.

28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας κτλ] See nn (1055, 1053, 1103). Perhaps intended to intimate that Plato passed judgment on these matters without sufficient musical knowledge. See § 9. SUSEM. (1082)

31 νομικῶς] 'Formally.' Idem sene significat atque νόμου χάριν *Meta.* XII(M). 1. 4, 1076 a 27: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421. SUSEM.

The passage from the *Metaphysics* runs thus: ἐπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν ἰδῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ δօν νόμου χάριν. Here ἀπλῶς seems to mean 'in general terms,' much as καθόλου (so Eudemus *σωτῆμα* in the parallel passage *E. E.* 1. 8, 1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz = simply (a sense nearly akin to χωρὶς); quaestionem de numeris et de principiis cum hac de ideis quaestione nondum vult coniungi). The precise reference in νόμου too is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's own practice of criticizing his predecessors: Bernays rendered νόμου χάριν by *dicis causa*: Diels disapproving of this remarks that νόμοις is not δοτον, nor does the phrase = δοτας χάριν, and prefers to render it "to comply with the prevailing custom, the fashion." It seems best to modify Bernays' interpretation a little. The original meaning is "only so far as to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e. "under compulsion and reluctantly." Other authors use the phrase thus, of what is

§ 3 μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαιρεσιν ἀποδεῖ,
χόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσι τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,
τὰ μὲν ἥθικά τὰ δὲ πρακτικά τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικά τιθέντες,
35 καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἔκαστα τούτων οἰκεῖαν

done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched: e.g. Diphilus *Zωγράφοι Fr. 2* l. 13 apud Athen. VII. 291 A: οὐδὲν ἥδες ποιεῖ γάρ οἵτος, ἀλλ' θσον νόμον χάριν, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Bernays *Die Dialoge* p. 150, Forchhammer *Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden* p. 51 f., Diels *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 488, Susemihl in *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 273. *τοὺς τέντοις*] With the plural comp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. 1. 1179 a 34, *Ικαρος ἔργα τοῦ τέντοις* instead of the more usual *τέντη*, 1276 b 19 n. "Contenting ourselves with a formal discussion in outline only."

§ 3 The construction is ἐτελέσθε... ἀποδέχομεθα ... ὡς διαιροῦσι ... καὶ ... τιθέσαι, *φανέν' δ' οὐ μᾶς ... χάριν* (καὶ γάρ... ἀνάπτωσι) all of which is the protasis, the apodosis beginning with *φανερόν*. Translate: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into ethical, scenic, ecstatic [literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy], as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by *purgation* will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, thirdly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."

33. *τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ*] Bergk *Rhein. Mus.* XIX. p. 603 plausibly suggests that the reference is to Aristotle's own pupil Aristoxenus. Cp. also § 8 n. (1104). SUSEM. (1083)

34. *τὰ μὲν ἥθικά κτλ.*] This division

is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. *ἥθος, πρᾶξις, πάθος*: characters, actions, emotions (c. 5 §§ 18—22, IV[VII]. 17. 10, cp. n. (963), *Poet.* c. 1 § 5, 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with *nn.* (1089, 1096, 1101), cp. *nn.* (1047, 1054). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions as such, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Pythian *νόμος* (see Hiller 'Sakadas the flute-player' *Rhein. Mus.* XXXI. 1876, p. 79 ff., Guhrauer *Der pythische νόμος Jahrb. für Philol. Suppl.* N. S. VIII. p. 309 ff.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the *πρακτικαὶ ἀρμονίαι* express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that *πρᾶξις* includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. IV[VII]. 17. 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSEM. (1084)

The second of the three classes (*πρακτικὰ μέλη, πρακτικαὶ ἀρμονίαι*) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious: the third the wild excited airs, at once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian *νόμος*, or arming for the fray, as in a lost tragedy: *Probl.* XIX. 48, *ἥθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηρυόνῳ* [cp. Nauck *Frag.* p. 762] *ἡ ξεόδος καὶ ἡ ἔξοδος ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηται.*

ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέλος τιθέασι, φαμὲν δ' οὐ μιᾶς ἐν
ἀφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων
ριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ
γομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς
40 ποιητικῆς ἑροῦμεν σαφέστερον—, τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγω-
πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπταν-
1342 α φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν
παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων

36 μέλος Tyrwhitt (on *Poet.* c. 6), μέρος Γ Π Bk. Susem.¹ in the text; Koraes
pects τιθέασι || 38 καὶ inserted before παιδείας by Pl.²⁻⁴ || παιδεῖας Π¹ Π², το-
apparently P⁶ (corr.) || 40 τρίτον δὲ] καὶ ταύτη Liepert (*Arist. u. d. Zweck*
Kunst, Passau 1862 p. 13, n. 3), ταύτης δὲ ἦ, or at least ταύτης δὲ, Susem.
Comm. n. (1101). Spengel would transpose τρίτον δὲ to follow διαγωγή, while
|| διαγωγή <καὶ> Liepert and Susemihl, διαγωγή <ἢ> Susem.², which is be-
and absolutely necessary if ταύτης δὲ ἦ just before is right. See n. (1101). [διαγωγή] Welldon, wrongly || 41 [πρὸς] τὴν ? Susem.

1342 α 1 οὐ...2 χρηστέον omitted by Π¹ || 3 ἀκρόασιν] κάθαρσιν Paris, 2043
Twining *Poet.* p. 243 (ed. 1), II. p. 7 (ed. 2), decidedly right: see Comm.

39 πάλιν δὲ τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς]
Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the
Poetics is no longer extant. Vahlen gives
good reasons for believing that it came
after the discussion of Comedy now lost:
see *Arist. Aufsätze* III. p. 13 s.f. (*Wiener*
Sitzungsber. LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) SUSEM.
(1085)

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν] At first
sight there is a difficulty, if κάθαρσις and
διαγωγή constitute separate ends. What
else than διαγωγή, as described above,
see n. (1000), could express the aim of
the concerts and musical exhibitions which
are productive of κάθαρσις more than
μάθησις (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that
it is strange to find, in the received text,
διαγωγή apparently explained by ἀνάπτασις
with which it is so often contrasted. Nor
is it possible to reconcile the three ad-
vantages attendant on the use of music
here with the three ends of musical
education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2-4 and
easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp.
Bernays *Rhein. Mus.* XIV. 1889 p. 371 f.,
Über die tragische Katharsis (ed. 2) p.
125f. See however Exc. v. p. 638. If the
two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to mu-
sic as a means of education, all the three
ends there given (διαγωγή, παιδεία = ἀρετή,
ἀνεσί = ἀνάπτασις) are summed up under
the single phrase παιδείας ἔνεκα of our
context. That is, though preparatory to

διαγωγή (since those who have not learned
when young can never fully enjoy man's
the educational use must be conceived
as distinct. Then there is further
emotional or pathological use (καθάρσις)
now introduced for the first time. Pla-
that does not attend on the music
ployed in education. It should be re-
marked that Zeller (*op. c.* p. 771 n. 1) insists
fourfold use here: he would separate
(3) πρὸς διαγωγήν, the following c.
(4) πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ...ἀνάπτασιν.

1342 α 3 ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις] In
class the Dorian Mode stands first.
Aristotle says himself § 8. But
Excurs. IV n. (1054) it seems strange
should speak of more than one ἡθικῶν
ἀρμονιῶν, since only the Aeolian and
haps the antiquated Locrian and Boehmian
can go with the Dorian; indeed even
Aeolian forms a transition to the εἰδικὴ πρακτικαὶ: cp. n. (1103).
Excurs. IV it would appear that Lydian
Hypo-phrygian (Ionian), and pos-
Hypo-lydian constitute the next group
πρακτικαὶ: while the ecstatic are
Phrygian, Mixolydian, high-pitched
Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (the
this was identical with the Mixolydian)
see pp. 620, 631. SUSEM. (1086)

πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτ. X.] "But
listening to while other people
ἀκρόασις is a conveniently general

§ 4 ρουργούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. ὁ (VII)
 5 γὰρ περὶ ἑνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἴσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν (p. 143)
 πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἡττοῦ διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον,
 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δὲ ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ

⁴ After ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς Reinkens (*Arist. üb. Kunst* pp. 145, 156) supposes that a definition of κάθαρσις has been lost and the words following mutilated; wrongly

under which κάθαρσις and διαγωγὴ can be included.

⁴ καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καὶ = 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from πρακτικαὶ and ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ such others as, though ἡθικαὶ, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἡθικώταται would be exceptions: yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see n. (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* LXXXV. 1862, p. 416 is admitted by Döring *Philologus* XXVII. p. 724, though I regret that in *Kunstlehre des Aris.* p. 283 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared *Philol.* XXI. p. 501.) Not to mention others, the Dorian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of πρακτικαὶ ἀριθμοὶ should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. n. (1054), and § 5, τὰ μέλη with n. (1096). SUSEM. (1087, 1088)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Zeller, p. 774, n. (2).

§§ 4, 5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic 'modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 256): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in ταἰδεῖα, the 'ecstatic' in κάθαρσις [see however n. 1007], the πρακτικαὶ perhaps as military music. *Besides this*, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two

species ἡθικὰ and πρακτικὰ are concerned: in respect of ecstatic music it sounds a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term κάθαρσις as well, Aristotle proceeds with §§ 4, 5. This enables him to give the explanation of κάθαρσις in general terms (ἀπλῶς) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, κορυφαῖταισμός." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aristides Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 332. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seizure by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take ἐκ τῶν τερψίων μελῶν with δράμειν: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hagfors p. 13 f.

⁷ οἷον Θεος καὶ φόβος] From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here adduced *not* with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my *Introd.* to the *Poetics* pp. 36—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See e. g. § 18 n. (1047), 7 § 3 (1084), § 5 (1096), § 8 (1101). SUSEM. (1089)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: *Introd.* p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-sprawled spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Bernays in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror

8 ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακόχιμοί τινες εἰσίν· ἐκ τῶν δ' [VI]
ἱερῶν μελῶν ὄρῳμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἔξοργια-
το ζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυ-
χόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταῦτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν

8 δ'] δὲ before τῶν P⁴⁻⁶ L¹ Ald. Bk., after 9 ιερῶν P⁶ || 9 [δταν...το μέλεσι] Susem.², see p. 640 || 10 καθισταμένας Π¹ Ι² (corrected by p¹) || τύχοντα Μ¹, τυχόντας possibly Γ || 11 [καὶ] Spengel, τῆς? Ueberweg formerly, <τῆς> [καὶ] Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δῆ] δὲ Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακόχιμος] 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, *κορυφαιτιασμός*. Plato uses *κατοκωχή* for inspiration, *Phaedr.* 245 A, *Ion* 536 C. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the mss. agree here and 1269 b 30 in an irrational form. But in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 3, 1179 b 9 K^b gives *κατοκόχιμος*.)

ἐκ τῶν δ' ιαρέων μελῶν] Join with καθισταμένους, not with ὄρῳμεν. See Bursian's *Jahresber. LVII.* p. 174 [and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 356 a 41]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. II. p. 621. SUSEM. (1090)

9 δταν χρήσωνται] "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. SUSEM. (1091)

Like κίνησις, καθισταθαι, κουφίζεσθαι, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. τῆσι φαρμακῆσι χρέοθαι, III. 859 κλινομοίσι χρέοθαι, I. 82 τῷ αὐτῇ χρῆσιν (remedy, treatment) ἀει προσδέχεσθαι (Döring). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τῷ μονικῷ χρῆσθαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; i.e. καταστατέαν (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) φασίν εἶναι τῷ μελῳδῇ, ἢτοι καὶ αὐτοὺς μιμήσει τῷ τῇ φύσεως ἀλογον ἀπομειλητούμενοι,... ἢ καὶ δὲ ἀκοής [όψεως] φόβοις τὸν τοινδεῖς ἀποτρεπούμενος, "the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening."

ἔξοργιατο] See ὄργαστικόν, 1341 a 22, n. (1072), and ὄργαστικά, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). SUSEM. (1092)

10 καθισταμένους] The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Döring has shown [see Steph. s. v. L. and S. quote only ἐπανα- καθ. Hippocr. 97, add I. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle καθισταθαι simply means 'to calm oneself,' to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense: e.g. *De Memor.* c. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, δὸδ καὶ ὄργαι καὶ φόβοι, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντικανούντων τῶν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, *De Somn.* c. 3 § 25, 461 a 25, ἡ δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μη νοσώδης (ἀναθυματίας) καταφέρει σωτηρίαν. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. κατάστασις *Rhet.* I. 11. 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1095), p. 640. SUSEM. (1093)

ώσπερ λαρπέλας τυχόντας καὶ καθάροις] The ὥσπερ marks the introduction of a metaphor: both λαρπέλα and καθάροι then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, nor of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homoeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homoeopathic element will be least represented. SUSEM. (1094)

Comp. II. 7. 11, 1267 a 7 f., διὰ τὴν ταΐην (sc. ἐπιθυμίας) διόκησοντι λαρπέλα.

§ 5 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in

καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς δλως πα- (VII)
θητικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων
ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τίνα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι
μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρικὰ παρέ-

τις τὸς ἀλλως Ατ., τὸς <ἄλλως> δλως? Susem., δλως τὸς Reiz not badly; but perhaps no change is needed. Döring (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 713) once conjectured [καὶ] τοὺς δλως: now (*Kunstlehre des Arist.* p. 257 n.) he prefers to accept the suggestion of Reiz || 15 καθαρικὰ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text and Thurot, who assumed a lacuna before δλως needlessly, see Comm.; πρακτικὰ Sauppe

general, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantiasm) come only morbid patients: here the world at large are included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as these passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficial effect which frees the 'o'er fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure (μεθ' ἡδονῆς).

13 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει] In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1260 a 19, 1261 b 35 n. Bernays p. 88 (188) shows that the principle of the cure of Bacchic delirium (Corybantiasm) was observed by Plato (*Laws* VII. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle," observes Butcher, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion, Bernays p. 46 (164) ff.

14 τίνα κάθαρσιν] This implies that the *catharsis* is not in all cases precisely of the same kind. The *catharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm' or morbid ecstasy. See the note on κάθαρσις p. 641. SUSEM. (1095)

κουφίζεσθαι] For the medical sense see *Probl.* III. 17, 873 b 22 (of the disease); II. 22, 868 a 36, b 6; IV. 30, 880 a 33 (of the patient). Cp. Hippocr. I. 177, III. 715 K. (Döring).

§ 6 15 τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρικὰ] Thus

the authorities. Sauppe's emendation τὰ πρακτικὰ was adopted in Susem²⁻³. See *Excursus v.* p. 638 f. especially p. 640 n. 1, and generally n. (1088). SUSEM. (1096)

In handling a *locus classicus* like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the MSS. leaves the sentence enigmatical. (1) Does it merely emphasize τὰ μέλη as opposed to ἀρμονία, a 4? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For μέλη are mentioned a 9 f., not to urge with Thurot *Études* p. 103 that Aristotle as little distinguishes between ἀρμονία and μέλη as a modern critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with μέλη; see e.g. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1, 7 § 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4–15 must be καθαρικά. The new species should be πρακτικά—of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is alluded to § 5, a 11–15, and this apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (χαρὰ ἀφλαβή) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4–15? If so, the 'harmless delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. (2) says that music purges the παθητικός, and affords enjoyment to all. Döring p. 260 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, κάθαρσις ἀλλώς, of morbid patients (whether suffering from the malady of Bacchic frenzy, or hypochondriacs through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music heard at concerts under ordinary circum-

§ 6 χει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύ-^{τη}
ταις ἄρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι * * θετέον τοὺς τὴν
[θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειρίζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δὲ
θεατὴς διττός, δὲ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, δὲ δὲ
20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ-
§ 7 κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγώνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
πρὸς ἀνάπτασιν εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε-
στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὗτοι καὶ τῶν ἄρμονιῶν

16 χώραν Π¹ (emended in P¹ by corr.¹) and P⁸ (corr.¹) || 17 θεατέον P³-S^bT^bL^aAr.
Ald. and P¹ (corr.¹) P⁴ (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), <χρῆ-
σθαι> θεατέον Ed. Müller II. p. 63, <χρῆσθαι> θεατέον Spengel, both plausible: Koraes
detected the error: παθετέον Jebb || τούς] πρὸς S^b T^b and P⁴ (in the margin, with
γρ. prefixed): omitted by M^a || 18 θεατρή written above the line as a gloss by
P⁸, omitted by Π¹ Ar. and P² (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities ||
19 ἐλευθέρος ? Susem. || 22 εἰσὶ] ἐστὶ Bk.²

stances. Bernay translated (from Bekker's text): "now in the same manner as other means of *catharsis* the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre" which is intended to provide innocent delight "should come forward with such modes and melodies." The objection to this is the forced meaning of *δύοις*. The means of *catharsis* just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in *ταῦτα τοῦτο πάσχειν*. Busse moreover in *op. c. p. 49* accepts the correction *πρακτικά*.

§ 6 "Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation."

16 *τοιαύτας*] Namely, *καθαρικά*: see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421 f.

17 θεατέον] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if *χρῆσθαι* were supplied, or *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in place of *ἀγωνίστας*. Still the meaning is clear. In *τούς...μεταχειρίζομένους* it is not hard to discover *τούς αὐτὸν τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην* of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The care shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the *Republic*.

20 ἐκ βαναύσων...συγκέφανος] As an attribute of *θεατής* this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. *De Finibus* II. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negotii est, quod e dupliciti genere voluptatis coniunctus est, or *ad Att.* IV. 15. 1, ut est ex me et ex te iunctus Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21 *δύοις καὶ δύοις*] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 "Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music."

22 *ἥσπερ αὐτῶν...23 ἔργος*] Comp. n. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, n. (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art III. II. 2, n. (565 b). SUSEM. (1097)

23 καὶ τὸν ἄρμονιὸν παρεκβάσαν] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the 'wailing and mournful' music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the 'lax and effeminate' low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 22, also Exc. IV. n. (1054). SUSEM. (1098)

παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακε- (VII)
 25 χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν
 οὐκεῖν, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἔξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς
 τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς
 § 8 μουσικῆς· πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν 8
 μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη
 30 δὲ ἡ δωριστὶ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ
 καν τινα ἄλλην ἡμὲν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φι-
 32 λοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ
 δὲ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μόνην

24 παρακεχωρημένα Π¹ (emended by p¹ in the margin with γρ. prefixed) and Π²
 || 28 παιδεία Π¹ (emended by p¹ in the margin) and Π² (1st hand, emended by corr.)
 || 30 δωριστῇ Π⁴⁻⁵

24 παρακεχωρημένα] A technical term for varieties of the three genera—diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See *Excursus IV*. p. 636. SUSEM. (1099)

25 ποιεῖ δὲ κτλ.] Apelt *Beiträge zur Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 325 (1) thinks this, in connexion with *N. E.* VII. 14. 2, 1154 a 12, points to a division of pleasures into φυσικαὶ and ἀναγκαῖαι. He compares Epicurus' division of ἐπιθυμίαι and Nemesius' *De Natura Hominis* c. 18 *τεπλὴ δονῶν*.

27 τοιούτῳ τινὶ] I.e. a corrupt, depraved style, in which 'colourings' and nuances i.e. transposed scales abound.

§ 8 28 ὥσπερ εἴρηται] In § 3, 1342 a 3, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις. See *Exc. v.* p. 638. SUSEM. (1100)

We have now reached the end of the long digression, §§ 4—7, following on the mention of modes suitable for public performance πρὸς ἀρχεῖσιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων: we have in fact answered the first question of c. 7 § 1 πέτρερον πάσαις χρηστέον. The connexion of the whole passage, and the best way of meeting the difficulties presented by the text, is discussed *Exc. v.* p. 638 ff. SUSEM. (1101)

30 πρότερον] In c. 5 § 22, 1340 b 3 ff. Comp. *n.* (1054) p. 628. The previous statement (ὅτε ἔχειν μέσων καὶ καθεστηκτῶν μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἐτέρων, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δ. μόνη ἀρμονίῶν) is not quite to the same effect. In one sense it includes more than is found here; cp. *n.* (1086). What has been pointed out *n.* (1086) agrees with this. SUSEM. (1102)

δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κτλ.] See *n.* (1086) for a conjecture as to the modes here intended. SUSEM. (1104)

31 οἱ κοινωνοὶ...32 παιδείας] Here the author of the division into three classes mentioned in § 3 is again most probably intended. See *n.* (1083). SUSEM. (1103)

Aristoxenos was at once a pupil of Aristotle's and an ardent musician, while on musical theory his *Harmonics* and the fragments of his *ῥυθμικά στοιχεῖα* are our highest authority. In Westphal's monumental works, the series *Theorie der musischen Künste der Hellenen* and the now completed edition *Aristoxenos, Melik und Rhythmis* (Leipzig, 1883 and 1893) everything has been done for this author. English readers unacquainted with Westphal's writings may with advantage consult Mr C. F. Abdy Williams' article on 'Ancient Metre' in *Classical Review* vii. p. 295 ff.

§ 9 *Socrates in the Republic is inconsistant: he rejects the flute, but tolerates the Phrygian Mode.*

δέ δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ.] This is the normal, explicit manner of referring to Socrates, the character in the dialogue 'The Republic,' and sufficiently accounts for the article in the abbreviated form ὁ Σωκράτης. Cp. *n.* on II. 1. 3, 1261 a 6.

The passage in *Rep.* III. 399 A runs thus: ἀλλὰ κυνωνεῖτε τοι δωριστὶ λεπτοθαι καὶ φρυγιστὶ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἐφη ἦγώ, τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατάλειπε ἑκάνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν [i.e. the Dorian], ἥ εν τε πολεμικῷ πράξει δύος ἀνδρεῶν καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βασιλείᾳ ἐργασίᾳ πρεπεῖτος ἀν μακήσαιτο φθόγγους τε καὶ προσφθίας, καὶ ἀποτιχθέντος ἡ εἰς τραύματα ἡ εἰς θανάτου λύτρος ἥ εἰς τινα ἄλλην ξυμφορῶν πεσόντος, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεγμένως καὶ καρπερούντως ἀμυνομένον τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἀλλην αὐτὸν [the Phrygian]

καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας ^(VII)
^{1342 b} τῶν ὄργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἡ
 φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὄργανοις
^{§ 10} ἄμφω γὰρ ὄργαντικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοῖ δὲ ἡ ποίησις.
 σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις ^(ρ. ω.)
⁵ μάλιστα τῶν ὄργάνων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δὲ ἀρμονιῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον.
 οἶνον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.
^{§ 11} καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν

1342 b 2 φρυγιστὴ Γ II 8 δείγματα P⁴-L⁴

ἐν εἰρητῇ τε καὶ μὴ βιαλῷ ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκουσίῳ πρᾶξει δύντος, ἡ τιμὴ τι τείσθωτος τε καὶ δεομένου, ἡ εὐχῆθεν ἡ διδαχῆ καὶ νοοθετῆσει ἀνθρώπον, ἡ τούναρτίσιος μᾶλλον δεομένῳ ἡ διδάσκοντι ἡ μεταπεθεούτη ἐαυτὸν ἐπέχοντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ μὴ ὑπερηφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μετρίως ἐπάσι τούτοις πράττοντά τε καὶ τὰ ἀποβαλνούτα ἀγαπῶντα. ταῦτα δύο ἀρμονίας βίαιοις, ἑκούσιοις, δυστυχούσιτον, εὐτυχούσιτον, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων αἰτίων φθόγγοις μηδησοταί μάλιστα, ταῦτα λείπεται. As with the musical instruments, n. (1071), so in the case of the modes Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in truth—see nn. (1086, 1102, 1104, 1109)—the Dorian Mode is the only one which he retains for the purpose of moral education. SUSEM. (1106)

34 ἀποδοκιμάσας.....τὸν αὐλόν] Pl. Κέρ. III. 399 D: τι δέ; αἰδοτοιοὺς ἡ αἰδητὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἡ οὐ τοῦτο πολυχορδόταντον καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τιγχάνει δύντα μημημα; The ostensible ground for its refection is the complexity of its music. SUSEM. (1106)

^{1342 b 3} ἄμφω γὰρ ὄργαντικά κτλ.] We were told this before of the flute, c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς θήκειν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὄργαντικόν; it has an intoxicating effect, tending not to form, but to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode again was described as relatively the most maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22. The addition of the more general term παθητικά = 'passionate' here is a fresh and striking proof that the ecstatic modes, *ai énθousiasistiká armoniai*, are not restricted to the expression or impression upon others of Ecstasy pure and simple. On the contrary, like the flute amongst musical instruments, they are adapted generally to pourtray and call up all emotions,

or at least all painful emotions:—in the words of the text, 'all Bacchic frenzy and similar mental excitement.' Comp. Exc. IV. p. 628 and *notes* (1089, 1047), also n. (1096) p. 643. SUSEM. (1107)

§ 10 Poetry shows this. When the subject is wild and delirious, as in a dithyramb, the music is set for the flute and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode. The cogency of this illustration depends on the fact, which must always be borne in mind, that the Greek poet set his own words to music (precisely as in the Wagenerian opera): he also chose his own dance measures.

5 τῶν δὲ ἀρμονῶν τὸ τοῖς...μέλοις] See Thurot p. 103 (cited above p. 611 upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταῦτα=βακχεία καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις (subject).

§ 11 8 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην] An extraordinary phrase where we should expect οἱ περὶ ταῦτα συνετοί δύτες: i.e. musical critics or connoisseurs. In Bonitz' words, σύνεσις is used 'objective' = ἡ μουσικὴ τέχνη.

9 Φιλόξενος] Of Cythera, born 459 B.C., one of the most famous of the dithyrambic poets. He lived for some time at the court of the elder Dionysius, who imprisoned him in the stone quarries of Syracuse, where (according to one account) he wrote his most noted dithyramb Κύκλωψ. When brought out to listen to Dionysius' own compositions, he is said to have addressed the attendants in the words *Eis λαρούλας*, "Take me back to the quarries." See further respecting him Bernhardy *Gesch. d. griech. Litteratur* II^a. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), SUSEM. (1106) Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criticism of the later dithyrambic poets, including Philoxenus, specially mentions

10 τὴν δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς μύθους οὐχ οἶστ’ ἡν., (VII)
 ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν
 12 προσήκουσαν ἄρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες 10
 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὗσης καὶ μᾶλιστα ἥθος ἔχούσης
 ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαι-
 15 νοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει
 τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἄρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ Δώ-
 13 ρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. [εἰσὶ¹
 δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
 δυνατὰ δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἐκά-
 20 στοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὠρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς
 ἀπειρηκόσι τιὰ χρόνου οὐ ράδιον ἢδειν τὰς συντόνους ἄρμο-

10 διθύραμβον τοὺς] διθύραμβικὸς Ramus || Μυσοῦς Schneider Bk.², μεθύσους
 ? Schmidt, [τοὺς μύθους] Sauppe || 11 τὴν προσήκουσαν... 12 δωριστὶ omitted by P²
 || 12 δωριστὴ Γ, δωριστικὴ Ald. || 17 τοὺς νεωτέρους Koraes, possibly Γ, rightly
 || [εἰσὶ... 34 πρέπον] Susem.²⁻³: see Comm. n. (1113) || 19 ἐκάστους P³, ἐκάστους
 Π¹⁻² || 21 χρο^κ M*, χρόνον P³⁻⁵ Π³ Bk., avoiding hiatus

their intermixture of styles and license in rhythm: οἱ δέ γε διθύραμβοι καὶ τοὺς τρόπους μετέβαλλον, Δωρίους τε καὶ Φρυγίους καὶ Λυδίους ἐν τῷ δρματι ποιουμέντες καὶ τὰς μελῳδίας ἐξῆλαττον... καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς κατὰ πολλὴν ἀδειαν ἐνεκουσιάζοντες διετέλουν· οἱ δὲ κατὰ Φιλόδενον καὶ Τιμόθεον καὶ Τελεστήν· ἐπει ταρά γε τοῖς ἀρχαῖοις τεταγμένοις ἦν ὁ διθύραμβος. *De compo. verb.* 19, p. 131, 14 ff. ed. Reiske.

11 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς] See § 13, 1342 b 27, ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει: also *Meta.* 1. 3., 14., 984 b 9 f., ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῇς ἀληθεῖας ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἐξῆτησαν, and *Phys.* 1. 5. 6., 188 b 29 f.

§ 12 13 διολογοῦσιν ὡς οὖστης] See 1262 b 12 n. Comp. vi(iv). 9. 7., 1294 b 20. The best explanation and parallels in Lobeck ad Soph. Aiac. 281. Frequent in Plato, e.g. *Phil.* 16 c, *Larus* 624 A, B.

στασιμωτάτης] That the Dorian is the only mode which produces a sober and sedate frame of mind was said c. 5 § 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. notes (1102, 1105). SUSEM. (1109)

14 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον κτλ] See vi (IV). 11. 4., 1295 b 3 f., διολογεῖται τὸ μέσον δραστὸν καὶ τὸ μέσον, n. (1290 b). SUSEM. (1110)

15 ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κτλ] I.e. the Dorian melodies are principally of a middle compass. In contrast to this, melodies composed in the 'high-strung' (*σύντονος*) and low-pitched (*ἀνευμέναι, χαλαραί*) modes diverged from this middle compass to the

higher and lower parts of the register respectively. This is explained in *Excursus III. n. (1054) p. 625. SUSEM. (1111)*

§ 13 18 σκοποῖς] πρὸς οὓς ποιοῦνται τὸ τίλος, 1341 b 15. That the choice of melodies must be regulated by what is practicable and what is becoming (sc. for the age and voice of the performers) is a truism, whoever enunciates it, see c. 6 § 3. n.

20 ξοτὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ] "But these conditions (viz. what is practicable and what is becoming) are defined by the age of the performers. For instance, it is not easy for those who are old and feeble to sing in the high-strung modes: nature suggests the low-pitched modes at their age."

21 διὰ χρόνου] Διὰ c. gen. means (1) "after the lapse of some time" as in iii. 1. 6., 1275 a 25, and vi(iv). 15. 1., 1299 a 6, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔτημέντος, οἱ δὲ διὰ ἀλάττονος ποιοῦνται ἀρχάς. So in *Rhet.* I. 11. 20, 1371 a 29 f., σπάνον τὸ διὰ χρόνου, a thing seen after an interval, an occasional enjoyment. Hence the distributive sense of διὰ τρίτου ἔτους 546 b 10, διὰ τρίτης (ἡμέρας) 594 b 21. (2) In διὰ βίου (4 times, cp. διὰ τίου χρ. 1272 b 13) it implies duration. With the accusative (as P³⁻⁵ Π³ see *Crit. n.*) the sense is causal: those who fail by reason of age. This reading avoids the hiatus, which is in its favour. But the causal sense with gen. is admitted by Eucken p. 38, Hagfors p. 46: cp. 1337 a 36 (?), 1346 b 14 (*altriῶν δι’ ὡς*).

νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλι-^(VII)
 § 14 κούντοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο <τῷ> Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ η
 τὴν μουσικήν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας ἀποδοκι-
 μάσσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ως μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς,
 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γάρ η γε
 μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκύιας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-
 § 15 των ἀρμονιῶν ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι
 30 δ' εἴ τις ἐστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ἡ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παι-
 δῶν ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ὅμα καὶ
 παιδείαν, οἷον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μᾶλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὥστε <εἰ> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by William, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐπὶ δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated by William and Ar., [καὶ] Koraes || 30 ἡ Γ Ald. || 32 παιδεῖαν C. E. Ch. Schneider (on Pl. Rep. III. 399 A) || παιδεῖαν οὖν P³ (1st hand, corrected by later hands), διάνοιαν P¹ (οὖν added in the text and γρ. παιδεῖαν by p¹ in the margin of P¹) and P² (corr.)¹

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωκράτει] I.e. in Plato Rep. III. 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακαὶ καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἀρμονῶν; 'Ιαστί, η δ' δέ, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἵνεις χαλαρὰ καλοῦνται. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὡς φένε, ἐπὶ τολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔσθ' ὅτι χρήσει; SUSEM. (1112)

25 ὡς μεθυστικὰς κτλ] "On the assumption that this is drunken music, not in the sense of intoxication—indeed intoxication rather tends to excite mad revelry—but as being enervated." Bonitz is probably right in making 27 ἀπειρηκύιας acc. plur. Ind. Ar. 71 b 47, comparing 24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἀρμονίας: and so 'enervated,' languid, exhausted. Schneider preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but if that were so, surely we should expect αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρηκύιας.

§§ 13—15 17 εἰσι 31...34 πρέπειν] That this close of the chapter is a foreign addition is indicated by the square brackets, and must be admitted unless we choose to believe that Aristotle would again partially introduce by a side-wind the musical modes which he has already openly banished from education. Aristotle recommends Dorian melodies for the instruction of the young on account of their middle compass: all other modes, 'the most ethical' alone excepted, are excluded: also, he expressly warns us against any education for amusement, c. 5 § 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing

or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently restricts the introduction of 'practical' (*πρακτικαὶ*) or 'ecstatic' Modes, as well as the less 'ethical' Modes, see n. (1087), to performances at which the citizens are auditors. The author of this addition, on the other hand, is anxious that the youth should also learn to sing in modes which, from the low compass of the melodies, are least suited to them and best adapted to be actually sung in riper age. Now it is no doubt true that these low-pitched modes do not belong either to the 'practical' (*πρακτικαὶ*) or to the 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and appear to constitute the less ethical; see nn. (1054, 1087). It is further true that Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal state an occasional banquet for relaxation and recreation, IV(vii). 17. 11, cp. n. (966), and at such times probably also permits them the exceptional privilege of singing (see c. 5 § 8 with nn. 1028, 1067). It is true that the description of the low-pitched keys here given (*ἀπειρηκύιας*) points, like Plato's Rep. 398 E, see n. (1112), to the appositeness of their employment on such occasions. Finally it cannot be denied that the idea of learning something in youth, which may afford amusement in later life, is not wrong in itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present instance inadmissible, because for mere amusement it is not necessary to learn to

33 ἀρμονιῶν, ἡ * * δῆλον ὅτι τρεῖς τούτους δρους ποιητέον εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον * *

33 ḥ after ἀρμονιῶν added by P¹ and P² (corr.¹), omitted by all other authorities
 Ar. Bk. || * * δῆλον Conring, δῆλον <οὖν> τρεῖς Schneider || τρεῖς after δρου
 M^a P²⁻⁵ II³ Bk. || ταῦτα Γ || οὐς δρους omitted by P¹ (1st hand), the lacuna left
 being filled in with another ink, δρους omitted by Γ P² || 34 παιδίαν II², παιδίαν P¹
 (1st hand, corrected by p¹ in the margin) || πρέπον * * William (*residuum huius
 operis in greco nondum inveni*)

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, c. 5 § 8: cp. *nn.* (1024, 1025, 1036). However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotle would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the 'practical' (*πράκτικα*) and ecstatic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction: "but in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see *n.* 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. This the interpolator has failed to recognize, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverse notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by gradua-

tions of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (*κόσμος ἄμα καὶ ταῦτα*) grace (decorum) and moral culture. But, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended:—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 8, 1342 a 30, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in Exc. IV, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the *πράκτικα*. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, *κόσμος ἔχειν καὶ ταῦτα*, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the *Ethics*, for in Aristotle's view the man of moral virtue and he alone behaves with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see *Nie. Eth.* IV, cc. 6—8 (12—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has *κόσμος* a different meaning from decorum? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The ḥ pre-

served in two MSS. would seem to indicate (*a*) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (*b*) this η marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, $\tau\delta\ \mu\sigma\sigma\omega$, which, as well as $\tau\delta\ \delta\omega\rho\alpha\delta\omega$ and $\tau\delta\ \pi\rho\epsilon\tau\omega$, is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has

fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from *notes* (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. SUSEM. (1113)

EXCURSUS I.

ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πᾶς χρηστόν, δρολογούμενόν ἔστιν
(μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβῆς κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον)...ὅταν δ' ἡβῆς ἐπι τρία
πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους μαθήμασι γένωνται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγ-
κοφαγίαις καταλαμβάνει τὴν ἔχομένην ἡλικίαν. *v(VIII).* c. 4 §§ 7—9, 1338 b
39—41, 1339 a 4—7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. n. (1003). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, *IV(VII).* 17, 15, to the age of puberty; gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, *n.* (970), in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the *Introd.* p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31—34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a 29 f., *n.* (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato's scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (*παιδεία ἐλευθέριος καὶ καλή*). These are the higher sciences (*τὰ περιττά*) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, *n.* (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, *n.* 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of *θανατοία*.

Aristotle's ideal state is not therefore, like Plato's Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. *Introd.* p. 48 f. But in the sequel wherever the word *παιδεία* is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, 20, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 25, 29, 38, 1342 a 3, 28, 32 etc., it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even *μάθησις* is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable

at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see *n.* (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with *τεχνίται* or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., *n.* (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, "no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest" (*καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθίοντος ή παιζοντος*, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, *n.* 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (*Nic. Eth.* vi. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theodectes. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money's worth. "It is inconceivable," remarks Bradley, *Hellenica* p. 214 *n.*, "that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of *βαναστία* applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: 'If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies': *καὶ οὐδείς εὐφύης νέος η τὸν ἐν Πίση θεασάμενος Δία γενέσθαι Φεδίας ἐπεθύμησεν η τὴν Ἡραν τὴν ἐν Ἀργει Πολύκλειτος, οὐδὲ Ἀνακρέων η Φεληφᾶς η Ἀρχιλοχος ησθεῖς αὐτῶν τοῖς ποιήμασιν:* Plutarch, *Vita Periclis* c. 2, p. 153 A." SUSEM. (1015)

EXCURSUS II.

THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τῶν Ὄλύμπου μελῶν ταῦτα γάρ ὄμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχᾶς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f. Cp. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἵερῶν μελῶν ὄρῳμεν τόντους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἱερογυμάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μᾶλεστι, καθισταμένους ὡσπερ λατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—11.

Olympus, like Musaeus *n.* (1034), is not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. IV. *n.* (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk *Poet. Lyr.*¹ p. 809 f.) or nothing but *αὐλητικοὶ νόμοι*, as they were called; cp. *n.* (17) to my edition of the *Politics*. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch. *De Musica* 5, 1132 E, F)², and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music: Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. *I. c.* But others were of later date than Terpander, and even than Thaletas², see *nn.* (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Pratinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those *νόμοι* of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a *νόμος πολυκέφαλος*, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Crates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the *πολυκέφαλος*. Another of these airs (*νόμοι*), called *ἀρμάτιος*, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. *I. c.* 7, 1133 D ff. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV) in honour of Athene, called *ὅρθιος*, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. *I. ad init.*, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. *Crat.* 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. *op. c.* 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called *μητρῷοι* (Plut. *I. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *op. c.* 19, 1137 D).

¹ The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, *αἰλητικῆν* and *αὐλητικῶν* should be read in this passage, instead of *αἰλωθίαν* and *αὐλω-*

δικῶν.

² For the introduction of the paeonian or cretic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athene ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.

As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship¹. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV. p. 628 and n. 1107), are the ‘sacred melodies’ from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, n. (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle’s mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. SUSEM. (1042)

EXCURSUS III.

ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ο δ' ἐθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθος πάθος ἔστιν, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 335 ff. (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, n. (977), and elsewhere, the expression ‘character of the soul,’ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν) ἥθος, or ‘character’ only, must be taken to mean *not* the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature² itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. nn. (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, n. (1022), it appears that this ‘orectic’ soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that “because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices” is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

¹ Plato *Sympos.* 215 C: Socrates is like Marsyas; οὐδὲν γε δί’ ὄργανων ἐκῆλε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δινάμει, καὶ ἔτι νινὶ διὰ τὰ ἐκεῖνον αἰλῆ. ἀ γάρ αὐτος. τὰ οὖν ἐκεῖνον ἔάν τε ἀγαθὸς αἰλητῆς αὐλῆ ἔάν τε φαῦλη αἰλητρὸς, μόνα κατέχεοθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. “Ολυμπος ηὔλει, Μαρσύου λέγω, τοῦ διδάξει.”

² τὸ ὄρεκτικόν, the ‘orectic’ soul.

be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (*έξεις*) called moral virtues. 'Influence upon the character' means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us 'attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character'¹ through the intervention of music (cp. *Poet.* 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.).² Thus the phrase 'character,' or 'character of the soul,' cannot mean that part of the soul *in itself* but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites,—*φυσικά έξεις, φυσικά ἀρεταὶ (καὶ κακαὶ)* as Aristotle calls them, *N.E.* vi. 13. 1 f., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above *Pol.* IV[VII]. 13. 11, n. 888), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, *πράξεις*, but with emotional excitements or feelings (*πάθη, N.E.* II. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral 'habit' may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: "because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits." Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called 'character' precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character. Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. *nn.* (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from *Rhet.* II. 9. 1, 1386 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character³: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring's explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. *n.* (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (*ἡθικά*) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. *n.* (1048) themselves characters (*ἡθοί*), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, *Poet.* I. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. *n.* (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (*πάθος*),

¹ ποιοι τινες τὰ ήθη γνόμενα, 1340 a 7.

² εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ήθη ποιοι τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εἰδαλομορφοὶ τὸν αγαθὸν οὐκον δύως τὰ ήθη μακήσωται πράττουσι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ήθη συμπαραλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις.

³ καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πάθη (sc. Ὀλεῦν καὶ νεμεσᾶν) ήθοις χρησταῖ. [Döring argues thus: πάθη are in this and other passages ascribed to ήθος, but *Nic. Eth.* II.

5. 1, 1105 b 20, πάθη are said to be ἐν τῷ φυχῇ, while from *Rhet.* II. 12. 1, 1388 b 30, we gather that ήθος (like φυχὴ) includes more under it than πάθη only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating ήθος with φυχὴ δρεκτικὴ, and would explain *Pol.* V(VIII). 5. 16, 1340 a 6, as a case where the more special term ήθος is combined with the more general term φυχὴ.]

in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (*ἦθος*) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. π. (1052), an artist 'full of character' (*ἦθος*) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13. 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression τὸν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθος πάθος 'an emotion of the character of the soul' = ὁ πάσχει τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθος, suggests the radical meaning of πάθος 'suffering.'

SUSEM. (1043)

EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC : MODES, RHYTHMS,
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

MODES.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μιλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μημῆματα τῶν ἥθων (καὶ τοῦτ' ἀστὶ φανερόν· εἴθε γάρ οἱ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν διάστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας δύνατικοτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολιδιστὴν καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακότερas τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἐνεμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν η δωριστὴ μόνη τῶν ἀρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' η φρυγιστές) c. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive *imitations* of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lydian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer ease; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."¹

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (la) and C (ut)², and

[¹ This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see *Translations* p. 121.]
[² *Do* is often used instead of *ut*.]

so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (*ἀρμονία*), or 'Species of Octaves' (*εἶδος τῶν τοῦ δὰ πασῶν*)¹, as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy:—

- (1) BC D EF G a b², Mixolydian;
- (2) C D EF G a bc³, Lydian;
- (3) D EF G a bc d , Phrygian;
- (4) EF G a bc d e , Dorian;
- (5) F G a bc d ef , Hypolydian;
- (6) G a bc d ef g , Ionian;
- (7) A BC D EF G a, Aeolian.

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid. apud Ath. XIV. 624 E), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-", and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal⁴ and Gevaert⁵ was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. *Eg.* 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (*σύντονοι*) and low-pitched (*ἀνεμέναι*) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names,

¹ Also called *τόνοι*, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word *species* itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'MUSIC,' for *ἀρμονία* or *εἶδος τῶν τοῦ δὰ πασῶν*: for *τόνοις* the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see n. p. 637 f.]

² Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart;

for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.

³ ut, ré, mi, fa, sol, la, si.

⁴ *Gr. Metrik* first edition II. I. p. 342 ff., second edition I. p. 266 ff., *Gesch. der alten und mittelalterlichen Musik* (Breslau 1865) p. 21 ff., 167 ff.

⁵ *Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité* (Gent 1875) I. p. 146.

but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be expected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added, a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. *Harm.* p. 18, Bacch. p. 19, Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocritus of Locri (Callim. in Schol. Pind. *Ol.* xi. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), commonly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out of use (Heracleid. in Ath. XIV. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as either the fifth (as is the case with the Aeolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case represents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff, that, as the ancients observed (Plut. *De Mus.* 16, 1136 E), it was the counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending :

BC D EF G A b,	Mixolydian (ascending)
b A G FE D CB,	Mixolydian (descending)
F G a bc d ef,	Hypolydian (ascending),

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished, and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented :

Fourth	Fifth
BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian;	
diminished Fifth	
Fifth	Fourth
F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian;	
augmented Fourth	

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (*Rep.* III. 398 E) says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation. Lastly in regard to the terms *σύντονοι* 'highly strung' and *ἀνεμέναι* 'relaxed,' which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to

explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 f., though not by Aristotle (see n. 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian¹, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed

¹ That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan *Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buch der Republik, Jahrb. für Philol.*, xcv. 1867, p. 815 sqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, e.g. a b c d e, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (*τρυπωδῆς*) half a tone higher (f♯); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (c♯); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (f♯, g♯, c♯, d♯) or lower three (e♭, a♭, b♭); and for an Ionian

there was a similar choice between raising three (f♯, g♯, c♯) or lowering four strings (e♭, a♭, b♭, d♭). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (e♯, f♯, g♯, a♯, c♯, d♯) or lowering b (*παράπειρος*) to b♭, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not readily capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth f b. (In this assertion Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a Canzonetta in this mode; see Gevaert, pp. 137 f., 172, 175.)

Mixolydian	E♯	F♯	G♯	A♯	B	C♯	D♯	E♯
[Low Hypolydian	E	F♯	G♯	A♯	B	C♯	D♯	E]
High-pitched Lydian	E	F♯	G♯	A	B	C♯	D♯	E
High-pitched Ionian	E	F♯	G♯	A	B	C♯	D♯	E
Phrygian	E	F♯	G	A	B	C♯	D	E
Aeolian	E	F♯	G	A	BC		D	E
Dorian	E	F	G	A	BC		D	E
[High Mixolydian	E	F	G	A	B♭	C	D	E]
[High Hypolydian	E♭	F	G	A♭	B♭	C	D	E♭]
Low-pitched Lydian	E♭	F	G	A♭	B♭	C	D	E♭
Low-pitched Ionian	E♭	F	G	A♭	B♭	C	D♭	E♭

The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have repro-

duced, with the necessary reservations where I could not concur. Still in view of the difficulty of the subject I did not wish to withhold Jan's opinion from the reader. [See further Jan's article 'Musik' in Baumeister's *Denkmäler* 11. 974—983.]

from the rest by ending on the third¹, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (*Lach.* 188 D), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato *Repub.* l.c. omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale :

A BC D EF G a=Aeolian;
A BC D E F♯ G♯a=our A minor;

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (*ἥσος*) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonous music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see *nn.* 1042, 1078)². It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new *āpouviai*, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major : the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh :

F G a bc d ef =Hypolydian;
F G ab ♭ c d ef =F Major;
G a bc d ef g =Ionian (Hypophrygian);
G a bc d e f♯g =G Major.

¹ [See note on p. 637 f.]

² We hear even of a Phrygian tetrachord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetrachord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetra-

chord ef g a. See Helmholtz *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].

DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).



8ve lower.
(Aeolian ?Boeotian Dorian (*sc.* final note of melody).
Hypodor.

Modern A minor.



PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).



8ve lower.
χαλαρὰ Ἰαττὶⁱ Hypophrg.
σύντονος Ἰαττὶⁱ Phrygian
Mixolyd.

Modern G major.



LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).



8ve lower.
χαλαρὰ Λυδιστὶ συντονολυδιστὶ Lydian
Hypolyd.

Modern F major.



There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or *authentic* order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or *plagal* order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which *πάθος* is a more correct expression than *θόρ*) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our 'major mode' is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in Plut. *De*

Musica 16, 1136 C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Ceos, a musician living at Athens (*Aristox.* *ibid.*), or according to another more detailed account (*Lysis ibid.*) by another musician of somewhat later date Lamproclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (*Schol. Plat. Alcib.* I. 118 C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see *n.* (1055) (*Plut. ibid.* 1136 E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato *Rep.* L.c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see *n.* 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into *ηθικαί*, ethical, *πρακτικαί* (Modes of action = scenic?) and *εὐθουσιαστικαί*, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (*πρακτικαί*); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (*Rep.* 399 A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 f. (see *n.* 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. There would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. *nn.* 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In *Problems* XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective *πρακτικός* applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (*ηθος ἔχει μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον*). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as *πρακτικά*, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions¹. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

¹ ή [ύπο]φρυγιστή (ένθουσιαστική γάρ καὶ βαχχική). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτην πάσχομέν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδωριστή καὶ ὑποφρυγιστή πρᾶττομεν. The insertion of μάλιστα δέ

ἡ μεξολυθιστή (from Gaza) before κατὰ μέν οὖν, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.

with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty: either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, *ηθικαῖ*, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle's pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see *n.* (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see *nn.* 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure¹. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see *n.* 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the *κομμῳ*, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Cratin. in Ath. XIV. 638 f.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. *De Musica* 17, 1136 F), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by VI(IV). 3. 4 (cp. *n.* 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental *ἀρχαῖα*, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular music of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. SUSEM. (1054)

¹ The explanations given by Susenmihl *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xcvi. 1867, p. 231 require considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.

MUSICAL RHYTHMS.

τὸν ἀντὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἱ μὲν γάρ ἔχουσιν ἡθος στασιμάτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ὀλευθερωτέρας. V(VIII) c. 5 § 23, 1340 b 7—10.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metre: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metre are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeonian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of $\frac{1}{2} : 1$. The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeonian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure $\sim \sim \sim$, $\sim \sim \sim$ was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. *De eloc.* § 189, *Metr. Ambros.* p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mar. Vict. II. 8. 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 90, 19 sq. Keil, Schol. A Hepha. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. *De Demosth. vi admirabili* p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and tripody correspond to our $\frac{4}{4}$, $\frac{2}{2}$, $\frac{3}{3}$ time. Cp. Westphal *Metrik* 2 ed. I. p. 534 ff. SUSEM. (1056) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, *Griechische Rhythmisik* (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, *Aristoxenus* I. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in $\frac{5}{4}$ time.

MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS: HARPS, ETC.

οἰον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβύκαι. V(VIII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.


None of these stringed instruments were of Greek origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 F) speaks of the *φοίνικες*, *πηκτίδες*, *μαγάδιδες*, *σαμβύκαι*, *τρίγωνα*, *κλεψίαμβοι*, *σκινδάψοι*, and *ἐννεάχορδαι* as uncommon (*ἔκφυλα*). The *πηκτίς* was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. Fr. 102 in Athen. XIV. 635 D, Soph. Fr. 375, ibid. 635 C and IV. 183 E, Telestes Fr. 5, ibid. XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. l. c., cp. Pind. l. c.). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho Fr. 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon Fr. 17, 22, by Plato *Repub.* III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like

the *magadis*, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aristox. in Athen. XIV. 635 B). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 B, E that Sappho was the first to use¹ the instrument, stating that he follows Aristoxenus in regarding it as the same as the *magadis*, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the *μάγαδις* and the *πηκτίς* (Ath. 636 A ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the *μάγαδις* seems to have been a modification of the *πηκτίς*. At any rate the *μάγαδις* also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 F and perhaps before him by Anacreon (*ibid. Fr. 18*), and the latter calls the *πηκτίς* (*Fr. 17*) and the *μάγαδις* (*Fr. 18* in Ath. 634 C, 635 C) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (*ibid. 634 C, D*), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristoxenus (*ibid. 635 B*), who quotes Pindar *I. c.* in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (*Fr. 4* in Ath. 637 A) apparently describes the *μάγαδις* as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater *I. c.* we must suppose that the *πηκτίς* had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phillis however (*ibid. 636 F*) says the *πηκτίς* and *μάγαδις* (which he distinguishes from one another), the *σαμβύκη*, *ιαμβύκη*, *τρίγωνον* and *κλεψυδρόν*, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. IV. 182 F, XIV. 435 A) the *μάγαδις* —or rather the *σαμβύκη*, a modification of it (see below)—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the *πηκτίς* this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Alcman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the *μάγαδις* (*Fr. 91* in Ath. 636 F) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the *βάρβιτον* (neuter), also *βάρβιτος* (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Strabo x. 471 says that all the names *σαμβύκη*, *βάρβιτος*, *πηκτίς*, are foreign, and Pindar *I. c.* designates the *βάρβιτον* as an adaptation of the Lydian *πηκτίς*. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar *I. c.* ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (*Carm. I. 1. 34*) calls it ‘Lesbian’ and assigns its use to Alcaeus (*Carm. I. 34. 5 ff.*). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 182 F = Sapph. *Fr. 154*, Anacr. *Fr. 143*). Critias calls the *βάρβιτον* Sappho’s favourite instrument (in Ath. XIII. 600 C); Neanthes (*Fr. 5* in

¹ So also Suidas s.v. Σαπφώ, where the mention of the plectrum in the received text is due to corruption.

Athen. 175 C) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon¹. Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcaeus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton :



The only particular difference between this instrument and the λύρα consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the πηκτίς, as appears from Pindar *I.c.* Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*R. A.* VII. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the κιθάρα and λύρα, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux IV. 8. 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath. 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch *De Monarch.* 4. 827 A, and Theocritus XVI. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (Pauly's *Realencycl.* IV. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of βάρβιτοι with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between βάρβιτοι and πηκτίδες on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the βάρβιτοι and even than the πηκτίς and μάγαδοι. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a σαμβύκη:—

¹ Cp. Pseudo-Simonides *Fr.* 184, Anacreontea 2, 14, 23, 40, 41, 59.



The *τρίγωνον* or triangle is called by Juba (*Fr. 73* in Ath. 175 D) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians¹; by Ptolemy *Harm. III. 7*, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles *I.c.* gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (in Ath. 636 A, see Nauck *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* p. 602 sq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (*s.v. Σιβύλλα*) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphy. on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. *I.c.*, Arist. *Probl. XIX. 23*). The *σαμβύκη* was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas *s.v. Ἰβύκος*) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 F). Euphorion represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the *μάγαδις* (in Ath. 635 A); the same writer (in Ath. 633 F on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Parthians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato *I.c.*. The statement of Skamon in Athen. 637 B that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes *I.c.* says either of the *τρίγωνον* or more probably (agreeing with Suidas *I.c.* and Schol. in Aristoph. *Thesm.* 168) of the *σαμβύκη*—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music; but Juba (*I.c.*) attributed the (?) *λυροφόινξ σαμβύκη*², as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the *τρίγωνον*, and more especially the *σαμβύκη*³, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the *σαμβύκη* by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 E⁴ and the phrases “ballet girl and player on the triangle,” *τὴν ποδοκτύπην τε καὶ*

¹ Heliodorus *Aeth. IV. 17* speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the *τριγήτις* indulge in wild Assyrian dances.

² In Kaibel's edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 175 D, between *λυροφόινκα* and *σαμβύκην*.

³ Both were introduced into Rome,

Dionys. Hal. R. A. L. 33, Ath. 183 C.
Liv. XXXIX. 6.

⁴ οὐ δέ Γυναικῶς ἐστ' ἀκούειν
θε νυκτερίν' εὑρε μοιχοῖς ἀεισματ' ἐκ-
καλεῖσθαι
γυναικας ἔχοντας λαμβύκην τε καὶ τρί-
γωνον.

τριγωνίστρον 'Lucian *Lixiph.* Σ. χαρακτής καὶ τριγωνίστρον' Plut. *Athen.* 9., ἄρτον τριγωνίστρον καὶ κυνόν. Plut. *Cleom.* 35. παιδεῖος ἄρτος καὶ τριγωνός Polyb. v. 37. 10. and others Tib. Gracch. in Macrobi. *Sat.* II. 10, Arnob. II. 42. This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing 'Fr. 1 in Ath. 183 C, F, in his comedy of the *Σέτες*, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotytta. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly *ἰαρπάνη*¹ and not *ἰαρπάναι*, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The *ἰαρπάνη* was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the *λεφίαρπος* being used when they were melodramatically² recited (Phillis *l.c.*, cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. *ἰαρπάνη*). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the *λεφίαρπος* among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Böckh *De metr. Pind.* p. 260 ff., Lobeck *Aglaophamus* p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, *De fidibus Graecorum* pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister *Denkmäler* III. p. 1444 ff. SUSEM. (1977)

SCALES.

τὰς μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ τεταρχημένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The "colour" of notes (*χρώμα*) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or 'genera' of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order e f g a b c d e. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. II.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. *Probl.* xix. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

e f a b c e

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (*διεστοις*):

e f* g* a b c* d* e

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

¹ The suggestion, which D. Volkmann *De Suidae biogr.* p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue *On Poets*) to attribute the original employment of the *τηκτίς*, *τριγωνός*, and *σαμβύκη* to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Sibyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

² See n. 10 on the *Poetics* (ed. Susem.).

In the case of the former there is between f and g rather more than a whole tone ($\frac{9}{8}$), and between g and a rather less than a whole tone ($\frac{9}{10}$), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone ($\frac{5}{4}$) and a diminished whole tone ($\frac{7}{6}$), a tone being inserted in the minor third B D in the place of the C omitted by Terpander, which was separated from D by the first, and from B by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third E G the intermediate tone F was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes G and D, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive F \sharp and C \sharp . Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of C, and with the enharmonic the omission of G, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones :

e f g \flat a b \flat b d e

semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone. The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or *nuances* (*χρώματι*) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. *De Musica* §§ 37—39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for chorus-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal *Metr.*² I. p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Helmholtz p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. SUSEM. (1099)

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-

paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, *παράφων*, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is *not* the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the *ιωάτη*; compare now Th. Reinach in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* XVII. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article MUSIC in the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) Mr D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, "the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended." The hypothesis, that the *μέση* of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. *Probl.* XIX. 20 (cp. Dio Chrys. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 367 ff. (cp. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal's assumption of 'Modes ending on the third' appeared in *Allg. Musik. Ztg* for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his *Aristoxenos' Melik und Rhythmis* (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (*Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift* XIII. 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

EXCURSUS V.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(VIII). C. 7
§§ 3–8, 1341 b 32–1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the *ethical* (*ἠθικαί*), those relating to *action* (*πρακτικαί*), and the *ecstatic* (*ἐνθουσιαστικαί*). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of *catharsis* and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (*ἔνθετος κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ή μάθησιν*). But now the question there left unsettled (see n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of *catharsis* to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (*ἀνάπτωσις*) and the highest rational enjoyment (*διαγωγή*). According to the *textus receptus* both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end¹. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons. (1) In the preceding chapters *διαγωγή* and *ἀνάπτωσις* have always

¹ See the translation of the *textus receptus* p. 607.

been opposed to each other ; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment : but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of 'moral training' (*παιδεία*) and 'purgation' (*κάθαρσις*) : consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends¹, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (b 40, *πρὸς διαγωγὴν <ἢ> πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε κτλ.*). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purgation (*κάθαρσις*) the elements of *διαγωγὴ* and *ἀνάπαυσις* : and (4) grammatically the change from *ἐνέκα* with the two first ends to *πρὸς* with this alleged third (*τρίτον δὲ πρὸς*) throws suspicion upon *τρίτον δὲ* also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a *cathartic* effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions : and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction ? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, *catharsis* is only a means to one or other of these two ends ; to *διαγωγὴ*, or to *ἀνάπαυσις*. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration *τρίτης δὲ οὐ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἐὰν πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν*.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the *textus receptus*) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (*πρακτικαῖς*) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of *κάθαρσις* (§ 4 f.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 τί δὲ λέγομεν κτλ.) and is now added in the form of a reason (διό γάρ περὶ ἐνίας κτλ. a 4 ff.), proves by the very form in which it is cast that *catharsis* is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by 'listening to the performances of others' (*ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων*) merely this is meant². It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for *catharsis*, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies : the otherwise meaningless final remark *ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ ταῦτα καθαρικάτ παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ*, a 15, can

¹ Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in *n.* on § 3 b 41, he would separate *ἀνεσίς* and *ἀνάπαυσις* as a *fourth* end from *διαγωγὴ*, which he makes the third.

² Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand *ἀκρόασις* *ἐτέρων χειρουργούντων* to mean *κάθαρσις*, yet the very term *ἀκρόασις* implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less

ethical) played and sung by others : that they never listened in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. Were this implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction *κάθαρσις* for *ἀκρόασις*. But then arises the question whether 1342 a 4 καὶ ταῦτα πρακτικάτ καὶ ταῦτα ἐνθουσιαστικάτ should not simply be translated 'both those of action and the ecstatic,' especially as, when afterwards *κάθαρσις* comes to be discussed and explained, these two classes of musical modes and melodies are alone taken into account.

only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word *πρακτικά* ‘melodies of action’ for *καθαρικά* ‘melodies of purgation¹.’ In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words *ὅταν χρήσεται τοῖς ἔξοργαζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι* may be a gloss upon *ἐκ τῶν δὲ ιερῶν μελῶν* which precedes².

From this investigation into the nature of *catharsis* it is inferred that the proposition³ it was adduced to prove is really correct (*διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαῖς κτλ §§ 6—8, a 16—29*). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (see n. 1100), in a less strict form, *τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύαις* a 28 f., i.e. *ethical modes* replacing the ‘most ethical,’ *ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις*, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to *ἀκρόασις ἐπέρων χειρουργούντων*, i.e. to *catharsis*, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of artizans, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and “chromatic” scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the nobler musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to *ethical*, and more especially to Dorian melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (*διαγωγῆ*). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. n. 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression. SUSEM. (1101)

¹ With this change the words will mean: “so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight.” It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the ‘ecstatic’ (*ἔθουσαστικά*) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked n. (1084), with which notes (1054, 1089) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homoeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions “of action.” Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

SUSEM. (1096) Cp. *Rhet.* II. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, *θαρραλέον γὰρ η ὁργή*. If Heracleides is rightly reported *Athen.* XIV. 625 E, δεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχει ήθον η πάθος, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by *πρακτικά μέλη* insuperable. Cf. however n. (1084).

² See Bursian’s *Jahresbr.* LVII. p. 174. Both expressions *ιερὰ μέλη* and *τὰ ἔξοργαζοντα τὴν ψυχὴν* must refer to the melodies of Olympus: cp. Pl. *Symp.* 215 C quoted p. 622 n. 1.

³ The proposition *φανερὸν δτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αἰτόν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον ἀλλὰ κτλ* § 3, 1342 a 1—4.

NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

καὶ γὰρ παιδεῖας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαμὲν τὴν μουσικὴν χρῆσθαι δεῖν]—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον. V(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38—40.

δὲ γὰρ περὶ ἑνὸς συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἡπτὸν διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον θεος καὶ φόβος, ἢ τι δὲ ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταῦτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακάχιμοι τίνες εἰσὶν· ἐκ τῶν δὲ ἵερῶν μελῶν ὅρμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἔξοργαίσουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μελεσταί, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ λατρεῖας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. § ταῦτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν καὶ τοὺς θεῆμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὄλως παθητικοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστη, καὶ πάσι γίνεσθαι τινὰ κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἕδονῆς. c. 7 §§ 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. Comp. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ [sc. τῷ αὐλῷ] καιρὸς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἡ μάθησιν. c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homœopathic treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the time and usually called by them *κάθαρσις*: in regard to this it is sufficient to refer to the Introduction of Susemihl's edition of the *Poetics* p. 44 f. and to the fuller investigations of Döring¹. Two points have been properly emphasized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical colouring which a number of Aristotle's expressions bear²; and secondly, that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as *κορυβαντιασμός*, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc. while on the other hand the subject of treatment by the musical *catharsis* is not compared to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is actually suffering from it. Even the term *κατακάχιμοι* (§ 4, a 8), though it reminds us of 'possession' and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more, as Döring points out, than '*liable* to be attacked' by a certain form of excitement. So too the phrase ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἑνὸς συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς *ἰσχυρῶς*, a 4, "the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds," in itself ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle's chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. n. 1094), and with their æsthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying

¹ Aristotelische Kunststheorie p. 319 ff. (*Philologus* XXI. p. 524 ff., XXVII. p. 714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).

² See 1342 a 8 κινήσεως and the notes on κατακάχιμοι, a 9 χρήσωνται, a 10 καθισταμένους, a 14 κουφίζεσθαι.

dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Döring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term *πάθος* itself recalls *τὸ πάσχειν*, suffering or ailment¹, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering "emotion"; see *Excursus III. n. (1043)*, p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful "emotions," but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all "emotions" without exception are included, this is, as Döring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable *with* (e.g. *φίλα Rhet. II. 4. 1*, 1380 b 33 ff., *Θάρσος*, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (*πάθη*), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the 'violent occurrence' (*συμβαίνει στρεψός*) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the 'employment' of melodies by those suffering from corybantiasm (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in *n. (1093)*: it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms *καθίστασθαι*=recover (but see *n. 1093*) and *ταρπέια*=regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (*κουφίζεσθαι* 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily 'relief' which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render *κάθαρσις* by 'homœopathic purgation of emotions' (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of *κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics 6. 2*, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer "cleansing" to "purgation." There also p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle's time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of *κάθαρσις* "cleansing" in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSEM (1095).

¹ Bonitz *Aris. Stud. v.* p. 44: mental emotion has the term *πάθος* applied to it as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (*πάθος = πάσχειν*).

Κάθαρσις as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connexion of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the *Sophist* 226 D—231 E. The Eleate stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (*καθαρμός*) is the general name for any such process¹. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (*a*) the *internal* purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (*b*) the merely *external* washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or ‘dress-reviver’². With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleate is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (*c*) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as *καθαρτής*, and the elenchus as a purge:—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

The liturgical or religious sense: lustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term *κάθαρσις* was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application³. Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablution and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and *περιρραντήρια* for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides’ *Ion*, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

¹ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις (sc. ἡ καταλεπούσα μὲν τὸ βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χείρον ἀποβάλλοντα) λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις, *Sophist* 226 D. Hence the definition “Οροὶ 415 D, κάθαρσις ἀπόκρισις χειρῶν ἀπὸ βελτιόνων. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between κάθαρσις and καθάρρος.

² τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρ-

σεων...τό τε τῶν ὄψων (α) δσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς λατρυκῆς τε ὅρῶς διακρινόμενα καθαρίζεται, καὶ (β) περὶ τάκτος, εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα, δσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἀφίκων σωμάτων, ὃν γραφευτικὴ καὶ ἔμπασα κοσμητικὴ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχουμένη...πολλὰ ὄντα πατά τοσχε, *Sophist* 226 E f.

³ Döring *Kunstlehre* p. 251.

The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the detergents (*περιψήματα*) used to 'suck up' the pollution¹, the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these *καθάρματα* (*καθάρσια*), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple². In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown: Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, *Odyss.* xv. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod.

1. 35.

Lustration as a cure for madness.

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconsiderable evidence that *κάθαρσις*, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells³. The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρμός* indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

¹ Compare also Διὸς κάδιον οὐ τὸ λεπτὸν Διὶ τέθναι... χρώται δὲ αὐτοῖς... πρὸ τοῦς καθαρμοὺς ὑποστρωνύντες αὐτὰ τοῖς ποσὶ τῶν ἐναγάρων (Suidas), εἴφ' οὐ οἱ καθαρμούμενοι ἐστήκεσσαν τῷ ἀριστερῷ ποδὶ (Hesychius).

² Porphy. *De Abstinentia* II. 19: δεῖ τοινυι καθηραμένους τὸ ἡθος λέναι θύσσωτας... ἐν γούν 'Επιβάντος προεγέγραπτο' ἀγρόν χρῆ ναιοι θυάδεος ἐντὸς λόντα

λέμεναι· ἀγνείη δὲ ἐστὶ φροεῖν δαιμόνια. The quotation from Bernays *Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit* p. 67 f.

³ θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τῷ ψυχήν (Ζάμολξες) ἐφη ἐπωδᾶς τις, Pl. *Charm.* 157 A. Not only ἐνθουσιασμός but lumbago and epi-

lepsy were said to be cured by music: Theophrastus περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, Fr. 87: θεὶ δὲ καὶ νόσους λāται μουσικὴ Θεόφραστος λατόρησεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, ισχικούς φάσκων ἀνθενούς διατελεῖν εἰ καταλήσσοι τις τοῦ τόπου τῇ φρυγιστὶ ἀγωνίᾳ (Ath. XIV. 624 B), Fr. 88 Θ. ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμῷ... φροτὶ... τὴν μουσικὴν πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γυγνομένων παθῶν λατρευειν καθάπερ λεποδημία φθίσους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γυγνομένας τὴν διατὰς ἐκστάσεις. λāται γάρ, φροτὶ, ἡ καταλήσις καὶ ισχιάδα καὶ ἐπιληψίας (an instance is appended, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* c. 49).

Cratylus. There Socrates, speaking of the attributes of Apollo, whose name he connects with ἀπολοίων, ἀπολύων, says: "the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul¹." The strange nature of primitive remedies is what we might expect; 'the hair of the dog that bit you' is but one instance of crude homeopathy, which might be indefinitely illustrated. The fact that to cure madness the Greeks resorted to noisy excitement is beyond all doubt. In Plato, madness itself is said to suggest this remedy to the clairvoyant patient, the 'illustrations and religious rites' which for his malady are alone of avail². In the legends we naturally find this method of treatment (ἢ διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θεράπεια) referred to an individual inventor: Melampus, a well known seer, is represented as healing the madness of the daughters of Proetus by such lustral rites³. Dionysus himself was the subject of another legendary cure⁴. The case of Orestes, Paus. II. 31. 4, is less clear seeing that he was 'cleansed' of matricide as well as madness⁵. On the other hand, in a picture of real life from the *Wasps* of Aristophanes, Bdelycleon in all seriousness endeavours to cure his father's madness by initiating him in the Corybantic rites⁶. Not less sober is the statement of the phenomenon as an acknowledged fact—the frenzy that music is supposed to excite and to cure—in the questions put by Porphyry and answered, in the person of Abammon, by Iamblichus⁷.

¹ πρώτον μὲν γάρ η κάθαρσις καὶ οἱ καθαρμοὶ καὶ κατὰ τὴν λατρικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ αἱ τοῖς λατρεῦοις φαρμάκους καὶ τοῖς μαντικοῖς περιειώσεις τε καὶ τὰ λουτρά τὰ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ αἱ περιράνσεις, πάντα ἐν τι ταῦτα δύναται ἀν., καθαρὸν παρέχειν τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, 405 A, B. The translation is Jowett's.

² ἄλλα μήν νόσους γε καὶ πόνους τῶν μεγίστων, ἀ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηρυμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τοι τῶν γενῶν, η μαρτλα ἔγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἰς ἔσσες ἀπαλλαγὴν εἶρετο, καταφυγάνων πρὸς θεῶν εὐχῶν τε καὶ λατρειῶν, διθεν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἔξαντη ἐποιησε τὸν ἁντῆς ἔχοντα, *Phaedr.* 244 D, E. In view of this and the other Platonic passages it seems impossible to endorse the objection of Reiz, *op. c.* p. 104, "expiari et iustrari dicuntur illi dumtaxat, qui polluti sunt aliquo scelere, tum qui mysteriis initiandi, aut qui rem sacram facturi sunt: non etiam illi quorum animus ab aliqua perturbatione tanquam morbo purgatur et liberatur."

³ ἐς τοῦτο ἀναφυγεῖν τὸ σπήλαιον τὰς θυγατέρας τὰς Προίτον μανέσσας λέγουσιν ἃ δὲ Μελάμπους θύσαις τε ἀπορρήτοις καὶ καθαρμοῖς κατήγαγεν ἐς χωρίου καλούμενον Λουσούς...καὶ ἡκέσσατο τῆς μανίας ἐν Ἀρτέ-

μόδος λερῷ, Pausan. VIII. 18. 3. The account of Apollodorus (II. 2. 2 ff.) makes the cure depend on counter-excitement, Μελάμπους δέ, μάντις ὁν καὶ τὴν διὰ φαρμάκων καὶ καθαρμῶν θεράπειαν πρώτος εὑρηκὼς, παραλαβὼν τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν νεαρῶν μετ' ἀλαζαγοῦ καὶ τυνού ἐνθέου χορειας ἐν τῷ δρών αὐτάς ἐς Σικίωνα συνεβίωσε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν δωργμὸν ἡ πρεσβυτάτη μετηλλαξεν ταῖς δὲ λοιπαῖς τυχούσαις καθαρμοῖς σωφρονήσας συνέθη.

⁴ Ἡπατίαν αὐτῷ ἐκβαλούσης αἴθις δὲ εἰς Κύβελα τῆς Φρυγίας ἀφικνεῖται, κάκει καθαρθεῖς ὑπὸ Πλέας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκμαθῶν..., Apollodorus III. 5. 1. This is alluded to by Plato *Laws* 672 B.

⁵ The same remark applies to the cleansing of Alcmeon, Apollodorus III. 7. 5. 2—4.

⁶ εἰτ' αὐτῷ ἀπέλουν κάκαθαιρ· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲ μάλα | μετὰ ταῦτ' ἐκορυβάντις' (120). Ibi schol. ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰ τῶν Κορυφάντων ἐποιει αὐτῷ μυστήρια, ἐπὶ καθαρῷ τῆς μανίας: and to the same effect Hesych. s.v. Κορυφαϊσμός· κάθαρσις μανίας.

⁷ ὡς τῶν ἔξιταμένων ἔνιοι τίνες αἰδῶν δικούσσοτες η κυψέλαιων η τυμπάνων η τυνού μέλους ἐνθουσιῶσιν, ως οἱ τε κορυφαντίζομενοι καὶ οἱ τῷ Σαβαῖψι κάτοχοι καὶ οἱ μητρίζοντες... with the ordinary explanation (which Abammon of course rejects)

The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in *Aglaophamus*, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, pourtraying various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe¹, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds²: then the wild frenzied dances³, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient⁴, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes⁵. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details⁶, but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, *Laws* 790 c—791 B, leave little more to be said: "this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent

τὸ μὲν οὖν κυνηγικὸν τι καὶ παθητικὸν εἶναι τὴν μουσικήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν αὐλῶν ἐμποιεῖν ἡ λαρναῖς τὰ πάθη τῆς παραρροτῆς, καὶ τὸ μεθιστάραν τὰ τοῦ σώματος κρύσεις ἡ διαθέσεις τὴν μουσικήν, καὶ τὸ ἀλλοι μὲν μέλεσιν ἀναβακχεῖσθαι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀποπαίσθαι τῆς βακχείας, καὶ τῶν αἱ τοβών διαφοραὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκστάσεις διαθέσεις προσαρμόσσουσι, καὶ διτὸς δασταγοὶ καὶ δκατάστατοι μέλοι πρὸς τὰς ἐκστάσεις οἰκεῖον, οὐ δέ εστι τὰ Ολύμπιον, καὶ δια τοιάδητα λέγεται, πάντα ἀλλοτρίως μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν Iamblich. de Mysteriis, 3, 9.

¹ Ion 536 C, οἱ Κορεβάντες ἑκένυον μόνον αἰσθάνοντα τοῦ μέλους ὅξεις δ ἦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου δν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἑκένυον τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ρημάτων εὐποροῦνται, τῶν δὲ ἀλλων οὐ φροντίζουσι.

² Crito 54 D, ταῦτα εἴ τιθι δι τὸ ἔγω δοκῶ ἀκούειν ὥσπερ οἱ Κορεβάντιώντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκούσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βουβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μῆδοντα τῶν ἀλλων ἀκούειν.

³ Ion 533 E, οἱ Κορεβάντες οὐκ ἐμφορεύεται δρχούνται.

⁴ Laws 790 E, αἱ μητέρες.....ἀτεχνῶς κατανυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βαγχεῖων Ιδσεις ταῦτη τῆς

κινήσεως ἀμα χορεῖα καὶ μοσηγ χρόμεται. From the expression βαγχεῖων Ιδσεις Döring op. c. 252 strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 c we find αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορεβάντων λαματα τελοῦσαι; τελεταὶ are joined to καθάρισι in *Phaedr.* 244 E (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not only 'cleansed' but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθάρθεις ὑπὸ Πέτρας καὶ τὰς ρελεάς ἐκράθων p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: *Laws* 672, λόγοι τις ἀμα καὶ φῆμα ὑπορρεῖ πῶς, ως ὁ θεός οὔτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητριᾶς "Πρας διεφορίζει τὴν ψυχής τὴν γρώμην, διὸ τὰς τε βαγχεῖας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικήν ἐμβαλλεῖ χορείας τιμωρούμενος, i.e. in retribution.

⁵ Sympr. 215 E: πολὺ μοι μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν Κορεβάντων ἡ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δέκρινα ἐκχείται.

⁶ Lucian Deor. Dial. XII. 37, De Sali. c. 79, p. 167, Plut. Amat. XVI. 7, p. 758 E, 12, 759 A, Strabo X. 21, p. 473, all cited by Lobeck p. 1152 ff.

internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy¹." Corroborative testimony is borne by Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage cited above p. 609, f.²

Κάθαρσις as purification or purging of impurity.

In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθαίρειν is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to *purge* [the system] but to *purge away* [what is noxious]; accordingly κάθαρσις denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications: e.g. 'separation' Plato *Phaedo* 67 C³, and moral 'purification,' which is a sense frequent in the *Phaedo*⁴. In the *Sophist* the elenchus is termed a purge. Socratic education, aped by the younger Sophists, was directed to ridding the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom⁵. Other usages, e.g. λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμὸν ἀδικημάτων (*Rep.* 364 E, cp. *Phaedo* 82 D), support this meaning of riddance or removal. From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists: in Stobaeus *Ecl. Phys.* 1 c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus περὶ ψυχῆς,

¹ *Laws* 790 C—791 B, Jowett's translation. Ed. Müller *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst* 1. 121, II. 70 (cp. *Jahrb. f. Kl. Phil.* CI. 1870, p. 405 f.) called attention to this passage in connexion with κάθαρσις. Especially noteworthy is 790 E ff. στατοῦ ἔξωθεν τις προσφέρει τοῖς τοιούτοις πάθεοις σεσωμόν, ἡ τῷ ἔξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις πρωσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβερὰν οὐσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δὲ γαληνὴν ήσυχιαν τε ἐν τῷ ψυχῇ φανεραίς ἀπεργασμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἔκστατω πηδήσεως, παντάπαιων ἀγαπητῶν τε τοῖς μὲν ὑπουργοῖς λαγχάνεις ποιεῖ, τοῦτο δὲ ἐγρηγορότας δροχουμένους τε καὶ αὐλούμενους μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἀν καλλιεργοῦντες ἔκαστοι θύσαι, κατεργάσαστο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἦμαν διαθέσεων ἔξεις ἐμφρονας ἔχειν. An objection made by Döring p. 252 to the whole idea of a 'lustration' of Bacchic enthusiasm as involving a contradiction, since the votary of the god, full of his enthusiasm, cannot possibly be unclean, or stand in need of consecration, is fully answered by this and similar passages.

² *De Musica* II. p. 157 M: διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ δοαι ταῦτας παραπλήσιοι λόγου τύποι ἔχεσθαι φασιν· διότι δὲ τῷ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτήσιοι διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν ταῦταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ δρχήσεως ἄμα ταῦταις ἐκκαθαργοῦται, cited and explained by Döring p. 332, cp. Beaufays *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 128.

³ κάθαρσις...τὸ χωρίσεων δὲ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν. Cp. *Soph.* 227 C, ψυχῆς καθαρμὸς = κακλας ἀφαίρεσις, i.e. λιτεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ τὸ φλαύρον.

⁴ E.g. 69 in τὸ δὲ ἀληθές τῷ δοτὶ γέ κάθαρσις [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν τοιούτων πάντων...καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρενοῖς μὴ καθαρμὸς τις γέ: "whereas in truth it is really a purgation from all such things...and wisdom itself is probably a mode of purification." See also 69 C ὁ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, 113 D, 114 C.

⁵ τὸν Θεγχον λεκτόν ὡς ἀρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἔστι, 230 D. The sophist is δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθῆμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρής, 231 E. The analogy to the medical treatment is brought out fully 230 C—E.

which fully explains in what sense *κάθαρσις* was a technical term¹. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle's pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

The usage of the medical writers: purgation, discharge.

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen *κάθαρσις* as a technical term denotes 'purgation,' i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foesius has well defined it: *κάθαρσις* purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocratis, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura moliatur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four 'humours,' blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile². Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame³. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt: preparatory to a discharge it must however be

¹ Πλωτίνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγράψεων, δόκησι τε πάσῃς ὑπεροψίᾳ [τε] καὶ τῶν ἐνδιλωτῶν διανοήσεων διπότασιν, πλέοντιν τε ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ δυτοῦ, ἀφομολωσιν τε τοῦ κατανοούμενου πρὸς τὸ καταρροῦν τὴν τελεωτάτην κάθαρσιν ἀπολαμβάνουσιν p. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κράτις, δικη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι assigns as the end of the last ἀρχαρεῖσις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀπόδοσις τῆς οὐκεταίς οὐσίας, τελεώτηρ, ἀποπληρωσις, αὐτάρκεια, ἀνδος ἐπὶ τῷ γεννησαμένῳ αἴτιῳ: whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of λέσις ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγῇ τῶν καταδέσμων καὶ φθορᾶς διενθέρωσις καὶ γενέσεως δρεσις. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in *Enn.* 1. 2 περὶ ἀρετῶν, and decides (1. 6. 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (*πολιτικά*) and below the intellectual (*θεωρητικά* καὶ ἀρεταί): see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii.

661, 711, 757, 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering "purification," so common hitherto and so unhappy ambiguous.

² τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν ταῖς αἷς καὶ φλέβαις καὶ χολῇ τὸ καρδιά τε καὶ μελαναῖς, καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ αἵτη τῇ φύσει τὸ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγεῖται καὶ ὕγεια. Hipp. *De natura hominis* 11. 3 p. 83 (L. p. 352 K.).

³ I.e. ὑγανεῖ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, δεῖται μετρίος ἔχει ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ὅληλα κρήσις τε καὶ δυνάμος καὶ τοῦ πλήθεος, καὶ μάλιστα μεριγμένα ὦν ἀλγεῖται δέ, ὀκτὼ τοιντέων ὥλασσον ὡν πλέον ὡν ὡν χωρισθεῖ τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκραμένον ὡν τοῖς ἔπεστι. Plato has a similar theory in his *Timaeus* cc. 39, 40, 82 A ff. except that he has transferred the 'unnatural excess' and 'defect' and the 'displacement' in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humours. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (*Tim.* 85 B).

reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, *τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων*, (2) their reduction, *τέψις*, itself a species of transformation, or *μεταβολή*, (3) their expulsion, *κρίσις*. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (*ταράττει*) without however effecting a purge¹. The inducement of excitement (*ταραχῇ*) is somewhat of a parallel to homeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated *ἴνθουσιασμός* in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame². The medical process (*ταραχῇ*) goes on until the reduction (*τέψις*) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasizes between the sense of *κάθαρσις* and of *κένωσις* in the Hippocratean corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: *κένωσιν ἀπλῶς εἴωθε λέγειν ὁ Ἰπποκράτης ὅταν ἀπαντεις οἱ χυμοὶ³ ὄμοτίμως κενώνται, κάθαρσιν δὲ ὅταν οἱ μοχθηροὶ κατὰ ποιότητα*. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phases as *κάθαρσις χολῆς, κ. αἷματος*, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague⁴: Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word⁵. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocrateans⁶: but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense⁷. Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

¹ ὁ γοῦν ἐλλέβορος ἀρχὴν τοῦ καθαρεύειν τὸ ταράττειν τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλ' ἦν ἐλάσσων τοῦ μετρίου δυθῆ, ταράττει μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ καθαρεῖ. Plut. Quaest. conv. III. 8, 8, p. 656 F.

² Comp. Plato's reflexions on the Corybantic rites, *Laws* II. 790 C ff. as quoted above p. 646 n. 4.

³ Galen *Comm. in Hippocr. De Humor. v. 12* (XVI. 105 K.). Compare also *κάθαρσιν δὲ ἔστω ἡ τῶν λυτρωτῶν κατὰ ποιότητα κένωσις* Galen *Comm. ad aphor. 2. 1. 1* (XVII. B. 358 K.); *κάθαρσιν γάρ εἰσθεν* [sc. ὁ Ἰπποκράτης] *οὐομάζειν οὐ μόνον τὰς ὑπὸ φαρικῶν γενομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως In Epidem. (XVII. B. 167 K.)]; *οὐομάζω δὲ κένωσιν μέν τῶν αἰκελῶν, ὅταν ὑπερβάλῃ τῷ πλήθει, κάθαρσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀλλορίων κατὰ ποιότητα Comm. in progn. (XVIII. B. 134 f. K.).* Here Galen is speaking in his own*

person. Other passages are cited by Siebeck *Zur Katharsisfrage in Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882, p. 225 ff.

⁴ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι, δοαι ὑπὸ λατρῶν ἀνομασμέναι εἰσιν, II. 49.

⁵ c. Conon. § 12, εἰ μὴ κάθαρσις αἷματος αἴρουμάτη μοι συνέβη Or. 54, p. 1260, 24.

⁶ Littré ed. of Hippocr. I. 73: plus on examine comparativement les écrits hippocratiques, ceux de Platon et d'Aristote, plus on trouve de conformités entre eux et de points de comparaison. Döring *φ. c. p. 319 ff.* collects a few instances of *κένωσις, τέψις, ταράττει, ταραχῇ*—e.g. 450 b 1, 70 b 9 ff., 1106 a 4, 1382 a 21, 1386 b 19, 23, 805 a 6, a 15 ff., 864 a 2, 873 b 31 f. *Add Probl. I. 42, 864 a 34* (quoted below p. 650 n. 8).

⁷ See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. 354 b 18 ‘*syn τὰ καταμήτρια*.’ The references adduced take up rather more than a column

Galen between *κένωσις* and *κάθαρσις* is much observed by unprofessional writers¹.

Κάθαρσις as an aesthetic term.

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of *κάθαρσις* in reference to Music in the *Politics*, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the *Poetics*². All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation³. Whether this aesthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated⁴: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion⁵ that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corybantian frenzy in the manner above described⁶. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context⁷, certain points in the process of relief⁸, and the consideration urged by Bernays⁹ that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato's 'psychiatry' in the *Laws*, but

(64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines of these latter is *De gen. anim.* II. 4. 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περιττωμάτων). Bernays *op. c.* p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν κατατυριών, ἐκρύσιος.

¹ E.g. Pl. *Phaedo* 69 c κάθαρσις = total removal.

² μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαῖας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἔχοντος ἴδιον μέντην λόγῳ χωρὶς ἔκποστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορφοῖς δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελτας, δι' ἑλκοῦ καὶ φέβον περαινούσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσος. *Poet.* 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

³ *Pol.* V(VIII). 7. 3. 1341 b 38. We have lost the fuller exposition of the *Poetics* (ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἔροῦμεν σφαστέροις, *cp. n.* 1085).

⁴ Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it *Jahrb. f. Phil.* Cl. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susemihl *Intr. to Poetics* p. 44.

⁵ *Phil. d. Griech.* II^a. ii. 775.

⁶ P. 642. Ed. Müller *I.c.* p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato *Laws* 790 D ff., and Aristotle *Pol.* V(VIII). is so great as to be unmistakeable (*τῶν*

ἐκφρόνων βαρχεῖσιν ιδεῖσιν

in Plato, ὁπός λαρπεῖς τιχεῖν καὶ καθαρόρεως in Aristotle: Εὗσι εὔφρονας ἔχειν in the former, σατσασθεῖν in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called *κάθαρσις* is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only eked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Susemihl remarks *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xci 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

⁷ See the notes *ad loc.* p. 610 f.

⁸ The operation of drugs is the subject of *Probl.* I. 42, διὸ τὶ τὰ φάρμακα εἰδοπεῖ; The illustration conveyed in the words οὐ πεφύτει φέροντα τὰ έμπεδια αἴροις καὶ καλεῖται τοῦτο κάθαρσις 864 a 32—34 is very apposite. *Cp. Pl. Soph.* 230 c νοούστοις γάρ οἱ καθαρόρρεις αἴροις, ὅπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα λατροὶ νερούσιν μὴ πρότερον ἀν τὴν προσφερομένην τροφὰν αἰσθανεῖν δίνασθαι σώμα, τῷδε ἀν τὰ λατρεύοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλλει... The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

⁹ *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 13 (143).

of Hippocrates' emetics and purges?" The incongruity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily cure, the attempt to explain the 'psychiatry' on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle's original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Corybantian frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homœopathic nature¹: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the *Attis*. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music². Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the *Politics*³. Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions⁴." If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between "the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes" and "the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies"—there can be no question that the former is an erroneous view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the *Poetics* we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself⁵: about its moral or educa-

¹ Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homœopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his *Samsæn Agonistes*: "(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing these passages well imitated. Nor is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his assertion, for so, in physick, things of melancholick hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours."

² μία δὲ φύσις τῆς μουσικῆς, κλησης τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ κατὰ ἀπόλιτον γεγομένη τῶν διά τὰ πάθη κακῶν *Frag.* 89 ed. Wimmer. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (ἀρχὰς μουσικῆς λόγη τὸν ἤδωντὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν): *Fr.* 90.

³ In *Quæst. Conv.* III. 8 Plutarch is

discussing the effect of wine; 2 § 10, 656 F ff. εἰκός δέ πον καὶ ταῦτη τὴν περὶ τὸν ἀκροθάρακα ταραχήν, ὅταν ἀκμὴν λάβῃ, μαρανεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τούτο συνεργεῖν τὸν οἶνον· πολὺς γάρ εἰσελθὼν τὸ σώμα συνεξέκαυσε καὶ κατανάλωσε τὸ μανιῶδες τῆς ψυχῆς. Μάκρεπεν γάρ ἡ θρηνωδία καὶ ὁ ἐπιτάχεος αὐλός ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυν ἔκβαλλε [cp. p. 646 n. 5], προδύω δέ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἰκεῖον οὐτοῦ κατὰ μικρὸν ἔχαιρεν καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπτικόν· ὅμοιος ίδοις ἀν τὸν οἶνον κτλ. With μαρανεσθαι cp. *Poet.* VI(VIII). 7. 14, 1342 b 27, ἀπειρηκιας. Again the assuaging effect, but not the previous excitement, is mentioned *Sept. sap. conv.*, 13, 156 C: αἱ δὲ Μούσαι καὶ παντάκασιν [μέμψαντ] ἀν τημᾶς] εἰ νομίζουμεν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι μιθραν καὶ αὐλούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ παιδεῖν τὰ ήδη καὶ παρηγορεῖν τὰ πάθη τῶν χρωμένων μέλεσι καὶ ἀρμολαῖς.

⁴ Prof. Butcher's translation, *op. c.* p. 348. The Greek is given p. 650 n. 2.

⁵ *Poet.* 14 § 4, 1453 b 10: οὐ γάρ πᾶσαν

tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama even must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempts made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a 'purging away' i.e. expulsion or 'purging' i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)¹: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the *materia peccans*? They are now expelled, and to speak of them as 'secreted' is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until sated with over indulgence they length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the *purgation* of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence² (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotion-excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an important element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate³ between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect the relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama⁴: (3) to

δεῖ δητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν
οἰκεῖαν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὴν ἄπο ἑλέου καὶ φόβου
διὸ μικρόσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν...,
26 § 15, 1462 b 13: δεῖ γάρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦ-
σαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτάς [sc. τὴν τραγῳδίαν
καὶ τὴν ἔποτον] ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην.

¹ Siebeck in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1882, p. 225 ff., Baumgart *Poetik* p. 435 f.

² Comp. Plut. *De intim. util.* 10, 91 F: τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἔχθρούς ἀποκαθάρσεις "indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies." Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητική ποιέτης), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, *Arist. Studien* v, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the *Rhetoric* (II. c. 5, c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—'a sort of pain' (λόγη τις), although the emotions generally are defined as *οἱ ἐπειταὶ λόγη καὶ ἡδονὴ Rhet.* II. I. 8, 1378 a 21, *Nic. Eth.* II. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

³ The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müller *Geschr. der Kunsts*. II. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter when interpreting τὴν τῷρα τοιούτων παθημάτων καθάρσιον: the definition of tragedy as the "expulsion," i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθημα = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion:—a distinction which in view of Bonitz' careful investigation (*Arist. Studien* v) cannot be maintained. See n. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the *purgation* of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

⁴ The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that a real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: *Rhet.* II. 8. 6, 1385 b 33, *οὐ γά*

associate the cure of the o'erburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience¹.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of κάθαρσις. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of *De Mysteriis*), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own: and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring²." If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the *Republic*—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (*συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν*) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied³." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched⁴, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascesis with the compromise proffered by Aristotle⁵. But while the dim outlines of the

λεοντίνοις οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκεῖῳ πάθει: § 12, 1386 a 22 f., τὸ γάρ δεινὸν ἔπειρον τοῦ ἀλεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρονιστικὸν τοῦ ἀλείνοντος. Whereas the drama excites both pity and fear: *Poet.* 14 § 2, 1453 b 3, οὔτε τὸ δικούσαντα καὶ φρίτεν καὶ ἀλεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβασιτων ἀπέρι δὲ πάθοι τις δικούσαν τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίποδος μόδον, § 5 τὴν ἀπό ἀλείνον καὶ φόβον. Cp. c. 13 § 4, 1453 a 2 ff.

This distinction affords the best possible explanation of τῶν τοιούτων in the definition (Reinkens *op. c.* p. 161): τοιότων would have postulated the complete identity of the two. Compare Ed. Müller *Gesch. d. Kunststheorie* II. p. 63 ff.

¹ Bernays *Zwei Abh.* p. 72 (181) ff. with whom E. Müller, Brandis, Zeller, Susemihl, and Reinkens substantially agree. See Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 366 ff.

² ἐν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότραι πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαρίζομεν· ἐν τοῖς λεπίσι θεάμασι τοις καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχρῶν [e.g. τῶν φαλλῶν] ἀπολύθμενα τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν συνπιπτούσης βλάβης I. II. p. 403 Parthey. Again in 3. 9, p. 119, 14 ἀπέρασιν

δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν λαρπεῖν οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸν [sc. τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπίποναν] κληρέον. οὐδέ γάρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ή πλεονασμόν ή περίτυπα πρώτων ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφέται there can be no doubt that these are Peripatetic technical terms which are rejected.

³ τὶ δῆποτε τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμῳδίην οὐ παραδέχεται καὶ ταῦτα συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν, ἀ μῆτε παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δυνατὸν μήτε ἐμπιπλάνειν πάλιν ἀργαλές, δεύμενα δὲ τῶν ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἢν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀκράσεσιν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνερχήστουν ἥπλας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν (p. 360 ed. Bas.):—εἰτερ διὰ τούτων δυνατὸν ἐμπέτρως ἀποκιμπλάνειν τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλάνας ἐνεργὰ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχειν, τὸ πεπονηκός αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας (p. 362).

⁴ διενιλαβησθεία μή...αντὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάθη μετρίας ἀφοσιώσεως ἔξι πονηράν καὶ δυσέκνιστον ἐντήκωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς (*ibid.*).

⁵ δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν πολιτικὸν διαμηχαρᾶσθαι τινας τῶν παθῶν τοιότων ἀπεράσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς φήσομεν, ἀλλ' <οὐχ> ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθεῖας συντελεῖν τούτων· τοιν μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινοῦν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν ἐμμελῶς ἀναστέλλειν, ἐκείνας δὲ ἀρα

theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phus or two (*ἀπέρασις, ἀφοσίωσις, ἐμμέτρως ἀποπιπλάνει τὰ πάθη*), the rest is coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of *κάθαρσις*.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information—the utterances and indications of Plato's own æsthetic views in his dialogues¹. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy². His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds the emotional nature which ought rather to be starved³. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: “If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, on having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's... Few persons even reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own!” Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: in granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means to their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate ‘the feeling kept under control in our own calamities’ with the pity of real life, and that which is ‘satisfied and delighted by the poets’ with the pity which (in Aristotle's definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions

τὰς ποιήσεις...πολλοῦ δεῖν εἰς ἀφοσίωσιν εἶναι χρησίμους· αἱ γὰρ ἀφοσίωσις οὐκ ἐν ὑπερβολαῖς εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν συνεσταλμέναις ἐνεργείαις [the neoplatonic view], συμκράντι διοιδύγεται πρὸς ἔκεινα ἔχουσαι ὡν εἰσιν ἀφοσίωσις (*ibid.*). In this and the previous citations from Proclus the corrections of Bernays (*op. c.* pp. 46—50) are given.

¹ See C. Belger *De Aristotele etiam in arte poetica componenda Platonis discipulo* (Berlin 1872), esp. p. 58 ff., Siebeck *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882, p. 226 ff.

² *Phaedr.* 268 C, βῆστες ποιεῖν...οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοὐναντίον αἱ φοβεράς καὶ ἀτελητικάς, *Ker.* X. 606 A.

³ τρέψει γὰρ ταῦτα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά τε καὶ λυτρῷ καὶ ηδεῖ ἐν τῷ ψυχῇ] δρόσουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἀρχοντα ἡμῶν καθιστοῦσι

δέον δρχεσθαι αὐτά, 606 D. Cp. Lm 790 E.

⁴ 606 A, B: εἰ ἐνθυμοῦσο, διτι τὸ μὲν χόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις ἐμφέρει τοι πεπικῆς τοῦ δικράναι τε καὶ ἀποδηματικῶν καὶ ἀποπλησθῆται, φύεται δι τοι τοιον τοῖτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τοτέ ἐστι τοι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον εἰς γῆραν τὸ δὲ φύεται βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἀλλα τακτικῶν πεπαιδευμένον λάγηρ οὐδὲ δέον, τοι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τοῖτο, ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν...λογιζεσθαι τοισι, διλέγοις τοι μέτεστιν, διτι ἀποδεικνύγκει ἄπο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ αἰσθητά φύεσται γὰρ ἐν ἔκεινοις ισχυρὸν τὸ εὑνόν οὐ βάδον εἰς τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσιν εἶχεν. The translation is Dr. Jowett. The last remark is endorsed by Aristedes Pol. V(VIII). 5. 19. 1340 a 23.

(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and (2) to conduce to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's *παιδεία*: habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* is something wholly distinct from this. It might be defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and so transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive: it might be urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the *Republic*, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little but just enough to send it to sleep¹.

In an Eudemian book of the *Ethics* an even more advanced position is taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 16 *χαρὰν ἀβλαβῆ*), even artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such 'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains². But that Aristotle was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shewn e.g. by his care for the education of the feelings in youth³.

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points in the exposition. In the *Philebus* (47 E ff.) there is an interesting and valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful, which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable concomitants of various phases of emotion⁴. We have every reason then to

¹ *Rep.* IX. 571 E f.: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἔνδειq δοὺς μήτε πλησμοργῆ, ὅπως ἀν κουμηθῆ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θύρων τῷ βελτισ τῷ χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐφ αὐτὸ [sc. τῷ βελτιστὸν] καθ' αὐτό μόνον καθαρὸς σκοτεῖν καὶ ὀργεσθαι τους καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι δ μὴ οἴσεν... ὥσπερ τὸ δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πρᾶ γας καὶ μὴ τις εἰς ὄργας ἐλθὼν κεκυμένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τὸ δό εῖδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας... οὕτως ἀποτι γηται. It seems then that while ἀποτι γηται is prohibited as immoral, ἡσυχάσας is a condition essential to the efficient

working of the rational soul. Of course the two philosophers differ wholly as to the application of this principle.

² *N.E.* VII. 14. 5. 1154 b 3: αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τυάς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητοι... b 13 f. ἐξελαύνει δὲ ηδονὴ λύπην ἢ τὸ ἐναντία καὶ τηνοῦσα, ἐλαύνει δὲ τὸ συχνά.

³ See V(VIII). 5. 17, 18, 1340 a 12 ff. (cp. 1341 a 13 f.).

⁴ See Bernays *op. c.* p. 143 f. Esp. cp. 1378 b 1 (*τάσῃ δργῇ ἐπεοθαί τινα ηδονήν*) with *Phil.* 48 A and the Homeric citation

conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem was only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

reference to the two; also *Ph.* 1331^a, 5.
12, 1339, b 25 ff. with *Phid.* 51 A ff. But
the detailed analysis in respect of comedy
appears inadequate, and of tragedy little

is said beyond the remark that the comic
transpires from the resources claimed in
Phid. 48 A. Cf. 50 E.

ADDENDA.



INTRODUCTION.

Page 1, line 3. The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

P. 2, note 1. After *θορλαι* add: and 1271 a 27 (1272 a 3, b 34) φιλίτια II¹ φιδίτια II².

P. 7, l. 17. As Plutarch *Περὶ Εὐγενεῖς* is a fabrication of the renaissance, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1556 (Lugduni apud Seb. Gryphium), the citations from the *Politics* would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the forger himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christopher Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorius. In his preface to Vol. IV of *Anecdota Graeca* (Hamburgi 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the *Περὶ Εὐγενεῖς* which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, "membranae illae uno altero ante inventam typographiam saeculo, meo iudicio, luculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscitantis librarii indiciis exaratae... Veterum scriptorum loca, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum supplente... Eleganter et erudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) confecta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi exstant, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam...cum Graecis in lucem profero, additis si pauca exceperis, auctorum testimonii, quae non sine cura aliqua ex monumentis eorum adhuc extantibus conquisiui." Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 196]: "Aristoteles lib. I. c. vi. Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vertendo liberius versatur Interpres" i.e. Ferron "nisi in opusculo Plutarchi eum alia quedam legisse censeas, quam quidem hodie apud Aristotelem exstant. In ms. hic loc⁹ deest."

P. 9, l. 29. Add: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* I. 165 ff. (Berlin 1885).

P. 9, l. 3 from end. Add: *De Politicis Aristoteleis Quaestiones criticae* Lipsiae 1886 (reprinted from the Supplement to *Jahrb. f. Philol.* Vol. XV. pp. 339—450, often hereafter cited as *Quaest. crit. collectae*). *Quaestionum Aristotellearum criticarum et exegeticarum Pars I* Gryphiswaldiae 1892; *Pars II* ib. 1893; *Pars III* ib. 1894: and *Prolegomena II* pp. XXVIII—XLIII of the 'nova impressio correctior' of the third edition in Teubner's series (Lipsiae 1894). Articles in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLVII. 1893, pp. 817—824; Bursian's *Fahrberichte* I. 592 f., III. 372 ff., V. 278 ff., IX. 354 ff., XVII. 279 ff., XXX. 66 ff., 97 f., XXXIV. 40 ff., XLII. 36, 253 ff., L. 12, LXVII. 137 ff., LXXV. 102 ff.

ADDENDA.

P. 10, last line. Add: *Zu Arist. Pol.* ibid. CXXIX. 1885. 544.

Jowett. Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.

Gomperz. *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller;* Wien, 1890.

Diels. Article in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* IV. 1891. 484.

Häberlin. Article on Arist. *Pol.* II. 9 in *Rhein. Mus.* XLV. 1890. 311 ff.

Machly. Article in *Philologus* LI. 1892. 197.

Zeller. In *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* VI. 1893. 153 n. 1.

Stoehr, Engel, Widemann, Schmidinger, Vogel. *Curae criticae in Ar. Pol.* in *Commentationes philologicae Monacenses*, 97—114: Munich, 1891.

Niemeyer. Article in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891. 412 ff.

v. Wilamowitz. *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 64—71, 187 f. n. (3).

P. 11, n. 1. Add references to Zeller in *Hermes* XV. 1880. 547—556, Dümmler in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. 179 ff., Shute *History of the Aristotelian writings*, Oxford, 1888, esp. c. 8, Newman *Introduction* to edition of the *Politics* I. 478—492, II. pp. xxx—xl, v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff. The discovery of the *Constitution of Athens* has called special attention to the connexion between the *Politics* and the *Polities*.

P. 14, n. 3. Add a reference to Birt *Das antike Buchwesen* p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δὲ inserted after περ by P² and P⁶ (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman *op. c.* II. p. xxi ff. xxvi f.

P. 18, n. 2. At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the athetesis of the last clause of B. I. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ πρῶτον...πολιτεῖα], II. c. 6 § 13, 1265 b 12—17 [Φεδωρ...δοτέρον], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [ώς...σκέψις], v (viii). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [θρα...μέλεσι], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (vi). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [ἢ θλυγάκις], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τράω...δημοτικόν]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [έπει...τινός;], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...πρότερον], Prof. Susemihl is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οἰκεῖν]—the discrepancy between this passage and IV (vii). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (vii)—as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [δεῖ...πολιορκία] in spite of note (246). On most of these passages see Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg. Pars IIII*, p. iii. Possibly even VIII (v). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 483 f.

P. 18, n. 3. Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. G. B. H. Θ. Δ. Z. E. Of these H. Θ. (and probably A. G.) were written earlier than the *Constitution of Athens*, the other four almost certainly later.

P. 18, n. 4. Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first: II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (5)=VIII (v) and B. 8 (6)=VII (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk.².

P. 18, n. 3. Cicero's acquaintance with the *Politics* has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's *Die mittlere Stoa* (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero

De Republica with Polybius vi. cc. 3—10 shows that both used a common authority, doubtless a political work by Panaetius. The suggestion was first made in a thesis appended to the dissertation published by P. Voight *Sorani Ephesii lib.* (Greifswald 1882). See Susemihl's edition of Aris. *Oeconomica* p. ix n. 16, *Griechische Litteraturgesch. in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig 1892) Vol. II. p. 75 n. (57), p. 180 n. (184). Direct acquaintance with the *Politics* is thus established for Panaetius whose life (circa 185—110) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apellicon of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala *Die Studien des Polybios* I. (Stuttgart 1890) p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—151) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle's *Politics*. This hypothesis is combated by Susemihl *Litteraturgesch.* II. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

P. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the *Ethics*: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heylbut 504, 8 ff., 520, 31 ff., 521, 5 ff., 610, 7 ff., 16 ff., 611, 10 ff., 615, 20 ff., 616, 6 f., 619, 14 ff., 18 ff., 620, 10 ff., Anon. p. 190, 4 f., p. 214, 36 ff.

The latter must commence with the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemihl's editions (Leipzig, 1883, 1884). Similarly with the *Oeconomica*: see again Susemihl's ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book I and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book II of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the *Politics* I. II 88 7—13, 1259 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of *Politics* I. c. 11. See below.

Mr Newman has compiled in Vol. II. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from *Rhetorica ad Alex.* 3, 1424 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., *De animal. motu* 7, 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] *Erasiae* 135 c, 138 c, Aristoxenus *Fr.* 19, 20, Philodemus *De Musica* (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3, *Fr.* 24, 52, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kemke and Gomperz, B. 1, *Fr.* 16, 17: B. 3, *Fr.* 45, 55; B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 5 f.; 16, 17 ff. Plutarch *Vita Crassi* c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words τίνες γάρ οἰκονομικήν ἐν ἀφέχοις χρηματιστικήν οὐσαν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικήν γεγονότην δρᾶμεν, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), *Moralia* 9 c, 527 A, 787 C—D, 812 B, D ff., 825 A—C; Dio Chrysostom, 3. 115, 7. 167, 14. 439, 36. 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemihl holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the *Politics*, but hardly with the *Polities*. Even his direct acquaintance with the 'Αθ. Πολ. is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893) I. pp. 299—303.

P. 20, n. 1. Add references to Blass *De Antiphonte sophista* (Kiel 1889), Dümmler *Prolegomena zu Platons Staat* (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 161 ff., esp. 169—185.

P. 35, n. 3. Gilbert's hypothesis, that Ephorus used the *Polities* of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the 'Αθηναῖων Πολετεῖα, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 329 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the 'Αθ. Πολ. under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Androtion. See A. Bauer *Forschungen zu Arist. 'Αθ. Πολ.* (Munich 1891) p. 155. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical *op. c.* I. p. 306.

P. 87, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the Ἀθηναῖος Πολιτεῖα. See Diels in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in *Des Arist. Politik u. d. ΑΘ. Πολ.* (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the athetesis should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 ἵπ...κλήψων, and 1274 b 23—26 ἐγένερο...δι. Against this view see Susemihl *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.

P. 68, ix. The date of the *Politics* has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens*, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the *Constitution*, which can confidently be dated *circa* 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the *Politics*. Thus Mr Newman notes (in *Class. Rev.* v. 162) that in the first part of the *Constitution of Athens* "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the *Politics* is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer" of 'ΑΘ. Πολ. c. 41 § 2 "Pol. 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in *Die Solonische Verfassung* (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the *Politics* to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the *Constitution*. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Susemihl has done *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* II. p. x—xii, III. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the *Ethics* and *Politics* were undoubtedly written later than the *Physica*, *De Celo*, *Meteorologica*: that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the *Encyclopaedia* with the exception of the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric* and *Metaphysics*. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the *Ethics* to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the *Politics* we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the *Constitution of Athens*, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books IV (VII), V (VIII): possibly also to Books I, III. The rest of the treatise, B. II, no less than Books IV—VI of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, *Metaphysics*, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining *Polities* (other than that of Athens), the Νόμιμα βαρβαρῶν, the διδασκαλίαι, and other similar works.

v. Wilamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on *Politics*. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books H Θ were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which ΔEZ are based." I.e. he thinks that ΔEZ are later, or at least not earlier, than the *Politics*, which according to him they presume: *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman II. p. xxxi: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, and

yet he framed no fresh one to take its place;" a most important admission. Comp. also Birt *op. c.* p. 459 f. If the transition from B. I is an editor's addition, and δὲ an insertion of the family II² in 1260 b 27, the place of B. II itself becomes doubtful, as Susemihl remarks Prolegomena II to the revised impression of the Teubner text: "nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perfecisset, etiam libros II. III. VII sic retractasset, ut II^{um} locum magis idoneum inter III^{um} et novi ordinis IV^{um} (veteris VII^{um}) invenisset." (This view is further developed in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. iii ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 360 n. defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, παραλιπόντων...τελειωθῆ as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.

P. 71, n. 4. Mr Newman examines the Vetus Versio *op. c.* II. pp. lxi—lxv. With the whole of section x compare below p. 454 ff., Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXXIII. 1887. 801—5, CXLVII. 1893. 817—824, *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. II., and for the other side Newman *op. c.* II. xli ff. and in *Class. Rev.* VIII. 304 ff.

P. 74, n. 4, line 5. After αὐτοκράτωρ insert 1287 a 39 πεσθέντας. See *Corrig.* and *Addenda to Critical Notes* ad loc.

P. 90, n. 4. Mr Newman admits that VI (IV) cc. 1—4 "are little better than a chaos." See his appendix, Vol. I. p. 565 ff. and compare Vol. II. p. xxvi, xxxviii, liv, lxvii.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp. 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of Mr Newman's volumes I. and II.

CRITICAL NOTES.

P. 139, line 1. 1253 a 14 αὐτὸς Tyrrell (cp. Eur. *Troad.* 1208).

P. 140. 1252 a 22 λέγειν and 23 διαιρεθέντων Machly, not rightly.

P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [ταῦτα] and (for ποιεῖν) διαπονεῖν Gomperz.

P. 142. Add: No MS. gives the second article 1330 b 1 τὰς πολιτικὰς πρᾶξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς: some omit it 1261 b 25.

P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 δὲ μὲν Χαρώδας] Χαρώδας μὲν II² Bk. Newman ||

Ib. line 5. Add: Shilleto followed Giphanius (p. 22 f.), who however preferred δημοκάπνους.

P. 144, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. κατὰ φύσιν after ξοικεῖ Γ M^a Susem.^{1,2} ||

P. 146, line 3. After 28 insert: ἡδη Γ P¹.

P. 147, line 5. 1253 a 2 Stöhr *Comm. phil. Monac.* p. 97 f. comparing 1253 a 2, a 7, 1278 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11, 1162 a 17, 1169 b 18, *Eth. End.* 1242 a 22 would read ἄρθρωτος. See Dem. *Olynth.* I. 3, *In Midiam* § 198 ||

Ib. line 6. See *Corrigenda*. 1253 a 3 ἔστι after ἵψει added by Γ M^a Susem.^{1,2} ||

P. 149, line 1. After Bk. add: avoiding hiatus.

P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 πρῶτον...1254 b 39 σώματος noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* Δ f. 55^a, p. 190, 4 f. Heylb. ||

P. 157, line 9. After ἀπὸ add: See Hagfors *De praepositionum in Aris. Politicis etc. usq.* (Berlin 1892) p. 5.

P. 160, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. After Bk. add: Susem.³

P. 161, line 1. After Bk. add: (ἔστιν Bk.²).

P. 163, line 1. Add: See however *Addenda* to p. 7 above.

- P. 176, line 1. After Ar. add: (but two Oxford mss. of Aretinus have *genitū*: Newman II. p. 71).
- P. 180, line 7. After Susem. add: Diebitsch would omit ω altogether.
- P. 183, line 1. 1257 b 12. For οὐτε Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.
- P. 190, line 2. c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mr Newman a later addition.
- P. 194, line 3. 1259 a 31 δράμα Campbell, but see Dem. *Prooem.* 55, p. 1460, n: δράμα τούτῳ ἐποιέιτο δὲ δῆμος, *In Aristocr.* XXIII. § 19 (δράμε), etc.
- P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. See *Corrigenda*. After Γ' M^a add: bracketed by Susem.¹⁻²
- Ib. line 3. 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin δρχέντων καλ, afterwards erased ||
- P. 203, line 4. 1260 b 20—24 [ωστ'...πολιτελας] bracketed by Birt, as an addition of the publisher. Cp. Susem.³ *Prolegomena* p. xli: Neque tamen ipsi Aristoteli hanc ratione succurro, sed compotori, qui perperam ultima libri I¹ verba 1260 b 23 sq. mi πρῶτος κτλ adiecit.
- P. 232. 1263 a 2. The change in punctuation (ξει πᾶσι, τάς, see *Corrigenda*) is due to Mr Newman ||
- P. 252. 1265 a 40 Add to line 12: δη for ἀν Mr H. Richards *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.
- P. 261. 1266 a 31 [φίλοσοφων] Zeller (*Archiv f. d. Ges. d. Philos.* VI. 153 n.); i.e. he would read ατ μὲν ιδιωτῶν ατ δὲ καλ πολιτικῶν.
- P. 269, last line. On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLVII. 1893, p. 192.
- P. 270. 1267 b 26 εἰτελοῦς] εἰσταλοῦς O. Apelt.
- P. 274. 1268 b 1 γεωργήσει] γεωργ<δ> οὐκ>ήσει Mr A. G. Peskett (1891).
- P. 289, line 2. Add: Comp. *Crit. Notes* on 1329 a 34.
- P. 290, line 2. 1270 b 8 M^a P¹ omit ἔστιν ||
- P. 294. 1271 a 7 [τὸ] δῶρον, or τι δῶρον C. Häberlin ||
- P. 295. 1271 a 20. Comp. ἀλλὰ μήν ει 1276 b 18, ἀλλὰ μήν ἐταυτεῖται γι 1277 a 25 (Newman).
- P. 305. See *Corrigenda* to 1272 b 9. δυναστῶν Π¹ Susem.¹⁻² ||
- P. 312. See *Corrigenda* to 1273 b 6. ἀποραὶ Γ' M^a Bk. Susem.¹⁻² ||
- P. 314, line 2. After Göttling add: Bernays (*Ges. Abh.* I. 172), Böckh (*Staatsbuch.* d. Ath.³ I. p. 295, 580 d).
- P. 316, line 3. *Dele* probably rightly. καλ Θεμιστοκλῆς Diels, rashly (in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. p. 484 n. 1).
- P. 317, line 3. 1274 a 18—20 After Diels add: But comp. Susemihl *Jahresber.* XLII. p. 255 n. 36.
- Ib. last line. 1274 a 20. Wilamowitz defends τρίτου τέλους, but hardly with success, *op. c.* I. p. 69 n. 41.
- P. 320, line 1. 1274 b 9—15 [Φαλέον...δχρηστον] Newman followed by P. Meyer and v. Wilamowitz. See however *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.
- P. 354. V^m is Prof. Susemihl's notation for the Vatican fragments in the Teubner text of the *Politics* (Susem.³ nova impressio correctior 1894), so that our fr. = V^m.
- P. 358. 1275 a 23 κρίσεως καλ defended by Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. p. 205 n. 32.
- P. 362. See *Corrigenda*. 1276 a 10—13 (τοτε...συμφέρον) εἰπερ the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLII. 1891, p. 412 ff.).
- P. 363. 1276 a 14 [καλ] Niemeyer || τινες κατὰ and comma after τρόπων Niemeyer

- P. 363. 1276 a 15 *ταῦτης* (before *τὰς*) defended by Niemeyer ||
 Ib. 1276 a 16 *τυπωνίδος*; (with interrogation) Niemeyer, partly following Koraes ||
- P. 364. 1276 a 26. See *Corrigenda*.
- P. 366. B. III. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 214, 36 ff. ed. Heylb.
- P. 369. 1276 b 39—40 [*έπειδη...πολίτας*] Widemann.
- P. 371. 1277 a 30 [*καὶ*] Spengel ||
- P. 372. 1277 a 32 *τούτου* II² fr. Bk.
- P. 374. 1277 b 17—25 noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 231, 38 ff. Heylb.
- P. 379. 1278 a 34 *δοτῶν* Cod. Berol. Hamiltonianus 41 (merely on conjecture; the ms., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of II². Possibly even in fr. the reading is conjectural).
- P. 380. 1278 b 8. See *Corrigenda*. *καὶ εἰ Γ Π¹ Susem.¹⁻²* (omitted by M⁴).
- P. 381. 1278 b 10—15 noticed (amongst other passages) by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* IX. f. 157^a 504, 8 ff. ed. Heylb.
- P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 [*ὑδ...άρχας*] Stöhr (hardly right).
- P. 387. 1281 a 41 *ἔχει* (with colon after *λέσθαι*) Welldon (hardly adequate).
- P. 401, last line. Add: But see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 539 b 18 ff.
- P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers *μέγιστον* as avoiding hiatus. It is however in *pausa*.
- P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert: *δόξειαν* P¹.
- P. 412, line 3. Delete Plutarch.
- P. 431, line 10. See *Corrigenda*. That 1287 a 39 *πεισθέντας* is right (*persuasos* William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in *Comm. phil. Monach.* p. 103.
- P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [*τοὺς...συάρχοντας*] Widemann (not rightly).
- P. 442, line 5. 1288 a 13. If Heybut's conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed: *ἡθος πολεμικός, δυνάμενος* ||
- P. 473, line 3. 1323 b 8. Vahlen's conjecture requires *εἰς τι*. See Hagfors *op. c.*
- p. 43.
- P. 475. See *Corrigenda*. 1323 b 18 *καὶ* added by Γ M⁴ Susem.¹⁻² ||
- P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Γ M⁴ is retained because neither the order of P¹ nor that of II² will stand without Congreve's emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.
- P. 489. 1325 b 34 [*καὶ περὶ...πρότερον*] would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.
- P. 490. 1326 a 9—b 24 noticed by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* ix. f. 161^b, p. 520, 31 ff. (cp. 521, 5 ff.) Heylb.
- P. 493. 1326 a 40 *οὐδὲ...41 σταδίων* noticed by Mich. Ephes. *ubi supra* p. 520, 35.
- P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (*δεῖ...έμετέρος*) is due to Mr Wyse.
- P. 497. 1327 a 23 [*πρὸς*] Argyriades, rightly, in *Διορθώσεις εἰς τὰ Ἀριστοτελεῖους Πολιτικά* A' (Athens 1893).
- P. 503, line 5. 1328 a 16. See *Corrigenda*. *πέρα...πέρα* Nauck, perhaps rightly ||
οὐδὲ Gomperz, *οὐ δὲ* with all other authorities Bk. Susem.¹⁻²
- P. 521. 1330 b 30. See *Corrigenda*. *μὴ ποτέν* after *πέλις* Γ M⁴ Susem.¹⁻²
- P. 529. 1332 a 13. See *Corrigenda*. *καὶ* inserted before *διαγκαῖαι* Γ M⁴ Susem.¹⁻²
- P. 535. 1332 b 31. See *Corrigenda*. *πάντων* after 32 *τούτων* Γ M⁴ Susem.¹⁻²
- P. 537. 1333 a 26. See *Corrigenda*. *διγρήσθαι* after *μέρος* Γ M⁴ Susem.¹⁻²

- P. 541. 1334 a 8. See *Corrigenda*. ἀνάστις Γ Μ^α Susem.^{1,2}
- P. 548. 1334 b 24. See *Corrigenda*. ἐγγίνεσθαι after 25 πέφυκεν Γ Μ^α St
- P. 549. 1335 a 27. See *Corrigenda*. ὠρισμένος after χρόνος Γ Μ^α Susem.¹
- P. 559. 1336 b 34. See *Corrigenda*. αὐτῶν after δοια Γ Μ^α Susem.^{1,2}

COMMENTARY.

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after note (2): The identity of βασιλικὴ with τὸν asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 C and *Politicus* 259 D. The question, What is the object of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politicus*. That στρι is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 A as in *Euthyd.* 290 C, D (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν ἀφηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to this participle against Bonitz here and c. 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this sense.

Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate separately, cp. *De part. anim.* I. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ὃ μὲν γάρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἶδει κράτιστον, εἰ τις δύνατο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστα καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὗτοι καὶ περὶ δρυῖθος (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well have served "not only for killing the victim (*σφαγῆ* Eur. *El.* 811) but also for flaying and cutting it up (*κοπῆ* *ibid.* 837)."

P. 143. 1252 b 8. Add after note (12): Eur. *Hel.* 246 τὰ βαρβάρων γάρ δοῦλα πλήγη ἔνεστι.

P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after note (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, διδοκάπτους, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion that the term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. I. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery late in Aristotle's time: see Hiller in *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. p. 527 f.

P. 144. 1252 b 16. See again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 332. As in b 10, so πρώτη must be predicative, =as the first, primarily: συνεστηκῦν being unde from b 13. "From these two relationships the family is first formed.... The number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the of every day is the village." Both passages should be omitted from the exa given by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 652 b 53 ff.

P. 145. 1252 b 18. The literature bearing upon διογδακτες and ὄργει continually increasing: see the authorities cited in Busolt *Gr. Gesch.* I¹. p. 390 f pp. 394—398 with notes, K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. gr. Alt.* Vol. I. *Staatschäumer* ed. V. Thumser § 58 [98] pp. 313—324, Töpffer *Attische Genealogie* p. For the later organization consult *C.I.A.* II. 596, 597, 605, ΕΦ. ΔΡΧ. 1883. 83.

Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that διογδακτες = those who was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked "What of the present tense (οὐδε καλοῦσ διογδακτες)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὄργειν)...τοὺς δι. οὐδειτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it current Aristotle's time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the p cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ Ἀρχιλού δρχοντος 346/

Philocorus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the Orators, having been expelled by γεννήται. It manifestly assists Aristotle's argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks ὅτον τῶν Ἀττικῶν).... As to the remark," p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, "that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the γένος presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The γένος implied κοινωνία λεπῶν."

P. 145, right col. To the note on 816 add : Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (*στρατόδοτες*) without any king, patriarchal or other, not of course 'to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times,' but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (*τὸν βασιλευομένων*).

P. 146. 1252 b 28. The place of τέλειος illustrates Dr Jackson's remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton).

P. 148. 1253 a 7. Add to note (25) : comp. Becq de Fouquières *Jeux des Anciens* p. 372 ff.

P. 150. 1253 a 22. Add to note (28) a reference to the note on p. 212, and to *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 334—336, 449 f.

Ib. 1253 a 26. Add to note on χωρισθεῖς : Possibly Aristotle has in mind Soph. *Phil.* 1018 δριφῶν ἔρημον ἀπόλων ἐν ἡώσιν νεκρόν (Newman).

P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴν. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety; prudence and perseverance (on Susemihl's conjecture), prudence and skill (on Freudenthal's)¹.

Against those who, with Jowett, by φρονήσει understand δεινότης (*N. E.* 1144 a 23 ff.) and by ἀρετῇ φυσικῇ ἀρετῇ or ἦξις (*N. E.* 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged l. l. that (1) such a use of ἀρετῇ is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals : *N. E.* 1144 b 8, *Hist. an.* 1. 1 § 32 ff. 488 b 12 ff., VIII. 1, IX. 1.

Spengel, who understands by ἀρετῇ *intellectual* virtue, is met not only by the invariable usage of the phrase φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴν, but also by the fact that φρόνησις is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term ἀρετῇ would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

¹ Quamvis recte monuerit Montecatinus, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtutem tamquam arma data esse dicere voluisse, scribendum ei potius suisse φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴν, quid impedit, ne prudentia et id quod sub corrupto vocabulo ἀρετῇ latet non ipsa arma sed res sint, quibus arma offerantur, armis autem praesidia illa varii generis atque adiumenta significentur unicuique necessaria, quotienscumque opus vel iustum vel iniustum tute perpetrare velit? *Qu. cr. coll.* p. 337.

Aristotle himself says *Rhet.* I. 1. 12, 1355 b 4: τοῦτό γε (i.e. abuse) κακῶς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν ἀγαθὸν πλήν ἀρετῆς.

Bernays again *Zwei Abhh. üb. d. aristot. Theorie* (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino's explanation (arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quotes Seneca *De ira* I. 17: Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro amissione, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent indicis arbitrio. haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non expedit manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: *nd* surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Bernays interprets the words, they are 'arms for insight and virtue.' Not to mention the objection, stated at p. 151, that διδούσα έχουσα δύλα shows the arms must be used by φρόνησις and φρέσκια not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests 'language' as one of these weapons, and admits that 'certain emotions, anger especially' are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]

P. 151. 1253 a 37. Add after note (28 c): Perhaps Aristotle had a saying à Pindar in mind: cp. Plut. *Præc. reip. ger.* c. 13, p. 807 C: δὲ τολετιός, δρα-
τέχνας τις ὁ κατὰ Πλευδαρον, καὶ δημοφύρως εὐνομίας καὶ δικῆς (Newman).

P. 152. 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἔστι but of ἔκεινων the antecedent to δύλα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence 'The parts of Economic life are of the constituents of the Household' the meaning of the words supplied are of is 'correspond to,' or 'relate to,' and not 'treat of.' Mr Newman compares 1258 b 17; (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz *Index Ar.* 533 b 6—13, with Waitz on *Anal. Pr.* I. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

Ib. 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμικός is 'nuptial' and not 'conjugal': cp. n. on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 153. 1253 b 20. Lest the expression 'speech delivered' in note (31) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεστηριαῖς was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the 'Archidamus' of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 11 ff.): cp. Blass *Attische Beredsamkeit* II.² pp. 350, 289.

Ib. 1253 b 21. Zeller *Pre-Socratics* Eng. tr. II. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμῳ γάρ δι μὲν δοῦλος δι δ' ἀλεύθερος forms a trimeter, so that under τοῖς δὲ, b 20, 2 poet may be included.

P. 153 f. 1253 b 23 ἐπει οὖν...33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the string of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπει. As οὗτοι introduces the apodosis to ἐπει in I. 10. 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* I. p. 29 f. (Gotting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὗτοι καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. Spengel *Ar. Stud.* III. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot *Études* p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 31 καὶ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation δρύάνων ἔστι καὶ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἔστι). Eucken's punctuation is as follows: ἐπει οὖν ἡ κτῆμα μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἔστι καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀνευ γάρ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων δύναται καὶ ξῆν καὶ εὐ ξῆν), ωσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὥρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον δι εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οὐτείς δρύανα, εἰ μελλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὗτοι καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ¹, τῶν δ' δρύάνων τι

¹ sc. ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα δρύανα presumably.

μὲν δύσχα τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ δὲ μὲν οὐαξ δύψυχον δὲ πρωρέας ἔμψυχον· δὲ γάρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὄργανον εἶδε ταῖς τέχναις ἔστιν¹)· οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ἥσην ἔστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὄργανων² ἔστι, καὶ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὕστερ ὄργανον πρὸς ὄργανων τὰς δὲ ὑπηρέτης.

The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted in the text.

P. 155. 1253 b 35. τοῦ=the Homeric Hephaestus (Bywater). “Aristotle's rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue.” Cp. note on 1261 a 6.

P. 156. 1254 a 12. To the ref. from *Eth. Eud.* add *Magna Moralia* I. c. 34, 1194 b 18 τοῦ γάρ δεσπότου τι ἔστιν δὲ οἰκέτης.

P. 159 f. 1254 b 8. Add to note (40): What is called δρεξις in 1254 b 5, and τὸ δρεκτικὸν *De Anima* III. 7. 2, 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μέρον: comp. III. 15. 5, 1286 a 18. Here as in IV(VII). 15. 9, 1334 b 18 ff., νοῦς and τὸ μέρον τὸ λόγον ἔχον are opposed to δρεξις and the irrational part (τὸ ἀλογοῦ 1334 b 18 and 1260 a 7; here τὸ παθητικὸν μέρον). But in *N. E.* I. 13. 15, 1102 b 13 f., the latter is called φύσις ἀλογος μετέχοντα τῷ λόγου.

P. 161. 1254 b 23. Cp. again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 343, where it is suggested that if λόγῳ be kept, the genitive λόγου may be understood from it as the object of αἰσθανθέντων, while both datives are governed by ὑπηρέται. Comp. however for the ellipse of the copula IV(VII). 14. 9, 1333 a 17 f. τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δὲ ὑπακοεῖν δυνάμενον.

P. 162. 1254 b 32. συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις κτλ. “But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men” [and hereby the former are after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Susemihl's second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated his position, which is that τοὺς μὲν=actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοὺς δὲ=actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but *only* the souls of freemen.

P. 163. Add after Excursus II: and the addenda to p. 209 below.

Ib. 1255 a 8. With τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις=jurisconsults Dittenberger compares οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις=dialecticians *Meta.* IX. 8. 20, 1050 b 35, οἱ περὶ φύσεως=physical philosophers 1006 a 2, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14, 1062 b 26. Nor does καὶ before a 11 σοφῶν make any real difficulty in taking τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις=qui de legibus philosophantur; for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From *Quaest. cr. coll.* p. 344.)

P. 165. 1255 a 15. With ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός comp. III. 12. 2, 1282 b 24, κατὰ ταυτὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ explained by κατὰ χρῶμα, κατὰ μέγεθος.

P. 166. 1255 a 20, 21 ὡς οὐδὲ δέ. Comp. Plato *Sympos.* 216 B ἀντιλέγειν μὲν οὐδὲ δυναμένως ὡς οὐ δέ τοιεῖν & οὐτος κελεύει, [Dem.] XXXIII. § 27, p. 901, 9: καὶ οὐκ ισχυρίζομαι τῷ νόμῳ ὡς οὐ δέ με δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ τργγυησάμην.

P. 170. 1255 b 25. Note that ἐγκύλιος is an epithet of ἀρχαῖ in c. 26 § 2, and of διοικητοῖς in c. 43 § 1 of the Ἀθ. τολ. (routine offices, routine of administration).

P. 172 f. 1256 a 13—19. See additional remarks on this passage, *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 349 ff.

¹ οὕτω...ὑπηρέτης is the apodosis of Eucken [and Newman].

² ἔστι καὶ δοῦλος...ὑπηρέτης is the

apodosis of Spengel, καὶ δοῦλος...ὑπηρέτης of Thurot.

P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Etruscan piracy (Bywater). See *Journal of Philol.* II. p. 60 ff., *Frag.* 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato *Menex.* 237 E, τὸν γένος τεκνὸν τροφὴν ἔχει ἐπιτηδεῖαν φῶν τέκυγε φῶ καὶ γυνὴ δῆλη τεκοῦσα τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μή, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ τηγάνα τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς] Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyrium *De Abstinencia* II. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to controvert it.

Ib. 1256 b 23. Add a reference to the fuller discussion *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 346 ff.

P. 179. 1257 a 3 ἔκεινης] "This last," comp. VIII(v). 6. 10, 1306 a 10: σφίσι δ' ή ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεῖα ἔκεινοι γάρ διλγοι ὑπερ πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσι (Busse).

P. 180. 1257 a 18 δον γάρ ικανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀλλαγὰς There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον δια, "For otherwise exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the ex-changers' own wants": and so Bernays and Jowett translate. Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 353 f. As it stands, 1257 b; διδ = διὰ τὸ καπηλικὸν γενέσθαι; "owing to the growth of Retail Trade Chrematistics (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money because *Chrematistic and Retail Trade are concerned therewith.*" At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in διδ.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. IV(vii). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch *De curia dicitur.* 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch *Life of Pelopidas.* 3, 279 B: τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οὐ χρώνται τῷ πλούτῳ διὰ μικρολογίας, οἱ δὲ παραχρώνται δι' ἀσωτίας κτλ. See *Frag.* 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 186. 1258 a 10. Comp. *Magna Moralia* I. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 1 ed. Susem.).

Ib. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their 'art' a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of *Oeconomica* B. II. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Charles is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud *Athen.* 532 B, F. H. G. I. 297.

P. 187. 1258 a 21 f. ὥστερ γάρ καλ...ούτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., II. § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καλ...ούτω καὶ VIII(v). 9 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ τούτων = starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. II. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

Ib. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take the

meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is servile. In any case compare V(vii). 2. 5, 1337 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrrell holds that in every case where ἀλεύθερος is of two terminations, the adjective = *liberalis*.

Ib. 1258 b 12. In the island of Carpathus mules are called κτήματα (quoted by Newman from J. T. Bent *Journal of Hell. Studies* vi. p. 241).

Ib. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato *Laws* 842 c, d may have suggested this passage.

P. 191. 1258 b 21. On the subdivisions of μεταβλητική see Büchsenschütz *Besitz u. Erwerb* p. 455 ff., who supports Cope's view respecting φορτγά. Prof. Susemihl is not convinced.

Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3: τόπον εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς <ἐστιν ἐκεῖνων> δόσις κτλ.

P. 193. 1259 a 5 δέ συλλέγειν. This has been done by the author of *Oeconomica* B. 11: see Susemihl's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. ix ff. n. (25), and for the age of the writer (*circa* 260—200 B.C.) p. xii.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction ἐπιδεῖξαι δὲ is found 213 a 25, *Ind. Ar.* s.v.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemihl, defending the reading ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet. Transl. has *quemadmodum et natura principiantium et subiectorum* (and so rc. bl), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading ἀρχόντων καὶ from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain: but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of K^b in the *Nicomachean Ethics* might with just as good reason be entitled 'conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather emendations) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are these latter? If we do translate ὥσπερ by "corresponding," we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the virtue of the rulers and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the *virtues* of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture καὶ <τῆς> τῶν. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the Vet. Transl.? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον θέτει καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀρχομένων.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With ὁ ἡγούμενος leader, chief, qui principem locum obtinet, comp. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* XXIII. § 113 δυοῖς ἀγαθοῖν...τοῦ μὲν ἡγούμενου καὶ μεγίστου πάντων, Plato *Laws* IX, 875 B, τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγούμενον τρέφων ἐν τῷ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἰδιον

ἐπέμενον τῷ κοινῷ, Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1. 8 τὸ ἡγούμενον τῆς στρατιᾶς φῦλον = the corps of the whole army.

P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of *τὸν*: the cor part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently run *τελέων ἔχα* *ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν*, *δλλ'* οὐ *τὴν δίδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἐργῶν δεσποτικὴν*, "it is fi master *qua* master, and not from the master as possessing the *δεσποτικὴν* *ἔτι* that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess (1) if so, *δλλ'* *οὐχ <ἢ>* would be required. (2) It should be remember c. 7 § 2, 1252 b 22 ff., teaching slaves their duties (*δίδασκαλική*) is called *ἐπιστήμη* as opposed to issuing the requisite commands which is *δεσποτικὴ* s.c. *λακῆ* (*ἐπισταθεὶς ἐπιτάπειρ*). It is no part of a master's business to teach their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable duties are to be rightly performed.

Ib. 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Boni λόγου here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not pro withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper ar to *ἐπιτάξει* 'rational conversation' does.

P. 205. To Excursus I on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no be accepted. Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 1 s. f. 'Ἐπιμελῶν δ' δὲ Κρῆς ἐπὶ τούτους τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the earlier of the two dates assig him (*circa* 600 B.C., not *circa* 500 B.C.). See H. Diels *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Ak* 1891 p. 387, Busolt *Gr. Alt.* 2 p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. II. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p (1) He distinguishes the objectors to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 *τολλοι τοῖς νόμοις*) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be conve and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which capti war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) e: ἄτεροι λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (I then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the pr that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslav superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between mast slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery fr claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impu claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weig cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman take with *δικαίων*. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the mas right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and th which is so authorized is *ipso facto just.*"

Prof. R. Y. Tyrrell has published remarks of his own and of the late Dr M on the Slavery passage in a review of Mr Newman's edition published in *Herm.* Vol. VI., No. 14 pp. 342—345.

P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff.

independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman's explanation, except that he makes *τοιαύτη*=probably *λιθίνη*, not *όμωνόμως λεχθεῖσα*. He translates: 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its *οὐσία*) 'will be no better than a stone hand.'

P. 213. 1260 b 30. After 'Nic. Eth. I. 13. 3' add '1102 a 10 ff., Plato Rep. 544 C, Protag. 342 A.'

P. 215. 1261 a 12 οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνον. To be rendered with Mr Newman "evidently does not result" (not, as in the note δὲ a 11, does not appear to result). Comp. 1266 a 5, 1270 a 33 n.

Ib. 1261 a 13. The adverbial πρὸς is found in Aristophanes e.g. *Frogs* 415 κάγγαρος πρὸς, 611 κλέπτωντα πρὸς τὰλλορία, 697 πρὸς δέ, τούτους εἰδός ὑμᾶς...παρέιναι, *Ach.* 1229, *Knights* 578, *Pax* 19, *Lysistr.* 665 ἀλλ' ὦφ' ὑμῶν δαλυθῆναι προσέτε κινδυνεύομεν. Also in Demosthenes *Adv. Lept.* XX. § 112 s. f. p. 491, 7 πρὸς δέ καὶ οὐδὲ δικαιοι, *Adv. Leocratem* § 13, p. 1084, 12 πρὸς δέ καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν.

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render μία μᾶλλον by 'more and more of a unity.'

P. 219. 1261 a 35. ὅσπερ δν] According to Mr Newman the ellipse is thus to be supplied: "as (all) would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations."

P. 220. 1261 b 2. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.

Ib. 1261 b 7. On πέφυκε Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, φύσιν ἔχει. Thus *Rep.* 473 A ἡ φύσιν ἔχει πρᾶξιν λέξεως ἥττον ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι; 489 B οὐ γάρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Comp. Demosth. XIV. 30 τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν, and for Ar. *Politics* VI(IV). 12. 3, 1296 b 26 ἐγράψθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates κατὰ τὸν λόγον in connexion with (or 'in') the expression i.e. τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἀμα τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μῆ. Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, τὸ λεγόμενον=the scheme in question. For plainly τὸ λεγόμενον, *de quo sermo est*, i.e. τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸν λέγειν, is not 'the expression' itself but 'the general adoption of the same expression': and so too with κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato *Rep.* 462 E by adding the words ἐνὸς δῆ, οἷμα, πάλιντος τῷν πολιτῶν διοιν ἡ ἀγαθὸν ἡ κακὸν ἡ τοιαύτη πόλις μᾶλιστά τε φήσει ἔντοῦς εἶναι τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἡ ἔννοιαθῆσται ἡ ἐνλύπησται.

Ib. 1261 b 26. Besides 1281 b 3 and 1192 a 11 f. (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of πάντες is prominent also in IV(VII). 13. 10, 1332 a 36 ff.

P. 224. 1262 a 1 ff. Add a reference to the fuller discussion in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 361 ff.

P. 225. 1262 a 7. After (Thurot) add: Or this may be another instance of μέν without δέ following; see 1270 a 34 and Susemihl's Critical Edition (Susem.¹) Index grammaticus s.v.

P. 226. 1262 a 19. Γῆι περίοδος had been written by Hecataeus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

Ib. 1262 a 21 f. καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἵψων. Probably γυναῖκες='females' both here and in the passage from *Hist. Anim.* 586 a 12, quoted in π. (143): εἰσὶ δέ καὶ γυναῖκες ἐνκέρα αἴρας γεννώσαι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ὅσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ Ιππος ἡ Δικαια καλονυμένη. Mr Newman prefers to take καὶ...καὶ=both...and. He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. *Cyrop.* VIII. 3. 38.

P. 227. 1262 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one *λόσεις* should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1262 b 23. The connexion between the two meanings given by Plato *Euthyd.* 304 B τὸ γάρ σπάνιον, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τίμων.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν see *Quaest. crit.* Mr Newman is quite right in taking σᾶσι with ἔχει in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 ἐπιδώσουσιν is not, Mr Newman thinks, *αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι*, but as all other commentators and I seen of *ἄνθρωποι* ὡν αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι εἰσι διηγέρειαι: for the increased traction which private ownership brings with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this advantage that they are merely means to the owner's increased advancing ἔκατῳ προσεδρεύοντες suits this construction alone, the other if προσεδρεύοντος (adopted in the reprint of Susem.³ 1894, see *Corrigenda*) with either: but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι to be the subject to ἐπιδώσουσιν.

Ib. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the exx. in the *Aristoteles* 431 a 10.

Ib. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which appears escaped some critics, is that καὶ δεղθῶσιν ἔφοδιων = καὶ τοῖς ἔφοδοις, &c. τ. sc. χρῶνται κοινῶς. 'In case they need provisions on a journey' implies have none of their own 'they share them in common.' Whose? we ask Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 οὐτεσι καὶ χρῶνται. For Bernays' ingenious correction οὐτεσι, which has Mr Bywater's approbation in his *Ges. Abhandlungen* I. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ νῦν. "In his verbis νῦν male de tempore infra factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotae id fecerunt novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γεωργεῖν τοὺς" Aristotelem affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphanium secundum philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemonis retinendi illius instituti sed studium tantum (*ἐπιχειροῦσι*), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more dicitur si hoc Aristoteles voluisse, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν verum ἐτι καὶ cum ita sint, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe ea quae νῦν enim saepissime id significat quod revera extat"; even as it is, even actually. "Fictae igitur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid τοιὲν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, pro quo expectas ποιῶσιν? Ni fallor, τοιὲν ἐπιχειροῦσι dumtaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, quid faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituant et qua haec res procedat et sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experient the experiment." "Quae loquendi ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis rel. de qua loquitur, institutionem, qualis apud Lacedaemonios inventa optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1296 a 34—b 10." *Quaest.* p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaenae VIII. § 1: διπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγχειροῦσι 'which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.'

P. 241. 1264 a 15. With ἢ καὶ 'or again' cp. *De Gen. Anim.* I. 7 724 b 5 (Newman).

P. 242. 1264 a 27. After πολίτας is predicate add: as δρχοντας in b 7, del γάρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς δρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφορὰ. Add the ref.: Plutarch *Lyc.* 8, *Inst.*

P. 248. 1264 b 33. ἐκ τούτων. Mr Newman aptly compares *De Part. Anim.* II. 1 § 4, 646 a 20 δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἡ τῶν ὁμοιομέρων φύσις, and Plato *Philebus* 27 B πρώτοι μὲν τόννα ἀπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπειρ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οἰσταν.

P. 249. 1265 a 13. πλῆθος] Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ὑποθέσεις of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1325 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. II. and construction in B. IV(vii), see *Introd.* p. 32 n. (2), p. 33 n. (8).

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To n. (203) add the reference: *Laws* 615 c (Newman).

P. 251. 1265 a 28 ff. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 368 f.

P. 252. 1265 a 40. On ἄν with future participle see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses*² §§ 197, 208, 216. He concludes: "The possibility of such a construction is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.

P. 253. 1265 b 7. Add to note (209): Aristotle's suggestion in b 7—10 much resembles that of Plato *Rep.* 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχοντι ποιήσομεν, οὐ ως μάλιστα διασφέσσω τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀδρῶν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες (Newman).

P. 255. 1265 b 29. After "adapted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of κοινοτάτην=most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1265 a 3.

P. 258. 1266 a 5. οὐδὲ ἔχοντα φαίνεται=obviously presents no monarchical element either. Cp. *Addenda* to 1261 a 12.

Ib. 1266 a 7. After VIII(v). 7. 7 add: 1307 a 21 (cp. II. II. 5, 1273 a 5 ἐκ. κλίνειν). In 'Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound περ-εγκλίνοντα.

Ib. 1266 a 8. To the references at the end of n. (223) add: *Laws* 945 B. As is now clear from the *Constitution of Athens*, c. 8 § 1, Plato in the *Laws* is merely reviving an old feature of Solon's constitution. Dr Sandys *ad loc.* has collected confirmatory evidence from Isocr. *Areop.* 22, *Panath.* 45, [Dem.] c. *Neaera* LIX. § 75.

Ib. 1266 a 11. After 2 § 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1329 a 9—11).

P. 259. 1266 a 14—20. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 370 ff.

P. 263. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alterthümer*² p. 137 n. 3.

P. 265. 1267 a 3 ff. "Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch *De cupid. divit.* 3, 524 A" (Newman).

P. 268. 1267 b 2. Add to n. (245): As to the form, although διωβολία occurs in the papyrus of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28, yet Meisterhans² p. 18 shows that the proper form is διωβελία. On Attic inscriptions διωβελία itself occurs only once with ε (in an inscription of date before 444 B.C.): but the derived forms preserve the older ε, unless the ending (as -βολον) includes an ο. Hence διωβελίας, διωβελία, διωβελία: on the other hand τριώβολον, πεντώβολον, δεκάβολον.

As to the introduction of the θεωρικήν, cp. now the passage referred to above, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ λυροποίος, οὐ καὶ τὴν διωβελίαν ἐπέβιστ πρώτοι), not (as Plut. *V. Pericl.* 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pericles. The increase in the grants must be due to the increased number of shows, for Dem. *De Corona* § 28, ἐν τοῖς δυοῖν διωβολοῖν, shows the price to have been only two obols in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. I. A. 1. 188 where the Treasurer of Athene pays διωβελία from the funds in hand, ἐπέτεια), just about

the time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* 1. 7. 10 of Archedemos, 460 B.C., δ τοῦ δῆμου τότε προεστηκὼς καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελόμενος.

P. 270. 1267 b 28. λόγιος=πολιτῶρ] ως οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ λέγειν καὶ νῦν λοῦσι οὐ τιθέσσιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ θύνει ἐπιχώρια ἔπιγραφέντων ἐπιτελεῖσθαι : Phrynicus p. 198 Lobeck, p. 284 Rutherford.

P. 272. 1268 a 9. Add to the note on οὐτῷ: Comp. Pl. *Symp.* 222 C, ως οὐ πάντα τούτου ἔρει εἰρηκύς.

Ib. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (259): The regulation in force at Athens, which Diog. Laer. 1. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens* c. 24 § 3 καὶ ὅρφανο...πτασι γάρ τούτους ἀπὸ τῶν καινῶν ἡ διοικησία ἦν. Mr Wyse refers to C. I. A. I. 1, C. I. A. IV. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Ib. 1268 a 12. “δῆμον δ' ἐπολεῖ τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is added because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25” (Newman).

P. 274. 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλῶς ought to have been rendered “couched in absolute terms,” and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλῶς δικαῖος=“duly framed in an unqualified form.”

P. 275. 1268 b 19 f. Mr Newman observes: “It is possible that Hippodamas had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature... There is much force in Aristotle's plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer.”

P. 276. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in *Lysias* XII. 68, 70.

P. 277. 1268 b 41. Add to note (271) the reference: Plato *Laws* 841 D (Newman).

P. 278. 1269 a 2. παρασχέσθαι is technical of witnesses: see *Antiphon* 5 §§ 20, 22, 24, 28, 30.

P. 279. 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Laws* 798 A, B οἷς γάρ ἀν ἐντραφῶσι τόμοι σέβεται καὶ φοβεῖται πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τι κινεῖ τῶν τότε καθεστώτων. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (*νόμος*, *νόμοις*) hold for him.

P. 282. 1269 b 20. This use of κατὰ is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. XXIV. § 109 κατὰ πάντα δίκει.

Ib. 1269 b 21. With τοιοῦτος comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, δπως δὲ γίνωσκει τοιοῦτοι.

P. 284. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καὶ> ἐν ἐπέρας. See 1094 b 13, 14 οὐχ δικαιοῖ...ώστερ οὐδ'. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not πρὸς τὰ ἐγκυκλία, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 110 baking-women were of service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in III. 74, where he says of the Corcyraeans: τολμηρῶς ξυνεπελάβοντο...παρὰ φύσιν ὑπομένονται τὸν θόρυβον.

P. 285. 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 s.f. οὐ γάρ δικαιοῖς ἐκ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀλλῆς πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησι.

P. 287. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 86.

P. 291. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great

plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. See A. Schäfer *Demosthenes* 3. 1. 163 who refers to Arrian 2. 13, 409: Curt. 4. 1. 37."¹ If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of mice' in Arcadia.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With *οὐ τοῦτον* comp. 1267 a 15 *οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον*.

P. 295. 1271 a 9. Add to note (333) a reference to the election of the Gerusia of the Ninety at Elis v.iiii(v). 6. 11, 1306 a 15 ff. *τὴν δὲ αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ δύοταν τῷ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαμονίῳ γερύντων*.

P. 296. 1271 a 22. Add to note (339) a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alt.*² p. 118 n. (6).

P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to note (346) a reference to *Rhet.* I. 6. 23, 1363 a 8 ff. *τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον* (sc. ἀγαθὸν ἔστι). *οὐ γάρ πάντες ἐφέρεται τοῦτον ἀγαθὸν ἦν*.

P. 300. 1271 b 24. Add to note (352) a reference to *F. H. G.* I. 249.

Ib. 1271 b 30—40. See also *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 377. Add to note (355) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 58 ff. He thinks (p. 96) δὺ καὶ σῦν κτλ a marginal note of date later than 220 B.C., comparing Polyb. IV. 53. See however against his assumption Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. v f.

P. 301. 1271 b 35—39. This is Ephorus again (*Fr. 61*) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, *F. H. G.* I. 249; *πρώτους δὲ Κρῆτας φασὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς | ἀρξαὶ θαλάττης, ἃς τε νησωτίδας | πόλεις κατασχεῖν, ἃς τε καὶ σινουκίσαι | αὐτῶν "Ἐφορος εἰρηκεν, εἶναι φησι τε | ἐπώνυμον τὴν νῆσον ἀπὸ Κρῆτος τίνος, | τοῦ δὴ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθονος" | πλοῦν ἡμέρας ἀπέχειν δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. Mr Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds: "The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3—4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus."*

P. 303. 1272 a 18. *φέρων οὐς φέροντιν*] "The word *φέρων* need not have political associations. It can mean *rent for land* and nothing more: here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in *Bull. Corr. Hell.* v. (1881), p. 108 ff. and for the fact Dosiadas apud Athen. IV. 142" (Wyse).

Ib. 1272 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this note by a reference to Plato *Laws* 677 E, where Epimenides' device (*μηχάνημα*)—apparently *ἀλιμος*, i.e. pemmican—is mentioned (see Stallbaum *ad loc.*), and to *F. H. G.* II. 30, III. 40 (Newman). To the next note (367) add a reference to Plato's strong censure *Laws* 835 B—841.

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps *ἔχοντας* sc. *τὴν πόλιν* and for the ellipse appeals to 1266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intolerable harshness.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of *ἀρστινόην* here is clear from the antithesis to *ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων*: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that *ἀρστινόην αἱρεῖσθαι*=election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and

'merit' or 'capacity,' as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Areop.* § 37 of καὶ γεγονότες καὶ πολλήν ἀρετήν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐνδεδεγμένοι, Philochorus *F. H. G.* L 2; πρωτεύοντες ἐν τε γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ βίῳ χρηστῷ (where πρωτεύοντες echoes ἀρετήν) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, καὶ ἀνδραγαθίαν αἱρεῖν.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τούτων καὶ δῆμος where all the authorities give καὶ τούτων δῆμος, and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrrell in *Hermathen* Vol. vi., No. 12 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seem imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τούτων in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For Mr Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τούτων: "over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between Shofetes and Senatus) "as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity." But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: Mr Newman has an alternative assumption that δημογράμματα = are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.

P. 313. 1273 b 12—15. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 380 f.

1273 b 13. κοινότερον ταῦτα] Mr Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render "for it is not only fairer to all, as we said" sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: the *Constitution of Athens* cc. 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon's and Dr Sandys' editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the *Politics* may be specially mentioned Mr Newman's review in *Class. Rev.* v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan's in *Journal Hellenic Studies* XII. 17—40, P. Meyer *Des Aristoteles Politik u. die 'Αθ. πολ.* (Bor. 1891), B. Keil *Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles* (Berlin 1892), U. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.* Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. griech. Alterthümer* Bd. Theil II. *Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thumser (Freiburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. II. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the inadvertent mention Aristeides p. 317 for which Mr Hicks is alone responsible.

Ib. 1273 b 36. ἔνοιο μὲν οἰορται... b 41 ξοκε δὲ... 1274 a 3 διὸ καὶ μέμφοται τινες... a 11 φαινεται δὲ...] In general structure this whole account may instructive be compared with two criticisms in 'Αθ. πολ. (1) c. 9 § 2, οἰορται μὲν οὖν τινες...οὐ μὲν εἰκός (cp. ξοκε above)...οὐ γάρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, ἐν οἷς πειρώνται τινες διαβάλλειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πιθανότερος δὲ τῶν δημοσιῶν λόγος: οὐ γάρ εἰκός...ταῦτη μὲν οὖν χρονιζεῖν ψευδῆ τὴν αἴτιαν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the ένοιο of 1273 b 36 with οἱ δημοσιοι of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* XXVII. p. 267 ff. would refer μέμφοται τινες to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon's constitution 'Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: τρίτη δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν στάσιν (cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 2 ad init.) συμπαθολή, η ἐτι Σόλωνος, ἀφ' ἣς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, πρῶτη ἐγένετο τοῦ δῆμου προστάτης sc. Solon.

Ib. 1273 b 37. λίαν δικατον κτλ] Compare 'Αθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: ἦν γάρ [τότε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἀλλοῖς διληγαρχικὴ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις...ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' διλγων ἦν κτλ: c. 4 s.

c. 5 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς δλίγοις, c. 6 § 1 τὸν δῆμον ἡλεύθερον, and (what were undoubtedly the writer's authorities for his facts) Solon's verses copied in c. 12 § 4.

Ib. 1273 b 38. δημοκρατίαν τὴν πάτριον] Comp. the use in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 29 § 3 of οἱ πάτριοι νόμοι οὓς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκεν with the comment subjoined ὡς οὐδὲ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παρατηρήσιαν οὖσαν τὴν Κλεισθένους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος; also c. 34 § 3, τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν (bis). Unquestionably πάτρια had become at the end of the fifth century a synonym for Solonian.

Ib. 1273 b 41. δικαστήριον] Fully explained by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 1, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία ταῦτ' εἰναι τὰ δημοτικά· τρίατον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἴτε τοῖς σώμασι, ἐπειτα τὸ ἔξειναι τῷ βαυλαμένῳ [τιμωρεῖν] ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δέ, <φ> μάλιστά φασιν ισχυκέναι τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐφεσις· κύριος γάρ ἦν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας.

Ib. *ἔοικε*] This, like *εἰκὼν* 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6, c. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the *Constitution* and not unknown in the *Politics*. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in *J. H. S.* XII. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the 'signals of this method' in style.

Ib. 1274 a 1. τὴν βουλὴν] That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the *Constitution of Athens*. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἀρχαῖα πολιτεία c. 3 § 6; ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διόφετο δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ἐγμοῦσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκομοῦντας κύριος. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (*ib.*). Under Draco's constitution it was made φίλατταν νόμων and received complaints of their violation (*εἰσαγγελία*), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the νόμος *εἰσαγγελίας*, c. 8 § 4.

Ib. 1274 a 2. τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν] According to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 8 § 1 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with sortition, τὰς δ' ἀρχαῖς ἐποίησε κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, a statement which sets in a proper light the tolerably correct (but hitherto neglected) conceptions of the Solonian practice found in Isocrates *Areop.* §§ 22, 23, *Panath.* § 145, and [Dem.] c. *Neaeram* LIX. § 75. Since the lot was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristotle can perfectly well speak of the people, here and in 1281 b 33, as *electing*.

Thus Aristotle's own qualifications of the democratic panegyrics passed upon Solon's constitution amount to this: "Solon did not found the Areopagite Council, though he confirmed it in its censorial prerogatives, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates." The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reform comes from 'Αθ. πολ. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ἀπεδέδοτο (not ἀπεδόθη ὑπὸ Δράκοντος) μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς δύτῃ παρεχομένοις ἥροντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐντέλεια ἀρχοντας. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in olden time the Areopagus

used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχεῖον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴ διακαλεσαμένη καὶ κρίνασσα καθ' αὐτήν τὸν ἐπιτῆδειον ἐφ' ἑάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἑναυτὸν διατάξασα διπέστελλεν.

Ib. τὸ δὲ δῆμον καταστῆσαι κτλ] The importance of the appeal to the law court where the people interpreted the laws is emphasized 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἐπὶ δὲ οὐδὶ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς...ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίνεσθαι καὶ τάντα βραφεῖσιν καὶ τὰ κονὰ καὶ τὰ θια τὸ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch V. Sol. 18 (τὸ συνεκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν) κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐδὲν οὐτερον δὲ ταπείρητε ἐφάνη τὸ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν διαφύρων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς (namely through appeals from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt *Gr. Alt.*² p. 150 n. (5).

P. 316. 1274 a 3. μέμφοντα τινες] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 1, 2 (πειρώντα τινες διαβάλλειν αὐτῶν...οἱ βουλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz φρ. c. 1. p. 74, p. 165 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 8. Ἐφίδλητης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novel contained in 'Αθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The part ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens *circa* 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia *circa* 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in *Class. Rev.* VI. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to insert that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the *Politics* we have to decide whether one or two attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys *Constitution* p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion ('Αθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγίτων τινα παρελθεῖσα) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of *Politics* and *Constitution* would be reconciled. Prof. Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the *Politics* Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: *Quaest Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. IV. He goes on to infer (1) that the more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. II. of *Politics* later than the *Constitution of Athens* (comp. above *Addenda* to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. II. as to Draco's constitution by reminding us that B. II. only professes to deal with εἰδοκιμοναῖς πολιτείαις, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the *Constitution of Athens*, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

Ib. 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch V. Cim. 10, V. Perikl. 9) Busolt *Gr. Alt.*² p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from 'Αθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th μέρη βολαῖ): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (11; a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ) agrees with the defence of Solon in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

P. 317. 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare 'Αθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὶ ταῦτα συνέβαινεν ἀνέσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμως δημαγωγοῦστας. It

mention of Aristeides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of προστάται τοῦ δήμου: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristeides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophon; and in c. 23 § 3 ff., c. 24 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristeides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 26 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

Frag. 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch's careless paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

Ib. 1274 a 15. *To note (411) add:* This is supported by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 3, τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαιοστηρίων μετέδισκε μάνον. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: 'Αθ. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in n. (411) is nearer the truth; neither is exactly right.

Ib. 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of εὐθύνειν in 'Αθ. πολ. Nor is εὐθύνειν δίκας σοκοὺς technical where it occurs in Solon's fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines Δῆμῳ μὲν γάρ έδωκα κτλ. *Fragg.* 5 and 6 Bergk.

Ib. 1274 a 19. *To note (414) add:* From 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the clause καθάπερ διέργη τὸ πρότερον when Solon's τιμῆματα are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in *Philologus* L. 393 ff.

P. 318. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 s. f. τοὺς δ' άλλους [sc. έδει τελεῖν] θητικόν, οὐδεμιᾶς μετέχοντας δρχής. See p. 573 note on 1337 b 21.

Ib. 1274 a 22. *Add to note (415):* In *Frag.* 505, 1561 a 5, Zaleukos is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, § 1, 1273 b 32.

Ib. 1274 a 23. *Add:* The laws of Chairondas (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herondas 2. 48: from Strabo XII. 539 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger *Sylloge* n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 123, Antigonus permits the people of Lebedos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (I. 65 n.) conjectures that the laws of Charondas, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was refounded, had spread from that place as a centre.

Ib. 1274 a 25. *τινές*] Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo vi. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Rhadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, cp. Scymnus Chius v. 314 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 30. *To note (419 b) add:* Comp. the similar exposure of a chronological error in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 17 § 2: φανερῶς ληροῦσιν οἱ φάσκοντες...οὐ γάρ ἐδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, έάν τις ἀναλογίζηται τὸν ἔκαρέον βίον καὶ ἐφ' οὐ διέθανεν δρχοντος. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks in Dr Sandys' edition of the *Constitution* p. lvi.

P. 319. 1274 b 7. Add a reference to Dr Sandys' note in his Demosthenes *Private Orations* Vol. II. p. 115, and the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) s.v.

P. 320. 1274 b 14. *ταῦ*] In *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* II. 504 Prof. B remarks that *ταῦ* is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, *ταῦ θεῖν* at times in inscr.: yet *ταῦ θεῖν* does occur, see *C. I. A.* II. 3, n. 1559. In the lists there is no instance of *ταῦ τοτρού* as feminine; but Menander *Fr.* 520 K *ταῦ ἀδελφαῖν ταῦ δυοῖν τατραύ*. On the other hand *τώ*, *τοτρώ*, *τάθε*, *ατρό*, *ώ*, are found as feminine, although *τά*, *ατρό*, *τατρά*, *τάθε*, with substantives of the declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that *τά*, *τατρά* nowhere attested, while *ταῦ* is found more often than *ταῦ*, e.g. in Plato *τοῦ* six *ταῦ* four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Therm.* 566 has *τώ θεώ*] *ώς τώ οὐκέτι δὲ τοῦ θεών ἀλλὰ ταῦ θεῖν*. In Isaeus *ταῦ* occurs six times, in Aristoph. six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.

See Röper *De dualismo Platonico* (Danzig 1878) and E. Haasse *Ueber den bei Xenophon u. Thucyd.* (Bartenstein 1889), *Ueb. den Dual bei den attischen Diktern* (Bartenstein 1891), also in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLI. 1891 p. 416 ff.; S. Ueb. d. *Dual bei den gr. Rednern* (Würzburg 1881).

P. 321. 1274 b 15 f. *Δράκοντος δὲ τόμωι μὲν εἰσι, πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρχοῖσι τόμους έθηκεν.* Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle's omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained, that Draco's was not one of the *εὐδοκιμῶσαι πολιτείαι*), especially in view of 134 οὗτοι γάρ (*Λυκούργος καὶ Σόλων*) καὶ τόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. suming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is incomprehensible with 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in chapter: which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in 'Αθ. in the last moment. See again *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. XVI, III. p. 111 ff.

Ib. Add to note (428): See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 with the increasing literature on the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Headlam at E. S. Thompson in *Class. Rev.* v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in *Revue Cr* 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. Joppe, p. 31 ff. and Busolt in *Philologus* L. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theramenes' oligarchical pamphlet 404 B.C.: it was reconstructed from the *θεσμοὺς* of Draco, upon inferences to Theramenes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that Draco's laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished πολ. c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco's work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato *Axiochus* 365 E: *ώς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κοντοῦ ή Κλεισθένους πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σε κακὸν ἦν*.

P. 324, line 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head *Hist. Num.* p. 372 states plainly that federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual discussions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Asia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 330. To note (8) of p. 329 add after *σύνηθες*: This evidence is disputed. Mr F. B. Jevons *Kin and Custom* in *Journal of Philol.* XVI. 1887 p. 104. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry

Spartans and Celts respectively, the 'Joint Undivided Family' having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 5. To note (250) add: O. Apelt *Beitrag sur gr. Philosophie* (Leipzig 1891) p. 382 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamas [Hegesidas apud Suidam].

P. 336, note 1. Add a reference to the excellent article by C. v. Holzinger *Aristoteles' u. Herakleides' Iakonische u. kretische Politen* in *Philologus* LII. p. 56 ff.

P. 337, line 18. See *Addenda* to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. 'Oxen' would appear to be meant by καρπάκοδα, 'cattle') ('sheep.'

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Carthaginian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Πολιτείαι and the Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. cr. et exeg.* III. p. iii f.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens* the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question: see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1275 a 10. To note (435) add: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 59 § 6, καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰ πόλεις οὗτοι κυροῦσι, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ συμβόλων εἰσάγουσι, where οὗτοι =οἱ θεσμοθέται.

P. 356. Comm. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Schömann *Attische Process* ed. Lipsius pp. 994—1006, *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) II. 734 ff. Also Roberts *Int. to Greek Epigraphy* I. p. 355. In the absence of σύμβολα the only right was the right of reprisals, συλλήν; cp. συλλην διδόναι κατά των, Dem. *adv. Lacritum* XXXV § 26 p. 931, 21.

Ib. 1275 a 15. ἐγγεγραμμένους. Comp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42 § 1.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. οὐκ ἔξεστι] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down 'Αθ. πολ. c. 62 s. f. δρχειν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον δρχάς ἔξεστι πλεονάκις, τῶν δ' ἀλλων οὐδεμίαν τὴν βουλεῦσαι διτ. Comp. c. 31 § 3, and *Politics* 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. At Acragas and Melite σύγκλητος was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: Swoboda *Die griechischen Volksbeschlüsse* p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] See below, *Addenda* to p. 379. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42, μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες δοτῶν.

P. 361. 1275 b 30. ἀπλοῦν] Comp. Plato *Politic.* 306 C πέτερον οὐτως ἀπλοῖν ἔστι τοῦτο, η παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔχει διαφοράν.

P. 362. 1276 a 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. XVII, following Niemeyer in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891, p. 412 ff. With the changes indicated in the *Addenda* to *Critical Notes* the passage runs thus: ἀποροῦσι γάρ τις πόθ' η πόλις ἐπράξει καὶ τότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οἷον θαν ἐξ διλιγαρχίας η τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τότε γάρ οὐτε τὰ συμβόλαια ένιοι βούλονται διαλένειν, οὐδὲ οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβίντος, οὐτ' ἀλλὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὖσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινή συμφέρων)· εἶτε οὖν [καὶ] δημοκρατοῦνται τινες τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οἷοις τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς διλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος; "Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny: some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by

the tyrant, and would decline many other such
the basis of certain forms of government is superior
suppose now men to be somewhere living under
state just as responsible for the acts of this govern-
the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 τοῦτον τὸν
διληπχίας ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. Th
have been put in the reverse way: is the state
deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts
them? But Aristotle's inexactness in such matter
the ταῦτα bracketed above, as if the question were
more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the
to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent
*Grammatik d. a. Insch.*³ p. 25 n. 1; Christ preface
series) p. xv, who cites the variants in the MSS. The whole question of orthography is complicated
(1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions.
been content to reproduce faithfully the best man-
rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non per-
sed suadente Stapfero ad Meisterhansi grammaticam
semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc se-
μέχρι, γήγενεθαι, γηγενώσκειν, πλέον et forsitan e
parativorum species in ovs et u desinentes semper
Studien zu Aris. v. I. Seele (Landshut 1890) p. 7 ff.
Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the matter
the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retention
(θαλάσση 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1327 a 16, πράσσων 1
v. Wilamowitz, *op. c. I.* 319, sees in Aristotle's Gre-

P. 366. *Tō note (467)—comp. n. (455)* p.
c. 39 s. f. (τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀ ἔδανεσαντο εἰς τὸν
and c. 40 § 3 (ἄλλα καὶ τὰ χρήματα Δακεδαιμονίου
Ελαύση, ἀπέδοσαν κοινῆ, κελενουσῶν τῶν συνθηκῶν
now informs us that there was a special clause
reconciliation (διαλόσεις) agreed upon between the two
justice that in the 'Αθ. πολ. the notice of the repayment
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστιθέασιν τῶν
καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνάδαστον ποιοῦσιν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. *Tō note (470) add:* Mr
Δημήθρον as the predicate with εἰναι.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εὖθις cp. Aristoph. *Cit*
τυπουρουρί έπλαττεν ένδον οἰκιας.

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. *Mid.* p. 53.
κορυφαῖοι and a ἡγεμόνιον κορυφαῖοι.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. *Tō note (490) add:* A tra-
xi. 29 ἐν τῷ γράφειν καὶ ἀναγνώσκειν οὐ πρότερον ἀ
of the Spartan military system is thus brought out
γάρ...ἀρχοντες ἀρχόντων εἰσι.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ sc. διπορεῖται

P. 377. 1278 a 14. With φανὲν cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c

P. 379. 1278 a 30. We owe to Mr Wyse the proper antithesis to γυῆσος πολίτης, viz. νόθος πολίτης: see *Scholia in Euripidem* ed. Schwartz I. *Orest.* 903 καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργεῖον οὐκ Ἀργεῖον ἦν [see the line] εἰς τούτον βλέπει [sc. Κλεοφῶτα]. θέλει γάρ εἰπεῖν Ἀθηναῖον οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον ὅντα αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ νόθον πολίτην παρόντα Θρᾶς ἦν δὲ Κλεοφῶν. Again in *Schol.* on l. 904.

Ib. 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρῶται = thus apply the law.

Ib. 1278 a 32. παραιροῦνται = (virtually) disfranchise: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 6.

Ib. 1278 a 34. Add to note (516): By 'Αθ. πολ. c. 26 § 4 this famous law of Pericles is assigned to the year 451/0 ἐπὶ Ἀυτιδέτου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, Περικλέους εἰπόντος, ἔγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἀν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῦ δαστοῦν ὡς γεγονώς. An error in the date is not so serious as to have maintained (with Duncker, Schenkl, Buermann and at one time Busolt) that no such law could have been proposed by Pericles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see c. 42 § 1 cited in *Addenda* to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. Add a reference to the reverse process at Byzantium according to *Oecon.* II. 2 § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. ὅντος δὲ ὄμοιοι αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι πολίτην διὰ μὴ ἐξ δαστοῦ ἀμφοτέρων ὡς χρημάτων δεηθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν ἐξ ἑνὸς ὄντα δαστοῦ καταβαλόντα μᾶς τρίδικοντα εἶναι πολίτην.

P. 381. 1278 b 20. Comp. *Eud. Eth.* 124 a 6, and note in Susemihl's ed.

Ib. 1278 b 22. See p. 457 n. (4). Add to the note on 1278 b 23: Dubito. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. Demosth. *De Corona* § 254, p. 312, 2 τὸ ἐπιβαλλον ἐφ' ἡμᾶς μέρος: but it may well be that δοον agrees with μέρος, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 269 b 9 ff. who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with *Pol. IV* (VII). 1. 10, 1323 b 21 and after adding 'inde explicandum videtur 1260 a 41' proceeds to the unmistakeable usage δοαν ἐπιβαλλη...ἢ σκέψις 1266 a 25.

P. 382. 1278 b 27. ἀν μὴ κτλ.=unless existence is overweighted with ['exceeds too much in'] the evils of life.

P. 385. 1279 a 26. Add a reference to n. (523).

P. 386. Comm. left col. line 32. For "409 (or 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. 9. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's *Protagoras* (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. ἀλευθερός] Free birth; the abstract noun answering to ἀλευθέρος = free born. See Newman I. p. 248 n. 1. Compare 1281 a 6 ἀλευθερίαν καὶ γένος, 1283 a 33 οἱ δὲ ἀλευθέροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἔγγος ἀλλήλων, 1290 b 9 ff. οἱ ἀλευθέροι διλγοὶ ὄντες πλειστοί [καὶ μὴ ἀλευθέρων] ἀρχωτοί; lastly, the *locus classicus* which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἀλευθέρος = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato *Comicus Hyperbolus* 3, 4 for ἀλευθέρος)(ξέρος, and refers to Diog. Laer. VI. 1 and VI. 4 for Antisthenes.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (II. 145) understands this differently: "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With βούλευεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν cf. 1274 a 15 ff. and reff. there.

P. 402. 1282 a 21. Mr Newman cites *Phys.* II. 2. 9, 194 a 36: δύο δὴ αἱ ἀρχονται τῆς θλῆς καὶ αἱ γυναῖκονται τέχναι, ἥ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς παιγνικῆς ἥ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ. The ship-captain, representing ἥ χρωμένη, ποῖν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου γυναῖκει καὶ ἐπιτάσσει.

Ib. 1282 a 22. Mr Wyse calls attention to the poetic colour of the δαιτυμάν (1338 a 30) and θύεη (1324 b 39) in this line; with which η τυμαλφέν, 1336 b 19.

Ib. 1282 a 28. The plural δῆμοι in 1294 a 13, 1310 b 21, 1320 a 4, 132 'Αθ. πολ. c. 40 § 3, Thuc. III. 82. 1, VIII. 65. 1.

Ib. 1282 a 31. ταμείουσι] Add to note (576): Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 4 § 2 (Dra constitution), c. 8 § 1 (Solon's): σημεῖος δ' ὅτι κληρωτὰς ἐποίησεν ἐκ τῶν τιμῆς περὶ τῶν ταμείων νόμος, φ' χρώμενος διατελοῦσι ἔτι καὶ νῦν· κελεύει γάρ κληροὶ ταμεῖας ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμνων, c. 47 § 1 ἐκ πεντηκοσιομεδίμνων κατὰ τὸν Σ νόμον (ἔτι γάρ i.e. circa 329 B.C. δ νόμος κύριος).

P. 410. 1283 b 5. ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις] Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 35 § 2 τὸ αναμφισβήτητον τὴν πολιτείαν.

Ib. 1283 b 14. Mr Wyse compares 1281 a 9, οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀν τοῦτος.

P. 415. Comm. left col. line 24. Add: The recent additions to our knowledge enable us to arrive at the following provisional results respecting Aristotle's judgment upon Ostracism. Having been wholly disused in the fourth century the institution had become the subject of antiquarian research. Two theories about its origin appeal, with something like confidence, to facts in their favour: (1) the view of the text, 1284 a 17 ff. and of VIII(v). 3. 3, 1302 b 15—18, which agrees with Diod. Plut. V. Themist. c. 22, Arist. 7, Nic. 11, Alcib. 13 (cp. Nepos Them. 8, Cim evidently the view of Ephorus and Theopompus, i.e. of the school of Isoc) (2) the view expressed by Philochorus, Fr. 79 b (cited in n. 603), which is also in Androton, Fr. 5 (quoted by Harpocrate s.v. Hipparchus). Both explanations appear in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22, the writer showing himself here as elsewhere well acquainted with the latest researches of historians and Atticographi.

Ib. line 39. The extract is preceded by an account of the procedure in case of ostracism: προχειροτονεῖ μὲν ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ή πρυτανεῖας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ δοτι εἰσφέρειν ὅτε δὲ δοκεῖ, ἐφράσσετο σαρῖαις ή ἀγορᾷ καὶ κατελείποτο εἰσοδοι δέκα, εἰσιόντες κατὰ φυλὰς ἑτέσσαν τὰ ὄστρακα, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφήν. ἐπεστάτι οἱ τε ἐννέα δρχούτες καὶ η βουλή διαριθμηθέντω δὲ ὅτῳ πλείστα γένοιτο καὶ μὴ ἐξακοσιάλιων, τοῦτο ἔδει τὰ δίκαια δόντα καὶ λαβόντα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάδι δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστήνα τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα (ὕστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πέντε) καρποὶ τὰ ἁυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐντὸς Γεραστοῦ Εὐβολας ἀκρωτηρίου· μόνος δὲ κτλ.

Ib. After note (603) add: Compare now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 22 § 1 ἐν οἷς [sc. η ἐτέθη καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ νόμος seemingly about 507 B.C. § 3 δαλιτόντι μετὰ τὴν νίκην [Marathon], θαρροῦντος ἥδη τοῦ δῆμου, τῷτε πρώτον ἐχρήσαστο τῷ τῷ περὶ τὸν ὀστρακισμόν, οὐ ἐτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσι Πειστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὃν τύραννος κατέστη' § 4 καὶ τὸ ὀστρακισθή τῶν ἑκείνου συγγενῶν Ἰππαρχος Χάρμου Κολλυτεύς, δι' οὐ καὶ μᾶλι τὸν νόμον ἐθηκεν δὲ Κλεισθένης, ἐξελάσσαι βουλόμενος αὐτὸν. εἰδὼς δὲ τῷ οὐ έτει [i.e. 487/6 B.C.]... ὀστρακισθή Μεγαλῆς Ἰπποκράτους Ἀλωπεκῆθεν [a perh Cleisthenes], ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν ἔτη τρία τὸν τύραννων φίλους ὀστράκιζεν, ὡς χι νόμος ἐτέθη, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῷ τετάρτῳ ἔτει [probably 485/4 B.C.] καὶ τῶν διλλα τοῖς δοκοὶ μετίσων εἶναι μεθίστατο· καὶ πρώτος ὀστρακισθή τῶν ἀπωθεῶν τῆς τίδος Ξάνθιππος δὲ Ἀρίφρονος. Unquestionably the motives assigned, (1) jealousy preeminence (Eph. Theopomp.) and (2) fear of a restoration of Hippias (And are inferences from the persons ostracized. The fragment of Androton in II creation runs thus: ἀλλος δὲ ἔστιν Ἰππαρχος δ Χάρμου, ὡς φησι Λυκοῦργος ἐν τῷ

Λεωκράτους' περὶ δὲ τούτου Ἀνδροίων ἐν τῷ β' φησὶν ὅτι συγγενῆς μὲν ἦν Πεισιστράτου τοῦ τυράννου καὶ πρῶτος ἵψωστρακίσθη τοῦ περὶ τὸν διπρακισμὸν νόμου τότε πρῶτον τεθέντος διὰ τὴν ἴποψίλαν τῶν περὶ Ηειστρατον, ὅτι δημαγωγὸς ὁν καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐτυράννησεν. The coincidence of language is unmistakeable, cp. VIII(v). 5. 6, 1305 a 7.

P. 417. To note (609) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 24 § 2: τοῖς συμμάχοις δεσποτικῶτερως ἔχωντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμιῶν τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἐνώπιον τὰς τε πολιτειὰς παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχειν ὡν ἐτυχον ἀρχοντες. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in *Class. Rev.* v. 162.

P. 423. 1285 a 16. Add: Busolt *Die Lakedaimonier* p. 141 ff. compares the *Tageia* in Thessaly, the *βασιλεῖα* of Arcadia (which is also a *στρατηγία*), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Germans.

P. 424. 1285 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meisterhans *Grammatik*² p. 23 n. (132) the true spelling is *Μοτιληραιοί*.

P. 426. 1285 b 14. Cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 24 § 3 ἀρχαὶ δ' ἐνδημοι μὲν... ὑπερέροις δέ.

Ib. 1285 b 15. παρίσταντο] In 'Αθ. πολ. c. 3 § 3 the word is παραχωρεῖν.

Ib. 1285 b 16. Add to note (619): For βασιλέων at Athens cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 3 § 2 ἐπικατέστη ἡ πολεμαρχία διὰ τὸ γενέθλιον τιθέσθαι τῶν βασιλέων μαλακούς. But as to the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer *Golden Bough* I. 44 ff., 118 ff., 158—165, 217—235, an epoch-making work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1286 a 3. Add: This is the distinction between τάξις and θεσμός in Dion. Halicar. *Ant. Rom.* v. 167 A.

P. 431. 1287 a 38. In 'Αθ. πολ. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάριν happens to occur.

P. 434. 1286 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2; after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἀκάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεισάγκειν δὲ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψυφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ δῆμος ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν. καὶ γάρ αἱ τῆς βασιλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληγίσθωσιν) the writer continues καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦντι ποιεῖν ὄρθως· εὐδιαφθοράτεροι γάρ <οἱ> διλγοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσιν καὶ κέρδειν καὶ χάρισιν.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out insert anyhow i.e.

P. 439. 1287 a 6. Comp. for this sense of διοικεῖσθαι, 1331 b 9: also 1330 a 7 for διοικεῖν τὴν δῆλην οἰκίαν, and 'Αθ. πολ. c. 24 s.l. ἀπασι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοικησης (maintenance) ἦν.

P. 442. 1287 b 19. περιληφθῆναι] In 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 περιλαβεῖν.

P. 454. Add to Excursus II.: See further remarks on the date of Pittacus, in reply to Beloch, by Toeppfer in *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 5. See Corrigenda. Delete the sentence: Again, one might... πολιτεῖα.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Susemihl in *Quaest. crit. et exeget.* II. (1893) and *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1893, p. 817 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in *Classical Review* VII. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Susemihl admits that 1272 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant διωστῶν by διωστεῖα in the next line, and accordingly

returns to δυνατῶν Π², and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts Ἐθεσι Π¹ in 1 ηθεσι Π²) or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposite (which may account for Prof. Susemihl's surrender of 1256 b 1 κομίζονται, 1 μεταβολικῆς, 1258 b 7 νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος in *Quæst. II.* p. IV. although he still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Ne omission to count 15 passages on the side of Π², for which see *Class. R.* p. 306 n. 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing statements in their latest form.

Let us start with Book I. where "Π¹ is certainly wrong 15 times" (text line 40) : deduct *three* of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall back the uncertain class, and add *seven*, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 12 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7 : this the total of errors in Π¹ to 19. But again, in B. I. "Π¹ is right 24 times" (text line 3 from below) : this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enum. Of these *five* are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from c them : viz. 1252 b 28 (*ηδη*), 1256 b 8 (*θερμότητη*), 1258 b 40 (*Χαρηγρίδη*), 1259 b 1260 a 37 (*ἅπα*), but he adds *five* in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 125 1260 a 26, a 31 : the total remaining 23. Thus in B. I. the problem works favour of Π¹ by 23 : 19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants c as right readings for Π¹ on the ground that words are omitted, and that this besetting sin of Π¹: these five omissions are 1252 a 9 (*εἰσατ*), b 20 (*σινηλθορ*), 33 (δ), 1257 b 7 (*εἰσατ*), 1260 a 31 (δ). If these five claims were struck out balance in favour of Π¹ would be destroyed.

In B. II. the alleged superiority claimed for Π¹ is still disputed. Mr Ne accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of Π² in no less 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of Π¹ over Π² 69 : 40 to 67 : 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extra cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl's figures for Book II. are thus explained. "I changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32) : deduc these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 127 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, b 8, b 9, b 14 : the new total of the errors of Π¹ is 48. Again of the 69 passed as right readings for Π¹ (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to *nine*, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 2 place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 (*καὶ*), b 5, 1264 b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35 : the total would thus remain : but on reflexion he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. as *five*, but only *two* (or three at most). This brings out the final result for I Π¹=67 (or 68 at most), Π²=48.

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35 transfers *nine* others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of Π²: 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by Π¹, together

165 b 11, 1267 a 35, b 26, 1269 b 6, 1271 a 20): the remaining 23 he leaves doubtful, though strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for II². Thus II¹ falls with him from 67 to 35: and II² rises by the addition to the 48 (which Susemihl really admits) of seven other variants, which Susemihl regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 21, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 32, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total or II²=55. Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Susemihl reckons for II¹ and Newman for II² and we get the result, II²=64, II¹=35.

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tyrrell's opinion as expressed in 1888, *Hermathena* Vol. vi. No. 14, p. 335. "The course taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, ποικωρέν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου. Bekker having completely neglected P¹ and Γ, Susemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and now Busse and Dittenberger"—may we not add Newman?—"seem to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."

P. 517. 1330 a 14. After note (835) add: Comp. Plato *Critias* 112 B: φκεῖτο δὲ sc. prehistoric Attica] τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν, ὥπ' αὐτὰ τὰ πλάγια αὐτῆς, ὡπό τῶν δημουρῶν ταῦτα γεωργῶν δύοι πλησίοι ἐγεώργων· τὰ δὲ ἐπάνω τὸ μάχιμον αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν μόνον γένος τερπὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς Ἡφαιστου τε λερὸν κατῳκήσειν, οἷον μᾶς οἰκλας κῆπον ἐν τερπὶδι τροστεριβεβλημένοι. τὰ γάρ πρὸς βορρᾶν αὐτῆς ὄψιν οἰκλας κοινὰς καὶ ἑνσύστια γεμμερινὰ κατασκευασθέμενοι (Wyse).

Ib. 1330 a 15. Ινα...ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τότων πάντες μετέχωσιν] No one can fail to notice the striking similarity between this sentence and the following in the account of Cleisthenes' local tribes: διτις ἀκάστη μετέχει πάντων τῶν τότων, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 21 § 4.

P. 520. 1330 b 11. For μὴ παρέργως see now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5 τοὺς μὴ παρέργως ἵποφαινομένους.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and III. 3. 2, 1276 a 14 ff.

P. 525. 1333 a 2. After οὐτε γάρ. add: Comp. Nic. Eth. v. 1. 5, 1129 a 19 τέταρτη γάρ η εὐεξία and X. 7. 2, 1177 a 21 (where Bywater brackets τε).

P. 539. 1333 b 12. With διεφήναντο comp. the passage cited in *Addenda* to p. 520 above, from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. To note (915) add: Comp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 23 § 4.

P. 541. 1334 a 5. Compare the parallel phrase of *Μεταφ.* I. 2. 11, 982 b 22, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸ συμβεβηκός.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. *Crito* 50 D etc. and Dem. *De Corona* § 205 (οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ μητρὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πατρίδι).

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